Как правильно пишется китайская народная республика

«People’s Republic of China» redirects here. For the Republic of China, see Taiwan.

People’s Republic of China

中华人民共和国 (Chinese)
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó (Pinyin)

Flag of China

Flag

National Emblem of China

National Emblem

Anthem: 
义勇军进行曲
Yìyǒngjūn Jìnxíngqǔ
«March of the Volunteers»
Territory controlled by the People's Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Territory controlled by the People’s Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Capital Beijing
39°55′N 116°23′E / 39.917°N 116.383°E
Largest city
by population
Shanghai
Official languages Standard Chinese[a]
Recognized regional languages
  • Mongolian
  • Uyghur
  • Tibetan
  • Zhuang
  • Others
Official script Simplified Chinese[b]
Ethnic groups

(2020)[1]

  • 91.1% Han Chinese
  • 8.9% Others
Religion

(2020)[2]

  • 74.5% No religion / Folk
  • 18.3% Buddhism
  • 5.2% Christianity
  • 1.6% Islam
  • 0.4% Others
Demonym(s) Chinese
Government Unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic

• CCP General Secretary[c]
President[d]
CMC Chairman[e]

Xi Jinping

• Premier

Li Keqiang

• Congress Chairman

Li Zhanshu

• CPPCC Chairman[f]

Wang Yang
Legislature National People’s Congress
Formation

• First pre-imperial dynasty

c. 2070 BCE

• First imperial dynasty

221 BCE

• Republic established

1 January 1912

• Proclamation of the People’s Republic

1 October 1949

• First constitution

20 September 1954

• Current constitution

4 December 1982

• Most recent polity admitted

20 December 1999
Area

• Total

9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi)[g][5] (3rd / 4th)

• Water (%)

2.8[h]
Population

• 2022 estimate

1,410,539,758[7] (1st)

• 2020 census

Neutral increase 1,411,778,724[8] (1st)

• Density

145[9]/km2 (375.5/sq mi) (83rd)
GDP (PPP) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $30.074 trillion[10] (1st)

• Per capita

Increase $21,291[10] (72nd)
GDP (nominal) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $18.321 trillion[i][10] (2nd)

• Per capita

Increase $12,970[10] (65th)
Gini (2019) Positive decrease 38.2[11]
medium
HDI (2021) Increase 0.768[12]
high · 79th
Currency Renminbi (元/¥)[j] (CNY)
Time zone UTC+8 (CST)
DST is not observed
Date format
  • yyyy-mm-dd
  • or yyyymd
  • (CE; Chinese calendar)
Driving side right (Mainland)
left (Hong Kong and Macau)
Calling code +86 (Mainland)
+852 (Hong Kong)
+853 (Macau)
ISO 3166 code CN
Internet TLD
  • .cn
  • .中国
  • .中國 (Mainland)
  • .hk
  • .香港 (Hong Kong)
  • .mo
  • .澳门
  • .澳門 (Macau)

China (Chinese: 中国; pinyin: Zhōngguó), officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC),[k] is a country in East Asia. It is the world’s most populous country, with a population exceeding 1.4 billion, slightly ahead of India. China spans the equivalent of five time zones and borders fourteen countries by land,[l] the most of any country in the world, tied with Russia. Covering an area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometres (3,700,000 sq mi), it is the world’s third largest country by total land area.[m] The country consists of 22 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The national capital is Beijing, and the most populous city and financial center is Shanghai.

Modern Chinese trace their origins to a cradle of civilization in the fertile basin of the Yellow River in the North China Plain. The semi-legendary Xia dynasty in the 21st century BCE and the well-attested Shang and Zhou dynasties developed a bureaucratic political system to serve hereditary monarchies, or dynasties. Chinese writing, Chinese classic literature, and the Hundred Schools of Thought emerged during this period and influenced China and its neighbors for centuries to come. In the third century BCE, Qin’s wars of unification created the first Chinese empire, the short-lived Qin dynasty. The Qin was followed by the more stable Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), which established a model for nearly two millennia in which the Chinese empire was one of the world’s foremost economic powers. The empire expanded, fractured and re-unified, was conquered and reestablished, absorbed foreign religions and ideas, and made world-leading scientific advances, such as the Four Great Inventions: gunpowder, paper, the compass, and printing. After centuries of disunion following the fall of the Han, the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties reunified the empire. The multi-ethnic Tang welcomed foreign trade and culture that came over the Silk Road and adapted Buddhism to Chinese needs. The early modern Song dynasty (960–1279) became increasingly urban and commercial. The civilian scholar-official or literati used the examination system and the doctrines of Neo-Confucianism to replace the military aristocrats of earlier dynasties. The Mongol invasion established the Yuan dynasty in 1279, but the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) re-established Han Chinese control. The Manchu-led Qing dynasty nearly doubled the empire’s territory and established a multi-ethnic state that was the basis of the modern Chinese nation, but suffered heavy losses to foreign imperialism in the 19th century.

The Chinese monarchy collapsed in 1912 with the Xinhai Revolution, when the Republic of China (ROC) replaced the Qing dynasty. In its early years as a republic, the country underwent a period of instability known as the Warlord Era before mostly reunifying in 1928 under a Nationalist government. A civil war between the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began in 1927. Japan invaded China in 1937, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War and temporarily halting the civil war. The surrender and expulsion of Japanese forces from China in 1945 left a power vacuum in the country, which led to renewed fighting between the CCP and the Kuomintang. The civil war ended in 1949[o] with the division of Chinese territory; the CCP established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland while the Kuomintang-led ROC government retreated to the island of Taiwan.[p] Both claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, although the United Nations has recognized the PRC as the sole representation since 1971. From 1959 to 1961, the PRC implemented an economic and social campaign called the Great Leap Forward, that resulted in a sharp economic decline and an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths, mostly through man-made famine. From 1966 to 1976, the turbulent period of political and social chaos within China known as the Cultural Revolution led to greater economic and educational decline, with millions being purged or subjected to either persecution or politicide based on political categories. Since then, the Chinese government has rebuked some of the earlier Maoist policies, conducting a series of political and economic reforms since 1978, which has greatly raised Chinese standards of living, and increased life expectancies.

China is currently governed as a unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic by the CCP. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a founding member of several multilateral and regional cooperation organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the New Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the RCEP, and is a member of the BRICS, the G8+5, the G20, the APEC, and the East Asia Summit. It ranks among the lowest in measurements of democracy, civil liberties, government transparency, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and human rights of ethnic minorities. The Chinese authorities have been criticized by human rights activists and non-governmental organizations for human rights abuses, including political repression, mass censorship, mass surveillance of their citizens, and violent suppression of protest and dissent.

Making up around one-fifth of the world economy, China is the world’s largest economy by GDP by purchasing power parity, the second-largest economy by nominal GDP, and the second-wealthiest country. The country is one of the fastest growing major economies and is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter, as well as the second-largest importer. China is a recognized nuclear-weapon state with the world’s largest standing army by military personnel and second-largest defense budget. China is considered to be a potential superpower due to its large markets, high innovation, economic potential, growing military strength, and influence in international affairs.

Etymology

The word «China» has been used in English since the 16th century; however, it was not a word used by the Chinese themselves during this period. Its origin has been traced through Portuguese, Malay, and Persian back to the Sanskrit word Chīna, used in ancient India.[18] «China» appears in Richard Eden’s 1555 translation[q] of the 1516 journal of the Portuguese explorer Duarte Barbosa.[r][18] Barbosa’s usage was derived from Persian Chīn (چین), which was in turn derived from Sanskrit Cīna (चीन).[23] Cīna was first used in early Hindu scripture, including the Mahābhārata (5th century BCE) and the Laws of Manu (2nd century BCE).[24] In 1655, Martino Martini suggested that the word China is derived ultimately from the name of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).[25][24] Although usage in Indian sources precedes this dynasty, this derivation is still given in various sources.[26] The origin of the Sanskrit word is a matter of debate, according to the Oxford English Dictionary.[18] Alternative suggestions include the names for Yelang and the Jing or Chu state.[24][27]
The official name of the modern state is the «People’s Republic of China» (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó). The shorter form is «China» Zhōngguó (中国; 中國) from zhōng («central») and guó («state»),[s] a term which developed under the Western Zhou dynasty in reference to its royal demesne.[t][u] It was then applied to the area around Luoyi (present-day Luoyang) during the Eastern Zhou and then to China’s Central Plain before being used as an occasional synonym for the state under the Qing.[29] It was often used as a cultural concept to distinguish the Huaxia people from perceived «barbarians».[29] The name Zhongguo is also translated as «Middle Kingdom» in English.[32] China (PRC) is sometimes referred to as the Mainland when distinguishing the ROC from the PRC.[33][34][35][36]

History

Prehistory

10,000 years old pottery, Xianren Cave culture (18000–7000 BCE)

China is regarded as one of the world’s oldest civilisations.[37][38] Archaeological evidence suggests that early hominids inhabited the country 2.25 million years ago.[39] The hominid fossils of Peking Man, a Homo erectus who used fire,[40] were discovered in a cave at Zhoukoudian near Beijing; they have been dated to between 680,000 and 780,000 years ago.[41] The fossilized teeth of Homo sapiens (dated to 125,000–80,000 years ago) have been discovered in Fuyan Cave in Dao County, Hunan.[42] Chinese proto-writing existed in Jiahu around 6600 BCE,[43] at Damaidi around 6000 BCE,[44] Dadiwan from 5800 to 5400 BCE, and Banpo dating from the 5th millennium BCE. Some scholars have suggested that the Jiahu symbols (7th millennium BCE) constituted the earliest Chinese writing system.[43]

Early dynastic rule

According to Chinese tradition, the first dynasty was the Xia, which emerged around 2100 BCE.[45] The Xia dynasty marked the beginning of China’s political system based on hereditary monarchies, or dynasties, which lasted for a millennium.[46] The Xia dynasty was considered mythical by historians until scientific excavations found early Bronze Age sites at Erlitou, Henan in 1959.[47] It remains unclear whether these sites are the remains of the Xia dynasty or of another culture from the same period.[48] The succeeding Shang dynasty is the earliest to be confirmed by contemporary records.[49] The Shang ruled the plain of the Yellow River in eastern China from the 17th to the 11th century BCE.[50] Their oracle bone script (from c. 1500 BCE)[51][52] represents the oldest form of Chinese writing yet found[53] and is a direct ancestor of modern Chinese characters.[54]

The Shang was conquered by the Zhou, who ruled between the 11th and 5th centuries BCE, though centralized authority was slowly eroded by feudal warlords. Some principalities eventually emerged from the weakened Zhou, no longer fully obeyed the Zhou king, and continually waged war with each other during the 300-year Spring and Autumn period. By the time of the Warring States period of the 5th–3rd centuries BCE, there were only seven powerful states left.[55]

Imperial China

The Warring States period ended in 221 BCE after the state of Qin conquered the other six kingdoms, reunited China and established the dominant order of autocracy. King Zheng of Qin proclaimed himself the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty. He enacted Qin’s legalist reforms throughout China, notably the forced standardization of Chinese characters, measurements, road widths (i.e., the cart axles’ length), and currency. His dynasty also conquered the Yue tribes in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Vietnam.[56] The Qin dynasty lasted only fifteen years, falling soon after the First Emperor’s death, as his harsh authoritarian policies led to widespread rebellion.[57][58]

Following a widespread civil war during which the imperial library at Xianyang was burned,[v] the Han dynasty emerged to rule China between 206 BCE and CE 220, creating a cultural identity among its populace still remembered in the ethnonym of the Han Chinese.[57][58] The Han expanded the empire’s territory considerably, with military campaigns reaching Central Asia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Yunnan, and the recovery of Guangdong and northern Vietnam from Nanyue. Han involvement in Central Asia and Sogdia helped establish the land route of the Silk Road, replacing the earlier path over the Himalayas to India. Han China gradually became the largest economy of the ancient world.[60] Despite the Han’s initial decentralization and the official abandonment of the Qin philosophy of Legalism in favor of Confucianism, Qin’s legalist institutions and policies continued to be employed by the Han government and its successors.[61]

Map showing the expansion of Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC

After the end of the Han dynasty, a period of strife known as Three Kingdoms followed,[62] whose central figures were later immortalized in one of the Four Classics of Chinese literature. At its end, Wei was swiftly overthrown by the Jin dynasty. The Jin fell to civil war upon the ascension of a developmentally disabled emperor; the Five Barbarians then invaded and ruled northern China as the Sixteen States. The Xianbei unified them as the Northern Wei, whose Emperor Xiaowen reversed his predecessors’ apartheid policies and enforced a drastic sinification on his subjects, largely integrating them into Chinese culture. In the south, the general Liu Yu secured the abdication of the Jin in favor of the Liu Song. The various successors of these states became known as the Northern and Southern dynasties, with the two areas finally reunited by the Sui in 581. The Sui restored the Han to power through China, reformed its agriculture, economy and imperial examination system, constructed the Grand Canal, and patronized Buddhism. However, they fell quickly when their conscription for public works and a failed war in northern Korea provoked widespread unrest.[63][64]

Under the succeeding Tang and Song dynasties, Chinese economy, technology, and culture entered a golden age.[65] The Tang dynasty retained control of the Western Regions and the Silk Road,[66] which brought traders to as far as Mesopotamia and the Horn of Africa,[67] and made the capital Chang’an a cosmopolitan urban center. However, it was devastated and weakened by the An Lushan Rebellion in the 8th century.[68] In 907, the Tang disintegrated completely when the local military governors became ungovernable. The Song dynasty ended the separatist situation in 960, leading to a balance of power between the Song and Khitan Liao. The Song was the first government in world history to issue paper money and the first Chinese polity to establish a permanent standing navy which was supported by the developed shipbuilding industry along with the sea trade.[69]

Between the 10th and 11th centuries, the population of China doubled in size to around 100 million people, mostly because of the expansion of rice cultivation in central and southern China, and the production of abundant food surpluses. The Song dynasty also saw a revival of Confucianism, in response to the growth of Buddhism during the Tang,[70] and a flourishing of philosophy and the arts, as landscape art and porcelain were brought to new levels of maturity and complexity.[71][72] However, the military weakness of the Song army was observed by the Jurchen Jin dynasty. In 1127, Emperor Huizong of Song and the capital Bianjing were captured during the Jin–Song Wars. The remnants of the Song retreated to southern China.[73]

The Mongol conquest of China began in 1205 with the gradual conquest of Western Xia by Genghis Khan,[74] who also invaded Jin territories.[75] In 1271, the Mongol leader Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty, which conquered the last remnant of the Song dynasty in 1279. Before the Mongol invasion, the population of Song China was 120 million citizens; this was reduced to 60 million by the time of the census in 1300.[76] A peasant named Zhu Yuanzhang led a rebellion that overthrew the Yuan in 1368 and founded the Ming dynasty as the Hongwu Emperor. Under the Ming dynasty, China enjoyed another golden age, developing one of the strongest navies in the world and a rich and prosperous economy amid a flourishing of art and culture. It was during this period that admiral Zheng He led the Ming treasure voyages throughout the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as East Africa.[77]

In the early years of the Ming dynasty, China’s capital was moved from Nanjing to Beijing. With the budding of capitalism, philosophers such as Wang Yangming further critiqued and expanded Neo-Confucianism with concepts of individualism and equality of four occupations.[78] The scholar-official stratum became a supporting force of industry and commerce in the tax boycott movements, which, together with the famines and defense against Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) and Manchu invasions led to an exhausted treasury.[79] In 1644, Beijing was captured by a coalition of peasant rebel forces led by Li Zicheng. The Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide when the city fell. The Manchu Qing dynasty, then allied with Ming dynasty general Wu Sangui, overthrew Li’s short-lived Shun dynasty and subsequently seized control of Beijing, which became the new capital of the Qing dynasty.[80]

The Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1644 until 1912, was the last imperial dynasty of China. Its conquest of the Ming (1618–1683) cost 25 million lives and the economy of China shrank drastically.[81] After the Southern Ming ended, the further conquest of the Dzungar Khanate added Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang to the empire.[82] The centralized autocracy was strengthened to suppress anti-Qing sentiment with the policy of valuing agriculture and restraining commerce, the Haijin («sea ban»), and ideological control as represented by the literary inquisition, causing social and technological stagnation.[83][84]

Fall of the Qing dynasty

In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty experienced Western imperialism in the Opium Wars with Britain and France. China was forced to pay compensation, open treaty ports, allow extraterritoriality for foreign nationals, and cede Hong Kong to the British[85] under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the first of the Unequal Treaties. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) resulted in Qing China’s loss of influence in the Korean Peninsula, as well as the cession of Taiwan to Japan.[86]
The Qing dynasty also began experiencing internal unrest in which tens of millions of people died, especially in the White Lotus Rebellion, the failed Taiping Rebellion that ravaged southern China in the 1850s and 1860s and the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) in the northwest. The initial success of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s was frustrated by a series of military defeats in the 1880s and 1890s.[citation needed]

In the 19th century, the great Chinese diaspora began. Losses due to emigration were added to by conflicts and catastrophes such as the Northern Chinese Famine of 1876–1879, in which between 9 and 13 million people died.[87] The Guangxu Emperor drafted a reform plan in 1898 to establish a modern constitutional monarchy, but these plans were thwarted by the Empress Dowager Cixi. The ill-fated anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901 further weakened the dynasty. Although Cixi sponsored a program of reforms, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1912 brought an end to the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China.[88] Puyi, the last Emperor of China, abdicated in 1912.[89]

Establishment of the Republic and World War II

On 1 January 1912, the Republic of China was established, and Sun Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (the KMT or Nationalist Party) was proclaimed provisional president.[90] On 12 February 1912, regent Empress Dowager Longyu sealed the imperial abdication decree on behalf of 4 year old Puyi, the last emperor of China, ending 5,000 years of monarchy in China.[91] In March 1912, the presidency was given to Yuan Shikai, a former Qing general who in 1915 proclaimed himself Emperor of China. In the face of popular condemnation and opposition from his own Beiyang Army, he was forced to abdicate and re-establish the republic in 1916.[92]

After Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, China was politically fragmented. Its Beijing-based government was internationally recognized but virtually powerless; regional warlords controlled most of its territory.[93][94] In the late 1920s, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, the then Principal of the Republic of China Military Academy, was able to reunify the country under its own control with a series of deft military and political maneuverings, known collectively as the Northern Expedition.[95][96] The Kuomintang moved the nation’s capital to Nanjing and implemented «political tutelage», an intermediate stage of political development outlined in Sun Yat-sen’s San-min program for transforming China into a modern democratic state.[97][98] The political division in China made it difficult for Chiang to battle the communist-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA), against whom the Kuomintang had been warring since 1927 in the Chinese Civil War. This war continued successfully for the Kuomintang, especially after the PLA retreated in the Long March, until Japanese aggression and the 1936 Xi’an Incident forced Chiang to confront Imperial Japan.[99]

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), a theater of World War II, forced an uneasy alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Japanese forces committed numerous war atrocities against the civilian population; in all, as many as 20 million Chinese civilians died.[100] An estimated 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese were massacred in the city of Nanjing alone during the Japanese occupation.[101] During the war, China, along with the UK, the United States, and the Soviet Union, were referred to as «trusteeship of the powerful»[102] and were recognized as the Allied «Big Four» in the Declaration by United Nations.[103][104] Along with the other three great powers, China was one of the four major Allies of World War II, and was later considered one of the primary victors in the war.[105][106] After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Taiwan, including the Pescadores, was handed over to Chinese control. However, the validity of this handover is controversial, in that whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was legally transferred and whether China is a legitimate recipient, due to complex issues that arose from the handling of Japan’s surrender, resulting in the unresolved political status of Taiwan, which is a flashpoint of potential war between China and Taiwan. China emerged victorious but war-ravaged and financially drained. The continued distrust between the Kuomintang and the Communists led to the resumption of civil war. Constitutional rule was established in 1947, but because of the ongoing unrest, many provisions of the ROC constitution were never implemented in mainland China.[107]

Civil War and the People’s Republic

Before the existence of the People’s Republic, the CCP had declared several areas of the country as the Chinese Soviet Republic (Jiangxi Soviet), a predecessor state to the PRC, in November 1931 in Ruijin, Jiangxi. The Jiangxi Soviet was wiped out by the KMT armies in 1934 and was relocated to Yan’an in Shaanxi where the Long March concluded in 1935.[108][failed verification] It would be the base of the communists before major combat in the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949. Afterwards, the CCP took control of most of mainland China, and the Kuomintang retreating offshore to Taiwan, reducing its territory to only Taiwan, Hainan, and their surrounding islands.

On 1 October 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China at the new nation’s founding ceremony and inaugural military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.[109][110] In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army captured Hainan from the ROC[111] and annexed Tibet.[112] However, remaining Kuomintang forces continued to wage an insurgency in western China throughout the 1950s.[113]

The government consolidated its popularity among the peasants through land reform, which included the execution of between 1 and 2 million landlords.[114] China developed an independent industrial system and its own nuclear weapons.[115] The Chinese population increased from 550 million in 1950 to 900 million in 1974.[116] However, the Great Leap Forward, an idealistic massive reform project, resulted in an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths between 1959 and 1961, mostly from starvation.[117][118] In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, sparking a decade of political recrimination and social upheaval that lasted until Mao’s death in 1976. In October 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations, and took its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.[119] This UN action also created the problem of the political status of Taiwan and the Two Chinas issue. See Cross-Strait relations and «Taiwan, China».

Reforms and contemporary history

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was ended by a military-led massacre which brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.

After Mao’s death, the Gang of Four was quickly arrested by Hua Guofeng and held responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, and instituted significant economic reforms. The CCP loosened governmental control over citizens’ personal lives, and the communes were gradually disbanded in favor of working contracted to households. Agricultural collectivization was dismantled and farmlands privatized, while foreign trade became a major new focus, leading to the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were restructured and unprofitable ones were closed outright, resulting in massive job losses.[citation needed] This marked China’s transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an increasingly open-market environment.[120] China adopted its current constitution on 4 December 1982. In 1989, the suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.[121]

Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji led the nation in the 1990s. Under their administration, China’s economic performance pulled an estimated[by whom?] 150 million peasants out of poverty and sustained an average annual gross domestic product growth rate of 11.2%.[122][better source needed] British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, as the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions under the principle of One country, two systems. The country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and maintained its high rate of economic growth under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s leadership in the 2000s. However, the growth also severely impacted the country’s resources and environment,[123][124] and caused major social displacement.[125][126]

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has ruled since 2012 and has pursued large-scale efforts to reform China’s economy[127][128] (which has suffered from structural instabilities and slowing growth),[129][130][131] and has also reformed the one-child policy and penal system,[132] as well as instituting a vast anti-corruption crackdown.[133] In the early 2010s, China’s economic growth rate began to slow amid domestic credit troubles, weakening international demand for Chinese exports and fragility in the global economy.[134][135][136] In 2013, China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment project.[137] Since 2017, the Chinese government has been engaged in a harsh crackdown in Xinjiang, with an estimated one million people, mostly Uyghurs but including other ethnic and religious minorities, in internment camps.[138] The National People’s Congress in 2018 altered the country’s constitution to remove the two-term limit on holding the Presidency of China, permitting the current leader, Xi Jinping, to remain president of China (and general secretary of the CCP) for an unlimited time, earning criticism for creating dictatorial governance.[139][140] In 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) passed a national security law in Hong Kong that gave the Hong Kong government wide-ranging tools to crack down on dissent.[141]

The global COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan and was first identified from an outbreak in December 2019.[142] The Chinese government response has included a zero-COVID strategy, making it one of few countries to pursue this approach.[143] China was the only major economy in the world to grow in 2020, recording a 2.3% growth due to its success in containing the coronavirus within its borders.[144] The country’s economy continued to broaden recovery from the recession during the pandemic, with stable job creation and record international trade growth, although retail consumption was still slower than predicted.[145][146] These Zero-COVID strategies have led to a variety of protests across China against them starting in November 2022.

Geography

China topographic map with East Asia countries

China’s landscape is vast and diverse, ranging from the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts in the arid north to the subtropical forests in the wetter south. The Himalaya, Karakoram, Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges separate China from much of South and Central Asia. The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the third- and sixth-longest in the world, respectively, run from the Tibetan Plateau to the densely populated eastern seaboard. China’s coastline along the Pacific Ocean is 14,500 km (9,000 mi) long and is bounded by the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China seas. China connects through the Kazakh border to the Eurasian Steppe which has been an artery of communication between East and West since the Neolithic through the Steppe Route – the ancestor of the terrestrial Silk Road(s).[citation needed]

The territory of China lies between latitudes 18° and 54° N, and longitudes 73° and 135° E. The geographical center of China is marked by the Center of the Country Monument at 35°50′40.9″N 103°27′7.5″E / 35.844694°N 103.452083°E. China’s landscapes vary significantly across its vast territory. In the east, along the shores of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, there are extensive and densely populated alluvial plains, while on the edges of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the north, broad grasslands predominate. Southern China is dominated by hills and low mountain ranges, while the central-east hosts the deltas of China’s two major rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. Other major rivers include the Xi, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Amur. To the west sit major mountain ranges, most notably the Himalayas. High plateaus feature among the more arid landscapes of the north, such as the Taklamakan and the Gobi Desert. The world’s highest point, Mount Everest (8,848 m), lies on the Sino-Nepalese border.[147] The country’s lowest point, and the world’s third-lowest, is the dried lake bed of Ayding Lake (−154 m) in the Turpan Depression.[148]

Climate

China’s climate is mainly dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons, which lead to pronounced temperature differences between winter and summer. In the winter, northern winds coming from high-latitude areas are cold and dry; in summer, southern winds from coastal areas at lower latitudes are warm and moist.[150]

A major environmental issue in China is the continued expansion of its deserts, particularly the Gobi Desert.[151][152] Although barrier tree lines planted since the 1970s have reduced the frequency of sandstorms, prolonged drought and poor agricultural practices have resulted in dust storms plaguing northern China each spring, which then spread to other parts of East Asia, including Japan and Korea. China’s environmental watchdog, SEPA, stated in 2007 that China is losing 4,000 km2 (1,500 sq mi) per year to desertification.[153] Water quality, erosion, and pollution control have become important issues in China’s relations with other countries. Melting glaciers in the Himalayas could potentially lead to water shortages for hundreds of millions of people.[154] According to academics, in order to limit climate change in China to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) electricity generation from coal in China without carbon capture must be phased out by 2045.[155] Official government statistics about Chinese agricultural productivity are considered unreliable, due to exaggeration of production at subsidiary government levels.[156][157] Much of China has a climate very suitable for agriculture and the country has been the world’s largest producer of rice, wheat, tomatoes, eggplant, grapes, watermelon, spinach, and many other crops.[158]

Biodiversity

China is one of 17 megadiverse countries,[159] lying in two of the world’s major biogeographic realms: the Palearctic and the Indomalayan. By one measure, China has over 34,687 species of animals and vascular plants, making it the third-most biodiverse country in the world, after Brazil and Colombia.[160] The country signed the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity on 11 June 1992, and became a party to the convention on 5 January 1993.[161] It later produced a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, with one revision that was received by the convention on 21 September 2010.[162]

China is home to at least 551 species of mammals (the third-highest such number in the world),[163] 1,221 species of birds (eighth),[164] 424 species of reptiles (seventh)[165] and 333 species of amphibians (seventh).[166] Wildlife in China shares habitat with, and bears acute pressure from, the world’s largest population of humans. At least 840 animal species are threatened, vulnerable or in danger of local extinction in China, due mainly to human activity such as habitat destruction, pollution and poaching for food, fur and ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine.[167] Endangered wildlife is protected by law, and as of 2005, the country has over 2,349 nature reserves, covering a total area of 149.95 million hectares, 15 percent of China’s total land area.[168][better source needed] Most wild animals have been eliminated from the core agricultural regions of east and central China, but they have fared better in the mountainous south and west.[169][170] The Baiji was confirmed extinct on 12 December 2006.[171]

China has over 32,000 species of vascular plants,[172] and is home to a variety of forest types. Cold coniferous forests predominate in the north of the country, supporting animal species such as moose and Asian black bear, along with over 120 bird species.[173] The understory of moist conifer forests may contain thickets of bamboo. In higher montane stands of juniper and yew, the bamboo is replaced by rhododendrons. Subtropical forests, which are predominate in central and southern China, support a high density of plant species including numerous rare endemics. Tropical and seasonal rainforests, though confined to Yunnan and Hainan Island, contain a quarter of all the animal and plant species found in China.[173] China has over 10,000 recorded species of fungi,[174] and of them, nearly 6,000 are higher fungi.[175]

Environment

In the early 2000s, China has suffered from environmental deterioration and pollution due to its rapid pace of industrialization.[176][177] While regulations such as the 1979 Environmental Protection Law are fairly stringent, they are poorly enforced, as they are frequently disregarded by local communities and government officials in favor of rapid economic development.[178] China is the country with the second highest death toll because of air pollution, after India. There are approximately 1 million deaths caused by exposure to ambient air pollution.[179][180] Although China ranks as the highest CO2 emitting country in the world,[181] it only emits 8 tons of CO2 per capita, significantly lower than developed countries such as the United States (16.1), Australia (16.8) and South Korea (13.6).[182]

In recent years, China has clamped down on pollution. In March 2014, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping «declared war» on pollution during the opening of the National People’s Congress.[183] After extensive debate lasting nearly two years, the parliament approved a new environmental law in April. The new law empowers environmental enforcement agencies with great punitive power and large fines for offenders, defines areas which require extra protection, and gives independent environmental groups more ability to operate in the country.[citation needed] In 2020, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and go carbon-neutral by 2060 in accordance with the Paris climate accord.[184] According to Climate Action Tracker, if accomplished it would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 – 0.3 degrees – «the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker».[185] In September 2021 Xi Jinping announced that China will not build «coal-fired power projects abroad». The decision can be «pivotal» in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.[186]

The country also had significant water pollution problems: 8.2% of China’s rivers had been polluted by industrial and agricultural waste in 2019.[187][188] China had a 2018 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.14/10, ranking it 53rd globally out of 172 countries.[189] In 2020, a sweeping law was passed by the Chinese government to protect the ecology of the Yangtze River. The new laws include strengthening ecological protection rules for hydropower projects along the river, banning chemical plants within 1 kilometer of the river, relocating polluting industries, severely restricting sand mining as well as a complete fishing ban on all the natural waterways of the river, including all its major tributaries and lakes.[190]

China is also the world’s leading investor in renewable energy and its commercialization, with $52 billion invested in 2011 alone;[191][192][193] it is a major manufacturer of renewable energy technologies and invests heavily in local-scale renewable energy projects.[194][195][196] By 2015, over 24% of China’s energy was derived from renewable sources, while most notably from hydroelectric power: a total installed capacity of 197 GW makes China the largest hydroelectric power producer in the world.[197][198] China also has the largest power capacity of installed solar photovoltaics system and wind power system in the world.[199][200] Greenhouse gas emissions by China are the world’s largest,[182] as is renewable energy in China.[201] Despite its emphasis on renewables, China remains deeply connected to global oil markets and next to India, has been the largest importer of Russian crude oil in 2022.[202][203]

Political geography

Map showing the territorial claims of the PRC.

The People’s Republic of China is the second-largest country in the world by land area after Russia.[w][x] China’s total area is generally stated as being approximately 9,600,000 km2 (3,700,000 sq mi).[204] Specific area figures range from 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) according to the Encyclopædia Britannica,[205] to 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) according to the UN Demographic Yearbook,[3] and the CIA World Factbook.[6]

China has the longest combined land border in the world, measuring 22,117 km (13,743 mi) and its coastline covers approximately 14,500 km (9,000 mi) from the mouth of the Yalu River (Amnok River) to the Gulf of Tonkin.[6] China borders 14 nations and covers the bulk of East Asia, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in Southeast Asia; India, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan[y] in South Asia; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia; and Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea in Inner Asia and Northeast Asia. It is narrowly separated from Bangladesh and Thailand to the southwest and south, and has several maritime neighbors such as Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[206]

Politics

The Chinese constitution states that the People’s Republic of China «is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship that is led by the working class and based on an alliance of workers and peasants,» and that the state institutions «shall practice the principle of democratic centralism.»[207] The PRC is one of the world’s only socialist states governed by a communist party. The Chinese government has been variously described as communist and socialist, but also as authoritarian[208] and corporatist,[209] with amongst the heaviest restrictions worldwide in many areas, most notably against free access to the Internet, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to have children, free formation of social organizations and freedom of religion.[210]

Although the Chinese Communist Party describes China as a «socialist consultative democracy»,[211] the country is commonly described as an authoritarian one-party surveillance state and a dictatorship.[212][213] China has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an «authoritarian regime» by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, ranking at 148th out of 167 countries in 2021.[214] Its current political, ideological and economic system has been termed by its leaders as a «whole-process people’s democracy» «people’s democratic dictatorship», «socialism with Chinese characteristics» (which is Marxism adapted to Chinese circumstances) and the «socialist market economy» respectively.[215][216]

Political concerns in China include the growing gap between rich and poor and government corruption.[217] Nonetheless, the level of public support for the government and its management of the nation is high, with 80–95% of Chinese citizens expressing satisfaction with the central government, according to a 2011 Harvard University survey.[218] A 2020 survey from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research also had most Chinese expressing satisfaction with the government on information dissemination and delivery of daily necessities during the COVID-19 pandemic.[219][220]

Chinese Communist Party

The main body of the Chinese constitution declares that «the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).»[221] China is a one-party Marxist–Leninist state,[222] wherein the CCP general secretary (party leader) holds ultimate power and authority over state and government and serves as the informal paramount leader.[223] The current general secretary is Xi Jinping, who took office on 15 November 2012, and was re-elected on 25 October 2017.[224] According to the CCP constitution, its highest body is the National Congress held every five years.[225] The National Congress elects the Central Committee, who then elects the party’s Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee and general secretary, the top leadership of the country.[225] At the local level, the secretary of the CCP committee of a subdivision outranks the local government level; CCP committee secretary of a provincial division outranks the governor while the CCP committee secretary of a city outranks the mayor.[226]

Since both the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.[227] In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People’s Republic of China by reference to these «generations».

Generations of Chinese leadership

Generation Paramount Leader Start End Ideology
First Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
1949 1978 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1978 1989 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1989 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

Government

The nearly 3,000 member National People’s Congress (NPC) is constitutionally the «highest state organ of power»,[207] though it has been also described as a «rubber stamp» body.[228] The NPC meets annually, while the NPC Standing Committee, around 150 member body elected from NPC delegates, meets every couple of months.[228] In what China calls the «people’s congress system», local people’s congresses at the lowest level[z] are officially directly elected, with all the higher-level people’s congresses up to the NPC being elected by the level one below.[207] However, the elections are not pluralistic, with nominations at all levels being controlled by the CCP.[229] The NPC is dominated by the CCP, with another eight minor parties having nominal representation in the condition of upholding CCP leadership.[230]

The president is the ceremonial head of state, elected by the NPC. The incumbent president is Xi Jinping, who is also the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him China’s paramount leader. The premier is the head of government, with Li Keqiang being the incumbent premier. The premier is officially nominated by the president and then elected by the NPC, and has generally been either the second or third-ranking member of the PSC. The premier presides over the State Council, China’s cabinet, composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.[207] The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a political advisory body that is critical in China’s «united front» system, which aims to gather non-CCP voices to support the CCP. Similar to the people’s congresses, CPPCC’s exist at various division, with the National Committee of the CPPCC being chaired by Wang Yang, one of China’s top leaders.[231]

A Harvard University survey published in July 2020 found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China’s government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey’s history.[232]

Administrative divisions

The People’s Republic of China is constitutionally a unitary state officially divided into 23 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions (each with a designated minority group), and four municipalities—collectively referred to as «mainland China»—as well as the special administrative regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau.[233] The PRC considers Taiwan to be its 23rd province,[234] although it is governed by the Republic of China (ROC), which claims to be the legitimate representative of China and its territory, though it has downplayed this claim since its democratization.[235] Geographically, all 31 provincial divisions of mainland China can be grouped into six regions: North China, Northeast China, East China, South Central China, Southwest China, and Northwest China.[236]

China administrative claimed included.svg

About this image

Provinces () Claimed Province
  • Anhui (安徽省)
  • Fujian (福建省)
  • Gansu (甘肃省)
  • Guangdong (广东省)
  • Guizhou (贵州省)
  • Hainan (海南省)
  • Hebei (河北省)
  • Heilongjiang (黑龙江省)
  • Henan (河南省)
  • Hubei (湖北省)
  • Hunan (湖南省)
  • Jiangsu (江苏省)
  • Jiangxi (江西省)
  • Jilin (吉林省)
  • Liaoning (辽宁省)
  • Qinghai (青海省)
  • Shaanxi (陕西省)
  • Shandong (山东省)
  • Shanxi (山西省)
  • Sichuan (四川省)
  • Yunnan (云南省)
  • Zhejiang (浙江省)
  • Taiwan (台湾省), governed by the Republic of China
Autonomous regions (自治区) Municipalities (直辖市) Special administrative regions (特别行政区)
  • Guangxi (广西壮族自治区)
  • Inner Mongolia / Nei Menggu (内蒙古自治区)
  • Ningxia (宁夏回族自治区)
  • Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区)
  • Tibet / Xizang (西藏自治区)
  • Beijing (北京市)
  • Chongqing (重庆市)
  • Shanghai (上海市)
  • Tianjin (天津市)
  • Hong Kong / Xianggang (香港特别行政区)
  • Macau / Aomen (澳门特别行政区)

Foreign relations

Diplomatic relations of China

The PRC has diplomatic relations with 175 countries and maintains embassies in 162. In 2019, China had the largest diplomatic network in the world.[237][238] Its legitimacy is disputed by the Republic of China and a few other countries; it is thus the largest and most populous state with limited recognition, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.[239] In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.[240] China was also a former member and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and still considers itself an advocate for developing countries.[241] Along with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, China is a member of the BRICS group of emerging major economies and hosted the group’s third official summit at Sanya, Hainan in April 2011.[242]

Under the One-China principle, Beijing has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to Taiwan and severs official ties with the government of the Republic of China.[citation needed] Chinese officials have protested on numerous occasions when foreign countries have made diplomatic overtures to Taiwan,[243] especially in the matter of armament sales.[244]

Much of current Chinese foreign policy is reportedly based on Premier Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and is also driven by the concept of «harmony without uniformity», which encourages diplomatic relations between states despite ideological differences.[245] This policy may have led China to support states that are regarded as dangerous or repressive by Western nations, such as Zimbabwe, North Korea and Iran.[246] China has a close economic and military relationship with Russia,[247] and the two states often vote in unison in the United Nations Security Council.[248][249][250]

Trade relations

China became the world’s largest trading nation in 2013 as measured by the sum of imports and exports, as well as the world’s largest commodity importer. comprising roughly 45% of maritime’s dry-bulk market.[251][252]
By 2016, China was the largest trading partner of 124 other countries.[253] China is the largest trading partner for the ASEAN nations, with a total trade value of $345.8 billion in 2015 accounting for 15.2% of ASEAN’s total trade.[254] ASEAN is also China’s largest trading partner.[255] In 2020, China became the largest trading partner of the European Union for goods, with the total value of goods trade reaching nearly $700 billion.[256] China, along with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free-trade area covering 30% of the world’s population and economic output.[257] China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 2004, it proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues.[258] The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005.[259]

China has had a long and complex trade relationship with the United States. In 2000, the United States Congress approved «permanent normal trade relations» (PNTR) with China, allowing Chinese exports in at the same low tariffs as goods from most other countries.[260] China has a significant trade surplus with the United States, its most important export market.[261] Economists have argued that the renminbi is undervalued, due to currency intervention from the Chinese government, giving China an unfair trade advantage.[262] In August 2019, the United States Department of the Treasury designated China as a «currency manipulator»,[263] later reversing the decision in January 2020.[264] The US and other foreign governments have also alleged that China doesn’t respect intellectual property (IP) rights and steals IP through espionage operations,[265][266] with the US Department of Justice saying that 80% of all the prosecutions related to economic espionage it brings were about conduct to benefit the Chinese state.[267]

Since the turn of the century, China has followed a policy of engaging with African nations for trade and bilateral co-operation;[268][269][270] in 2019, Sino-African trade totalled $208 billion, having grown 20 times over two decades.[271] According to Madison Condon «China finances more infrastructure projects in Africa than the World Bank and provides billions of dollars in low-interest loans to the continent’s emerging economies.»[272] China maintains extensive and highly diversified trade links with the European Union.[256] China has furthermore strengthened its trade ties with major South American economies,[273] and is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and several others.[274]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded significantly over the last six years and, as of April 2020, includes 138 countries and 30 international organizations. In addition to intensifying foreign policy relations, the focus here is particularly on building efficient transport routes. The focus is particularly on the maritime Silk Road with its connections to East Africa and Europe and there are Chinese investments or related declarations of intent at numerous ports such as Gwadar, Kuantan, Hambantota, Piraeus and Trieste. However many of these loans made under the Belt and Road program are unsustainable and China has faced a number of calls for debt relief from debtor nations.[275][276]

Territorial disputes

Taiwan

Map depicting territorial disputes between the PRC and neighboring states. For a larger map, see here.

Ever since its establishment after the Chinese Civil War, the PRC has claimed the territories governed by the Republic of China (ROC), a separate political entity today commonly known as Taiwan, as a part of its territory. It regards the island of Taiwan as its Taiwan Province, Kinmen and Matsu as a part of Fujian Province and islands the ROC controls in the South China Sea as a part of Hainan Province and Guangdong Province. These claims are controversial because of the complicated Cross-Strait relations, with the PRC treating the One-China Principle as one of its most important diplomatic principles.[277][better source needed]

Land border disputes

China has resolved its land borders with 12 out of 14 neighboring countries, having pursued substantial compromises in most of them.[278][279][280] As of 2022, China currently has a disputed land border with India and Bhutan.[citation needed]

Maritime border disputes

China is additionally involved in maritime disputes with multiple countries over the ownership of several small islands in the East and South China Seas, such as Socotra Rock, the Senkaku Islands and the entirety of South China Sea Islands,[281][282] along with the EEZ disputes over East China Sea.

Sociopolitical issues and human rights

China uses a massive espionage network of cameras, facial recognition software, sensors, and surveillance of personal technology as a means of social control of persons living in the country.[283] The Chinese democracy movement, social activists, and some members of the CCP[who?] believe in the need for social and political reform. While economic and social controls have been significantly relaxed in China since the 1970s, political freedom is still tightly restricted. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that the «fundamental rights» of citizens include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, and property rights. However, in practice, these provisions do not afford significant protection against criminal prosecution by the state.[284][285] Although some criticisms of government policies and the ruling CCP are tolerated, censorship of political speech and information, most notably on the Internet,[286][287] are routinely used to prevent collective action.[288]

A number of foreign governments, foreign press agencies, and non-governmental organizations have criticized China’s human rights record, alleging widespread civil rights violations such as detention without trial, forced abortions,[289] forced confessions, torture, restrictions of fundamental rights,[210][290] and excessive use of the death penalty.[291][292] The government suppresses popular protests and demonstrations that it considers a potential threat to «social stability», as was the case with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[293]

China is regularly accused of large-scale repression and human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang,[295][296][297] including violent police crackdowns and religious suppression.[298][299] In Xinjiang, At least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic and religion minorities have been detained in internment camps, officially termed «Vocational Education and Training Centers», aimed at changing the political thinking of detainees, their identities, and their religious beliefs.[138] According to the U.S. Department of State, actions including political indoctrination, torture, physical and psychological abuse, forced sterilization, sexual abuse, and forced labor are common in these facilities.[300] The state has also sought to control offshore reporting of tensions in Xinjiang, intimidating foreign-based reporters by detaining their family members.[301] According to a 2020 report, China’s treatment of Uyghurs meets the UN definition of genocide,[302] and several groups called for a UN investigation.[303] Several countries have recognized China’s actions in Xinjiang as a genocide.[304][294][305]

Global studies from Pew Research Center in 2014 and 2017 ranked the Chinese government’s restrictions on religion as among the highest in the world, despite low to moderate rankings for religious-related social hostilities in the country.[306][307] The Global Slavery Index estimated that in 2016 more than 3.8 million people were living in «conditions of modern slavery», or 0.25% of the population, including victims of human trafficking, forced labor, forced marriage, child labor, and state-imposed forced labor. The state-imposed forced system was formally abolished in 2013, but it is not clear to which extent its various practices have stopped.[308] The Chinese penal system includes labor prison factories, detention centers, and re-education camps, collectively known as laogai («reform through labor»). The Laogai Research Foundation in the United States estimated that there were over a thousand slave labor prisons and camps in China.[309]

In 2019, a study called for the mass retraction of more than 400 scientific papers on organ transplantation, because of fears the organs were obtained unethically from Chinese prisoners. While the government says 10,000 transplants occur each year, a report by the Falun Gong-linked IETAC alleged that between 60,000 and 100,000 organs are transplanted each year and claimed that this gap was being made up by executed prisoners of conscience.[310]

Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is considered one of the world’s most powerful militaries and has rapidly modernized in the recent decades.[311] It consists of the Ground Force (PLAGF), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAAF), the Rocket Force (PLARF) and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Its nearly 2.2 million active duty personnel is the largest in the world. The PLA holds the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons,[312][313] and the world’s second-largest navy by tonnage.[314] China’s official military budget for 2022 totalled US$230 billion (1.45 trillion Yuan), the second-largest in the world. According to SIPRI estimates, its military spending from 2012 to 2021 averaged US$215 billion per year or 1.7 per cent of GDP, behind only the United States at US$734 billion per year or 3.6 per cent of GDP.[315] The PLA is commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the party and the state; though officially two separate organizations, the two CMCs have identical membership except during leadership transition periods and effectively function as one organization. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the officeholder also generally being the CCP general secretary, making them the paramount leader of China.[316]

Economy

A proportional representation of Chinese exports, 2019

China has the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP,[318] and the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).[319] As of 2021, China accounts for around 18% of the world economy by GDP nominal.[320] China is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies,[321] with its economic growth having been consistently above 6% since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978.[322] According to the World Bank, China’s GDP grew from $150 billion in 1978 to $17.73 trillion by 2021.[323] Of the world’s 500 largest companies, 145 are headquartered in China.[324]

China had one of the largest economies in the world for most of the past two thousand years,[325] during which it has seen cycles of prosperity and decline.[326][327] Since economic reforms began in 1978, China has developed into a highly diversified economy and one of the most consequential players in international trade. Major sectors of competitive strength include manufacturing, retail, mining, steel, textiles, automobiles, energy generation, green energy, banking, electronics, telecommunications, real estate, e-commerce, and tourism. China has three out of the ten largest stock exchanges in the world[328]—Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen—that together have a market capitalization of over $15.9 trillion, as of October 2020.[329] China has four (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shenzhen) out of the world’s top ten most competitive financial centers, which is more than any country in the 2020 Global Financial Centres Index.[330] By 2035, China’s four cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) are projected to be among the global top ten largest cities by nominal GDP according to a report by Oxford Economics.[331]

Modern-day China is considered an example of state capitalism or party-state capitalism.[332][333] The state dominates in strategic «pillar» sectors such as energy production and heavy industries, but private enterprise has expanded enormously, with around 30 million private businesses recorded in 2008.[334][335][336] In 2018, private enterprises in China accounted for 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 90% of new jobs.[337][better source needed]

China has been the world’s No. 1 manufacturer since 2010, after overtaking the US, which had been No. 1 for the previous hundred years.[338][339] China has also been No. 2 in high-tech manufacturing since 2012, according to US National Science Foundation.[340] China is the second largest retail market in the world, next to the United States.[341] China leads the world in e-commerce, accounting for 40% of the global market share in 2016[342] and more than 50% of the global market share in 2019.[343] China is the world’s leader in electric vehicles, manufacturing and buying half of all the plug-in electric cars (BEV and PHEV) in the world in 2018.[344] China is also the leading producer of batteries for electric vehicles as well as several key raw materials for batteries.[345] China had 174 GW of installed solar capacity by the end of 2018, which amounts to more than 40% of the global solar capacity.[346][347]

Wealth

China accounted for 17.9% of the world’s total wealth in 2021, second highest in the world after the US.[348] It ranks at 65th at GDP (nominal) per capita, making it an upper-middle income country.[349] China brought more people out of extreme poverty than any other country in history[350][351]—between 1978 and 2018, China reduced extreme poverty by 800 million. China reduced the extreme poverty rate—per international standard, it refers to an income of less than $1.90/day—from 88% in 1981 to 1.85% by 2013.[352] The portion of people in China living below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day (2011 PPP) fell to 0.3% in 2018 from 66.3% in 1990. Using the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 per day, the portion fell to 2.9% in 2018 from 90.0% in 1990. Using the upper-middle income poverty line of $5.50 per day, the portion fell to 17.0% from 98.3% in 1990.[353]

From 1978 to 2018, the average standard of living multiplied by a factor of twenty-six.[354] Wages in China have grown a lot in the last 40 years—real (inflation-adjusted) wages grew seven-fold from 1978 to 2007.[355] Per capita incomes have risen significantly – when the PRC was founded in 1949, per capita income in China was one-fifth of the world average; per capita incomes now equal the world average itself.[354] China’s development is highly uneven. Its major cities and coastal areas are far more prosperous compared to rural and interior regions.[356] It has a high level of economic inequality,[357] which has increased in the past few decades.[358] In 2018 China’s Gini coefficient was 0.467, according to the World Bank.[11]

As of 2020, China was second in the world, after the US, in total number of billionaires and total number of millionaires, with 698 Chinese billionaires and 4.4 million millionaires.[359] In 2019, China overtook the US as the home to the highest number of people who have a net personal wealth of at least $110,000, according to the global wealth report by Credit Suisse.[360][361] According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2020, China is home to five of the world’s top ten cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 10th spots, respectively) by the highest number of billionaires, which is more than any other country.[362] China had 85 female billionaires as of January 2021, two-thirds of the global total, and minted 24 new female billionaires in 2020.[363] China has had the world’s largest middle-class population since 2015,[364] and the middle-class grew to a size of 400 million by 2018.[365]

China in the global economy

China’s nominal GDP trend from 1952 to 2015

Share of world GDP (PPP)[366]
Year Share
1980 2.25%
1990 3.99%
2000 7.24%
2010 13.62%
2020 18.18%

China is a member of the WTO and is the world’s largest trading power, with a total international trade value of US$4.62 trillion in 2018.[367] China is the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods.[368] Its foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.1 trillion as of 2019,[369] making its reserves by far the world’s largest.[370][371] In 2012, China was the world’s largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting $253 billion.[372] In 2014, China’s foreign exchange remittances were $US64 billion making it the second largest recipient of remittances in the world.[373] China also invests abroad, with a total outward FDI of $62.4 billion in 2012,[372] and a number of major takeovers of foreign firms by Chinese companies.[374] China is a major owner of US public debt, holding trillions of dollars worth of U.S. Treasury bonds.[375][376] China’s undervalued exchange rate has caused friction with other major economies,[377] and it has also been widely criticized for manufacturing large quantities of counterfeit goods.[378][379]

Largest economies by nominal GDP in 2022[380]

Following the 2007–08 financial crisis, Chinese authorities sought to actively wean off of its dependence on the U.S. dollar as a result of perceived weaknesses of the international monetary system.[381] To achieve those ends, China took a series of actions to further the internationalization of the Renminbi. In 2008, China established the dim sum bond market and expanded the Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project, which helps establish pools of offshore RMB liquidity.[382][383] This was followed with bilateral agreements to settle trades directly in renminbi with Russia,[384] Japan,[385] Australia,[386] Singapore,[387] the United Kingdom,[388] and Canada.[389] As a result of the rapid internationalization of the renminbi, it became the eighth-most-traded currency in the world by 2018, an emerging international reserve currency,[390] and a component of the IMF’s special drawing rights; however, partly due to capital controls that make the renminbi fall short of being a fully convertible currency, it remains far behind the Euro, Dollar and Japanese Yen in international trade volumes.[391] As of 2022, Yuan is the world’s fifth-most traded currency.[392]

Science and technology

Historical

Earliest known written formula for gunpowder, from the Wujing Zongyao of 1044 CE

China was a world leader in science and technology until the Ming dynasty.[393] Ancient Chinese discoveries and inventions, such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions), became widespread across East Asia, the Middle East and later Europe. Chinese mathematicians were the first to use negative numbers.[394][395] By the 17th century, the Western hemisphere surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement.[396] The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars.[397]

After repeated military defeats by the European colonial powers and Japan in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communists came to power in 1949, efforts were made to organize science and technology based on the model of the Soviet Union, in which scientific research was part of central planning.[398] After Mao’s death in 1976, science and technology were promoted as one of the Four Modernizations,[399] and the Soviet-inspired academic system was gradually reformed.[400]

Modern era

Headquarters of Tencent in Shenzhen, one of the largest technology and entertainment companies in the world.[401]

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has made significant investments in scientific research[402] and is quickly catching up with the US in R&D spending.[403][404] China officially spent around 2.4% of its GDP on R&D in 2020, totaling to around $377.8 billion.[405] According to the World Intellectual Property Indicators, China received more applications than the US did in 2018 and 2019 and ranked first globally in patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, and creative goods exports in 2021.[406][407][408] It was ranked 11th in the Global Innovation Index in 2022, a considerable improvement from its rank of 35th in 2013.[409][410][411][412] Chinese supercomputers became the fastest in the world on a few occasions.[413] However, China has also struggled with developing several technologies domestically, such as the most advanced semiconductors and reliable jet engines.[414][415]

China is developing its education system with an emphasis on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).[416] It became the world’s largest publisher of scientific papers in 2016.[417][418][419] Chinese-born academicians have won prestigious prizes in the sciences and in mathematics, although most of them had conducted their winning research in Western nations.[aa][improper synthesis?]

Space program

The Chinese space program started in 1958 with some technology transfers from the Soviet Union. However, it did not launch the nation’s first satellite until 1970 with the Dong Fang Hong I, which made China the fifth country to do so independently.[426] In 2003, China became the third country in the world to independently send humans into space with Yang Liwei’s spaceflight aboard Shenzhou 5. as of 2022, sixteen Chinese nationals have journeyed into space, including two women. In 2011, China launched its first space station testbed, Tiangong-1.[427] In 2013, a Chinese robotic rover Yutu successfully touched down on the lunar surface as part of the Chang’e 3 mission.[428] In 2019, China became the first country to land a probe—Chang’e 4—on the far side of the Moon.[429] In 2020, Chang’e 5 successfully returned moon samples to the Earth, making China the third country to do so independently after the United States and the Soviet Union.[430] In 2021, China became the second nation in history to independently land a rover (Zhurong) on Mars, after the United States.[431] China completed its own modular space station, the Tiangong, in low Earth orbit on 3 November 2022.[432][433][434] On 29 November 2022, China performed its first in-orbit crew handover aboard the Tiangong.[435][436]

Infrastructure

After a decades-long infrastructural boom,[437] China has produced numerous world-leading infrastructural projects: China has the world’s largest bullet train network,[438] the most supertall skyscrapers in the world,[439] the world’s largest power plant (the Three Gorges Dam),[440] the largest energy generation capacity in the world,[441] a global satellite navigation system with the largest number of satellites in the world,[442] and has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a large global infrastructure building initiative with funding on the order of $50–100 billion per year.[443] The Belt and Road Initiative could be one of the largest development plans in modern history.[444]

Telecommunications

China is the largest telecom market in the world and currently has the largest number of active cellphones of any country in the world, with over 1.5 billion subscribers, as of 2018.[445][better source needed] It also has the world’s largest number of internet and broadband users, with over 800 million Internet users as of 2018—equivalent to around 60% of its population—and almost all of them being mobile as well.[446] By 2018, China had more than 1 billion 4G users, accounting for 40% of world’s total.[447] China is making rapid advances in 5G—by late 2018, China had started large-scale and commercial 5G trials.[448]

China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, are the three large providers of mobile and internet in China. China Telecom alone served more than 145 million broadband subscribers and 300 million mobile users; China Unicom had about 300 million subscribers; and China Mobile, the largest of them all, had 925 million users, as of 2018.[449] Combined, the three operators had over 3.4 million 4G base-stations in China.[450] Several Chinese telecommunications companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE, have been accused of spying for the Chinese military.[451]

China has developed its own satellite navigation system, dubbed Beidou, which began offering commercial navigation services across Asia in 2012[452] as well as global services by the end of 2018.[453][454] Upon the completion of the 35th Beidou satellite, which was launched into orbit on 23 June 2020, Beidou followed GPS and GLONASS as the third completed global navigation satellite in the world.[455]

Transport

Since the late 1990s, China’s national road network has been significantly expanded through the creation of a network of national highways and expressways. In 2018, China’s highways had reached a total length of 142,500 km (88,500 mi), making it the longest highway system in the world.[456][better source needed] China has the world’s largest market for automobiles, having surpassed the United States in both auto sales and production. A side-effect of the rapid growth of China’s road network has been a significant rise in traffic accidents,[457] though the number of fatalities in traffic accidents fell by 20% from 2007 to 2017.[458][better source needed] In urban areas, bicycles remain a common mode of transport, despite the increasing prevalence of automobiles – as of 2012, there are approximately 470 million bicycles in China.[459]

China’s railways, which are state-owned, are among the busiest in the world, handling a quarter of the world’s rail traffic volume on only 6 percent of the world’s tracks in 2006.[460][better source needed] As of 2017, the country had 127,000 km (78,914 mi) of railways, the second longest network in the world.[461] The railways strain to meet enormous demand particularly during the Chinese New Year holiday, when the world’s largest annual human migration takes place.[462]

China’s high-speed rail (HSR) system started construction in the early 2000s. By the end of 2020, high speed rail in China had reached 37,900 kilometers (23,550 miles) of dedicated lines alone, making it the longest HSR network in the world.[463][464] Services on the Beijing–Shanghai, Beijing–Tianjin, and Chengdu–Chongqing Lines reach up to 350 km/h (217 mph), making them the fastest conventional high speed railway services in the world. With an annual ridership of over 2.29 billion passengers in 2019 it is the world’s busiest.[465][better source needed] The network includes the Beijing–Guangzhou–Shenzhen High-Speed Railway, the single longest HSR line in the world, and the Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway, which has three of longest railroad bridges in the world.[466] The Shanghai Maglev Train, which reaches 431 km/h (268 mph), is the fastest commercial train service in the world.[467]

Since 2000, the growth of rapid transit systems in Chinese cities has accelerated.[468] As of January 2021, 44 Chinese cities have urban mass transit systems in operation[469] and 39 more have metro systems approved.[470] As of 2020, China boasts the five longest metro systems in the world with the networks in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenzhen being the largest.

There were approximately 229 airports in 2017, with around 240 planned by 2020. China has over 2,000 river and seaports, about 130 of which are open to foreign shipping.[471] In 2017, the Ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Tianjin ranked in the Top 10 in the world in container traffic and cargo tonnage.[472]

Water supply and sanitation

Water supply and sanitation infrastructure in China is facing challenges such as rapid urbanization, as well as water scarcity, contamination, and pollution.[473] According to data presented by the Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO and UNICEF in 2015, about 36% of the rural population in China still did not have access to improved sanitation.[474] The ongoing South–North Water Transfer Project intends to abate water shortage in the north.[475]

Demographics

A 2009 population density map of the People’s Republic of China, with territories not under its control in blue. The eastern coastal provinces are much more densely populated than the western interior.

The national census of 2020 recorded the population of the People’s Republic of China as approximately 1,411,778,724. According to the 2020 census, about 17.95% of the population were 14 years old or younger, 63.35% were between 15 and 59 years old, and 18.7% were over 60 years old.[8] The population growth rate for 2013 is estimated to be 0.46%.[476] China used to make up much of the world’s poor; now it makes up much of the world’s middle-class.[477] Although a middle-income country by Western standards, China’s rapid growth has pulled hundreds of millions—800 million, to be more precise[478]—of its people out of poverty since 1978. By 2013, less than 2% of the Chinese population lived below the international poverty line of US$1.9 per day, down from 88% in 1981.[352] From 2009 to 2018, the unemployment rate in China has averaged about 4%.[479]

Given concerns about population growth, China implemented a two-child limit during the 1970s, and, in 1979, began to advocate for an even stricter limit of one child per family. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, given the unpopularity of the strict limits, China began to allow some major exemptions, particularly in rural areas, resulting in what was actually a «1.5»-child policy from the mid-1980s to 2015 (ethnic minorities were also exempt from one child limits). The next major loosening of the policy was enacted in December 2013, allowing families to have two children if one parent is an only child.[480] In 2016, the one-child policy was replaced in favor of a two-child policy.[481] A three-child policy was announced on 31 May 2021, due to population aging,[482] and in July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[483] According to data from the 2020 census, China’s total fertility rate is 1.3, but some experts believe that after adjusting for the transient effects of the relaxation of restrictions, the country’s actual total fertility rate is as low as 1.1.[484]

According to one group of scholars, one-child limits had little effect on population growth[485] or the size of the total population.[486] However, these scholars have been challenged. Their own counterfactual model of fertility decline without such restrictions implies that China averted more than 500 million births between 1970 and 2015, a number which may reach one billion by 2060 given all the lost descendants of births averted during the era of fertility restrictions, with one-child restrictions accounting for the great bulk of that reduction.[487] The policy, along with traditional preference for boys, may have contributed to an imbalance in the sex ratio at birth.[488][489] According to the 2010 census, the sex ratio at birth was 118.06 boys for every 100 girls,[490] which is beyond the normal range of around 105 boys for every 100 girls.[491] The 2010 census found that males accounted for 51.27 percent of the total population.[490] However, China’s sex ratio is more balanced than it was in 1953, when males accounted for 51.82 percent of the total population.[490]

Ethnic groups

Ethnolinguistic map of China

China legally recognizes 56 distinct ethnic groups, who altogether comprise the Zhonghua Minzu. The largest of these nationalities are the ethnic Chinese or «Han», who constitute more than 90% of the total
population.[492] The Han Chinese – the world’s largest single ethnic group[493] – outnumber other ethnic groups in every provincial-level division except Tibet and Xinjiang.[494] Ethnic minorities account for less than 10% of the population of China, according to the 2010 census.[492] Compared with the 2000 population census, the Han population increased by 66,537,177 persons, or 5.74%, while the population of the 55 national minorities combined increased by 7,362,627 persons, or 6.92%.[492] The 2010 census recorded a total of 593,832 foreign nationals living in China. The largest such groups were from South Korea (120,750), the
United States (71,493) and Japan (66,159).[495]

Languages

There are as many as 292 living languages in China.[496] The languages most commonly spoken belong to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, which contains Mandarin (spoken by 70% of the population),[497] and other varieties of Chinese language: Yue (including Cantonese and Taishanese), Wu (including Shanghainese and Suzhounese), Min (including Fuzhounese, Hokkien and Teochew), Xiang, Gan and Hakka. Languages of the Tibeto-Burman branch, including Tibetan, Qiang, Naxi and Yi, are spoken across the Tibetan and Yunnan–Guizhou Plateau. Other ethnic minority languages in southwest China include Zhuang, Thai, Dong and Sui of the Tai-Kadai family, Miao and Yao of the Hmong–Mien family, and Wa of the Austroasiatic family. Across northeastern and northwestern China, local ethnic groups speak Altaic languages including Manchu, Mongolian and several Turkic languages: Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar and Western Yugur. Korean is spoken natively along the border with North Korea. Sarikoli, the language of Tajiks in western Xinjiang, is an Indo-European language. Taiwanese aborigines, including a small population on the mainland, speak Austronesian languages.[498]

Standard Mandarin, a variety of Mandarin based on the Beijing dialect, is the official national language of China and is used as a lingua franca in the country between people of different linguistic backgrounds.[499][500] Mongolian, Uyghur, Tibetan, Zhuang and various other languages are also regionally recognized throughout the country.[501]

Chinese characters have been used as the written script for the Sinitic languages for thousands of years. They allow speakers of mutually unintelligible Chinese varieties to communicate with each other through writing. In 1956, the government introduced simplified characters, which have supplanted the older traditional characters in mainland China. Chinese characters are romanized using the Pinyin system. Tibetan uses an alphabet based on an Indic script. Uyghur is most commonly written in Persian alphabet-based Uyghur Arabic alphabet. The Mongolian script used in China and the Manchu script are both derived from the Old Uyghur alphabet. Zhuang uses both an official Latin alphabet script and a traditional Chinese character script.[citation needed]

Urbanization

China has urbanized significantly in recent decades. The percent of the country’s population living in urban areas increased from 20% in 1980 to over 60% in 2019.[502][503][504] It is estimated that China’s urban population will reach one billion by 2030, potentially equivalent to one-eighth of the world population.[503][504]

China has over 160 cities with a population of over one million,[505] including the 17 megacities as of 2021[506][507] (cities with a population of over 10 million) of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xi’an, Suzhou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Hangzhou, Linyi, Shijiazhuang, Dongguan, Qingdao and Changsha.[508] Among them, the total permanent population of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu is above 20 million.[509] Shanghai is China’s most populous urban area[510][511] while Chongqing is its largest city proper, the only city in China with the largest permanent population of over 30 million.[512] By 2025, it is estimated that the country will be home to 221 cities with over a million inhabitants.[503] The figures in the table below are from the 2017 census,[513] and are only estimates of the urban populations within administrative city limits; a different ranking exists when considering the total municipal populations (which includes suburban and rural populations). The large «floating populations» of migrant workers make conducting censuses in urban areas difficult;[514] the figures below include only long-term residents.[citation needed]

  • v
  • t
  • e

Largest cities or municipalities in the People’s Republic of China

China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2020 Urban Population and Urban Temporary Population [515][note 1][note 2]

Rank Name Province Pop. Rank Name Province Pop.
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing
Beijing
1 Shanghai SH 24,281,400 11 Hong Kong HK 7,448,900 Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Shenzhen
Shenzhen
2 Beijing BJ 19,164,000 12 Zhengzhou HA 7,179,400
3 Guangzhou GD 13,858,700 13 Nanjing JS 6,823,500
4 Shenzhen GD 13,438,800 14 Xi’an SN 6,642,100
5 Tianjin TJ 11,744,400 15 Jinan SD 6,409,600
6 Chongqing CQ 11,488,000 16 Shenyang LN 5,900,000
7 Dongguan GD 9,752,500 17 Qingdao SD 5,501,400
8 Chengdu SC 8,875,600 18 Harbin HL 5,054,500
9 Wuhan HB 8,652,900 19 Hefei AH 4,750,100
10 Hangzhou ZJ 8,109,000 20 Changchun JL 4,730,900
  1. ^ Population of Hong Kong as of 2018 estimate.[516]
  2. ^ The data of Chongqing in the list is the data of «Metropolitan Developed Economic Area», which contains two parts: «City Proper» and «Metropolitan Area». The «City proper» are consist of 9 districts: Yuzhong, Dadukou, Jiangbei, Shapingba, Jiulongpo, Nan’an, Beibei, Yubei, & Banan, has the urban population of 5,646,300 as of 2018. And the «Metropolitan Area» are consist of 12 districts: Fuling, Changshou, Jiangjin, Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Qijiang, Dazu, Bishan, Tongliang, Tongnan, & Rongchang, has the urban population of 5,841,700.[517] Total urban population of all 26 districts of Chongqing are up to 15,076,600.

Education

Since 1986, compulsory education in China comprises primary and junior secondary school, which together last for nine years.[520] In 2021, about 91.4 percent of students continued their education at a three-year senior secondary school.[521] The Gaokao, China’s national university entrance exam, is a prerequisite for entrance into most higher education institutions. In 2010, 24 percent of secondary school graduates were enrolled in higher education.[522] This number increased significantly over the last decades, reaching a tertiary school enrolment of 58.42 percent in 2020.[523] Vocational education is available to students at the secondary and tertiary level.[524] More than 10 million Chinese students graduated from vocational colleges nationwide every year.[525]

China has the largest education system in the world, with about 282 million students and 17.32 million full-time teachers in over 530,000 schools.[526] In February 2006, the government pledged to provide completely free nine-year education, including textbooks and fees.[527] Annual education investment went from less than US$50 billion in 2003 to more than US$817 billion in 2020.[528][529] However, there remains an inequality in education spending. In 2010, the annual education expenditure per secondary school student in Beijing totalled ¥20,023, while in Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in China, only totalled ¥3,204.[530] Free compulsory education in China consists of primary school and junior secondary school between the ages of 6 and 15. In 2020, the graduation enrollment ratio at compulsory education level reached 95.2 percent, exceeding average levels recorded in high-income countries,[526] and around 91.2% of Chinese have received secondary education.[524]

China’s literacy rate has grown dramatically, from only 20% in 1949 and 65.5% in 1979.[531] to 97% of the population over age 15 in 2018.[532] In the same year, China (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) was ranked the highest in the world in the Programme for International Student Assessment ranking for all three categories of Mathematics, Science and Reading.[533]

As of 2021, China has over 3,000 universities, with over 44.3 million students enrolled in mainland China and 240 million Chinese citizens have received high education, making China the largest higher education system in the world.[534][535][536] As of 2021, China had the world’s second-highest number of top universities (the highest in Asia & Oceania region).[537] Currently, China trails only the United States in terms of representation on lists of top 200 universities according to the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).[538] China is home to the two of the highest ranking universities (Tsinghua University and Peking University) in Asia and emerging economies according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings.[539] As of 2022, two universities in Mainland China rank in the world’s top 15, with Peking University (12th) and Tsinghua University (14th) and three other universities ranking in the world’s top 50, namely Fudan, Zhejiang, and Shanghai Jiao Tong according to the QS World University Rankings.[540] These universities are members of the C9 League, an alliance of elite Chinese universities offering comprehensive and leading education.[541]

Health

The National Health and Family Planning Commission, together with its counterparts in the local commissions, oversees the health needs of the Chinese population.[542] An emphasis on public health and preventive medicine has characterized Chinese health policy since the early 1950s. At that time, the Communist Party started the Patriotic Health Campaign, which was aimed at improving sanitation and hygiene, as well as treating and preventing several diseases. Diseases such as cholera, typhoid and scarlet fever, which were previously rife in China, were nearly eradicated by the campaign.[citation needed]

After Deng Xiaoping began instituting economic reforms in 1978, the health of the Chinese public improved rapidly because of better nutrition, although many of the free public health services provided in the countryside disappeared along with the People’s Communes. Healthcare in China became mostly privatized, and experienced a significant rise in quality. In 2009, the government began a 3-year large-scale healthcare provision initiative worth US$124 billion.[543] By 2011, the campaign resulted in 95% of China’s population having basic health insurance coverage.[544] In 2011, China was estimated to be the world’s third-largest supplier of pharmaceuticals, but its population has suffered from the development and distribution of counterfeit medications.[545]

As of 2017, the average life expectancy at birth in China is 76 years,[546] and the infant mortality rate is 7 per thousand.[547] Both have improved significantly since the 1950s.[ab] Rates of stunting, a condition caused by malnutrition, have declined from 33.1% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2010.[550] Despite significant improvements in health and the construction of advanced medical facilities, China has several emerging public health problems, such as respiratory illnesses caused by widespread air pollution,[551] hundreds of millions of cigarette smokers,[552] and an increase in obesity among urban youths.[553][554] China’s large population and densely populated cities have led to serious disease outbreaks in recent years, such as the 2003 outbreak of SARS, although this has since been largely contained.[555] In 2010, air pollution caused 1.2 million premature deaths in China.[556]

The COVID-19 pandemic was first identified in Wuhan in December 2019.[557][558] Further studies are being carried out around the world on a possible origin for the virus.[559][560] The Chinese government has been criticized for its handling of the epidemic and accused of concealing the extent of the outbreak before it became an international pandemic.[561]

Religion

The government of the People’s Republic of China officially espouses state atheism,[566] and has conducted antireligious campaigns to this end.[567] Religious affairs and issues in the country are overseen by the State Administration for Religious Affairs.[568] Freedom of religion is guaranteed by China’s constitution, although religious organizations that lack official approval can be subject to state persecution.[290][569]

Over the millennia, Chinese civilization has been influenced by various religious movements. The «three teachings», including Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Chinese Buddhism), historically have a significant role in shaping Chinese culture,[570][571] enriching a theological and spiritual framework which harks back to the early Shang and Zhou dynasty. Chinese popular or folk religion, which is framed by the three teachings and other traditions,[572] consists in allegiance to the shen (), a character that signifies the «energies of generation», who can be deities of the environment or ancestral principles of human groups, concepts of civility, culture heroes, many of whom feature in Chinese mythology and history.[573] Among the most popular cults are those of Mazu (goddess of the seas),[574] Huangdi (one of the two divine patriarchs of the Chinese race),[574][575] Guandi (god of war and business), Caishen (god of prosperity and richness), Pangu and many others. China is home to many of the world’s tallest religious statues, including the tallest of all, the Spring Temple Buddha in Henan.[576]

Clear data on religious affiliation in China is difficult to gather due to varying definitions of «religion» and the unorganized, diffusive nature of Chinese religious traditions. Scholars note that in China there is no clear boundary between three teachings religions and local folk religious practice.[570] A 2015 poll conducted by Gallup International found that 61% of Chinese people self-identified as «convinced atheist»,[577] though it is worthwhile to note that Chinese religions or some of their strands are definable as non-theistic and humanistic religions, since they do not believe that divine creativity is completely transcendent, but it is inherent in the world and in particular in the human being.[578] According to a 2014 study, approximately 74% are either non-religious or practice Chinese folk belief, 16% are Buddhists, 2% are Christians, 1% are Muslims, and 8% adhere to other religions including Taoists and folk salvationism.[579][580] In addition to Han people’s local religious practices, there are also various ethnic minority groups in China who maintain their traditional autochthone religions. The various folk religions today comprise 2–3% of the population, while Confucianism as a religious self-identification is common within the intellectual class. Significant faiths specifically connected to certain ethnic groups include Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic religion of the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other peoples in Northwest China.[citation needed] The 2010 population census reported the total number of Muslims in the country as 23.14 million.[581]

A 2021 poll from Ipsos and the Policy Institute at King’s College London found that 35% of Chinese people said there was tension between different religious groups, which was the second lowest percentage of the 28 countries surveyed.[582][583]

Culture

Fenghuang County, an ancient town that harbors many architectural remains of Ming and Qing styles.

Since ancient times, Chinese culture has been heavily influenced by Confucianism. For much of the country’s dynastic era, opportunities for social advancement could be provided by high performance in the prestigious imperial examinations, which have their origins in the Han dynasty.[585] The literary emphasis of the exams affected the general perception of cultural refinement in China, such as the belief that calligraphy, poetry and painting were higher forms of art than dancing or drama. Chinese culture has long emphasized a sense of deep history and a largely inward-looking national perspective.[586] Examinations and a culture of merit remain greatly valued in China today.[587]

The first leaders of the People’s Republic of China were born into the traditional imperial order but were influenced by the May Fourth Movement and reformist ideals. They sought to change some traditional aspects of Chinese culture, such as rural land tenure, sexism, and the Confucian system of education, while preserving others, such as the family structure and culture of obedience to the state. Some observers see the period following the establishment of the PRC in 1949 as a continuation of traditional Chinese dynastic history, while others claim that the Communist Party’s rule has damaged the foundations of Chinese culture, especially through political movements such as the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, where many aspects of traditional culture were destroyed, having been denounced as «regressive and harmful» or «vestiges of feudalism». Many important aspects of traditional Chinese morals and culture, such as Confucianism, art, literature, and performing arts like Peking opera,[588] were altered to conform to government policies and propaganda at the time. Access to foreign media remains heavily restricted.[589]

Today, the Chinese government has accepted numerous elements of traditional Chinese culture as being integral to Chinese society. With the rise of Chinese nationalism and the end of the Cultural Revolution, various forms of traditional Chinese art, literature, music, film, fashion and architecture have seen a vigorous revival,[590][591] and folk and variety art in particular have sparked interest nationally and even worldwide.[592]

Tourism

China received 55.7 million inbound international visitors in 2010,[593] and in 2012 was the third-most-visited country in the world.[594] It also experiences an enormous volume of domestic tourism; an estimated 740 million Chinese holidaymakers traveled within the country in October 2012.[595] China hosts the world’s second-largest number of World Heritage Sites (56) after Italy, and is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world (first in the Asia-Pacific).

Literature

Chinese literature is based on the literature of the Zhou dynasty.[596] Concepts covered within the Chinese classic texts present a wide range of thoughts and subjects including calendar, military, astrology, herbology, geography and many others.[597] Some of the most important early texts include the I Ching and the Shujing within the Four Books and Five Classics which served as the Confucian authoritative books for the state-sponsored curriculum in dynastic era.[598] Inherited from the Classic of Poetry, classical Chinese poetry developed to its floruit during the Tang dynasty. Li Bai and Du Fu opened the forking ways for the poetic circles through romanticism and realism respectively.[599] Chinese historiography began with the Shiji, the overall scope of the historiographical tradition in China is termed the Twenty-Four Histories, which set a vast stage for Chinese fictions along with Chinese mythology and folklore.[600] Pushed by a burgeoning citizen class in the Ming dynasty, Chinese classical fiction rose to a boom of the historical, town and gods and demons fictions as represented by the Four Great Classical Novels which include Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Journey to the West and Dream of the Red Chamber.[601] Along with the wuxia fictions of Jin Yong and Liang Yusheng,[602] it remains an enduring source of popular culture in the East Asian cultural sphere.[603]

In the wake of the New Culture Movement after the end of the Qing dynasty, Chinese literature embarked on a new era with written vernacular Chinese for ordinary citizens. Hu Shih and Lu Xun were pioneers in modern literature.[604] Various literary genres, such as misty poetry, scar literature, young adult fiction and the xungen literature, which is influenced by magic realism,[605] emerged following the Cultural Revolution. Mo Yan, a xungen literature author, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012.[606]

Cuisine

Map showing major regional cuisines of China

Chinese cuisine is highly diverse, drawing on several millennia of culinary history and geographical variety, in which the most influential are known as the «Eight Major Cuisines», including Sichuan, Cantonese, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui, and Zhejiang cuisines.[607] All of them are featured by the precise skills of shaping, heating, and flavoring.[608][better source needed] Chinese cuisine is also known for its width of cooking methods and ingredients,[609] as well as food therapy that is emphasized by traditional Chinese medicine.[610][better source needed] Generally, China’s staple food is rice in the south, wheat-based breads and noodles in the north. The diet of the common people in pre-modern times was largely grain and simple vegetables, with meat reserved for special occasions. The bean products, such as tofu and soy milk, remain as a popular source of protein.[611] Pork is now the most popular meat in China, accounting for about three-fourths of the country’s total meat consumption.[612] While pork dominates the meat market, there is also the vegetarian Buddhist cuisine and the pork-free Chinese Islamic cuisine. Southern cuisine, due to the area’s proximity to the ocean and milder climate, has a wide variety of seafood and vegetables; it differs in many respects from the wheat-based diets across dry northern China. Numerous offshoots of Chinese food, such as Hong Kong cuisine and American Chinese food, have emerged in the nations that play host to the Chinese diaspora.[citation needed]

Music

Chinese music covers a highly diverse range of music from traditional music to modern music. Chinese music dates back before the pre-imperial times. Traditional Chinese musical instruments were traditionally grouped into eight categories known as bayin (八音). Traditional Chinese opera is a form of musical theatre in China originating thousands of years and has regional style forms such as Beijing opera and Cantonese opera.[613] Chinese pop (C-Pop) includes mandopop and cantopop. Chinese rap, Chinese hip hop and Hong Kong hip hop have become popular in contemporary times.[614]

Cinema

Cinema was first introduced to China in 1896 and the first Chinese film, Dingjun Mountain, was released in 1905.[615] China has the largest number of movie screens in the world since 2016,[616] China became the largest cinema market in the world in 2020.[617][618] The top 3 highest-grossing films in China currently are Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), Ne Zha (2019), and The Wandering Earth (2019).[619]

Fashion

Hanfu is the historical clothing of the Han people in China. The qipao or cheongsam is a popular Chinese female dress.[620] The hanfu movement has been popular in contemporary times and seeks to revitalize Hanfu clothing.[621]

Sports

China has one of the oldest sporting cultures in the world. There is evidence that archery (shèjiàn) was practiced during the Western Zhou dynasty. Swordplay (jiànshù) and cuju, a sport loosely related to association football[622] date back to China’s early dynasties as well.[623]

Go is an abstract strategy board game for two players, in which the aim is to surround more territory than the opponent and was invented in China more than 2,500 years ago.

Physical fitness is widely emphasized in Chinese culture, with morning exercises such as qigong and t’ai chi ch’uan widely practiced,[624] and commercial gyms and private fitness clubs are gaining popularity across the country.[625] Basketball is currently the most popular spectator sport in China.[626] The Chinese Basketball Association and the American National Basketball Association have a huge following among the people, with native or ethnic Chinese players such as Yao Ming and Yi Jianlian held in high esteem.[627] China’s professional football league, now known as Chinese Super League, was established in 1994, it is the largest football market in Asia.[628] Other popular sports in the country include martial arts, table tennis, badminton, swimming and snooker. Board games such as go (known as wéiqí in Chinese), xiangqi, mahjong, and more recently chess, are also played at a professional level.[629] In addition, China is home to a huge number of cyclists, with an estimated 470 million bicycles as of 2012.[459] Many more traditional sports, such as dragon boat racing, Mongolian-style wrestling and horse racing are also popular.[630]

China has participated in the Olympic Games since 1932, although it has only participated as the PRC since 1952. China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, where its athletes received 48 gold medals – the highest number of gold medals of any participating nation that year.[631] China also won the most medals of any nation at the 2012 Summer Paralympics, with 231 overall, including 95 gold medals.[632][633] In 2011, Shenzhen in Guangdong, China hosted the 2011 Summer Universiade. China hosted the 2013 East Asian Games in Tianjin and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics in Nanjing; the first country to host both regular and Youth Olympics. Beijing and its nearby city Zhangjiakou of Hebei province collaboratively hosted the 2022 Olympic Winter Games, making Beijing the first dual olympic city in the world by holding both the Summer Olympics and the Winter Olympics.[634][635]

See also

  • Outline of China

Notes

  1. ^ Chinese and English are the official languages in Hong Kong only. Chinese and Portuguese are the official languages in Macau only.
  2. ^
    • In the Hong Kong Traditional Chinese characters and English alphabet are used,
    • In the Macau Traditional Chinese characters and Portuguese orthography are used,
    • In Inner Mongolia the Mongolian script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Tibet Autonomous Region the Tibetan script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Xinjiang the Uyghur Arabic alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Guangxi and Wenshan Prefecture the Latin alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Chosŏn’gŭl is used alongside simplified Chinese.

  3. ^ The top position in one-party ruling China.
  4. ^ Although PRC President is head of state, it is a largely ceremonial office with limited power under CCP General Secretary.
  5. ^ Including both state and party’s central military chairs.
  6. ^ Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
  7. ^ The area given is the official United Nations figure for the mainland and excludes Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.[3] It also excludes the Trans-Karakoram Tract (5,180 km2 (2,000 sq mi)), Aksai Chin (38,000 km2 (15,000 sq mi)) and other territories in dispute with India. The total area of China is listed as 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) by the Encyclopædia Britannica.[4] For further information, see Territorial changes of the People’s Republic of China.
  8. ^ This figure was calculated using data from the CIA World Factbook.[6]
  9. ^ GDP figures exclude Taiwan, and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
  10. ^
    • Hong Kong dollar used in Hong Kong and Macau
    • Macanese pataca used in Macau only.

  11. ^ Chinese: 中华人民共和国; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
  12. ^ China’s border with Pakistan is disputed by India, which claims the entire Kashmir region as its territory.
  13. ^ The total area ranking relative to the United States depends on the measurement of the total areas of both countries. See List of countries and dependencies by area for more information.

    The following two primary sources (non-mirrored) represent the range (min./max.) of estimates of China’s and the United States’ total areas.

    Both sources (1) exclude Taiwan from the area of China; (2) exclude China’s coastal and territorial waters.

    However, the CIA World Factbook includes the United States coastal and territorial waters, while Encyclopædia Britannica excludes the United States coastal and territorial waters.

    1. The Encyclopædia Britannica lists China as world’s third-largest country (after Russia and Canada) with a total area of 9,572,900 km2,[13] and the United States as fourth-largest at 9,525,067 km2.[14]
    2. The CIA World Factbook lists China as the fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada and the United States) with a total area of 9,596,960 km2,[15] and the United States as the third-largest at 9,833,517 km2.[16]

    Notably, the Encyclopædia Britannica specifies the United States’ area (excluding coastal and territorial waters) as 9,525,067 km2, which is less than either source’s figure given for China’s area.[14] Therefore, while it can be determined that China has a larger area excluding coastal and territorial waters, it is unclear which country has a larger area including coastal and territorial waters.


    The United Nations Statistics Division’s figure for the United States is 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi) and China is 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi). These closely match the CIA World Factbook figures and similarly include coastal and territorial waters for the United States, but exclude coastal and territorial waters for China.


    Further explanation of disputed ranking: The dispute about which is the world’s third-largest country arose from the inclusion of coastal and territorial waters for the United States. This discrepancy was deduced from comparing the CIA World Factbook and its previous iterations[17] against the information for United States in Encyclopædia Britannica, particularly its footnote section.[14] In sum, according to older versions of the CIA World Factbook (from 1982 to 1996), the U.S. was listed as the world’s fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and China) with a total area of 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi). However, in the 1997 edition, the U.S. added coastal waters to its total area (increasing it to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi)). And then again in 2007, U.S. added territorial water to its total area (increasing it to 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi)). During this time, China’s total area remained unchanged. In other words, no coastal or territorial water area was added to China’s total area figure. The United States has a coastal water area of 109,362 km2 (42,225 sq mi), and a territorial water area of 195,213 km2 (75,372 sq mi), for a total of 304,575 km2 (117,597 sq mi) of additional water space. This is larger than entire countries like Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Adding this figure to the U.S. will boost it over China in ranking since China’s coastal and territorial water figures are currently unknown (no official publication) and thus cannot be added into China’s total area figure.

  14. ^ a b China claims the de facto state of Taiwan, which it does not control, as its disputed 23rd province, i.e. Taiwan Province. See § Administrative divisions for more details.
  15. ^ The island of Hainan was taken on 1 May 1950 while the unrecognized polity of Tibet was annexed on 23 May 1951.
  16. ^ The KMT solely governed the island until its transition to democracy in 1996.
  17. ^ «… Next vnto this, is found the great China, whose kyng is thought to bee the greatest prince in the worlde, and is named Santoa Raia».[19][20]
  18. ^ «… The Very Great Kingdom of China».[21] (Portuguese:  O Grande Reino da China ).[22]
  19. ^ Although this is the present meaning of guó, in Old Chinese (when its pronunciation was something like /*qʷˤək/)[28] it meant the walled city of the Chinese and the areas they could control from them.[29]
  20. ^ Its earliest extant use is on the ritual bronze vessel He zun, where it apparently refers to only the Shang’s immediate demesne conquered by the Zhou.[30]
  21. ^ Its meaning «Zhou’s royal demesne» is attested from the 6th-century BC Classic of History, which states «Huangtian bestowed the lands and the peoples of the central state to the ancestors» (皇天既付中國民越厥疆土于先王).[31]
  22. ^ Owing to Qin Shi Huang’s earlier policy involving the «burning of books and burying of scholars», the destruction of the confiscated copies at Xianyang was an event similar to the destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the west. Even those texts that did survive had to be painstakingly reconstructed from memory, luck, or forgery.[59] The Old Texts of the Five Classics were said to have been found hidden in a wall at the Kong residence in Qufu. Mei Ze’s «rediscovered» edition of the Book of Documents was only shown to be a forgery in the Qing dynasty.
  23. ^ China is larger than Canada and the United States in terms of land area.
  24. ^ According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the total area of the United States, at 9,522,055 km2 (3,676,486 sq mi), is slightly smaller than that of China. Meanwhile, the CIA World Factbook states that China’s total area was greater than that of the United States until the coastal waters of the Great Lakes was added to the United States’ total area in 1996. From 1989 through 1996, the total area of US was listed as 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi) (land area plus inland water only). The listed total area changed to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi) in 1997 (with the Great Lakes areas and the coastal waters added), to 9,631,418 km2 (3,718,711 sq mi) in 2004, to 9,631,420 km2 (3,718,710 sq mi) in 2006, and to 9,826,630 km2 (3,794,080 sq mi) in 2007 (territorial waters added).
  25. ^ China’s border with Pakistan and part of its border with India falls in the disputed region of Kashmir. The area under Pakistani administration is claimed by India, while the area under Indian administration is claimed by Pakistan.
  26. ^ Meaning cities that are not divided into districts (不设区的市), counties (县), city districts (市辖区), towns (镇), townships (乡), and lastly ethnic townships (民族乡)
  27. ^ Tsung-Dao Lee,[420] Chen Ning Yang,[420] Daniel C. Tsui,[421] Charles K. Kao,[422] Yuan T. Lee,[423] Tu Youyou[424] Shing-Tung Yau[425]
  28. ^ The national life expectancy at birth rose from about 31 years in 1949 to 75 years in 2008,[548] and infant mortality decreased from 300 per thousand in the 1950s to around 33 per thousand in 2001.[549]

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  635. ^ «Beijing 2022 Winter Games Olympics – results & video highlights». International Olympic Committee. 23 February 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2018.

Further reading

  • Farah, Paolo (2006). «Five Years of China’s WTO Membership: EU and US Perspectives on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism». Legal Issues of Economic Integration. Kluwer Law International. Volume 33, Number 3. pp. 263–304. Abstract.
  • Heilig, Gerhard K. (2006/2007). China Bibliography – Online Archived 5 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. China-Profile.com.
  • Jacques, Martin (2009).When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. Penguin Books. Rev. ed. (28 August 2012). ISBN 978-1-59420-185-1
  • Jaffe, Amy Myers, «Green Giant: Renewable Energy and Chinese Power», Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 2 (March / April 2018), pp. 83–93.
  • Johnson, Ian, «What Holds China Together?», The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 14 (26 September 2019), pp. 14, 16, 18. «The Manchus … had [in 1644] conquered the last ethnic Chinese empire, the Ming [and established Imperial China’s last dynasty, the Qing] … The Manchus expanded the empire’s borders northward to include all of Mongolia, and westward to Tibet and Xinjiang.» [p. 16.] «China’s rulers have no faith that anything but force can keep this sprawling country intact.» [p. 18.]
  • Lagerwey, John (2010). China: A Religious State. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. ISBN 978-988-8028-04-7.
  • Meng, Fanhua (2011). Phenomenon of Chinese Culture at the Turn of the 21st century. Singapore: Silkroad Press. ISBN 978-981-4332-35-4.
  • Sang Ye (2006). China Candid: The People on the People’s Republic. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24514-3.
  • Selden, Mark (1979). The People’s Republic of China: Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-532-5.
  • Shambaugh, David L. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Washington, DC; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-25492-3.

External links

Government

  • The Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China (in English)

General information

  • China at a Glance from People’s Daily
  • Country profile – China at BBC News
  • China. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency.
  • China, People’s Republic of from UCB Libraries GovPubs
  • China at Curlie

Maps

Coordinates: 35°N 103°E / 35°N 103°E

«People’s Republic of China» redirects here. For the Republic of China, see Taiwan.

People’s Republic of China

中华人民共和国 (Chinese)
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó (Pinyin)

Flag of China

Flag

National Emblem of China

National Emblem

Anthem: 
义勇军进行曲
Yìyǒngjūn Jìnxíngqǔ
«March of the Volunteers»
Territory controlled by the People's Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Territory controlled by the People’s Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Capital Beijing
39°55′N 116°23′E / 39.917°N 116.383°E
Largest city
by population
Shanghai
Official languages Standard Chinese[a]
Recognized regional languages
  • Mongolian
  • Uyghur
  • Tibetan
  • Zhuang
  • Others
Official script Simplified Chinese[b]
Ethnic groups

(2020)[1]

  • 91.1% Han Chinese
  • 8.9% Others
Religion

(2020)[2]

  • 74.5% No religion / Folk
  • 18.3% Buddhism
  • 5.2% Christianity
  • 1.6% Islam
  • 0.4% Others
Demonym(s) Chinese
Government Unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic

• CCP General Secretary[c]
President[d]
CMC Chairman[e]

Xi Jinping

• Premier

Li Keqiang

• Congress Chairman

Li Zhanshu

• CPPCC Chairman[f]

Wang Yang
Legislature National People’s Congress
Formation

• First pre-imperial dynasty

c. 2070 BCE

• First imperial dynasty

221 BCE

• Republic established

1 January 1912

• Proclamation of the People’s Republic

1 October 1949

• First constitution

20 September 1954

• Current constitution

4 December 1982

• Most recent polity admitted

20 December 1999
Area

• Total

9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi)[g][5] (3rd / 4th)

• Water (%)

2.8[h]
Population

• 2022 estimate

1,410,539,758[7] (1st)

• 2020 census

Neutral increase 1,411,778,724[8] (1st)

• Density

145[9]/km2 (375.5/sq mi) (83rd)
GDP (PPP) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $30.074 trillion[10] (1st)

• Per capita

Increase $21,291[10] (72nd)
GDP (nominal) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $18.321 trillion[i][10] (2nd)

• Per capita

Increase $12,970[10] (65th)
Gini (2019) Positive decrease 38.2[11]
medium
HDI (2021) Increase 0.768[12]
high · 79th
Currency Renminbi (元/¥)[j] (CNY)
Time zone UTC+8 (CST)
DST is not observed
Date format
  • yyyy-mm-dd
  • or yyyymd
  • (CE; Chinese calendar)
Driving side right (Mainland)
left (Hong Kong and Macau)
Calling code +86 (Mainland)
+852 (Hong Kong)
+853 (Macau)
ISO 3166 code CN
Internet TLD
  • .cn
  • .中国
  • .中國 (Mainland)
  • .hk
  • .香港 (Hong Kong)
  • .mo
  • .澳门
  • .澳門 (Macau)

China (Chinese: 中国; pinyin: Zhōngguó), officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC),[k] is a country in East Asia. It is the world’s most populous country, with a population exceeding 1.4 billion, slightly ahead of India. China spans the equivalent of five time zones and borders fourteen countries by land,[l] the most of any country in the world, tied with Russia. Covering an area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometres (3,700,000 sq mi), it is the world’s third largest country by total land area.[m] The country consists of 22 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The national capital is Beijing, and the most populous city and financial center is Shanghai.

Modern Chinese trace their origins to a cradle of civilization in the fertile basin of the Yellow River in the North China Plain. The semi-legendary Xia dynasty in the 21st century BCE and the well-attested Shang and Zhou dynasties developed a bureaucratic political system to serve hereditary monarchies, or dynasties. Chinese writing, Chinese classic literature, and the Hundred Schools of Thought emerged during this period and influenced China and its neighbors for centuries to come. In the third century BCE, Qin’s wars of unification created the first Chinese empire, the short-lived Qin dynasty. The Qin was followed by the more stable Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), which established a model for nearly two millennia in which the Chinese empire was one of the world’s foremost economic powers. The empire expanded, fractured and re-unified, was conquered and reestablished, absorbed foreign religions and ideas, and made world-leading scientific advances, such as the Four Great Inventions: gunpowder, paper, the compass, and printing. After centuries of disunion following the fall of the Han, the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties reunified the empire. The multi-ethnic Tang welcomed foreign trade and culture that came over the Silk Road and adapted Buddhism to Chinese needs. The early modern Song dynasty (960–1279) became increasingly urban and commercial. The civilian scholar-official or literati used the examination system and the doctrines of Neo-Confucianism to replace the military aristocrats of earlier dynasties. The Mongol invasion established the Yuan dynasty in 1279, but the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) re-established Han Chinese control. The Manchu-led Qing dynasty nearly doubled the empire’s territory and established a multi-ethnic state that was the basis of the modern Chinese nation, but suffered heavy losses to foreign imperialism in the 19th century.

The Chinese monarchy collapsed in 1912 with the Xinhai Revolution, when the Republic of China (ROC) replaced the Qing dynasty. In its early years as a republic, the country underwent a period of instability known as the Warlord Era before mostly reunifying in 1928 under a Nationalist government. A civil war between the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began in 1927. Japan invaded China in 1937, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War and temporarily halting the civil war. The surrender and expulsion of Japanese forces from China in 1945 left a power vacuum in the country, which led to renewed fighting between the CCP and the Kuomintang. The civil war ended in 1949[o] with the division of Chinese territory; the CCP established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland while the Kuomintang-led ROC government retreated to the island of Taiwan.[p] Both claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, although the United Nations has recognized the PRC as the sole representation since 1971. From 1959 to 1961, the PRC implemented an economic and social campaign called the Great Leap Forward, that resulted in a sharp economic decline and an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths, mostly through man-made famine. From 1966 to 1976, the turbulent period of political and social chaos within China known as the Cultural Revolution led to greater economic and educational decline, with millions being purged or subjected to either persecution or politicide based on political categories. Since then, the Chinese government has rebuked some of the earlier Maoist policies, conducting a series of political and economic reforms since 1978, which has greatly raised Chinese standards of living, and increased life expectancies.

China is currently governed as a unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic by the CCP. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a founding member of several multilateral and regional cooperation organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the New Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the RCEP, and is a member of the BRICS, the G8+5, the G20, the APEC, and the East Asia Summit. It ranks among the lowest in measurements of democracy, civil liberties, government transparency, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and human rights of ethnic minorities. The Chinese authorities have been criticized by human rights activists and non-governmental organizations for human rights abuses, including political repression, mass censorship, mass surveillance of their citizens, and violent suppression of protest and dissent.

Making up around one-fifth of the world economy, China is the world’s largest economy by GDP by purchasing power parity, the second-largest economy by nominal GDP, and the second-wealthiest country. The country is one of the fastest growing major economies and is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter, as well as the second-largest importer. China is a recognized nuclear-weapon state with the world’s largest standing army by military personnel and second-largest defense budget. China is considered to be a potential superpower due to its large markets, high innovation, economic potential, growing military strength, and influence in international affairs.

Etymology

The word «China» has been used in English since the 16th century; however, it was not a word used by the Chinese themselves during this period. Its origin has been traced through Portuguese, Malay, and Persian back to the Sanskrit word Chīna, used in ancient India.[18] «China» appears in Richard Eden’s 1555 translation[q] of the 1516 journal of the Portuguese explorer Duarte Barbosa.[r][18] Barbosa’s usage was derived from Persian Chīn (چین), which was in turn derived from Sanskrit Cīna (चीन).[23] Cīna was first used in early Hindu scripture, including the Mahābhārata (5th century BCE) and the Laws of Manu (2nd century BCE).[24] In 1655, Martino Martini suggested that the word China is derived ultimately from the name of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).[25][24] Although usage in Indian sources precedes this dynasty, this derivation is still given in various sources.[26] The origin of the Sanskrit word is a matter of debate, according to the Oxford English Dictionary.[18] Alternative suggestions include the names for Yelang and the Jing or Chu state.[24][27]
The official name of the modern state is the «People’s Republic of China» (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó). The shorter form is «China» Zhōngguó (中国; 中國) from zhōng («central») and guó («state»),[s] a term which developed under the Western Zhou dynasty in reference to its royal demesne.[t][u] It was then applied to the area around Luoyi (present-day Luoyang) during the Eastern Zhou and then to China’s Central Plain before being used as an occasional synonym for the state under the Qing.[29] It was often used as a cultural concept to distinguish the Huaxia people from perceived «barbarians».[29] The name Zhongguo is also translated as «Middle Kingdom» in English.[32] China (PRC) is sometimes referred to as the Mainland when distinguishing the ROC from the PRC.[33][34][35][36]

History

Prehistory

10,000 years old pottery, Xianren Cave culture (18000–7000 BCE)

China is regarded as one of the world’s oldest civilisations.[37][38] Archaeological evidence suggests that early hominids inhabited the country 2.25 million years ago.[39] The hominid fossils of Peking Man, a Homo erectus who used fire,[40] were discovered in a cave at Zhoukoudian near Beijing; they have been dated to between 680,000 and 780,000 years ago.[41] The fossilized teeth of Homo sapiens (dated to 125,000–80,000 years ago) have been discovered in Fuyan Cave in Dao County, Hunan.[42] Chinese proto-writing existed in Jiahu around 6600 BCE,[43] at Damaidi around 6000 BCE,[44] Dadiwan from 5800 to 5400 BCE, and Banpo dating from the 5th millennium BCE. Some scholars have suggested that the Jiahu symbols (7th millennium BCE) constituted the earliest Chinese writing system.[43]

Early dynastic rule

According to Chinese tradition, the first dynasty was the Xia, which emerged around 2100 BCE.[45] The Xia dynasty marked the beginning of China’s political system based on hereditary monarchies, or dynasties, which lasted for a millennium.[46] The Xia dynasty was considered mythical by historians until scientific excavations found early Bronze Age sites at Erlitou, Henan in 1959.[47] It remains unclear whether these sites are the remains of the Xia dynasty or of another culture from the same period.[48] The succeeding Shang dynasty is the earliest to be confirmed by contemporary records.[49] The Shang ruled the plain of the Yellow River in eastern China from the 17th to the 11th century BCE.[50] Their oracle bone script (from c. 1500 BCE)[51][52] represents the oldest form of Chinese writing yet found[53] and is a direct ancestor of modern Chinese characters.[54]

The Shang was conquered by the Zhou, who ruled between the 11th and 5th centuries BCE, though centralized authority was slowly eroded by feudal warlords. Some principalities eventually emerged from the weakened Zhou, no longer fully obeyed the Zhou king, and continually waged war with each other during the 300-year Spring and Autumn period. By the time of the Warring States period of the 5th–3rd centuries BCE, there were only seven powerful states left.[55]

Imperial China

The Warring States period ended in 221 BCE after the state of Qin conquered the other six kingdoms, reunited China and established the dominant order of autocracy. King Zheng of Qin proclaimed himself the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty. He enacted Qin’s legalist reforms throughout China, notably the forced standardization of Chinese characters, measurements, road widths (i.e., the cart axles’ length), and currency. His dynasty also conquered the Yue tribes in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Vietnam.[56] The Qin dynasty lasted only fifteen years, falling soon after the First Emperor’s death, as his harsh authoritarian policies led to widespread rebellion.[57][58]

Following a widespread civil war during which the imperial library at Xianyang was burned,[v] the Han dynasty emerged to rule China between 206 BCE and CE 220, creating a cultural identity among its populace still remembered in the ethnonym of the Han Chinese.[57][58] The Han expanded the empire’s territory considerably, with military campaigns reaching Central Asia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Yunnan, and the recovery of Guangdong and northern Vietnam from Nanyue. Han involvement in Central Asia and Sogdia helped establish the land route of the Silk Road, replacing the earlier path over the Himalayas to India. Han China gradually became the largest economy of the ancient world.[60] Despite the Han’s initial decentralization and the official abandonment of the Qin philosophy of Legalism in favor of Confucianism, Qin’s legalist institutions and policies continued to be employed by the Han government and its successors.[61]

Map showing the expansion of Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC

After the end of the Han dynasty, a period of strife known as Three Kingdoms followed,[62] whose central figures were later immortalized in one of the Four Classics of Chinese literature. At its end, Wei was swiftly overthrown by the Jin dynasty. The Jin fell to civil war upon the ascension of a developmentally disabled emperor; the Five Barbarians then invaded and ruled northern China as the Sixteen States. The Xianbei unified them as the Northern Wei, whose Emperor Xiaowen reversed his predecessors’ apartheid policies and enforced a drastic sinification on his subjects, largely integrating them into Chinese culture. In the south, the general Liu Yu secured the abdication of the Jin in favor of the Liu Song. The various successors of these states became known as the Northern and Southern dynasties, with the two areas finally reunited by the Sui in 581. The Sui restored the Han to power through China, reformed its agriculture, economy and imperial examination system, constructed the Grand Canal, and patronized Buddhism. However, they fell quickly when their conscription for public works and a failed war in northern Korea provoked widespread unrest.[63][64]

Under the succeeding Tang and Song dynasties, Chinese economy, technology, and culture entered a golden age.[65] The Tang dynasty retained control of the Western Regions and the Silk Road,[66] which brought traders to as far as Mesopotamia and the Horn of Africa,[67] and made the capital Chang’an a cosmopolitan urban center. However, it was devastated and weakened by the An Lushan Rebellion in the 8th century.[68] In 907, the Tang disintegrated completely when the local military governors became ungovernable. The Song dynasty ended the separatist situation in 960, leading to a balance of power between the Song and Khitan Liao. The Song was the first government in world history to issue paper money and the first Chinese polity to establish a permanent standing navy which was supported by the developed shipbuilding industry along with the sea trade.[69]

Between the 10th and 11th centuries, the population of China doubled in size to around 100 million people, mostly because of the expansion of rice cultivation in central and southern China, and the production of abundant food surpluses. The Song dynasty also saw a revival of Confucianism, in response to the growth of Buddhism during the Tang,[70] and a flourishing of philosophy and the arts, as landscape art and porcelain were brought to new levels of maturity and complexity.[71][72] However, the military weakness of the Song army was observed by the Jurchen Jin dynasty. In 1127, Emperor Huizong of Song and the capital Bianjing were captured during the Jin–Song Wars. The remnants of the Song retreated to southern China.[73]

The Mongol conquest of China began in 1205 with the gradual conquest of Western Xia by Genghis Khan,[74] who also invaded Jin territories.[75] In 1271, the Mongol leader Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty, which conquered the last remnant of the Song dynasty in 1279. Before the Mongol invasion, the population of Song China was 120 million citizens; this was reduced to 60 million by the time of the census in 1300.[76] A peasant named Zhu Yuanzhang led a rebellion that overthrew the Yuan in 1368 and founded the Ming dynasty as the Hongwu Emperor. Under the Ming dynasty, China enjoyed another golden age, developing one of the strongest navies in the world and a rich and prosperous economy amid a flourishing of art and culture. It was during this period that admiral Zheng He led the Ming treasure voyages throughout the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as East Africa.[77]

In the early years of the Ming dynasty, China’s capital was moved from Nanjing to Beijing. With the budding of capitalism, philosophers such as Wang Yangming further critiqued and expanded Neo-Confucianism with concepts of individualism and equality of four occupations.[78] The scholar-official stratum became a supporting force of industry and commerce in the tax boycott movements, which, together with the famines and defense against Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) and Manchu invasions led to an exhausted treasury.[79] In 1644, Beijing was captured by a coalition of peasant rebel forces led by Li Zicheng. The Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide when the city fell. The Manchu Qing dynasty, then allied with Ming dynasty general Wu Sangui, overthrew Li’s short-lived Shun dynasty and subsequently seized control of Beijing, which became the new capital of the Qing dynasty.[80]

The Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1644 until 1912, was the last imperial dynasty of China. Its conquest of the Ming (1618–1683) cost 25 million lives and the economy of China shrank drastically.[81] After the Southern Ming ended, the further conquest of the Dzungar Khanate added Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang to the empire.[82] The centralized autocracy was strengthened to suppress anti-Qing sentiment with the policy of valuing agriculture and restraining commerce, the Haijin («sea ban»), and ideological control as represented by the literary inquisition, causing social and technological stagnation.[83][84]

Fall of the Qing dynasty

In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty experienced Western imperialism in the Opium Wars with Britain and France. China was forced to pay compensation, open treaty ports, allow extraterritoriality for foreign nationals, and cede Hong Kong to the British[85] under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the first of the Unequal Treaties. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) resulted in Qing China’s loss of influence in the Korean Peninsula, as well as the cession of Taiwan to Japan.[86]
The Qing dynasty also began experiencing internal unrest in which tens of millions of people died, especially in the White Lotus Rebellion, the failed Taiping Rebellion that ravaged southern China in the 1850s and 1860s and the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) in the northwest. The initial success of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s was frustrated by a series of military defeats in the 1880s and 1890s.[citation needed]

In the 19th century, the great Chinese diaspora began. Losses due to emigration were added to by conflicts and catastrophes such as the Northern Chinese Famine of 1876–1879, in which between 9 and 13 million people died.[87] The Guangxu Emperor drafted a reform plan in 1898 to establish a modern constitutional monarchy, but these plans were thwarted by the Empress Dowager Cixi. The ill-fated anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901 further weakened the dynasty. Although Cixi sponsored a program of reforms, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1912 brought an end to the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China.[88] Puyi, the last Emperor of China, abdicated in 1912.[89]

Establishment of the Republic and World War II

On 1 January 1912, the Republic of China was established, and Sun Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (the KMT or Nationalist Party) was proclaimed provisional president.[90] On 12 February 1912, regent Empress Dowager Longyu sealed the imperial abdication decree on behalf of 4 year old Puyi, the last emperor of China, ending 5,000 years of monarchy in China.[91] In March 1912, the presidency was given to Yuan Shikai, a former Qing general who in 1915 proclaimed himself Emperor of China. In the face of popular condemnation and opposition from his own Beiyang Army, he was forced to abdicate and re-establish the republic in 1916.[92]

After Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, China was politically fragmented. Its Beijing-based government was internationally recognized but virtually powerless; regional warlords controlled most of its territory.[93][94] In the late 1920s, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, the then Principal of the Republic of China Military Academy, was able to reunify the country under its own control with a series of deft military and political maneuverings, known collectively as the Northern Expedition.[95][96] The Kuomintang moved the nation’s capital to Nanjing and implemented «political tutelage», an intermediate stage of political development outlined in Sun Yat-sen’s San-min program for transforming China into a modern democratic state.[97][98] The political division in China made it difficult for Chiang to battle the communist-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA), against whom the Kuomintang had been warring since 1927 in the Chinese Civil War. This war continued successfully for the Kuomintang, especially after the PLA retreated in the Long March, until Japanese aggression and the 1936 Xi’an Incident forced Chiang to confront Imperial Japan.[99]

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), a theater of World War II, forced an uneasy alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Japanese forces committed numerous war atrocities against the civilian population; in all, as many as 20 million Chinese civilians died.[100] An estimated 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese were massacred in the city of Nanjing alone during the Japanese occupation.[101] During the war, China, along with the UK, the United States, and the Soviet Union, were referred to as «trusteeship of the powerful»[102] and were recognized as the Allied «Big Four» in the Declaration by United Nations.[103][104] Along with the other three great powers, China was one of the four major Allies of World War II, and was later considered one of the primary victors in the war.[105][106] After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Taiwan, including the Pescadores, was handed over to Chinese control. However, the validity of this handover is controversial, in that whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was legally transferred and whether China is a legitimate recipient, due to complex issues that arose from the handling of Japan’s surrender, resulting in the unresolved political status of Taiwan, which is a flashpoint of potential war between China and Taiwan. China emerged victorious but war-ravaged and financially drained. The continued distrust between the Kuomintang and the Communists led to the resumption of civil war. Constitutional rule was established in 1947, but because of the ongoing unrest, many provisions of the ROC constitution were never implemented in mainland China.[107]

Civil War and the People’s Republic

Before the existence of the People’s Republic, the CCP had declared several areas of the country as the Chinese Soviet Republic (Jiangxi Soviet), a predecessor state to the PRC, in November 1931 in Ruijin, Jiangxi. The Jiangxi Soviet was wiped out by the KMT armies in 1934 and was relocated to Yan’an in Shaanxi where the Long March concluded in 1935.[108][failed verification] It would be the base of the communists before major combat in the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949. Afterwards, the CCP took control of most of mainland China, and the Kuomintang retreating offshore to Taiwan, reducing its territory to only Taiwan, Hainan, and their surrounding islands.

On 1 October 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China at the new nation’s founding ceremony and inaugural military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.[109][110] In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army captured Hainan from the ROC[111] and annexed Tibet.[112] However, remaining Kuomintang forces continued to wage an insurgency in western China throughout the 1950s.[113]

The government consolidated its popularity among the peasants through land reform, which included the execution of between 1 and 2 million landlords.[114] China developed an independent industrial system and its own nuclear weapons.[115] The Chinese population increased from 550 million in 1950 to 900 million in 1974.[116] However, the Great Leap Forward, an idealistic massive reform project, resulted in an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths between 1959 and 1961, mostly from starvation.[117][118] In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, sparking a decade of political recrimination and social upheaval that lasted until Mao’s death in 1976. In October 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations, and took its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.[119] This UN action also created the problem of the political status of Taiwan and the Two Chinas issue. See Cross-Strait relations and «Taiwan, China».

Reforms and contemporary history

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was ended by a military-led massacre which brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.

After Mao’s death, the Gang of Four was quickly arrested by Hua Guofeng and held responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, and instituted significant economic reforms. The CCP loosened governmental control over citizens’ personal lives, and the communes were gradually disbanded in favor of working contracted to households. Agricultural collectivization was dismantled and farmlands privatized, while foreign trade became a major new focus, leading to the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were restructured and unprofitable ones were closed outright, resulting in massive job losses.[citation needed] This marked China’s transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an increasingly open-market environment.[120] China adopted its current constitution on 4 December 1982. In 1989, the suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.[121]

Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji led the nation in the 1990s. Under their administration, China’s economic performance pulled an estimated[by whom?] 150 million peasants out of poverty and sustained an average annual gross domestic product growth rate of 11.2%.[122][better source needed] British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, as the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions under the principle of One country, two systems. The country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and maintained its high rate of economic growth under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s leadership in the 2000s. However, the growth also severely impacted the country’s resources and environment,[123][124] and caused major social displacement.[125][126]

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has ruled since 2012 and has pursued large-scale efforts to reform China’s economy[127][128] (which has suffered from structural instabilities and slowing growth),[129][130][131] and has also reformed the one-child policy and penal system,[132] as well as instituting a vast anti-corruption crackdown.[133] In the early 2010s, China’s economic growth rate began to slow amid domestic credit troubles, weakening international demand for Chinese exports and fragility in the global economy.[134][135][136] In 2013, China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment project.[137] Since 2017, the Chinese government has been engaged in a harsh crackdown in Xinjiang, with an estimated one million people, mostly Uyghurs but including other ethnic and religious minorities, in internment camps.[138] The National People’s Congress in 2018 altered the country’s constitution to remove the two-term limit on holding the Presidency of China, permitting the current leader, Xi Jinping, to remain president of China (and general secretary of the CCP) for an unlimited time, earning criticism for creating dictatorial governance.[139][140] In 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) passed a national security law in Hong Kong that gave the Hong Kong government wide-ranging tools to crack down on dissent.[141]

The global COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan and was first identified from an outbreak in December 2019.[142] The Chinese government response has included a zero-COVID strategy, making it one of few countries to pursue this approach.[143] China was the only major economy in the world to grow in 2020, recording a 2.3% growth due to its success in containing the coronavirus within its borders.[144] The country’s economy continued to broaden recovery from the recession during the pandemic, with stable job creation and record international trade growth, although retail consumption was still slower than predicted.[145][146] These Zero-COVID strategies have led to a variety of protests across China against them starting in November 2022.

Geography

China topographic map with East Asia countries

China’s landscape is vast and diverse, ranging from the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts in the arid north to the subtropical forests in the wetter south. The Himalaya, Karakoram, Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges separate China from much of South and Central Asia. The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the third- and sixth-longest in the world, respectively, run from the Tibetan Plateau to the densely populated eastern seaboard. China’s coastline along the Pacific Ocean is 14,500 km (9,000 mi) long and is bounded by the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China seas. China connects through the Kazakh border to the Eurasian Steppe which has been an artery of communication between East and West since the Neolithic through the Steppe Route – the ancestor of the terrestrial Silk Road(s).[citation needed]

The territory of China lies between latitudes 18° and 54° N, and longitudes 73° and 135° E. The geographical center of China is marked by the Center of the Country Monument at 35°50′40.9″N 103°27′7.5″E / 35.844694°N 103.452083°E. China’s landscapes vary significantly across its vast territory. In the east, along the shores of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, there are extensive and densely populated alluvial plains, while on the edges of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the north, broad grasslands predominate. Southern China is dominated by hills and low mountain ranges, while the central-east hosts the deltas of China’s two major rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. Other major rivers include the Xi, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Amur. To the west sit major mountain ranges, most notably the Himalayas. High plateaus feature among the more arid landscapes of the north, such as the Taklamakan and the Gobi Desert. The world’s highest point, Mount Everest (8,848 m), lies on the Sino-Nepalese border.[147] The country’s lowest point, and the world’s third-lowest, is the dried lake bed of Ayding Lake (−154 m) in the Turpan Depression.[148]

Climate

China’s climate is mainly dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons, which lead to pronounced temperature differences between winter and summer. In the winter, northern winds coming from high-latitude areas are cold and dry; in summer, southern winds from coastal areas at lower latitudes are warm and moist.[150]

A major environmental issue in China is the continued expansion of its deserts, particularly the Gobi Desert.[151][152] Although barrier tree lines planted since the 1970s have reduced the frequency of sandstorms, prolonged drought and poor agricultural practices have resulted in dust storms plaguing northern China each spring, which then spread to other parts of East Asia, including Japan and Korea. China’s environmental watchdog, SEPA, stated in 2007 that China is losing 4,000 km2 (1,500 sq mi) per year to desertification.[153] Water quality, erosion, and pollution control have become important issues in China’s relations with other countries. Melting glaciers in the Himalayas could potentially lead to water shortages for hundreds of millions of people.[154] According to academics, in order to limit climate change in China to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) electricity generation from coal in China without carbon capture must be phased out by 2045.[155] Official government statistics about Chinese agricultural productivity are considered unreliable, due to exaggeration of production at subsidiary government levels.[156][157] Much of China has a climate very suitable for agriculture and the country has been the world’s largest producer of rice, wheat, tomatoes, eggplant, grapes, watermelon, spinach, and many other crops.[158]

Biodiversity

China is one of 17 megadiverse countries,[159] lying in two of the world’s major biogeographic realms: the Palearctic and the Indomalayan. By one measure, China has over 34,687 species of animals and vascular plants, making it the third-most biodiverse country in the world, after Brazil and Colombia.[160] The country signed the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity on 11 June 1992, and became a party to the convention on 5 January 1993.[161] It later produced a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, with one revision that was received by the convention on 21 September 2010.[162]

China is home to at least 551 species of mammals (the third-highest such number in the world),[163] 1,221 species of birds (eighth),[164] 424 species of reptiles (seventh)[165] and 333 species of amphibians (seventh).[166] Wildlife in China shares habitat with, and bears acute pressure from, the world’s largest population of humans. At least 840 animal species are threatened, vulnerable or in danger of local extinction in China, due mainly to human activity such as habitat destruction, pollution and poaching for food, fur and ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine.[167] Endangered wildlife is protected by law, and as of 2005, the country has over 2,349 nature reserves, covering a total area of 149.95 million hectares, 15 percent of China’s total land area.[168][better source needed] Most wild animals have been eliminated from the core agricultural regions of east and central China, but they have fared better in the mountainous south and west.[169][170] The Baiji was confirmed extinct on 12 December 2006.[171]

China has over 32,000 species of vascular plants,[172] and is home to a variety of forest types. Cold coniferous forests predominate in the north of the country, supporting animal species such as moose and Asian black bear, along with over 120 bird species.[173] The understory of moist conifer forests may contain thickets of bamboo. In higher montane stands of juniper and yew, the bamboo is replaced by rhododendrons. Subtropical forests, which are predominate in central and southern China, support a high density of plant species including numerous rare endemics. Tropical and seasonal rainforests, though confined to Yunnan and Hainan Island, contain a quarter of all the animal and plant species found in China.[173] China has over 10,000 recorded species of fungi,[174] and of them, nearly 6,000 are higher fungi.[175]

Environment

In the early 2000s, China has suffered from environmental deterioration and pollution due to its rapid pace of industrialization.[176][177] While regulations such as the 1979 Environmental Protection Law are fairly stringent, they are poorly enforced, as they are frequently disregarded by local communities and government officials in favor of rapid economic development.[178] China is the country with the second highest death toll because of air pollution, after India. There are approximately 1 million deaths caused by exposure to ambient air pollution.[179][180] Although China ranks as the highest CO2 emitting country in the world,[181] it only emits 8 tons of CO2 per capita, significantly lower than developed countries such as the United States (16.1), Australia (16.8) and South Korea (13.6).[182]

In recent years, China has clamped down on pollution. In March 2014, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping «declared war» on pollution during the opening of the National People’s Congress.[183] After extensive debate lasting nearly two years, the parliament approved a new environmental law in April. The new law empowers environmental enforcement agencies with great punitive power and large fines for offenders, defines areas which require extra protection, and gives independent environmental groups more ability to operate in the country.[citation needed] In 2020, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and go carbon-neutral by 2060 in accordance with the Paris climate accord.[184] According to Climate Action Tracker, if accomplished it would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 – 0.3 degrees – «the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker».[185] In September 2021 Xi Jinping announced that China will not build «coal-fired power projects abroad». The decision can be «pivotal» in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.[186]

The country also had significant water pollution problems: 8.2% of China’s rivers had been polluted by industrial and agricultural waste in 2019.[187][188] China had a 2018 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.14/10, ranking it 53rd globally out of 172 countries.[189] In 2020, a sweeping law was passed by the Chinese government to protect the ecology of the Yangtze River. The new laws include strengthening ecological protection rules for hydropower projects along the river, banning chemical plants within 1 kilometer of the river, relocating polluting industries, severely restricting sand mining as well as a complete fishing ban on all the natural waterways of the river, including all its major tributaries and lakes.[190]

China is also the world’s leading investor in renewable energy and its commercialization, with $52 billion invested in 2011 alone;[191][192][193] it is a major manufacturer of renewable energy technologies and invests heavily in local-scale renewable energy projects.[194][195][196] By 2015, over 24% of China’s energy was derived from renewable sources, while most notably from hydroelectric power: a total installed capacity of 197 GW makes China the largest hydroelectric power producer in the world.[197][198] China also has the largest power capacity of installed solar photovoltaics system and wind power system in the world.[199][200] Greenhouse gas emissions by China are the world’s largest,[182] as is renewable energy in China.[201] Despite its emphasis on renewables, China remains deeply connected to global oil markets and next to India, has been the largest importer of Russian crude oil in 2022.[202][203]

Political geography

Map showing the territorial claims of the PRC.

The People’s Republic of China is the second-largest country in the world by land area after Russia.[w][x] China’s total area is generally stated as being approximately 9,600,000 km2 (3,700,000 sq mi).[204] Specific area figures range from 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) according to the Encyclopædia Britannica,[205] to 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) according to the UN Demographic Yearbook,[3] and the CIA World Factbook.[6]

China has the longest combined land border in the world, measuring 22,117 km (13,743 mi) and its coastline covers approximately 14,500 km (9,000 mi) from the mouth of the Yalu River (Amnok River) to the Gulf of Tonkin.[6] China borders 14 nations and covers the bulk of East Asia, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in Southeast Asia; India, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan[y] in South Asia; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia; and Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea in Inner Asia and Northeast Asia. It is narrowly separated from Bangladesh and Thailand to the southwest and south, and has several maritime neighbors such as Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[206]

Politics

The Chinese constitution states that the People’s Republic of China «is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship that is led by the working class and based on an alliance of workers and peasants,» and that the state institutions «shall practice the principle of democratic centralism.»[207] The PRC is one of the world’s only socialist states governed by a communist party. The Chinese government has been variously described as communist and socialist, but also as authoritarian[208] and corporatist,[209] with amongst the heaviest restrictions worldwide in many areas, most notably against free access to the Internet, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to have children, free formation of social organizations and freedom of religion.[210]

Although the Chinese Communist Party describes China as a «socialist consultative democracy»,[211] the country is commonly described as an authoritarian one-party surveillance state and a dictatorship.[212][213] China has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an «authoritarian regime» by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, ranking at 148th out of 167 countries in 2021.[214] Its current political, ideological and economic system has been termed by its leaders as a «whole-process people’s democracy» «people’s democratic dictatorship», «socialism with Chinese characteristics» (which is Marxism adapted to Chinese circumstances) and the «socialist market economy» respectively.[215][216]

Political concerns in China include the growing gap between rich and poor and government corruption.[217] Nonetheless, the level of public support for the government and its management of the nation is high, with 80–95% of Chinese citizens expressing satisfaction with the central government, according to a 2011 Harvard University survey.[218] A 2020 survey from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research also had most Chinese expressing satisfaction with the government on information dissemination and delivery of daily necessities during the COVID-19 pandemic.[219][220]

Chinese Communist Party

The main body of the Chinese constitution declares that «the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).»[221] China is a one-party Marxist–Leninist state,[222] wherein the CCP general secretary (party leader) holds ultimate power and authority over state and government and serves as the informal paramount leader.[223] The current general secretary is Xi Jinping, who took office on 15 November 2012, and was re-elected on 25 October 2017.[224] According to the CCP constitution, its highest body is the National Congress held every five years.[225] The National Congress elects the Central Committee, who then elects the party’s Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee and general secretary, the top leadership of the country.[225] At the local level, the secretary of the CCP committee of a subdivision outranks the local government level; CCP committee secretary of a provincial division outranks the governor while the CCP committee secretary of a city outranks the mayor.[226]

Since both the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.[227] In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People’s Republic of China by reference to these «generations».

Generations of Chinese leadership

Generation Paramount Leader Start End Ideology
First Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
1949 1978 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1978 1989 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1989 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

Government

The nearly 3,000 member National People’s Congress (NPC) is constitutionally the «highest state organ of power»,[207] though it has been also described as a «rubber stamp» body.[228] The NPC meets annually, while the NPC Standing Committee, around 150 member body elected from NPC delegates, meets every couple of months.[228] In what China calls the «people’s congress system», local people’s congresses at the lowest level[z] are officially directly elected, with all the higher-level people’s congresses up to the NPC being elected by the level one below.[207] However, the elections are not pluralistic, with nominations at all levels being controlled by the CCP.[229] The NPC is dominated by the CCP, with another eight minor parties having nominal representation in the condition of upholding CCP leadership.[230]

The president is the ceremonial head of state, elected by the NPC. The incumbent president is Xi Jinping, who is also the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him China’s paramount leader. The premier is the head of government, with Li Keqiang being the incumbent premier. The premier is officially nominated by the president and then elected by the NPC, and has generally been either the second or third-ranking member of the PSC. The premier presides over the State Council, China’s cabinet, composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.[207] The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a political advisory body that is critical in China’s «united front» system, which aims to gather non-CCP voices to support the CCP. Similar to the people’s congresses, CPPCC’s exist at various division, with the National Committee of the CPPCC being chaired by Wang Yang, one of China’s top leaders.[231]

A Harvard University survey published in July 2020 found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China’s government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey’s history.[232]

Administrative divisions

The People’s Republic of China is constitutionally a unitary state officially divided into 23 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions (each with a designated minority group), and four municipalities—collectively referred to as «mainland China»—as well as the special administrative regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau.[233] The PRC considers Taiwan to be its 23rd province,[234] although it is governed by the Republic of China (ROC), which claims to be the legitimate representative of China and its territory, though it has downplayed this claim since its democratization.[235] Geographically, all 31 provincial divisions of mainland China can be grouped into six regions: North China, Northeast China, East China, South Central China, Southwest China, and Northwest China.[236]

China administrative claimed included.svg

About this image

Provinces () Claimed Province
  • Anhui (安徽省)
  • Fujian (福建省)
  • Gansu (甘肃省)
  • Guangdong (广东省)
  • Guizhou (贵州省)
  • Hainan (海南省)
  • Hebei (河北省)
  • Heilongjiang (黑龙江省)
  • Henan (河南省)
  • Hubei (湖北省)
  • Hunan (湖南省)
  • Jiangsu (江苏省)
  • Jiangxi (江西省)
  • Jilin (吉林省)
  • Liaoning (辽宁省)
  • Qinghai (青海省)
  • Shaanxi (陕西省)
  • Shandong (山东省)
  • Shanxi (山西省)
  • Sichuan (四川省)
  • Yunnan (云南省)
  • Zhejiang (浙江省)
  • Taiwan (台湾省), governed by the Republic of China
Autonomous regions (自治区) Municipalities (直辖市) Special administrative regions (特别行政区)
  • Guangxi (广西壮族自治区)
  • Inner Mongolia / Nei Menggu (内蒙古自治区)
  • Ningxia (宁夏回族自治区)
  • Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区)
  • Tibet / Xizang (西藏自治区)
  • Beijing (北京市)
  • Chongqing (重庆市)
  • Shanghai (上海市)
  • Tianjin (天津市)
  • Hong Kong / Xianggang (香港特别行政区)
  • Macau / Aomen (澳门特别行政区)

Foreign relations

Diplomatic relations of China

The PRC has diplomatic relations with 175 countries and maintains embassies in 162. In 2019, China had the largest diplomatic network in the world.[237][238] Its legitimacy is disputed by the Republic of China and a few other countries; it is thus the largest and most populous state with limited recognition, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.[239] In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.[240] China was also a former member and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and still considers itself an advocate for developing countries.[241] Along with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, China is a member of the BRICS group of emerging major economies and hosted the group’s third official summit at Sanya, Hainan in April 2011.[242]

Under the One-China principle, Beijing has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to Taiwan and severs official ties with the government of the Republic of China.[citation needed] Chinese officials have protested on numerous occasions when foreign countries have made diplomatic overtures to Taiwan,[243] especially in the matter of armament sales.[244]

Much of current Chinese foreign policy is reportedly based on Premier Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and is also driven by the concept of «harmony without uniformity», which encourages diplomatic relations between states despite ideological differences.[245] This policy may have led China to support states that are regarded as dangerous or repressive by Western nations, such as Zimbabwe, North Korea and Iran.[246] China has a close economic and military relationship with Russia,[247] and the two states often vote in unison in the United Nations Security Council.[248][249][250]

Trade relations

China became the world’s largest trading nation in 2013 as measured by the sum of imports and exports, as well as the world’s largest commodity importer. comprising roughly 45% of maritime’s dry-bulk market.[251][252]
By 2016, China was the largest trading partner of 124 other countries.[253] China is the largest trading partner for the ASEAN nations, with a total trade value of $345.8 billion in 2015 accounting for 15.2% of ASEAN’s total trade.[254] ASEAN is also China’s largest trading partner.[255] In 2020, China became the largest trading partner of the European Union for goods, with the total value of goods trade reaching nearly $700 billion.[256] China, along with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free-trade area covering 30% of the world’s population and economic output.[257] China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 2004, it proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues.[258] The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005.[259]

China has had a long and complex trade relationship with the United States. In 2000, the United States Congress approved «permanent normal trade relations» (PNTR) with China, allowing Chinese exports in at the same low tariffs as goods from most other countries.[260] China has a significant trade surplus with the United States, its most important export market.[261] Economists have argued that the renminbi is undervalued, due to currency intervention from the Chinese government, giving China an unfair trade advantage.[262] In August 2019, the United States Department of the Treasury designated China as a «currency manipulator»,[263] later reversing the decision in January 2020.[264] The US and other foreign governments have also alleged that China doesn’t respect intellectual property (IP) rights and steals IP through espionage operations,[265][266] with the US Department of Justice saying that 80% of all the prosecutions related to economic espionage it brings were about conduct to benefit the Chinese state.[267]

Since the turn of the century, China has followed a policy of engaging with African nations for trade and bilateral co-operation;[268][269][270] in 2019, Sino-African trade totalled $208 billion, having grown 20 times over two decades.[271] According to Madison Condon «China finances more infrastructure projects in Africa than the World Bank and provides billions of dollars in low-interest loans to the continent’s emerging economies.»[272] China maintains extensive and highly diversified trade links with the European Union.[256] China has furthermore strengthened its trade ties with major South American economies,[273] and is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and several others.[274]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded significantly over the last six years and, as of April 2020, includes 138 countries and 30 international organizations. In addition to intensifying foreign policy relations, the focus here is particularly on building efficient transport routes. The focus is particularly on the maritime Silk Road with its connections to East Africa and Europe and there are Chinese investments or related declarations of intent at numerous ports such as Gwadar, Kuantan, Hambantota, Piraeus and Trieste. However many of these loans made under the Belt and Road program are unsustainable and China has faced a number of calls for debt relief from debtor nations.[275][276]

Territorial disputes

Taiwan

Map depicting territorial disputes between the PRC and neighboring states. For a larger map, see here.

Ever since its establishment after the Chinese Civil War, the PRC has claimed the territories governed by the Republic of China (ROC), a separate political entity today commonly known as Taiwan, as a part of its territory. It regards the island of Taiwan as its Taiwan Province, Kinmen and Matsu as a part of Fujian Province and islands the ROC controls in the South China Sea as a part of Hainan Province and Guangdong Province. These claims are controversial because of the complicated Cross-Strait relations, with the PRC treating the One-China Principle as one of its most important diplomatic principles.[277][better source needed]

Land border disputes

China has resolved its land borders with 12 out of 14 neighboring countries, having pursued substantial compromises in most of them.[278][279][280] As of 2022, China currently has a disputed land border with India and Bhutan.[citation needed]

Maritime border disputes

China is additionally involved in maritime disputes with multiple countries over the ownership of several small islands in the East and South China Seas, such as Socotra Rock, the Senkaku Islands and the entirety of South China Sea Islands,[281][282] along with the EEZ disputes over East China Sea.

Sociopolitical issues and human rights

China uses a massive espionage network of cameras, facial recognition software, sensors, and surveillance of personal technology as a means of social control of persons living in the country.[283] The Chinese democracy movement, social activists, and some members of the CCP[who?] believe in the need for social and political reform. While economic and social controls have been significantly relaxed in China since the 1970s, political freedom is still tightly restricted. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that the «fundamental rights» of citizens include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, and property rights. However, in practice, these provisions do not afford significant protection against criminal prosecution by the state.[284][285] Although some criticisms of government policies and the ruling CCP are tolerated, censorship of political speech and information, most notably on the Internet,[286][287] are routinely used to prevent collective action.[288]

A number of foreign governments, foreign press agencies, and non-governmental organizations have criticized China’s human rights record, alleging widespread civil rights violations such as detention without trial, forced abortions,[289] forced confessions, torture, restrictions of fundamental rights,[210][290] and excessive use of the death penalty.[291][292] The government suppresses popular protests and demonstrations that it considers a potential threat to «social stability», as was the case with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[293]

China is regularly accused of large-scale repression and human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang,[295][296][297] including violent police crackdowns and religious suppression.[298][299] In Xinjiang, At least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic and religion minorities have been detained in internment camps, officially termed «Vocational Education and Training Centers», aimed at changing the political thinking of detainees, their identities, and their religious beliefs.[138] According to the U.S. Department of State, actions including political indoctrination, torture, physical and psychological abuse, forced sterilization, sexual abuse, and forced labor are common in these facilities.[300] The state has also sought to control offshore reporting of tensions in Xinjiang, intimidating foreign-based reporters by detaining their family members.[301] According to a 2020 report, China’s treatment of Uyghurs meets the UN definition of genocide,[302] and several groups called for a UN investigation.[303] Several countries have recognized China’s actions in Xinjiang as a genocide.[304][294][305]

Global studies from Pew Research Center in 2014 and 2017 ranked the Chinese government’s restrictions on religion as among the highest in the world, despite low to moderate rankings for religious-related social hostilities in the country.[306][307] The Global Slavery Index estimated that in 2016 more than 3.8 million people were living in «conditions of modern slavery», or 0.25% of the population, including victims of human trafficking, forced labor, forced marriage, child labor, and state-imposed forced labor. The state-imposed forced system was formally abolished in 2013, but it is not clear to which extent its various practices have stopped.[308] The Chinese penal system includes labor prison factories, detention centers, and re-education camps, collectively known as laogai («reform through labor»). The Laogai Research Foundation in the United States estimated that there were over a thousand slave labor prisons and camps in China.[309]

In 2019, a study called for the mass retraction of more than 400 scientific papers on organ transplantation, because of fears the organs were obtained unethically from Chinese prisoners. While the government says 10,000 transplants occur each year, a report by the Falun Gong-linked IETAC alleged that between 60,000 and 100,000 organs are transplanted each year and claimed that this gap was being made up by executed prisoners of conscience.[310]

Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is considered one of the world’s most powerful militaries and has rapidly modernized in the recent decades.[311] It consists of the Ground Force (PLAGF), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAAF), the Rocket Force (PLARF) and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Its nearly 2.2 million active duty personnel is the largest in the world. The PLA holds the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons,[312][313] and the world’s second-largest navy by tonnage.[314] China’s official military budget for 2022 totalled US$230 billion (1.45 trillion Yuan), the second-largest in the world. According to SIPRI estimates, its military spending from 2012 to 2021 averaged US$215 billion per year or 1.7 per cent of GDP, behind only the United States at US$734 billion per year or 3.6 per cent of GDP.[315] The PLA is commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the party and the state; though officially two separate organizations, the two CMCs have identical membership except during leadership transition periods and effectively function as one organization. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the officeholder also generally being the CCP general secretary, making them the paramount leader of China.[316]

Economy

A proportional representation of Chinese exports, 2019

China has the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP,[318] and the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).[319] As of 2021, China accounts for around 18% of the world economy by GDP nominal.[320] China is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies,[321] with its economic growth having been consistently above 6% since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978.[322] According to the World Bank, China’s GDP grew from $150 billion in 1978 to $17.73 trillion by 2021.[323] Of the world’s 500 largest companies, 145 are headquartered in China.[324]

China had one of the largest economies in the world for most of the past two thousand years,[325] during which it has seen cycles of prosperity and decline.[326][327] Since economic reforms began in 1978, China has developed into a highly diversified economy and one of the most consequential players in international trade. Major sectors of competitive strength include manufacturing, retail, mining, steel, textiles, automobiles, energy generation, green energy, banking, electronics, telecommunications, real estate, e-commerce, and tourism. China has three out of the ten largest stock exchanges in the world[328]—Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen—that together have a market capitalization of over $15.9 trillion, as of October 2020.[329] China has four (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shenzhen) out of the world’s top ten most competitive financial centers, which is more than any country in the 2020 Global Financial Centres Index.[330] By 2035, China’s four cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) are projected to be among the global top ten largest cities by nominal GDP according to a report by Oxford Economics.[331]

Modern-day China is considered an example of state capitalism or party-state capitalism.[332][333] The state dominates in strategic «pillar» sectors such as energy production and heavy industries, but private enterprise has expanded enormously, with around 30 million private businesses recorded in 2008.[334][335][336] In 2018, private enterprises in China accounted for 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 90% of new jobs.[337][better source needed]

China has been the world’s No. 1 manufacturer since 2010, after overtaking the US, which had been No. 1 for the previous hundred years.[338][339] China has also been No. 2 in high-tech manufacturing since 2012, according to US National Science Foundation.[340] China is the second largest retail market in the world, next to the United States.[341] China leads the world in e-commerce, accounting for 40% of the global market share in 2016[342] and more than 50% of the global market share in 2019.[343] China is the world’s leader in electric vehicles, manufacturing and buying half of all the plug-in electric cars (BEV and PHEV) in the world in 2018.[344] China is also the leading producer of batteries for electric vehicles as well as several key raw materials for batteries.[345] China had 174 GW of installed solar capacity by the end of 2018, which amounts to more than 40% of the global solar capacity.[346][347]

Wealth

China accounted for 17.9% of the world’s total wealth in 2021, second highest in the world after the US.[348] It ranks at 65th at GDP (nominal) per capita, making it an upper-middle income country.[349] China brought more people out of extreme poverty than any other country in history[350][351]—between 1978 and 2018, China reduced extreme poverty by 800 million. China reduced the extreme poverty rate—per international standard, it refers to an income of less than $1.90/day—from 88% in 1981 to 1.85% by 2013.[352] The portion of people in China living below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day (2011 PPP) fell to 0.3% in 2018 from 66.3% in 1990. Using the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 per day, the portion fell to 2.9% in 2018 from 90.0% in 1990. Using the upper-middle income poverty line of $5.50 per day, the portion fell to 17.0% from 98.3% in 1990.[353]

From 1978 to 2018, the average standard of living multiplied by a factor of twenty-six.[354] Wages in China have grown a lot in the last 40 years—real (inflation-adjusted) wages grew seven-fold from 1978 to 2007.[355] Per capita incomes have risen significantly – when the PRC was founded in 1949, per capita income in China was one-fifth of the world average; per capita incomes now equal the world average itself.[354] China’s development is highly uneven. Its major cities and coastal areas are far more prosperous compared to rural and interior regions.[356] It has a high level of economic inequality,[357] which has increased in the past few decades.[358] In 2018 China’s Gini coefficient was 0.467, according to the World Bank.[11]

As of 2020, China was second in the world, after the US, in total number of billionaires and total number of millionaires, with 698 Chinese billionaires and 4.4 million millionaires.[359] In 2019, China overtook the US as the home to the highest number of people who have a net personal wealth of at least $110,000, according to the global wealth report by Credit Suisse.[360][361] According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2020, China is home to five of the world’s top ten cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 10th spots, respectively) by the highest number of billionaires, which is more than any other country.[362] China had 85 female billionaires as of January 2021, two-thirds of the global total, and minted 24 new female billionaires in 2020.[363] China has had the world’s largest middle-class population since 2015,[364] and the middle-class grew to a size of 400 million by 2018.[365]

China in the global economy

China’s nominal GDP trend from 1952 to 2015

Share of world GDP (PPP)[366]
Year Share
1980 2.25%
1990 3.99%
2000 7.24%
2010 13.62%
2020 18.18%

China is a member of the WTO and is the world’s largest trading power, with a total international trade value of US$4.62 trillion in 2018.[367] China is the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods.[368] Its foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.1 trillion as of 2019,[369] making its reserves by far the world’s largest.[370][371] In 2012, China was the world’s largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting $253 billion.[372] In 2014, China’s foreign exchange remittances were $US64 billion making it the second largest recipient of remittances in the world.[373] China also invests abroad, with a total outward FDI of $62.4 billion in 2012,[372] and a number of major takeovers of foreign firms by Chinese companies.[374] China is a major owner of US public debt, holding trillions of dollars worth of U.S. Treasury bonds.[375][376] China’s undervalued exchange rate has caused friction with other major economies,[377] and it has also been widely criticized for manufacturing large quantities of counterfeit goods.[378][379]

Largest economies by nominal GDP in 2022[380]

Following the 2007–08 financial crisis, Chinese authorities sought to actively wean off of its dependence on the U.S. dollar as a result of perceived weaknesses of the international monetary system.[381] To achieve those ends, China took a series of actions to further the internationalization of the Renminbi. In 2008, China established the dim sum bond market and expanded the Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project, which helps establish pools of offshore RMB liquidity.[382][383] This was followed with bilateral agreements to settle trades directly in renminbi with Russia,[384] Japan,[385] Australia,[386] Singapore,[387] the United Kingdom,[388] and Canada.[389] As a result of the rapid internationalization of the renminbi, it became the eighth-most-traded currency in the world by 2018, an emerging international reserve currency,[390] and a component of the IMF’s special drawing rights; however, partly due to capital controls that make the renminbi fall short of being a fully convertible currency, it remains far behind the Euro, Dollar and Japanese Yen in international trade volumes.[391] As of 2022, Yuan is the world’s fifth-most traded currency.[392]

Science and technology

Historical

Earliest known written formula for gunpowder, from the Wujing Zongyao of 1044 CE

China was a world leader in science and technology until the Ming dynasty.[393] Ancient Chinese discoveries and inventions, such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions), became widespread across East Asia, the Middle East and later Europe. Chinese mathematicians were the first to use negative numbers.[394][395] By the 17th century, the Western hemisphere surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement.[396] The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars.[397]

After repeated military defeats by the European colonial powers and Japan in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communists came to power in 1949, efforts were made to organize science and technology based on the model of the Soviet Union, in which scientific research was part of central planning.[398] After Mao’s death in 1976, science and technology were promoted as one of the Four Modernizations,[399] and the Soviet-inspired academic system was gradually reformed.[400]

Modern era

Headquarters of Tencent in Shenzhen, one of the largest technology and entertainment companies in the world.[401]

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has made significant investments in scientific research[402] and is quickly catching up with the US in R&D spending.[403][404] China officially spent around 2.4% of its GDP on R&D in 2020, totaling to around $377.8 billion.[405] According to the World Intellectual Property Indicators, China received more applications than the US did in 2018 and 2019 and ranked first globally in patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, and creative goods exports in 2021.[406][407][408] It was ranked 11th in the Global Innovation Index in 2022, a considerable improvement from its rank of 35th in 2013.[409][410][411][412] Chinese supercomputers became the fastest in the world on a few occasions.[413] However, China has also struggled with developing several technologies domestically, such as the most advanced semiconductors and reliable jet engines.[414][415]

China is developing its education system with an emphasis on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).[416] It became the world’s largest publisher of scientific papers in 2016.[417][418][419] Chinese-born academicians have won prestigious prizes in the sciences and in mathematics, although most of them had conducted their winning research in Western nations.[aa][improper synthesis?]

Space program

The Chinese space program started in 1958 with some technology transfers from the Soviet Union. However, it did not launch the nation’s first satellite until 1970 with the Dong Fang Hong I, which made China the fifth country to do so independently.[426] In 2003, China became the third country in the world to independently send humans into space with Yang Liwei’s spaceflight aboard Shenzhou 5. as of 2022, sixteen Chinese nationals have journeyed into space, including two women. In 2011, China launched its first space station testbed, Tiangong-1.[427] In 2013, a Chinese robotic rover Yutu successfully touched down on the lunar surface as part of the Chang’e 3 mission.[428] In 2019, China became the first country to land a probe—Chang’e 4—on the far side of the Moon.[429] In 2020, Chang’e 5 successfully returned moon samples to the Earth, making China the third country to do so independently after the United States and the Soviet Union.[430] In 2021, China became the second nation in history to independently land a rover (Zhurong) on Mars, after the United States.[431] China completed its own modular space station, the Tiangong, in low Earth orbit on 3 November 2022.[432][433][434] On 29 November 2022, China performed its first in-orbit crew handover aboard the Tiangong.[435][436]

Infrastructure

After a decades-long infrastructural boom,[437] China has produced numerous world-leading infrastructural projects: China has the world’s largest bullet train network,[438] the most supertall skyscrapers in the world,[439] the world’s largest power plant (the Three Gorges Dam),[440] the largest energy generation capacity in the world,[441] a global satellite navigation system with the largest number of satellites in the world,[442] and has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a large global infrastructure building initiative with funding on the order of $50–100 billion per year.[443] The Belt and Road Initiative could be one of the largest development plans in modern history.[444]

Telecommunications

China is the largest telecom market in the world and currently has the largest number of active cellphones of any country in the world, with over 1.5 billion subscribers, as of 2018.[445][better source needed] It also has the world’s largest number of internet and broadband users, with over 800 million Internet users as of 2018—equivalent to around 60% of its population—and almost all of them being mobile as well.[446] By 2018, China had more than 1 billion 4G users, accounting for 40% of world’s total.[447] China is making rapid advances in 5G—by late 2018, China had started large-scale and commercial 5G trials.[448]

China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, are the three large providers of mobile and internet in China. China Telecom alone served more than 145 million broadband subscribers and 300 million mobile users; China Unicom had about 300 million subscribers; and China Mobile, the largest of them all, had 925 million users, as of 2018.[449] Combined, the three operators had over 3.4 million 4G base-stations in China.[450] Several Chinese telecommunications companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE, have been accused of spying for the Chinese military.[451]

China has developed its own satellite navigation system, dubbed Beidou, which began offering commercial navigation services across Asia in 2012[452] as well as global services by the end of 2018.[453][454] Upon the completion of the 35th Beidou satellite, which was launched into orbit on 23 June 2020, Beidou followed GPS and GLONASS as the third completed global navigation satellite in the world.[455]

Transport

Since the late 1990s, China’s national road network has been significantly expanded through the creation of a network of national highways and expressways. In 2018, China’s highways had reached a total length of 142,500 km (88,500 mi), making it the longest highway system in the world.[456][better source needed] China has the world’s largest market for automobiles, having surpassed the United States in both auto sales and production. A side-effect of the rapid growth of China’s road network has been a significant rise in traffic accidents,[457] though the number of fatalities in traffic accidents fell by 20% from 2007 to 2017.[458][better source needed] In urban areas, bicycles remain a common mode of transport, despite the increasing prevalence of automobiles – as of 2012, there are approximately 470 million bicycles in China.[459]

China’s railways, which are state-owned, are among the busiest in the world, handling a quarter of the world’s rail traffic volume on only 6 percent of the world’s tracks in 2006.[460][better source needed] As of 2017, the country had 127,000 km (78,914 mi) of railways, the second longest network in the world.[461] The railways strain to meet enormous demand particularly during the Chinese New Year holiday, when the world’s largest annual human migration takes place.[462]

China’s high-speed rail (HSR) system started construction in the early 2000s. By the end of 2020, high speed rail in China had reached 37,900 kilometers (23,550 miles) of dedicated lines alone, making it the longest HSR network in the world.[463][464] Services on the Beijing–Shanghai, Beijing–Tianjin, and Chengdu–Chongqing Lines reach up to 350 km/h (217 mph), making them the fastest conventional high speed railway services in the world. With an annual ridership of over 2.29 billion passengers in 2019 it is the world’s busiest.[465][better source needed] The network includes the Beijing–Guangzhou–Shenzhen High-Speed Railway, the single longest HSR line in the world, and the Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway, which has three of longest railroad bridges in the world.[466] The Shanghai Maglev Train, which reaches 431 km/h (268 mph), is the fastest commercial train service in the world.[467]

Since 2000, the growth of rapid transit systems in Chinese cities has accelerated.[468] As of January 2021, 44 Chinese cities have urban mass transit systems in operation[469] and 39 more have metro systems approved.[470] As of 2020, China boasts the five longest metro systems in the world with the networks in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenzhen being the largest.

There were approximately 229 airports in 2017, with around 240 planned by 2020. China has over 2,000 river and seaports, about 130 of which are open to foreign shipping.[471] In 2017, the Ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Tianjin ranked in the Top 10 in the world in container traffic and cargo tonnage.[472]

Water supply and sanitation

Water supply and sanitation infrastructure in China is facing challenges such as rapid urbanization, as well as water scarcity, contamination, and pollution.[473] According to data presented by the Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO and UNICEF in 2015, about 36% of the rural population in China still did not have access to improved sanitation.[474] The ongoing South–North Water Transfer Project intends to abate water shortage in the north.[475]

Demographics

A 2009 population density map of the People’s Republic of China, with territories not under its control in blue. The eastern coastal provinces are much more densely populated than the western interior.

The national census of 2020 recorded the population of the People’s Republic of China as approximately 1,411,778,724. According to the 2020 census, about 17.95% of the population were 14 years old or younger, 63.35% were between 15 and 59 years old, and 18.7% were over 60 years old.[8] The population growth rate for 2013 is estimated to be 0.46%.[476] China used to make up much of the world’s poor; now it makes up much of the world’s middle-class.[477] Although a middle-income country by Western standards, China’s rapid growth has pulled hundreds of millions—800 million, to be more precise[478]—of its people out of poverty since 1978. By 2013, less than 2% of the Chinese population lived below the international poverty line of US$1.9 per day, down from 88% in 1981.[352] From 2009 to 2018, the unemployment rate in China has averaged about 4%.[479]

Given concerns about population growth, China implemented a two-child limit during the 1970s, and, in 1979, began to advocate for an even stricter limit of one child per family. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, given the unpopularity of the strict limits, China began to allow some major exemptions, particularly in rural areas, resulting in what was actually a «1.5»-child policy from the mid-1980s to 2015 (ethnic minorities were also exempt from one child limits). The next major loosening of the policy was enacted in December 2013, allowing families to have two children if one parent is an only child.[480] In 2016, the one-child policy was replaced in favor of a two-child policy.[481] A three-child policy was announced on 31 May 2021, due to population aging,[482] and in July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[483] According to data from the 2020 census, China’s total fertility rate is 1.3, but some experts believe that after adjusting for the transient effects of the relaxation of restrictions, the country’s actual total fertility rate is as low as 1.1.[484]

According to one group of scholars, one-child limits had little effect on population growth[485] or the size of the total population.[486] However, these scholars have been challenged. Their own counterfactual model of fertility decline without such restrictions implies that China averted more than 500 million births between 1970 and 2015, a number which may reach one billion by 2060 given all the lost descendants of births averted during the era of fertility restrictions, with one-child restrictions accounting for the great bulk of that reduction.[487] The policy, along with traditional preference for boys, may have contributed to an imbalance in the sex ratio at birth.[488][489] According to the 2010 census, the sex ratio at birth was 118.06 boys for every 100 girls,[490] which is beyond the normal range of around 105 boys for every 100 girls.[491] The 2010 census found that males accounted for 51.27 percent of the total population.[490] However, China’s sex ratio is more balanced than it was in 1953, when males accounted for 51.82 percent of the total population.[490]

Ethnic groups

Ethnolinguistic map of China

China legally recognizes 56 distinct ethnic groups, who altogether comprise the Zhonghua Minzu. The largest of these nationalities are the ethnic Chinese or «Han», who constitute more than 90% of the total
population.[492] The Han Chinese – the world’s largest single ethnic group[493] – outnumber other ethnic groups in every provincial-level division except Tibet and Xinjiang.[494] Ethnic minorities account for less than 10% of the population of China, according to the 2010 census.[492] Compared with the 2000 population census, the Han population increased by 66,537,177 persons, or 5.74%, while the population of the 55 national minorities combined increased by 7,362,627 persons, or 6.92%.[492] The 2010 census recorded a total of 593,832 foreign nationals living in China. The largest such groups were from South Korea (120,750), the
United States (71,493) and Japan (66,159).[495]

Languages

There are as many as 292 living languages in China.[496] The languages most commonly spoken belong to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, which contains Mandarin (spoken by 70% of the population),[497] and other varieties of Chinese language: Yue (including Cantonese and Taishanese), Wu (including Shanghainese and Suzhounese), Min (including Fuzhounese, Hokkien and Teochew), Xiang, Gan and Hakka. Languages of the Tibeto-Burman branch, including Tibetan, Qiang, Naxi and Yi, are spoken across the Tibetan and Yunnan–Guizhou Plateau. Other ethnic minority languages in southwest China include Zhuang, Thai, Dong and Sui of the Tai-Kadai family, Miao and Yao of the Hmong–Mien family, and Wa of the Austroasiatic family. Across northeastern and northwestern China, local ethnic groups speak Altaic languages including Manchu, Mongolian and several Turkic languages: Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar and Western Yugur. Korean is spoken natively along the border with North Korea. Sarikoli, the language of Tajiks in western Xinjiang, is an Indo-European language. Taiwanese aborigines, including a small population on the mainland, speak Austronesian languages.[498]

Standard Mandarin, a variety of Mandarin based on the Beijing dialect, is the official national language of China and is used as a lingua franca in the country between people of different linguistic backgrounds.[499][500] Mongolian, Uyghur, Tibetan, Zhuang and various other languages are also regionally recognized throughout the country.[501]

Chinese characters have been used as the written script for the Sinitic languages for thousands of years. They allow speakers of mutually unintelligible Chinese varieties to communicate with each other through writing. In 1956, the government introduced simplified characters, which have supplanted the older traditional characters in mainland China. Chinese characters are romanized using the Pinyin system. Tibetan uses an alphabet based on an Indic script. Uyghur is most commonly written in Persian alphabet-based Uyghur Arabic alphabet. The Mongolian script used in China and the Manchu script are both derived from the Old Uyghur alphabet. Zhuang uses both an official Latin alphabet script and a traditional Chinese character script.[citation needed]

Urbanization

China has urbanized significantly in recent decades. The percent of the country’s population living in urban areas increased from 20% in 1980 to over 60% in 2019.[502][503][504] It is estimated that China’s urban population will reach one billion by 2030, potentially equivalent to one-eighth of the world population.[503][504]

China has over 160 cities with a population of over one million,[505] including the 17 megacities as of 2021[506][507] (cities with a population of over 10 million) of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xi’an, Suzhou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Hangzhou, Linyi, Shijiazhuang, Dongguan, Qingdao and Changsha.[508] Among them, the total permanent population of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu is above 20 million.[509] Shanghai is China’s most populous urban area[510][511] while Chongqing is its largest city proper, the only city in China with the largest permanent population of over 30 million.[512] By 2025, it is estimated that the country will be home to 221 cities with over a million inhabitants.[503] The figures in the table below are from the 2017 census,[513] and are only estimates of the urban populations within administrative city limits; a different ranking exists when considering the total municipal populations (which includes suburban and rural populations). The large «floating populations» of migrant workers make conducting censuses in urban areas difficult;[514] the figures below include only long-term residents.[citation needed]

  • v
  • t
  • e

Largest cities or municipalities in the People’s Republic of China

China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2020 Urban Population and Urban Temporary Population [515][note 1][note 2]

Rank Name Province Pop. Rank Name Province Pop.
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing
Beijing
1 Shanghai SH 24,281,400 11 Hong Kong HK 7,448,900 Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Shenzhen
Shenzhen
2 Beijing BJ 19,164,000 12 Zhengzhou HA 7,179,400
3 Guangzhou GD 13,858,700 13 Nanjing JS 6,823,500
4 Shenzhen GD 13,438,800 14 Xi’an SN 6,642,100
5 Tianjin TJ 11,744,400 15 Jinan SD 6,409,600
6 Chongqing CQ 11,488,000 16 Shenyang LN 5,900,000
7 Dongguan GD 9,752,500 17 Qingdao SD 5,501,400
8 Chengdu SC 8,875,600 18 Harbin HL 5,054,500
9 Wuhan HB 8,652,900 19 Hefei AH 4,750,100
10 Hangzhou ZJ 8,109,000 20 Changchun JL 4,730,900
  1. ^ Population of Hong Kong as of 2018 estimate.[516]
  2. ^ The data of Chongqing in the list is the data of «Metropolitan Developed Economic Area», which contains two parts: «City Proper» and «Metropolitan Area». The «City proper» are consist of 9 districts: Yuzhong, Dadukou, Jiangbei, Shapingba, Jiulongpo, Nan’an, Beibei, Yubei, & Banan, has the urban population of 5,646,300 as of 2018. And the «Metropolitan Area» are consist of 12 districts: Fuling, Changshou, Jiangjin, Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Qijiang, Dazu, Bishan, Tongliang, Tongnan, & Rongchang, has the urban population of 5,841,700.[517] Total urban population of all 26 districts of Chongqing are up to 15,076,600.

Education

Since 1986, compulsory education in China comprises primary and junior secondary school, which together last for nine years.[520] In 2021, about 91.4 percent of students continued their education at a three-year senior secondary school.[521] The Gaokao, China’s national university entrance exam, is a prerequisite for entrance into most higher education institutions. In 2010, 24 percent of secondary school graduates were enrolled in higher education.[522] This number increased significantly over the last decades, reaching a tertiary school enrolment of 58.42 percent in 2020.[523] Vocational education is available to students at the secondary and tertiary level.[524] More than 10 million Chinese students graduated from vocational colleges nationwide every year.[525]

China has the largest education system in the world, with about 282 million students and 17.32 million full-time teachers in over 530,000 schools.[526] In February 2006, the government pledged to provide completely free nine-year education, including textbooks and fees.[527] Annual education investment went from less than US$50 billion in 2003 to more than US$817 billion in 2020.[528][529] However, there remains an inequality in education spending. In 2010, the annual education expenditure per secondary school student in Beijing totalled ¥20,023, while in Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in China, only totalled ¥3,204.[530] Free compulsory education in China consists of primary school and junior secondary school between the ages of 6 and 15. In 2020, the graduation enrollment ratio at compulsory education level reached 95.2 percent, exceeding average levels recorded in high-income countries,[526] and around 91.2% of Chinese have received secondary education.[524]

China’s literacy rate has grown dramatically, from only 20% in 1949 and 65.5% in 1979.[531] to 97% of the population over age 15 in 2018.[532] In the same year, China (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) was ranked the highest in the world in the Programme for International Student Assessment ranking for all three categories of Mathematics, Science and Reading.[533]

As of 2021, China has over 3,000 universities, with over 44.3 million students enrolled in mainland China and 240 million Chinese citizens have received high education, making China the largest higher education system in the world.[534][535][536] As of 2021, China had the world’s second-highest number of top universities (the highest in Asia & Oceania region).[537] Currently, China trails only the United States in terms of representation on lists of top 200 universities according to the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).[538] China is home to the two of the highest ranking universities (Tsinghua University and Peking University) in Asia and emerging economies according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings.[539] As of 2022, two universities in Mainland China rank in the world’s top 15, with Peking University (12th) and Tsinghua University (14th) and three other universities ranking in the world’s top 50, namely Fudan, Zhejiang, and Shanghai Jiao Tong according to the QS World University Rankings.[540] These universities are members of the C9 League, an alliance of elite Chinese universities offering comprehensive and leading education.[541]

Health

The National Health and Family Planning Commission, together with its counterparts in the local commissions, oversees the health needs of the Chinese population.[542] An emphasis on public health and preventive medicine has characterized Chinese health policy since the early 1950s. At that time, the Communist Party started the Patriotic Health Campaign, which was aimed at improving sanitation and hygiene, as well as treating and preventing several diseases. Diseases such as cholera, typhoid and scarlet fever, which were previously rife in China, were nearly eradicated by the campaign.[citation needed]

After Deng Xiaoping began instituting economic reforms in 1978, the health of the Chinese public improved rapidly because of better nutrition, although many of the free public health services provided in the countryside disappeared along with the People’s Communes. Healthcare in China became mostly privatized, and experienced a significant rise in quality. In 2009, the government began a 3-year large-scale healthcare provision initiative worth US$124 billion.[543] By 2011, the campaign resulted in 95% of China’s population having basic health insurance coverage.[544] In 2011, China was estimated to be the world’s third-largest supplier of pharmaceuticals, but its population has suffered from the development and distribution of counterfeit medications.[545]

As of 2017, the average life expectancy at birth in China is 76 years,[546] and the infant mortality rate is 7 per thousand.[547] Both have improved significantly since the 1950s.[ab] Rates of stunting, a condition caused by malnutrition, have declined from 33.1% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2010.[550] Despite significant improvements in health and the construction of advanced medical facilities, China has several emerging public health problems, such as respiratory illnesses caused by widespread air pollution,[551] hundreds of millions of cigarette smokers,[552] and an increase in obesity among urban youths.[553][554] China’s large population and densely populated cities have led to serious disease outbreaks in recent years, such as the 2003 outbreak of SARS, although this has since been largely contained.[555] In 2010, air pollution caused 1.2 million premature deaths in China.[556]

The COVID-19 pandemic was first identified in Wuhan in December 2019.[557][558] Further studies are being carried out around the world on a possible origin for the virus.[559][560] The Chinese government has been criticized for its handling of the epidemic and accused of concealing the extent of the outbreak before it became an international pandemic.[561]

Religion

The government of the People’s Republic of China officially espouses state atheism,[566] and has conducted antireligious campaigns to this end.[567] Religious affairs and issues in the country are overseen by the State Administration for Religious Affairs.[568] Freedom of religion is guaranteed by China’s constitution, although religious organizations that lack official approval can be subject to state persecution.[290][569]

Over the millennia, Chinese civilization has been influenced by various religious movements. The «three teachings», including Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Chinese Buddhism), historically have a significant role in shaping Chinese culture,[570][571] enriching a theological and spiritual framework which harks back to the early Shang and Zhou dynasty. Chinese popular or folk religion, which is framed by the three teachings and other traditions,[572] consists in allegiance to the shen (), a character that signifies the «energies of generation», who can be deities of the environment or ancestral principles of human groups, concepts of civility, culture heroes, many of whom feature in Chinese mythology and history.[573] Among the most popular cults are those of Mazu (goddess of the seas),[574] Huangdi (one of the two divine patriarchs of the Chinese race),[574][575] Guandi (god of war and business), Caishen (god of prosperity and richness), Pangu and many others. China is home to many of the world’s tallest religious statues, including the tallest of all, the Spring Temple Buddha in Henan.[576]

Clear data on religious affiliation in China is difficult to gather due to varying definitions of «religion» and the unorganized, diffusive nature of Chinese religious traditions. Scholars note that in China there is no clear boundary between three teachings religions and local folk religious practice.[570] A 2015 poll conducted by Gallup International found that 61% of Chinese people self-identified as «convinced atheist»,[577] though it is worthwhile to note that Chinese religions or some of their strands are definable as non-theistic and humanistic religions, since they do not believe that divine creativity is completely transcendent, but it is inherent in the world and in particular in the human being.[578] According to a 2014 study, approximately 74% are either non-religious or practice Chinese folk belief, 16% are Buddhists, 2% are Christians, 1% are Muslims, and 8% adhere to other religions including Taoists and folk salvationism.[579][580] In addition to Han people’s local religious practices, there are also various ethnic minority groups in China who maintain their traditional autochthone religions. The various folk religions today comprise 2–3% of the population, while Confucianism as a religious self-identification is common within the intellectual class. Significant faiths specifically connected to certain ethnic groups include Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic religion of the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other peoples in Northwest China.[citation needed] The 2010 population census reported the total number of Muslims in the country as 23.14 million.[581]

A 2021 poll from Ipsos and the Policy Institute at King’s College London found that 35% of Chinese people said there was tension between different religious groups, which was the second lowest percentage of the 28 countries surveyed.[582][583]

Culture

Fenghuang County, an ancient town that harbors many architectural remains of Ming and Qing styles.

Since ancient times, Chinese culture has been heavily influenced by Confucianism. For much of the country’s dynastic era, opportunities for social advancement could be provided by high performance in the prestigious imperial examinations, which have their origins in the Han dynasty.[585] The literary emphasis of the exams affected the general perception of cultural refinement in China, such as the belief that calligraphy, poetry and painting were higher forms of art than dancing or drama. Chinese culture has long emphasized a sense of deep history and a largely inward-looking national perspective.[586] Examinations and a culture of merit remain greatly valued in China today.[587]

The first leaders of the People’s Republic of China were born into the traditional imperial order but were influenced by the May Fourth Movement and reformist ideals. They sought to change some traditional aspects of Chinese culture, such as rural land tenure, sexism, and the Confucian system of education, while preserving others, such as the family structure and culture of obedience to the state. Some observers see the period following the establishment of the PRC in 1949 as a continuation of traditional Chinese dynastic history, while others claim that the Communist Party’s rule has damaged the foundations of Chinese culture, especially through political movements such as the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, where many aspects of traditional culture were destroyed, having been denounced as «regressive and harmful» or «vestiges of feudalism». Many important aspects of traditional Chinese morals and culture, such as Confucianism, art, literature, and performing arts like Peking opera,[588] were altered to conform to government policies and propaganda at the time. Access to foreign media remains heavily restricted.[589]

Today, the Chinese government has accepted numerous elements of traditional Chinese culture as being integral to Chinese society. With the rise of Chinese nationalism and the end of the Cultural Revolution, various forms of traditional Chinese art, literature, music, film, fashion and architecture have seen a vigorous revival,[590][591] and folk and variety art in particular have sparked interest nationally and even worldwide.[592]

Tourism

China received 55.7 million inbound international visitors in 2010,[593] and in 2012 was the third-most-visited country in the world.[594] It also experiences an enormous volume of domestic tourism; an estimated 740 million Chinese holidaymakers traveled within the country in October 2012.[595] China hosts the world’s second-largest number of World Heritage Sites (56) after Italy, and is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world (first in the Asia-Pacific).

Literature

Chinese literature is based on the literature of the Zhou dynasty.[596] Concepts covered within the Chinese classic texts present a wide range of thoughts and subjects including calendar, military, astrology, herbology, geography and many others.[597] Some of the most important early texts include the I Ching and the Shujing within the Four Books and Five Classics which served as the Confucian authoritative books for the state-sponsored curriculum in dynastic era.[598] Inherited from the Classic of Poetry, classical Chinese poetry developed to its floruit during the Tang dynasty. Li Bai and Du Fu opened the forking ways for the poetic circles through romanticism and realism respectively.[599] Chinese historiography began with the Shiji, the overall scope of the historiographical tradition in China is termed the Twenty-Four Histories, which set a vast stage for Chinese fictions along with Chinese mythology and folklore.[600] Pushed by a burgeoning citizen class in the Ming dynasty, Chinese classical fiction rose to a boom of the historical, town and gods and demons fictions as represented by the Four Great Classical Novels which include Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Journey to the West and Dream of the Red Chamber.[601] Along with the wuxia fictions of Jin Yong and Liang Yusheng,[602] it remains an enduring source of popular culture in the East Asian cultural sphere.[603]

In the wake of the New Culture Movement after the end of the Qing dynasty, Chinese literature embarked on a new era with written vernacular Chinese for ordinary citizens. Hu Shih and Lu Xun were pioneers in modern literature.[604] Various literary genres, such as misty poetry, scar literature, young adult fiction and the xungen literature, which is influenced by magic realism,[605] emerged following the Cultural Revolution. Mo Yan, a xungen literature author, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012.[606]

Cuisine

Map showing major regional cuisines of China

Chinese cuisine is highly diverse, drawing on several millennia of culinary history and geographical variety, in which the most influential are known as the «Eight Major Cuisines», including Sichuan, Cantonese, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui, and Zhejiang cuisines.[607] All of them are featured by the precise skills of shaping, heating, and flavoring.[608][better source needed] Chinese cuisine is also known for its width of cooking methods and ingredients,[609] as well as food therapy that is emphasized by traditional Chinese medicine.[610][better source needed] Generally, China’s staple food is rice in the south, wheat-based breads and noodles in the north. The diet of the common people in pre-modern times was largely grain and simple vegetables, with meat reserved for special occasions. The bean products, such as tofu and soy milk, remain as a popular source of protein.[611] Pork is now the most popular meat in China, accounting for about three-fourths of the country’s total meat consumption.[612] While pork dominates the meat market, there is also the vegetarian Buddhist cuisine and the pork-free Chinese Islamic cuisine. Southern cuisine, due to the area’s proximity to the ocean and milder climate, has a wide variety of seafood and vegetables; it differs in many respects from the wheat-based diets across dry northern China. Numerous offshoots of Chinese food, such as Hong Kong cuisine and American Chinese food, have emerged in the nations that play host to the Chinese diaspora.[citation needed]

Music

Chinese music covers a highly diverse range of music from traditional music to modern music. Chinese music dates back before the pre-imperial times. Traditional Chinese musical instruments were traditionally grouped into eight categories known as bayin (八音). Traditional Chinese opera is a form of musical theatre in China originating thousands of years and has regional style forms such as Beijing opera and Cantonese opera.[613] Chinese pop (C-Pop) includes mandopop and cantopop. Chinese rap, Chinese hip hop and Hong Kong hip hop have become popular in contemporary times.[614]

Cinema

Cinema was first introduced to China in 1896 and the first Chinese film, Dingjun Mountain, was released in 1905.[615] China has the largest number of movie screens in the world since 2016,[616] China became the largest cinema market in the world in 2020.[617][618] The top 3 highest-grossing films in China currently are Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), Ne Zha (2019), and The Wandering Earth (2019).[619]

Fashion

Hanfu is the historical clothing of the Han people in China. The qipao or cheongsam is a popular Chinese female dress.[620] The hanfu movement has been popular in contemporary times and seeks to revitalize Hanfu clothing.[621]

Sports

China has one of the oldest sporting cultures in the world. There is evidence that archery (shèjiàn) was practiced during the Western Zhou dynasty. Swordplay (jiànshù) and cuju, a sport loosely related to association football[622] date back to China’s early dynasties as well.[623]

Go is an abstract strategy board game for two players, in which the aim is to surround more territory than the opponent and was invented in China more than 2,500 years ago.

Physical fitness is widely emphasized in Chinese culture, with morning exercises such as qigong and t’ai chi ch’uan widely practiced,[624] and commercial gyms and private fitness clubs are gaining popularity across the country.[625] Basketball is currently the most popular spectator sport in China.[626] The Chinese Basketball Association and the American National Basketball Association have a huge following among the people, with native or ethnic Chinese players such as Yao Ming and Yi Jianlian held in high esteem.[627] China’s professional football league, now known as Chinese Super League, was established in 1994, it is the largest football market in Asia.[628] Other popular sports in the country include martial arts, table tennis, badminton, swimming and snooker. Board games such as go (known as wéiqí in Chinese), xiangqi, mahjong, and more recently chess, are also played at a professional level.[629] In addition, China is home to a huge number of cyclists, with an estimated 470 million bicycles as of 2012.[459] Many more traditional sports, such as dragon boat racing, Mongolian-style wrestling and horse racing are also popular.[630]

China has participated in the Olympic Games since 1932, although it has only participated as the PRC since 1952. China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, where its athletes received 48 gold medals – the highest number of gold medals of any participating nation that year.[631] China also won the most medals of any nation at the 2012 Summer Paralympics, with 231 overall, including 95 gold medals.[632][633] In 2011, Shenzhen in Guangdong, China hosted the 2011 Summer Universiade. China hosted the 2013 East Asian Games in Tianjin and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics in Nanjing; the first country to host both regular and Youth Olympics. Beijing and its nearby city Zhangjiakou of Hebei province collaboratively hosted the 2022 Olympic Winter Games, making Beijing the first dual olympic city in the world by holding both the Summer Olympics and the Winter Olympics.[634][635]

See also

  • Outline of China

Notes

  1. ^ Chinese and English are the official languages in Hong Kong only. Chinese and Portuguese are the official languages in Macau only.
  2. ^
    • In the Hong Kong Traditional Chinese characters and English alphabet are used,
    • In the Macau Traditional Chinese characters and Portuguese orthography are used,
    • In Inner Mongolia the Mongolian script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Tibet Autonomous Region the Tibetan script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Xinjiang the Uyghur Arabic alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Guangxi and Wenshan Prefecture the Latin alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Chosŏn’gŭl is used alongside simplified Chinese.

  3. ^ The top position in one-party ruling China.
  4. ^ Although PRC President is head of state, it is a largely ceremonial office with limited power under CCP General Secretary.
  5. ^ Including both state and party’s central military chairs.
  6. ^ Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
  7. ^ The area given is the official United Nations figure for the mainland and excludes Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.[3] It also excludes the Trans-Karakoram Tract (5,180 km2 (2,000 sq mi)), Aksai Chin (38,000 km2 (15,000 sq mi)) and other territories in dispute with India. The total area of China is listed as 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) by the Encyclopædia Britannica.[4] For further information, see Territorial changes of the People’s Republic of China.
  8. ^ This figure was calculated using data from the CIA World Factbook.[6]
  9. ^ GDP figures exclude Taiwan, and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
  10. ^
    • Hong Kong dollar used in Hong Kong and Macau
    • Macanese pataca used in Macau only.

  11. ^ Chinese: 中华人民共和国; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
  12. ^ China’s border with Pakistan is disputed by India, which claims the entire Kashmir region as its territory.
  13. ^ The total area ranking relative to the United States depends on the measurement of the total areas of both countries. See List of countries and dependencies by area for more information.

    The following two primary sources (non-mirrored) represent the range (min./max.) of estimates of China’s and the United States’ total areas.

    Both sources (1) exclude Taiwan from the area of China; (2) exclude China’s coastal and territorial waters.

    However, the CIA World Factbook includes the United States coastal and territorial waters, while Encyclopædia Britannica excludes the United States coastal and territorial waters.

    1. The Encyclopædia Britannica lists China as world’s third-largest country (after Russia and Canada) with a total area of 9,572,900 km2,[13] and the United States as fourth-largest at 9,525,067 km2.[14]
    2. The CIA World Factbook lists China as the fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada and the United States) with a total area of 9,596,960 km2,[15] and the United States as the third-largest at 9,833,517 km2.[16]

    Notably, the Encyclopædia Britannica specifies the United States’ area (excluding coastal and territorial waters) as 9,525,067 km2, which is less than either source’s figure given for China’s area.[14] Therefore, while it can be determined that China has a larger area excluding coastal and territorial waters, it is unclear which country has a larger area including coastal and territorial waters.


    The United Nations Statistics Division’s figure for the United States is 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi) and China is 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi). These closely match the CIA World Factbook figures and similarly include coastal and territorial waters for the United States, but exclude coastal and territorial waters for China.


    Further explanation of disputed ranking: The dispute about which is the world’s third-largest country arose from the inclusion of coastal and territorial waters for the United States. This discrepancy was deduced from comparing the CIA World Factbook and its previous iterations[17] against the information for United States in Encyclopædia Britannica, particularly its footnote section.[14] In sum, according to older versions of the CIA World Factbook (from 1982 to 1996), the U.S. was listed as the world’s fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and China) with a total area of 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi). However, in the 1997 edition, the U.S. added coastal waters to its total area (increasing it to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi)). And then again in 2007, U.S. added territorial water to its total area (increasing it to 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi)). During this time, China’s total area remained unchanged. In other words, no coastal or territorial water area was added to China’s total area figure. The United States has a coastal water area of 109,362 km2 (42,225 sq mi), and a territorial water area of 195,213 km2 (75,372 sq mi), for a total of 304,575 km2 (117,597 sq mi) of additional water space. This is larger than entire countries like Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Adding this figure to the U.S. will boost it over China in ranking since China’s coastal and territorial water figures are currently unknown (no official publication) and thus cannot be added into China’s total area figure.

  14. ^ a b China claims the de facto state of Taiwan, which it does not control, as its disputed 23rd province, i.e. Taiwan Province. See § Administrative divisions for more details.
  15. ^ The island of Hainan was taken on 1 May 1950 while the unrecognized polity of Tibet was annexed on 23 May 1951.
  16. ^ The KMT solely governed the island until its transition to democracy in 1996.
  17. ^ «… Next vnto this, is found the great China, whose kyng is thought to bee the greatest prince in the worlde, and is named Santoa Raia».[19][20]
  18. ^ «… The Very Great Kingdom of China».[21] (Portuguese:  O Grande Reino da China ).[22]
  19. ^ Although this is the present meaning of guó, in Old Chinese (when its pronunciation was something like /*qʷˤək/)[28] it meant the walled city of the Chinese and the areas they could control from them.[29]
  20. ^ Its earliest extant use is on the ritual bronze vessel He zun, where it apparently refers to only the Shang’s immediate demesne conquered by the Zhou.[30]
  21. ^ Its meaning «Zhou’s royal demesne» is attested from the 6th-century BC Classic of History, which states «Huangtian bestowed the lands and the peoples of the central state to the ancestors» (皇天既付中國民越厥疆土于先王).[31]
  22. ^ Owing to Qin Shi Huang’s earlier policy involving the «burning of books and burying of scholars», the destruction of the confiscated copies at Xianyang was an event similar to the destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the west. Even those texts that did survive had to be painstakingly reconstructed from memory, luck, or forgery.[59] The Old Texts of the Five Classics were said to have been found hidden in a wall at the Kong residence in Qufu. Mei Ze’s «rediscovered» edition of the Book of Documents was only shown to be a forgery in the Qing dynasty.
  23. ^ China is larger than Canada and the United States in terms of land area.
  24. ^ According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the total area of the United States, at 9,522,055 km2 (3,676,486 sq mi), is slightly smaller than that of China. Meanwhile, the CIA World Factbook states that China’s total area was greater than that of the United States until the coastal waters of the Great Lakes was added to the United States’ total area in 1996. From 1989 through 1996, the total area of US was listed as 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi) (land area plus inland water only). The listed total area changed to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi) in 1997 (with the Great Lakes areas and the coastal waters added), to 9,631,418 km2 (3,718,711 sq mi) in 2004, to 9,631,420 km2 (3,718,710 sq mi) in 2006, and to 9,826,630 km2 (3,794,080 sq mi) in 2007 (territorial waters added).
  25. ^ China’s border with Pakistan and part of its border with India falls in the disputed region of Kashmir. The area under Pakistani administration is claimed by India, while the area under Indian administration is claimed by Pakistan.
  26. ^ Meaning cities that are not divided into districts (不设区的市), counties (县), city districts (市辖区), towns (镇), townships (乡), and lastly ethnic townships (民族乡)
  27. ^ Tsung-Dao Lee,[420] Chen Ning Yang,[420] Daniel C. Tsui,[421] Charles K. Kao,[422] Yuan T. Lee,[423] Tu Youyou[424] Shing-Tung Yau[425]
  28. ^ The national life expectancy at birth rose from about 31 years in 1949 to 75 years in 2008,[548] and infant mortality decreased from 300 per thousand in the 1950s to around 33 per thousand in 2001.[549]

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Further reading

  • Farah, Paolo (2006). «Five Years of China’s WTO Membership: EU and US Perspectives on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism». Legal Issues of Economic Integration. Kluwer Law International. Volume 33, Number 3. pp. 263–304. Abstract.
  • Heilig, Gerhard K. (2006/2007). China Bibliography – Online Archived 5 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. China-Profile.com.
  • Jacques, Martin (2009).When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. Penguin Books. Rev. ed. (28 August 2012). ISBN 978-1-59420-185-1
  • Jaffe, Amy Myers, «Green Giant: Renewable Energy and Chinese Power», Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 2 (March / April 2018), pp. 83–93.
  • Johnson, Ian, «What Holds China Together?», The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 14 (26 September 2019), pp. 14, 16, 18. «The Manchus … had [in 1644] conquered the last ethnic Chinese empire, the Ming [and established Imperial China’s last dynasty, the Qing] … The Manchus expanded the empire’s borders northward to include all of Mongolia, and westward to Tibet and Xinjiang.» [p. 16.] «China’s rulers have no faith that anything but force can keep this sprawling country intact.» [p. 18.]
  • Lagerwey, John (2010). China: A Religious State. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. ISBN 978-988-8028-04-7.
  • Meng, Fanhua (2011). Phenomenon of Chinese Culture at the Turn of the 21st century. Singapore: Silkroad Press. ISBN 978-981-4332-35-4.
  • Sang Ye (2006). China Candid: The People on the People’s Republic. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24514-3.
  • Selden, Mark (1979). The People’s Republic of China: Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-532-5.
  • Shambaugh, David L. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Washington, DC; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-25492-3.

External links

Government

  • The Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China (in English)

General information

  • China at a Glance from People’s Daily
  • Country profile – China at BBC News
  • China. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency.
  • China, People’s Republic of from UCB Libraries GovPubs
  • China at Curlie

Maps

Coordinates: 35°N 103°E / 35°N 103°E

Запрос «КНР» перенаправляется сюда; см. также другие значения.

У этого термина существуют и другие значения, см. Китай (значения).

Китайская Народная Республика
кит. трад. 中華人民共和國, упр. 中华人民共和国, пиньинь: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
тиб. ཀྲུང་ཧྭ་མི་དམངས་སྤྱི་མཐུན་རྒྱལ་ཁབ།
уйг. جۇڭخۇا خەلق جۇمھۇرىيىتى
монг. ᠪᠦᠭᠦᠳᠡ ᠨᠠᠶᠢᠷᠠᠮᠳᠠᠬᠤ ᠳᠤᠮᠳᠠᠳᠤ ᠠᠷᠠᠳ ᠤᠯᠤᠰ/ Бүгд Найрамдах Хятад Ард Улс
чжуанск. Cunghvaz Yinzminz Gunghozgoz
англ. People’s Republic of China
порт. República Popular da China
каз. Қытай Халық Республикасы

Китайская Народная Республика Герб Китайской Народной Республики
Флаг Китайской Народной Республики Герб Китайской Народной Республики

Координаты: 32°48′00″ с. ш. 103°05′00″ в. д. / 32.8° с. ш. 103.083333° в. д. (G) (O)

Гимн: «Марш добровольцев»

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CHN orthographic.svg
Основано 1 октября 1949
Официальный язык китайский[1]
Столица Пекин
Крупнейшие города Чунцин,Тяньцзинь,Шанхай, Пекин, Гуанчжоу
Форма правления Народная республика
Председатель КНР
Заместитель Председателя КНР
Премьер Госсовета
Председатель ВСНП
Председатель НПКС
Си Цзиньпин
Си Цзиньпин
Ли Кэцян
У Банго
Цзя Цинлинь
Территория
• Всего
• % водной поверхн.
3-я в мире
9 596 960[2] км²
3,8
Население
• Оценка (2010)
• Плотность
1 347 374 752[3] чел. (1-е)
139,6 чел./км²
ВВП
  • Итого (2011)
  • На душу населения
7,5 трлн. (номинал)[4] $ (2-й)
4 264[5] $
Этнохороним китаец, китаянка, китайцы
Валюта юань (жэньминьби) (CNY, код 156) [6]
Интернет-домен .cn
Телефонный код +86
Часовой пояс +8

Bocinolo.jpg

Этот звуковой файл был создан на основе введения в статью версии за 8 мая 2012 года и не отражает правки после этой даты.

cм. также другие аудиостатьи

Кита́йская Наро́дная Респу́блика (кит. трад. 中華人民共和國, упр. 中华人民共和国, пиньинь: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó, палл.: Чжунхуа Жэньминь Гунхэго, сокращённо КНР[7] или просто Кита́й[8] (см. происхождение русского названия), кит. трад. 中國, упр. 中国, пиньинь: Zhōngguó, Чжунго, буквально: «срединное государство») — государство в Восточной Азии, крупнейшее по численности населения государство мира (свыше 1,3 млрд, большинство населения — этнические китайцы, самоназвание — хань); занимает третье место в мире по территории, уступая России и Канаде.

Со времени провозглашения Китайской Народной Республики в 1949 правящей партией является Коммунистическая партия Китая (КПК). Существуют также ещё восемь зарегистрированных политических партий (например, Революционный комитет Гоминьдана), формально независимых от КПК.

Содержание

  • 1 История
    • 1.1 Периодизация истории Китая
    • 1.2 КНР
  • 2 Политика
    • 2.1 Права человека
    • 2.2 Политическая структура КНР
  • 3 Внутренняя политика
    • 3.1 Народное образование
    • 3.2 Частное образование
    • 3.3 Медицина
  • 4 Внешняя политика
    • 4.1 КНР-США
    • 4.2 КНР-Россия
    • 4.3 КНР-Великобритания
    • 4.4 Территориальные вопросы
  • 5 Административное деление КНР
    • 5.1 Пекин
    • 5.2 Шанхай
  • 6 Физико-географическая характеристика
    • 6.1 Географическое положение
    • 6.2 Рельеф
    • 6.3 Климат
    • 6.4 Полезные ископаемые
    • 6.5 Реки и озёра
    • 6.6 Растительность
  • 7 Экономика
    • 7.1 Внешняя торговля
    • 7.2 Транспорт в Китае
    • 7.3 Связь в Китае
    • 7.4 Экономический рост и положение населения
    • 7.5 Юань
    • 7.6 ОЭСР и Китай
    • 7.7 Саудовская Аравия и Китай
    • 7.8 Сельское хозяйство
    • 7.9 Банки Китая
  • 8 Вооружённые силы
  • 9 Население
    • 9.1 Семейная жизнь
    • 9.2 Крупнейшие города
    • 9.3 Социальные слои
    • 9.4 Язык и письменность
      • 9.4.1 Языковые семьи народностей Китая
      • 9.4.2 Печатный орган
    • 9.5 Религия
      • 9.5.1 Конфуцианство
      • 9.5.2 Буддизм
      • 9.5.3 Ислам
      • 9.5.4 Православие
      • 9.5.5 Католицизм
  • 10 Культура
    • 10.1 Фэншуй
    • 10.2 Энергия «ци»
    • 10.3 Каллиграфия
    • 10.4 Фарфор
    • 10.5 Кунг-фу
    • 10.6 Рис
    • 10.7 Культурные и исторические памятники Китая
      • 10.7.1 Великая Китайская стена
      • 10.7.2 Императорский дворец
      • 10.7.3 Мавзолей императора Цинь Шихуанди и «терракотовая армия»
    • 10.8 Китайские изобретения
      • 10.8.1 Китайская астрология
      • 10.8.2 Книгопечатание
      • 10.8.3 Иероглифы
  • 11 Спорт
  • 12 См. также
  • 13 Примечания
  • 14 Ссылки

История

Чжунго «Срединное государство» — самоназвание Китая

История Китая особенна множеством и разнообразием письменных источников, которые, в сочетании с археологическими данными, позволяют реконструировать политическую жизнь и социальные процессы, начиная с глубокой древности. Канонизированные древнекитайские тексты религиозно-философского и исторического содержания — особенно те из них, в которых излагалось учение Конфуция — в свою очередь, сами влияли на дальнейшее развитие китайской цивилизации, мировоззрение китайского народа.

Для китайской цивилизации со времён Конфуция была характерна высокая социально-политическая активность каждого человека, направленная на достижение счастья и благополучия именно в земной жизни — при этом судьба его зависела не от божественного предопределения, а от собственных усилий. В этом коренится насыщенность китайской истории массовыми народными движениями и типичная для Китая высокая социальная мобильность[источник не указан 271 день].

Китайская цивилизация — одна из старейших в мире. По утверждениям китайских учёных[каких?], её возраст может составлять пять тысяч лет, при этом имеющиеся письменные источники покрывают период не менее 3500 лет. Давнее наличие систем административного управления, которые совершенствовались сменявшими друг друга династиями, создавало очевидные преимущества для китайского государства, экономика которого основывалась на развитом земледелии, по сравнению с более отсталыми соседями-кочевниками и горцами. Ещё более укрепило китайскую цивилизацию введение конфуцианства в качестве государственной идеологии (I век до н. э.) и единой системы письма (II век до н. э.).

С политической точки зрения Китай в течение нескольких тысячелетий проходил через циклически повторяющиеся периоды политического единства и распада, причём в ряде случаев частично или полностью становился частью иностранных государств (например, империй Юань и Цин). Территория Китая регулярно подвергалась нашествиям извне, однако большинство захватчиков рано или поздно подвергались китаизации и ассимилировались в китайский этнос, а территории их государств обычно включались в территорию Китая. Современное китайское государство и общество является результатом многовекового культурного и политического взаимопроникновения и взаимодействия с многочисленными окружающими азиатскими народами, сопровождавшегося перемещениями многомиллионных людских масс и многовековой ханьской ассимиляцией. При этом необходимо учитывать, что традиционная китайская историография включает суверенные государства других народов (монголов, маньчжуров и др.) в хроникально-династийную историю Китая, игнорируя собственные исторические традиции этих народов и рассматривая их государства как исторические части Китая.

Периодизация истории Китая

Краткая хронологическая таблица, принятая в китайской исторической науке

Годы Государство (династия)
До нашей эры
2353 до н. э. — 2255 до н. э. Легендарный правитель Яо
2255 до н. э. — 2205 до н. э. Легендарный правитель Шунь
2205 до н. э. — 1766 до н. э. Легендарная династия Ся
1766 до н. э. — 1122 до н. э. Традиционные даты династии Шан-Инь
1122 до н. э. — 249 до н. э. Традиционные даты династии Чжоу
221 до н. э. — 206 до н. э. Традиционные даты династии Цинь
206 год до н. э. — 220 н. э. Традиционные даты династии Хань
(в том числе Западная Хань — с 206 до н. э. по 25 н. э.,
Восточная Хань — 25 — 220 н. э.)
Наша эра
220 — 264 Династия Вэй, Эпоха Троецарствия
265 — 420 Династия Цзинь (Западная Цзинь: 265—316, Восточная Цзинь: 317—420)
420 — 479 Династия Южная Сун
479 — 501 Династия Ци
502 — 556 Династия Лян
557 — 588 Династия Чэнь
581 — 618 Династия Суй
618 — 917 Династия Тан
907 — 959 Эпоха пяти династий и десяти царств
960 — 1279 Династия Сун
1280 — 1368 Династия Юань (монгольская)
1368 — 1644 Династия Мин
1644 — 1911 Династия Цин (маньчжурская)
1912 — 1949
(на Тайване — по н. вр.)
Китайская Республика
С 1 октября 1949 Китайская Народная Республика

КНР

К 1949 г. вооружённые силы КПК одержали победу в гражданской войне в Китае, причём Гоминьдан мог защитить свою власть самостоятельно — без помощи США, тогда как «Компартия Китая своих возможностей для вооружённого захвата власти не имела и опиралась на Советский Союз»[9]. США оказывали огромную военную помощь Гоминьдану, в том числе и поставками очень большого количества танков.

В 1949—1956 при помощи СССР созданы базовые отрасли промышленности, проведена национализация промышленности и коллективизация сельского хозяйства, развёрнуто массированное социалистическое строительство.

В 1956 на 8-м съезде КПК провозглашён новый курс, вылившийся в победу идей Мао Цзэдуна и политику «большого скачка» и «коммунизации» (1958—1966), а в дальнейшем, в результате борьбы двух линий провозглашена «культурная революция» 1966—1976, основным постулатом которой было усиление классовой борьбы по мере строительства социализма и «особый путь» Китая в построении государства и общества (отрицание товарно-денежных отношений, отсутствие негосударственных форм собственности, замораживание внешнеэкономических связей, публичные суды над нечестными политиками, хунвэйбины и др.)

Эта политика была впоследствии осуждена пришедшим к власти после свержения «банды четырёх» Дэн Сяопином. III Пленум ЦК КПК 11 созыва (декабрь 1978) провозгласил курс на социалистическую рыночную экономику при сочетании двух систем: планово-распределительной и рыночной при массовом привлечении иностранных инвестиций, большей хозяйственной самостоятельности предприятий, введении семейного подряда на селе, сокращении доли государственного сектора в экономике, открытии свободных экономических зон, преодолении бедности, развитии науки и техники.

Именно Дэн Сяопин способствовал стабилизации политической ситуации в Китае и ускорению его социально-экономического развития[источник не указан 271 день]. При нём внешняя политика страны, в отличие от эпохи Мао, стала пассивной. В конце 1980-х — начале 1990-х Китаю удалось полностью снять проблему обеспечения населения питанием, развить высокие темпы роста ВВП и промышленного производства, поднять уровень жизни народа.

Реформы были продолжены и его преемниками — Цзян Цзэминем (с 1993) и Ху Цзиньтао (с 2002).

В течение 2002−2005 Ху Цзиньтао сосредоточил в своих руках высшие партийные, государственные и военные посты в стране (генеральный секретарь ЦК КПК, председатель КНР, главнокомандующий НОАК).

Среднегодовые темпы роста ВВП в 1990—1999 составляли 10,3 %, в 1998—2001 — 10 %, в 2002—2005 — 9 %[источник не указан 271 день].

По объёму ВВП, рассчитанному по покупательной способности валют, Китай занимает в настоящее время второе место в мире после США[10]. Резко возросли валютные резервы. Объём внешней торговли к 2004 году превысил 850 млрд долл.

Прибрежные провинции на востоке страны в большей степени индустриализированы, в то время как население многих внутренних регионов КНР живёт беднее. Одним из самых бедных регионов страны является Тибет.

В октябре 2005 началась кампания по установлению государственного контроля над деятельностью крупнейших операторов сотовой связи. Проведены массовые чистки среди партийного и государственного руководства провинции Гуандун, обвиняемого в повсеместной коррупции[источник не указан 271 день].

Пленум ЦК КПК в октябре 2005 принял 11-й пятилетний план, «имеющий своей стратегической целью построение в Китае гармоничного общества».

5 марта 2006 на очередной сессии ВСНП выступивший с программным докладом премьер-министр Вэнь Цзябао предложил снизить темпы экономического роста страны, а высвободившиеся средства направить на улучшение жизни крестьян и увеличение военного бюджета.

Правительство планировало замедлить темпы прироста ВВП Китая до 7,5 % в год против нынешних 10 %. Освободившиеся средства были направлены на сокращение разрыва между уровнем жизни городского населения и крестьян (около 900 млн, или почти 75 % населения). В 2006 году планировалось потратить на развитие аграрного сектора около 340 млрд юаней, что на 14 % больше, чем в 2005 году.

Возросли расходы и на армию. Официальный военный бюджет вырос в 2006 году на 14,7 % и составил 284 млрд юаней (35,5 млрд долл.)

Планируемое увеличение расходов на сельское хозяйство и вооружённые силы будет осуществлено за счёт богатых приморских провинций. Поэтому ожидается, что проведение этой политики может натолкнуться на противодействие так называемого шанхайского клана бывшего председателя Цзян Цзэминя.

Также, согласно этому плану, к 2010 году доля энергии, извлекаемой из возобновляемых источников, должна вырасти с 2,5 до 10 % общего объёма производства электроэнергии[11].

Политика

Права человека

Политическая структура КНР

После образования КНР в декабре 1949 года были приняты четыре Конституции (в 1954, 1975, 1978 и 1982 годах). В соответствии с Конституцией Китайской Народной Республики (декабрь 1982), КНР — социалистическое государство демократической диктатуры народа. Высший орган государственной власти — однопалатное Всекитайское собрание народных представителей (ВСНП), состоящее из 2979 депутатов, избираемых региональными собраниями народных представителей сроком на 5 лет. Сессии ВСНП созываются на ежегодной основе.

Из-за большого количества депутатов в период между сессиями функции ВСНП выполняет избираемый из числа депутатов Постоянный Комитет (около 150 человек).

К выборам допускаются только депутаты от Коммунистической партии Китая и восьми так называемых демократических партий, входящих в Народный политический консультативный совет Китая (НПКСК). Собственные органы законодательной власти действуют на территории специальных административных районов Гонконга и Макао.

Все депутаты ВСНП являются представителями блока коммунистов и демократов.

Председатель КНР — Ху Цзиньтао (кит. 胡锦涛), генеральный секретарь ЦК КПК. Это представитель уже четвёртого поколения руководителей страны.

Переход властных полномочий к этому поколению начался в 2002, когда Ху Цзиньтао сменил Цзян Цзэминя на посту генерального секретаря ЦК КПК. В марте 2003 Ху Цзиньтао был избран Председателем КНР, а в сентябре 2004 — Председателем Центрального Военного Совета (ЦВС) ЦК КПК. Ранее все эти посты также занимал Цзян Цзэминь. 8 марта 2005 сессия китайского парламента (Всекитайского собрания народных представителей) одобрила просьбу Цзян Цзэминя об отставке с поста Председателя Центрального Военного Совета КНР. Позднее этот пост также занял Ху Цзиньтао, что завершило процесс смены власти в высшем руководстве страны.

Центральный Военный Совет КНР был учреждён в 1982 году. Его первым председателем был Дэн Сяопин, в 1990 году на этом посту его сменил Цзян Цзэминь. Посты председателей ЦВС ЦК КПК и ЦВС КНР в нынешней политической системе Китая, как правило, совмещает один человек.

Военный совет и его руководитель играют важную роль в китайской политической системе. Так, в 1989 занимавший этот пост Дэн Сяопин, к этому времени уже ушедший с высших партийных и государственных постов, практически единолично[источник не указан 271 день] принял решение о подавлении выступлений на площади Тяньаньмэнь (кит. 天安门).

На январь 2011 года распределение высших государственных и партийных должностей в КНР выглядело следующим образом:

Ранг Должность Занимающий должность
1 Генеральный секретарь ЦК КПК Ху Цзиньтао
2 Председатель Китайской Народной Республики
3 / 4 Председатель Постоянного комитета Всекитайского собрания народных представителей У Банго
Премьер Государственного совета КНР Вэнь Цзябао
5 Председатель Народного политического консультативного совета Китая Цзя Цинлинь
6 Председатель Центрального Военного Совета КНР Ху Цзиньтао
7 Заместитель Председателя КНР Си Цзиньпин

Внутренняя политика

Народное образование

В Китае введено всеобщее обязательное 9-летнее обучение. В 1991—2001 годах коэффициент обучения детей младшего школьного возраста в начальной школе составил по стране 97,8-99,1 %. Людей с высшим образованием тоже становится всё больше. В 2001 году коэффициент принятых в вузы составил по стране 11 %. Приём в вузы за последние годы значительно расширился. Его ежегодный рост превышает 20 %. Если в 1998 году в вузы было принято 1,08 млн абитуриентов, то в 2001 году число принятых составило 2,68 млн.

Частное образование

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Правительство поддерживает частные образовательные организации. Первый «Закон о поощрении частного образования» вступил в силу с 1 сентября 2003 года. Развитие частных школ означает увеличение объёма предложения в сфере образования и удовлетворение образовательных потребностей за счет отказа от традиционной модели, согласно которой существовали только государственные школы.

На конец 2004 года насчитывалось более 70 тысяч частных школ разных типов и уровня, с общим контингентом 14,16 миллионов учащихся, в том числе 1279 частных высших учебных заведений с общим контингентом 1,81 миллион студентов. Частное образование занимает более половины всего образовательного сектора Китая.

Частные школы, которые первыми начали сотрудничество с зарубежными партнерами в управлении школами и многими зарубежными университетами, значительно улучшили качество ресурсов китайского образования и открыли новые каналы для дальнейшего развития учащихся.

Медицина

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Больницы и другие медицинские учреждения различных уровней имеются в стране повсеместно. Постепенно расширяется система медицинского страхования городских рабочих и служащих, которая соединяет в себе социальное планирование с индивидуальными взносами. Китай в первых рядах развивающихся стран по ожидаемой среднедушевой продолжительности жизни людей, по снижению смертности младенцев, беременных женщин и рожениц, а по некоторым другим показателям здоровья приближается к уровню развитых стран Запада. На конец 2001 года медработников в стране насчитывалось 4,5 млн, из них врачей — 2,1, а медсестёр с высшим и средним образованием — 1,28 млн. В среднем на каждую тысячу человек населения приходится 1,68 врача.

Внешняя политика

Западные страны критикуют внешнюю политику Китая за поддержку КНДР. КНР проводит внешнюю политику, способствующую укреплению роли Китая в мировой политике, при этом придерживающаяся сравнительно нейтральной позиции.

КНР-США

С момента установления двусторонних дипломатических отношений между этими странами — 1 января 1979 года — прошло уже более тридцати лет. На протяжении этого периода американо-китайские отношения не были ни дружескими, ни враждебными. Существуют различные определения характера данных отношений: «отношения ложного партнерства», «ни друзья и ни враги» или «лежа на одной кровати видеть разные сны».

Пекин, не оглядываясь на Вашингтон, выполняет контрактные обязательства с Ираном и КНДР на поставки им вооружений и технологий, занимает жёсткую и недвусмысленную позицию по проблеме Тайваня. Китай успешно теснит американских производителей не только на рынках АТР, но и в самих США. Одной из проблем в отношениях между государствами является увеличение масштабов китайской эмиграции в США.

Центральной проблемой американо-китайских отношений остаётся проблема Тайваня. Речь идёт не только о суверенитете КНР, но и о мире и стабильности в азиатско-тихоокеанском регионе в целом. Отдельную проблему между США и Китаем составляет комплекс вопросов энергетической безопасности. С XXI века основные противоречия Вашингтона и Пекина находятся в АТР. Это связано, в первую очередь, с началом осуществления Бараком Обамой свой «тихоокеанской» стратегии, целью которой является усиление американского влияния в АТР.Все действия Вашингтона, направленные на достижение такой цели и вытеснение Китая из региона встречают резкий отпор со стороны Пекина. Так, Вашингтон пытался играть на территориальных спорах между Китаем и другими странами в Южно-китайском море. Однако особого успеха добиться пока не получилось. В настоящее время нарастает напряженность в этом регионе, которая, например, проявляется в развернутой гонке вооружений Китая и США.

Тем не менее, с начала XXI в. существует Стратегический диалог по экономическим вопросам, стороны регулярно встречаются и обсуждают основные проблемы.

КНР-Россия

КНР-Великобритания

Территориальные вопросы

Административное деление КНР

Административное деление и территориальные споры КНР

Описание изображения

Китайская народная республика осуществляет административный контроль над 22 провинциями (); при этом правительство КНР считает Тайвань своей 23-й провинцией. Кроме этого, в КНР также входят 5 автономных районов (自治区), где проживают национальные меньшинства Китая; 4 муниципальных образования (直辖市), соответствующих городам центрального подчинения, и 2 специальных административных района (特别行政区).

22 провинции, 5 автономных районов и 4 города центрального подчинения объединяются термином «континентальный Китай», куда обычно не входят Гонконг, Макао и Тайвань.

В конституции КНР де-юре предусмотрено трёхступенчатое административное деление: провинции (автономные районы, города центрального подчинения), уезды и волости. Однако де-факто в материковом Китае насчитывается пять уровней местного самоуправления:

  • Провинциальный уровень: 23 провинции, 5 автономных районов, 4 города центрального подчинения и 2 специальных административных района.
  • Окружной уровень: 17 округов (префектуры), 283 городские округа, 30 автономных округов, 3 аймака
  • Уездный уровень: 1464 уезда, 374 городских уезда, 117 автономных уездов, 49 хошунов, 855 районов, 3 автономных хошуна.
  • Волостной уровень: 19522 посёлка, 14677 волостей, 1092 национальные волости, 181 сомон, 1 национальный сомон, 6152 уличных комитета и 11 районов уездного подчинения
  • Деревенский уровень: деревни и местные общины, или микрорайоны (в городах).

Пекин

Основная статья: Пекин

Город расположен на северо-западной оконечности Северо-Китайской равнины и обрамлён цепью гор на западе и севере, переходящих затем в равнину, которая на юго-западе имеет спуск к Бохайскому морю. Для Пекина характерны умеренно-континентальный климат и отчётливо выраженная смена времён года.

Шанхай

Расположен на 31 град. 14 мин. с. ш., 121 град. 29мин. в. д. в передней части дельты реки Янцзы. На востоке он омывается Восточно-Китайским морем, а на юге — заливом Ханчжоувань, на западе он граничит с провинциями Цзянсу и Чжэцзян, а на севере с устьем Янцзы. Шанхай как раз расположен в середине морского побережья страны. Он имеет удобный транспорт и обширное внутреннее пространство, обладает стратегическим расположением, является крупным речным и морским портом.

Физико-географическая характеристика

Топографическая карта Китая

Географическое положение

Китай расположен в Восточной Азии. С востока омывается водами западных морей Тихого океана. На северо-востоке Китай граничит с КНДР и Россией, на севере — с Монголией, на северо-западе — с Россией и Казахстаном, на западе — с Киргизией, Таджикистаном и Афганистаном, на юго-западе — с Пакистаном, Индией, Непалом и Бутаном, на юге — с Мьянмой, Лаосом, Вьетнамом. Площадь территории Китая составляет 9,6 млн км²[12]. Китай является самой большой страной в Азии и третьей по площади страной в мире, уступая только России и Канаде. Единый китайский часовой пояс — UTC+8.

Суммарная длина сухопутных границ Китая составляет 22 117 км с 14 странами[источник не указан 271 день]. Побережье Китая тянется от границы с Северной Кореей на севере до Вьетнама на юге и имеет длину 14 500 км. Китай омывается Восточно-Китайским морем, Корейским заливом, Жёлтым морем и Южно-Китайским морем. Остров Тайвань отделён от материка Тайваньским проливом.

Рельеф

Топография Китая очень разнообразна, на его территории имеются высокие горы, плато, впадины, пустыни и обширные равнины. Обычно выделяют три крупных орографических региона:

  • Тибетское нагорье высотой более 2000 м над уровнем моря расположено на юго-западе страны;
  • пояс гор и высоких равнин имеет высоты 200—2000 м, находится в северной части;
  • низкие аккумулятивные равнины высотой ниже 200 м и невысокие горы на северо-востоке, востоке и юге страны, где проживает бо́льшая часть населения Китая.

Великая Китайская равнина, долина реки Хуанхэ и дельта Янцзы объединяются около морского побережья, простираясь от Пекина на севере до Шанхая на юге. Бассейн Жемчужной реки (и её главного притока Сицзян) расположен в южной части Китая и отделён от бассейна реки Янцзы горами Наньлин и хребтом Уишань (который включён в список Всемирного наследия в Китае).

В направлении с запада на восток китайский рельеф образует три ступени. Первое из них — Тибетское нагорье, где преобладают высоты более 4000 метров над уровнем моря. Следующую ступень образуют горы Сычуани и Центрального Китая, высота которых от 1500 до 3000 м. Здесь растительность резко изменяется, на сравнительно небольших расстояниях происходит смена природных зон от высокогорных холодных пустынь к субтропическому лесу. Последней ступенью служат плодородные равнины, занимающие высоты ниже 1500 м над уровнем моря.

Климат

Климат Китая очень разнообразен — от субтропического на юго-востоке до резко-континентального (аридного) на северо-западе. На южном побережье погода определяется муссонами, которые возникают из-за различных поглощательных свойств суши и океана. Сезонные движения воздуха и сопутствующие ветра содержат большое количество влаги в летний период и довольно сухие зимой. Наступление и отход муссонов в большой степени определяют количество и распределение осадков по стране. Огромные разницы по широте, долготе и высоте на территории Китая порождают большое разнообразие температурных и метеорологических режимов, несмотря на то, что большая часть страны лежит в области умеренного климата.

Более 2/3 страны занимают горные хребты, нагорья и плато, пустыни и полупустыни. Примерно 90 % населения живёт всего на 10 % площади страны — в прибрежных районах и поймах больших рек, таких, как Янцзы, Хуанхэ (Жёлтая река) и Перл. Эти территории находятся в тяжёлом экологическом состоянии в результате долгой и интенсивной сельскохозяйственной обработки и промышленного загрязнения окружающей среды.

Самая северная провинция Китая Хэйлунцзян находится в области умеренного климата, похожего на климат Владивостока и Хабаровска, а южный остров Хайнань — в тропиках. Разница температур между этими регионами в зимние месяцы велика, но летом различие уменьшается. В северной части Хэйлунцзяна температура в январе может опускаться до −30 °C, средние температуры — около 0 °C. Средняя температура июля в этой области составляет 20 °C. В южных же частях провинции Гуандун средняя температура колеблется от 10 °C в январе до 28 °C в июле.

Количество осадков изменяется даже в большей степени, чем температура. На южных склонах гор Циньлин выпадают многочисленные дожди, максимум которых приходится на летние муссоны. При движении к северу и западу от гор вероятность дождей уменьшается. Северо-западные районы страны — самые сухие, в расположенных там пустынях (Такла-Макан, Гоби, Ордос) осадков практически нет.

Южные и восточные области Китая часто (около 5 раз в год) страдают от разрушительных тайфунов, а также от наводнений, муссонов, цунами и засух. Северные районы Китая каждую весну накрывают жёлтые пыльные бури, которые зарождаются в северных пустынях и переносятся ветрами в сторону Кореи и Японии.

Полезные ископаемые

Китай богат разнообразными видами топливных и сырьевых минеральных ресурсов. Особенно большое значение имеют запасы нефти, угля, металлических руд и драгметаллов.

Китай имеет залежи почти 150 известных в мире полезных ископаемых[источник не указан 271 день]. Основным источником энергии в Китае является уголь, по запасам которого Китай уступает немногим странам. Месторождения сконцентрированы преимущественно в Северном Китае. Крупные ресурсы имеются также в Северо-Западном Китае. Беднее углем другие районы, особенно южные. Большая часть залежей представлена каменным углем. Угольные месторождения в основном расположены в Северном и Северо-Восточном Китае. Самые большие запасы угля сконцентрированы в провинции Шаньси (30 % общего объёма запасов) — Датунские и Янцюаньские угольные шахты.

Другим важным источником энергоресурсов является нефть. По запасам нефти Китаю принадлежит заметное место среди стран Центральной, Восточной и Юго-Восточной Азии. Месторождения нефти обнаружены в различных районах, но наиболее значительны они в Северо-Восточном Китае (равнина Сунгари-Нонни), прибрежных территориях и шельфе Северного Китая, а также в некоторых внутренних районах — Джунгарской котловине, Сычуани.

Китай является крупнейшим в мире производителем золота с 2007 года.[13] В 2011 году объём добычи золота в Китае увеличился на 5,89 % по сравнению с 2010 годом и составил 360,96 тонн. Китайские компании продолжают активно осваивать рудники как в своей стране, так и за рубежом.[13]

Реки и озёра

В Китае множество рек, общая протяженность которых составляет 220 000 км. Свыше 5000 из них несут воды, собранные с площади более 100  км² каждая. Реки Китая образуют внутренние и внешние системы. Внешние реки — это Янцзы, Хуанхэ, Хэйлунцзян (Амур), Чжуцзян, Ланьцанцзян (Меконг), Нуцзян и Ялуцангпо, имеющие выход к Тихому, Индийскому и Северному Ледовитому океанам, их общая водосборная площадь охватывает около 64 % территории страны. Внутренние реки, количество которых невелико, значительно удалены друг от друга и на большинстве участков обмелели. Они впадают в озёра внутренних районов или теряются в пустынях или соленых топях; их водосборная площадь охватывает около 36 % территории страны.

В Китае много озёр, общая площадь, которую они занимают, составляет примерно 80 000 кв. км. Имеются также тысячи искусственных озёр — водохранилищ. Озёра в Китае тоже можно разделить на внешние и внутренние. К внешним относятся главным образом богатые аквапродуктами пресноводные озера, такие, как Поянху, Дунтинху и Тайху. К внутренним относятся солёные озёра, самое большое из которых — озеро Цинхай. Среди озёр внутренних районов много высохших, например Лоб-Нор и Цзюйянь.

Растительность

В Китае произрастает более 500 видов бамбука, формирующих 3 % всех лесов. Заросли бамбука, встречающиеся в 18 провинциях — не только среда обитания многих животных, но и источник ценного сырья. Их одревесневшие соломины (стебли) широко используются в промышленности.

Экономика

Динамика ВВП на душу населения в странах БРИК в 1998—2011 годах, в долларах США

На 2010 год экономика КНР занимает 2 место в мире по величине номинального ВВП, обогнав Японию[14], и 2 место по ВВП, рассчитанному по паритету покупательной способности[источник не указан 271 день].

Согласно Конституции КНР является социалистическим государством, однако около 70 % ВВП обеспечивается частными предприятиями[15]. В соответствии с поправками к Конституции, принятыми в 2004 году, частная собственность является «неприкосновенной». Официально КНР называет свой нынешний экономический строй «строительством социализма с китайской спецификой». Оценки отдельных экономистов о формах экономики в Китае сильно разнятся.

Начиная с 1980 китайская экономика растёт в среднем на 15 % в год. К концу 1990-х годов темпы экономического роста замедлились до 8 % годовых, но с вступлением КНР во Всемирную торговую организацию в 2001 году приток прямых иностранных инвестиций и расширение экспорта привели к новому ускорению.

По официальным данным, в 2003 ВВП Китая вырос на 10 %, но, по мнению экспертов, в действительности прирост ВВП мог достигать 10-12 %. Рост объёма внешней торговли в 2005 году составил 23 %.

Ярким показателем экономического роста страны является потребление энергоносителей. Так, например, потребление нефти в Китае за 40 лет с начала 1960-х увеличилось более чем в 25 раз, составив в 2005 году, по данным Государственного статистического управления КНР, 300 млн тонн. По данным ОПЕК, в 2005 году Китай потреблял 6,5 млн баррелей нефти в день. Собственная добыча КНР составляет около 170 млн тонн в год. В Китае отсутствует ресурсная база, которая могла бы позволить рассчитывать на увеличение добычи нефти, что приводит к постепенному увеличению зависимости от импорта. Учитывая продолжающийся экономический рост, по прогнозам китайских специалистов, к 2020 году потребность страны в импорте нефти достигнет 450 млн тонн. К 2025 году по прогнозам объём потребления нефти в КНР составит 710 млн тонн в год.

Нефтяные компании Китая, такие как Sinopec, ищут возможность доступа к месторождениям нефти и газа за пределами КНР, например в России, Казахстане, странах Африки[16] и Латинской Америки.

Потребление природного газа КНР в 2005 году составило 50 млрд куб. м. Согласно прогнозам, к 2020 году потребление газа вырастет примерно до 200 млрд куб. м.

Объём потребления электроэнергии в 2005 году составил 2,456 трлн кВт·ч. При этом некоторые районы Северного и Южного Китая страдают от нехватки электроэнергии.

Не последнюю роль в развитии Китая сыграло наличие свободных экономических зон. В настоящее время в КНР действуют 4 специальные экономические зоны (регионы) — Шэньчжэнь, Чжухай, Шаньтоу, Сямэнь, 14 зон свободной (беспошлинной) торговли, 53 зоны высоких и новых технологий, более 70 научно-технических зон для специалистов, получивших образование за границей, 38 зон переработки продукции, ориентированной на экспорт.

В качестве примера можно привести данные по региону Шэньчжэнь, который получил официальный статус свободной экономической зоны в августе 1980 года. ОЭР Шэньчжэнь — самая быстро развивающаяся зона: в 1979—2008 годах средний ежегодный рост его ВВП составил 31,2 %[17]. Город является первым в Китае по объёмам внешней торговли.

Три из четырёх китайских Специальных Экономических Зон (СЭЗ) — Шэньчжэнь, Чжухай и Шаньтоу — находятся в провинции Гуандун. Отчасти благодаря этому, провинция Гуандун занимает ведущее место на материковом Китае по производству электронной, текстильной, пищевой, фармацевтической продукции и лидирует в сфере производства бытовой техники.

В провинции находятся сборочные заводы таких гигантов, как Nissan, Honda и Toyota; в нефтяной и нефтехимической отрасли провинции доминирует китайская корпорация Sinopec; среди производителей электроники можно выделить китайские корпорации BBK Electronics, TCL; в регионе также расположено производство Guangzhou Pharmaceutical (GP) — одной из крупнейших аптечных сетей в Китае и проч.

Внешняя торговля

Товары с пометкой «сделано в Китае» ныне можно встретить по всему миру. Как показывает статистика, Китай уже первенствует в мире по объёму производства свыше 100 видов продукции. В Китае выпускается более 50 % продаваемых в мире фотоаппаратов, 30 % кондиционеров, 25 % стиральных машин и примерно 20 % холодильников.

Кроме того, согласно таможенной статистике, Китай уже много лет подряд является первым экспортёром текстильных изделий, одежды, обуви, часов, велосипедов, швейных машин и других видов трудоёмкой продукции. С 1989 года среднегодовой прирост импортной и экспортной торговли Китая составляет 15 %.

Ключевой экспортный рынок для Китая — США, торговые связи двух стран чрезвычайно сильны. Основные статьи экспорта из КНР в США: электрооборудование, одежда и обувь, мебель.

Транспорт в Китае

Протяжённость автодорог (включая сельские) составляет 3,5 млн км. Общая длина современных многополосных автострад на конец 2006 года составляла 45,3 тыс. км (в 2006 году было построено 4,3 тыс. км автострад, в 2007 году планируется ввести 5 тыс. км).

Протяжённость железнодорожной сети China Railways составляла на конец 2006 года 76,6 тыс. км (в 2006 году прирост составил 1,2 тыс. км).[18] В 2006 году была введена в строй самая высокогорная железная дорога в Тибете (до 5072 м над уровнем моря) стоимостью $4,2 млрд.

Водный транспорт включает в себя морские внешнеторговые и внутренние перевозки, а также грузоперевозки по наиболее крупным внутренним рекам. Водный транспорт сосредоточен на юго-восточном приморье и южных районах. Его доля в общем грузообороте поднялась с 42 процентов в 1980 году до 53,2 процента в 2001 году. Общая протяженность внутренних рек Китая превышает 110 тыс. км, а общая протяженность судоходных фарватеров — 7,8 тыс. км.

Воздушный транспорт. Лет десять назад полет на самолете был у китайцев признаком положения и богатства. Сейчас частота рейсов между городами все больше растет. Так, из Пекина в Шанхай ежедневно более 40 рейсов. В 2001 году в Китае насчитывалось уже 143 гражданских аэропорта и 1143 авиалинии.

Связь в Китае

Уровень телефонизации Китая в 1991 году составлял лишь 1,29 %, а в 2002 году он уже достиг 30 %. Число абонентов проводной связи 207 млн и является самым большим в мире.

Мобильная связь. Число абонентов мобильной телефонной связи, составлявшее в 1990 году лишь 18 тыс., к концу сентября 2002 года поднялось до 190 млн став наивысшим в мире, сохраняет ежемесячный прирост в 5 млн.

Экономический рост и положение населения

В начале XXI века, несмотря на экономический рост, Китай столкнулся с рядом серьёзных экономических, экологических и социальных проблем: увеличился разрыв в доходах между богатыми и бедными; выросла разница в развитии села и города, западных и восточных, особенно прибрежных, районов; увеличилась безработица, в некоторых районах оказалась отравлена земля, почва и гидросфера. В Китае нарастают уличные протесты.[19] На сессии ВСНП выступивший с программным докладом премьер-министр Вэнь Цзябао предложил снизить темпы экономического роста страны, а высвободившиеся средства направить на улучшение жизни крестьян и увеличение военного бюджета.

Правительство планирует замедлить темпы прироста ВВП Китая до 7,5 % в год против нынешних 10 %. Освободившиеся средства будут направлены на сокращение разрыва между уровнем жизни городского населения и крестьян (около 900 млн, или почти 75 % населения), чтобы не допустить повторения «цветных революций» в КНР.

В первом квартале 2010 года рост ВВП КНР показал 11,5 % — это один из самых высоких показателей среди других стран.

Юань

Юань (кит. упр. , пиньинь: yuán)  — денежная единица Китая.

В китайском языке «юанем» называют базовую единицу любой валюты, например, доллар США — это «мэй юань». Но в международном контексте это слово обозначает юань КНР — или, реже, одну из других валют китайскоязычных государств (регионов) — тайваньский доллар, гонконгский доллар и Макаоскую патаку.

Юань КНР — базовая единица китайской денежной системы жэньминьби («народные деньги» — в латинском (пиньиньском) написании Renminbi (RMB)). Международное обозначение валюты по ISO 4217 — CNY.

Один юань делится на 10 цзяо, которые, в свою очередь, делятся на 10 фэней (фэнь практически вышел из обращения). Например, сумма в 3,14 юаня произносится как 3 юань 1 цзяо 4 фэня. Слова цзяо и фэнь также обозначают десятичные приставки 10−1 и 10−2 соответственно.

В разговорной речи при обозначении цены вместо слова «юань» также употребляется слово «куай», а вместо «цзяо» — «мао».

Юани имеют хождение в виде бумажных купюр и монет. Кроме того, в обороте существуют купюры как нового, так и старого образца.

С 1994 китайские власти законсервировали курс юаня на уровне $1/8,28 юаня. В последнее время, однако, Китай находился под нарастающим давлением со стороны стран ЕС, Японии и особенно США, настаивавших на либерализации курса юаня. По их мнению, курс юаня занижен и в результате китайские товары получают дополнительное конкурентное преимущество. Пассивное сальдо США в торговле с Китаем составило $162 млрд в 2004, а в I квартале 2005 увеличилось ещё на 40 % по отношению к аналогичному прошлогоднему периоду.

21 июля 2005 Китай отказался от привязки юаня к доллару и поднял курс национальной валюты на 2 %. Курс юаня теперь будет определяться исходя из его отношения к бивалютной корзине.

По мнению китайских экспертов, привязка к корзине валют сделает курс юаня более чутким к мировой экономической конъюнктуре, но при этом не создаст угрозы устойчивости финансовой системы страны.

ОЭСР и Китай

В июле 2005 генеральный секретарь ОЭСР (Организации экономического сотрудничества и развития) Дональд Джонсон в интервью газете Financial Times призвал принять КНР в эту организацию, поскольку, по его мнению, вступление в ОЭСР крупных развивающихся стран необходимо, если организация хочет оставаться эффективной структурой, влияющей на формирование глобальной экономики: «Китай — крупнейший производитель стали в мире и оказывает серьезное влияние на другие международные рынки сырья. Эта страна может стать крупнейшей экономикой в мире».

Китай уже получил приглашения к участию в проводимом ОЭСР исследовании его экономики, что обычно является первым шагом к вступлению в организацию.

Саудовская Аравия и Китай

Дипломатические отношения между двумя странами были установлены в 1990 году.

В рамках первого визита короля Саудовской Аравии в Китай в конце января 2006 года Саудовская Аравия и Китай подписали в Пекине договор о сотрудничестве в нефтегазовой отрасли.

За первые 11 месяцев 2005 года торговый оборот двух стран достиг 14,5 миллиарда долларов, что на 59 % выше показателя 2004 года. По данным Саудовской Аравии, она ежедневно поставляет китайской стороне 450 тысяч баррелей нефти (то есть около 14 % всего китайского нефтяного импорта).

Сельское хозяйство

Главные виды сельхозпродукции. С 90-х годов прошлого столетия Китай занимает первое место в мире по производству зерновых, мяса, хлопка, семян рапса, фруктов, листового табака, второе — по производству чая и шерсти и третье либо четвёртое по производству соевых бобов, сахарного тростника и джута. Однако в среднедушевом расчёте объём продукции невелик.

В Китае большое разнообразие земельных ресурсов, однако гористых местностей много, а равнин мало. Равнины составляют — 43 % всей земельной площади страны. Пахотных земель у Китая 127 млн га, а это приблизительно 7 % всех пахотных земель мира. У Китая огромная прибрежная морская полоса. Его мелководные рыбные угодья занимают 1500 тыс. кв.км. и составляют четверть всех мировых мелководных угодий.

Китай с давних пор является аграрной страной, но с 50-х годов прошлого века он приступил к широкомасштабной индустриализации. В начале 80-х годов доля сельского хозяйства в ВВП составляла примерно 32 %, но затем стала постепенно снижаться и в 2001 году упала до 15,2 %. Сельские труженики, удельный вес которых в общей численности занятых снизился с 70,5 % в 1978 году до 50 %, насчитывают теперь около 365 млн чел. В Китае земля является государственной и коллективной собственностью. В конце 1978 года и прежде всего в деревне началась реформа. Благодаря ей быстро распространилась новая хозяйственная система — семейная подрядная ответственность, связанная с результатами производства.

Банки Китая

Карта стран по резервам иностранной валюты и золота минус внешней задолженности на основе данных 2010 года из ЦРУ Factbook

Банковская система Китая состоит из Центрального банка, «политических» (то есть некоммерческих) банков, государственных коммерческих банков, акционерных банков, городских коммерческих банков и небанковских финансовых учреждений в лице городских и сельских кредитных кооперативов, а также инвестиционных траст-компаний.

Вооружённые силы

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В 2005 в Китае завершилась передача высшей власти от Цзян Цзэминя к Ху Цзиньтао.

Ху Цзиньтао предстоит поддерживать баланс между темпами экономического роста и увеличением военных расходов. Модернизация вооружённых сил объявлена одним из основных приоритетов из-за растущей напряжённости в отношениях с Тайванем и некоторой дестабилизации китайско-американских отношений.

При прежнем руководстве военные расходы Китая стабильно росли — в 2004 году, например, оборонный бюджет Китая увеличился на 11,6 % по сравнению с 2003 г. По оценкам специалистов, с 1992 Китай закупил вооружений у России примерно на $10 млрд. В 2004 на Китай пришлось почти 50 % российского военного экспорта (около $2,8 млрд).

В настоящее время приоритеты китайских военных постепенно перемещаются с накопления обычных вооружений на разработки в области информационных технологий. Одновременно китайцы хотели бы закупать у России военные технологии и вооружение, которое Россия до сих пор отказывалась поставлять — в области авиации, например, это современное авиационное ракетное вооружение, тяжёлые бомбардировщики.

Народно-освободительная армия Китая (НОАК) насчитывает 2,5 млн человек. Сокращение численности НОАК планируется проводить в первую очередь за счёт нестроевых частей и многочисленных научно-исследовательских институтов. В 2005 году армию покинули 200 тыс. военнослужащих.

По западным оценкам[источник не указан 1286 дней], на вооружении НОАК стоят 7060 единиц бронетанковой и 14500 единиц артиллерийской техники, примерно 4500 истребителей и штурмовиков, 420 бомбардировщиков (дальняя военная авиация отсутствует). Вся техника отечественного, советского, российского или европейского производства.

ВМФ НОАК : свыше 60 эсминцев и фрегатов, 60 дизель-электрических и 10 атомных подводных лодок и 1 авианосец.

Согласно данным вашингтонских аналитиков[источник не указан 1286 дней], на боевом дежурстве ракетных войск стратегического назначения НОАК стоят 20 межконтинентальных ракет с ядерными боеголовками, примерно 100 ракет среднего радиуса действия и 350 тактических ядерных зарядов.

В ходе оборонной реформы ставится задача сокращения существенного отставания НОАК от вооружённых сил ведущих мировых государств. По мнению американских экспертов, по степени оснащённости современным оружием и техникой КНР позади США в среднем на 15—20 лет.

В связи с этим Китай реализует программу по оснащению армии современным высокоточным оружием, уделяя приоритетное внимание развитию ракетных войск, а также ВМС и ВВС.

Отмечается[кем?], что из почти 2,5 тыс. истребителей лишь около 350 (в основном российские СУ-27 и СУ-30) по своим характеристикам отвечают современным требованиям ведения воздушных боев[источник не указан 487 дней].

Китай уже закупил в России несколько дизель-электрических подводных лодок, а также два эсминца класса «Современный», ещё несколько строятся на российских верфях. Одновременно ускоренными темпами ведётся создание собственных эсминцев, оснащённых современными радарными и зенитно-ракетными системами.

По мнению западных экспертов[обтекаемые выражения][источник не указан 487 дней], реальные военные расходы КНР могут составлять не $30 млрд, как заявлено, а $40-45 млрд ежегодно, поскольку финансирование разработок новейших видов вооружений проходит по другим, закрытым, статьям бюджета.

Быстрое сокращение отставания КНР в оборонной сфере от соседей по региону — России, Японии, Южной Кореи, Индии, а также Тайваня — вызывает озабоченность, в первую очередь, у Японии, борющейся с КНР за политико-экономическое влияние в регионе, а также у Тайваня.

По подсчётам экспертов, количество тактических ракет, размещённых в южных провинциях КНР и нацеленных на Тайвань, постоянно наращивается, приближаясь уже к тысяче. По числу самолётов ВВС НОАК превосходит тайваньскую сторону — правда, в большинстве своём отставая по боевым характеристикам. К 2010 НОАК рассчитывает получить подавляющее преимущество над тайваньскими вооружёнными силами в воздухе и на море.

На баланс сил в регионе может повлиять и ожидаемое снятие Евросоюзом эмбарго на поставки оружия в КНР, введённого в 1989 после подавления студенческих выступлений на площади Тяньаньмэнь в Пекине. Правительства ведущих европейских стран, включая Францию, Германию и Италию, уже согласились на отмену санкций, несмотря на неодобрение США.

В июне 2005 разгорелся скандал между США и Израилем по поводу продажи военных технологий и оружия в Китай в обход прямого запрета США. США считают, что эти технологии могут дать КНР военное преимущество перед Тайванем. Речь идёт о поставках из Израиля в Китай беспилотных ударных летательных аппаратов Harpy, предназначенных для поражения радаров систем ПВО.

В июне 2005 американская газета «Вашингтон таймс» опубликовала информацию о неком секретном докладе, представленном руководителю разведывательного сообщества США Джону Негропонте, в котором утверждается, что Китай совершил резкий рывок в области вооружений, существенно увеличивший мощь китайской армии. Среди достижений китайской оборонной отрасли называются:

  • разработка новой крылатой ракеты большой дальности,
  • ввод в строй новых боевых кораблей, оснащённых китайским аналогом американской системы управления огнём Иджис,
  • создание новой ударной подводной лодки класса «Юань»,
  • разработка высокоточного оружия, в том числе новой ракеты класса «воздух-земля» и ракет класса «земля-земля», которые могут использоваться для нанесения ударов по боевым авианосным группам США.

Обладая собственным развёрнутым производством мин, в том числе средств дистанционного минирования и средств дистанционного разминирования, Китай является крупнейшим экспортёром противопехотных мин в мире. Китайская государственная компания NORINCO успешно конкурирует на этом рынке с европейскими компаниями.

Разведывательная деятельность китайских спецслужб, в том числе китайской военной разведки — ГРУ ГШ НОАК — высоко оцениваются иностранными специалистами, её называют одной из 3 наиболее сильных разведок мира[источник не указан 487 дней].

Население

Демографическая кривая КНР

В Китае живут около 56 различных народов — каждый со своими обычаями, национальными костюмами и во многих случаях с собственным языком. Но при всём их разнообразии и богатстве культурных традиций — эти народы составляют лишь около 7 % населения страны, главную часть которого образуют китайцы, называющие себя «хань». Модернизация общества и межнациональные браки неизбежно ведут к стиранию различий между этническими группами, и тем не менее многие из них гордятся своим наследием и остаются верными обычаям и верованиям. Красивые обряды и праздники привлекают зарубежных гостей.

В ноябре 2000 года Китай провёл пятую по счету всекитайскую перепись населения. По данным переписи, в Китае насчитывалось 1 137 386 112 китайцев (абсолютное большинство населения). Годовой прирост населения составил в 2005 году 0,58 %. Как показала шестая всекитайская перепись населения в 2010 году, общая численность населения в континентальной части страны составляла 1 млрд. 339 млн. 724 тыс. 852 человека[20] и является самой большой в мире. Чтобы задержать рост населения, в 1979 году Китай перешёл к политике ограничения рождаемости. Несмотря на то, что естественный прирост населения в Китае уже снизился до среднего уровня, оно из-за огромной базисной цифры по-прежнему из года в год значительно возрастает. В период с 1990 по 2000 год население в среднем ежегодно увеличивалось почти на 12 млн человек.

При населении более чем 1,3 миллиарда человек КПК очень озабочена приростом населения в КНР и пытается осуществить строгую политику планирования семьи. Её результаты довольно противоречивы.

Цель правительства — один ребёнок на семью, с исключениями для этнических меньшинств. Гибкая политика проводится и в сельских районах, где у семьи может быть второй ребёнок, если первый является девочкой или имеет физические отклонения. Цель правительства состоит в том, чтобы стабилизировать прирост населения в начале XXI столетия.

Политике, проводимой государством, сопротивляются, особенно в сельских районах, из-за потребности в рабочей силе и традиционного предпочтения мальчикам (которые могут со временем стать наследниками). Семьи, которые нарушают политику, часто лгут во время переписи. Официальная правительственная политика выступает против стерилизации или абортов, но на деле местные власти практикуют такой способ ограничения рождаемости, так как они сталкиваются с большими штрафами в случае провала попытки обуздать прирост населения.

На конец 2000 года лиц в возрасте 65 лет и старше было в Китае 88 млн. 110 тыс. Это 6,96 % всего его населения.

Соотношение китайского населения по полу — 106,74:100. Это несколько выше среднемирового уровня 101,44:100. Половое соотношение населения от нулевого возраста до 4 лет довольно высоко и достигает примерно 119:100. В целом продолжительность жизни у женского населения больше, чем у мужского. В настоящее время предполагаемая средняя продолжительность жизни среди китайского населения — 71 год.

36,22 % китайского населения составляет городское и 63,78 % — сельское. Уровень урбанизации всё ещё довольно низок, и избыточной рабочей силы в селе довольно много. В 90-х годах XX века процент городского населения в Китае ежегодно рос в среднем на 0,91 %. Как предполагается, эти темпы сохранятся и в начале XXI века. По прогнозам ООН, население китайских городов возрастёт к 2030 году до 884 млн. Другими словами, оно составит 59,1 % всего населения страны и в целом достигнет к тому времени среднемирового уровня.

Семейная жизнь

В восьми из десяти случаев родители нынешних китайцев женились по выбору и одобрению своих профессиональных союзов. Сегодня же проживающие в городах молодые китайцы рано приобретают сексуальный опыт. Распространен фактический брак и смена нескольких партнёров до брака.

Разводы, о которых вплоть до XX века и не помышляли, ныне — обычная практика. А внебрачные связи получили столь широкое распространение, что власти всерьёз обсуждают вопрос юридического оформления их незаконности.

Считается, что на семейных традициях негативно сказывается политика одна семья — один ребёнок, которая создаёт проблему избалованных детей.

Крупнейшие города

Начиная с 2000 г., китайские города увеличивались в среднем на 10 % в год. Сегодня в КНР есть более 100 городов с населением свыше одного миллиона жителей.

Лидирующие городские центры Китайской Народной Республики

Shanghai
Шанхай
Hong Kong
Гонконг
Guangzhou
Гуанчжоу

Shenzhen
Шэньчжэнь

Город Административное деление Население города Население городского округа Регион

Beijing
Пекин
Tianjin
Тяньцзинь
Chongqing
Чунцин
Nanjing
Нанкин

1 Шанхай Шанхай 9,495,701 18,542,200 Восток
2 Пекин Пекин 7,296,962 17,430,000 Север
3 Гонконг Гонконг 6,985,200 6,985,200 Юг
4 Тяньцзинь Тяньцзинь 5,066,129 11,500,000 Север
5 Ухань Хубэй 6,660,000 9,100,000 Юг
6 Гуанчжоу Гуандун 4,154,808 15,000,000 Юг
7 Шэньчжэнь Гуандун 4,000,000 8,615,500 Юг
8 Шэньян Ляонин 3,981,023 7,500,000 Северо-восток
9 Чунцин Чунцин 3,934,239 31,442,300 Юго-запад
10 Наньчан Цзянси 3,790,000 4,990,184 Восток
11 Нанкин Цзянсу 2,822,117 8,004,000 Восток
12 Харбин Хэйлунцзян 2,672,069 8,499,000 Северо-восток
13 Шицзячжуан Хэбэй 2,620,357 9,630,000 Север
14 Сиань Шэньси 2,588,987 10,500,000 Северо-запад
15 Чэнду Сычуань 2,341,203 11,300,000 Юго-запад
16 Чанчунь Гирин 2,223,170 7,400,000 Северо-восток
17 Далянь Ляонин 2,118,087 6,200,000 Северовосток
18 Ханчжоу Чжэцзян 1,932,612 7,000,000 Восток
19 Цзинань Шаньдун 1,917,204 6,300,000 Восток
20 Тайюань Шаньси 1,905,403 3,413,800 Север
21 Циндао Шаньдун 1,867,365 8,000,000 Восток
По оценкам 2008 г. — население пригородов и сельское население исключены из населения города

Социальные слои

В декабре 2001 года Академия общественных наук Китая опубликовала доклад об изучении социальных слоев современного Китая. Их число сводится к десяти. Это слой лиц, управляющих государством и обществом, менеджеры, частные предприниматели, специальный и технический персонал, канцелярские служащие, индивидуальные промышленники и торговцы, обслуживающий персонал торговли, промышленные рабочие, труженики сельского хозяйства, а также лица без определённых занятий, безработные и полубезработные. Дифференциация в плане социальных слоев Китая всё больше и больше идёт по линии профессии, что иногда приводит к социальным взрывам[21].

Язык и письменность

Ханьцы имеют свой собственный разговорный и письменный язык — китайский, — которым пользуются как в стране, так и за её пределами. Общая численность говорящих на китайском превышает 1 миллиард человек.

Большинство из 55 национальных меньшинств Китая также имеют свои собственные языки. До освобождения страны, помимо народностей хуэй, маньчжуров и шэ, которые употребляли в основном китайский язык, на своём национальном языке говорили и писали монголы, тибетцы, уйгуры, корейцы, казахи, сибо, тай, узбеки, киргизы, татары и русские. Своя письменность существовала и у наси, мяо, цзинпо, лису, ва, лазу, но она широко не использовалась. Остальные 34 этнические группы национальной письменности не имели.

После образования КНР в рамках правительственной программы были созданы и систематизированы письменные языки для 10 этнических групп, включая чжуан, буи, мяо, дун, хани, ли и др., проведена реформа письменности уйгуров, казахов, цзинпо, лаху и тай. Согласно лингвистической классификации, 29 языков относятся к китайско-тибетской семье, 17 — к алтайской, 3 — к южноазиатской и 2 — к индоевропейской семье. Распространённый на Тайване язык гаошань относится к индонезийской языковой семье. Принадлежность одного из языков ещё не установлена.

Китайская письменность — иероглифика — восходит к гадательным костям династии Шан (16-11 вв. до н. э.) с вырезанными стилизованными изображениями предметов — символами, заменявшими слова и использовавшимися для предсказаний. Несмотря на изменения в материалах для письма, китайские иероглифы остались практически такими же, какими были в древности. Для чтения газеты необходимо знать не менее 3000 иероглифов, а образованный человек владеет более чем 5000 иероглифов. С 1913 г. официальным разговорным языком в Китае служит диалект путунхуа (мандарин), однако существует по крайней мере 7 региональных диалектов китайского языка, которые сильно различаются по произношению, поэтому в разговоре жители различных частей Китая не понимают друг друга. Объединяет их единая иероглифическая система письма.

Языковые семьи народностей Китая

  • I. Китайско-тибетская языковая семья
    • А. Языковые группы чжуан и дун
      • 1. Ветвь языков чжуан-тай: чжуан, буи, тай
      • 2. Ветвь языков дун-шуй: дун, мулао, шуй, маонань
      • 3. Ветвь языков ли: ли
    • Б. Тибетско-бирманская языковая группа
      • 1. Ветвь тибетских языков: тибетский, мэньба
      • 2. Языковая ветвь и: и, лису, наси, хани, лаху, цзино, бай
      • 3. Языковая ветвь цзинпо: цзинпо, дулун
      • 4. Языковая ветвь цян: цян, пуми
      • Не установлена языковая ветвь: лоба, ну, ачаны
    • В. Языковая группа мяо-яо
      • Языковая ветвь яо: яо
      • Не установлена языковая группа и ветвь: туцзя, гэлао
    • Г. Китайский язык (хань): хуэй
  • II. Алтайская языковая семья
    • А. Тюркские языки: уйгуры, салары, узбеки, казахи, татары, югуры (яохуры), киргизы
    • Б. Монгольская языковая семья: монголы, ту, дунсяны, дауры, баоань, югуры
    • В. Тунгусо-маньчжурская языковая семья: маньчжуры, сибо, эвенки, орочоны, нана́йцы, хэчжэнь
  • III. Южноазиатская семья: ва, бэнлуны, буланы
  • IV. Индонезийская языковая семья: гаошань
  • V. Индоевропейская семья
    • А. Славянская ветвь языков: русские
    • Б. Иранская ветвь языков: таджики
  • VI. Не определена языковая семья, языковая группа и языковая ветвь языка цзин
    • Не определена языковая ветвь и группа: корейцы

Печатный орган

Печатный орган ЦК КПК — газета «Жэньминь жибао». В связи с тем, что в последнее время политика Китая становится всё более прозрачной, конкуренция между прессой, телевидением и Интернетом становится всё более ожесточённой.

Религия

Традиционно в китайской религии и философии сплетаются конфуцианство, даосизм и буддизм. Они благополучно сосуществуют, причём зачастую — в пределах одного храма. Конфуцианство, первым обретшее влияние в Китае, по сути, стало кодексом подчинённости индивида обществу и его ответственности перед ним. Даосизм развивает идеи личного совершенствования и единения с природой; конфуцианскому учению о предопределённости социальных ролей он противопоставляет концепцию относительности. Буддизм, привнесённый в Китай извне и сосредоточенный на развитии духовного начала, выступает альтернативой китайскому прагматизму. В годы культурной революции религия в Китае была запрещена.

Китай — государство, где сосуществуют различные религии. Помимо трёх мировых религий — буддизма, ислама и христианства — в Китае ещё существует своеобразное традиционное религиозное учение — даосизм. Кроме того, у некоторых национальных меньшинств всё ещё сохраняется первобытное поклонение перед силами природы и многобожие.

Китай — страна с различными религиозными культами. Хуэй, уйгуры, казахи, киргизы, татары, узбеки, таджики, дунсяне, салары и баоань исповедуют ислам, в то время как религия тибетцев, монголов, так и югуров — буддизм, у некоторых представителей мяо и яо распространено христианство, а у большинства дауров, орочонов и эвенков — шаманизм. Некоторые китайцы (ханьцы) являются приверженцами христианства или буддизма, но большинство верующих исповедуют традиционную китайскую религию — даосизм.

Конфуцианство

Разработанное Конфуцием (551 − 479 гг. до н. э.) и развитое его последователями, конфуцианство защищает структурированность социума, опирающуюся на моральные принципы, которые связывают индивидов и определяют пять типов общественных отношений, как-то: родитель-ребёнок, правитель-подданный, брат-брат, муж-жена и друг-друг. В императорском Китае конфуцианство было философией учёных-мыслителей. Долгие годы в КНР оно считалось реакционным учением аристократии.

Буддизм

В Китае распространён буддизм Махаяны, обещающий избавление от страданий всем, кто его страждет обрести. Просветлённые, или бодхисатвы, остаются в этом мире, чтобы помочь достичь просветления другим. Своими деяниями и набожностью верующие заслуживают общения с бодхисатвами, приближающими их к нирване.

Ислам

Основная статья: Ислам в Китае

В Китае ислам распространен среди хуэйцев, саларов, дунсянов, баоаньцев, уйгуров, казахов, киргизов, узбеков, татар и таджиков. Количество мусульман по разным оценкам насчитывается от 19,5[22] до 29[23] миллионов человек. Высшим органом мусульман в Китае является Китайская исламская ассоциация.

Православие

Из-за сложных исторических судеб и позиции современных китайских властей деятельность церкви практически заморожена. Религиозное законодательство КНР не позволяет совершать неофициальные богослужения, можно только молиться в домах прихожан. Официально в Китае действует один православный храм.

Католицизм

Связи папского престола с Китаем восходят к XIII веку.[24] В настоящее время в Китае количество католиков исчисляется несколькими миллионами. Точная цифра неизвестна. В 1951 году коммунистическое руководство страны запретило китайским католикам иметь какие-либо связи с Ватиканом. Однако в конце ХХ — начале ХХI века положение начало постепенно изменяться. Власти Китая теперь, как правило, принимают во внимание желания Ватикана, когда назначают католических священников на важные посты. Тем не менее, эта практика иногда всё ещё нарушается.[25]

Культура

Культура Китая — одна из самых древних и самобытных в мире. Культура Китая оказала большое влияние сначала на развитие культуры многочисленных соседних народов, населявших обширные территории позднейших Монголии, Тибета, Индокитая, Кореи и Японии.

Фэншуй

Китайская геомантика, или фэншуй («ветер и вода»), основывается на идеях космической энергии ци. Например, правильная планировка дома, расположение дверей влияет на циркулирующую в помещении энергию ци и соответственно на благополучие его обитателей.

Энергия «ци»

Основная статья: Ци

Китайская философская концепция космической ци, или энергии (силы), пронизывающей Вселенную, развилась в эпохи Шан и Чжоу. Китайцы верят в то, что ци породила космос и Землю и два начала — «отрицательный» и «положительный» принципы инь и ян, породившие в свою очередь всё остальное («тьму вещей»). Каждое физическое изменение, происходящее в мире, китайцы считают результатом действия ци. Особые методики, предназначенные для регулирования движения ци в организме с целью общего оздоровления и даже обретения паранормальных способностей, называются цигун (букв. «работа с ци»).

Каллиграфия

Каллиграфия вывела обычное китайское письмо на уровень художественной формы искусства и традиционно приравнивается к живописи и поэзии, как метод самовыражения. Поскольку иероглифические изображения ограничены восемью линиями, индивидуальный стиль художника определяют их толщина, угол изгиба и придаваемый рисункам динамизм. Эксперты оценивают сбалансированность и пропорциональность линий, композиционное построение иероглифов и их целостность и гармоничность.

Основные элементы каллиграфии, которые китайцы называют «четырьмя сокровищами знания» — это чернильные палочки, чернильный камень, кисти и бумага.

Фарфор

Несмотря на то что керамика в Китае известна издревле, только в бронзовом веке (1500—400 гг. до н. э.) китайцы научились получать особенно прочные клеи и делать печи для высокотемпературного обжига, позволившие им изготавливать более прочную, иногда глазурованную глиняную посуду. Настоящий же фарфор появился только в эпоху Суй. Более тонкий, чем керамика, настоящий фарфор ровный и полированный. При ударе по фарфоровому изделию оно звучит. Тонкий фарфор кажется прозрачным.

Кунг-фу

Китайские боевые искусства на западе обычно ассоциируются с кунг-фу, или гун-фу. Гун-фу в переводе с китайского означает «мастерство» или «усердная работа» и может применяться как при описании достижений борца, так и каллиграфа или пианиста.

Рис

Рис всегда имел огромное значение для китайцев — и как основной пищевой продукт, и как техническая культура. Считается, что традиция культивирования риса в Южном Китае зародилась около 10000 лет до н. э., хотя метод устройства заливных полей, требующий масштабных ирригационных работ, достиг совершенства по прошествии тысяч лет. Сегодня рис выращивается в Китае почти повсеместно. Китайский рис составляет 35 % мировой продукции.

Культурные и исторические памятники Китая

Великая Китайская стена

Великая стена, или, как её называют китайцы, Длинная стена, протянулась на 8851,8 км через весь Северный Китай. Из этого 6260 км стены состоят из кирпичной кладки, 2232,5 км — из естественного горного массива. Около 360 км вообще являются не стеной, а заполненными водой рвами.[26] Сооружение стены началось в IV—III вв. до н. э., когда отдельные китайские государства вынуждены были создавать оборонительные сооружения от набегов кочевых народов Центральной Азии.

После объединения Китая под властью династии Цинь в 221 г. до н. э. император Ши Хуанди приказал соединить ряд оборонительных линий в единую стену. При последующей династии — Хань строительные работы на Великой стене продолжались и были завершены в III в. н. э. В настоящее время в своей западной части Великая стена сохраняет первоначальную форму, в восточной же части сильно разрушена и местами представляет только земляной вал.

В сохранившихся частях стена имеет ширину у основания около 9 м и на вершине около 6 м, высота стены достигает 10 м. Примерно через каждые 200 м — четырёхугольные сторожевые башни, а с внешней стороны стены — высокие оборонительные зубцы с отверстиями-амбразурами. Верхняя плоскость стены, замощенная плитами, некогда представляла собой широкую защищенную дорогу, по которой могли быстро передвигаться воинские части и обозы. В настоящее время некоторые участки этой плоскости заасфальтированы и используются как автомобильные дороги. Стена проходит главным образом по гористым местам, повторяя изгибы рельефа и органично вписываясь в окружающий пейзаж.

Императорский дворец

В самом центре Пекина находится Императорский дворец, известен также как Запретный город, так как на протяжении 500 лет его истории здесь мог жить только император и его семья, а придворные, чиновники и все остальные жили за его стенами, и до 1925 года простым смертным вход сюда был запрещён. Занесён ЮНЕСКО в список всемирного наследия человечества в 1987 году. Построен в 1406—1420 гг., резиденция 24 китайских императоров. Общая площадь в 720 тыс. кв. м, в нём находится 9999 комнат. Он окружён стеной длиной 3400 м и рвом с водой, которая называется «Золотая вода». Комплекс разделён на Внутренний дворец и Внешний дворец. Основные помещения Внешнего дворца, где император выполнял свои государственные функции — зал Верховной гармонии, Полной гармонии и Сохранения гармонии. Во Внутреннем дворце находились жилые помещения, где жили, играли, поклонялись Богам император, императрицы, наложницы, принцы и принцессы. Основные помещения этой части Запретного города — залы Небесной чистоты, Объединения и мира, Земного спокойствия. Здесь же находятся три императорских сада — Долголетия, Доброты и Спокойствия и Императорский сад.

Мавзолей императора Цинь Шихуанди и «терракотовая армия»

Г.Сиань, провинция Шэньси, включены в список ЮНЕСКО в 1987 году. Находится в 35 км от города Сианя, построен в 221—210 гг. до н. э. для первого императора объединённого Китая. На его строительстве были заняты 700 тыс. рабочих. В подземном дворце размещается более 400 захоронений, его площадь — более 56.25 кв.км. Главное экспонаты комплекса — терракотовая армия, случайно обнаруженная местными крестьянами в 1974 году. В трёх сводчатых подземных камерах находятся в общей сложности фигуры около 7400 солдат и лошадей и 90 военных колесниц — практически вся императорская армия. Фигуры выполнены в полный рост, их высота 1,8 м, каждое лицо солдата уникально.

Китайские изобретения

Печатные книги, фарфор, шёлк, зеркала, зонтики и бумажные змеи — это лишь малая доля тех предметов нашей повседневности, которые были изобретены китайцами и которыми люди пользуются и по сей день во всем мире. Примечательно, что китайцы разработали технологию производства фарфора за тысячу лет до европейцев. А два самых известных китайских изобретения появились благодаря философии. В поисках эликсира бессмертия даосские алхимики случайно вывели формулу пороха, а магнитный компас был создан на основе инструмента, применявшегося для геомантии и фэн-шуй.

Китайская астрология

Каждый год ассоциируется с одним из 12 животных, имеющих особый символ и составляющих повторяющийся астрологический цикл. В преддверии Нового года у китайцев принято говорить, например, о приходе «года собаки». В китайской астрологии человеку, рождённому под знаком определённого животного, приписываются особенности, присущие этому животному.

В честь Китая был назван астероид (139) Жуйхуа, открытый 10 октября 1874 года канадо-американским астрономом Джеймсом Уотсоном в Пекине. В переводе с китайского название астероида означает «Звезда счастья Китая».

Книгопечатание

Изобретение подвижного шрифта не оказало значительного влияния на китайское общество, и большинство печатников продолжали использовать прежние формы. В Европе изобретение подвижного шрифта произвело революцию. Оперировать 30 печатными формами латинского алфавита проще, чем 3000 и более для иероглифов, использующихся при выпуске китайской газеты. Выполнение оттисков иероглифов на одной печатной форме требует намного больше усилий и затрат.

Иероглифы

Китайские иероглифы могут состоять из пиктографических, идеографических и фонетических элементов. Радикал (или ключ) — элемент, который пишется слева или наверху иероглифа, — ключ к заложенному в нём смысле. Ключи могут быть как фонетическими элементами, так и смысловыми. Например, в иероглифе 吗 (ма), обозначающим вопросительную частицу общего вопроса, иероглиф 马 (ма, «лошадь»), является фонетиком. Также в иероглифе , обозначающем «хорошо» и произносящемся как «hǎo»[27], радикал «женщина» сочетается с другим смысловым элементом «ребёнок» . Идея иероглифа, таким образом, заключается в том, что «женщина» и «ребёнок» в семье — это хорошо, к счастью. С недавнего времени китайцы перешли на упрощённые иероглифы, что заметно облегчило обучение китайскому языку.

Спорт

Китай обладает одной из старейших спортивных культур в мире. Существуют свидетельства о том, что в Китае ещё в древние времена играли в некую игру с кожаным мячом, наподобие современного футбола. Помимо футбола, самыми популярными спортивными состязаниями в стране являются военные искусства, пулевая стрельба, настольный теннис, спортивная гимнастика и прыжки на батуте, тяжёлая атлетика, бадминтон, лёгкая атлетика, плавание, шорт трек, фигурное катание, конькобежный спорт, баскетбол и бильярд. Физическая подготовка широко распространена в китайской культуре. Крупнейший издатель спортивной литературы в стране China Sports Publications Corporation выпускает множество спортивных книг, газет и журналов.

Летние Олимпийские игры 2008 года проводились также в Китае — в Пекине. КНР на них одержала убедительную победу в неофициальном общекомандном зачёте.

Пекин был избран основным городом Олимпиады решением жюри Международного олимпийского комитета 13 июля 2001 года. Официальный логотип летних Олимпийских игр 2008 года — «Танцующий Пекин». Талисманы — пять игрушек Фува, каждая из которых олицетворяла цвет олимпийских колец. Слоган Олимпиады — «Один мир, одна мечта». Спортсмены соревновались в 28 видах спорта.

С 2004 года в Шанхае на трассе «Шанхай Интернешнл» проводится гонка «Гран-при Китая» в классе «Формула-1».

См. также

  • Поколения руководителей КНР
  • Праздники Китайской Народной Республики
  • Китай (страна)
  • Список изобретений, сделанных в Китае
  • Космическая программа Китая
  • Транспорт в Китайской Народной Республике
  • Блокирование Википедии в Китайской Народной Республике
  • Институт Конфуция
  • Олимпийское движение и политический протест
  • Китайская угроза

Примечания

  1. Также английский в Гонконге и португальский в Макао.
  2. Цифровые данные приведены без включения данных по Тайваню, Гонконгу и Макао.
    Атлас мира, обзорно-географический, ИПУ РАН, ООО «УНИИНТЕХ», Москва, 2004.
    Атлас мира, ПКО «Картография» федеральной службы геодезии и картографии России, Москва, 2005.
  3. Коммюнике о предварительных результатах переписи населения 2010 года (данные не включают Тайвань, с Тайванем 1 370 536 875 чел.)
  4. ВВП КНР в 2011 г. вырос на 9,2% | Новости экономики | РБК-Украина
  5. Ошибка в сносках?: Неверный тег <ref>; для сносок IMF_2010 не указан текст
  6. Также гонконгский доллар в Гонконге и патака в Макао.
  7. Посол КНР в РФ
  8. Общероссийский классификатор стран мира
  9. Ледовский А. М. 2005. СССР, США и китайская революция глазами очевидца 1946—1949. М.: Ин-т Дальнего Востока РАН.
  10. Международный валютный фонд
  11. Зеленеющий Китай. Частный Корреспондент. chaskor.ru (26 декабря 2008). Архивировано из первоисточника 21 августа 2011.
  12. Сайт ЦРУ. The world factbook
  13. 1 2 Объем добычи золота в Китае в 2011 году достиг нового рекорда
  14. China Passes Japan to Become No. 2 Economy — NYTimes.com
  15. China Is a Private-Sector Economy. Interview Pete Engardio with economist Fan Gang  (англ.). BusinessWeek (22 August 2005). Архивировано из первоисточника 21 августа 2011. Проверено 20 июля 2009.
  16. Экономическая экспансия Китая в ЮАР и другие страны Африки к югу от Сахары (недоступная ссылка — история)
  17. Шэньчжэнь: место старта новых китайских реформ?
  18. «О развитии транспортной инфраструктуры в Китае». БИКИ, 04.12.07 г.
  19. Нереволюционная ситуация.(недоступная ссылка — история) (недоступная ссылка — история)
  20. Коммюнике о результатах 6-й Всекитайской переписи населения (данные приведены без населения Гонконга, Макао и Тайваня). (недоступная ссылка — история)
  21. «В Китае 30 тысяч сталеваров устроили драку с полицией», lenta.ru от 26.07.2009: «Погибший (главный управляющий компании Jianlong Steel Holding Company) ежемесячно получал три миллиона юаней (около 438 тысяч долларов), в то время как пенсия среднего работника Tonghua Iron and Steel Group не превышает 200 юаней в месяц.»
  22. Сколько мусульман проживают во всем мире?
  23. Сколько мусульман в мире?
  24. Селезнев Н., Марей А. Китай // Католическая Энциклопедия, т. 2. М.: Изд-во Францисканцев, 2005, кол. 1035—1046.
  25. La Iglesia china daña la fe, denuncia el Vaticano  (исп.)
  26. Великая Китайская стена оказалась почти на 3 000 км длиннее
  27. U+597D в Unihan database

Ссылки

П: Портал «Китай»
wikt: Китай в Викисловаре?
s: Китай в Викитеке?
commons: Китай на Викискладе?
n: Китай в Викиновостях?

Китайская Народная Республика в темах

Китайская Народная Республика

LocationAsia.png

Организация Объединённых Наций Совет Безопасности ООН

Постоянные члены Flag of the United Kingdom.svg ВеликобританияFlag of the People's Republic of China.svg КНРFlag of Russia.svg РоссияFlag of the United States.svg СШАFlag of France.svg Франция UN emblem blue.svg
2011—2012 Flag of Germany.svg ГерманияFlag of India.svg ИндияFlag of Colombia.svg КолумбияFlag of Portugal.svg ПортугалияFlag of South Africa.svg ЮАР
2012—2013 Flag of Azerbaijan.svg АзербайджанFlag of Guatemala.svg ГватемалаFlag of Morocco.svg МароккоFlag of Pakistan.svg ПакистанFlag of Togo.svg Того
Резолюции • Члены по годам

Официальное название: Китайская Народная Республика (КНР),
(название на китайском 中国 «zhōngguó«, на английском China)
Площадь страны: 9 596 960 км² (3 место в мире).

Президент:
Си Цзиньпин  Премьер-министр: Ли Кэцян 

Столица:

Пекин

 (21,9 млн человек)
Крупные города: Шанхай (24,8 млн человек); Гуанчжоу (18,6 млн человек) ; Шэньчжэнь (17,5 млн человек) ; Чунцин (31,1 млн человек); Тяньцзинь (13,8 млн человек).

Валюта:
Китайский юань (RMB, CNY,¥)
Телефонный код: +86

Население Китая:
 1 443 497 378 человек (по данным на 2021 год)
Плотность населения: 148,35 чел / км2
Средняя продолжительность жизни: 75.8 лет.

Китайская Народная Республика (中华人民共和国)  — это крупнейшая страна в Восточной Азии, занимающая первое место по численности населения и являющаяся второй экономикой мира.


Дата основания КНР

1 октября 1949 года.

Китайская цивилизация, зародившаяся приблизительно 5000 лет назад, пережила тысячелетия бурных потрясений и революций, взлетов и падений. Благодаря недавнему экономическому буму, инициированному реформами Дэн Сяопина, Китай стал одной из ведущих стран в мире. Многие эксперты сходятся во мнении, что этому способствовали богатые природные ресурсы страны и трудолюбивое население. Китай всегда имел множество путей культурного и торгового обмена (в частности, всем известный Великий шелковый путь), благодаря которым по сей день привлекает большое количество туристов со всего мира.

Административное деление и провинции Китая

Китай делится на 22 провинции, 5 автономных районов и 4 города центрального подчинения и 2 специальных административных района. Руководство каждого субъекта контролирует все внутренние дела своей провинции, района или города.

Автономным регионам предоставляется больше свободы, чем обычным провинциям – к примеру, их руководство имеет право объявлять дополнительные официальные языки помимо официального мандаринского диалекта. Кроме того, в состав страны входят специальные административные районы Гонконг и Макао. Как в Гонконге, так и в Макао действуют собственные правовые системы и миграционная политика, своя валюта, а также им предоставляется свобода принимать законы независимо от правительства материкового Китая. Их политические системы более открыты, а население пользуется избирательными правами.
Тайвань также считается провинцией КНР, хотя фактически в настоящее время ни одна часть Тайваня не находится под контролем Китая. В последнее время правительства поддерживают идею сотрудничества, в связи с чем недавно был подписан торговый договор для усиления связи экономик Китая и Тайваня.

Карта провинций и регионов Китая

С кем граничит КНР


Китай граничит с 14 странами

. Они перечислены в порядке длины границы: Монголия (4630 км), Россия (4179 км), Индия (2659 км), Мьянма (2129 км), Казахстан (1352 км), Непал (1389 км), Северная Корея (1352 км) ), Вьетнам (1 297 км), Кыргызстан (1 063 км), Таджикистан (477 км), Бутан (477 км), Лаос (475 км), Пакистан (438 км) и Афганистан (91 км).

Политическое устройство

С 1949 года Китай называется Китайской Народной Республикой и официально является унитарной однопартийной социалистической республикой. Несмотря на то, что страна открыто пропагандирует коммунизм, основная идеология Китая — «социализм с китайской спецификой». После того как Дэн Сяопин сменил Мао Цзедуна на посту лидера страны, марксистско-ленинская политика была полностью пересмотрена в целях приспособления ее под материальные условия Китая. Лидеры Китая излагали собственные взгляды на коммунизм, например, в таких работах, как «Теория Дэн Сяопина» и «Мысли Си Цзиньпина». Страна полностью отказалась от советской модели и вместо этого придерживалась идеи, что, согласно классическому марксизму, Китаю необходимо, в первую очередь, улучшить свою экономику и рынки, а уже после этого преследовать эгалитарный коммунизм.

В рамках унитарной однопартийной системы правящая партия (Коммунистическая партия Китая — КПК) выполняет все функции правительства. Выборы проводятся только для членов местных народных правительств, которые в свою очередь голосуют за членов вышестоящих законодательных органов, в том числе, и за членов ВСНП — Всекитайского Собрания Народных Правителей. В конституции КНР подчеркивается, что общий процент членов Коммунистической партии в законодательных органах должен преобладать над представителями других партий, которым, тем не менее, разрешено некоторое представительство на местном уровне. Руководители региональных партий имеют значительные полномочия, что еще сильнее децентрализует процесс управления.

Религия в Китае

Религия в Китае

Распространение религий в Китае:

  • Буддизм 18,2%,
  • Христианство 5,1%,
  • Мусульманство 1,8%,
  • Китайские религии 21,9%,
  • Индуизм<0,1%,
  • Иудаизм <0,1%,
  • Другие 0,7% (включая даоистов),
  • Нет религии/атеисты: 52,2%.

Большинство китайцев не являются приверженцами какой-либо религии — это является результатом активного подавления религиозных исповеданий в середине 20-го века. Страна официально придерживается атеистических взглядов. Однако на правовом уровне Китай признает практику пяти религий: буддизм, католицизм, даосизм, ислам и протестантизм. Все они тесно связаны с историей развития Китая. Различные народные верования и религиозные культы формально не признаются, но допускаются правительством.

Экономика КНР

После введения рыночных реформ Дэн Сяопином в в 70-80х года прошлого столетия в Китае сей день наблюдается устойчивый экономический рост. В настоящее время китайская экономика по своей величине занимает первое или второе место в мире, в зависимости от того, какую оценочную систему используют эксперты. Китай является крупнейшим в мире экспортером товаров и вторым по величине импортером в мире. Китай конкурирует с США по уровню влияния на мировую экономику и, по прогнозам, рост экономики в будущем только продолжится. На протяжении последних нескольких лет в Китае наблюдается резкий скачок благосостояния среднего класса, поскольку страна все больше отходит от сельскохозяйственной экономики. Китай также добился огромных успехов в разработке и использовании возобновляемых источников энергии.

Экономика Китая в Цифрах:

  • ВВП Китая: $14.72 триллиона (на 2020 год)
  • ВВП на душу населения: 10,484 USD (2020)
  • Темпы роста: 18.3% (1 квартал 2021 года)
  • Инфляция: 2.5% (2020г)
  • Государственные расходы: 37% от ВВП (2020 г.)
  • Государственный долг: 270,1% от ВВП (2021 г.)

Трудовые ресурсы

Трудоспособное население: 880.7 миллионов (2021.)
Примечание: количество трудоспособного населения в 2012 (15-64 года) было 1.004 миллиарда.

Сферы занятости

: Сельское хозяйство: 27.7%, Промышленность: 28.8%, Сфера услуг: 43.5% (2018.)

Уровень безработицы:

15.4% (2021.)

Процент населения за чертой бедности:

менее 1% (2021.)

Примечание: в 2011 году правительством Китая была установлена новая черта бедности на уровне 2300 юаней (примерно 330 долларов США).

Торговля

Экспорт: 2.591 трлн долларов (2020 год)
Основные статьи экспорта: Электроника и оборудование, электроника и телекоммуникационное оборудование, одежда, мебель, текстиль

Основные партнеры Китая по экспорту по итогам 2020 года:

США

— 452.6 млрд. долл |17,5%,

Гонконг

— 272.7 млрд. долл | 10.5%

Япония

— 142.6 млрд. долл | 5,5%

Вьетнам

— 113.8 млрд. долл | 4,4%

Южная Корея

— 112.5 млрд. долл | 4,4%

Импорт: 2.06 триллионов долларов USD (2020)
Основные статьи импорта: электроника, включая интегральные схемы и другие компьютерные компоненты, нефть и топливо; оптическое и медицинское оборудование, металлическая руда, автомобили, соевые бобы.

Основные партнеры Китая по импорту в 2020 году:

Япония

10%,

Южная Корея

10%,

США

  7,9%,

Австралия

— 6,6%,

Германия

6.3%,

Бразилия

4.9%.

На каком языке говорят в Китае

Основные диалекты китайского языка:
— Официальный мандаринский диалект (путунхуа) ,
— Кантонский,
— Шанхайский,
— Минбэй (преимущественно в Фучжоу) и Миннань (хоккиен-тайваньский).

Официальный язык Китая

мандаринский диалект китайского языка

, основанный по большей части на пекинском диалекте, известном в китайском языке как «путунхуа» (Putonghua, 普通话, «общепринятый диалект»). С 1950-х годов в образовательной системе страны используется только мандаринский диалект, и именно поэтому большинство жителей Китая говорят на этом языке. На центральных теле- и радиоканалах, в прессе также используется мандаринский диалект. Путунхуа, как и другие диалекты, основан на тонах — одно слово имеет несколько значений, в зависимости от того, в каком тоне оно произнесено. 

Во многих регионах, особенно на юго-востоке и юге страны, также имеются свои собственные диалекты. Кантонский, на котором говорят на юге страны, является вторым по распространенности диалектом в Китае. Фактически кантонский и путунхуа — это разные языки, отличающиеся между собой так же сильно, как, к примеру, итальянский и французский, что на данный момент является острой политической проблемой. Как и стандартный мандаринский, другие диалекты являются тональными языками. 

Все диалекта объединяет иероглифика. Вне зависимости от региона и диалекта, все иероглифы имеют одинаковое значение. На всей территории материкового Китая используется упрощенная система иероглифов, а в Гонконге и Макао до сих пор распространено традиционное, старое написание иероглифов. Разница между традиционными и упрощенными иероглифами заключается в количестве черт и сложности написания. Например, иероглиф 广 в традиционном написании выглядит как 廣, или 关 в старом написании выглядит как 關. Упрощение иероглифов было организовано правительством КНР с целью повышения грамотности населения в 1956 году. Подробней о китайском языке читайте в нашей статье.

Китайская кухня

Китай знаменит своими кулинарными традициями. Нужно сразу сказать, что не существует такого единого понятия как «Китайская Кухня» — практически в каждой провинции и регионе едят свои уникальные блюда.

Всего можно выделить восемь основных кухонь Китая: аньхойская, кантонская, фуцзяньская, хунанская, кухня цзянсу, шаньдунская, сычуаньская и чжэцзянская.

Имеется также масса региональных разновидностей китайской кухни. Огромные территории Китая и разные виды климата (от тропического до пустынного) способствовали появлению различных вкусовых предпочтений. По этой причине даже сегодня на севере больше предпочитают мясные блюда и мучные изделия, на юге и востоке — морепродукты, рис и пр.

Способы приготовления еды в Китае сильно отличается от европейской кухни и русской кухни — даже сегодня китайцы продолжают следовать древним ритуалам и верят в свои убеждения о совместимости и исключительной пользе отдельных ингредиентов. 

Подробней о китайской кухне читайте в статье Кухня Китая,  в которой мы подробно рассмотрели все виды региональных кухонь и дали рекомендации по тем блюдам, которые стоит обязательно попробовать во время путешествия в Китай.

Города Китая  

Ниже перечислено 10 самых важных и интересных для туристов городов, расположенных на материковой части Китая. Другие города перечислены в разделах с соответствующими регионами. 
Пекин (北京) — столица, культурный и исторический центр КНР.
Гуанчжоу (广州) — один из самых развитых и либеральных городов на юге страны.
Гуйлинь (桂林) — город с самыми красивыми природными пейзажами.
Ханьчжоу (杭州) — город, известный своей традиционной красотой, крупный центр шелковой индустрии.
Куньмин (昆明) — столица провинции Юньнань и родина представителей многих этнических меньшинств.
Нанкин (南京) — знаменитый своей богатой культурой и историей город со множеством исторических достопримечательностей.
Шанхай (上海) — крупнейший город Китая, расположенный на берегу реки Янцзы и являющийся крупным коммерческим и торговым центром.
Сучжоу (苏州) — «Восточная Венеция», древний город к западу от Шанхая, известный своими садами и каналами.
Сиань (西安) — древнейший город страны и бывшая столица Китая, родина десяти династий, включая Хань и Тан, конечная точка древнего Шелкового пути и родина терракотовых воинов.
Янчжоу (扬州) — «Олицетворение Китая», город, которому более 2500 лет, где в конце 13-го века Марко Поло занимал должность губернатора на протяжении 3 лет.
Чэнду (成都) — «Дом гигантских панд», основанный еще до Сианя. Столица провинции Сычуань и родина самой острой еды в стране.

Абхазия Республика Абхазия Abkhazia AB ABH 895 Азия Закавказье Австралия Australia AU AUS 036 Океания Австралия и Новая Зеландия Австрия Австрийская Республика Austria AT AUT 040 Европа Западная Европа Азербайджан Республика Азербайджан Azerbaijan AZ AZE 031 Азия Западная Азия Албания Республика Албания Albania AL ALB 008 Европа Южная Европа Алжир Алжирская Народная Демократическая Республика Algeria DZ DZA 012 Африка Северная Африка Американское Самоа American Samoa AS ASM 016 Океания Полинезия Ангилья Anguilla AI AIA 660 Америка Карибский бассейн Ангола Республика Ангола Angola AO AGO 024 Африка Центральная Африка Андорра Княжество Андорра Andorra AD AND 020 Европа Южная Европа Антарктида Antarctica AQ ATA 010 Антарктика Антигуа и Барбуда Antigua and Barbuda AG ATG 028 Америка Карибский бассейн Аргентина Аргентинская Республика Argentina AR ARG 032 Америка Южная Америка Армения Республика Армения Armenia AM ARM 051 Азия Западная Азия Аруба Aruba AW ABW 533 Америка Карибский бассейн Афганистан Переходное Исламское Государство Афганистан Afghanistan AF AFG 004 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Багамы Содружество Багамы Bahamas BS BHS 044 Америка Карибский бассейн Бангладеш Народная Республика Бангладеш Bangladesh BD BGD 050 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Барбадос Barbados BB BRB 052 Америка Карибский бассейн Бахрейн Королевство Бахрейн Bahrain BH BHR 048 Азия Западная Азия Беларусь Республика Беларусь Belarus BY BLR 112 Европа Восточная Европа Белиз Belize BZ BLZ 084 Америка Карибский бассейн Бельгия Королевство Бельгии Belgium BE BEL 056 Европа Западная Европа Бенин Республика Бенин Benin BJ BEN 204 Африка Западная Африка Бермуды Bermuda BM BMU 060 Америка Северная Америка Болгария Республика Болгария Bulgaria BG BGR 100 Европа Восточная Европа Боливия, Многонациональное Государство Многонациональное Государство Боливия Bolivia, plurinational state of BO BOL 068 Америка Южная Америка Бонайре, Саба и Синт-Эстатиус Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba BQ BES 535 Америка Карибский бассейн Босния и Герцеговина Bosnia and Herzegovina BA BIH 070 Европа Южная Европа Ботсвана Республика Ботсвана Botswana BW BWA 072 Африка Южная часть Африки Бразилия Федеративная Республика Бразилия Brazil BR BRA 076 Америка Южная Америка Британская территория в Индийском океане British Indian Ocean Territory IO IOT 086 Океания Индийский океан Бруней-Даруссалам Brunei Darussalam BN BRN 096 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Буркина-Фасо Burkina Faso BF BFA 854 Африка Западная Африка Бурунди Республика Бурунди Burundi BI BDI 108 Африка Восточная Африка Бутан Королевство Бутан Bhutan BT BTN 064 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Вануату Республика Вануату Vanuatu VU VUT 548 Океания Меланезия Венгрия Венгерская Республика Hungary HU HUN 348 Европа Восточная Европа Венесуэла Боливарианская Республика Боливарийская Республика Венесуэла Venezuela VE VEN 862 Америка Южная Америка Виргинские острова, Британские Британские Виргинские острова Virgin Islands, British VG VGB 092 Америка Карибский бассейн Виргинские острова, США Виргинские острова Соединенных Штатов Virgin Islands, U.S. VI VIR 850 Америка Карибский бассейн Вьетнам Социалистическая Республика Вьетнам Vietnam VN VNM 704 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Габон Габонская Республика Gabon GA GAB 266 Африка Центральная Африка Гаити Республика Гаити Haiti HT HTI 332 Америка Карибский бассейн Гайана Республика Гайана Guyana GY GUY 328 Америка Южная Америка Гамбия Республика Гамбия Gambia GM GMB 270 Африка Западная Африка Гана Республика Гана Ghana GH GHA 288 Африка Западная Африка Гваделупа Guadeloupe GP GLP 312 Америка Карибский бассейн Гватемала Республика Гватемала Guatemala GT GTM 320 Америка Центральная Америка Гвинея Гвинейская Республика Guinea GN GIN 324 Африка Западная Африка Гвинея-Бисау Республика Гвинея-Бисау Guinea-Bissau GW GNB 624 Африка Западная Африка Германия Федеративная Республика Германия Germany DE DEU 276 Европа Западная Европа Гернси Guernsey GG GGY 831 Европа Северная Европа Гибралтар Gibraltar GI GIB 292 Европа Южная Европа Гондурас Республика Гондурас Honduras HN HND 340 Америка Центральная Америка Гонконг Специальный административный регион Китая Гонконг Hong Kong HK HKG 344 Азия Восточная Азия Гренада Grenada GD GRD 308 Америка Карибский бассейн Гренландия Greenland GL GRL 304 Америка Северная Америка Греция Греческая Республика Greece GR GRC 300 Европа Южная Европа Грузия Georgia GE GEO 268 Азия Западная Азия Гуам Guam GU GUM 316 Океания Микронезия Дания Королевство Дания Denmark DK DNK 208 Европа Северная Европа Джерси Jersey JE JEY 832 Европа Северная Европа Джибути Республика Джибути Djibouti DJ DJI 262 Африка Восточная Африка Доминика Содружество Доминики Dominica DM DMA 212 Америка Карибский бассейн Доминиканская Республика Dominican Republic DO DOM 214 Америка Карибский бассейн Египет Арабская Республика Египет Egypt EG EGY 818 Африка Северная Африка Замбия Республика Замбия Zambia ZM ZMB 894 Африка Восточная Африка Западная Сахара Western Sahara EH ESH 732 Африка Северная Африка Зимбабве Республика Зимбабве Zimbabwe ZW ZWE 716 Африка Восточная Африка Израиль Государство Израиль Israel IL ISR 376 Азия Западная Азия Индия Республика Индия India IN IND 356 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Индонезия Республика Индонезия Indonesia ID IDN 360 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Иордания Иорданское Хашимитское Королевство Jordan JO JOR 400 Азия Западная Азия Ирак Республика Ирак Iraq IQ IRQ 368 Азия Западная Азия Иран, Исламская Республика Исламская Республика Иран Iran, Islamic Republic of IR IRN 364 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Ирландия Ireland IE IRL 372 Европа Северная Европа Исландия Республика Исландия Iceland IS ISL 352 Европа Северная Европа Испания Королевство Испания Spain ES ESP 724 Европа Южная Европа Италия Итальянская Республика Italy IT ITA 380 Европа Южная Европа Йемен Йеменская Республика Yemen YE YEM 887 Азия Западная Азия Кабо-Верде Республика Кабо-Верде Cape Verde CV CPV 132 Африка Западная Африка Казахстан Республика Казахстан Kazakhstan KZ KAZ 398 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Камбоджа Королевство Камбоджа Cambodia KH KHM 116 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Камерун Республика Камерун Cameroon CM CMR 120 Африка Центральная Африка Канада Canada CA CAN 124 Америка Северная Америка Катар Государство Катар Qatar QA QAT 634 Азия Западная Азия Кения Республика Кения Kenya KE KEN 404 Африка Восточная Африка Кипр Республика Кипр Cyprus CY CYP 196 Азия Западная Азия Киргизия Киргизская Республика Kyrgyzstan KG KGZ 417 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Кирибати Республика Кирибати Kiribati KI KIR 296 Океания Микронезия Китай Китайская Народная Республика China CN CHN 156 Азия Восточная Азия Кокосовые (Килинг) острова Cocos (Keeling) Islands CC CCK 166 Океания Индийский океан Колумбия Республика Колумбия Colombia CO COL 170 Америка Южная Америка Коморы Союз Коморы Comoros KM COM 174 Африка Восточная Африка Конго Республика Конго Congo CG COG 178 Африка Центральная Африка Конго, Демократическая Республика Демократическая Республика Конго Congo, Democratic Republic of the CD COD 180 Африка Центральная Африка Корея, Народно-Демократическая Республика Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика Korea, Democratic People’s republic of KP PRK 408 Азия Восточная Азия Корея, Республика Республика Корея Korea, Republic of KR KOR 410 Азия Восточная Азия Коста-Рика Республика Коста-Рика Costa Rica CR CRI 188 Америка Центральная Америка Кот д’Ивуар Республика Кот д’Ивуар Cote d’Ivoire CI CIV 384 Африка Западная Африка Куба Республика Куба Cuba CU CUB 192 Америка Карибский бассейн Кувейт Государство Кувейт Kuwait KW KWT 414 Азия Западная Азия Кюрасао Curaçao CW CUW 531 Америка Карибский бассейн Лаос Лаосская Народно-Демократическая Республика Lao People’s Democratic Republic LA LAO 418 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Латвия Латвийская Республика Latvia LV LVA 428 Европа Северная Европа Лесото Королевство Лесото Lesotho LS LSO 426 Африка Южная часть Африки Ливан Ливанская Республика Lebanon LB LBN 422 Азия Западная Азия Ливийская Арабская Джамахирия Социалистическая Народная Ливийская Арабская Джамахирия Libyan Arab Jamahiriya LY LBY 434 Африка Северная Африка Либерия Республика Либерия Liberia LR LBR 430 Африка Западная Африка Лихтенштейн Княжество Лихтенштейн Liechtenstein LI LIE 438 Европа Западная Европа Литва Литовская Республика Lithuania LT LTU 440 Европа Северная Европа Люксембург Великое Герцогство Люксембург Luxembourg LU LUX 442 Европа Западная Европа Маврикий Республика Маврикий Mauritius MU MUS 480 Африка Восточная Африка Мавритания Исламская Республика Мавритания Mauritania MR MRT 478 Африка Западная Африка Мадагаскар Республика Мадагаскар Madagascar MG MDG 450 Африка Восточная Африка Майотта Mayotte YT MYT 175 Африка Южная часть Африки Макао Специальный административный регион Китая Макао Macao MO MAC 446 Азия Восточная Азия Малави Республика Малави Malawi MW MWI 454 Африка Восточная Африка Малайзия Malaysia MY MYS 458 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Мали Республика Мали Mali ML MLI 466 Африка Западная Африка Малые Тихоокеанские отдаленные острова Соединенных Штатов United States Minor Outlying Islands UM UMI 581 Океания Индийский океан Мальдивы Мальдивская Республика Maldives MV MDV 462 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Мальта Республика Мальта Malta MT MLT 470 Европа Южная Европа Марокко Королевство Марокко Morocco MA MAR 504 Африка Северная Африка Мартиника Martinique MQ MTQ 474 Америка Карибский бассейн Маршалловы острова Республика Маршалловы острова Marshall Islands MH MHL 584 Океания Микронезия Мексика Мексиканские Соединенные Штаты Mexico MX MEX 484 Америка Центральная Америка Микронезия, Федеративные Штаты Федеративные штаты Микронезии Micronesia, Federated States of FM FSM 583 Океания Микронезия Мозамбик Республика Мозамбик Mozambique MZ MOZ 508 Африка Восточная Африка Молдова, Республика Республика Молдова Moldova MD MDA 498 Европа Восточная Европа Монако Княжество Монако Monaco MC MCO 492 Европа Западная Европа Монголия Mongolia MN MNG 496 Азия Восточная Азия Монтсеррат Montserrat MS MSR 500 Америка Карибский бассейн Мьянма Союз Мьянма Burma MM MMR 104 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Намибия Республика Намибия Namibia NA NAM 516 Африка Южная часть Африки Науру Республика Науру Nauru NR NRU 520 Океания Микронезия Непал Королевство Непал Nepal NP NPL 524 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Нигер Республика Нигер Niger NE NER 562 Африка Западная Африка Нигерия Федеративная Республика Нигерия Nigeria NG NGA 566 Африка Западная Африка Нидерланды Королевство Нидерландов Netherlands NL NLD 528 Европа Западная Европа Никарагуа Республика Никарагуа Nicaragua NI NIC 558 Америка Центральная Америка Ниуэ Республика Ниуэ Niue NU NIU 570 Океания Полинезия Новая Зеландия New Zealand NZ NZL 554 Океания Австралия и Новая Зеландия Новая Каледония New Caledonia NC NCL 540 Океания Меланезия Норвегия Королевство Норвегия Norway NO NOR 578 Европа Северная Европа Объединенные Арабские Эмираты United Arab Emirates AE ARE 784 Азия Западная Азия Оман Султанат Оман Oman OM OMN 512 Азия Западная Азия Остров Буве Bouvet Island BV BVT 074 Южный океан Остров Мэн Isle of Man IM IMN 833 Европа Северная Европа Остров Норфолк Norfolk Island NF NFK 574 Океания Австралия и Новая Зеландия Остров Рождества Christmas Island CX CXR 162 Азия Индийский океан Остров Херд и острова Макдональд Heard Island and McDonald Islands HM HMD 334 Индийский океан Острова Кайман Cayman Islands KY CYM 136 Америка Карибский бассейн Острова Кука Cook Islands CK COK 184 Океания Полинезия Острова Теркс и Кайкос Turks and Caicos Islands TC TCA 796 Америка Карибский бассейн Пакистан Исламская Республика Пакистан Pakistan PK PAK 586 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Палау Республика Палау Palau PW PLW 585 Океания Микронезия Палестинская территория, оккупированная Оккупированная Палестинская территория Palestinian Territory, Occupied PS PSE 275 Азия Западная Азия Панама Республика Панама Panama PA PAN 591 Америка Центральная Америка Папский Престол (Государство — город Ватикан) Holy See (Vatican City State) VA VAT 336 Европа Южная Европа Папуа-Новая Гвинея Papua New Guinea PG PNG 598 Океания Меланезия Парагвай Республика Парагвай Paraguay PY PRY 600 Америка Южная Америка Перу Республика Перу Peru PE PER 604 Америка Южная Америка Питкерн Pitcairn PN PCN 612 Океания Полинезия Польша Республика Польша Poland PL POL 616 Европа Восточная Европа Португалия Португальская Республика Portugal PT PRT 620 Европа Южная Европа Пуэрто-Рико Puerto Rico PR PRI 630 Америка Карибский бассейн Республика Македония Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic Of MK MKD 807 Европа Южная Европа Реюньон Reunion RE REU 638 Африка Восточная Африка Россия Российская Федерация Russian Federation RU RUS 643 Европа Восточная Европа Руанда Руандийская Республика Rwanda RW RWA 646 Африка Восточная Африка Румыния Romania RO ROU 642 Европа Восточная Европа Самоа Независимое Государство Самоа Samoa WS WSM 882 Океания Полинезия Сан-Марино Республика Сан-Марино San Marino SM SMR 674 Европа Южная Европа Сан-Томе и Принсипи Демократическая Республика Сан-Томе и Принсипи Sao Tome and Principe ST STP 678 Африка Центральная Африка Саудовская Аравия Королевство Саудовская Аравия Saudi Arabia SA SAU 682 Азия Западная Азия Святая Елена, Остров вознесения, Тристан-да-Кунья Saint Helena, Ascension And Tristan Da Cunha SH SHN 654 Африка Западная Африка Северные Марианские острова Содружество Северных Марианских островов Northern Mariana Islands MP MNP 580 Океания Микронезия Сен-Бартельми Saint Barthélemy BL BLM 652 Америка Карибский бассейн Сен-Мартен Saint Martin (French Part) MF MAF 663 Америка Карибский бассейн Сенегал Республика Сенегал Senegal SN SEN 686 Африка Западная Африка Сент-Винсент и Гренадины Saint Vincent and the Grenadines VC VCT 670 Америка Карибский бассейн Сент-Китс и Невис Saint Kitts and Nevis KN KNA 659 Америка Карибский бассейн Сент-Люсия Saint Lucia LC LCA 662 Америка Карибский бассейн Сент-Пьер и Микелон Saint Pierre and Miquelon PM SPM 666 Америка Северная Америка Сербия Республика Сербия Serbia RS SRB 688 Европа Южная Европа Сейшелы Республика Сейшелы Seychelles SC SYC 690 Африка Восточная Африка Сингапур Республика Сингапур Singapore SG SGP 702 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Синт-Мартен Sint Maarten SX SXM 534 Америка Карибский бассейн Сирийская Арабская Республика Syrian Arab Republic SY SYR 760 Азия Западная Азия Словакия Словацкая Республика Slovakia SK SVK 703 Европа Восточная Европа Словения Республика Словения Slovenia SI SVN 705 Европа Южная Европа Соединенное Королевство Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии United Kingdom GB GBR 826 Европа Северная Европа Соединенные Штаты Соединенные Штаты Америки United States US USA 840 Америка Северная Америка Соломоновы острова Solomon Islands SB SLB 090 Океания Меланезия Сомали Сомалийская Республика Somalia SO SOM 706 Африка Восточная Африка Судан Республика Судан Sudan SD SDN 729 Африка Северная Африка Суринам Республика Суринам Suriname SR SUR 740 Америка Южная Америка Сьерра-Леоне Республика Сьерра-Леоне Sierra Leone SL SLE 694 Африка Западная Африка Таджикистан Республика Таджикистан Tajikistan TJ TJK 762 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Таиланд Королевство Таиланд Thailand TH THA 764 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Тайвань (Китай) Taiwan, Province of China TW TWN 158 Азия Восточная Азия Танзания, Объединенная Республика Объединенная Республика Танзания Tanzania, United Republic Of TZ TZA 834 Африка Восточная Африка Тимор-Лесте Демократическая Республика Тимор-Лесте Timor-Leste TL TLS 626 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Того Тоголезская Республика Togo TG TGO 768 Африка Западная Африка Токелау Tokelau TK TKL 772 Океания Полинезия Тонга Королевство Тонга Tonga TO TON 776 Океания Полинезия Тринидад и Тобаго Республика Тринидад и Тобаго Trinidad and Tobago TT TTO 780 Америка Карибский бассейн Тувалу Tuvalu TV TUV 798 Океания Полинезия Тунис Тунисская Республика Tunisia TN TUN 788 Африка Северная Африка Туркмения Туркменистан Turkmenistan TM TKM 795 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Турция Турецкая Республика Turkey TR TUR 792 Азия Западная Азия Уганда Республика Уганда Uganda UG UGA 800 Африка Восточная Африка Узбекистан Республика Узбекистан Uzbekistan UZ UZB 860 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Украина Ukraine UA UKR 804 Европа Восточная Европа Уоллис и Футуна Wallis and Futuna WF WLF 876 Океания Полинезия Уругвай Восточная Республика Уругвай Uruguay UY URY 858 Америка Южная Америка Фарерские острова Faroe Islands FO FRO 234 Европа Северная Европа Фиджи Республика островов Фиджи Fiji FJ FJI 242 Океания Меланезия Филиппины Республика Филиппины Philippines PH PHL 608 Азия Юго-Восточная Азия Финляндия Финляндская Республика Finland FI FIN 246 Европа Северная Европа Фолклендские острова (Мальвинские) Falkland Islands (Malvinas) FK FLK 238 Америка Южная Америка Франция Французская Республика France FR FRA 250 Европа Западная Европа Французская Гвиана French Guiana GF GUF 254 Америка Южная Америка Французская Полинезия French Polynesia PF PYF 258 Океания Полинезия Французские Южные территории French Southern Territories TF ATF 260 Индийский океан Хорватия Республика Хорватия Croatia HR HRV 191 Европа Южная Европа Центрально-Африканская Республика Central African Republic CF CAF 140 Африка Центральная Африка Чад Республика Чад Chad TD TCD 148 Африка Центральная Африка Черногория Республика Черногория Montenegro ME MNE 499 Европа Южная Европа Чешская Республика Czech Republic CZ CZE 203 Европа Восточная Европа Чили Республика Чили Chile CL CHL 152 Америка Южная Америка Швейцария Швейцарская Конфедерация Switzerland CH CHE 756 Европа Западная Европа Швеция Королевство Швеция Sweden SE SWE 752 Европа Северная Европа Шпицберген и Ян Майен Svalbard and Jan Mayen SJ SJM 744 Европа Северная Европа Шри-Ланка Демократическая Социалистическая Республика Шри-Ланка Sri Lanka LK LKA 144 Азия Южная часть Центральной Азии Эквадор Республика Эквадор Ecuador EC ECU 218 Америка Южная Америка Экваториальная Гвинея Республика Экваториальная Гвинея Equatorial Guinea GQ GNQ 226 Африка Центральная Африка Эландские острова Åland Islands AX ALA 248 Европа Северная Европа Эль-Сальвадор Республика Эль-Сальвадор El Salvador SV SLV 222 Америка Центральная Америка Эритрея Eritrea ER ERI 232 Африка Восточная Африка Эсватини Королевство Эсватини Eswatini SZ SWZ 748 Африка Южная часть Африки Эстония Эстонская Республика Estonia EE EST 233 Европа Северная Европа Эфиопия Федеративная Демократическая Республика Эфиопия Ethiopia ET ETH 231 Африка Восточная Африка Южная Африка Южно-Африканская Республика South Africa ZA ZAF 710 Африка Южная часть Африки Южная Джорджия и Южные Сандвичевы острова South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands GS SGS 239 Южный океан Южная Осетия Республика Южная Осетия South Ossetia OS OST 896 Азия Закавказье Южный Судан South Sudan SS SSD 728 Африка Северная Африка Ямайка Jamaica JM JAM 388 Америка Карибский бассейн Япония Japan JP JPN 392 Азия Восточная Азия

Китай или КНР

Модераторы: Кирилл Кузнецов, madgrey, Ilia, Всегда на страже

Кудряшка

 
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Китай или КНР

В заявке указана страна происхождения — «КНР». В классификаторе только сокращенное «Китай» и полное «Китайская народная республика». КНР — общепринятое. Отклоняем? Ваши мнения, практика, советы.


sander

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Re: Китай или КНР

Сообщение sander » 31 июл 2015, 09:58

Официальное название — Китайская Народная Республика, сокращенное, т.е. общеупотребительное — КНР. В Конституции Китая закреплено название «Китайская Народная Республика». Следовательно, так и должно быть.


Кудряшка

 
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Re: Китай или КНР

Сообщение Кудряшка » 31 июл 2015, 10:05

как должно быть?


Всегда на страже

Контролирующий орган
 
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Re: Китай или КНР

Сообщение Всегда на страже » 31 июл 2015, 10:31

если других причин для отказа в допуске нет — допускайте.


tomich

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Re: Китай или КНР

Сообщение tomich » 31 июл 2015, 10:47

КНР — она же Китайская Народная Республика.
Оснований для отклонения не вижу.

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«People’s Republic of China» redirects here. For the Republic of China, see Taiwan.

People’s Republic of China

中华人民共和国 (Chinese)
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó (Pinyin)

Flag of China

Flag

National Emblem of China

National Emblem

Anthem: 
义勇军进行曲
Yìyǒngjūn Jìnxíngqǔ
«March of the Volunteers»
Territory controlled by the People's Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Territory controlled by the People’s Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Capital Beijing
39°55′N 116°23′E / 39.917°N 116.383°E
Largest city
by population
Shanghai
Official languages Standard Chinese[a]
Recognized regional languages
  • Mongolian
  • Uyghur
  • Tibetan
  • Zhuang
  • Others
Official script Simplified Chinese[b]
Ethnic groups

(2020)[1]

  • 91.1% Han Chinese
  • 8.9% Others
Religion

(2020)[2]

  • 74.5% No religion / Folk
  • 18.3% Buddhism
  • 5.2% Christianity
  • 1.6% Islam
  • 0.4% Others
Demonym(s) Chinese
Government Unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic

• CCP General Secretary[c]
President[d]
CMC Chairman[e]

Xi Jinping

• Premier

Li Keqiang

• Congress Chairman

Li Zhanshu

• CPPCC Chairman[f]

Wang Yang
Legislature National People’s Congress
Formation

• First pre-imperial dynasty

c. 2070 BCE

• First imperial dynasty

221 BCE

• Republic established

1 January 1912

• Proclamation of the People’s Republic

1 October 1949

• First constitution

20 September 1954

• Current constitution

4 December 1982

• Most recent polity admitted

20 December 1999
Area

• Total

9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi)[g][5] (3rd / 4th)

• Water (%)

2.8[h]
Population

• 2022 estimate

1,410,539,758[7] (1st)

• 2020 census

Neutral increase 1,411,778,724[8] (1st)

• Density

145[9]/km2 (375.5/sq mi) (83rd)
GDP (PPP) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $30.074 trillion[10] (1st)

• Per capita

Increase $21,291[10] (72nd)
GDP (nominal) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $18.321 trillion[i][10] (2nd)

• Per capita

Increase $12,970[10] (65th)
Gini (2019) Positive decrease 38.2[11]
medium
HDI (2021) Increase 0.768[12]
high · 79th
Currency Renminbi (元/¥)[j] (CNY)
Time zone UTC+8 (CST)
DST is not observed
Date format
  • yyyy-mm-dd
  • or yyyymd
  • (CE; Chinese calendar)
Driving side right (Mainland)
left (Hong Kong and Macau)
Calling code +86 (Mainland)
+852 (Hong Kong)
+853 (Macau)
ISO 3166 code CN
Internet TLD
  • .cn
  • .中国
  • .中國 (Mainland)
  • .hk
  • .香港 (Hong Kong)
  • .mo
  • .澳门
  • .澳門 (Macau)

China (Chinese: 中国; pinyin: Zhōngguó), officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC),[k] is a country in East Asia. It is the world’s most populous country, with a population exceeding 1.4 billion, slightly ahead of India. China spans the equivalent of five time zones and borders fourteen countries by land,[l] the most of any country in the world, tied with Russia. Covering an area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometres (3,700,000 sq mi), it is the world’s third largest country by total land area.[m] The country consists of 22 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The national capital is Beijing, and the most populous city and financial center is Shanghai.

Modern Chinese trace their origins to a cradle of civilization in the fertile basin of the Yellow River in the North China Plain. The semi-legendary Xia dynasty in the 21st century BCE and the well-attested Shang and Zhou dynasties developed a bureaucratic political system to serve hereditary monarchies, or dynasties. Chinese writing, Chinese classic literature, and the Hundred Schools of Thought emerged during this period and influenced China and its neighbors for centuries to come. In the third century BCE, Qin’s wars of unification created the first Chinese empire, the short-lived Qin dynasty. The Qin was followed by the more stable Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), which established a model for nearly two millennia in which the Chinese empire was one of the world’s foremost economic powers. The empire expanded, fractured and re-unified, was conquered and reestablished, absorbed foreign religions and ideas, and made world-leading scientific advances, such as the Four Great Inventions: gunpowder, paper, the compass, and printing. After centuries of disunion following the fall of the Han, the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties reunified the empire. The multi-ethnic Tang welcomed foreign trade and culture that came over the Silk Road and adapted Buddhism to Chinese needs. The early modern Song dynasty (960–1279) became increasingly urban and commercial. The civilian scholar-official or literati used the examination system and the doctrines of Neo-Confucianism to replace the military aristocrats of earlier dynasties. The Mongol invasion established the Yuan dynasty in 1279, but the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) re-established Han Chinese control. The Manchu-led Qing dynasty nearly doubled the empire’s territory and established a multi-ethnic state that was the basis of the modern Chinese nation, but suffered heavy losses to foreign imperialism in the 19th century.

The Chinese monarchy collapsed in 1912 with the Xinhai Revolution, when the Republic of China (ROC) replaced the Qing dynasty. In its early years as a republic, the country underwent a period of instability known as the Warlord Era before mostly reunifying in 1928 under a Nationalist government. A civil war between the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began in 1927. Japan invaded China in 1937, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War and temporarily halting the civil war. The surrender and expulsion of Japanese forces from China in 1945 left a power vacuum in the country, which led to renewed fighting between the CCP and the Kuomintang. The civil war ended in 1949[o] with the division of Chinese territory; the CCP established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland while the Kuomintang-led ROC government retreated to the island of Taiwan.[p] Both claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, although the United Nations has recognized the PRC as the sole representation since 1971. From 1959 to 1961, the PRC implemented an economic and social campaign called the Great Leap Forward, that resulted in a sharp economic decline and an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths, mostly through man-made famine. From 1966 to 1976, the turbulent period of political and social chaos within China known as the Cultural Revolution led to greater economic and educational decline, with millions being purged or subjected to either persecution or politicide based on political categories. Since then, the Chinese government has rebuked some of the earlier Maoist policies, conducting a series of political and economic reforms since 1978, which has greatly raised Chinese standards of living, and increased life expectancies.

China is currently governed as a unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic by the CCP. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a founding member of several multilateral and regional cooperation organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the New Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the RCEP, and is a member of the BRICS, the G8+5, the G20, the APEC, and the East Asia Summit. It ranks among the lowest in measurements of democracy, civil liberties, government transparency, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and human rights of ethnic minorities. The Chinese authorities have been criticized by human rights activists and non-governmental organizations for human rights abuses, including political repression, mass censorship, mass surveillance of their citizens, and violent suppression of protest and dissent.

Making up around one-fifth of the world economy, China is the world’s largest economy by GDP by purchasing power parity, the second-largest economy by nominal GDP, and the second-wealthiest country. The country is one of the fastest growing major economies and is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter, as well as the second-largest importer. China is a recognized nuclear-weapon state with the world’s largest standing army by military personnel and second-largest defense budget. China is considered to be a potential superpower due to its large markets, high innovation, economic potential, growing military strength, and influence in international affairs.

Etymology

The word «China» has been used in English since the 16th century; however, it was not a word used by the Chinese themselves during this period. Its origin has been traced through Portuguese, Malay, and Persian back to the Sanskrit word Chīna, used in ancient India.[18] «China» appears in Richard Eden’s 1555 translation[q] of the 1516 journal of the Portuguese explorer Duarte Barbosa.[r][18] Barbosa’s usage was derived from Persian Chīn (چین), which was in turn derived from Sanskrit Cīna (चीन).[23] Cīna was first used in early Hindu scripture, including the Mahābhārata (5th century BCE) and the Laws of Manu (2nd century BCE).[24] In 1655, Martino Martini suggested that the word China is derived ultimately from the name of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).[25][24] Although usage in Indian sources precedes this dynasty, this derivation is still given in various sources.[26] The origin of the Sanskrit word is a matter of debate, according to the Oxford English Dictionary.[18] Alternative suggestions include the names for Yelang and the Jing or Chu state.[24][27]
The official name of the modern state is the «People’s Republic of China» (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó). The shorter form is «China» Zhōngguó (中国; 中國) from zhōng («central») and guó («state»),[s] a term which developed under the Western Zhou dynasty in reference to its royal demesne.[t][u] It was then applied to the area around Luoyi (present-day Luoyang) during the Eastern Zhou and then to China’s Central Plain before being used as an occasional synonym for the state under the Qing.[29] It was often used as a cultural concept to distinguish the Huaxia people from perceived «barbarians».[29] The name Zhongguo is also translated as «Middle Kingdom» in English.[32] China (PRC) is sometimes referred to as the Mainland when distinguishing the ROC from the PRC.[33][34][35][36]

History

Prehistory

10,000 years old pottery, Xianren Cave culture (18000–7000 BCE)

China is regarded as one of the world’s oldest civilisations.[37][38] Archaeological evidence suggests that early hominids inhabited the country 2.25 million years ago.[39] The hominid fossils of Peking Man, a Homo erectus who used fire,[40] were discovered in a cave at Zhoukoudian near Beijing; they have been dated to between 680,000 and 780,000 years ago.[41] The fossilized teeth of Homo sapiens (dated to 125,000–80,000 years ago) have been discovered in Fuyan Cave in Dao County, Hunan.[42] Chinese proto-writing existed in Jiahu around 6600 BCE,[43] at Damaidi around 6000 BCE,[44] Dadiwan from 5800 to 5400 BCE, and Banpo dating from the 5th millennium BCE. Some scholars have suggested that the Jiahu symbols (7th millennium BCE) constituted the earliest Chinese writing system.[43]

Early dynastic rule

According to Chinese tradition, the first dynasty was the Xia, which emerged around 2100 BCE.[45] The Xia dynasty marked the beginning of China’s political system based on hereditary monarchies, or dynasties, which lasted for a millennium.[46] The Xia dynasty was considered mythical by historians until scientific excavations found early Bronze Age sites at Erlitou, Henan in 1959.[47] It remains unclear whether these sites are the remains of the Xia dynasty or of another culture from the same period.[48] The succeeding Shang dynasty is the earliest to be confirmed by contemporary records.[49] The Shang ruled the plain of the Yellow River in eastern China from the 17th to the 11th century BCE.[50] Their oracle bone script (from c. 1500 BCE)[51][52] represents the oldest form of Chinese writing yet found[53] and is a direct ancestor of modern Chinese characters.[54]

The Shang was conquered by the Zhou, who ruled between the 11th and 5th centuries BCE, though centralized authority was slowly eroded by feudal warlords. Some principalities eventually emerged from the weakened Zhou, no longer fully obeyed the Zhou king, and continually waged war with each other during the 300-year Spring and Autumn period. By the time of the Warring States period of the 5th–3rd centuries BCE, there were only seven powerful states left.[55]

Imperial China

The Warring States period ended in 221 BCE after the state of Qin conquered the other six kingdoms, reunited China and established the dominant order of autocracy. King Zheng of Qin proclaimed himself the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty. He enacted Qin’s legalist reforms throughout China, notably the forced standardization of Chinese characters, measurements, road widths (i.e., the cart axles’ length), and currency. His dynasty also conquered the Yue tribes in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Vietnam.[56] The Qin dynasty lasted only fifteen years, falling soon after the First Emperor’s death, as his harsh authoritarian policies led to widespread rebellion.[57][58]

Following a widespread civil war during which the imperial library at Xianyang was burned,[v] the Han dynasty emerged to rule China between 206 BCE and CE 220, creating a cultural identity among its populace still remembered in the ethnonym of the Han Chinese.[57][58] The Han expanded the empire’s territory considerably, with military campaigns reaching Central Asia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Yunnan, and the recovery of Guangdong and northern Vietnam from Nanyue. Han involvement in Central Asia and Sogdia helped establish the land route of the Silk Road, replacing the earlier path over the Himalayas to India. Han China gradually became the largest economy of the ancient world.[60] Despite the Han’s initial decentralization and the official abandonment of the Qin philosophy of Legalism in favor of Confucianism, Qin’s legalist institutions and policies continued to be employed by the Han government and its successors.[61]

Map showing the expansion of Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC

After the end of the Han dynasty, a period of strife known as Three Kingdoms followed,[62] whose central figures were later immortalized in one of the Four Classics of Chinese literature. At its end, Wei was swiftly overthrown by the Jin dynasty. The Jin fell to civil war upon the ascension of a developmentally disabled emperor; the Five Barbarians then invaded and ruled northern China as the Sixteen States. The Xianbei unified them as the Northern Wei, whose Emperor Xiaowen reversed his predecessors’ apartheid policies and enforced a drastic sinification on his subjects, largely integrating them into Chinese culture. In the south, the general Liu Yu secured the abdication of the Jin in favor of the Liu Song. The various successors of these states became known as the Northern and Southern dynasties, with the two areas finally reunited by the Sui in 581. The Sui restored the Han to power through China, reformed its agriculture, economy and imperial examination system, constructed the Grand Canal, and patronized Buddhism. However, they fell quickly when their conscription for public works and a failed war in northern Korea provoked widespread unrest.[63][64]

Under the succeeding Tang and Song dynasties, Chinese economy, technology, and culture entered a golden age.[65] The Tang dynasty retained control of the Western Regions and the Silk Road,[66] which brought traders to as far as Mesopotamia and the Horn of Africa,[67] and made the capital Chang’an a cosmopolitan urban center. However, it was devastated and weakened by the An Lushan Rebellion in the 8th century.[68] In 907, the Tang disintegrated completely when the local military governors became ungovernable. The Song dynasty ended the separatist situation in 960, leading to a balance of power between the Song and Khitan Liao. The Song was the first government in world history to issue paper money and the first Chinese polity to establish a permanent standing navy which was supported by the developed shipbuilding industry along with the sea trade.[69]

Between the 10th and 11th centuries, the population of China doubled in size to around 100 million people, mostly because of the expansion of rice cultivation in central and southern China, and the production of abundant food surpluses. The Song dynasty also saw a revival of Confucianism, in response to the growth of Buddhism during the Tang,[70] and a flourishing of philosophy and the arts, as landscape art and porcelain were brought to new levels of maturity and complexity.[71][72] However, the military weakness of the Song army was observed by the Jurchen Jin dynasty. In 1127, Emperor Huizong of Song and the capital Bianjing were captured during the Jin–Song Wars. The remnants of the Song retreated to southern China.[73]

The Mongol conquest of China began in 1205 with the gradual conquest of Western Xia by Genghis Khan,[74] who also invaded Jin territories.[75] In 1271, the Mongol leader Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty, which conquered the last remnant of the Song dynasty in 1279. Before the Mongol invasion, the population of Song China was 120 million citizens; this was reduced to 60 million by the time of the census in 1300.[76] A peasant named Zhu Yuanzhang led a rebellion that overthrew the Yuan in 1368 and founded the Ming dynasty as the Hongwu Emperor. Under the Ming dynasty, China enjoyed another golden age, developing one of the strongest navies in the world and a rich and prosperous economy amid a flourishing of art and culture. It was during this period that admiral Zheng He led the Ming treasure voyages throughout the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as East Africa.[77]

In the early years of the Ming dynasty, China’s capital was moved from Nanjing to Beijing. With the budding of capitalism, philosophers such as Wang Yangming further critiqued and expanded Neo-Confucianism with concepts of individualism and equality of four occupations.[78] The scholar-official stratum became a supporting force of industry and commerce in the tax boycott movements, which, together with the famines and defense against Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) and Manchu invasions led to an exhausted treasury.[79] In 1644, Beijing was captured by a coalition of peasant rebel forces led by Li Zicheng. The Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide when the city fell. The Manchu Qing dynasty, then allied with Ming dynasty general Wu Sangui, overthrew Li’s short-lived Shun dynasty and subsequently seized control of Beijing, which became the new capital of the Qing dynasty.[80]

The Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1644 until 1912, was the last imperial dynasty of China. Its conquest of the Ming (1618–1683) cost 25 million lives and the economy of China shrank drastically.[81] After the Southern Ming ended, the further conquest of the Dzungar Khanate added Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang to the empire.[82] The centralized autocracy was strengthened to suppress anti-Qing sentiment with the policy of valuing agriculture and restraining commerce, the Haijin («sea ban»), and ideological control as represented by the literary inquisition, causing social and technological stagnation.[83][84]

Fall of the Qing dynasty

In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty experienced Western imperialism in the Opium Wars with Britain and France. China was forced to pay compensation, open treaty ports, allow extraterritoriality for foreign nationals, and cede Hong Kong to the British[85] under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the first of the Unequal Treaties. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) resulted in Qing China’s loss of influence in the Korean Peninsula, as well as the cession of Taiwan to Japan.[86]
The Qing dynasty also began experiencing internal unrest in which tens of millions of people died, especially in the White Lotus Rebellion, the failed Taiping Rebellion that ravaged southern China in the 1850s and 1860s and the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) in the northwest. The initial success of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s was frustrated by a series of military defeats in the 1880s and 1890s.[citation needed]

In the 19th century, the great Chinese diaspora began. Losses due to emigration were added to by conflicts and catastrophes such as the Northern Chinese Famine of 1876–1879, in which between 9 and 13 million people died.[87] The Guangxu Emperor drafted a reform plan in 1898 to establish a modern constitutional monarchy, but these plans were thwarted by the Empress Dowager Cixi. The ill-fated anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901 further weakened the dynasty. Although Cixi sponsored a program of reforms, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1912 brought an end to the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China.[88] Puyi, the last Emperor of China, abdicated in 1912.[89]

Establishment of the Republic and World War II

On 1 January 1912, the Republic of China was established, and Sun Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (the KMT or Nationalist Party) was proclaimed provisional president.[90] On 12 February 1912, regent Empress Dowager Longyu sealed the imperial abdication decree on behalf of 4 year old Puyi, the last emperor of China, ending 5,000 years of monarchy in China.[91] In March 1912, the presidency was given to Yuan Shikai, a former Qing general who in 1915 proclaimed himself Emperor of China. In the face of popular condemnation and opposition from his own Beiyang Army, he was forced to abdicate and re-establish the republic in 1916.[92]

After Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, China was politically fragmented. Its Beijing-based government was internationally recognized but virtually powerless; regional warlords controlled most of its territory.[93][94] In the late 1920s, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, the then Principal of the Republic of China Military Academy, was able to reunify the country under its own control with a series of deft military and political maneuverings, known collectively as the Northern Expedition.[95][96] The Kuomintang moved the nation’s capital to Nanjing and implemented «political tutelage», an intermediate stage of political development outlined in Sun Yat-sen’s San-min program for transforming China into a modern democratic state.[97][98] The political division in China made it difficult for Chiang to battle the communist-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA), against whom the Kuomintang had been warring since 1927 in the Chinese Civil War. This war continued successfully for the Kuomintang, especially after the PLA retreated in the Long March, until Japanese aggression and the 1936 Xi’an Incident forced Chiang to confront Imperial Japan.[99]

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), a theater of World War II, forced an uneasy alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Japanese forces committed numerous war atrocities against the civilian population; in all, as many as 20 million Chinese civilians died.[100] An estimated 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese were massacred in the city of Nanjing alone during the Japanese occupation.[101] During the war, China, along with the UK, the United States, and the Soviet Union, were referred to as «trusteeship of the powerful»[102] and were recognized as the Allied «Big Four» in the Declaration by United Nations.[103][104] Along with the other three great powers, China was one of the four major Allies of World War II, and was later considered one of the primary victors in the war.[105][106] After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Taiwan, including the Pescadores, was handed over to Chinese control. However, the validity of this handover is controversial, in that whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was legally transferred and whether China is a legitimate recipient, due to complex issues that arose from the handling of Japan’s surrender, resulting in the unresolved political status of Taiwan, which is a flashpoint of potential war between China and Taiwan. China emerged victorious but war-ravaged and financially drained. The continued distrust between the Kuomintang and the Communists led to the resumption of civil war. Constitutional rule was established in 1947, but because of the ongoing unrest, many provisions of the ROC constitution were never implemented in mainland China.[107]

Civil War and the People’s Republic

Before the existence of the People’s Republic, the CCP had declared several areas of the country as the Chinese Soviet Republic (Jiangxi Soviet), a predecessor state to the PRC, in November 1931 in Ruijin, Jiangxi. The Jiangxi Soviet was wiped out by the KMT armies in 1934 and was relocated to Yan’an in Shaanxi where the Long March concluded in 1935.[108][failed verification] It would be the base of the communists before major combat in the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949. Afterwards, the CCP took control of most of mainland China, and the Kuomintang retreating offshore to Taiwan, reducing its territory to only Taiwan, Hainan, and their surrounding islands.

On 1 October 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China at the new nation’s founding ceremony and inaugural military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.[109][110] In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army captured Hainan from the ROC[111] and annexed Tibet.[112] However, remaining Kuomintang forces continued to wage an insurgency in western China throughout the 1950s.[113]

The government consolidated its popularity among the peasants through land reform, which included the execution of between 1 and 2 million landlords.[114] China developed an independent industrial system and its own nuclear weapons.[115] The Chinese population increased from 550 million in 1950 to 900 million in 1974.[116] However, the Great Leap Forward, an idealistic massive reform project, resulted in an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths between 1959 and 1961, mostly from starvation.[117][118] In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, sparking a decade of political recrimination and social upheaval that lasted until Mao’s death in 1976. In October 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations, and took its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.[119] This UN action also created the problem of the political status of Taiwan and the Two Chinas issue. See Cross-Strait relations and «Taiwan, China».

Reforms and contemporary history

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was ended by a military-led massacre which brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.

After Mao’s death, the Gang of Four was quickly arrested by Hua Guofeng and held responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, and instituted significant economic reforms. The CCP loosened governmental control over citizens’ personal lives, and the communes were gradually disbanded in favor of working contracted to households. Agricultural collectivization was dismantled and farmlands privatized, while foreign trade became a major new focus, leading to the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were restructured and unprofitable ones were closed outright, resulting in massive job losses.[citation needed] This marked China’s transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an increasingly open-market environment.[120] China adopted its current constitution on 4 December 1982. In 1989, the suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.[121]

Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji led the nation in the 1990s. Under their administration, China’s economic performance pulled an estimated[by whom?] 150 million peasants out of poverty and sustained an average annual gross domestic product growth rate of 11.2%.[122][better source needed] British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, as the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions under the principle of One country, two systems. The country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and maintained its high rate of economic growth under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s leadership in the 2000s. However, the growth also severely impacted the country’s resources and environment,[123][124] and caused major social displacement.[125][126]

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has ruled since 2012 and has pursued large-scale efforts to reform China’s economy[127][128] (which has suffered from structural instabilities and slowing growth),[129][130][131] and has also reformed the one-child policy and penal system,[132] as well as instituting a vast anti-corruption crackdown.[133] In the early 2010s, China’s economic growth rate began to slow amid domestic credit troubles, weakening international demand for Chinese exports and fragility in the global economy.[134][135][136] In 2013, China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment project.[137] Since 2017, the Chinese government has been engaged in a harsh crackdown in Xinjiang, with an estimated one million people, mostly Uyghurs but including other ethnic and religious minorities, in internment camps.[138] The National People’s Congress in 2018 altered the country’s constitution to remove the two-term limit on holding the Presidency of China, permitting the current leader, Xi Jinping, to remain president of China (and general secretary of the CCP) for an unlimited time, earning criticism for creating dictatorial governance.[139][140] In 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) passed a national security law in Hong Kong that gave the Hong Kong government wide-ranging tools to crack down on dissent.[141]

The global COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan and was first identified from an outbreak in December 2019.[142] The Chinese government response has included a zero-COVID strategy, making it one of few countries to pursue this approach.[143] China was the only major economy in the world to grow in 2020, recording a 2.3% growth due to its success in containing the coronavirus within its borders.[144] The country’s economy continued to broaden recovery from the recession during the pandemic, with stable job creation and record international trade growth, although retail consumption was still slower than predicted.[145][146] These Zero-COVID strategies have led to a variety of protests across China against them starting in November 2022.

Geography

China topographic map with East Asia countries

China’s landscape is vast and diverse, ranging from the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts in the arid north to the subtropical forests in the wetter south. The Himalaya, Karakoram, Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges separate China from much of South and Central Asia. The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the third- and sixth-longest in the world, respectively, run from the Tibetan Plateau to the densely populated eastern seaboard. China’s coastline along the Pacific Ocean is 14,500 km (9,000 mi) long and is bounded by the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China seas. China connects through the Kazakh border to the Eurasian Steppe which has been an artery of communication between East and West since the Neolithic through the Steppe Route – the ancestor of the terrestrial Silk Road(s).[citation needed]

The territory of China lies between latitudes 18° and 54° N, and longitudes 73° and 135° E. The geographical center of China is marked by the Center of the Country Monument at 35°50′40.9″N 103°27′7.5″E / 35.844694°N 103.452083°E. China’s landscapes vary significantly across its vast territory. In the east, along the shores of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, there are extensive and densely populated alluvial plains, while on the edges of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the north, broad grasslands predominate. Southern China is dominated by hills and low mountain ranges, while the central-east hosts the deltas of China’s two major rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. Other major rivers include the Xi, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Amur. To the west sit major mountain ranges, most notably the Himalayas. High plateaus feature among the more arid landscapes of the north, such as the Taklamakan and the Gobi Desert. The world’s highest point, Mount Everest (8,848 m), lies on the Sino-Nepalese border.[147] The country’s lowest point, and the world’s third-lowest, is the dried lake bed of Ayding Lake (−154 m) in the Turpan Depression.[148]

Climate

China’s climate is mainly dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons, which lead to pronounced temperature differences between winter and summer. In the winter, northern winds coming from high-latitude areas are cold and dry; in summer, southern winds from coastal areas at lower latitudes are warm and moist.[150]

A major environmental issue in China is the continued expansion of its deserts, particularly the Gobi Desert.[151][152] Although barrier tree lines planted since the 1970s have reduced the frequency of sandstorms, prolonged drought and poor agricultural practices have resulted in dust storms plaguing northern China each spring, which then spread to other parts of East Asia, including Japan and Korea. China’s environmental watchdog, SEPA, stated in 2007 that China is losing 4,000 km2 (1,500 sq mi) per year to desertification.[153] Water quality, erosion, and pollution control have become important issues in China’s relations with other countries. Melting glaciers in the Himalayas could potentially lead to water shortages for hundreds of millions of people.[154] According to academics, in order to limit climate change in China to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) electricity generation from coal in China without carbon capture must be phased out by 2045.[155] Official government statistics about Chinese agricultural productivity are considered unreliable, due to exaggeration of production at subsidiary government levels.[156][157] Much of China has a climate very suitable for agriculture and the country has been the world’s largest producer of rice, wheat, tomatoes, eggplant, grapes, watermelon, spinach, and many other crops.[158]

Biodiversity

China is one of 17 megadiverse countries,[159] lying in two of the world’s major biogeographic realms: the Palearctic and the Indomalayan. By one measure, China has over 34,687 species of animals and vascular plants, making it the third-most biodiverse country in the world, after Brazil and Colombia.[160] The country signed the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity on 11 June 1992, and became a party to the convention on 5 January 1993.[161] It later produced a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, with one revision that was received by the convention on 21 September 2010.[162]

China is home to at least 551 species of mammals (the third-highest such number in the world),[163] 1,221 species of birds (eighth),[164] 424 species of reptiles (seventh)[165] and 333 species of amphibians (seventh).[166] Wildlife in China shares habitat with, and bears acute pressure from, the world’s largest population of humans. At least 840 animal species are threatened, vulnerable or in danger of local extinction in China, due mainly to human activity such as habitat destruction, pollution and poaching for food, fur and ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine.[167] Endangered wildlife is protected by law, and as of 2005, the country has over 2,349 nature reserves, covering a total area of 149.95 million hectares, 15 percent of China’s total land area.[168][better source needed] Most wild animals have been eliminated from the core agricultural regions of east and central China, but they have fared better in the mountainous south and west.[169][170] The Baiji was confirmed extinct on 12 December 2006.[171]

China has over 32,000 species of vascular plants,[172] and is home to a variety of forest types. Cold coniferous forests predominate in the north of the country, supporting animal species such as moose and Asian black bear, along with over 120 bird species.[173] The understory of moist conifer forests may contain thickets of bamboo. In higher montane stands of juniper and yew, the bamboo is replaced by rhododendrons. Subtropical forests, which are predominate in central and southern China, support a high density of plant species including numerous rare endemics. Tropical and seasonal rainforests, though confined to Yunnan and Hainan Island, contain a quarter of all the animal and plant species found in China.[173] China has over 10,000 recorded species of fungi,[174] and of them, nearly 6,000 are higher fungi.[175]

Environment

In the early 2000s, China has suffered from environmental deterioration and pollution due to its rapid pace of industrialization.[176][177] While regulations such as the 1979 Environmental Protection Law are fairly stringent, they are poorly enforced, as they are frequently disregarded by local communities and government officials in favor of rapid economic development.[178] China is the country with the second highest death toll because of air pollution, after India. There are approximately 1 million deaths caused by exposure to ambient air pollution.[179][180] Although China ranks as the highest CO2 emitting country in the world,[181] it only emits 8 tons of CO2 per capita, significantly lower than developed countries such as the United States (16.1), Australia (16.8) and South Korea (13.6).[182]

In recent years, China has clamped down on pollution. In March 2014, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping «declared war» on pollution during the opening of the National People’s Congress.[183] After extensive debate lasting nearly two years, the parliament approved a new environmental law in April. The new law empowers environmental enforcement agencies with great punitive power and large fines for offenders, defines areas which require extra protection, and gives independent environmental groups more ability to operate in the country.[citation needed] In 2020, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and go carbon-neutral by 2060 in accordance with the Paris climate accord.[184] According to Climate Action Tracker, if accomplished it would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 – 0.3 degrees – «the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker».[185] In September 2021 Xi Jinping announced that China will not build «coal-fired power projects abroad». The decision can be «pivotal» in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.[186]

The country also had significant water pollution problems: 8.2% of China’s rivers had been polluted by industrial and agricultural waste in 2019.[187][188] China had a 2018 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.14/10, ranking it 53rd globally out of 172 countries.[189] In 2020, a sweeping law was passed by the Chinese government to protect the ecology of the Yangtze River. The new laws include strengthening ecological protection rules for hydropower projects along the river, banning chemical plants within 1 kilometer of the river, relocating polluting industries, severely restricting sand mining as well as a complete fishing ban on all the natural waterways of the river, including all its major tributaries and lakes.[190]

China is also the world’s leading investor in renewable energy and its commercialization, with $52 billion invested in 2011 alone;[191][192][193] it is a major manufacturer of renewable energy technologies and invests heavily in local-scale renewable energy projects.[194][195][196] By 2015, over 24% of China’s energy was derived from renewable sources, while most notably from hydroelectric power: a total installed capacity of 197 GW makes China the largest hydroelectric power producer in the world.[197][198] China also has the largest power capacity of installed solar photovoltaics system and wind power system in the world.[199][200] Greenhouse gas emissions by China are the world’s largest,[182] as is renewable energy in China.[201] Despite its emphasis on renewables, China remains deeply connected to global oil markets and next to India, has been the largest importer of Russian crude oil in 2022.[202][203]

Political geography

Map showing the territorial claims of the PRC.

The People’s Republic of China is the second-largest country in the world by land area after Russia.[w][x] China’s total area is generally stated as being approximately 9,600,000 km2 (3,700,000 sq mi).[204] Specific area figures range from 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) according to the Encyclopædia Britannica,[205] to 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) according to the UN Demographic Yearbook,[3] and the CIA World Factbook.[6]

China has the longest combined land border in the world, measuring 22,117 km (13,743 mi) and its coastline covers approximately 14,500 km (9,000 mi) from the mouth of the Yalu River (Amnok River) to the Gulf of Tonkin.[6] China borders 14 nations and covers the bulk of East Asia, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in Southeast Asia; India, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan[y] in South Asia; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia; and Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea in Inner Asia and Northeast Asia. It is narrowly separated from Bangladesh and Thailand to the southwest and south, and has several maritime neighbors such as Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[206]

Politics

The Chinese constitution states that the People’s Republic of China «is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship that is led by the working class and based on an alliance of workers and peasants,» and that the state institutions «shall practice the principle of democratic centralism.»[207] The PRC is one of the world’s only socialist states governed by a communist party. The Chinese government has been variously described as communist and socialist, but also as authoritarian[208] and corporatist,[209] with amongst the heaviest restrictions worldwide in many areas, most notably against free access to the Internet, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to have children, free formation of social organizations and freedom of religion.[210]

Although the Chinese Communist Party describes China as a «socialist consultative democracy»,[211] the country is commonly described as an authoritarian one-party surveillance state and a dictatorship.[212][213] China has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an «authoritarian regime» by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, ranking at 148th out of 167 countries in 2021.[214] Its current political, ideological and economic system has been termed by its leaders as a «whole-process people’s democracy» «people’s democratic dictatorship», «socialism with Chinese characteristics» (which is Marxism adapted to Chinese circumstances) and the «socialist market economy» respectively.[215][216]

Political concerns in China include the growing gap between rich and poor and government corruption.[217] Nonetheless, the level of public support for the government and its management of the nation is high, with 80–95% of Chinese citizens expressing satisfaction with the central government, according to a 2011 Harvard University survey.[218] A 2020 survey from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research also had most Chinese expressing satisfaction with the government on information dissemination and delivery of daily necessities during the COVID-19 pandemic.[219][220]

Chinese Communist Party

The main body of the Chinese constitution declares that «the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).»[221] China is a one-party Marxist–Leninist state,[222] wherein the CCP general secretary (party leader) holds ultimate power and authority over state and government and serves as the informal paramount leader.[223] The current general secretary is Xi Jinping, who took office on 15 November 2012, and was re-elected on 25 October 2017.[224] According to the CCP constitution, its highest body is the National Congress held every five years.[225] The National Congress elects the Central Committee, who then elects the party’s Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee and general secretary, the top leadership of the country.[225] At the local level, the secretary of the CCP committee of a subdivision outranks the local government level; CCP committee secretary of a provincial division outranks the governor while the CCP committee secretary of a city outranks the mayor.[226]

Since both the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.[227] In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People’s Republic of China by reference to these «generations».

Generations of Chinese leadership

Generation Paramount Leader Start End Ideology
First Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
1949 1978 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1978 1989 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1989 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

Government

The nearly 3,000 member National People’s Congress (NPC) is constitutionally the «highest state organ of power»,[207] though it has been also described as a «rubber stamp» body.[228] The NPC meets annually, while the NPC Standing Committee, around 150 member body elected from NPC delegates, meets every couple of months.[228] In what China calls the «people’s congress system», local people’s congresses at the lowest level[z] are officially directly elected, with all the higher-level people’s congresses up to the NPC being elected by the level one below.[207] However, the elections are not pluralistic, with nominations at all levels being controlled by the CCP.[229] The NPC is dominated by the CCP, with another eight minor parties having nominal representation in the condition of upholding CCP leadership.[230]

The president is the ceremonial head of state, elected by the NPC. The incumbent president is Xi Jinping, who is also the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him China’s paramount leader. The premier is the head of government, with Li Keqiang being the incumbent premier. The premier is officially nominated by the president and then elected by the NPC, and has generally been either the second or third-ranking member of the PSC. The premier presides over the State Council, China’s cabinet, composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.[207] The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a political advisory body that is critical in China’s «united front» system, which aims to gather non-CCP voices to support the CCP. Similar to the people’s congresses, CPPCC’s exist at various division, with the National Committee of the CPPCC being chaired by Wang Yang, one of China’s top leaders.[231]

A Harvard University survey published in July 2020 found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China’s government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey’s history.[232]

Administrative divisions

The People’s Republic of China is constitutionally a unitary state officially divided into 23 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions (each with a designated minority group), and four municipalities—collectively referred to as «mainland China»—as well as the special administrative regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau.[233] The PRC considers Taiwan to be its 23rd province,[234] although it is governed by the Republic of China (ROC), which claims to be the legitimate representative of China and its territory, though it has downplayed this claim since its democratization.[235] Geographically, all 31 provincial divisions of mainland China can be grouped into six regions: North China, Northeast China, East China, South Central China, Southwest China, and Northwest China.[236]

China administrative claimed included.svg

About this image

Provinces () Claimed Province
  • Anhui (安徽省)
  • Fujian (福建省)
  • Gansu (甘肃省)
  • Guangdong (广东省)
  • Guizhou (贵州省)
  • Hainan (海南省)
  • Hebei (河北省)
  • Heilongjiang (黑龙江省)
  • Henan (河南省)
  • Hubei (湖北省)
  • Hunan (湖南省)
  • Jiangsu (江苏省)
  • Jiangxi (江西省)
  • Jilin (吉林省)
  • Liaoning (辽宁省)
  • Qinghai (青海省)
  • Shaanxi (陕西省)
  • Shandong (山东省)
  • Shanxi (山西省)
  • Sichuan (四川省)
  • Yunnan (云南省)
  • Zhejiang (浙江省)
  • Taiwan (台湾省), governed by the Republic of China
Autonomous regions (自治区) Municipalities (直辖市) Special administrative regions (特别行政区)
  • Guangxi (广西壮族自治区)
  • Inner Mongolia / Nei Menggu (内蒙古自治区)
  • Ningxia (宁夏回族自治区)
  • Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区)
  • Tibet / Xizang (西藏自治区)
  • Beijing (北京市)
  • Chongqing (重庆市)
  • Shanghai (上海市)
  • Tianjin (天津市)
  • Hong Kong / Xianggang (香港特别行政区)
  • Macau / Aomen (澳门特别行政区)

Foreign relations

Diplomatic relations of China

The PRC has diplomatic relations with 175 countries and maintains embassies in 162. In 2019, China had the largest diplomatic network in the world.[237][238] Its legitimacy is disputed by the Republic of China and a few other countries; it is thus the largest and most populous state with limited recognition, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.[239] In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.[240] China was also a former member and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and still considers itself an advocate for developing countries.[241] Along with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, China is a member of the BRICS group of emerging major economies and hosted the group’s third official summit at Sanya, Hainan in April 2011.[242]

Under the One-China principle, Beijing has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to Taiwan and severs official ties with the government of the Republic of China.[citation needed] Chinese officials have protested on numerous occasions when foreign countries have made diplomatic overtures to Taiwan,[243] especially in the matter of armament sales.[244]

Much of current Chinese foreign policy is reportedly based on Premier Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and is also driven by the concept of «harmony without uniformity», which encourages diplomatic relations between states despite ideological differences.[245] This policy may have led China to support states that are regarded as dangerous or repressive by Western nations, such as Zimbabwe, North Korea and Iran.[246] China has a close economic and military relationship with Russia,[247] and the two states often vote in unison in the United Nations Security Council.[248][249][250]

Trade relations

China became the world’s largest trading nation in 2013 as measured by the sum of imports and exports, as well as the world’s largest commodity importer. comprising roughly 45% of maritime’s dry-bulk market.[251][252]
By 2016, China was the largest trading partner of 124 other countries.[253] China is the largest trading partner for the ASEAN nations, with a total trade value of $345.8 billion in 2015 accounting for 15.2% of ASEAN’s total trade.[254] ASEAN is also China’s largest trading partner.[255] In 2020, China became the largest trading partner of the European Union for goods, with the total value of goods trade reaching nearly $700 billion.[256] China, along with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free-trade area covering 30% of the world’s population and economic output.[257] China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 2004, it proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues.[258] The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005.[259]

China has had a long and complex trade relationship with the United States. In 2000, the United States Congress approved «permanent normal trade relations» (PNTR) with China, allowing Chinese exports in at the same low tariffs as goods from most other countries.[260] China has a significant trade surplus with the United States, its most important export market.[261] Economists have argued that the renminbi is undervalued, due to currency intervention from the Chinese government, giving China an unfair trade advantage.[262] In August 2019, the United States Department of the Treasury designated China as a «currency manipulator»,[263] later reversing the decision in January 2020.[264] The US and other foreign governments have also alleged that China doesn’t respect intellectual property (IP) rights and steals IP through espionage operations,[265][266] with the US Department of Justice saying that 80% of all the prosecutions related to economic espionage it brings were about conduct to benefit the Chinese state.[267]

Since the turn of the century, China has followed a policy of engaging with African nations for trade and bilateral co-operation;[268][269][270] in 2019, Sino-African trade totalled $208 billion, having grown 20 times over two decades.[271] According to Madison Condon «China finances more infrastructure projects in Africa than the World Bank and provides billions of dollars in low-interest loans to the continent’s emerging economies.»[272] China maintains extensive and highly diversified trade links with the European Union.[256] China has furthermore strengthened its trade ties with major South American economies,[273] and is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and several others.[274]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded significantly over the last six years and, as of April 2020, includes 138 countries and 30 international organizations. In addition to intensifying foreign policy relations, the focus here is particularly on building efficient transport routes. The focus is particularly on the maritime Silk Road with its connections to East Africa and Europe and there are Chinese investments or related declarations of intent at numerous ports such as Gwadar, Kuantan, Hambantota, Piraeus and Trieste. However many of these loans made under the Belt and Road program are unsustainable and China has faced a number of calls for debt relief from debtor nations.[275][276]

Territorial disputes

Taiwan

Map depicting territorial disputes between the PRC and neighboring states. For a larger map, see here.

Ever since its establishment after the Chinese Civil War, the PRC has claimed the territories governed by the Republic of China (ROC), a separate political entity today commonly known as Taiwan, as a part of its territory. It regards the island of Taiwan as its Taiwan Province, Kinmen and Matsu as a part of Fujian Province and islands the ROC controls in the South China Sea as a part of Hainan Province and Guangdong Province. These claims are controversial because of the complicated Cross-Strait relations, with the PRC treating the One-China Principle as one of its most important diplomatic principles.[277][better source needed]

Land border disputes

China has resolved its land borders with 12 out of 14 neighboring countries, having pursued substantial compromises in most of them.[278][279][280] As of 2022, China currently has a disputed land border with India and Bhutan.[citation needed]

Maritime border disputes

China is additionally involved in maritime disputes with multiple countries over the ownership of several small islands in the East and South China Seas, such as Socotra Rock, the Senkaku Islands and the entirety of South China Sea Islands,[281][282] along with the EEZ disputes over East China Sea.

Sociopolitical issues and human rights

China uses a massive espionage network of cameras, facial recognition software, sensors, and surveillance of personal technology as a means of social control of persons living in the country.[283] The Chinese democracy movement, social activists, and some members of the CCP[who?] believe in the need for social and political reform. While economic and social controls have been significantly relaxed in China since the 1970s, political freedom is still tightly restricted. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that the «fundamental rights» of citizens include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, and property rights. However, in practice, these provisions do not afford significant protection against criminal prosecution by the state.[284][285] Although some criticisms of government policies and the ruling CCP are tolerated, censorship of political speech and information, most notably on the Internet,[286][287] are routinely used to prevent collective action.[288]

A number of foreign governments, foreign press agencies, and non-governmental organizations have criticized China’s human rights record, alleging widespread civil rights violations such as detention without trial, forced abortions,[289] forced confessions, torture, restrictions of fundamental rights,[210][290] and excessive use of the death penalty.[291][292] The government suppresses popular protests and demonstrations that it considers a potential threat to «social stability», as was the case with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[293]

China is regularly accused of large-scale repression and human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang,[295][296][297] including violent police crackdowns and religious suppression.[298][299] In Xinjiang, At least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic and religion minorities have been detained in internment camps, officially termed «Vocational Education and Training Centers», aimed at changing the political thinking of detainees, their identities, and their religious beliefs.[138] According to the U.S. Department of State, actions including political indoctrination, torture, physical and psychological abuse, forced sterilization, sexual abuse, and forced labor are common in these facilities.[300] The state has also sought to control offshore reporting of tensions in Xinjiang, intimidating foreign-based reporters by detaining their family members.[301] According to a 2020 report, China’s treatment of Uyghurs meets the UN definition of genocide,[302] and several groups called for a UN investigation.[303] Several countries have recognized China’s actions in Xinjiang as a genocide.[304][294][305]

Global studies from Pew Research Center in 2014 and 2017 ranked the Chinese government’s restrictions on religion as among the highest in the world, despite low to moderate rankings for religious-related social hostilities in the country.[306][307] The Global Slavery Index estimated that in 2016 more than 3.8 million people were living in «conditions of modern slavery», or 0.25% of the population, including victims of human trafficking, forced labor, forced marriage, child labor, and state-imposed forced labor. The state-imposed forced system was formally abolished in 2013, but it is not clear to which extent its various practices have stopped.[308] The Chinese penal system includes labor prison factories, detention centers, and re-education camps, collectively known as laogai («reform through labor»). The Laogai Research Foundation in the United States estimated that there were over a thousand slave labor prisons and camps in China.[309]

In 2019, a study called for the mass retraction of more than 400 scientific papers on organ transplantation, because of fears the organs were obtained unethically from Chinese prisoners. While the government says 10,000 transplants occur each year, a report by the Falun Gong-linked IETAC alleged that between 60,000 and 100,000 organs are transplanted each year and claimed that this gap was being made up by executed prisoners of conscience.[310]

Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is considered one of the world’s most powerful militaries and has rapidly modernized in the recent decades.[311] It consists of the Ground Force (PLAGF), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAAF), the Rocket Force (PLARF) and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Its nearly 2.2 million active duty personnel is the largest in the world. The PLA holds the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons,[312][313] and the world’s second-largest navy by tonnage.[314] China’s official military budget for 2022 totalled US$230 billion (1.45 trillion Yuan), the second-largest in the world. According to SIPRI estimates, its military spending from 2012 to 2021 averaged US$215 billion per year or 1.7 per cent of GDP, behind only the United States at US$734 billion per year or 3.6 per cent of GDP.[315] The PLA is commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the party and the state; though officially two separate organizations, the two CMCs have identical membership except during leadership transition periods and effectively function as one organization. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the officeholder also generally being the CCP general secretary, making them the paramount leader of China.[316]

Economy

A proportional representation of Chinese exports, 2019

China has the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP,[318] and the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).[319] As of 2021, China accounts for around 18% of the world economy by GDP nominal.[320] China is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies,[321] with its economic growth having been consistently above 6% since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978.[322] According to the World Bank, China’s GDP grew from $150 billion in 1978 to $17.73 trillion by 2021.[323] Of the world’s 500 largest companies, 145 are headquartered in China.[324]

China had one of the largest economies in the world for most of the past two thousand years,[325] during which it has seen cycles of prosperity and decline.[326][327] Since economic reforms began in 1978, China has developed into a highly diversified economy and one of the most consequential players in international trade. Major sectors of competitive strength include manufacturing, retail, mining, steel, textiles, automobiles, energy generation, green energy, banking, electronics, telecommunications, real estate, e-commerce, and tourism. China has three out of the ten largest stock exchanges in the world[328]—Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen—that together have a market capitalization of over $15.9 trillion, as of October 2020.[329] China has four (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shenzhen) out of the world’s top ten most competitive financial centers, which is more than any country in the 2020 Global Financial Centres Index.[330] By 2035, China’s four cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) are projected to be among the global top ten largest cities by nominal GDP according to a report by Oxford Economics.[331]

Modern-day China is considered an example of state capitalism or party-state capitalism.[332][333] The state dominates in strategic «pillar» sectors such as energy production and heavy industries, but private enterprise has expanded enormously, with around 30 million private businesses recorded in 2008.[334][335][336] In 2018, private enterprises in China accounted for 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 90% of new jobs.[337][better source needed]

China has been the world’s No. 1 manufacturer since 2010, after overtaking the US, which had been No. 1 for the previous hundred years.[338][339] China has also been No. 2 in high-tech manufacturing since 2012, according to US National Science Foundation.[340] China is the second largest retail market in the world, next to the United States.[341] China leads the world in e-commerce, accounting for 40% of the global market share in 2016[342] and more than 50% of the global market share in 2019.[343] China is the world’s leader in electric vehicles, manufacturing and buying half of all the plug-in electric cars (BEV and PHEV) in the world in 2018.[344] China is also the leading producer of batteries for electric vehicles as well as several key raw materials for batteries.[345] China had 174 GW of installed solar capacity by the end of 2018, which amounts to more than 40% of the global solar capacity.[346][347]

Wealth

China accounted for 17.9% of the world’s total wealth in 2021, second highest in the world after the US.[348] It ranks at 65th at GDP (nominal) per capita, making it an upper-middle income country.[349] China brought more people out of extreme poverty than any other country in history[350][351]—between 1978 and 2018, China reduced extreme poverty by 800 million. China reduced the extreme poverty rate—per international standard, it refers to an income of less than $1.90/day—from 88% in 1981 to 1.85% by 2013.[352] The portion of people in China living below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day (2011 PPP) fell to 0.3% in 2018 from 66.3% in 1990. Using the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 per day, the portion fell to 2.9% in 2018 from 90.0% in 1990. Using the upper-middle income poverty line of $5.50 per day, the portion fell to 17.0% from 98.3% in 1990.[353]

From 1978 to 2018, the average standard of living multiplied by a factor of twenty-six.[354] Wages in China have grown a lot in the last 40 years—real (inflation-adjusted) wages grew seven-fold from 1978 to 2007.[355] Per capita incomes have risen significantly – when the PRC was founded in 1949, per capita income in China was one-fifth of the world average; per capita incomes now equal the world average itself.[354] China’s development is highly uneven. Its major cities and coastal areas are far more prosperous compared to rural and interior regions.[356] It has a high level of economic inequality,[357] which has increased in the past few decades.[358] In 2018 China’s Gini coefficient was 0.467, according to the World Bank.[11]

As of 2020, China was second in the world, after the US, in total number of billionaires and total number of millionaires, with 698 Chinese billionaires and 4.4 million millionaires.[359] In 2019, China overtook the US as the home to the highest number of people who have a net personal wealth of at least $110,000, according to the global wealth report by Credit Suisse.[360][361] According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2020, China is home to five of the world’s top ten cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 10th spots, respectively) by the highest number of billionaires, which is more than any other country.[362] China had 85 female billionaires as of January 2021, two-thirds of the global total, and minted 24 new female billionaires in 2020.[363] China has had the world’s largest middle-class population since 2015,[364] and the middle-class grew to a size of 400 million by 2018.[365]

China in the global economy

China’s nominal GDP trend from 1952 to 2015

Share of world GDP (PPP)[366]
Year Share
1980 2.25%
1990 3.99%
2000 7.24%
2010 13.62%
2020 18.18%

China is a member of the WTO and is the world’s largest trading power, with a total international trade value of US$4.62 trillion in 2018.[367] China is the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods.[368] Its foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.1 trillion as of 2019,[369] making its reserves by far the world’s largest.[370][371] In 2012, China was the world’s largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting $253 billion.[372] In 2014, China’s foreign exchange remittances were $US64 billion making it the second largest recipient of remittances in the world.[373] China also invests abroad, with a total outward FDI of $62.4 billion in 2012,[372] and a number of major takeovers of foreign firms by Chinese companies.[374] China is a major owner of US public debt, holding trillions of dollars worth of U.S. Treasury bonds.[375][376] China’s undervalued exchange rate has caused friction with other major economies,[377] and it has also been widely criticized for manufacturing large quantities of counterfeit goods.[378][379]

Largest economies by nominal GDP in 2022[380]

Following the 2007–08 financial crisis, Chinese authorities sought to actively wean off of its dependence on the U.S. dollar as a result of perceived weaknesses of the international monetary system.[381] To achieve those ends, China took a series of actions to further the internationalization of the Renminbi. In 2008, China established the dim sum bond market and expanded the Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project, which helps establish pools of offshore RMB liquidity.[382][383] This was followed with bilateral agreements to settle trades directly in renminbi with Russia,[384] Japan,[385] Australia,[386] Singapore,[387] the United Kingdom,[388] and Canada.[389] As a result of the rapid internationalization of the renminbi, it became the eighth-most-traded currency in the world by 2018, an emerging international reserve currency,[390] and a component of the IMF’s special drawing rights; however, partly due to capital controls that make the renminbi fall short of being a fully convertible currency, it remains far behind the Euro, Dollar and Japanese Yen in international trade volumes.[391] As of 2022, Yuan is the world’s fifth-most traded currency.[392]

Science and technology

Historical

Earliest known written formula for gunpowder, from the Wujing Zongyao of 1044 CE

China was a world leader in science and technology until the Ming dynasty.[393] Ancient Chinese discoveries and inventions, such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions), became widespread across East Asia, the Middle East and later Europe. Chinese mathematicians were the first to use negative numbers.[394][395] By the 17th century, the Western hemisphere surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement.[396] The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars.[397]

After repeated military defeats by the European colonial powers and Japan in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communists came to power in 1949, efforts were made to organize science and technology based on the model of the Soviet Union, in which scientific research was part of central planning.[398] After Mao’s death in 1976, science and technology were promoted as one of the Four Modernizations,[399] and the Soviet-inspired academic system was gradually reformed.[400]

Modern era

Headquarters of Tencent in Shenzhen, one of the largest technology and entertainment companies in the world.[401]

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has made significant investments in scientific research[402] and is quickly catching up with the US in R&D spending.[403][404] China officially spent around 2.4% of its GDP on R&D in 2020, totaling to around $377.8 billion.[405] According to the World Intellectual Property Indicators, China received more applications than the US did in 2018 and 2019 and ranked first globally in patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, and creative goods exports in 2021.[406][407][408] It was ranked 11th in the Global Innovation Index in 2022, a considerable improvement from its rank of 35th in 2013.[409][410][411][412] Chinese supercomputers became the fastest in the world on a few occasions.[413] However, China has also struggled with developing several technologies domestically, such as the most advanced semiconductors and reliable jet engines.[414][415]

China is developing its education system with an emphasis on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).[416] It became the world’s largest publisher of scientific papers in 2016.[417][418][419] Chinese-born academicians have won prestigious prizes in the sciences and in mathematics, although most of them had conducted their winning research in Western nations.[aa][improper synthesis?]

Space program

The Chinese space program started in 1958 with some technology transfers from the Soviet Union. However, it did not launch the nation’s first satellite until 1970 with the Dong Fang Hong I, which made China the fifth country to do so independently.[426] In 2003, China became the third country in the world to independently send humans into space with Yang Liwei’s spaceflight aboard Shenzhou 5. as of 2022, sixteen Chinese nationals have journeyed into space, including two women. In 2011, China launched its first space station testbed, Tiangong-1.[427] In 2013, a Chinese robotic rover Yutu successfully touched down on the lunar surface as part of the Chang’e 3 mission.[428] In 2019, China became the first country to land a probe—Chang’e 4—on the far side of the Moon.[429] In 2020, Chang’e 5 successfully returned moon samples to the Earth, making China the third country to do so independently after the United States and the Soviet Union.[430] In 2021, China became the second nation in history to independently land a rover (Zhurong) on Mars, after the United States.[431] China completed its own modular space station, the Tiangong, in low Earth orbit on 3 November 2022.[432][433][434] On 29 November 2022, China performed its first in-orbit crew handover aboard the Tiangong.[435][436]

Infrastructure

After a decades-long infrastructural boom,[437] China has produced numerous world-leading infrastructural projects: China has the world’s largest bullet train network,[438] the most supertall skyscrapers in the world,[439] the world’s largest power plant (the Three Gorges Dam),[440] the largest energy generation capacity in the world,[441] a global satellite navigation system with the largest number of satellites in the world,[442] and has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a large global infrastructure building initiative with funding on the order of $50–100 billion per year.[443] The Belt and Road Initiative could be one of the largest development plans in modern history.[444]

Telecommunications

China is the largest telecom market in the world and currently has the largest number of active cellphones of any country in the world, with over 1.5 billion subscribers, as of 2018.[445][better source needed] It also has the world’s largest number of internet and broadband users, with over 800 million Internet users as of 2018—equivalent to around 60% of its population—and almost all of them being mobile as well.[446] By 2018, China had more than 1 billion 4G users, accounting for 40% of world’s total.[447] China is making rapid advances in 5G—by late 2018, China had started large-scale and commercial 5G trials.[448]

China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, are the three large providers of mobile and internet in China. China Telecom alone served more than 145 million broadband subscribers and 300 million mobile users; China Unicom had about 300 million subscribers; and China Mobile, the largest of them all, had 925 million users, as of 2018.[449] Combined, the three operators had over 3.4 million 4G base-stations in China.[450] Several Chinese telecommunications companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE, have been accused of spying for the Chinese military.[451]

China has developed its own satellite navigation system, dubbed Beidou, which began offering commercial navigation services across Asia in 2012[452] as well as global services by the end of 2018.[453][454] Upon the completion of the 35th Beidou satellite, which was launched into orbit on 23 June 2020, Beidou followed GPS and GLONASS as the third completed global navigation satellite in the world.[455]

Transport

Since the late 1990s, China’s national road network has been significantly expanded through the creation of a network of national highways and expressways. In 2018, China’s highways had reached a total length of 142,500 km (88,500 mi), making it the longest highway system in the world.[456][better source needed] China has the world’s largest market for automobiles, having surpassed the United States in both auto sales and production. A side-effect of the rapid growth of China’s road network has been a significant rise in traffic accidents,[457] though the number of fatalities in traffic accidents fell by 20% from 2007 to 2017.[458][better source needed] In urban areas, bicycles remain a common mode of transport, despite the increasing prevalence of automobiles – as of 2012, there are approximately 470 million bicycles in China.[459]

China’s railways, which are state-owned, are among the busiest in the world, handling a quarter of the world’s rail traffic volume on only 6 percent of the world’s tracks in 2006.[460][better source needed] As of 2017, the country had 127,000 km (78,914 mi) of railways, the second longest network in the world.[461] The railways strain to meet enormous demand particularly during the Chinese New Year holiday, when the world’s largest annual human migration takes place.[462]

China’s high-speed rail (HSR) system started construction in the early 2000s. By the end of 2020, high speed rail in China had reached 37,900 kilometers (23,550 miles) of dedicated lines alone, making it the longest HSR network in the world.[463][464] Services on the Beijing–Shanghai, Beijing–Tianjin, and Chengdu–Chongqing Lines reach up to 350 km/h (217 mph), making them the fastest conventional high speed railway services in the world. With an annual ridership of over 2.29 billion passengers in 2019 it is the world’s busiest.[465][better source needed] The network includes the Beijing–Guangzhou–Shenzhen High-Speed Railway, the single longest HSR line in the world, and the Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway, which has three of longest railroad bridges in the world.[466] The Shanghai Maglev Train, which reaches 431 km/h (268 mph), is the fastest commercial train service in the world.[467]

Since 2000, the growth of rapid transit systems in Chinese cities has accelerated.[468] As of January 2021, 44 Chinese cities have urban mass transit systems in operation[469] and 39 more have metro systems approved.[470] As of 2020, China boasts the five longest metro systems in the world with the networks in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenzhen being the largest.

There were approximately 229 airports in 2017, with around 240 planned by 2020. China has over 2,000 river and seaports, about 130 of which are open to foreign shipping.[471] In 2017, the Ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Tianjin ranked in the Top 10 in the world in container traffic and cargo tonnage.[472]

Water supply and sanitation

Water supply and sanitation infrastructure in China is facing challenges such as rapid urbanization, as well as water scarcity, contamination, and pollution.[473] According to data presented by the Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO and UNICEF in 2015, about 36% of the rural population in China still did not have access to improved sanitation.[474] The ongoing South–North Water Transfer Project intends to abate water shortage in the north.[475]

Demographics

A 2009 population density map of the People’s Republic of China, with territories not under its control in blue. The eastern coastal provinces are much more densely populated than the western interior.

The national census of 2020 recorded the population of the People’s Republic of China as approximately 1,411,778,724. According to the 2020 census, about 17.95% of the population were 14 years old or younger, 63.35% were between 15 and 59 years old, and 18.7% were over 60 years old.[8] The population growth rate for 2013 is estimated to be 0.46%.[476] China used to make up much of the world’s poor; now it makes up much of the world’s middle-class.[477] Although a middle-income country by Western standards, China’s rapid growth has pulled hundreds of millions—800 million, to be more precise[478]—of its people out of poverty since 1978. By 2013, less than 2% of the Chinese population lived below the international poverty line of US$1.9 per day, down from 88% in 1981.[352] From 2009 to 2018, the unemployment rate in China has averaged about 4%.[479]

Given concerns about population growth, China implemented a two-child limit during the 1970s, and, in 1979, began to advocate for an even stricter limit of one child per family. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, given the unpopularity of the strict limits, China began to allow some major exemptions, particularly in rural areas, resulting in what was actually a «1.5»-child policy from the mid-1980s to 2015 (ethnic minorities were also exempt from one child limits). The next major loosening of the policy was enacted in December 2013, allowing families to have two children if one parent is an only child.[480] In 2016, the one-child policy was replaced in favor of a two-child policy.[481] A three-child policy was announced on 31 May 2021, due to population aging,[482] and in July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[483] According to data from the 2020 census, China’s total fertility rate is 1.3, but some experts believe that after adjusting for the transient effects of the relaxation of restrictions, the country’s actual total fertility rate is as low as 1.1.[484]

According to one group of scholars, one-child limits had little effect on population growth[485] or the size of the total population.[486] However, these scholars have been challenged. Their own counterfactual model of fertility decline without such restrictions implies that China averted more than 500 million births between 1970 and 2015, a number which may reach one billion by 2060 given all the lost descendants of births averted during the era of fertility restrictions, with one-child restrictions accounting for the great bulk of that reduction.[487] The policy, along with traditional preference for boys, may have contributed to an imbalance in the sex ratio at birth.[488][489] According to the 2010 census, the sex ratio at birth was 118.06 boys for every 100 girls,[490] which is beyond the normal range of around 105 boys for every 100 girls.[491] The 2010 census found that males accounted for 51.27 percent of the total population.[490] However, China’s sex ratio is more balanced than it was in 1953, when males accounted for 51.82 percent of the total population.[490]

Ethnic groups

Ethnolinguistic map of China

China legally recognizes 56 distinct ethnic groups, who altogether comprise the Zhonghua Minzu. The largest of these nationalities are the ethnic Chinese or «Han», who constitute more than 90% of the total
population.[492] The Han Chinese – the world’s largest single ethnic group[493] – outnumber other ethnic groups in every provincial-level division except Tibet and Xinjiang.[494] Ethnic minorities account for less than 10% of the population of China, according to the 2010 census.[492] Compared with the 2000 population census, the Han population increased by 66,537,177 persons, or 5.74%, while the population of the 55 national minorities combined increased by 7,362,627 persons, or 6.92%.[492] The 2010 census recorded a total of 593,832 foreign nationals living in China. The largest such groups were from South Korea (120,750), the
United States (71,493) and Japan (66,159).[495]

Languages

There are as many as 292 living languages in China.[496] The languages most commonly spoken belong to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, which contains Mandarin (spoken by 70% of the population),[497] and other varieties of Chinese language: Yue (including Cantonese and Taishanese), Wu (including Shanghainese and Suzhounese), Min (including Fuzhounese, Hokkien and Teochew), Xiang, Gan and Hakka. Languages of the Tibeto-Burman branch, including Tibetan, Qiang, Naxi and Yi, are spoken across the Tibetan and Yunnan–Guizhou Plateau. Other ethnic minority languages in southwest China include Zhuang, Thai, Dong and Sui of the Tai-Kadai family, Miao and Yao of the Hmong–Mien family, and Wa of the Austroasiatic family. Across northeastern and northwestern China, local ethnic groups speak Altaic languages including Manchu, Mongolian and several Turkic languages: Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar and Western Yugur. Korean is spoken natively along the border with North Korea. Sarikoli, the language of Tajiks in western Xinjiang, is an Indo-European language. Taiwanese aborigines, including a small population on the mainland, speak Austronesian languages.[498]

Standard Mandarin, a variety of Mandarin based on the Beijing dialect, is the official national language of China and is used as a lingua franca in the country between people of different linguistic backgrounds.[499][500] Mongolian, Uyghur, Tibetan, Zhuang and various other languages are also regionally recognized throughout the country.[501]

Chinese characters have been used as the written script for the Sinitic languages for thousands of years. They allow speakers of mutually unintelligible Chinese varieties to communicate with each other through writing. In 1956, the government introduced simplified characters, which have supplanted the older traditional characters in mainland China. Chinese characters are romanized using the Pinyin system. Tibetan uses an alphabet based on an Indic script. Uyghur is most commonly written in Persian alphabet-based Uyghur Arabic alphabet. The Mongolian script used in China and the Manchu script are both derived from the Old Uyghur alphabet. Zhuang uses both an official Latin alphabet script and a traditional Chinese character script.[citation needed]

Urbanization

China has urbanized significantly in recent decades. The percent of the country’s population living in urban areas increased from 20% in 1980 to over 60% in 2019.[502][503][504] It is estimated that China’s urban population will reach one billion by 2030, potentially equivalent to one-eighth of the world population.[503][504]

China has over 160 cities with a population of over one million,[505] including the 17 megacities as of 2021[506][507] (cities with a population of over 10 million) of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xi’an, Suzhou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Hangzhou, Linyi, Shijiazhuang, Dongguan, Qingdao and Changsha.[508] Among them, the total permanent population of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu is above 20 million.[509] Shanghai is China’s most populous urban area[510][511] while Chongqing is its largest city proper, the only city in China with the largest permanent population of over 30 million.[512] By 2025, it is estimated that the country will be home to 221 cities with over a million inhabitants.[503] The figures in the table below are from the 2017 census,[513] and are only estimates of the urban populations within administrative city limits; a different ranking exists when considering the total municipal populations (which includes suburban and rural populations). The large «floating populations» of migrant workers make conducting censuses in urban areas difficult;[514] the figures below include only long-term residents.[citation needed]

  • v
  • t
  • e

Largest cities or municipalities in the People’s Republic of China

China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2020 Urban Population and Urban Temporary Population [515][note 1][note 2]

Rank Name Province Pop. Rank Name Province Pop.
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing
Beijing
1 Shanghai SH 24,281,400 11 Hong Kong HK 7,448,900 Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Shenzhen
Shenzhen
2 Beijing BJ 19,164,000 12 Zhengzhou HA 7,179,400
3 Guangzhou GD 13,858,700 13 Nanjing JS 6,823,500
4 Shenzhen GD 13,438,800 14 Xi’an SN 6,642,100
5 Tianjin TJ 11,744,400 15 Jinan SD 6,409,600
6 Chongqing CQ 11,488,000 16 Shenyang LN 5,900,000
7 Dongguan GD 9,752,500 17 Qingdao SD 5,501,400
8 Chengdu SC 8,875,600 18 Harbin HL 5,054,500
9 Wuhan HB 8,652,900 19 Hefei AH 4,750,100
10 Hangzhou ZJ 8,109,000 20 Changchun JL 4,730,900
  1. ^ Population of Hong Kong as of 2018 estimate.[516]
  2. ^ The data of Chongqing in the list is the data of «Metropolitan Developed Economic Area», which contains two parts: «City Proper» and «Metropolitan Area». The «City proper» are consist of 9 districts: Yuzhong, Dadukou, Jiangbei, Shapingba, Jiulongpo, Nan’an, Beibei, Yubei, & Banan, has the urban population of 5,646,300 as of 2018. And the «Metropolitan Area» are consist of 12 districts: Fuling, Changshou, Jiangjin, Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Qijiang, Dazu, Bishan, Tongliang, Tongnan, & Rongchang, has the urban population of 5,841,700.[517] Total urban population of all 26 districts of Chongqing are up to 15,076,600.

Education

Since 1986, compulsory education in China comprises primary and junior secondary school, which together last for nine years.[520] In 2021, about 91.4 percent of students continued their education at a three-year senior secondary school.[521] The Gaokao, China’s national university entrance exam, is a prerequisite for entrance into most higher education institutions. In 2010, 24 percent of secondary school graduates were enrolled in higher education.[522] This number increased significantly over the last decades, reaching a tertiary school enrolment of 58.42 percent in 2020.[523] Vocational education is available to students at the secondary and tertiary level.[524] More than 10 million Chinese students graduated from vocational colleges nationwide every year.[525]

China has the largest education system in the world, with about 282 million students and 17.32 million full-time teachers in over 530,000 schools.[526] In February 2006, the government pledged to provide completely free nine-year education, including textbooks and fees.[527] Annual education investment went from less than US$50 billion in 2003 to more than US$817 billion in 2020.[528][529] However, there remains an inequality in education spending. In 2010, the annual education expenditure per secondary school student in Beijing totalled ¥20,023, while in Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in China, only totalled ¥3,204.[530] Free compulsory education in China consists of primary school and junior secondary school between the ages of 6 and 15. In 2020, the graduation enrollment ratio at compulsory education level reached 95.2 percent, exceeding average levels recorded in high-income countries,[526] and around 91.2% of Chinese have received secondary education.[524]

China’s literacy rate has grown dramatically, from only 20% in 1949 and 65.5% in 1979.[531] to 97% of the population over age 15 in 2018.[532] In the same year, China (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) was ranked the highest in the world in the Programme for International Student Assessment ranking for all three categories of Mathematics, Science and Reading.[533]

As of 2021, China has over 3,000 universities, with over 44.3 million students enrolled in mainland China and 240 million Chinese citizens have received high education, making China the largest higher education system in the world.[534][535][536] As of 2021, China had the world’s second-highest number of top universities (the highest in Asia & Oceania region).[537] Currently, China trails only the United States in terms of representation on lists of top 200 universities according to the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).[538] China is home to the two of the highest ranking universities (Tsinghua University and Peking University) in Asia and emerging economies according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings.[539] As of 2022, two universities in Mainland China rank in the world’s top 15, with Peking University (12th) and Tsinghua University (14th) and three other universities ranking in the world’s top 50, namely Fudan, Zhejiang, and Shanghai Jiao Tong according to the QS World University Rankings.[540] These universities are members of the C9 League, an alliance of elite Chinese universities offering comprehensive and leading education.[541]

Health

The National Health and Family Planning Commission, together with its counterparts in the local commissions, oversees the health needs of the Chinese population.[542] An emphasis on public health and preventive medicine has characterized Chinese health policy since the early 1950s. At that time, the Communist Party started the Patriotic Health Campaign, which was aimed at improving sanitation and hygiene, as well as treating and preventing several diseases. Diseases such as cholera, typhoid and scarlet fever, which were previously rife in China, were nearly eradicated by the campaign.[citation needed]

After Deng Xiaoping began instituting economic reforms in 1978, the health of the Chinese public improved rapidly because of better nutrition, although many of the free public health services provided in the countryside disappeared along with the People’s Communes. Healthcare in China became mostly privatized, and experienced a significant rise in quality. In 2009, the government began a 3-year large-scale healthcare provision initiative worth US$124 billion.[543] By 2011, the campaign resulted in 95% of China’s population having basic health insurance coverage.[544] In 2011, China was estimated to be the world’s third-largest supplier of pharmaceuticals, but its population has suffered from the development and distribution of counterfeit medications.[545]

As of 2017, the average life expectancy at birth in China is 76 years,[546] and the infant mortality rate is 7 per thousand.[547] Both have improved significantly since the 1950s.[ab] Rates of stunting, a condition caused by malnutrition, have declined from 33.1% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2010.[550] Despite significant improvements in health and the construction of advanced medical facilities, China has several emerging public health problems, such as respiratory illnesses caused by widespread air pollution,[551] hundreds of millions of cigarette smokers,[552] and an increase in obesity among urban youths.[553][554] China’s large population and densely populated cities have led to serious disease outbreaks in recent years, such as the 2003 outbreak of SARS, although this has since been largely contained.[555] In 2010, air pollution caused 1.2 million premature deaths in China.[556]

The COVID-19 pandemic was first identified in Wuhan in December 2019.[557][558] Further studies are being carried out around the world on a possible origin for the virus.[559][560] The Chinese government has been criticized for its handling of the epidemic and accused of concealing the extent of the outbreak before it became an international pandemic.[561]

Religion

The government of the People’s Republic of China officially espouses state atheism,[566] and has conducted antireligious campaigns to this end.[567] Religious affairs and issues in the country are overseen by the State Administration for Religious Affairs.[568] Freedom of religion is guaranteed by China’s constitution, although religious organizations that lack official approval can be subject to state persecution.[290][569]

Over the millennia, Chinese civilization has been influenced by various religious movements. The «three teachings», including Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Chinese Buddhism), historically have a significant role in shaping Chinese culture,[570][571] enriching a theological and spiritual framework which harks back to the early Shang and Zhou dynasty. Chinese popular or folk religion, which is framed by the three teachings and other traditions,[572] consists in allegiance to the shen (), a character that signifies the «energies of generation», who can be deities of the environment or ancestral principles of human groups, concepts of civility, culture heroes, many of whom feature in Chinese mythology and history.[573] Among the most popular cults are those of Mazu (goddess of the seas),[574] Huangdi (one of the two divine patriarchs of the Chinese race),[574][575] Guandi (god of war and business), Caishen (god of prosperity and richness), Pangu and many others. China is home to many of the world’s tallest religious statues, including the tallest of all, the Spring Temple Buddha in Henan.[576]

Clear data on religious affiliation in China is difficult to gather due to varying definitions of «religion» and the unorganized, diffusive nature of Chinese religious traditions. Scholars note that in China there is no clear boundary between three teachings religions and local folk religious practice.[570] A 2015 poll conducted by Gallup International found that 61% of Chinese people self-identified as «convinced atheist»,[577] though it is worthwhile to note that Chinese religions or some of their strands are definable as non-theistic and humanistic religions, since they do not believe that divine creativity is completely transcendent, but it is inherent in the world and in particular in the human being.[578] According to a 2014 study, approximately 74% are either non-religious or practice Chinese folk belief, 16% are Buddhists, 2% are Christians, 1% are Muslims, and 8% adhere to other religions including Taoists and folk salvationism.[579][580] In addition to Han people’s local religious practices, there are also various ethnic minority groups in China who maintain their traditional autochthone religions. The various folk religions today comprise 2–3% of the population, while Confucianism as a religious self-identification is common within the intellectual class. Significant faiths specifically connected to certain ethnic groups include Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic religion of the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other peoples in Northwest China.[citation needed] The 2010 population census reported the total number of Muslims in the country as 23.14 million.[581]

A 2021 poll from Ipsos and the Policy Institute at King’s College London found that 35% of Chinese people said there was tension between different religious groups, which was the second lowest percentage of the 28 countries surveyed.[582][583]

Culture

Fenghuang County, an ancient town that harbors many architectural remains of Ming and Qing styles.

Since ancient times, Chinese culture has been heavily influenced by Confucianism. For much of the country’s dynastic era, opportunities for social advancement could be provided by high performance in the prestigious imperial examinations, which have their origins in the Han dynasty.[585] The literary emphasis of the exams affected the general perception of cultural refinement in China, such as the belief that calligraphy, poetry and painting were higher forms of art than dancing or drama. Chinese culture has long emphasized a sense of deep history and a largely inward-looking national perspective.[586] Examinations and a culture of merit remain greatly valued in China today.[587]

The first leaders of the People’s Republic of China were born into the traditional imperial order but were influenced by the May Fourth Movement and reformist ideals. They sought to change some traditional aspects of Chinese culture, such as rural land tenure, sexism, and the Confucian system of education, while preserving others, such as the family structure and culture of obedience to the state. Some observers see the period following the establishment of the PRC in 1949 as a continuation of traditional Chinese dynastic history, while others claim that the Communist Party’s rule has damaged the foundations of Chinese culture, especially through political movements such as the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, where many aspects of traditional culture were destroyed, having been denounced as «regressive and harmful» or «vestiges of feudalism». Many important aspects of traditional Chinese morals and culture, such as Confucianism, art, literature, and performing arts like Peking opera,[588] were altered to conform to government policies and propaganda at the time. Access to foreign media remains heavily restricted.[589]

Today, the Chinese government has accepted numerous elements of traditional Chinese culture as being integral to Chinese society. With the rise of Chinese nationalism and the end of the Cultural Revolution, various forms of traditional Chinese art, literature, music, film, fashion and architecture have seen a vigorous revival,[590][591] and folk and variety art in particular have sparked interest nationally and even worldwide.[592]

Tourism

China received 55.7 million inbound international visitors in 2010,[593] and in 2012 was the third-most-visited country in the world.[594] It also experiences an enormous volume of domestic tourism; an estimated 740 million Chinese holidaymakers traveled within the country in October 2012.[595] China hosts the world’s second-largest number of World Heritage Sites (56) after Italy, and is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world (first in the Asia-Pacific).

Literature

Chinese literature is based on the literature of the Zhou dynasty.[596] Concepts covered within the Chinese classic texts present a wide range of thoughts and subjects including calendar, military, astrology, herbology, geography and many others.[597] Some of the most important early texts include the I Ching and the Shujing within the Four Books and Five Classics which served as the Confucian authoritative books for the state-sponsored curriculum in dynastic era.[598] Inherited from the Classic of Poetry, classical Chinese poetry developed to its floruit during the Tang dynasty. Li Bai and Du Fu opened the forking ways for the poetic circles through romanticism and realism respectively.[599] Chinese historiography began with the Shiji, the overall scope of the historiographical tradition in China is termed the Twenty-Four Histories, which set a vast stage for Chinese fictions along with Chinese mythology and folklore.[600] Pushed by a burgeoning citizen class in the Ming dynasty, Chinese classical fiction rose to a boom of the historical, town and gods and demons fictions as represented by the Four Great Classical Novels which include Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Journey to the West and Dream of the Red Chamber.[601] Along with the wuxia fictions of Jin Yong and Liang Yusheng,[602] it remains an enduring source of popular culture in the East Asian cultural sphere.[603]

In the wake of the New Culture Movement after the end of the Qing dynasty, Chinese literature embarked on a new era with written vernacular Chinese for ordinary citizens. Hu Shih and Lu Xun were pioneers in modern literature.[604] Various literary genres, such as misty poetry, scar literature, young adult fiction and the xungen literature, which is influenced by magic realism,[605] emerged following the Cultural Revolution. Mo Yan, a xungen literature author, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012.[606]

Cuisine

Map showing major regional cuisines of China

Chinese cuisine is highly diverse, drawing on several millennia of culinary history and geographical variety, in which the most influential are known as the «Eight Major Cuisines», including Sichuan, Cantonese, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui, and Zhejiang cuisines.[607] All of them are featured by the precise skills of shaping, heating, and flavoring.[608][better source needed] Chinese cuisine is also known for its width of cooking methods and ingredients,[609] as well as food therapy that is emphasized by traditional Chinese medicine.[610][better source needed] Generally, China’s staple food is rice in the south, wheat-based breads and noodles in the north. The diet of the common people in pre-modern times was largely grain and simple vegetables, with meat reserved for special occasions. The bean products, such as tofu and soy milk, remain as a popular source of protein.[611] Pork is now the most popular meat in China, accounting for about three-fourths of the country’s total meat consumption.[612] While pork dominates the meat market, there is also the vegetarian Buddhist cuisine and the pork-free Chinese Islamic cuisine. Southern cuisine, due to the area’s proximity to the ocean and milder climate, has a wide variety of seafood and vegetables; it differs in many respects from the wheat-based diets across dry northern China. Numerous offshoots of Chinese food, such as Hong Kong cuisine and American Chinese food, have emerged in the nations that play host to the Chinese diaspora.[citation needed]

Music

Chinese music covers a highly diverse range of music from traditional music to modern music. Chinese music dates back before the pre-imperial times. Traditional Chinese musical instruments were traditionally grouped into eight categories known as bayin (八音). Traditional Chinese opera is a form of musical theatre in China originating thousands of years and has regional style forms such as Beijing opera and Cantonese opera.[613] Chinese pop (C-Pop) includes mandopop and cantopop. Chinese rap, Chinese hip hop and Hong Kong hip hop have become popular in contemporary times.[614]

Cinema

Cinema was first introduced to China in 1896 and the first Chinese film, Dingjun Mountain, was released in 1905.[615] China has the largest number of movie screens in the world since 2016,[616] China became the largest cinema market in the world in 2020.[617][618] The top 3 highest-grossing films in China currently are Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), Ne Zha (2019), and The Wandering Earth (2019).[619]

Fashion

Hanfu is the historical clothing of the Han people in China. The qipao or cheongsam is a popular Chinese female dress.[620] The hanfu movement has been popular in contemporary times and seeks to revitalize Hanfu clothing.[621]

Sports

China has one of the oldest sporting cultures in the world. There is evidence that archery (shèjiàn) was practiced during the Western Zhou dynasty. Swordplay (jiànshù) and cuju, a sport loosely related to association football[622] date back to China’s early dynasties as well.[623]

Go is an abstract strategy board game for two players, in which the aim is to surround more territory than the opponent and was invented in China more than 2,500 years ago.

Physical fitness is widely emphasized in Chinese culture, with morning exercises such as qigong and t’ai chi ch’uan widely practiced,[624] and commercial gyms and private fitness clubs are gaining popularity across the country.[625] Basketball is currently the most popular spectator sport in China.[626] The Chinese Basketball Association and the American National Basketball Association have a huge following among the people, with native or ethnic Chinese players such as Yao Ming and Yi Jianlian held in high esteem.[627] China’s professional football league, now known as Chinese Super League, was established in 1994, it is the largest football market in Asia.[628] Other popular sports in the country include martial arts, table tennis, badminton, swimming and snooker. Board games such as go (known as wéiqí in Chinese), xiangqi, mahjong, and more recently chess, are also played at a professional level.[629] In addition, China is home to a huge number of cyclists, with an estimated 470 million bicycles as of 2012.[459] Many more traditional sports, such as dragon boat racing, Mongolian-style wrestling and horse racing are also popular.[630]

China has participated in the Olympic Games since 1932, although it has only participated as the PRC since 1952. China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, where its athletes received 48 gold medals – the highest number of gold medals of any participating nation that year.[631] China also won the most medals of any nation at the 2012 Summer Paralympics, with 231 overall, including 95 gold medals.[632][633] In 2011, Shenzhen in Guangdong, China hosted the 2011 Summer Universiade. China hosted the 2013 East Asian Games in Tianjin and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics in Nanjing; the first country to host both regular and Youth Olympics. Beijing and its nearby city Zhangjiakou of Hebei province collaboratively hosted the 2022 Olympic Winter Games, making Beijing the first dual olympic city in the world by holding both the Summer Olympics and the Winter Olympics.[634][635]

See also

  • Outline of China

Notes

  1. ^ Chinese and English are the official languages in Hong Kong only. Chinese and Portuguese are the official languages in Macau only.
  2. ^
    • In the Hong Kong Traditional Chinese characters and English alphabet are used,
    • In the Macau Traditional Chinese characters and Portuguese orthography are used,
    • In Inner Mongolia the Mongolian script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Tibet Autonomous Region the Tibetan script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Xinjiang the Uyghur Arabic alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Guangxi and Wenshan Prefecture the Latin alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Chosŏn’gŭl is used alongside simplified Chinese.

  3. ^ The top position in one-party ruling China.
  4. ^ Although PRC President is head of state, it is a largely ceremonial office with limited power under CCP General Secretary.
  5. ^ Including both state and party’s central military chairs.
  6. ^ Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
  7. ^ The area given is the official United Nations figure for the mainland and excludes Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.[3] It also excludes the Trans-Karakoram Tract (5,180 km2 (2,000 sq mi)), Aksai Chin (38,000 km2 (15,000 sq mi)) and other territories in dispute with India. The total area of China is listed as 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) by the Encyclopædia Britannica.[4] For further information, see Territorial changes of the People’s Republic of China.
  8. ^ This figure was calculated using data from the CIA World Factbook.[6]
  9. ^ GDP figures exclude Taiwan, and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
  10. ^
    • Hong Kong dollar used in Hong Kong and Macau
    • Macanese pataca used in Macau only.

  11. ^ Chinese: 中华人民共和国; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
  12. ^ China’s border with Pakistan is disputed by India, which claims the entire Kashmir region as its territory.
  13. ^ The total area ranking relative to the United States depends on the measurement of the total areas of both countries. See List of countries and dependencies by area for more information.

    The following two primary sources (non-mirrored) represent the range (min./max.) of estimates of China’s and the United States’ total areas.

    Both sources (1) exclude Taiwan from the area of China; (2) exclude China’s coastal and territorial waters.

    However, the CIA World Factbook includes the United States coastal and territorial waters, while Encyclopædia Britannica excludes the United States coastal and territorial waters.

    1. The Encyclopædia Britannica lists China as world’s third-largest country (after Russia and Canada) with a total area of 9,572,900 km2,[13] and the United States as fourth-largest at 9,525,067 km2.[14]
    2. The CIA World Factbook lists China as the fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada and the United States) with a total area of 9,596,960 km2,[15] and the United States as the third-largest at 9,833,517 km2.[16]

    Notably, the Encyclopædia Britannica specifies the United States’ area (excluding coastal and territorial waters) as 9,525,067 km2, which is less than either source’s figure given for China’s area.[14] Therefore, while it can be determined that China has a larger area excluding coastal and territorial waters, it is unclear which country has a larger area including coastal and territorial waters.


    The United Nations Statistics Division’s figure for the United States is 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi) and China is 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi). These closely match the CIA World Factbook figures and similarly include coastal and territorial waters for the United States, but exclude coastal and territorial waters for China.


    Further explanation of disputed ranking: The dispute about which is the world’s third-largest country arose from the inclusion of coastal and territorial waters for the United States. This discrepancy was deduced from comparing the CIA World Factbook and its previous iterations[17] against the information for United States in Encyclopædia Britannica, particularly its footnote section.[14] In sum, according to older versions of the CIA World Factbook (from 1982 to 1996), the U.S. was listed as the world’s fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and China) with a total area of 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi). However, in the 1997 edition, the U.S. added coastal waters to its total area (increasing it to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi)). And then again in 2007, U.S. added territorial water to its total area (increasing it to 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi)). During this time, China’s total area remained unchanged. In other words, no coastal or territorial water area was added to China’s total area figure. The United States has a coastal water area of 109,362 km2 (42,225 sq mi), and a territorial water area of 195,213 km2 (75,372 sq mi), for a total of 304,575 km2 (117,597 sq mi) of additional water space. This is larger than entire countries like Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Adding this figure to the U.S. will boost it over China in ranking since China’s coastal and territorial water figures are currently unknown (no official publication) and thus cannot be added into China’s total area figure.

  14. ^ a b China claims the de facto state of Taiwan, which it does not control, as its disputed 23rd province, i.e. Taiwan Province. See § Administrative divisions for more details.
  15. ^ The island of Hainan was taken on 1 May 1950 while the unrecognized polity of Tibet was annexed on 23 May 1951.
  16. ^ The KMT solely governed the island until its transition to democracy in 1996.
  17. ^ «… Next vnto this, is found the great China, whose kyng is thought to bee the greatest prince in the worlde, and is named Santoa Raia».[19][20]
  18. ^ «… The Very Great Kingdom of China».[21] (Portuguese:  O Grande Reino da China ).[22]
  19. ^ Although this is the present meaning of guó, in Old Chinese (when its pronunciation was something like /*qʷˤək/)[28] it meant the walled city of the Chinese and the areas they could control from them.[29]
  20. ^ Its earliest extant use is on the ritual bronze vessel He zun, where it apparently refers to only the Shang’s immediate demesne conquered by the Zhou.[30]
  21. ^ Its meaning «Zhou’s royal demesne» is attested from the 6th-century BC Classic of History, which states «Huangtian bestowed the lands and the peoples of the central state to the ancestors» (皇天既付中國民越厥疆土于先王).[31]
  22. ^ Owing to Qin Shi Huang’s earlier policy involving the «burning of books and burying of scholars», the destruction of the confiscated copies at Xianyang was an event similar to the destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the west. Even those texts that did survive had to be painstakingly reconstructed from memory, luck, or forgery.[59] The Old Texts of the Five Classics were said to have been found hidden in a wall at the Kong residence in Qufu. Mei Ze’s «rediscovered» edition of the Book of Documents was only shown to be a forgery in the Qing dynasty.
  23. ^ China is larger than Canada and the United States in terms of land area.
  24. ^ According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the total area of the United States, at 9,522,055 km2 (3,676,486 sq mi), is slightly smaller than that of China. Meanwhile, the CIA World Factbook states that China’s total area was greater than that of the United States until the coastal waters of the Great Lakes was added to the United States’ total area in 1996. From 1989 through 1996, the total area of US was listed as 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi) (land area plus inland water only). The listed total area changed to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi) in 1997 (with the Great Lakes areas and the coastal waters added), to 9,631,418 km2 (3,718,711 sq mi) in 2004, to 9,631,420 km2 (3,718,710 sq mi) in 2006, and to 9,826,630 km2 (3,794,080 sq mi) in 2007 (territorial waters added).
  25. ^ China’s border with Pakistan and part of its border with India falls in the disputed region of Kashmir. The area under Pakistani administration is claimed by India, while the area under Indian administration is claimed by Pakistan.
  26. ^ Meaning cities that are not divided into districts (不设区的市), counties (县), city districts (市辖区), towns (镇), townships (乡), and lastly ethnic townships (民族乡)
  27. ^ Tsung-Dao Lee,[420] Chen Ning Yang,[420] Daniel C. Tsui,[421] Charles K. Kao,[422] Yuan T. Lee,[423] Tu Youyou[424] Shing-Tung Yau[425]
  28. ^ The national life expectancy at birth rose from about 31 years in 1949 to 75 years in 2008,[548] and infant mortality decreased from 300 per thousand in the 1950s to around 33 per thousand in 2001.[549]

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Further reading

  • Farah, Paolo (2006). «Five Years of China’s WTO Membership: EU and US Perspectives on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism». Legal Issues of Economic Integration. Kluwer Law International. Volume 33, Number 3. pp. 263–304. Abstract.
  • Heilig, Gerhard K. (2006/2007). China Bibliography – Online Archived 5 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. China-Profile.com.
  • Jacques, Martin (2009).When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. Penguin Books. Rev. ed. (28 August 2012). ISBN 978-1-59420-185-1
  • Jaffe, Amy Myers, «Green Giant: Renewable Energy and Chinese Power», Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 2 (March / April 2018), pp. 83–93.
  • Johnson, Ian, «What Holds China Together?», The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 14 (26 September 2019), pp. 14, 16, 18. «The Manchus … had [in 1644] conquered the last ethnic Chinese empire, the Ming [and established Imperial China’s last dynasty, the Qing] … The Manchus expanded the empire’s borders northward to include all of Mongolia, and westward to Tibet and Xinjiang.» [p. 16.] «China’s rulers have no faith that anything but force can keep this sprawling country intact.» [p. 18.]
  • Lagerwey, John (2010). China: A Religious State. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. ISBN 978-988-8028-04-7.
  • Meng, Fanhua (2011). Phenomenon of Chinese Culture at the Turn of the 21st century. Singapore: Silkroad Press. ISBN 978-981-4332-35-4.
  • Sang Ye (2006). China Candid: The People on the People’s Republic. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24514-3.
  • Selden, Mark (1979). The People’s Republic of China: Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-532-5.
  • Shambaugh, David L. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Washington, DC; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-25492-3.

External links

Government

  • The Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China (in English)

General information

  • China at a Glance from People’s Daily
  • Country profile – China at BBC News
  • China. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency.
  • China, People’s Republic of from UCB Libraries GovPubs
  • China at Curlie

Maps

Coordinates: 35°N 103°E / 35°N 103°E

«People’s Republic of China» redirects here. For the Republic of China, see Taiwan.

People’s Republic of China

中华人民共和国 (Chinese)
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó (Pinyin)

Flag of China

Flag

National Emblem of China

National Emblem

Anthem: 
义勇军进行曲
Yìyǒngjūn Jìnxíngqǔ
«March of the Volunteers»
Territory controlled by the People's Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Territory controlled by the People’s Republic of China shown in dark green; territory claimed but not controlled shown in light green

Capital Beijing
39°55′N 116°23′E / 39.917°N 116.383°E
Largest city
by population
Shanghai
Official languages Standard Chinese[a]
Recognized regional languages
  • Mongolian
  • Uyghur
  • Tibetan
  • Zhuang
  • Others
Official script Simplified Chinese[b]
Ethnic groups

(2020)[1]

  • 91.1% Han Chinese
  • 8.9% Others
Religion

(2020)[2]

  • 74.5% No religion / Folk
  • 18.3% Buddhism
  • 5.2% Christianity
  • 1.6% Islam
  • 0.4% Others
Demonym(s) Chinese
Government Unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic

• CCP General Secretary[c]
President[d]
CMC Chairman[e]

Xi Jinping

• Premier

Li Keqiang

• Congress Chairman

Li Zhanshu

• CPPCC Chairman[f]

Wang Yang
Legislature National People’s Congress
Formation

• First pre-imperial dynasty

c. 2070 BCE

• First imperial dynasty

221 BCE

• Republic established

1 January 1912

• Proclamation of the People’s Republic

1 October 1949

• First constitution

20 September 1954

• Current constitution

4 December 1982

• Most recent polity admitted

20 December 1999
Area

• Total

9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi)[g][5] (3rd / 4th)

• Water (%)

2.8[h]
Population

• 2022 estimate

1,410,539,758[7] (1st)

• 2020 census

Neutral increase 1,411,778,724[8] (1st)

• Density

145[9]/km2 (375.5/sq mi) (83rd)
GDP (PPP) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $30.074 trillion[10] (1st)

• Per capita

Increase $21,291[10] (72nd)
GDP (nominal) 2022 estimate

• Total

Increase $18.321 trillion[i][10] (2nd)

• Per capita

Increase $12,970[10] (65th)
Gini (2019) Positive decrease 38.2[11]
medium
HDI (2021) Increase 0.768[12]
high · 79th
Currency Renminbi (元/¥)[j] (CNY)
Time zone UTC+8 (CST)
DST is not observed
Date format
  • yyyy-mm-dd
  • or yyyymd
  • (CE; Chinese calendar)
Driving side right (Mainland)
left (Hong Kong and Macau)
Calling code +86 (Mainland)
+852 (Hong Kong)
+853 (Macau)
ISO 3166 code CN
Internet TLD
  • .cn
  • .中国
  • .中國 (Mainland)
  • .hk
  • .香港 (Hong Kong)
  • .mo
  • .澳门
  • .澳門 (Macau)

China (Chinese: 中国; pinyin: Zhōngguó), officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC),[k] is a country in East Asia. It is the world’s most populous country, with a population exceeding 1.4 billion, slightly ahead of India. China spans the equivalent of five time zones and borders fourteen countries by land,[l] the most of any country in the world, tied with Russia. Covering an area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometres (3,700,000 sq mi), it is the world’s third largest country by total land area.[m] The country consists of 22 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The national capital is Beijing, and the most populous city and financial center is Shanghai.

Modern Chinese trace their origins to a cradle of civilization in the fertile basin of the Yellow River in the North China Plain. The semi-legendary Xia dynasty in the 21st century BCE and the well-attested Shang and Zhou dynasties developed a bureaucratic political system to serve hereditary monarchies, or dynasties. Chinese writing, Chinese classic literature, and the Hundred Schools of Thought emerged during this period and influenced China and its neighbors for centuries to come. In the third century BCE, Qin’s wars of unification created the first Chinese empire, the short-lived Qin dynasty. The Qin was followed by the more stable Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), which established a model for nearly two millennia in which the Chinese empire was one of the world’s foremost economic powers. The empire expanded, fractured and re-unified, was conquered and reestablished, absorbed foreign religions and ideas, and made world-leading scientific advances, such as the Four Great Inventions: gunpowder, paper, the compass, and printing. After centuries of disunion following the fall of the Han, the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties reunified the empire. The multi-ethnic Tang welcomed foreign trade and culture that came over the Silk Road and adapted Buddhism to Chinese needs. The early modern Song dynasty (960–1279) became increasingly urban and commercial. The civilian scholar-official or literati used the examination system and the doctrines of Neo-Confucianism to replace the military aristocrats of earlier dynasties. The Mongol invasion established the Yuan dynasty in 1279, but the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) re-established Han Chinese control. The Manchu-led Qing dynasty nearly doubled the empire’s territory and established a multi-ethnic state that was the basis of the modern Chinese nation, but suffered heavy losses to foreign imperialism in the 19th century.

The Chinese monarchy collapsed in 1912 with the Xinhai Revolution, when the Republic of China (ROC) replaced the Qing dynasty. In its early years as a republic, the country underwent a period of instability known as the Warlord Era before mostly reunifying in 1928 under a Nationalist government. A civil war between the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began in 1927. Japan invaded China in 1937, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War and temporarily halting the civil war. The surrender and expulsion of Japanese forces from China in 1945 left a power vacuum in the country, which led to renewed fighting between the CCP and the Kuomintang. The civil war ended in 1949[o] with the division of Chinese territory; the CCP established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland while the Kuomintang-led ROC government retreated to the island of Taiwan.[p] Both claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, although the United Nations has recognized the PRC as the sole representation since 1971. From 1959 to 1961, the PRC implemented an economic and social campaign called the Great Leap Forward, that resulted in a sharp economic decline and an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths, mostly through man-made famine. From 1966 to 1976, the turbulent period of political and social chaos within China known as the Cultural Revolution led to greater economic and educational decline, with millions being purged or subjected to either persecution or politicide based on political categories. Since then, the Chinese government has rebuked some of the earlier Maoist policies, conducting a series of political and economic reforms since 1978, which has greatly raised Chinese standards of living, and increased life expectancies.

China is currently governed as a unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic by the CCP. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a founding member of several multilateral and regional cooperation organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the New Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the RCEP, and is a member of the BRICS, the G8+5, the G20, the APEC, and the East Asia Summit. It ranks among the lowest in measurements of democracy, civil liberties, government transparency, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and human rights of ethnic minorities. The Chinese authorities have been criticized by human rights activists and non-governmental organizations for human rights abuses, including political repression, mass censorship, mass surveillance of their citizens, and violent suppression of protest and dissent.

Making up around one-fifth of the world economy, China is the world’s largest economy by GDP by purchasing power parity, the second-largest economy by nominal GDP, and the second-wealthiest country. The country is one of the fastest growing major economies and is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter, as well as the second-largest importer. China is a recognized nuclear-weapon state with the world’s largest standing army by military personnel and second-largest defense budget. China is considered to be a potential superpower due to its large markets, high innovation, economic potential, growing military strength, and influence in international affairs.

Etymology

The word «China» has been used in English since the 16th century; however, it was not a word used by the Chinese themselves during this period. Its origin has been traced through Portuguese, Malay, and Persian back to the Sanskrit word Chīna, used in ancient India.[18] «China» appears in Richard Eden’s 1555 translation[q] of the 1516 journal of the Portuguese explorer Duarte Barbosa.[r][18] Barbosa’s usage was derived from Persian Chīn (چین), which was in turn derived from Sanskrit Cīna (चीन).[23] Cīna was first used in early Hindu scripture, including the Mahābhārata (5th century BCE) and the Laws of Manu (2nd century BCE).[24] In 1655, Martino Martini suggested that the word China is derived ultimately from the name of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).[25][24] Although usage in Indian sources precedes this dynasty, this derivation is still given in various sources.[26] The origin of the Sanskrit word is a matter of debate, according to the Oxford English Dictionary.[18] Alternative suggestions include the names for Yelang and the Jing or Chu state.[24][27]
The official name of the modern state is the «People’s Republic of China» (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó). The shorter form is «China» Zhōngguó (中国; 中國) from zhōng («central») and guó («state»),[s] a term which developed under the Western Zhou dynasty in reference to its royal demesne.[t][u] It was then applied to the area around Luoyi (present-day Luoyang) during the Eastern Zhou and then to China’s Central Plain before being used as an occasional synonym for the state under the Qing.[29] It was often used as a cultural concept to distinguish the Huaxia people from perceived «barbarians».[29] The name Zhongguo is also translated as «Middle Kingdom» in English.[32] China (PRC) is sometimes referred to as the Mainland when distinguishing the ROC from the PRC.[33][34][35][36]

History

Prehistory

10,000 years old pottery, Xianren Cave culture (18000–7000 BCE)

China is regarded as one of the world’s oldest civilisations.[37][38] Archaeological evidence suggests that early hominids inhabited the country 2.25 million years ago.[39] The hominid fossils of Peking Man, a Homo erectus who used fire,[40] were discovered in a cave at Zhoukoudian near Beijing; they have been dated to between 680,000 and 780,000 years ago.[41] The fossilized teeth of Homo sapiens (dated to 125,000–80,000 years ago) have been discovered in Fuyan Cave in Dao County, Hunan.[42] Chinese proto-writing existed in Jiahu around 6600 BCE,[43] at Damaidi around 6000 BCE,[44] Dadiwan from 5800 to 5400 BCE, and Banpo dating from the 5th millennium BCE. Some scholars have suggested that the Jiahu symbols (7th millennium BCE) constituted the earliest Chinese writing system.[43]

Early dynastic rule

According to Chinese tradition, the first dynasty was the Xia, which emerged around 2100 BCE.[45] The Xia dynasty marked the beginning of China’s political system based on hereditary monarchies, or dynasties, which lasted for a millennium.[46] The Xia dynasty was considered mythical by historians until scientific excavations found early Bronze Age sites at Erlitou, Henan in 1959.[47] It remains unclear whether these sites are the remains of the Xia dynasty or of another culture from the same period.[48] The succeeding Shang dynasty is the earliest to be confirmed by contemporary records.[49] The Shang ruled the plain of the Yellow River in eastern China from the 17th to the 11th century BCE.[50] Their oracle bone script (from c. 1500 BCE)[51][52] represents the oldest form of Chinese writing yet found[53] and is a direct ancestor of modern Chinese characters.[54]

The Shang was conquered by the Zhou, who ruled between the 11th and 5th centuries BCE, though centralized authority was slowly eroded by feudal warlords. Some principalities eventually emerged from the weakened Zhou, no longer fully obeyed the Zhou king, and continually waged war with each other during the 300-year Spring and Autumn period. By the time of the Warring States period of the 5th–3rd centuries BCE, there were only seven powerful states left.[55]

Imperial China

The Warring States period ended in 221 BCE after the state of Qin conquered the other six kingdoms, reunited China and established the dominant order of autocracy. King Zheng of Qin proclaimed himself the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty. He enacted Qin’s legalist reforms throughout China, notably the forced standardization of Chinese characters, measurements, road widths (i.e., the cart axles’ length), and currency. His dynasty also conquered the Yue tribes in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Vietnam.[56] The Qin dynasty lasted only fifteen years, falling soon after the First Emperor’s death, as his harsh authoritarian policies led to widespread rebellion.[57][58]

Following a widespread civil war during which the imperial library at Xianyang was burned,[v] the Han dynasty emerged to rule China between 206 BCE and CE 220, creating a cultural identity among its populace still remembered in the ethnonym of the Han Chinese.[57][58] The Han expanded the empire’s territory considerably, with military campaigns reaching Central Asia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Yunnan, and the recovery of Guangdong and northern Vietnam from Nanyue. Han involvement in Central Asia and Sogdia helped establish the land route of the Silk Road, replacing the earlier path over the Himalayas to India. Han China gradually became the largest economy of the ancient world.[60] Despite the Han’s initial decentralization and the official abandonment of the Qin philosophy of Legalism in favor of Confucianism, Qin’s legalist institutions and policies continued to be employed by the Han government and its successors.[61]

Map showing the expansion of Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC

After the end of the Han dynasty, a period of strife known as Three Kingdoms followed,[62] whose central figures were later immortalized in one of the Four Classics of Chinese literature. At its end, Wei was swiftly overthrown by the Jin dynasty. The Jin fell to civil war upon the ascension of a developmentally disabled emperor; the Five Barbarians then invaded and ruled northern China as the Sixteen States. The Xianbei unified them as the Northern Wei, whose Emperor Xiaowen reversed his predecessors’ apartheid policies and enforced a drastic sinification on his subjects, largely integrating them into Chinese culture. In the south, the general Liu Yu secured the abdication of the Jin in favor of the Liu Song. The various successors of these states became known as the Northern and Southern dynasties, with the two areas finally reunited by the Sui in 581. The Sui restored the Han to power through China, reformed its agriculture, economy and imperial examination system, constructed the Grand Canal, and patronized Buddhism. However, they fell quickly when their conscription for public works and a failed war in northern Korea provoked widespread unrest.[63][64]

Under the succeeding Tang and Song dynasties, Chinese economy, technology, and culture entered a golden age.[65] The Tang dynasty retained control of the Western Regions and the Silk Road,[66] which brought traders to as far as Mesopotamia and the Horn of Africa,[67] and made the capital Chang’an a cosmopolitan urban center. However, it was devastated and weakened by the An Lushan Rebellion in the 8th century.[68] In 907, the Tang disintegrated completely when the local military governors became ungovernable. The Song dynasty ended the separatist situation in 960, leading to a balance of power between the Song and Khitan Liao. The Song was the first government in world history to issue paper money and the first Chinese polity to establish a permanent standing navy which was supported by the developed shipbuilding industry along with the sea trade.[69]

Between the 10th and 11th centuries, the population of China doubled in size to around 100 million people, mostly because of the expansion of rice cultivation in central and southern China, and the production of abundant food surpluses. The Song dynasty also saw a revival of Confucianism, in response to the growth of Buddhism during the Tang,[70] and a flourishing of philosophy and the arts, as landscape art and porcelain were brought to new levels of maturity and complexity.[71][72] However, the military weakness of the Song army was observed by the Jurchen Jin dynasty. In 1127, Emperor Huizong of Song and the capital Bianjing were captured during the Jin–Song Wars. The remnants of the Song retreated to southern China.[73]

The Mongol conquest of China began in 1205 with the gradual conquest of Western Xia by Genghis Khan,[74] who also invaded Jin territories.[75] In 1271, the Mongol leader Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty, which conquered the last remnant of the Song dynasty in 1279. Before the Mongol invasion, the population of Song China was 120 million citizens; this was reduced to 60 million by the time of the census in 1300.[76] A peasant named Zhu Yuanzhang led a rebellion that overthrew the Yuan in 1368 and founded the Ming dynasty as the Hongwu Emperor. Under the Ming dynasty, China enjoyed another golden age, developing one of the strongest navies in the world and a rich and prosperous economy amid a flourishing of art and culture. It was during this period that admiral Zheng He led the Ming treasure voyages throughout the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as East Africa.[77]

In the early years of the Ming dynasty, China’s capital was moved from Nanjing to Beijing. With the budding of capitalism, philosophers such as Wang Yangming further critiqued and expanded Neo-Confucianism with concepts of individualism and equality of four occupations.[78] The scholar-official stratum became a supporting force of industry and commerce in the tax boycott movements, which, together with the famines and defense against Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) and Manchu invasions led to an exhausted treasury.[79] In 1644, Beijing was captured by a coalition of peasant rebel forces led by Li Zicheng. The Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide when the city fell. The Manchu Qing dynasty, then allied with Ming dynasty general Wu Sangui, overthrew Li’s short-lived Shun dynasty and subsequently seized control of Beijing, which became the new capital of the Qing dynasty.[80]

The Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1644 until 1912, was the last imperial dynasty of China. Its conquest of the Ming (1618–1683) cost 25 million lives and the economy of China shrank drastically.[81] After the Southern Ming ended, the further conquest of the Dzungar Khanate added Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang to the empire.[82] The centralized autocracy was strengthened to suppress anti-Qing sentiment with the policy of valuing agriculture and restraining commerce, the Haijin («sea ban»), and ideological control as represented by the literary inquisition, causing social and technological stagnation.[83][84]

Fall of the Qing dynasty

In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty experienced Western imperialism in the Opium Wars with Britain and France. China was forced to pay compensation, open treaty ports, allow extraterritoriality for foreign nationals, and cede Hong Kong to the British[85] under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the first of the Unequal Treaties. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) resulted in Qing China’s loss of influence in the Korean Peninsula, as well as the cession of Taiwan to Japan.[86]
The Qing dynasty also began experiencing internal unrest in which tens of millions of people died, especially in the White Lotus Rebellion, the failed Taiping Rebellion that ravaged southern China in the 1850s and 1860s and the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) in the northwest. The initial success of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s was frustrated by a series of military defeats in the 1880s and 1890s.[citation needed]

In the 19th century, the great Chinese diaspora began. Losses due to emigration were added to by conflicts and catastrophes such as the Northern Chinese Famine of 1876–1879, in which between 9 and 13 million people died.[87] The Guangxu Emperor drafted a reform plan in 1898 to establish a modern constitutional monarchy, but these plans were thwarted by the Empress Dowager Cixi. The ill-fated anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901 further weakened the dynasty. Although Cixi sponsored a program of reforms, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1912 brought an end to the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China.[88] Puyi, the last Emperor of China, abdicated in 1912.[89]

Establishment of the Republic and World War II

On 1 January 1912, the Republic of China was established, and Sun Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (the KMT or Nationalist Party) was proclaimed provisional president.[90] On 12 February 1912, regent Empress Dowager Longyu sealed the imperial abdication decree on behalf of 4 year old Puyi, the last emperor of China, ending 5,000 years of monarchy in China.[91] In March 1912, the presidency was given to Yuan Shikai, a former Qing general who in 1915 proclaimed himself Emperor of China. In the face of popular condemnation and opposition from his own Beiyang Army, he was forced to abdicate and re-establish the republic in 1916.[92]

After Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, China was politically fragmented. Its Beijing-based government was internationally recognized but virtually powerless; regional warlords controlled most of its territory.[93][94] In the late 1920s, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, the then Principal of the Republic of China Military Academy, was able to reunify the country under its own control with a series of deft military and political maneuverings, known collectively as the Northern Expedition.[95][96] The Kuomintang moved the nation’s capital to Nanjing and implemented «political tutelage», an intermediate stage of political development outlined in Sun Yat-sen’s San-min program for transforming China into a modern democratic state.[97][98] The political division in China made it difficult for Chiang to battle the communist-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA), against whom the Kuomintang had been warring since 1927 in the Chinese Civil War. This war continued successfully for the Kuomintang, especially after the PLA retreated in the Long March, until Japanese aggression and the 1936 Xi’an Incident forced Chiang to confront Imperial Japan.[99]

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), a theater of World War II, forced an uneasy alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Japanese forces committed numerous war atrocities against the civilian population; in all, as many as 20 million Chinese civilians died.[100] An estimated 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese were massacred in the city of Nanjing alone during the Japanese occupation.[101] During the war, China, along with the UK, the United States, and the Soviet Union, were referred to as «trusteeship of the powerful»[102] and were recognized as the Allied «Big Four» in the Declaration by United Nations.[103][104] Along with the other three great powers, China was one of the four major Allies of World War II, and was later considered one of the primary victors in the war.[105][106] After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Taiwan, including the Pescadores, was handed over to Chinese control. However, the validity of this handover is controversial, in that whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was legally transferred and whether China is a legitimate recipient, due to complex issues that arose from the handling of Japan’s surrender, resulting in the unresolved political status of Taiwan, which is a flashpoint of potential war between China and Taiwan. China emerged victorious but war-ravaged and financially drained. The continued distrust between the Kuomintang and the Communists led to the resumption of civil war. Constitutional rule was established in 1947, but because of the ongoing unrest, many provisions of the ROC constitution were never implemented in mainland China.[107]

Civil War and the People’s Republic

Before the existence of the People’s Republic, the CCP had declared several areas of the country as the Chinese Soviet Republic (Jiangxi Soviet), a predecessor state to the PRC, in November 1931 in Ruijin, Jiangxi. The Jiangxi Soviet was wiped out by the KMT armies in 1934 and was relocated to Yan’an in Shaanxi where the Long March concluded in 1935.[108][failed verification] It would be the base of the communists before major combat in the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949. Afterwards, the CCP took control of most of mainland China, and the Kuomintang retreating offshore to Taiwan, reducing its territory to only Taiwan, Hainan, and their surrounding islands.

On 1 October 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China at the new nation’s founding ceremony and inaugural military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.[109][110] In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army captured Hainan from the ROC[111] and annexed Tibet.[112] However, remaining Kuomintang forces continued to wage an insurgency in western China throughout the 1950s.[113]

The government consolidated its popularity among the peasants through land reform, which included the execution of between 1 and 2 million landlords.[114] China developed an independent industrial system and its own nuclear weapons.[115] The Chinese population increased from 550 million in 1950 to 900 million in 1974.[116] However, the Great Leap Forward, an idealistic massive reform project, resulted in an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths between 1959 and 1961, mostly from starvation.[117][118] In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, sparking a decade of political recrimination and social upheaval that lasted until Mao’s death in 1976. In October 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations, and took its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.[119] This UN action also created the problem of the political status of Taiwan and the Two Chinas issue. See Cross-Strait relations and «Taiwan, China».

Reforms and contemporary history

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was ended by a military-led massacre which brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.

After Mao’s death, the Gang of Four was quickly arrested by Hua Guofeng and held responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, and instituted significant economic reforms. The CCP loosened governmental control over citizens’ personal lives, and the communes were gradually disbanded in favor of working contracted to households. Agricultural collectivization was dismantled and farmlands privatized, while foreign trade became a major new focus, leading to the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were restructured and unprofitable ones were closed outright, resulting in massive job losses.[citation needed] This marked China’s transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an increasingly open-market environment.[120] China adopted its current constitution on 4 December 1982. In 1989, the suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square brought condemnations and sanctions against the Chinese government from various foreign countries.[121]

Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji led the nation in the 1990s. Under their administration, China’s economic performance pulled an estimated[by whom?] 150 million peasants out of poverty and sustained an average annual gross domestic product growth rate of 11.2%.[122][better source needed] British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, as the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions under the principle of One country, two systems. The country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and maintained its high rate of economic growth under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s leadership in the 2000s. However, the growth also severely impacted the country’s resources and environment,[123][124] and caused major social displacement.[125][126]

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has ruled since 2012 and has pursued large-scale efforts to reform China’s economy[127][128] (which has suffered from structural instabilities and slowing growth),[129][130][131] and has also reformed the one-child policy and penal system,[132] as well as instituting a vast anti-corruption crackdown.[133] In the early 2010s, China’s economic growth rate began to slow amid domestic credit troubles, weakening international demand for Chinese exports and fragility in the global economy.[134][135][136] In 2013, China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment project.[137] Since 2017, the Chinese government has been engaged in a harsh crackdown in Xinjiang, with an estimated one million people, mostly Uyghurs but including other ethnic and religious minorities, in internment camps.[138] The National People’s Congress in 2018 altered the country’s constitution to remove the two-term limit on holding the Presidency of China, permitting the current leader, Xi Jinping, to remain president of China (and general secretary of the CCP) for an unlimited time, earning criticism for creating dictatorial governance.[139][140] In 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) passed a national security law in Hong Kong that gave the Hong Kong government wide-ranging tools to crack down on dissent.[141]

The global COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan and was first identified from an outbreak in December 2019.[142] The Chinese government response has included a zero-COVID strategy, making it one of few countries to pursue this approach.[143] China was the only major economy in the world to grow in 2020, recording a 2.3% growth due to its success in containing the coronavirus within its borders.[144] The country’s economy continued to broaden recovery from the recession during the pandemic, with stable job creation and record international trade growth, although retail consumption was still slower than predicted.[145][146] These Zero-COVID strategies have led to a variety of protests across China against them starting in November 2022.

Geography

China topographic map with East Asia countries

China’s landscape is vast and diverse, ranging from the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts in the arid north to the subtropical forests in the wetter south. The Himalaya, Karakoram, Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges separate China from much of South and Central Asia. The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the third- and sixth-longest in the world, respectively, run from the Tibetan Plateau to the densely populated eastern seaboard. China’s coastline along the Pacific Ocean is 14,500 km (9,000 mi) long and is bounded by the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China seas. China connects through the Kazakh border to the Eurasian Steppe which has been an artery of communication between East and West since the Neolithic through the Steppe Route – the ancestor of the terrestrial Silk Road(s).[citation needed]

The territory of China lies between latitudes 18° and 54° N, and longitudes 73° and 135° E. The geographical center of China is marked by the Center of the Country Monument at 35°50′40.9″N 103°27′7.5″E / 35.844694°N 103.452083°E. China’s landscapes vary significantly across its vast territory. In the east, along the shores of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, there are extensive and densely populated alluvial plains, while on the edges of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the north, broad grasslands predominate. Southern China is dominated by hills and low mountain ranges, while the central-east hosts the deltas of China’s two major rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. Other major rivers include the Xi, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Amur. To the west sit major mountain ranges, most notably the Himalayas. High plateaus feature among the more arid landscapes of the north, such as the Taklamakan and the Gobi Desert. The world’s highest point, Mount Everest (8,848 m), lies on the Sino-Nepalese border.[147] The country’s lowest point, and the world’s third-lowest, is the dried lake bed of Ayding Lake (−154 m) in the Turpan Depression.[148]

Climate

China’s climate is mainly dominated by dry seasons and wet monsoons, which lead to pronounced temperature differences between winter and summer. In the winter, northern winds coming from high-latitude areas are cold and dry; in summer, southern winds from coastal areas at lower latitudes are warm and moist.[150]

A major environmental issue in China is the continued expansion of its deserts, particularly the Gobi Desert.[151][152] Although barrier tree lines planted since the 1970s have reduced the frequency of sandstorms, prolonged drought and poor agricultural practices have resulted in dust storms plaguing northern China each spring, which then spread to other parts of East Asia, including Japan and Korea. China’s environmental watchdog, SEPA, stated in 2007 that China is losing 4,000 km2 (1,500 sq mi) per year to desertification.[153] Water quality, erosion, and pollution control have become important issues in China’s relations with other countries. Melting glaciers in the Himalayas could potentially lead to water shortages for hundreds of millions of people.[154] According to academics, in order to limit climate change in China to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) electricity generation from coal in China without carbon capture must be phased out by 2045.[155] Official government statistics about Chinese agricultural productivity are considered unreliable, due to exaggeration of production at subsidiary government levels.[156][157] Much of China has a climate very suitable for agriculture and the country has been the world’s largest producer of rice, wheat, tomatoes, eggplant, grapes, watermelon, spinach, and many other crops.[158]

Biodiversity

China is one of 17 megadiverse countries,[159] lying in two of the world’s major biogeographic realms: the Palearctic and the Indomalayan. By one measure, China has over 34,687 species of animals and vascular plants, making it the third-most biodiverse country in the world, after Brazil and Colombia.[160] The country signed the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity on 11 June 1992, and became a party to the convention on 5 January 1993.[161] It later produced a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, with one revision that was received by the convention on 21 September 2010.[162]

China is home to at least 551 species of mammals (the third-highest such number in the world),[163] 1,221 species of birds (eighth),[164] 424 species of reptiles (seventh)[165] and 333 species of amphibians (seventh).[166] Wildlife in China shares habitat with, and bears acute pressure from, the world’s largest population of humans. At least 840 animal species are threatened, vulnerable or in danger of local extinction in China, due mainly to human activity such as habitat destruction, pollution and poaching for food, fur and ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine.[167] Endangered wildlife is protected by law, and as of 2005, the country has over 2,349 nature reserves, covering a total area of 149.95 million hectares, 15 percent of China’s total land area.[168][better source needed] Most wild animals have been eliminated from the core agricultural regions of east and central China, but they have fared better in the mountainous south and west.[169][170] The Baiji was confirmed extinct on 12 December 2006.[171]

China has over 32,000 species of vascular plants,[172] and is home to a variety of forest types. Cold coniferous forests predominate in the north of the country, supporting animal species such as moose and Asian black bear, along with over 120 bird species.[173] The understory of moist conifer forests may contain thickets of bamboo. In higher montane stands of juniper and yew, the bamboo is replaced by rhododendrons. Subtropical forests, which are predominate in central and southern China, support a high density of plant species including numerous rare endemics. Tropical and seasonal rainforests, though confined to Yunnan and Hainan Island, contain a quarter of all the animal and plant species found in China.[173] China has over 10,000 recorded species of fungi,[174] and of them, nearly 6,000 are higher fungi.[175]

Environment

In the early 2000s, China has suffered from environmental deterioration and pollution due to its rapid pace of industrialization.[176][177] While regulations such as the 1979 Environmental Protection Law are fairly stringent, they are poorly enforced, as they are frequently disregarded by local communities and government officials in favor of rapid economic development.[178] China is the country with the second highest death toll because of air pollution, after India. There are approximately 1 million deaths caused by exposure to ambient air pollution.[179][180] Although China ranks as the highest CO2 emitting country in the world,[181] it only emits 8 tons of CO2 per capita, significantly lower than developed countries such as the United States (16.1), Australia (16.8) and South Korea (13.6).[182]

In recent years, China has clamped down on pollution. In March 2014, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping «declared war» on pollution during the opening of the National People’s Congress.[183] After extensive debate lasting nearly two years, the parliament approved a new environmental law in April. The new law empowers environmental enforcement agencies with great punitive power and large fines for offenders, defines areas which require extra protection, and gives independent environmental groups more ability to operate in the country.[citation needed] In 2020, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and go carbon-neutral by 2060 in accordance with the Paris climate accord.[184] According to Climate Action Tracker, if accomplished it would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 – 0.3 degrees – «the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker».[185] In September 2021 Xi Jinping announced that China will not build «coal-fired power projects abroad». The decision can be «pivotal» in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.[186]

The country also had significant water pollution problems: 8.2% of China’s rivers had been polluted by industrial and agricultural waste in 2019.[187][188] China had a 2018 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.14/10, ranking it 53rd globally out of 172 countries.[189] In 2020, a sweeping law was passed by the Chinese government to protect the ecology of the Yangtze River. The new laws include strengthening ecological protection rules for hydropower projects along the river, banning chemical plants within 1 kilometer of the river, relocating polluting industries, severely restricting sand mining as well as a complete fishing ban on all the natural waterways of the river, including all its major tributaries and lakes.[190]

China is also the world’s leading investor in renewable energy and its commercialization, with $52 billion invested in 2011 alone;[191][192][193] it is a major manufacturer of renewable energy technologies and invests heavily in local-scale renewable energy projects.[194][195][196] By 2015, over 24% of China’s energy was derived from renewable sources, while most notably from hydroelectric power: a total installed capacity of 197 GW makes China the largest hydroelectric power producer in the world.[197][198] China also has the largest power capacity of installed solar photovoltaics system and wind power system in the world.[199][200] Greenhouse gas emissions by China are the world’s largest,[182] as is renewable energy in China.[201] Despite its emphasis on renewables, China remains deeply connected to global oil markets and next to India, has been the largest importer of Russian crude oil in 2022.[202][203]

Political geography

Map showing the territorial claims of the PRC.

The People’s Republic of China is the second-largest country in the world by land area after Russia.[w][x] China’s total area is generally stated as being approximately 9,600,000 km2 (3,700,000 sq mi).[204] Specific area figures range from 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) according to the Encyclopædia Britannica,[205] to 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) according to the UN Demographic Yearbook,[3] and the CIA World Factbook.[6]

China has the longest combined land border in the world, measuring 22,117 km (13,743 mi) and its coastline covers approximately 14,500 km (9,000 mi) from the mouth of the Yalu River (Amnok River) to the Gulf of Tonkin.[6] China borders 14 nations and covers the bulk of East Asia, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in Southeast Asia; India, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan[y] in South Asia; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia; and Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea in Inner Asia and Northeast Asia. It is narrowly separated from Bangladesh and Thailand to the southwest and south, and has several maritime neighbors such as Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[206]

Politics

The Chinese constitution states that the People’s Republic of China «is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship that is led by the working class and based on an alliance of workers and peasants,» and that the state institutions «shall practice the principle of democratic centralism.»[207] The PRC is one of the world’s only socialist states governed by a communist party. The Chinese government has been variously described as communist and socialist, but also as authoritarian[208] and corporatist,[209] with amongst the heaviest restrictions worldwide in many areas, most notably against free access to the Internet, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to have children, free formation of social organizations and freedom of religion.[210]

Although the Chinese Communist Party describes China as a «socialist consultative democracy»,[211] the country is commonly described as an authoritarian one-party surveillance state and a dictatorship.[212][213] China has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an «authoritarian regime» by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, ranking at 148th out of 167 countries in 2021.[214] Its current political, ideological and economic system has been termed by its leaders as a «whole-process people’s democracy» «people’s democratic dictatorship», «socialism with Chinese characteristics» (which is Marxism adapted to Chinese circumstances) and the «socialist market economy» respectively.[215][216]

Political concerns in China include the growing gap between rich and poor and government corruption.[217] Nonetheless, the level of public support for the government and its management of the nation is high, with 80–95% of Chinese citizens expressing satisfaction with the central government, according to a 2011 Harvard University survey.[218] A 2020 survey from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research also had most Chinese expressing satisfaction with the government on information dissemination and delivery of daily necessities during the COVID-19 pandemic.[219][220]

Chinese Communist Party

The main body of the Chinese constitution declares that «the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).»[221] China is a one-party Marxist–Leninist state,[222] wherein the CCP general secretary (party leader) holds ultimate power and authority over state and government and serves as the informal paramount leader.[223] The current general secretary is Xi Jinping, who took office on 15 November 2012, and was re-elected on 25 October 2017.[224] According to the CCP constitution, its highest body is the National Congress held every five years.[225] The National Congress elects the Central Committee, who then elects the party’s Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee and general secretary, the top leadership of the country.[225] At the local level, the secretary of the CCP committee of a subdivision outranks the local government level; CCP committee secretary of a provincial division outranks the governor while the CCP committee secretary of a city outranks the mayor.[226]

Since both the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.[227] In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People’s Republic of China by reference to these «generations».

Generations of Chinese leadership

Generation Paramount Leader Start End Ideology
First Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
1949 1978 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1978 1989 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1989 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

Government

The nearly 3,000 member National People’s Congress (NPC) is constitutionally the «highest state organ of power»,[207] though it has been also described as a «rubber stamp» body.[228] The NPC meets annually, while the NPC Standing Committee, around 150 member body elected from NPC delegates, meets every couple of months.[228] In what China calls the «people’s congress system», local people’s congresses at the lowest level[z] are officially directly elected, with all the higher-level people’s congresses up to the NPC being elected by the level one below.[207] However, the elections are not pluralistic, with nominations at all levels being controlled by the CCP.[229] The NPC is dominated by the CCP, with another eight minor parties having nominal representation in the condition of upholding CCP leadership.[230]

The president is the ceremonial head of state, elected by the NPC. The incumbent president is Xi Jinping, who is also the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him China’s paramount leader. The premier is the head of government, with Li Keqiang being the incumbent premier. The premier is officially nominated by the president and then elected by the NPC, and has generally been either the second or third-ranking member of the PSC. The premier presides over the State Council, China’s cabinet, composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.[207] The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a political advisory body that is critical in China’s «united front» system, which aims to gather non-CCP voices to support the CCP. Similar to the people’s congresses, CPPCC’s exist at various division, with the National Committee of the CPPCC being chaired by Wang Yang, one of China’s top leaders.[231]

A Harvard University survey published in July 2020 found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China’s government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey’s history.[232]

Administrative divisions

The People’s Republic of China is constitutionally a unitary state officially divided into 23 provinces,[n] five autonomous regions (each with a designated minority group), and four municipalities—collectively referred to as «mainland China»—as well as the special administrative regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau.[233] The PRC considers Taiwan to be its 23rd province,[234] although it is governed by the Republic of China (ROC), which claims to be the legitimate representative of China and its territory, though it has downplayed this claim since its democratization.[235] Geographically, all 31 provincial divisions of mainland China can be grouped into six regions: North China, Northeast China, East China, South Central China, Southwest China, and Northwest China.[236]

China administrative claimed included.svg

About this image

Provinces () Claimed Province
  • Anhui (安徽省)
  • Fujian (福建省)
  • Gansu (甘肃省)
  • Guangdong (广东省)
  • Guizhou (贵州省)
  • Hainan (海南省)
  • Hebei (河北省)
  • Heilongjiang (黑龙江省)
  • Henan (河南省)
  • Hubei (湖北省)
  • Hunan (湖南省)
  • Jiangsu (江苏省)
  • Jiangxi (江西省)
  • Jilin (吉林省)
  • Liaoning (辽宁省)
  • Qinghai (青海省)
  • Shaanxi (陕西省)
  • Shandong (山东省)
  • Shanxi (山西省)
  • Sichuan (四川省)
  • Yunnan (云南省)
  • Zhejiang (浙江省)
  • Taiwan (台湾省), governed by the Republic of China
Autonomous regions (自治区) Municipalities (直辖市) Special administrative regions (特别行政区)
  • Guangxi (广西壮族自治区)
  • Inner Mongolia / Nei Menggu (内蒙古自治区)
  • Ningxia (宁夏回族自治区)
  • Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区)
  • Tibet / Xizang (西藏自治区)
  • Beijing (北京市)
  • Chongqing (重庆市)
  • Shanghai (上海市)
  • Tianjin (天津市)
  • Hong Kong / Xianggang (香港特别行政区)
  • Macau / Aomen (澳门特别行政区)

Foreign relations

Diplomatic relations of China

The PRC has diplomatic relations with 175 countries and maintains embassies in 162. In 2019, China had the largest diplomatic network in the world.[237][238] Its legitimacy is disputed by the Republic of China and a few other countries; it is thus the largest and most populous state with limited recognition, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.[239] In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.[240] China was also a former member and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and still considers itself an advocate for developing countries.[241] Along with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, China is a member of the BRICS group of emerging major economies and hosted the group’s third official summit at Sanya, Hainan in April 2011.[242]

Under the One-China principle, Beijing has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to Taiwan and severs official ties with the government of the Republic of China.[citation needed] Chinese officials have protested on numerous occasions when foreign countries have made diplomatic overtures to Taiwan,[243] especially in the matter of armament sales.[244]

Much of current Chinese foreign policy is reportedly based on Premier Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and is also driven by the concept of «harmony without uniformity», which encourages diplomatic relations between states despite ideological differences.[245] This policy may have led China to support states that are regarded as dangerous or repressive by Western nations, such as Zimbabwe, North Korea and Iran.[246] China has a close economic and military relationship with Russia,[247] and the two states often vote in unison in the United Nations Security Council.[248][249][250]

Trade relations

China became the world’s largest trading nation in 2013 as measured by the sum of imports and exports, as well as the world’s largest commodity importer. comprising roughly 45% of maritime’s dry-bulk market.[251][252]
By 2016, China was the largest trading partner of 124 other countries.[253] China is the largest trading partner for the ASEAN nations, with a total trade value of $345.8 billion in 2015 accounting for 15.2% of ASEAN’s total trade.[254] ASEAN is also China’s largest trading partner.[255] In 2020, China became the largest trading partner of the European Union for goods, with the total value of goods trade reaching nearly $700 billion.[256] China, along with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free-trade area covering 30% of the world’s population and economic output.[257] China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 2004, it proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues.[258] The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005.[259]

China has had a long and complex trade relationship with the United States. In 2000, the United States Congress approved «permanent normal trade relations» (PNTR) with China, allowing Chinese exports in at the same low tariffs as goods from most other countries.[260] China has a significant trade surplus with the United States, its most important export market.[261] Economists have argued that the renminbi is undervalued, due to currency intervention from the Chinese government, giving China an unfair trade advantage.[262] In August 2019, the United States Department of the Treasury designated China as a «currency manipulator»,[263] later reversing the decision in January 2020.[264] The US and other foreign governments have also alleged that China doesn’t respect intellectual property (IP) rights and steals IP through espionage operations,[265][266] with the US Department of Justice saying that 80% of all the prosecutions related to economic espionage it brings were about conduct to benefit the Chinese state.[267]

Since the turn of the century, China has followed a policy of engaging with African nations for trade and bilateral co-operation;[268][269][270] in 2019, Sino-African trade totalled $208 billion, having grown 20 times over two decades.[271] According to Madison Condon «China finances more infrastructure projects in Africa than the World Bank and provides billions of dollars in low-interest loans to the continent’s emerging economies.»[272] China maintains extensive and highly diversified trade links with the European Union.[256] China has furthermore strengthened its trade ties with major South American economies,[273] and is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and several others.[274]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded significantly over the last six years and, as of April 2020, includes 138 countries and 30 international organizations. In addition to intensifying foreign policy relations, the focus here is particularly on building efficient transport routes. The focus is particularly on the maritime Silk Road with its connections to East Africa and Europe and there are Chinese investments or related declarations of intent at numerous ports such as Gwadar, Kuantan, Hambantota, Piraeus and Trieste. However many of these loans made under the Belt and Road program are unsustainable and China has faced a number of calls for debt relief from debtor nations.[275][276]

Territorial disputes

Taiwan

Map depicting territorial disputes between the PRC and neighboring states. For a larger map, see here.

Ever since its establishment after the Chinese Civil War, the PRC has claimed the territories governed by the Republic of China (ROC), a separate political entity today commonly known as Taiwan, as a part of its territory. It regards the island of Taiwan as its Taiwan Province, Kinmen and Matsu as a part of Fujian Province and islands the ROC controls in the South China Sea as a part of Hainan Province and Guangdong Province. These claims are controversial because of the complicated Cross-Strait relations, with the PRC treating the One-China Principle as one of its most important diplomatic principles.[277][better source needed]

Land border disputes

China has resolved its land borders with 12 out of 14 neighboring countries, having pursued substantial compromises in most of them.[278][279][280] As of 2022, China currently has a disputed land border with India and Bhutan.[citation needed]

Maritime border disputes

China is additionally involved in maritime disputes with multiple countries over the ownership of several small islands in the East and South China Seas, such as Socotra Rock, the Senkaku Islands and the entirety of South China Sea Islands,[281][282] along with the EEZ disputes over East China Sea.

Sociopolitical issues and human rights

China uses a massive espionage network of cameras, facial recognition software, sensors, and surveillance of personal technology as a means of social control of persons living in the country.[283] The Chinese democracy movement, social activists, and some members of the CCP[who?] believe in the need for social and political reform. While economic and social controls have been significantly relaxed in China since the 1970s, political freedom is still tightly restricted. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that the «fundamental rights» of citizens include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, and property rights. However, in practice, these provisions do not afford significant protection against criminal prosecution by the state.[284][285] Although some criticisms of government policies and the ruling CCP are tolerated, censorship of political speech and information, most notably on the Internet,[286][287] are routinely used to prevent collective action.[288]

A number of foreign governments, foreign press agencies, and non-governmental organizations have criticized China’s human rights record, alleging widespread civil rights violations such as detention without trial, forced abortions,[289] forced confessions, torture, restrictions of fundamental rights,[210][290] and excessive use of the death penalty.[291][292] The government suppresses popular protests and demonstrations that it considers a potential threat to «social stability», as was the case with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[293]

China is regularly accused of large-scale repression and human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang,[295][296][297] including violent police crackdowns and religious suppression.[298][299] In Xinjiang, At least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic and religion minorities have been detained in internment camps, officially termed «Vocational Education and Training Centers», aimed at changing the political thinking of detainees, their identities, and their religious beliefs.[138] According to the U.S. Department of State, actions including political indoctrination, torture, physical and psychological abuse, forced sterilization, sexual abuse, and forced labor are common in these facilities.[300] The state has also sought to control offshore reporting of tensions in Xinjiang, intimidating foreign-based reporters by detaining their family members.[301] According to a 2020 report, China’s treatment of Uyghurs meets the UN definition of genocide,[302] and several groups called for a UN investigation.[303] Several countries have recognized China’s actions in Xinjiang as a genocide.[304][294][305]

Global studies from Pew Research Center in 2014 and 2017 ranked the Chinese government’s restrictions on religion as among the highest in the world, despite low to moderate rankings for religious-related social hostilities in the country.[306][307] The Global Slavery Index estimated that in 2016 more than 3.8 million people were living in «conditions of modern slavery», or 0.25% of the population, including victims of human trafficking, forced labor, forced marriage, child labor, and state-imposed forced labor. The state-imposed forced system was formally abolished in 2013, but it is not clear to which extent its various practices have stopped.[308] The Chinese penal system includes labor prison factories, detention centers, and re-education camps, collectively known as laogai («reform through labor»). The Laogai Research Foundation in the United States estimated that there were over a thousand slave labor prisons and camps in China.[309]

In 2019, a study called for the mass retraction of more than 400 scientific papers on organ transplantation, because of fears the organs were obtained unethically from Chinese prisoners. While the government says 10,000 transplants occur each year, a report by the Falun Gong-linked IETAC alleged that between 60,000 and 100,000 organs are transplanted each year and claimed that this gap was being made up by executed prisoners of conscience.[310]

Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is considered one of the world’s most powerful militaries and has rapidly modernized in the recent decades.[311] It consists of the Ground Force (PLAGF), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAAF), the Rocket Force (PLARF) and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Its nearly 2.2 million active duty personnel is the largest in the world. The PLA holds the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons,[312][313] and the world’s second-largest navy by tonnage.[314] China’s official military budget for 2022 totalled US$230 billion (1.45 trillion Yuan), the second-largest in the world. According to SIPRI estimates, its military spending from 2012 to 2021 averaged US$215 billion per year or 1.7 per cent of GDP, behind only the United States at US$734 billion per year or 3.6 per cent of GDP.[315] The PLA is commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the party and the state; though officially two separate organizations, the two CMCs have identical membership except during leadership transition periods and effectively function as one organization. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the officeholder also generally being the CCP general secretary, making them the paramount leader of China.[316]

Economy

A proportional representation of Chinese exports, 2019

China has the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP,[318] and the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).[319] As of 2021, China accounts for around 18% of the world economy by GDP nominal.[320] China is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies,[321] with its economic growth having been consistently above 6% since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978.[322] According to the World Bank, China’s GDP grew from $150 billion in 1978 to $17.73 trillion by 2021.[323] Of the world’s 500 largest companies, 145 are headquartered in China.[324]

China had one of the largest economies in the world for most of the past two thousand years,[325] during which it has seen cycles of prosperity and decline.[326][327] Since economic reforms began in 1978, China has developed into a highly diversified economy and one of the most consequential players in international trade. Major sectors of competitive strength include manufacturing, retail, mining, steel, textiles, automobiles, energy generation, green energy, banking, electronics, telecommunications, real estate, e-commerce, and tourism. China has three out of the ten largest stock exchanges in the world[328]—Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen—that together have a market capitalization of over $15.9 trillion, as of October 2020.[329] China has four (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shenzhen) out of the world’s top ten most competitive financial centers, which is more than any country in the 2020 Global Financial Centres Index.[330] By 2035, China’s four cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) are projected to be among the global top ten largest cities by nominal GDP according to a report by Oxford Economics.[331]

Modern-day China is considered an example of state capitalism or party-state capitalism.[332][333] The state dominates in strategic «pillar» sectors such as energy production and heavy industries, but private enterprise has expanded enormously, with around 30 million private businesses recorded in 2008.[334][335][336] In 2018, private enterprises in China accounted for 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 90% of new jobs.[337][better source needed]

China has been the world’s No. 1 manufacturer since 2010, after overtaking the US, which had been No. 1 for the previous hundred years.[338][339] China has also been No. 2 in high-tech manufacturing since 2012, according to US National Science Foundation.[340] China is the second largest retail market in the world, next to the United States.[341] China leads the world in e-commerce, accounting for 40% of the global market share in 2016[342] and more than 50% of the global market share in 2019.[343] China is the world’s leader in electric vehicles, manufacturing and buying half of all the plug-in electric cars (BEV and PHEV) in the world in 2018.[344] China is also the leading producer of batteries for electric vehicles as well as several key raw materials for batteries.[345] China had 174 GW of installed solar capacity by the end of 2018, which amounts to more than 40% of the global solar capacity.[346][347]

Wealth

China accounted for 17.9% of the world’s total wealth in 2021, second highest in the world after the US.[348] It ranks at 65th at GDP (nominal) per capita, making it an upper-middle income country.[349] China brought more people out of extreme poverty than any other country in history[350][351]—between 1978 and 2018, China reduced extreme poverty by 800 million. China reduced the extreme poverty rate—per international standard, it refers to an income of less than $1.90/day—from 88% in 1981 to 1.85% by 2013.[352] The portion of people in China living below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day (2011 PPP) fell to 0.3% in 2018 from 66.3% in 1990. Using the lower-middle income poverty line of $3.20 per day, the portion fell to 2.9% in 2018 from 90.0% in 1990. Using the upper-middle income poverty line of $5.50 per day, the portion fell to 17.0% from 98.3% in 1990.[353]

From 1978 to 2018, the average standard of living multiplied by a factor of twenty-six.[354] Wages in China have grown a lot in the last 40 years—real (inflation-adjusted) wages grew seven-fold from 1978 to 2007.[355] Per capita incomes have risen significantly – when the PRC was founded in 1949, per capita income in China was one-fifth of the world average; per capita incomes now equal the world average itself.[354] China’s development is highly uneven. Its major cities and coastal areas are far more prosperous compared to rural and interior regions.[356] It has a high level of economic inequality,[357] which has increased in the past few decades.[358] In 2018 China’s Gini coefficient was 0.467, according to the World Bank.[11]

As of 2020, China was second in the world, after the US, in total number of billionaires and total number of millionaires, with 698 Chinese billionaires and 4.4 million millionaires.[359] In 2019, China overtook the US as the home to the highest number of people who have a net personal wealth of at least $110,000, according to the global wealth report by Credit Suisse.[360][361] According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2020, China is home to five of the world’s top ten cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 10th spots, respectively) by the highest number of billionaires, which is more than any other country.[362] China had 85 female billionaires as of January 2021, two-thirds of the global total, and minted 24 new female billionaires in 2020.[363] China has had the world’s largest middle-class population since 2015,[364] and the middle-class grew to a size of 400 million by 2018.[365]

China in the global economy

China’s nominal GDP trend from 1952 to 2015

Share of world GDP (PPP)[366]
Year Share
1980 2.25%
1990 3.99%
2000 7.24%
2010 13.62%
2020 18.18%

China is a member of the WTO and is the world’s largest trading power, with a total international trade value of US$4.62 trillion in 2018.[367] China is the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods.[368] Its foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.1 trillion as of 2019,[369] making its reserves by far the world’s largest.[370][371] In 2012, China was the world’s largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting $253 billion.[372] In 2014, China’s foreign exchange remittances were $US64 billion making it the second largest recipient of remittances in the world.[373] China also invests abroad, with a total outward FDI of $62.4 billion in 2012,[372] and a number of major takeovers of foreign firms by Chinese companies.[374] China is a major owner of US public debt, holding trillions of dollars worth of U.S. Treasury bonds.[375][376] China’s undervalued exchange rate has caused friction with other major economies,[377] and it has also been widely criticized for manufacturing large quantities of counterfeit goods.[378][379]

Largest economies by nominal GDP in 2022[380]

Following the 2007–08 financial crisis, Chinese authorities sought to actively wean off of its dependence on the U.S. dollar as a result of perceived weaknesses of the international monetary system.[381] To achieve those ends, China took a series of actions to further the internationalization of the Renminbi. In 2008, China established the dim sum bond market and expanded the Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project, which helps establish pools of offshore RMB liquidity.[382][383] This was followed with bilateral agreements to settle trades directly in renminbi with Russia,[384] Japan,[385] Australia,[386] Singapore,[387] the United Kingdom,[388] and Canada.[389] As a result of the rapid internationalization of the renminbi, it became the eighth-most-traded currency in the world by 2018, an emerging international reserve currency,[390] and a component of the IMF’s special drawing rights; however, partly due to capital controls that make the renminbi fall short of being a fully convertible currency, it remains far behind the Euro, Dollar and Japanese Yen in international trade volumes.[391] As of 2022, Yuan is the world’s fifth-most traded currency.[392]

Science and technology

Historical

Earliest known written formula for gunpowder, from the Wujing Zongyao of 1044 CE

China was a world leader in science and technology until the Ming dynasty.[393] Ancient Chinese discoveries and inventions, such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions), became widespread across East Asia, the Middle East and later Europe. Chinese mathematicians were the first to use negative numbers.[394][395] By the 17th century, the Western hemisphere surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement.[396] The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars.[397]

After repeated military defeats by the European colonial powers and Japan in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communists came to power in 1949, efforts were made to organize science and technology based on the model of the Soviet Union, in which scientific research was part of central planning.[398] After Mao’s death in 1976, science and technology were promoted as one of the Four Modernizations,[399] and the Soviet-inspired academic system was gradually reformed.[400]

Modern era

Headquarters of Tencent in Shenzhen, one of the largest technology and entertainment companies in the world.[401]

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has made significant investments in scientific research[402] and is quickly catching up with the US in R&D spending.[403][404] China officially spent around 2.4% of its GDP on R&D in 2020, totaling to around $377.8 billion.[405] According to the World Intellectual Property Indicators, China received more applications than the US did in 2018 and 2019 and ranked first globally in patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, and creative goods exports in 2021.[406][407][408] It was ranked 11th in the Global Innovation Index in 2022, a considerable improvement from its rank of 35th in 2013.[409][410][411][412] Chinese supercomputers became the fastest in the world on a few occasions.[413] However, China has also struggled with developing several technologies domestically, such as the most advanced semiconductors and reliable jet engines.[414][415]

China is developing its education system with an emphasis on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).[416] It became the world’s largest publisher of scientific papers in 2016.[417][418][419] Chinese-born academicians have won prestigious prizes in the sciences and in mathematics, although most of them had conducted their winning research in Western nations.[aa][improper synthesis?]

Space program

The Chinese space program started in 1958 with some technology transfers from the Soviet Union. However, it did not launch the nation’s first satellite until 1970 with the Dong Fang Hong I, which made China the fifth country to do so independently.[426] In 2003, China became the third country in the world to independently send humans into space with Yang Liwei’s spaceflight aboard Shenzhou 5. as of 2022, sixteen Chinese nationals have journeyed into space, including two women. In 2011, China launched its first space station testbed, Tiangong-1.[427] In 2013, a Chinese robotic rover Yutu successfully touched down on the lunar surface as part of the Chang’e 3 mission.[428] In 2019, China became the first country to land a probe—Chang’e 4—on the far side of the Moon.[429] In 2020, Chang’e 5 successfully returned moon samples to the Earth, making China the third country to do so independently after the United States and the Soviet Union.[430] In 2021, China became the second nation in history to independently land a rover (Zhurong) on Mars, after the United States.[431] China completed its own modular space station, the Tiangong, in low Earth orbit on 3 November 2022.[432][433][434] On 29 November 2022, China performed its first in-orbit crew handover aboard the Tiangong.[435][436]

Infrastructure

After a decades-long infrastructural boom,[437] China has produced numerous world-leading infrastructural projects: China has the world’s largest bullet train network,[438] the most supertall skyscrapers in the world,[439] the world’s largest power plant (the Three Gorges Dam),[440] the largest energy generation capacity in the world,[441] a global satellite navigation system with the largest number of satellites in the world,[442] and has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, a large global infrastructure building initiative with funding on the order of $50–100 billion per year.[443] The Belt and Road Initiative could be one of the largest development plans in modern history.[444]

Telecommunications

China is the largest telecom market in the world and currently has the largest number of active cellphones of any country in the world, with over 1.5 billion subscribers, as of 2018.[445][better source needed] It also has the world’s largest number of internet and broadband users, with over 800 million Internet users as of 2018—equivalent to around 60% of its population—and almost all of them being mobile as well.[446] By 2018, China had more than 1 billion 4G users, accounting for 40% of world’s total.[447] China is making rapid advances in 5G—by late 2018, China had started large-scale and commercial 5G trials.[448]

China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, are the three large providers of mobile and internet in China. China Telecom alone served more than 145 million broadband subscribers and 300 million mobile users; China Unicom had about 300 million subscribers; and China Mobile, the largest of them all, had 925 million users, as of 2018.[449] Combined, the three operators had over 3.4 million 4G base-stations in China.[450] Several Chinese telecommunications companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE, have been accused of spying for the Chinese military.[451]

China has developed its own satellite navigation system, dubbed Beidou, which began offering commercial navigation services across Asia in 2012[452] as well as global services by the end of 2018.[453][454] Upon the completion of the 35th Beidou satellite, which was launched into orbit on 23 June 2020, Beidou followed GPS and GLONASS as the third completed global navigation satellite in the world.[455]

Transport

Since the late 1990s, China’s national road network has been significantly expanded through the creation of a network of national highways and expressways. In 2018, China’s highways had reached a total length of 142,500 km (88,500 mi), making it the longest highway system in the world.[456][better source needed] China has the world’s largest market for automobiles, having surpassed the United States in both auto sales and production. A side-effect of the rapid growth of China’s road network has been a significant rise in traffic accidents,[457] though the number of fatalities in traffic accidents fell by 20% from 2007 to 2017.[458][better source needed] In urban areas, bicycles remain a common mode of transport, despite the increasing prevalence of automobiles – as of 2012, there are approximately 470 million bicycles in China.[459]

China’s railways, which are state-owned, are among the busiest in the world, handling a quarter of the world’s rail traffic volume on only 6 percent of the world’s tracks in 2006.[460][better source needed] As of 2017, the country had 127,000 km (78,914 mi) of railways, the second longest network in the world.[461] The railways strain to meet enormous demand particularly during the Chinese New Year holiday, when the world’s largest annual human migration takes place.[462]

China’s high-speed rail (HSR) system started construction in the early 2000s. By the end of 2020, high speed rail in China had reached 37,900 kilometers (23,550 miles) of dedicated lines alone, making it the longest HSR network in the world.[463][464] Services on the Beijing–Shanghai, Beijing–Tianjin, and Chengdu–Chongqing Lines reach up to 350 km/h (217 mph), making them the fastest conventional high speed railway services in the world. With an annual ridership of over 2.29 billion passengers in 2019 it is the world’s busiest.[465][better source needed] The network includes the Beijing–Guangzhou–Shenzhen High-Speed Railway, the single longest HSR line in the world, and the Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway, which has three of longest railroad bridges in the world.[466] The Shanghai Maglev Train, which reaches 431 km/h (268 mph), is the fastest commercial train service in the world.[467]

Since 2000, the growth of rapid transit systems in Chinese cities has accelerated.[468] As of January 2021, 44 Chinese cities have urban mass transit systems in operation[469] and 39 more have metro systems approved.[470] As of 2020, China boasts the five longest metro systems in the world with the networks in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenzhen being the largest.

There were approximately 229 airports in 2017, with around 240 planned by 2020. China has over 2,000 river and seaports, about 130 of which are open to foreign shipping.[471] In 2017, the Ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Tianjin ranked in the Top 10 in the world in container traffic and cargo tonnage.[472]

Water supply and sanitation

Water supply and sanitation infrastructure in China is facing challenges such as rapid urbanization, as well as water scarcity, contamination, and pollution.[473] According to data presented by the Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO and UNICEF in 2015, about 36% of the rural population in China still did not have access to improved sanitation.[474] The ongoing South–North Water Transfer Project intends to abate water shortage in the north.[475]

Demographics

A 2009 population density map of the People’s Republic of China, with territories not under its control in blue. The eastern coastal provinces are much more densely populated than the western interior.

The national census of 2020 recorded the population of the People’s Republic of China as approximately 1,411,778,724. According to the 2020 census, about 17.95% of the population were 14 years old or younger, 63.35% were between 15 and 59 years old, and 18.7% were over 60 years old.[8] The population growth rate for 2013 is estimated to be 0.46%.[476] China used to make up much of the world’s poor; now it makes up much of the world’s middle-class.[477] Although a middle-income country by Western standards, China’s rapid growth has pulled hundreds of millions—800 million, to be more precise[478]—of its people out of poverty since 1978. By 2013, less than 2% of the Chinese population lived below the international poverty line of US$1.9 per day, down from 88% in 1981.[352] From 2009 to 2018, the unemployment rate in China has averaged about 4%.[479]

Given concerns about population growth, China implemented a two-child limit during the 1970s, and, in 1979, began to advocate for an even stricter limit of one child per family. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, given the unpopularity of the strict limits, China began to allow some major exemptions, particularly in rural areas, resulting in what was actually a «1.5»-child policy from the mid-1980s to 2015 (ethnic minorities were also exempt from one child limits). The next major loosening of the policy was enacted in December 2013, allowing families to have two children if one parent is an only child.[480] In 2016, the one-child policy was replaced in favor of a two-child policy.[481] A three-child policy was announced on 31 May 2021, due to population aging,[482] and in July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[483] According to data from the 2020 census, China’s total fertility rate is 1.3, but some experts believe that after adjusting for the transient effects of the relaxation of restrictions, the country’s actual total fertility rate is as low as 1.1.[484]

According to one group of scholars, one-child limits had little effect on population growth[485] or the size of the total population.[486] However, these scholars have been challenged. Their own counterfactual model of fertility decline without such restrictions implies that China averted more than 500 million births between 1970 and 2015, a number which may reach one billion by 2060 given all the lost descendants of births averted during the era of fertility restrictions, with one-child restrictions accounting for the great bulk of that reduction.[487] The policy, along with traditional preference for boys, may have contributed to an imbalance in the sex ratio at birth.[488][489] According to the 2010 census, the sex ratio at birth was 118.06 boys for every 100 girls,[490] which is beyond the normal range of around 105 boys for every 100 girls.[491] The 2010 census found that males accounted for 51.27 percent of the total population.[490] However, China’s sex ratio is more balanced than it was in 1953, when males accounted for 51.82 percent of the total population.[490]

Ethnic groups

Ethnolinguistic map of China

China legally recognizes 56 distinct ethnic groups, who altogether comprise the Zhonghua Minzu. The largest of these nationalities are the ethnic Chinese or «Han», who constitute more than 90% of the total
population.[492] The Han Chinese – the world’s largest single ethnic group[493] – outnumber other ethnic groups in every provincial-level division except Tibet and Xinjiang.[494] Ethnic minorities account for less than 10% of the population of China, according to the 2010 census.[492] Compared with the 2000 population census, the Han population increased by 66,537,177 persons, or 5.74%, while the population of the 55 national minorities combined increased by 7,362,627 persons, or 6.92%.[492] The 2010 census recorded a total of 593,832 foreign nationals living in China. The largest such groups were from South Korea (120,750), the
United States (71,493) and Japan (66,159).[495]

Languages

There are as many as 292 living languages in China.[496] The languages most commonly spoken belong to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, which contains Mandarin (spoken by 70% of the population),[497] and other varieties of Chinese language: Yue (including Cantonese and Taishanese), Wu (including Shanghainese and Suzhounese), Min (including Fuzhounese, Hokkien and Teochew), Xiang, Gan and Hakka. Languages of the Tibeto-Burman branch, including Tibetan, Qiang, Naxi and Yi, are spoken across the Tibetan and Yunnan–Guizhou Plateau. Other ethnic minority languages in southwest China include Zhuang, Thai, Dong and Sui of the Tai-Kadai family, Miao and Yao of the Hmong–Mien family, and Wa of the Austroasiatic family. Across northeastern and northwestern China, local ethnic groups speak Altaic languages including Manchu, Mongolian and several Turkic languages: Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar and Western Yugur. Korean is spoken natively along the border with North Korea. Sarikoli, the language of Tajiks in western Xinjiang, is an Indo-European language. Taiwanese aborigines, including a small population on the mainland, speak Austronesian languages.[498]

Standard Mandarin, a variety of Mandarin based on the Beijing dialect, is the official national language of China and is used as a lingua franca in the country between people of different linguistic backgrounds.[499][500] Mongolian, Uyghur, Tibetan, Zhuang and various other languages are also regionally recognized throughout the country.[501]

Chinese characters have been used as the written script for the Sinitic languages for thousands of years. They allow speakers of mutually unintelligible Chinese varieties to communicate with each other through writing. In 1956, the government introduced simplified characters, which have supplanted the older traditional characters in mainland China. Chinese characters are romanized using the Pinyin system. Tibetan uses an alphabet based on an Indic script. Uyghur is most commonly written in Persian alphabet-based Uyghur Arabic alphabet. The Mongolian script used in China and the Manchu script are both derived from the Old Uyghur alphabet. Zhuang uses both an official Latin alphabet script and a traditional Chinese character script.[citation needed]

Urbanization

China has urbanized significantly in recent decades. The percent of the country’s population living in urban areas increased from 20% in 1980 to over 60% in 2019.[502][503][504] It is estimated that China’s urban population will reach one billion by 2030, potentially equivalent to one-eighth of the world population.[503][504]

China has over 160 cities with a population of over one million,[505] including the 17 megacities as of 2021[506][507] (cities with a population of over 10 million) of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xi’an, Suzhou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Hangzhou, Linyi, Shijiazhuang, Dongguan, Qingdao and Changsha.[508] Among them, the total permanent population of Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu is above 20 million.[509] Shanghai is China’s most populous urban area[510][511] while Chongqing is its largest city proper, the only city in China with the largest permanent population of over 30 million.[512] By 2025, it is estimated that the country will be home to 221 cities with over a million inhabitants.[503] The figures in the table below are from the 2017 census,[513] and are only estimates of the urban populations within administrative city limits; a different ranking exists when considering the total municipal populations (which includes suburban and rural populations). The large «floating populations» of migrant workers make conducting censuses in urban areas difficult;[514] the figures below include only long-term residents.[citation needed]

  • v
  • t
  • e

Largest cities or municipalities in the People’s Republic of China

China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2020 Urban Population and Urban Temporary Population [515][note 1][note 2]

Rank Name Province Pop. Rank Name Province Pop.
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing
Beijing
1 Shanghai SH 24,281,400 11 Hong Kong HK 7,448,900 Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Shenzhen
Shenzhen
2 Beijing BJ 19,164,000 12 Zhengzhou HA 7,179,400
3 Guangzhou GD 13,858,700 13 Nanjing JS 6,823,500
4 Shenzhen GD 13,438,800 14 Xi’an SN 6,642,100
5 Tianjin TJ 11,744,400 15 Jinan SD 6,409,600
6 Chongqing CQ 11,488,000 16 Shenyang LN 5,900,000
7 Dongguan GD 9,752,500 17 Qingdao SD 5,501,400
8 Chengdu SC 8,875,600 18 Harbin HL 5,054,500
9 Wuhan HB 8,652,900 19 Hefei AH 4,750,100
10 Hangzhou ZJ 8,109,000 20 Changchun JL 4,730,900
  1. ^ Population of Hong Kong as of 2018 estimate.[516]
  2. ^ The data of Chongqing in the list is the data of «Metropolitan Developed Economic Area», which contains two parts: «City Proper» and «Metropolitan Area». The «City proper» are consist of 9 districts: Yuzhong, Dadukou, Jiangbei, Shapingba, Jiulongpo, Nan’an, Beibei, Yubei, & Banan, has the urban population of 5,646,300 as of 2018. And the «Metropolitan Area» are consist of 12 districts: Fuling, Changshou, Jiangjin, Hechuan, Yongchuan, Nanchuan, Qijiang, Dazu, Bishan, Tongliang, Tongnan, & Rongchang, has the urban population of 5,841,700.[517] Total urban population of all 26 districts of Chongqing are up to 15,076,600.

Education

Since 1986, compulsory education in China comprises primary and junior secondary school, which together last for nine years.[520] In 2021, about 91.4 percent of students continued their education at a three-year senior secondary school.[521] The Gaokao, China’s national university entrance exam, is a prerequisite for entrance into most higher education institutions. In 2010, 24 percent of secondary school graduates were enrolled in higher education.[522] This number increased significantly over the last decades, reaching a tertiary school enrolment of 58.42 percent in 2020.[523] Vocational education is available to students at the secondary and tertiary level.[524] More than 10 million Chinese students graduated from vocational colleges nationwide every year.[525]

China has the largest education system in the world, with about 282 million students and 17.32 million full-time teachers in over 530,000 schools.[526] In February 2006, the government pledged to provide completely free nine-year education, including textbooks and fees.[527] Annual education investment went from less than US$50 billion in 2003 to more than US$817 billion in 2020.[528][529] However, there remains an inequality in education spending. In 2010, the annual education expenditure per secondary school student in Beijing totalled ¥20,023, while in Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in China, only totalled ¥3,204.[530] Free compulsory education in China consists of primary school and junior secondary school between the ages of 6 and 15. In 2020, the graduation enrollment ratio at compulsory education level reached 95.2 percent, exceeding average levels recorded in high-income countries,[526] and around 91.2% of Chinese have received secondary education.[524]

China’s literacy rate has grown dramatically, from only 20% in 1949 and 65.5% in 1979.[531] to 97% of the population over age 15 in 2018.[532] In the same year, China (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) was ranked the highest in the world in the Programme for International Student Assessment ranking for all three categories of Mathematics, Science and Reading.[533]

As of 2021, China has over 3,000 universities, with over 44.3 million students enrolled in mainland China and 240 million Chinese citizens have received high education, making China the largest higher education system in the world.[534][535][536] As of 2021, China had the world’s second-highest number of top universities (the highest in Asia & Oceania region).[537] Currently, China trails only the United States in terms of representation on lists of top 200 universities according to the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).[538] China is home to the two of the highest ranking universities (Tsinghua University and Peking University) in Asia and emerging economies according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings.[539] As of 2022, two universities in Mainland China rank in the world’s top 15, with Peking University (12th) and Tsinghua University (14th) and three other universities ranking in the world’s top 50, namely Fudan, Zhejiang, and Shanghai Jiao Tong according to the QS World University Rankings.[540] These universities are members of the C9 League, an alliance of elite Chinese universities offering comprehensive and leading education.[541]

Health

The National Health and Family Planning Commission, together with its counterparts in the local commissions, oversees the health needs of the Chinese population.[542] An emphasis on public health and preventive medicine has characterized Chinese health policy since the early 1950s. At that time, the Communist Party started the Patriotic Health Campaign, which was aimed at improving sanitation and hygiene, as well as treating and preventing several diseases. Diseases such as cholera, typhoid and scarlet fever, which were previously rife in China, were nearly eradicated by the campaign.[citation needed]

After Deng Xiaoping began instituting economic reforms in 1978, the health of the Chinese public improved rapidly because of better nutrition, although many of the free public health services provided in the countryside disappeared along with the People’s Communes. Healthcare in China became mostly privatized, and experienced a significant rise in quality. In 2009, the government began a 3-year large-scale healthcare provision initiative worth US$124 billion.[543] By 2011, the campaign resulted in 95% of China’s population having basic health insurance coverage.[544] In 2011, China was estimated to be the world’s third-largest supplier of pharmaceuticals, but its population has suffered from the development and distribution of counterfeit medications.[545]

As of 2017, the average life expectancy at birth in China is 76 years,[546] and the infant mortality rate is 7 per thousand.[547] Both have improved significantly since the 1950s.[ab] Rates of stunting, a condition caused by malnutrition, have declined from 33.1% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2010.[550] Despite significant improvements in health and the construction of advanced medical facilities, China has several emerging public health problems, such as respiratory illnesses caused by widespread air pollution,[551] hundreds of millions of cigarette smokers,[552] and an increase in obesity among urban youths.[553][554] China’s large population and densely populated cities have led to serious disease outbreaks in recent years, such as the 2003 outbreak of SARS, although this has since been largely contained.[555] In 2010, air pollution caused 1.2 million premature deaths in China.[556]

The COVID-19 pandemic was first identified in Wuhan in December 2019.[557][558] Further studies are being carried out around the world on a possible origin for the virus.[559][560] The Chinese government has been criticized for its handling of the epidemic and accused of concealing the extent of the outbreak before it became an international pandemic.[561]

Religion

The government of the People’s Republic of China officially espouses state atheism,[566] and has conducted antireligious campaigns to this end.[567] Religious affairs and issues in the country are overseen by the State Administration for Religious Affairs.[568] Freedom of religion is guaranteed by China’s constitution, although religious organizations that lack official approval can be subject to state persecution.[290][569]

Over the millennia, Chinese civilization has been influenced by various religious movements. The «three teachings», including Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Chinese Buddhism), historically have a significant role in shaping Chinese culture,[570][571] enriching a theological and spiritual framework which harks back to the early Shang and Zhou dynasty. Chinese popular or folk religion, which is framed by the three teachings and other traditions,[572] consists in allegiance to the shen (), a character that signifies the «energies of generation», who can be deities of the environment or ancestral principles of human groups, concepts of civility, culture heroes, many of whom feature in Chinese mythology and history.[573] Among the most popular cults are those of Mazu (goddess of the seas),[574] Huangdi (one of the two divine patriarchs of the Chinese race),[574][575] Guandi (god of war and business), Caishen (god of prosperity and richness), Pangu and many others. China is home to many of the world’s tallest religious statues, including the tallest of all, the Spring Temple Buddha in Henan.[576]

Clear data on religious affiliation in China is difficult to gather due to varying definitions of «religion» and the unorganized, diffusive nature of Chinese religious traditions. Scholars note that in China there is no clear boundary between three teachings religions and local folk religious practice.[570] A 2015 poll conducted by Gallup International found that 61% of Chinese people self-identified as «convinced atheist»,[577] though it is worthwhile to note that Chinese religions or some of their strands are definable as non-theistic and humanistic religions, since they do not believe that divine creativity is completely transcendent, but it is inherent in the world and in particular in the human being.[578] According to a 2014 study, approximately 74% are either non-religious or practice Chinese folk belief, 16% are Buddhists, 2% are Christians, 1% are Muslims, and 8% adhere to other religions including Taoists and folk salvationism.[579][580] In addition to Han people’s local religious practices, there are also various ethnic minority groups in China who maintain their traditional autochthone religions. The various folk religions today comprise 2–3% of the population, while Confucianism as a religious self-identification is common within the intellectual class. Significant faiths specifically connected to certain ethnic groups include Tibetan Buddhism and the Islamic religion of the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other peoples in Northwest China.[citation needed] The 2010 population census reported the total number of Muslims in the country as 23.14 million.[581]

A 2021 poll from Ipsos and the Policy Institute at King’s College London found that 35% of Chinese people said there was tension between different religious groups, which was the second lowest percentage of the 28 countries surveyed.[582][583]

Culture

Fenghuang County, an ancient town that harbors many architectural remains of Ming and Qing styles.

Since ancient times, Chinese culture has been heavily influenced by Confucianism. For much of the country’s dynastic era, opportunities for social advancement could be provided by high performance in the prestigious imperial examinations, which have their origins in the Han dynasty.[585] The literary emphasis of the exams affected the general perception of cultural refinement in China, such as the belief that calligraphy, poetry and painting were higher forms of art than dancing or drama. Chinese culture has long emphasized a sense of deep history and a largely inward-looking national perspective.[586] Examinations and a culture of merit remain greatly valued in China today.[587]

The first leaders of the People’s Republic of China were born into the traditional imperial order but were influenced by the May Fourth Movement and reformist ideals. They sought to change some traditional aspects of Chinese culture, such as rural land tenure, sexism, and the Confucian system of education, while preserving others, such as the family structure and culture of obedience to the state. Some observers see the period following the establishment of the PRC in 1949 as a continuation of traditional Chinese dynastic history, while others claim that the Communist Party’s rule has damaged the foundations of Chinese culture, especially through political movements such as the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, where many aspects of traditional culture were destroyed, having been denounced as «regressive and harmful» or «vestiges of feudalism». Many important aspects of traditional Chinese morals and culture, such as Confucianism, art, literature, and performing arts like Peking opera,[588] were altered to conform to government policies and propaganda at the time. Access to foreign media remains heavily restricted.[589]

Today, the Chinese government has accepted numerous elements of traditional Chinese culture as being integral to Chinese society. With the rise of Chinese nationalism and the end of the Cultural Revolution, various forms of traditional Chinese art, literature, music, film, fashion and architecture have seen a vigorous revival,[590][591] and folk and variety art in particular have sparked interest nationally and even worldwide.[592]

Tourism

China received 55.7 million inbound international visitors in 2010,[593] and in 2012 was the third-most-visited country in the world.[594] It also experiences an enormous volume of domestic tourism; an estimated 740 million Chinese holidaymakers traveled within the country in October 2012.[595] China hosts the world’s second-largest number of World Heritage Sites (56) after Italy, and is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world (first in the Asia-Pacific).

Literature

Chinese literature is based on the literature of the Zhou dynasty.[596] Concepts covered within the Chinese classic texts present a wide range of thoughts and subjects including calendar, military, astrology, herbology, geography and many others.[597] Some of the most important early texts include the I Ching and the Shujing within the Four Books and Five Classics which served as the Confucian authoritative books for the state-sponsored curriculum in dynastic era.[598] Inherited from the Classic of Poetry, classical Chinese poetry developed to its floruit during the Tang dynasty. Li Bai and Du Fu opened the forking ways for the poetic circles through romanticism and realism respectively.[599] Chinese historiography began with the Shiji, the overall scope of the historiographical tradition in China is termed the Twenty-Four Histories, which set a vast stage for Chinese fictions along with Chinese mythology and folklore.[600] Pushed by a burgeoning citizen class in the Ming dynasty, Chinese classical fiction rose to a boom of the historical, town and gods and demons fictions as represented by the Four Great Classical Novels which include Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Journey to the West and Dream of the Red Chamber.[601] Along with the wuxia fictions of Jin Yong and Liang Yusheng,[602] it remains an enduring source of popular culture in the East Asian cultural sphere.[603]

In the wake of the New Culture Movement after the end of the Qing dynasty, Chinese literature embarked on a new era with written vernacular Chinese for ordinary citizens. Hu Shih and Lu Xun were pioneers in modern literature.[604] Various literary genres, such as misty poetry, scar literature, young adult fiction and the xungen literature, which is influenced by magic realism,[605] emerged following the Cultural Revolution. Mo Yan, a xungen literature author, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012.[606]

Cuisine

Map showing major regional cuisines of China

Chinese cuisine is highly diverse, drawing on several millennia of culinary history and geographical variety, in which the most influential are known as the «Eight Major Cuisines», including Sichuan, Cantonese, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui, and Zhejiang cuisines.[607] All of them are featured by the precise skills of shaping, heating, and flavoring.[608][better source needed] Chinese cuisine is also known for its width of cooking methods and ingredients,[609] as well as food therapy that is emphasized by traditional Chinese medicine.[610][better source needed] Generally, China’s staple food is rice in the south, wheat-based breads and noodles in the north. The diet of the common people in pre-modern times was largely grain and simple vegetables, with meat reserved for special occasions. The bean products, such as tofu and soy milk, remain as a popular source of protein.[611] Pork is now the most popular meat in China, accounting for about three-fourths of the country’s total meat consumption.[612] While pork dominates the meat market, there is also the vegetarian Buddhist cuisine and the pork-free Chinese Islamic cuisine. Southern cuisine, due to the area’s proximity to the ocean and milder climate, has a wide variety of seafood and vegetables; it differs in many respects from the wheat-based diets across dry northern China. Numerous offshoots of Chinese food, such as Hong Kong cuisine and American Chinese food, have emerged in the nations that play host to the Chinese diaspora.[citation needed]

Music

Chinese music covers a highly diverse range of music from traditional music to modern music. Chinese music dates back before the pre-imperial times. Traditional Chinese musical instruments were traditionally grouped into eight categories known as bayin (八音). Traditional Chinese opera is a form of musical theatre in China originating thousands of years and has regional style forms such as Beijing opera and Cantonese opera.[613] Chinese pop (C-Pop) includes mandopop and cantopop. Chinese rap, Chinese hip hop and Hong Kong hip hop have become popular in contemporary times.[614]

Cinema

Cinema was first introduced to China in 1896 and the first Chinese film, Dingjun Mountain, was released in 1905.[615] China has the largest number of movie screens in the world since 2016,[616] China became the largest cinema market in the world in 2020.[617][618] The top 3 highest-grossing films in China currently are Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), Ne Zha (2019), and The Wandering Earth (2019).[619]

Fashion

Hanfu is the historical clothing of the Han people in China. The qipao or cheongsam is a popular Chinese female dress.[620] The hanfu movement has been popular in contemporary times and seeks to revitalize Hanfu clothing.[621]

Sports

China has one of the oldest sporting cultures in the world. There is evidence that archery (shèjiàn) was practiced during the Western Zhou dynasty. Swordplay (jiànshù) and cuju, a sport loosely related to association football[622] date back to China’s early dynasties as well.[623]

Go is an abstract strategy board game for two players, in which the aim is to surround more territory than the opponent and was invented in China more than 2,500 years ago.

Physical fitness is widely emphasized in Chinese culture, with morning exercises such as qigong and t’ai chi ch’uan widely practiced,[624] and commercial gyms and private fitness clubs are gaining popularity across the country.[625] Basketball is currently the most popular spectator sport in China.[626] The Chinese Basketball Association and the American National Basketball Association have a huge following among the people, with native or ethnic Chinese players such as Yao Ming and Yi Jianlian held in high esteem.[627] China’s professional football league, now known as Chinese Super League, was established in 1994, it is the largest football market in Asia.[628] Other popular sports in the country include martial arts, table tennis, badminton, swimming and snooker. Board games such as go (known as wéiqí in Chinese), xiangqi, mahjong, and more recently chess, are also played at a professional level.[629] In addition, China is home to a huge number of cyclists, with an estimated 470 million bicycles as of 2012.[459] Many more traditional sports, such as dragon boat racing, Mongolian-style wrestling and horse racing are also popular.[630]

China has participated in the Olympic Games since 1932, although it has only participated as the PRC since 1952. China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, where its athletes received 48 gold medals – the highest number of gold medals of any participating nation that year.[631] China also won the most medals of any nation at the 2012 Summer Paralympics, with 231 overall, including 95 gold medals.[632][633] In 2011, Shenzhen in Guangdong, China hosted the 2011 Summer Universiade. China hosted the 2013 East Asian Games in Tianjin and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics in Nanjing; the first country to host both regular and Youth Olympics. Beijing and its nearby city Zhangjiakou of Hebei province collaboratively hosted the 2022 Olympic Winter Games, making Beijing the first dual olympic city in the world by holding both the Summer Olympics and the Winter Olympics.[634][635]

See also

  • Outline of China

Notes

  1. ^ Chinese and English are the official languages in Hong Kong only. Chinese and Portuguese are the official languages in Macau only.
  2. ^
    • In the Hong Kong Traditional Chinese characters and English alphabet are used,
    • In the Macau Traditional Chinese characters and Portuguese orthography are used,
    • In Inner Mongolia the Mongolian script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Tibet Autonomous Region the Tibetan script is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Xinjiang the Uyghur Arabic alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In Guangxi and Wenshan Prefecture the Latin alphabet is used alongside simplified Chinese,
    • In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Chosŏn’gŭl is used alongside simplified Chinese.

  3. ^ The top position in one-party ruling China.
  4. ^ Although PRC President is head of state, it is a largely ceremonial office with limited power under CCP General Secretary.
  5. ^ Including both state and party’s central military chairs.
  6. ^ Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
  7. ^ The area given is the official United Nations figure for the mainland and excludes Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.[3] It also excludes the Trans-Karakoram Tract (5,180 km2 (2,000 sq mi)), Aksai Chin (38,000 km2 (15,000 sq mi)) and other territories in dispute with India. The total area of China is listed as 9,572,900 km2 (3,696,100 sq mi) by the Encyclopædia Britannica.[4] For further information, see Territorial changes of the People’s Republic of China.
  8. ^ This figure was calculated using data from the CIA World Factbook.[6]
  9. ^ GDP figures exclude Taiwan, and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
  10. ^
    • Hong Kong dollar used in Hong Kong and Macau
    • Macanese pataca used in Macau only.

  11. ^ Chinese: 中华人民共和国; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
  12. ^ China’s border with Pakistan is disputed by India, which claims the entire Kashmir region as its territory.
  13. ^ The total area ranking relative to the United States depends on the measurement of the total areas of both countries. See List of countries and dependencies by area for more information.

    The following two primary sources (non-mirrored) represent the range (min./max.) of estimates of China’s and the United States’ total areas.

    Both sources (1) exclude Taiwan from the area of China; (2) exclude China’s coastal and territorial waters.

    However, the CIA World Factbook includes the United States coastal and territorial waters, while Encyclopædia Britannica excludes the United States coastal and territorial waters.

    1. The Encyclopædia Britannica lists China as world’s third-largest country (after Russia and Canada) with a total area of 9,572,900 km2,[13] and the United States as fourth-largest at 9,525,067 km2.[14]
    2. The CIA World Factbook lists China as the fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada and the United States) with a total area of 9,596,960 km2,[15] and the United States as the third-largest at 9,833,517 km2.[16]

    Notably, the Encyclopædia Britannica specifies the United States’ area (excluding coastal and territorial waters) as 9,525,067 km2, which is less than either source’s figure given for China’s area.[14] Therefore, while it can be determined that China has a larger area excluding coastal and territorial waters, it is unclear which country has a larger area including coastal and territorial waters.


    The United Nations Statistics Division’s figure for the United States is 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi) and China is 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi). These closely match the CIA World Factbook figures and similarly include coastal and territorial waters for the United States, but exclude coastal and territorial waters for China.


    Further explanation of disputed ranking: The dispute about which is the world’s third-largest country arose from the inclusion of coastal and territorial waters for the United States. This discrepancy was deduced from comparing the CIA World Factbook and its previous iterations[17] against the information for United States in Encyclopædia Britannica, particularly its footnote section.[14] In sum, according to older versions of the CIA World Factbook (from 1982 to 1996), the U.S. was listed as the world’s fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and China) with a total area of 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi). However, in the 1997 edition, the U.S. added coastal waters to its total area (increasing it to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi)). And then again in 2007, U.S. added territorial water to its total area (increasing it to 9,833,517 km2 (3,796,742 sq mi)). During this time, China’s total area remained unchanged. In other words, no coastal or territorial water area was added to China’s total area figure. The United States has a coastal water area of 109,362 km2 (42,225 sq mi), and a territorial water area of 195,213 km2 (75,372 sq mi), for a total of 304,575 km2 (117,597 sq mi) of additional water space. This is larger than entire countries like Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Adding this figure to the U.S. will boost it over China in ranking since China’s coastal and territorial water figures are currently unknown (no official publication) and thus cannot be added into China’s total area figure.

  14. ^ a b China claims the de facto state of Taiwan, which it does not control, as its disputed 23rd province, i.e. Taiwan Province. See § Administrative divisions for more details.
  15. ^ The island of Hainan was taken on 1 May 1950 while the unrecognized polity of Tibet was annexed on 23 May 1951.
  16. ^ The KMT solely governed the island until its transition to democracy in 1996.
  17. ^ «… Next vnto this, is found the great China, whose kyng is thought to bee the greatest prince in the worlde, and is named Santoa Raia».[19][20]
  18. ^ «… The Very Great Kingdom of China».[21] (Portuguese:  O Grande Reino da China ).[22]
  19. ^ Although this is the present meaning of guó, in Old Chinese (when its pronunciation was something like /*qʷˤək/)[28] it meant the walled city of the Chinese and the areas they could control from them.[29]
  20. ^ Its earliest extant use is on the ritual bronze vessel He zun, where it apparently refers to only the Shang’s immediate demesne conquered by the Zhou.[30]
  21. ^ Its meaning «Zhou’s royal demesne» is attested from the 6th-century BC Classic of History, which states «Huangtian bestowed the lands and the peoples of the central state to the ancestors» (皇天既付中國民越厥疆土于先王).[31]
  22. ^ Owing to Qin Shi Huang’s earlier policy involving the «burning of books and burying of scholars», the destruction of the confiscated copies at Xianyang was an event similar to the destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the west. Even those texts that did survive had to be painstakingly reconstructed from memory, luck, or forgery.[59] The Old Texts of the Five Classics were said to have been found hidden in a wall at the Kong residence in Qufu. Mei Ze’s «rediscovered» edition of the Book of Documents was only shown to be a forgery in the Qing dynasty.
  23. ^ China is larger than Canada and the United States in terms of land area.
  24. ^ According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the total area of the United States, at 9,522,055 km2 (3,676,486 sq mi), is slightly smaller than that of China. Meanwhile, the CIA World Factbook states that China’s total area was greater than that of the United States until the coastal waters of the Great Lakes was added to the United States’ total area in 1996. From 1989 through 1996, the total area of US was listed as 9,372,610 km2 (3,618,780 sq mi) (land area plus inland water only). The listed total area changed to 9,629,091 km2 (3,717,813 sq mi) in 1997 (with the Great Lakes areas and the coastal waters added), to 9,631,418 km2 (3,718,711 sq mi) in 2004, to 9,631,420 km2 (3,718,710 sq mi) in 2006, and to 9,826,630 km2 (3,794,080 sq mi) in 2007 (territorial waters added).
  25. ^ China’s border with Pakistan and part of its border with India falls in the disputed region of Kashmir. The area under Pakistani administration is claimed by India, while the area under Indian administration is claimed by Pakistan.
  26. ^ Meaning cities that are not divided into districts (不设区的市), counties (县), city districts (市辖区), towns (镇), townships (乡), and lastly ethnic townships (民族乡)
  27. ^ Tsung-Dao Lee,[420] Chen Ning Yang,[420] Daniel C. Tsui,[421] Charles K. Kao,[422] Yuan T. Lee,[423] Tu Youyou[424] Shing-Tung Yau[425]
  28. ^ The national life expectancy at birth rose from about 31 years in 1949 to 75 years in 2008,[548] and infant mortality decreased from 300 per thousand in the 1950s to around 33 per thousand in 2001.[549]

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Further reading

  • Farah, Paolo (2006). «Five Years of China’s WTO Membership: EU and US Perspectives on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism». Legal Issues of Economic Integration. Kluwer Law International. Volume 33, Number 3. pp. 263–304. Abstract.
  • Heilig, Gerhard K. (2006/2007). China Bibliography – Online Archived 5 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. China-Profile.com.
  • Jacques, Martin (2009).When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. Penguin Books. Rev. ed. (28 August 2012). ISBN 978-1-59420-185-1
  • Jaffe, Amy Myers, «Green Giant: Renewable Energy and Chinese Power», Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 2 (March / April 2018), pp. 83–93.
  • Johnson, Ian, «What Holds China Together?», The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 14 (26 September 2019), pp. 14, 16, 18. «The Manchus … had [in 1644] conquered the last ethnic Chinese empire, the Ming [and established Imperial China’s last dynasty, the Qing] … The Manchus expanded the empire’s borders northward to include all of Mongolia, and westward to Tibet and Xinjiang.» [p. 16.] «China’s rulers have no faith that anything but force can keep this sprawling country intact.» [p. 18.]
  • Lagerwey, John (2010). China: A Religious State. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. ISBN 978-988-8028-04-7.
  • Meng, Fanhua (2011). Phenomenon of Chinese Culture at the Turn of the 21st century. Singapore: Silkroad Press. ISBN 978-981-4332-35-4.
  • Sang Ye (2006). China Candid: The People on the People’s Republic. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24514-3.
  • Selden, Mark (1979). The People’s Republic of China: Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-532-5.
  • Shambaugh, David L. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Washington, DC; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-25492-3.

External links

Government

  • The Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China (in English)

General information

  • China at a Glance from People’s Daily
  • Country profile – China at BBC News
  • China. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency.
  • China, People’s Republic of from UCB Libraries GovPubs
  • China at Curlie

Maps

Coordinates: 35°N 103°E / 35°N 103°E

КИТА́Й (кит. – Чжун­го, букв. – Сре­дин­ное го­су­дар­ст­во), Ки­тай­ская На­род­ная Рес­пуб­ли­ка (КНР; кит. – Чжунхуа жэнь­минь гун­хэ­го).

Общие сведения

К. – го­су­дар­ст­во в Вост. и Центр. Азии. На вос­то­ке и юго-вос­то­ке омы­ва­ет­ся во­да­ми Жёл­то­го, Во­сточ­но-Ки­тай­ско­го и Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го мо­рей Ти­хо­го ок. (про­тя­жён­ность бе­ре­го­вой ли­нии св. 18 тыс. км); у по­бе­ре­жья мно­го­числ. ост­ро­ва (круп­ней­шие – Тай­вань и Хай­нань). Дли­на су­хо­пут­ных гра­ниц ок. 22,8 тыс. км. На се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке гра­ни­чит с КНДР и Рос­си­ей, на се­ве­ре – с Мон­го­ли­ей, на се­ве­ро-за­па­де – с Рос­си­ей, Ка­зах­ста­ном и Кир­ги­зи­ей, на за­па­де – с Та­д­жи­ки­ста­ном и Аф­га­ни­ста­ном, а так­же с Па­ки­ста­ном (по т. н. ли­нии кон­тро­ля в Каш­ми­ре), на юго-за­па­де и юге – с Ин­ди­ей, Не­па­лом и Бу­та­ном; на юго-вос­то­ке – с Мьян­мой, Лао­сом и Вьет­на­мом.

Пл. 9,6 млн. км2 (3-е ме­сто в ми­ре после Рос­сии и Ка­на­ды). Нас. св. 1,3 млрд. чел. (2009, 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре). Сто­ли­ца – Пе­кин. Офиц. язык – ки­тай­ский. Де­неж­ная еди­ни­ца – юань. В адм. от­но­ше­нии тер­ри­то­рия К. со­сто­ит из 23 про­вин­ций, 5 ав­то­ном­ных рай­онов, 4 го­ро­дов центр. под­чи­не­ния (в пре­де­лы их адм. гра­ниц, кро­ме круп­ней­ших го­ро­дов с при­го­ро­да­ми, вклю­че­ны об­шир­ные ок­ру­жаю­щие тер­ри­то­рии), 2 осо­бых адм. рай­онов (табл. 1).

Таб­ли­ца 1. Ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­тив­но-тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ное де­ле­ние (2007)*

  Площадь, тыс. км2 Население, млн. чел. Административный центр
Провинции
Аньхой 139,0 61,18 Хэфэй
Ганьсу 450,0 26,17 Ланьчжоу
Гирин (Цзилинь) 187,0  27,30  Чанчунь
Гуандун 186,0 94,49 Гуанчжоу (Кантон)
Гуйчжоу 170,0 37,62 Гуйян
Ляонин 145,7 42,98 Шэньян (Мукден)
Сычуань 488,0 81,27 Чэнду
Фуцзянь 120,0 35,81 Фучжоу
Хайнань 34,0 8,45 Хайкоу
Хубэй 187,4 56,99 Ухань
Хунань 210,0  63,55 Чанша
Хэбэй 190,0  69,43 Шицзячжуан
Хэйлунцзян 469,0  38,24 Харбин
Хэнань 167,0 93,60 Чжэнчжоу
Цзянси 166,6  43,68 Наньчан
Цзянсу 102,6  76,25 Нанкин
Цинхай 720,0 5,52 Синин
Чжэцзян 101,8  50,60 Ханчжоу
Шаньдун 153,0 93,67 Цзинань
Шаньси 156,0 33,93 Тайюань
 Шэньси 205,0 37,48  Сиань
Юньнань 394,0 45,14 Куньмин
Тайвань** 36,0 22,96  Тайбэй
Автономные районы
Внутренняя Монголия 1183,0  24,05 Хух-Хото
Гуанси-Чжуанский 36,7 47,68  Наньнин
Нинся-Хуэйский 62,8 6,10  Иньчуань
Синьцзян-Уйгурский 1655,8  20,95 Урумчи
Тибетский 1202,3  2,95 Лхаса
Города центрального подчинения
Пекин 16,8 16,33   
Тяньцзинь 11,3 11,15  
Чунцин 82,3 28,16   
Шанхай 6,3 18,58   
Особые административные районы
Аомынь (Макао)** 24,0 0,53   
Сянган (Гонконг)** 1,1 6,93  

*Источник: China statistical yearbook 2007. Beijing, 2007. **По другим источникам.

К. – член ООН (1945), МВФ (1945), МБРР (1945), АТЭС (1991), ВТО (2001), ШОС (2001).

Государственный строй

КНР – уни­тар­ное гос-во. Кон­сти­ту­ция об­на­ро­до­ва­на 4.12.1982. Фор­ма прав­ле­ния – рес­пуб­ли­ка сов. ти­па; пред­ста­вит. ор­га­ны вла­сти – со­б­ра­ния нар. пред­ста­ви­те­лей (СНП), соз­да­ют­ся на всех адм. уров­нях: волость – уезд – про­вин­ция. Пря­мые вы­бо­ры де­пу­та­тов про­во­дят­ся толь­ко на ни­зо­вом и уезд­ном уров­нях, де­пу­та­ты ос­таль­ных уров­ней из­би­ра­ют­ся СНП ниже­стоя­ще­го уров­ня.

Выс­ший ор­ган гос. вла­сти – Все­ки­тай­ское со­б­ра­ние нар. пред­ста­ви­те­лей (ВСНП; ок. 3 тыс. де­пу­та­тов), из­би­ра­ет­ся на 5 лет СНП про­вин­ций, ав­то­ном­ных рай­онов, го­ро­дов центр. под­чи­не­ния, а так­же во­ин­ски­ми час­тя­ми. Сес­сии ВСНП со­зы­ва­ют­ся 1 раз в год. Ме­ж­ду сес­сия­ми ВСНП ра­бо­та­ет По­сто­ян­ный к-т ВСНП (155 де­пу­та­тов), об­ла­даю­щий за­ко­но­дат. пра­ва­ми. ВСНП – выс­ший за­ко­но­дат. ор­ган, в ком­пе­тен­цию ко­то­ро­го вхо­дит так­же ут­вер­жде­ние пла­нов эко­но­мич. раз­ви­тия и гос. бюд­же­та. Он из­би­ра­ет гла­ву гос-ва – Пред. КНР (срок пол­но­мо­чий – 5 лет, име­ет пра­во од­но­го пе­ре­из­бра­ния) и его за­мес­ти­те­ля, др. выс­ших долж­но­ст­ных лиц, ут­вер­жда­ет со­став выс­ше­го ис­пол­нит. ор­га­на КНР – Гос. со­ве­та (пра­ви­тель­ст­ва).

Гос. совет – ис­пол­нит. ор­ган ВСНП и выс­ший гос. адм. ор­ган, ко­то­ро­му под­чи­не­ны все ор­га­ны гос. уп­рав­ле­ния. Гос. со­ве­ту КНР пре­дос­тав­ле­но пра­во при­ня­тия нор­ма­тив­ных ак­тов в рам­ках дей­ст­вую­щих за­ко­нов.

Сис­те­ма ор­га­нов вла­сти КНР ра­бо­та­ет под рук. Ком­му­ни­сти­че­ской пар­тии Ки­тая (КПК), ве­ду­щая роль ко­то­рой в кит. об­ще­ст­ве за­кре­п­ле­на дей­ст­вую­щей Кон­сти­ту­ци­ей. Че­рез пред­ста­вит. ор­га­ны КПК про­во­дит свою по­ли­ти­ку в за­ко­но­да­тель­ной и др. сфе­рах. ЦК КПК при­ни­ма­ет ре­ше­ния по всем круп­ным гос. во­про­сам и вно­сит их в ви­де пред­ло­же­ний в ВСНП, где они по­лу­ча­ют за­ко­но­дат. оформ­ле­ние. ЦК КПК мо­жет так­же да­вать ре­ко­мен­да­ции Гос. со­ве­ту и из­да­вать совм. с ним по­ста­нов­ле­ния, яв­ляю­щие­ся од­но­вре­мен­но гос. ак­та­ми и парт. ди­рек­ти­ва­ми.

Спе­ци­фич. осо­бен­ность по­ли­тич. сис­те­мы КНР – на­ли­чие еди­но­го пат­рио­тич. фрон­та, ор­га­ни­за­ци­он­но оформ­лен­но­го в ви­де сис­те­мы ор­га­нов нар. по­ли­тич. кон­суль­та­тив­ных со­ве­тов (НПКС), имею­щих со­ве­щат. ха­рак­тер. Они объ­еди­ня­ют пред­ста­ви­те­лей по­ли­тич., об­ществ., куль­тур­ных, на­уч., ре­лиг. и др. ор­га­ни­за­ций, а так­же нац. мень­шинств К. НПКС об­ра­зу­ют­ся на всех адм. уров­нях, вплоть до об­ще­на­цио­наль­но­го Нар. по­ли­тич. кон­суль­та­тив­но­го со­ве­та К. (НПКСК), ко­ли­че­ст­во их чле­нов при­мер­но рав­но чис­лен­но­сти де­пу­тат­ско­го кор­пу­са со­от­вет­ст­вую­ще­го уров­ня.

В состав КНР входят осо­бые адм. рай­оны, об­ла­даю­щие ши­ро­кой ав­то­но­ми­ей и внутр. са­мо­управ­ле­ни­ем.

Для Сян­га­на и Ао­мы­ня по со­гла­ше­ни­ям со­от­вет­ст­вен­но с Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ни­ей и Пор­ту­га­ли­ей ус­та­нов­ле­на не­из­мен­ность в те­че­ние 50 лет эко­но­мич., об­ществ. и пра­во­вой сис­тем, су­ще­ст­во­вав­ших до мо­мен­та их пе­ре­да­чи в со­став КНР. В ве­де­нии центр. пра­ви­тельств. ор­га­нов КНР на­хо­дят­ся во­про­сы, ка­саю­щие­ся внеш­них сно­ше­ний и обо­ро­ны этих тер­ри­то­рий. На них рас­про­стра­ня­ет­ся толь­ко дей­ст­вие за­ко­нов КНР о гос. сим­во­ли­ке и гра­ж­дан­ст­ве. Выс­ши­ми ор­га­на­ми са­мо­управ­ле­ния в Сян­га­не и Ао­мы­не яв­ля­ют­ся за­ко­но­дат. со­ве­ты, из­би­рае­мые пу­тём пря­мых тай­ных вы­бо­ров. Ор­га­ны ис­пол­нит. вла­сти воз­глав­ля­ют на­зна­чае­мые за­ко­но­дат. со­ве­та­ми гла­вы ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ций, при ко­то­рых дей­ст­ву­ют со­ве­щат. ор­га­ны – адм. со­ве­ты. Гла­вы ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ций рас­по­ла­га­ют боль­шин­ст­вом пол­но­мо­чий, ко­то­ры­ми ра­нее об­ла­да­ли брит. и пор­туг. гу­бер­на­то­ры, в ча­ст­но­сти пра­вом от­ла­га­тель­но­го ве­то в от­но­ше­нии при­ня­тых за­ко­но­дат. со­ве­та­ми ак­тов, пра­вом по­ми­ло­ва­ния или смяг­че­ния уго­лов­но­го на­ка­за­ния и др.

Управ­ле­ние Тай­ва­нем, на тер­ри­то­рию ко­то­ро­го ны­не не рас­про­ст­ра­ня­ет­ся дей­ст­вие за­ко­но­да­тель­ст­ва КНР, ос­но­вы­ва­ет­ся на по­ло­же­ни­ях кон­сти­ту­ции Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки 1947 и осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся из­би­рае­мы­ми на 4 го­да пу­тём пря­мых тай­ных вы­бо­ров пре­зи­ден­том и Нац. со­б­ра­ни­ем (334 де­пу­та­та) Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки. Кон­сти­ту­ци­ей пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­ет­ся раз­де­ле­ние вла­сти на региональном уров­не ме­ж­ду 5 вет­вя­ми: За­ко­но­да­тель­ным, Ис­пол­ни­тель­ным, Юри­ди­че­ским, Эк­за­ме­на­ци­он­ным и Кон­троль­ным юаня­ми. За­ко­но­дат. юань со­сто­ит из де­пу­та­тов, часть ко­то­рых из­би­ра­ют­ся пря­мо, часть – по парт. спи­скам. Гла­ва пра­ви­тель­ст­ва, яв­ляю­щий­ся пред. Ис­пол­нит. юа­ня, на­зна­ча­ет­ся пре­зи­ден­том по со­гла­со­ва­нию с За­ко­но­дат. юа­нем. В ве­де­нии Юри­дич. юа­ня на­хо­дит­ся сис­те­ма су­до­про­из­вод­ст­ва, он вы­пол­ня­ет так­же функ­ции Кон­сти­туц. су­да. Эк­за­ме­нац. юань ве­да­ет от­бо­ром и на­зна­че­ни­ем чи­нов­ни­ков, Кон­троль­ный юань осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет на­блю­де­ние за дея­тель­но­стью всех вет­вей вла­сти.

В КНР су­ще­ст­ву­ет мно­го­пар­тий­ная сис­те­ма. По­ми­мо ком­пар­тии, дей­ст­ву­ют ещё 8 не­боль­ших по­ли­тич. пар­тий (об­щая чис­лен­ность ок. 600 тыс. чел.), при­знаю­щих ру­ко­во­дство КПК и офи­ци­аль­но име­нуе­мых «де­мо­кра­тич. пар­тия­ми». Все они бы­ли соз­да­ны ещё до об­ра­зо­вания КНР и в своё вре­мя вы­сту­па­ли со­юз­ни­ца­ми КПК в борь­бе с Го­минь­да­ном. Эти пар­тии не яв­ля­ют­ся оп­по­зи­ци­он­ны­ми, они «дру­же­ст­вен­ны по от­но­ше­нию к КПК и при­ни­ма­ют уча­стие в гос. управ­ле­нии». В чис­ло «де­мо­кра­тич. пар­тий» вхо­дят: Ре­во­люц. к-т Го­минь­да­на Ки­тая; Де­мо­кра­тич. ли­га Ки­тая; Ас­со­циа­ция де­мо­кра­тич. нац. строи­тель­ст­ва Ки­тая; Ас­со­циа­ция со­дей­ст­вия раз­ви­тию де­мо­кра­тии в Ки­тае; Ра­бо­че-кре­сть­ян­ская де­мо­кра­тич. пар­тия Ки­тая; Кит. пар­тия стрем­ле­ния к спра­вед­ли­во­сти; Об-во «3 сен­тяб­ря»; Ли­га де­мо­кра­тич. са­мо­управ­ле­ния Тай­ва­ня. В Сян­га­не в ро­ли оп­по­зиц. КПК по­ли­тич. ор­га­ни­за­ции вы­сту­па­ет ме­ст­ная Де­мо­кра­тич. пар­тия. Ве­ду­щие по­литич. пар­тии на Тай­ва­не – Го­минь­дан, Де­мо­кра­тич. про­грес­сив­ная пар­тия и Но­вая кит. пар­тия.

Природа

Берега

Бе­ре­го­вая ли­ния силь­но из­ре­за­на; вы­де­ля­ют­ся круп­ные по­лу­ост­ро­ва Ляо­дун­ский и Шань­дун­ский в вост. час­ти, Лэй­чжо­убань­дао на юге. На юге и юго-вос­то­ке пре­об­ла­да­ют силь­но­рас­чле­нён­ные аб­ра­зи­он­но-ак­ку­му­ля­тив­ные бе­ре­га (к югу от дель­ты р. Сиц­зян мес­та­ми с ман­гро­вы­ми за­рос­ля­ми), окайм­лён­ные не­ши­ро­ки­ми при­бреж­ны­ми низ­мен­но­стя­ми; на вос­то­ке – низ­мен­ные сла­бо­из­ре­зан­ные и дель­то­вые бе­ре­га. Ост­ров­ная часть К. пред­став­ле­на мно­го­числ. ост­ро­ва­ми (св. 5400), са­мы­ми круп­ны­ми из ко­то­рых яв­ля­ют­ся Хай­нань и Тай­вань.

Рельеф

Раз­но­об­ра­зие рель­е­фа К. обу­слов­ле­но слож­ным гео­ло­гич. строе­ни­ем и ог­ром­ны­ми раз­ме­ра­ми тер­ри­то­рии. Ам­пли­ту­да вы­сот от –155 м (Тур­фан­ская впа­ди­на) до 8848 м (го­ра Джо­молун­гма на границе с Непалом – выс­шая точ­ка Зем­ли). На тер­ри­то­рии К. с учё­том осо­бен­но­стей рель­е­фа вы­де­ля­ют­ся неск. круп­ных суб­ме­ри­дио­наль­но ори­ен­ти­ро­ван­ных об­лас­тей: Сев.-Вост. гор­ная стра­на, низ­мен­ные ак­ку­му­ля­тив­ные рав­ни­ны Вост. К., Юго-Вост. гор­ная стра­на, Цинь­лин-Юнь­нань­ская гор­ная стра­на, пла­то и го­ры Сев. К., Сев.-Зап. гор­ная стра­на и Ти­бет­ское на­го­рье.

Сев.-Вост. гор­ная стра­на вклю­ча­ет хреб­ты Боль­шой Хин­ган, Ма­лый Хин­ган, на­го­рье Ляо­си, Мань­чжу­ро-Ко­рей­ские го­ры. На край­нем се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К. рас­по­ло­же­на Сред­не­амур­ская низ­мен­ность, к юго-за­па­ду от неё в об­шир­ной меж­гор­ной впа­ди­не – рав­ни­на Сун­ляо.

Об­ласть низ­мен­ных ак­ку­му­ля­тив­ных рав­нин Вост. К. пред­став­ле­на Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­ной и рас­по­ло­жен­ны­ми к югу от неё низ­мен­но­стя­ми (выс. ме­нее 200 м) ниж­не­го и сред­не­го те­че­ния р. Янц­зы.

Юго-Вост. гор­ная стра­на ох­ва­ты­ва­ет Нань­лин, Уи­шань и др. гор­ные сис­те­мы юго-вост. час­ти К. вдоль мор. по­бе­ре­жья – от ни­зовь­ев Янц­зы до зал. Бак­бо (Тон­кин­ский). В оро­гра­фич. от­но­ше­нии стра­на пред­став­ля­ет со­бой че­ре­до­ва­ние низ­ко­гор­ных и сред­не­гор­ных мас­си­вов с меж­гор­ны­ми впа­ди­на­ми. Ха­рак­тер­но ин­тен­сив­ное эро­зи­он­ное рас­чле­не­ние, час­то имею­щее ла­би­рин­то­об­раз­ный ха­рак­тер; гор­ные хреб­ты от­де­ле­ны друг от дру­га ши­ро­ки­ми тер­ра­си­ро­ван­ны­ми до­ли­на­ми. В зап. час­ти раз­ви­ты кар­сто­вые фор­мы рель­е­фа, в т. ч. жи­во­пис­ные ос­тан­цо­вые го­ры в до­ли­не р. Лиц­зян (Гу­ан­сий­ская кот­ло­ви­на). На край­нем юге К. рас­по­ло­же­на низ­мен­ная рав­ни­на, об­ра­зо­ван­ная дель­та­ми рек Сиц­зян, Бэй­цзян и Дун­цзян.

Цинь­лин-Юнь­нань­ская гор­ная стра­на про­сти­ра­ет­ся ши­ро­кой по­ло­сой вдоль вост. края Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья до юж. гра­ни­цы К. В её со­став вхо­дят хре­бет Цинь­лин, Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ское на­горье, Сы­чу­ань­ская впа­ди­на.

Пла­то и го­ры Сев. К. (выс. 500–2000 м) вклю­ча­ют: на­го­рье Шань­си и его вост. про­дол­же­ние – хре­бет Тай­хан­шань; Лёс­со­вое пла­то и пла­то Ор­дос, го­ры Инь­шань.

К за­па­ду от пла­то Ор­дос и Лёс­со­во­го и к се­ве­ру от гор Кунь­лунь и Нань­шань рас­по­ло­же­на Сев.-Зап. гор­ная стра­на, в рель­е­фе ко­то­рой гор­ные хреб­ты выс. 3000–5000 м (сис­те­мы Мон­голь­ско­го Ал­тая, Вост. Тянь-Ша­ня) че­ре­ду­ют­ся с об­шир­ны­ми меж­гор­ны­ми кот­ло­ви­на­ми ср. выс. 900–1300 м (Джун­гар­ская рав­ни­на, Та­рим­ская впа­ди­на, Тур­фан­ская впа­ди­на).


Тибетское нагорье.


Rosfoto / К. Скоробогатько

На юго-за­па­де К. рас­по­ло­же­но об­шир­ное Ти­бет­ское на­го­рье, об­рам­лён­ное по пе­ри­фе­рии вы­со­ки­ми (св. 6000 м) про­тя­жён­ны­ми гор­ны­ми сис­те­ма­ми (Ги­ма­лаи, Ка­ра­ко­рум, Кунь­лунь, Нань­шань, Си­но-Ти­бет­ские го­ры).

Геологическое строение и полезные ископаемые


Тропический карст Южного Китая.


Фото Е. А. Фортыгиной

На тер­ри­то­рии К. вы­де­ля­ют бло­ки до­кем­брий­ской ко­ры (древ­ние плат­фор­мы и мас­си­вы) и раз­де­ляю­щие и об­рам­ляю­щие их склад­ча­тые об­лас­ти и сис­те­мы фа­не­ро­зоя, от­но­ся­щие­ся к Ура­ло-Охот­ско­му, Па­лео­те­ти­че­ско­му, Аль­пий­ско-Ги­ма­лай­ско­му и За­пад­но-Ти­хо­оке­ан­ско­му под­виж­ным поя­сам. Отд. уча­ст­ки плат­форм и склад­ча­тых об­лас­тей, под­верг­шие­ся го­ро­об­ра­зо­ва­нию в кай­но­зое, сфор­ми­ро­ва­ли Цен­траль­ноа­зи­ат­ский по­яс воз­ро­ж­дён­ных гор. На се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К. ак­тив­но про­яв­лен риф­то­ге­нез (Вос­точ­но-Ази­ат­ская риф­то­вая сис­те­ма); тер­ри­то­рию стра­ны пе­ре­се­ка­ют мно­го­числ. сейс­мо­ак­тив­ные раз­ло­мы.

Сев. про­вин­ции К. от­но­сят­ся к юго-вост. час­ти позд­не­про­те­ро­зой­ско-па­лео­зой­ско­го Ура­ло-Охот­ско­го под­виж­но­го поя­са, воз­ник­ше­го на мес­те Па­лео­ази­ат­ско­го ок. и сло­жен­но­го ин­тен­сив­но ди­сло­ци­ро­ван­ны­ми вул­ка­но­ген­но-оса­доч­ны­ми тол­ща­ми с уча­сти­ем офио­ли­тов, про­рван­ны­ми плу­то­на­ми гра­ни­тои­дов. На тер­ри­то­рии К. по­яс вклю­ча­ет про­дол­же­ния склад­ча­тых сис­тем Тянь-Ша­ня и Ал­тая; на вос­то­ке ог­ра­ни­чен Бу­ре­ин­ским (Цзя­му­сы) и Хан­кай­ским до­кем­брий­ски­ми мас­си­ва­ми, от­де­ляю­щи­ми его от Си­хо­тэ-Алин­ской позд­не­ме­зо­зой­ской склад­ча­той сис­те­мы За­пад­но-Ти­хо­оке­ан­ско­го под­виж­но­го поя­са. На вост. часть Ура­ло-Охот­ско­го поя­са на­ло­же­на про­сти­раю­щая­ся в ме­ри­дио­наль­ном на­прав­ле­нии впа­ди­на Сун­ляо (зве­но Вос­точ­но- Ази­ат­ской риф­то­вой си­сте­мы), за­пол­нен­ная ме­зо­зой­ски­ми и кай­но­зой­ски­ми оса­доч­ны­ми тол­ща­ми (пред­став­ля­ет со­бой од­но­им. неф­те­га­зо­нос­ный бас­сейн). К за­па­ду от впа­ди­ны про­тя­ги­ва­ет­ся юр­ский вул­ка­нич. по­яс Боль­шо­го Хин­га­на.

Юж. ог­ра­ни­че­ни­ем Ура­ло-Охот­ско­го поя­са яв­ля­ют­ся Ки­тай­ско-Ко­рей­ская плат­фор­ма (на вос­то­ке) и Та­рим­ская плат­фор­ма (на за­па­де). Фун­да­мент Ки­тай­ско-Ко­рей­ской плат­фор­мы об­ра­зо­ван глу­бо­ко­ме­та­мор­фи­зов. гор­ны­ми по­ро­да­ми ран­не­го до­кем­брия, а так­же гра­ни­та­ми; рас­се­чён ав­ла­ко­ге­на­ми (па­лео­риф­та­ми), за­пол­нен­ны­ми ри­фей­ски­ми осад­ка­ми и вул­ка­ни­та­ми. Оса­доч­ный че­хол сло­жен мор. кар­бо­нат­но-тер­ри­ген­ны­ми от­ло­же­ния­ми верх­ней час­ти ри­фея – ор­до­ви­ка, при­бреж­но-мор­ски­ми уг­ле­нос­ны­ми и кон­ти­нен­таль­ны­ми крас­но­цвет­ны­ми тол­ща­ми верх­не­го па­лео­зоя, ме­зо­зоя и кай­но­зоя. В пре­де­лы плат­фор­мы про­тяги­ва­ет­ся Вос­точ­но-Ази­ат­ская риф­то­вая сис­те­ма, звень­я­ми ко­то­рой яв­ля­ют­ся гра­бе­ны до­ли­ны р. Ляо­хэ и зал. Бо­хай (кай­но­зой­ские неф­те­га­зо­нос­ные бас­сей­ны). Фун­да­мент Та­рим­ской плат­фор­мы вклю­ча­ет ран­не­до­кем­брий­ские и позд­не­до­кем­брий­ские ме­та­мор­фич. об­ра­зо­ва­ния. Центр. часть плат­фор­мы, пе­ре­кры­тая чех­лом тер­ри­ген­но-кар­бо­нат­ных осад­ков, в фа­не­ро­зое ис­пы­та­ла ин­тен­сив­ные по­гру­же­ния (осо­бен­но в ме­зо­зое и кай­но­зое), сфор­ми­ро­вав неф­те­га­зо­нос­ный бас­сейн. Ки­тай­ско-Ко­рей­ская и Та­рим­ская плат­фор­мы раз­де­ле­ны ка­ле­дон­ской Нань­шань­ской склад­ча­той сис­те­мой (юго-вост. от­ветв­ле­ние Ура­ло-Охот­ско­го поя­са).

Юж­нее Ки­тай­ско-Ко­рей­ской и Та­рим­ской плат­форм в ши­рот­ном на­прав­ле­нии про­сти­ра­ют­ся позд­не­про­те­ро­зой­ско-па­лео­зой­ские склад­ча­тые сис­те­мы Кунь­лу­ня и Цинь­ли­на, об­ра­зо­ван­ные на мес­те океа­на Па­лео­те­тис, за­вер­шив­ше­го раз­ви­тие в ран­не­ким­ме­рий­скую эпо­ху тек­то­ге­не­за (в кон­це триа­са) в ре­зуль­та­те столк­но­ве­ния (кол­ли­зии) ря­да кон­ти­нен­таль­ных бло­ков, от­ко­лов­ших­ся от Гон­два­ны, с юж. ок­раи­ной Ев­ра­зии (в т. ч. с Ки­тай­ско-Ко­рей­ской и Та­рим­ской плат­фор­ма­ми). К югу от склад­ча­той сис­те­мы Цинь­ли­на, ко­то­рая на вос­то­ке ог­ра­ни­че­на круп­ным раз­ло­мом (ле­вым сдви­гом) Тан­лу, со­пря­жён­ным с Вос­точ­но-Ази­ат­ской риф­то­вой сис­те­мой, рас­по­ло­же­на древ­няя Юж­но-Ки­тай­ская плат­фор­ма. В фун­да­мен­те этой плат­фор­мы из­вест­ны бло­ки ниж­не­го и верх­не­го до­кем­брия (до се­ре­ди­ны верх­не­го ри­фея). Оса­доч­ный че­хол сло­жен мор. кар­бо­нат­но-тер­ри­ген­ны­ми от­ло­же­ния­ми верх­ней час­ти ри­фея, па­лео­зоя и триа­са, де­фор­ми­ро­ван­ны­ми в кон­це триа­са – на­ча­ле юры, а так­же кон­ти­нен­таль­ны­ми по­ро­да­ми юры, ме­ла и кай­но­зоя, за­пол­няю­щи­ми Сы­чу­ань­скую си­нек­ли­зу на за­па­де (неф­те­га­зо­нос­ный бас­сейн). Че­хол вклю­ча­ет го­ри­зон­ты древ­них лед­ни­ко­вых от­ло­же­ний (тил­ли­ты), перм­ские пла­то­ба­заль­ты. Ме­ж­ду Юж­но-Ки­тай­ской плат­фор­мой и впа­ди­ной Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го м. про­сти­ра­ет­ся Ка­та­зи­ат­ская склад­ча­тая сис­те­ма ка­ле­дон­ско­го воз­рас­та, ко­то­рая вдоль мор. по­бе­ре­жья сме­ня­ет­ся зо­ной позд­не­ким­ме­рий­ских дис­ло­ка­ций и гра­ни­тои­дов.

По­яс ран­не­ким­ме­рий­ских де­фор­ма­ций, про­тя­ги­ваю­щий­ся вдоль юж. скло­нов Кунь­лу­ня и Цинь­ли­на, у зап. края Юж­но-Ки­тай­ской плат­фор­мы от­ветв­ля­ет­ся на юг и сле­ду­ет че­рез зап. часть Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ско­го на­го­рья на п-ов Ин­до­ки­тай. Ран­ние ким­ме­ри­ды Кунь­лу­ня об­рам­ля­ют Севе­ро-Ти­бет­ский (Цзян­тан) блок древ­ней кон­ти­нен­таль­ной ко­ры, ме­ж­ду ко­то­рым и Юж­но-Ти­бет­ским (Лха­са) бло­ком про­тя­ги­ва­ет­ся уз­кая по­ло­са склад­ча­тых струк­тур позд­не­ким­ме­рий­ско­го воз­рас­та, за­во­ра­чи­ваю­щая на вос­то­ке Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья к югу. Вдоль гра­ни­цы К. с Ин­ди­ей и Не­па­лом про­тя­ги­ва­ет­ся аль­пий­ская склад­ча­тая сис­те­ма Ги­ма­ла­ев, воз­ник­шая на мес­те океа­на Не­оте­тис в ре­зуль­та­те кол­ли­зии Ин­дий­ской ли­то­сфер­ной пли­ты с юж. кра­ем Ев­ра­зий­ской пли­ты в позд­нем эо­це­не. Про­дол­жаю­щая­ся до­ны­не кол­ли­зия ли­то­сфер­ных плит так­же обу­сло­ви­ла взды­ма­ние Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья, вы­зва­ла по­втор­ное го­ро­об­ра­зо­ва­ние в пре­де­лах б. ч. ос­таль­ной тер­ри­то­рии К., вклю­чая Кунь­лунь, Нань­шань, Цинь­лин, Тянь-Шань, Ал­тай, ме­ж­ду ко­то­ры­ми обо­со­би­лись меж­гор­ные впа­ди­ны – Джун­гар­ская, Цай­дам­ская и др.

Пo ха­рак­те­ру сейс­мич­но­сти тер­ри­то­рия К. раз­де­ле­на при­мер­но по 106° в. д. на две поч­ти рав­ные час­ти. B зап. час­ти зем­ле­тря­се­ния при­уро­че­ны к круп­ным гор­ным со­ору­же­ни­ям и про­ис­хо­дят вдоль юж. ок­раи­ны Тянь-Ша­ня (силь­ней­шее из­вест­ное зем­ле­тря­се­ние – Каш­гар­ское, 1902, маг­ни­ту­да 8,1), вдоль зап. скло­на Мон­голь­ско­го Ал­тая (Мон­го­ло-Ал­тай­ское зем­ле­тря­се­ние, 1931, маг­ни­ту­да 8,0; 10 тыс. жертв), вдоль сис­те­мы сев. хреб­тов Кунь­лу­ня, Ал­тын­та­га, Нань­ша­ня [зем­ле­тря­се­ния, про­ис­шед­шие в 1920 (маг­ни­ту­да 7,8; 200 тыс. жертв) и в 1927 (маг­ни­ту­да 7,6; ок. 41 тыс. жертв)], в Ка­ра­ко­ру­ме, Ган­ди­сы­ша­не и в вост. час­ти Ги­ма­ла­ев (од­но из силь­ней­ших в ми­ре Ти­бет­ско-Ас­сам­ское зем­ле­тря­се­ние, 1950, маг­ни­ту­да 8,6; св. 1,5 тыс. жертв) и к вос­то­ку и юго-вос­то­ку от Ти­бе­та в сис­те­ме хреб­тов ме­ри­дио­наль­но­го на­прав­ле­ния (зем­ле­тря­се­ние в 1933, маг­ни­ту­да 7,5; св. 9 тыс. жертв). Ме­ж­ду вы­со­ко­сейс­мич­ны­ми ли­ней­ны­ми зо­на­ми рас­по­ла­га­ют­ся прак­ти­че­ски асейс­мич. уча­ст­ки (напр., Та­рим­ская впа­ди­на). Сейс­мич. ак­тив­ность зап. части К. вы­со­ка, сейс­мич. ре­жим ре­гу­ля­рен и силь­ные зем­ле­тря­се­ния (маг­ни­ту­да св. 6) про­ис­хо­дят час­то. На рав­нин­ных тер­ри­то­ри­ях вост. час­ти К. сейс­мич. ре­жим не­ре­гу­ля­рен, сред­не­мно­го­лет­няя ак­тив­ность низ­ка, эпи­цен­тры зем­ле­тря­се­ний не об­ра­зу­ют чёт­ко вы­ра­жен­ных ли­ней­ных зон, пе­рио­ды ак­ти­ви­за­ции сме­ня­ют­ся мно­го­ве­ко­вы­ми пе­рио­да­ми за­тишья. В вост. час­ти К. про­изош­ли наи­бо­лее раз­ру­ши­тель­ные в ис­то­рии че­ло­ве­че­ст­ва зем­ле­тря­се­ния, напр. в 1556 в pайоне вост. окон­ча­ния xpебта Цинь­лин (маг­ни­ту­да 8,1; 830 тыс. жертв), в 1976 в pайоне г. Тан­шань к вос­то­ку от г. Пе­кин (маг­ни­ту­да 7,8; св. 240 тыс. жертв). По­след­нее силь­ное раз­ру­шит. зем­ле­тря­се­ние про­изош­ло 12.5.2008 на сев.-зап. ок­раи­не Сы­чу­ань­ской кот­ло­ви­ны (центр. часть пров. Сы­чу­ань, маг­ни­ту­да 7,9; св. 68 тыс. жертв).

Полезные ископаемые

Слож­ность и раз­но­об­ра­зие гео­ло­гич. строе­ния тер­ри­то­рии К. оп­ре­де­ли­ли на­ли­чие мно­го­числ. ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний разл. ви­дов ми­нер. сы­рья на су­ше и на шель­фе. К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре (2005–06) по за­па­сам ка­мен­но­го уг­ля, руд вольф­ра­ма, мо­либ­де­на, оло­ва, сурь­мы, ред­ко­зе­мель­ных эле­мен­тов, ба­ри­та. Весь­ма зна­чи­тель­ны за­па­сы руд же­ле­за, мар­ган­ца, алю­ми­ния, ме­ди, ни­ке­ля, цин­ка, свин­ца, рту­ти, зо­ло­та, пла­ти­ны и ме­тал­лов пла­ти­но­вой груп­пы, бе­рил­лия, тан­та­ла, а так­же фос­фо­ри­тов, бу­рых уг­лей.

В не­драх К. (в т. ч. на шель­фе) за­клю­че­но ок. 2% ми­ро­вых за­па­сов неф­ти (2006) и ок. 0,8% ми­ро­вых за­па­сов при­род­но­го го­рю­че­го га­за (2005). Б. ч. раз­ве­дан­ных за­па­сов неф­ти со­сре­до­то­че­на на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке и вос­то­ке К. – в неф­те­га­зо­нос­ных бас­сей­нах Сун­ляо и Сев.-Ки­тай­ском (круп­ней­шие ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния – Да­цин, Ляо­хэ, Шэн­ли, Да­ган). В центр. и зап. рай­онах К. на­хо­дят­ся ме­нее круп­ные по за­па­сам бас­сей­ны – Пред­нань­шань­ский, Та­рим­ский, Цай­дам­ский и Джун­гар­ский. Круп­ней­шее ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние неф­ти на се­ве­ро-за­па­де К. – Ка­ра­май. Осн. ко­ли­че­ст­во ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний при­род­но­го га­за от­кры­то в бас­сей­не Сы­чу­ань в центр. час­ти К.; круп­ней­шие ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния об­на­ру­же­ны в Та­рим­ском бас­сей­не в зап. час­ти К. Гл. бас­сей­ны ка­мен­ных, за­час­тую кок­сую­щих­ся, уг­лей – бас­сейн Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­ны, Ор­дос­ский (в сев. час­ти К.), Сы­чу­ань (в центр. час­ти), Тан­син (в юж. час­ти) и др. Круп­ней­шие ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния – Ху­ай­бэй, Кай­лу­ань, Да­тун и др.

Бóльшая часть за­па­сов руд вольф­ра­ма свя­за­на c гид­ро­тер­маль­ны­ми жиль­ны­ми ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния­ми (напр., Гуй­мэй­шань в пров. Цзян­си); так­же из­вест­ны кон­так­то­во-ме­та­со­ма­ти­че­ские (скар­но­вые) (Яо­ган­сянь в пров. Ху­нань), грей­зе­но­вые (Ляньхуа­шань в пров. Гу­ан­дун) и рос­сып­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния. Круп­ней­шее в К. мо­либ­де­но­вое ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние Янц­зяч­жанц­зы (пров. Ляо­нин) от­но­сит­ся к скар­но­во­му ти­пу; его ру­ды так­же со­дер­жат сви­нец, цинк и се­реб­ро. Др. мо­либ­де­но­вые ме­сто­рож­де­ния – Лу­ань­чуань (пров. Хэ­нань), Цзинь­дуй­чэн (пров. Шань­си), Да­хэй­шань [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)]. Осн. за­па­сы руд оло­ва скон­цен­три­ро­ва­ны в ко­рен­ных ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ни­ях (круп­ней­ший в стра­не руд­но-рос­сып­ной р-н Гэц­зю в пров. Юнь­нань; ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние Да­чан в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном p-не); так­же име­ют­ся рос­сып­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния (Гэц­зю). Мес­то­ро­ж­де­ния руд сурь­мы на­хо­дят­ся в про­вин­ци­ях Ху­нань (уни­каль­ное ме­сто­рож­де­ние Си­ку­ан­шань), Гуй­чжоу, Гу­ан­дун и в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном p-не; об­ра­зо­ва­ны кварц-ан­ти­мо­ни­то­вы­ми жи­ла­ми и бо­лее слож­ны­ми те­ла­ми, за­ле­гаю­щи­ми в разл. по­ро­дах. Ре­сур­сы ред­ко­зе­мель­ных эле­мен­тов (в т. ч. итт­рия) за­клю­че­ны гл. обр. в од­ном из круп­ней­ших в ми­ре же­ле­зо-ред­ко­ме­талль­но-ред­ко­зе­мельном ме­сто­ро­ж­де­нии Ба­ян-Обо во Внутр. Мон­го­лии. Ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния ред­ко­зе­мель­ных эле­мен­тов ло­ка­ли­зу­ют­ся так­же в пров. Ляо­нин. Гл. ба­ри­то­вые ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния – Синьху­ан, Юнь­нань, рас­по­ло­жен­ные в юж. час­ти стра­ны, от­но­сят­ся к стра­ти­форм­но­му и стра­ти­форм­но-жиль­но­му ти­пам.

Ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния же­ле­зи­стых квар­ци­тов рас­по­ло­же­ны боль­шей ча­стью в сев.-вост. и сев. pайонах К. (напр., Ань­шань­ская груп­па). Важ­ное зна­че­ние так­же име­ют мно­го­числ. оса­доч­ные, кон­так­то­во-ме­та­со­ма­ти­че­ские (груп­па Дae в пров. Ху­бэй и др.), маг­ма­ти­че­ские ва­на­дий­со­дер­жа­щие (Паньч­жи­хуа в пров. Сы­чуань и др.) и гид­ро­тер­маль­ные же­ле­зо­руд­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния. Мар­ган­це­вые ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния пред­став­ле­ны пла­ста­ми кар­бо­нат­ных руд и пла­ста­ми бо­лее бо­га­тых руд зон вы­вет­ри­ва­ния и окис­ле­ния ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний (в про­вин­ци­ях Ху­нань, Гуйч­жоу, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не и др.). Сре­ди ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний алю­ми­ние­во­го сы­рья наи­боль­шее зна­че­ние име­ют за­ле­жи бок­си­тов (напр., груп­па Кунь­мин в пров. Шань­дун); из­вест­ны ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния алу­ни­тов (Фань­шань в пров. Чжэц­зян, Луц­зян в пров. Ань­хой, Тай­бэй на о. Тай­вань) и гли­но­зё­ми­стых слан­цев (ряд ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний в про­вин­ци­ях Ляо­нин, Гу­ан­дун). B К. из­вест­но неск. со­тен ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний руд ме­ди, от­но­ся­щих­ся к мед­но-пор­фи­ро­во­му, гид­ро­тер­маль­но­му, скар­но­во­му, мед­но-кол­че­дан­но­му, маг­ма­ти­че­ско­му (ли­к­ва­ци­он­но­му) и др. ти­пам. Наи­бо­лее круп­ные ме­сто­рож­де­ния – Дэ­син в пров. Цзян­си, Чжун­тяо­шань в пров. Шань­си (мед­но-пор­фиро­вые; их ру­ды так­же со­дер­жат мо­либ­ден и зо­ло­то); Дун­чу­ань и Имынь в пров. Юнь­нань (гид­ро­тер­маль­ные, час­то ни­кель­со­дер­жа­щие), Дае в пров. Ху­бэй, Тун­гу­ань­шан в пров. Ань­хой (скар­но­вые), Бай­ин­чан в пров. Гань­су (мед­но-кол­че­дан­ное). Маг­ма­тич. ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния (Ли­ма­хэ в пров. Сы­чу­ань, Цзинь­чан в пров. Гань­су, Та­ок в пров. Шань­дун, и др.) – мед­но-ни­ке­ле­вые; в ру­дах так­же при­сут­ст­ву­ют ко­бальт и ме­тал­лы пла­ти­но­вой груп­пы. В пров. Юнь­нань име­ют­ся ко­бальт­со­дер­жа­щие же­ле­зо­ни­ке­ле­вые мес­то­ро­ж­де­ния кор вы­вет­ри­ва­ния (Моц­зян и др.). Свин­цо­во-цин­ко­вые мес­то­ро­ж­де­ния из­вест­ны во всех про­вин­ци­ях К. Наи­бо­лее круп­ные из них: Фань­коу в пров. Гу­ан­дун (кол­че­дан­но-по­ли­ме­тал­ли­че­ское в вул­ка­но­ген­ных тол­щах), Си­те­шань в пров. Цин­хай (стра­ти­форм­ное), Шуй­ко­у­шань в пров. Ху­нань (скар­но­вое) и др. Мно­го­числ. ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния руд рту­ти об­ра­зу­ют ртут­ный по­яс в пре­де­лах Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ско­го на­го­рья (стра­ти­форм­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния Вань­шань, Ла­му­чан и др.). Соб­ст­вен­но зо­ло­то­руд­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния мно­го­чис­лен­ны, но не­ве­ли­ки по за­па­сам. Осн. за­па­сы зо­ло­та свя­за­ны с круп­ны­ми зо­ло­то­со­дер­жа­щи­ми мед­но- пор­фи­ро­вы­ми ме­сто­рож­де­ния­ми. Боль­шое зна­че­ние име­ют рос­сып­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния зо­ло­та на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К., в Сы­чу­ань­ской кот­ло­ви­не и в сред­нем те­че­нии р. Янц­зы. Се­реб­ро при­сут­ст­ву­ет в по­ли­ме­тал­лич., ино­гда в мед­но-пор­фи­ро­вых ру­дах. Ре­сур­сы руд тан­та­ла и нио­бия за­клю­че­ны в ред­ко­ме­талль­ных пег­ма­ти­тах Мон­голь­ско­го Ал­тая в Синь­цзян- Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном p-не (напр., мес­то­ро­ж­де­ние Кёк­то­хай, ру­ды ко­то­ро­го так­же со­дер­жат зна­чит. ко­ли­че­ст­во бе­рил­лия) и в пров. Гу­ан­дун. Ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния фос­фо­ри­тов ло­ка­ли­зу­ют­ся гл. обр. на юго- за­па­де стра­ны (фос­фо­ри­то­нос­ный бас­сейн Янц­зы, пром. мес­то­ро­ж­де­ния рас­по­ло­же­ны в осн. в зап. час­ти бас­сей­на).

В К. так­же име­ют­ся ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния руд ура­на, ти­та­на, хро­ма; са­мо­род­ной се­ры, пи­ри­та, флюо­ри­та, ас­бе­ста, таль­ка, маг­не­зи­та, гра­фи­та, ка­мен­ной и ка­лий­ных со­лей, бор­но­го, це­мент­но­го сы­рья, бен­то­ни­та, као­ли­на, при­род­ных стро­ит. ма­те­риа­лов. Вы­яв­ле­ны не­боль­шие ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния ал­ма­зов, пье­зо­к­вар­ца. Из­вест­но боль­шое чис­ло ми­не­раль­ных, гл. обр. тер­маль­ных, ис­точ­ни­ков. Неск. круп­ных гео­тер­маль­ных pайонов на­хо­дят­ся в Юж. Ти­бе­те и в пров. Юнь­нань.

Климат

Тер­ри­то­рия КНР рас­по­ло­же­на в пре­де­лах трёх кли­ма­тич. поя­сов: уме­рен­но­го (к се­ве­ру от ли­нии р. Ху­ай­хэ – хре­бет Цинь­лин), суб­тро­пи­че­ско­го и тро­пи­че­ско­го (к югу от р. Сиц­зян). Оп­ре­де­ляю­щее воз­дей­ст­вие на кли­мат К. зи­мой ока­зы­ва­ет Ази­ат­ский ан­ти­ци­клон, влия­ние ко­то­ро­го про­сле­жи­ва­ет­ся да­же в вост. при­океа­нич. об­лас­тях. Ти­пич­ны ано­маль­но хо­лод­ные зи­мы в уме­рен­ном и суб­тро­пич. поя­сах.

В пре­де­лах уме­рен­но­го поя­са вы­де­ля­ют­ся об­лас­ти кон­ти­нен­таль­но­го (пла­то и го­ры Сев. К. и Сев.-Зап. К.) и мус­сон­но­го (Сев.-Вост. гор­ная стра­на, сев. часть Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­ны) кли­ма­тов; сред­не­го­до­вые темп-ры из­ме­ня­ют­ся от –5 °C (Урум­чи) до 14 °C (Шань­дун­ский п-ов). Ти­пич­ны боль­шие го­довые ам­пли­ту­ды тем­пе­ра­тур (до 70 °C в Тур­фан­ской впа­ди­не). Зи­ма про­дол­жи­тель­ная, хо­лод­ная, не­ред­ко с силь­ны­ми мо­ро­за­ми и вет­ра­ми, ма­ло­снеж­ная (на се­ве­ре и се­ве­ро-за­па­де бес­снеж­ная); ср. темп-ры ян­ва­ря со­став­ля­ют на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке от –16 до –25 °C, в Вост. К. – от –6 до 4 °C. Ми­ним. зим­ние темп-ры на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке стра­ны мо­гут дос­ти­гать –40 °C. Ле­то жар­кое, ср. темп-ры ию­ля от 20 до 26 °C, в Тур­фан­ской впа­ди­не до 34 °C. Ле­том гос­под­ству­ет ци­кло­нич. дея­тель­ность с обиль­ны­ми осад­ка­ми на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке стра­ны; на за­па­де осад­ков прак­ти­че­ски не вы­па­да­ет. Сред­не­го­до­вое ко­ли­че­ст­во осад­ков ми­ни­маль­но в зап. рай­онах К. (ме­нее 90 мм в Та­рим­ской впа­ди­не) и по­сте­пен­но уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся к вос­то­ку от 400–500 мм на вос­то­ке Внутр. Мон­го­лии до 850 мм в при­мор­ских рай­онах.

В суб­тро­пич. поя­се раз­ли­ча­ют мус­сон­ную и вы­со­ко­гор­ную кли­ма­тич. об­лас­ти. Для мус­сон­ной об­лас­ти ха­рак­тер­на чёт­ко вы­ра­жен­ная се­зон­ность: хо­лод­ная су­хая зи­ма и жар­кое влаж­ное ле­то, про­дол­жи­тель­ная вес­на и осень. Ср. темп-ры ян­ва­ря ко­леб­лют­ся от 0 до 8 °C; июля – от 26 до 31 °C. Мак­си­мум осад­ков при­хо­дит­ся на тё­п­лое вре­мя го­да. Сред­не­го­до­вое ко­ли­че­ст­во осад­ков в при­мор­ских об­лас­тях 1500 мм, в сред­нем те­че­нии Янц­зы 1100 мм, на Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ском на­го­рье 800 мм. Осо­бен­но­стью кли­ма­та бас­сей­на Янц­зы яв­ля­ет­ся дожд­ливая вес­на в сред­нем и ниж­нем те­че­нии (т. н. сли­во­вые до­ж­ди) и дожд­ли­вая осень в верх­нем те­че­нии. Юж. и вост. по­бе­ре­жья К. ле­том и осе­нью стра­да­ют от со­про­во­ж­даю­щих­ся силь­ны­ми лив­ня­ми тай­фу­нов.

Зо­наль­ность кли­ма­та на­ру­ша­ет­ся вы­со­ко­гор­ной сис­те­мой Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья. В сев. и центр. час­тях на­го­рья ср. темп-ры ян­ва­ря со­став­ля­ют от –20 до –25 °C, ию­ля 6–7 °C; в вост. час­ти со­ответ­ст­вен­но –8 и 12–14 °C. Ве­ли­ки су­точ­ные ко­ле­ба­ния темп-р (св. 30 °C). Сред­не­го­до­вое ко­ли­че­ст­во осад­ков в вост. час­ти 250–750 мм, в зап. час­ти 100–200 мм и ме­нее. На юге и юго-вос­то­ке Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья кли­мат не­сколь­ко мяг­че: хо­тя зи­мы так­же очень хо­лод­ные, мус­сон с Ин­дий­ско­го ок. ле­том при­но­сит обиль­ные осад­ки.

В пре­де­лах тро­пич. кли­ма­тич. поя­са рас­по­ло­же­ны рай­оны к югу от р. Си­цзян, по­бе­ре­жье Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го м. до 25° с. ш., а так­же ост­ро­ва Хай­нань и Тай­вань. Ср. темп-ры ян­ва­ря 20–22 °C, ию­ля 32 °C. Сред­не­го­до­вое ко­ли­че­ст­во осад­ков мак­си­маль­но на о. Тай­вань (2460 мм), в ма­те­ри­ко­вой час­ти Юж. К. умень­ша­ет­ся до 1680 мм. В пе­ре­ход­ные се­зо­ны не­ред­ки тай­фу­ны.

Вы­со­та сне­го­вой ли­нии со­став­ля­ет от 4400–4600 м (зап. и вост. ок­раи­ны Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья) до 6200 м (центр. часть Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья). Пло­щадь совр. оле­де­не­ния не­ве­ли­ка (ок. 84 тыс. км2). Наи­бо­лее круп­ные цен­тры оле­де­не­ния рас­по­ло­же­ны в го­рах Ка­ра­ко­рум, Кунь­лунь, Нань­шань, Вост. Тянь-Шань, Мон­голь­ский Ал­тай. Не­со­от­вет­ст­вие мас­шта­бов оле­де­не­ния и зна­чит. вы­со­ты гор обу­слов­ле­но су­хо­стью кли­ма­та внутр. рай­онов К. Боль­шин­ст­во совр. лед­ни­ков на­хо­дит­ся в ста­дии от­сту­па­ния.

Внутренние воды


Верхнее течение реки Янцзы. Провинция Юньнань.


Фото Е. А. Фортыгиной

Тер­ри­то­рия К. бо­га­та вод­ны­ми ре­сур­са­ми: на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся бо­лее 50 тыс. рек с пл. бас­сей­на св. 100 км2. Об­щая дли­на рек 220 тыс. км, сум­мар­ный сток бо­лее 2,8 млрд. км3. Б. ч. тер­ри­то­рии от­но­сит­ся к бас­сей­ну Ти­хо­го ок. (осн. ре­ки – Янц­зы, Ху­ан­хэ, Ху­ай­хэ, Сиц­зян, Ляо­хэ, Амур); св. 1/3 тер­ри­то­рии К. – к бас­сей­ну внутр. сто­ка (Та­рим, Каш­гар, Яр­кенд). Юг Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья при­над­ле­жит бас­сей­ну Ин­дий­ско­го ок. (здесь рас­по­ло­же­ны ис­то­ки рек Ме­конг, Инд, Брах­ма­пут­ра, Са­лу­ин); край­ний се­ве­ро-за­пад – бас­сей­ну Сев. Ле­до­ви­то­го ок. (р. Чёр­ный Ир­тыш).

Ре­ки бас­сей­на Ти­хо­го ок. име­ют пре­им. до­ж­де­вое пи­та­ние, их сред­не­го­до­вые рас­хо­ды из­ме­ня­ют­ся в со­от­вет­ст­вии с уве­ли­че­ни­ем ко­ли­че­ст­ва осад­ков с се­ве­ра на юг, макс. сток ха­рак­те­рен для лет­не-осен­не­го пе­рио­да. Суб­ши­рот­ное на­прав­ле­ние те­че­ния рек при­во­дит к то­му, что при про­дви­же­нии мус­со­на по­яс обиль­ных осад­ков мо­жет од­но­вре­мен­но ус­та­нав­ли­вать­ся над верх­ним, сред­ним и ниж­ним те­че­ния­ми рек. Та­кое сов­па­де­ние мак­си­му­ма осад­ков вы­зы­ва­ет силь­ные па­вод­ки (в осн. ле­том) и ка­та­ст­ро­фич. на­вод­не­ния. Для пре­дот­вра­ще­ния раз­ли­вов и на­вод­не­ний рус­ла мн. рек об­ва­ло­ва­ны. Соз­дан ряд круп­ных гид­ро­тех­нич. со­ору­же­ний и во­до­хра­ни­лищ (в бас­сей­нах рек Ху­ан­хэ, Ху­ай­хэ, Янц­зы) для ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния сто­ка; боль­шое ко­ли­че­ст­во ир­ри­гац. ка­на­лов, од­ной из круп­ней­ших и древ­них ру­ко­твор­ных вод­ных ар­те­рий яв­ля­ет­ся Ве­ли­кий ка­нал. Ре­ки бас­сей­на внутр. сто­ка от­ли­ча­ют­ся ма­лы­ми рас­хо­да­ми, а так­же вы­со­кой не­рав­но­мер­но­стью внут­ри­го­до­во­го и мно­го­лет­не­го сто­ка. Рав­нин­ные ре­ки час­то пе­ре­сы­ха­ют и ме­ня­ют свои рус­ла. Ре­ки Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья име­ют пре­им. сне­го­вое и до­ж­де­вое пи­та­ние.

На­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся св. 2800 озёр с пл. зер­ка­ла бо­лее 1 км2. Из пре­сно­вод­ных са­мые круп­ные – пой­мен­ные озё­ра (Дун­тин­ху, По­ян­ху, Тай­ху). Са­мым глу­боким яв­ля­ет­ся вул­ка­нич. оз. Тянь­чи (373 м). Из со­лё­ных озёр круп­ней­шие: Ку­ку­нор, Лоб­нор, Нам-Цо. На Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ском на­го­рье есть круп­ные кар­сто­вые озё­ра (Дянь­чи, Эр­хай).

Важ­ное зна­че­ние для хо­зяй­ст­ва К. име­ют под­зем­ные во­ды, т. к. св. 1/2 тер­ри­то­рии стра­ны ис­пы­ты­ва­ет не­дос­та­ток ре­сур­сов по­верх­но­ст­но­го сто­ка. За­па­сы под­зем­ных вод со­став­ля­ют ок. 900 млрд. м3. Вы­де­ля­ет­ся 12 ар­те­зи­ан­ских бас­сей­нов, но лишь 2/3 из них мож­но ис­поль­зо­вать для ком­му­наль­но-бы­то­во­го во­до­снаб­же­ния из-за осо­бен­но­стей за­ле­га­ния пла­стов или их вы­со­кой ми­не­ра­ли­за­ции.

К. об­ла­да­ет зна­чит. за­па­са­ми еже­год­но во­зоб­нов­ляе­мых вод­ных ре­сур­сов (2829 км3). Во­до­обес­пе­чен­ность К. до­ста­точ­но вы­со­ка: на ка­ж­до­го жи­те­ля стра­ны при­хо­дит­ся 2173 м3 во­ды в год. Еже­год­но ис­поль­зу­ет­ся св. 20% имею­щих­ся вод­ных ре­сур­сов (из них 77% идёт на ну­ж­ды с. х-ва, 18% по­треб­ля­ют пром. пред­при­ятия, 5% рас­хо­ду­ет­ся на ком­му­наль­но-бы­то­вое во­до­снаб­же­ние). Во мно­гих рай­онах ре­сур­сы как по­верх­но­ст­ных, так и под­зем­ных вод близ­ки к ис­чер­па­нию. Зна­чит. гид­ро­по­тен­ци­ал рек ос­во­ен ме­нее чем на 10%. На ре­ках Ху­ан­хэ, Ян­цзы со­ору­же­ны круп­ные гид­ро­уз­лы.

Почвы, растительный и животный мир

Раз­но­об­ра­зие кли­ма­тич. ус­ло­вий, ти­пов рель­е­фа и ли­то­ло­гич. со­ста­ва поч­во­об­ра­зую­щих по­род оп­ре­де­ли­ло фор­ми­ро­ва­ние слож­но­го поч­вен­но­го по­кро­ва, из­ме­нён­но­го во мно­гих рай­онах ты­ся­че­лет­ней прак­ти­кой ри­со­сея­ния, а в за­суш­ли­вых и вы­со­ко­гор­ных рай­онах Сев. и Вост. К. так­же вы­па­сом. На Лёс­со­вом пла­то и на ал­лю­ви­аль­ных рав­ни­нах К., где зем­ле­де­лие раз­ви­ва­ет­ся поч­ти 5 тыс. лет, ес­теств. поч­вен­ный по­кров прак­ти­че­ски от­сут­ст­ву­ет и до­ми­ни­рую­щее по­ло­же­ние за­ни­ма­ют куль­тур­ные поч­вы. В рас­пре­де­ле­нии ес­теств. поч­вен­но­го по­кро­ва про­яв­ля­ют­ся как ши­рот­но-зо­наль­ные, так и вы­сот­но-по­яс­ные за­ко­но­мер­но­сти.

В пре­де­лах уме­рен­но­го поя­са К. об­шир­ные тер­ри­то­рии за­ни­ма­ют бу­рые лес­ные, в т. ч. опод­зо­лен­ные, поч­вы. Они раз­ви­ты на под­гор­ных рав­ни­нах и в низ­ко­горь­ях к се­ве­ру от р. Ху­ай­хэ. Под гор­ны­ми тем­но­хвой­ны­ми ле­са­ми Боль­шо­го и Ма­ло­го Хин­га­на рас­про­стра­не­ны гор­ные ил­лю­ви­аль­но-же­ле­зи­стые под­зо­лы. На вост. скло­нах хреб­та Тай­хан­шань, от­ро­гах хреб­тов Цинь­лин и Да­бе­шань сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись жёл­то-бу­рые поч­вы. Аре­ал лу­го­вых, лу­го­во-чер­но­зём­ных и ко­рич­не­вых почв ох­ва­ты­ва­ет ал­лю­ви­аль­ные рав­ни­ны Сев.-Вост. гор­ной стра­ны и Вост. К. Вы­со­кие уров­ни ак­ку­му­ля­тив­ных рав­нин рек Сун­га­ри, Нэнь­цзян и Ляо­хэ за­ня­ты чер­но­зё­мо­вид­ны­ми лу­го­вы­ми поч­ва­ми (хэ­ту). В бо­лее су­хих рай­онах, бли­же к Боль­шо­му Хин­га­ну, они сме­ня­ют­ся вы­ще­ло­чен­ны­ми чер­но­зё­ма­ми. На бо­лее низ­ких уров­нях пе­рио­ди­че­ски за­та­п­ли­вае­мых рав­нин гос­под­ству­ют лу­го­вые тем­но­цвет­ные ог­ле­ен­ные, час­то за­со­лён­ные и осо­ло­де­лые поч­вы. На воз­вы­шен­но­стях Шань­дун­ско­го и Ляо­дун­ско­го по­лу­ост­ро­вов рас­про­стра­не­ны вы­ще­ло­чен­ные ко­рич­не­вые поч­вы. На гра­ни­це уме­рен­но­го и суб­тро­пич. поя­сов, на ал­лю­ви­аль­ных рав­ни­нах рек Ху­ан­хэ, Ху­ай­хэ и Янц­зы на пы­ле­ва­тых, кар­бо­нат­ных суг­лин­ках ал­лю­ви­аль­ных рав­нин сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись лу­го­во-ко­рич­не­вые поч­вы. Ал­лю­ви­аль­ные и ри­со­вые поч­вы раз­ви­ты на рав­ни­нах сред­не­го те­че­ния и в дель­те р. Янц­зы, в до­ли­не р. Минь­цзян, на рав­ни­не Чэн­ду. В дель­тах рек Вост. К. встре­ча­ют­ся за­со­лён­ные поч­вы. Поч­вы Лёс­со­во­го пла­то – се­ро-ко­рич­не­вые (хэй­лу­ту) – име­ют гид­ро­тер­мич. ре­жим, схо­жий с ре­жи­мом степ­ных почв – каш­та­но­вых и чер­но­зё­мов.

В гор­ном об­рам­ле­нии Лёс­со­во­го пла­то пре­об­ла­да­ют гор­ные ко­рич­не­вые ма­ло­кар­бо­нат­ные и бу­рые лес­ные поч­вы; на за­па­де Лёс­со­во­го пла­то, на пла­то Ор­дос, в пред­горь­ях Нань­ша­ня и Цинь­лина – се­ро­зё­мы. В кон­ти­нен­таль­ном сек­то­ре уме­рен­но­го поя­са про­сти­ра­ет­ся об­шир­ная зо­на каш­та­но­вых почв, за­ни­маю­щих де­ну­да­ци­он­но-ак­ку­му­ля­тив­ные рав­ни­ны Внутр. Мон­го­лии. В го­рах Мон­голь­ско­го Ал­тая под ле­со­степ­ной и степ­ной рас­ти­тель­но­стью каш­та­но­вые поч­вы под­ни­ма­ют­ся по скло­нам юж. экс­по­зи­ции вы­ше 2000 м. Зо­на каш­та­но­вых почв на юге сме­ня­ет­ся зо­ной бу­рых пус­тын­но-степ­ных почв (Го­би, Джун­гар­ская рав­ни­на, под­гор­ные рав­ни­ны Тянь-Ша­ня и Мон­голь­ско­го Ал­тая).

Жел­то­зё­мы и крас­но­зё­мы за­ни­ма­ют наи­боль­шие пло­ща­ди в пре­де­лах юж. час­ти К. Для низ­ко­го­рий и сред­не­го­рий Юго-Вост. гор­ной стра­ны ти­пич­ны гор­ные крас­но­зё­мы и жел­то­зё­мы, час­то опод­зо­лен­ные, сме­няю­щие­ся с вы­со­той жёл­то-бу­ры­ми, бу­ры­ми и тём­но-бу­ры­ми гор­ны­ми лес­ны­ми поч­ва­ми. На по­бе­ре­жье, в мес­тах про­из­ра­ста­ния ман­гро­вых за­рос­лей, рас­про­стра­не­ны ман­гро­вые со­лон­ча­ко­вые поч­вы.

По уров­ню фло­ри­стич. раз­но­об­ра­зия К. за­ни­ма­ет од­но из пер­вых мест в ми­ре. Здесь на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся 32200 ви­дов рас­те­ний из 353 се­мейств, из них св. 7000 ви­дов дре­вес­ных и кус­тар­ни­ко­вых по­род, в т. ч. 2800 ви­дов де­ревь­ев. Св. 190 ре­лик­то­вых ви­дов, напр. эн­де­мич­ные для К. ме­та­се­к­войя глип­то­ст­ро­бо­вид­ная, древ­нее гинк­го дву­ло­па­ст­ное, ки­тай­ское тюль­пан­ное де­ре­во, ки­тай­ская ар­ги­ро­фил­ла, тай­вань­ская флу­зиа­на, фуц­зянь­ский ки­па­рис, да­ви­дия, эв­ком­мия, тай­ва­ния, лжет­су­га и др. Под уг­ро­зой ис­чез­но­ве­ния на­хо­дят­ся 168 ви­дов выс­ших рас­те­ний.

По ха­рак­те­ру рас­ти­тель­но­сти К. от­чёт­ли­во де­лит­ся на две час­ти – арид­ную за­пад­ную и влаж­ную вос­точ­ную. Гра­ни­ца ме­ж­ду ни­ми про­хо­дит при­мер­но по ли­нии хреб­тов Тай­хан­шань – Цинь­лин и Си­но-Ти­бет­ских гор. В зап. час­ти в ус­ло­ви­ях де­фи­ци­та ув­лаж­не­ния гос­под­ству­ют пус­ты­ни, по­лу­пус­ты­ни и сте­пи. В вост. час­ти в со­ста­ве ко­рен­ной рас­ти­тель­но­сти до­ми­ни­ру­ют лес­ные, ле­со­степ­ные и лу­го­во-степ­ные со­об­ще­ст­ва.


Пустыня Гоби.

Пус­ты­ни К. от­ли­ча­ют­ся силь­но раз­ре­жен­ным рас­ти­тель­ным по­кро­вом, пред­став­лен­ным по­лу­кус­тар­нич­ко­вы­ми (по­лы­ни) и кус­тар­ни­ко­вы­ми (ка­ра­га­на) со­об­ще­ст­ва­ми. Уча­ст­ки гли­ни­стых пус­тынь за­ня­ты кус­тар­нич­ко­вым по­кро­вом из рео­мю­рии и по­таш­ни­ка. Пес­ча­но-га­леч­ные рав­ни­ны по­кры­ты раз­ре­жен­ны­ми за­рос­ля­ми сак­сау­ла, дре­во­вид­ной со­лян­ки, эфед­ры Прже­валь­ско­го. Зна­чит. пло­ща­ди в Та­рим­ской впа­ди­не, пус­ты­не Ала­шань и на се­ве­ре Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья пол­но­стью ли­ше­ны рас­ти­тель­но­сти. В древ­них озёр­ных кот­ло­ви­нах, на за­со­лён­ных уча­ст­ках Та­рим­ской впа­ди­ны и Джун­гар­ской рав­ни­ны, в пус­ты­не Ала­шань и Цай­дам­ской кот­ло­ви­не об­шир­ные пло­ща­ди пред­став­ле­ны раз­ре­жен­ны­ми за­рос­ля­ми сак­сау­лов. На вы­со­ких рав­ни­нах Го­би и Внутр. Мон­го­лии пус­тын­ная рас­ти­тель­ность сме­ня­ет­ся со­об­ще­ст­ва­ми зла­ко­во-кус­тар­нич­ко­вых и кус­тар­нич­ко­вых су­хих сте­пей и по­лу­пус­тынь. От вост. час­ти пус­ты­ни Ала­шань до зап. час­ти пла­то Ор­дос про­тя­ги­ва­ет­ся зо­на опус­ты­нен­ных сте­пей. За­со­лён­ные по­ни­же­ния за­ня­ты га­ло­фит­ны­ми груп­пи­ров­ка­ми и со­лян­ко­вы­ми пус­ты­ня­ми. В ус­ло­ви­ях чуть боль­ше­го ув­лаж­не­ния (се­вер Лёс­со­во­го пла­то, Внутр. Мон­го­лия, под­гор­ные рав­ни­ны се­ве­ро-за­па­да стра­ны) рас­про­ст­ра­не­ны дер­но­вин­но-зла­ко­вые сте­пи.


Фото В. А. Снатенкова


Пустыня Такла-Макан.

Ти­бет­ское на­го­рье – об­ласть раз­ви­тия вы­со­ко­гор­ных зла­ко­во-кус­тар­нич­ко­вых пус­тынь и хо­лод­ных сте­пей с эле­мен­та­ми аль­пий­ских лу­гов, с вы­со­ко­гор­ны­ми по­ду­шеч­ни­ка­ми и кус­тар­ни­ка­ми. В зап. час­ти на­го­рья гос­под­ству­ет хо­лод­ная вы­со­ко­гор­ная пус­ты­ня с по­лу­кус­тар­нич­ко­вой и ред­кой тра­вя­ни­стой рас­ти­тель­но­стью. Для вы­со­ко­го­рий Си­но-Ти­бет­ских гор ха­рак­тер­но на­ли­чие низ­ко­зла­ко­вой сте­пи, пе­ре­ме­жаю­щей­ся с пят­на­ми аль­пий­ских лу­гов, с мож­же­вель­ни­ком и спи­ре­ей в до­ли­нах ручь­ёв.

Лес­ная рас­ти­тель­ность (зо­на сме­шан­ных лис­то­пад­но-веч­но­зе­лё­ных ле­сов) в про­шлом ох­ва­ты­ва­ла весь Вост. и Сев.-Вост. К., од­на­ко ес­теств. рас­ти­тель­ность ны­не со­хра­ни­лась пре­им. в сред­не­горь­ях этих рай­онов. Для ниж­них час­тей скло­нов Боль­шо­го Хин­га­на и Ма­ло­го Хин­га­на ти­пич­ны свет­лох­вой­ные ле­са, вы­ше 1800–2000 м сме­няю­щие­ся ли­ст­вен­нич­но-кед­ро­вы­ми или кед­ро­вы­ми ле­са­ми. С вы­со­ты 2500 м раз­ви­ты зла­ко­вые или осо­ко­вые со­об­ще­ст­ва, пе­ре­хо­дя­щие в гор­ные кус­тар­ни­ко­вые и мо­хо­во-ли­шай­ни­ко­вые тун­д­ры. Сме­шан­ные хвой­но-ши­ро­ко­ли­ст­вен­ные ле­са ха­рак­тер­ны для вост. скло­нов Боль­шо­го Хин­га­на. В бо­лее тё­п­лых рай­онах уме­рен­но­го поя­са – в пре­де­лах хреб­тов Цинь­лин, Да­бе­шань и др. – рас­про­стра­не­ны лис­то­пад­ные ши­ро­ко­ли­ст­вен­ные и хвой­ные ело­во-со­сно­вые ле­са. Под­вет­рен­ные по от­но­ше­нию к юго-вост. мус­со­ну рав­ни­ны Сев.-Вост. К. за­ня­ты со­об­ще­ст­ва­ми лу­го­вых сте­пей и ле­со­сте­пей. Ши­ро­ко пред­став­ле­ны зла­ки – ко­вы­ли, вос­трец, кос­тер с обиль­ным раз­но­травь­ем.

Ме­ж­ду хреб­та­ми Цинь­лин и Нань­лин, а так­же в сред­нем и ниж­нем те­че­нии р. Янц­зы рас­ти­тель­ность пред­став­ле­на се­зон­но влаж­ны­ми ши­ро­ко­ли­ст­вен­но-хвой­ны­ми суб­тро­пич. ле­са­ми слож­но­го ви­до­во­го со­ста­ва, с оби­ли­ем ли­ан, ши­ро­ким рас­про­стра­не­ни­ем бам­бу­ко­вых за­рос­лей по опуш­кам ле­сов и до­ли­нам рек. Осн. хвой­ные по­ро­ды: кун­нин­га­мия лан­цет­ная, ки­па­рис пе­чаль­ный, крип­то­ме­рия япон­ская. В фор­ми­ро­ва­нии ле­сов уча­ст­ву­ют и ре­лик­то­вые хвой­ные – ме­та­се­к­войя, лже­ли­ст­вен­ни­ца, тисс ки­тай­ский. В го­рах вы­ше 1500–1800 м дре­во­стои из кун­нин­га­мии сме­ня­ют­ся чис­ты­ми пих­то­вы­ми или сме­шан­ны­ми ле­са­ми с ки­па­ри­сом, тсу­гой с при­ме­сью лис­то­пад­ных ви­дов (клё­ны, ря­би­ны, яб­ло­ни). Верх­ние поя­са гор за­ня­ты аль­пий­ски­ми лу­га­ми.

Ес­те­ст­вен­ная рас­ти­тель­ность юго-зап. час­ти Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ско­го на­го­рья, п-ова Лэй­чжо­убань­дао и ост­ро­вов Тай­вань и Хай­нань пред­став­ле­на веч­но­зе­лё­ны­ми тро­пич. ле­са­ми, су­хи­ми по­лу­лис­то­пад­ны­ми ле­са­ми и са­ван­на­ми. К югу от р. Сиц­зян вдоль мор. бе­ре­гов раз­ви­та уз­кая по­ло­са ман­гро­вых за­рос­лей из бру­гие­ры и ави­цен­нии.

В со­ста­ве фау­ны св. 500 ви­дов мле­ко­пи­таю­щих, св. 1200 ви­дов птиц, св. 400 ви­дов пре­смы­каю­щих­ся и ок. 350 ви­дов зем­но­вод­ных. В Сев. и Сев.-Зап. К. фау­ни­стич. раз­но­об­ра­зие не­ве­ли­ко, но ко­ли­че­ст­во осо­бей отд. ви­дов бы­ва­ет зна­чи­тель­ным: в пус­ты­нях встре­ча­ют­ся ло­шадь Прже­валь­ско­го, ку­лан, джей­ран, ди­кий дву­гор­бый верб­люд, туш­кан­чи­ки; для сте­пей ха­рак­тер­ны дзе­рен, по­лёв­ка Бранд­та, мон­голь­ская пес­чан­ка и др. Ха­рак­тер­ны­ми пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми вы­со­ко­гор­ной фау­ны Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья яв­ля­ют­ся на­хо­дя­щие­ся под уг­ро­зой ис­чез­но­ве­ния ди­кий як, снеж­ный барс, мед­ведь-пи­щу­хо­ед, а так­же мно­го­числ. гры­зу­ны (пи­щу­хи, гор­ные по­лёв­ки, хо­мяч­ки, сур­ки).

В Сев.-Вост. К. мно­го хищ­ных мле­ко­пи­таю­щих: ко­ло­нок, со­боль, гор­но­стай, лас­ка, рысь и др. Фау­на суб­тро­пич. рай­онов Вост. К., Ти­бет­ско­го на­го­рья и Цинь­лин-Юнь­нань­ской гор­ной стра­ны от­ли­ча­ет­ся вы­со­ким уров­нем раз­но­об­ра­зия и эн­де­миз­ма (на­хо­дя­щие­ся под уг­ро­зой ис­чез­но­ве­ния боль­шая пан­да, ма­лая пан­да, ки­тай­ский тигр, а так­же та­ки­ны, гу­лок, зем­ле­рой­ко­вые кро­ты и др.). В во­дах р. Янц­зы во­дят­ся эн­де­мич­ные ки­тай­ский ал­ли­га­тор и озёр­ный дель­фин.

На юге К. во влаж­ных тро­пич. ле­сах оби­та­ют разл. ви­ды тон­ко­те­лых обезь­ян, гиб­бо­нов, тол­стый ло­ри, ви­вер­ро­вые и др.; ха­рак­тер­ны­ми пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми ор­ни­то­фау­ны яв­ля­ют­ся тро­го­ны, по­пу­гаи, нек­тар­ни­цы, се­реб­ри­стые фа­за­ны.

Под уг­ро­зой ис­чез­но­ве­ния на­хо­дят­ся 79 ви­дов мле­ко­пи­таю­щих, 74 ви­да птиц, 31 вид пре­смы­каю­щих­ся и 84 ви­да зем­но­вод­ных.

Антропогенное преобразование ландшафтов, состояние и охрана окружающей среды

В ре­зуль­та­те ты­ся­че­лет­не­го и ин­тен­сив­но­го хо­зяйств. ос­вое­ния при­род­ные ланд­шаф­ты К. в зна­чит. сте­пе­ни из­ме­не­ны че­лове­ком. На про­тя­же­нии ве­ков ак­тив­но из­ме­нял­ся не толь­ко рас­тит. по­кров, но и рель­еф – це­ле­на­прав­лен­но (тер­ра­си­ро­ва­ние скло­нов гор и хол­мов, ни­ве­ли­ро­ва­ние по­верх­но­сти для воз­де­лы­ва­ния с.-х. куль­тур и ир­ри­га­ции, при со­ору­же­нии ка­на­лов, до­рог и во­до­хра­ни­лищ) или как по­боч­ный ре­зуль­тат ан­тро­по­ген­ной дея­тель­но­сти (воз­ник­но­ве­ние ов­ра­гов, про­сад­ка грун­тов, за­бо­ла­чи­ва­ние, эро­зия поч­вы и др.).

Совр. ланд­шаф­ты пред­став­ле­ны пре­им. при­род­но-ан­тро­по­ген­ны­ми ком­плек­са­ми (84% пл. К.) с вы­со­кой до­лей вто­рич­но-про­из­вод­ных ланд­шаф­тов (61%); ан­тро­по­ген­ные мо­ди­фи­ка­ции ланд­шаф­тов, за­ни­маю­щие 23%, рас­про­стра­не­ны в осн. в пре­де­лах рав­нин и низ­ко­го­рий. Ус­лов­но-ко­рен­ные ланд­шаф­ты (16%) со­хра­ни­лись в труд­но­дос­туп­ных гор­ных мас­си­вах, не за­тро­ну­тых хо­зяйств. дея­тель­но­стью. Са­мая слож­ная эко­ло­гич. об­ста­нов­ка сло­жи­лась в Вост. К. и Сы­чу­ань­ской впа­ди­не, где про­жи­ва­ет 60% нас. и рас­по­ло­же­ны круп­ней­шие го­ро­да и пром. цен­тры. Наи­бо­лее ак­ту­аль­ны про­бле­мы за­гряз­не­ния ат­мо­сфе­ры, вод и почв, в т. ч. вслед­ст­вие вы­па­де­ния ки­слот­ных до­ж­дей.

В со­ста­ве вто­рич­но-про­из­вод­ных ле­сов Вост. К. до­ми­ни­ру­ет со­сна Мас­со­на. В сред­нем те­че­нии р. Янц­зы раз­ви­ва­ет­ся лес­ное план­тац. хо­зяй­ст­во, в ко­то­ром ве­ду­щую роль иг­ра­ет кун­нин­га­мия. На юге Юнь­нань-Гуй­чжоу­ско­го на­го­рья и в го­рах Юго-Вост. К. куль­ти­ви­ру­ют эко­но­ми­че­ски цен­ные по­ро­ды де­ревь­ев: боль­шие пло­ща­ди за­ни­ма­ют план­та­ции кау­чу­ко­но­сов, пальм и бам­бу­ка. Для рай­онов Сев.-Зап. К. ти­пич­но раз­ви­тие ле­со­по­лос пре­им. из мел­ко­ли­ст­вен­ных по­род. Про­цес­сы обез­ле­се­ния, уве­ли­че­ние ин­тен­сив­но­сти лес­ных по­жа­ров, по­ра­же­ние дре­во­сто­ев на­се­ко­мы­ми-вре­ди­те­ля­ми, на­ря­ду с бес­по­ря­доч­ны­ми руб­ка­ми (не­смот­ря на офиц. за­прет пром. за­го­то­вок дре­ве­си­ны в 1998), ве­дут к со­кра­ще­нию ле­со­по­кры­тых пло­ща­дей и сни­же­нию ка­че­ст­ва дре­во­сто­ев.

Из­ме­не­ние ес­те­ст­вен­ной рас­ти­тель­но­сти в арид­ных зо­нах свя­за­но с про­цес­са­ми опус­ты­ни­ва­ния – за­ме­ной степ­ных ланд­шаф­тов по­лу­пус­тын­ны­ми и пус­тын­ны­ми фор­ма­ция­ми. Сре­ди про­цес­сов де­гра­да­ции па­ст­бищ­ных ланд­шаф­тов мож­но вы­де­лить: раз­ви­тие эро­зии и де­фля­ции, вто­рич­ное за­со­ле­ние почв и грунтов, за­ме­ну цен­ных кор­мо­вых ви­дов рас­те­ний на сор­ные ви­ды, ка­та­ст­ро­фич. раз­мно­же­ние гры­зу­нов. Боль­шой вклад в унич­то­же­ние кор­мо­вой ба­зы вно­сят и сти­хий­ные бед­ст­вия (чрез­вы­чай­но снеж­ные или бес­снеж­ные зи­мы, пыль­ные бу­ри и др.).

Наи­бо­лее силь­ные транс­фор­ма­ции ис­пы­ты­ва­ют с.-х. мо­ди­фи­ка­ции ан­тро­по­ген­ных ланд­шаф­тов. Они пред­став­ле­ны па­хот­ны­ми («ри­со­вые» ланд­шаф­ты рав­нин, кот­ло­вин и «чай­ные» ланд­шаф­ты низ­ко­го­рий и сред­не­го­рий Вост. и Юж. К.), са­до­во-план­та­ци­он­ны­ми (о. Хай­нань, по­бе­ре­жья и низ­ко­го­рья Юго-Вост. К.) и сме­шан­ны­ми ти­па­ми мо­ди­фи­ка­ций (па­ст­бищ­но-па­хот­ные, ле­со­по­ле­вые и ле­со­план­та­ци­он­ные) ланд­шаф­тов.


Фото Е. А. Фортыгиной


Посадки куннингамии. На заднем плане – Сино-Тибетские горы.


Гора Хуаншань.


Фото Е. А. Фортыгиной

С кон­ца 1990-х гг. эко­ло­гич. си­туа­ция в ря­де рай­онов К. ста­ла улуч­шать­ся: на борь­бу с за­гряз­не­ни­ем ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды рас­хо­ду­ет­ся до 1% ВВП, дей­ст­ву­ет св. 1000 не­пра­ви­тельств. эко­ло­гич. ор­га­ни­за­ций; К. при­сое­ди­нил­ся к бо­лее чем 50 ме­ж­ду­нар. кон­вен­ци­ям по ох­ра­не ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды. Уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся ле­си­стость (ле­са за­ни­ма­ют св. 175 млн. га, или 18% пл. стра­ны; 2008): еже­год­но вы­са­жи­ва­ет­ся лес на пл. 6 млн. га. Соз­да­но бо­лее 2350 ох­ра­няе­мых при­род­ных тер­ри­то­рий (в т. ч. 350 гос. за­по­вед­ни­ков), за­ни­маю­щих ок. 15% пл. стра­ны. Нац. сис­те­ма ох­ра­няе­мых при­род­ных тер­ри­то­рий на­хо­дит­ся в ве­де­нии Гос. лес­ной ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции (84% всех ох­ра­няе­мых тер­ри­то­рий), Мин-ва с. х-ва и Мин-ва охра­ны ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды. В це­лом ох­ра­няе­мые при­род­ные тер­ри­то­рии К. обес­пе­чи­ва­ют ох­ра­ну 85% ви­дов жи­вот­ных, 65% выс­ших рас­те­ний и 20% со­хра­нив­ших­ся в стра­не ле­сов. В сеть био­сфер­ных ре­зер­ва­тов ЮНЕСКО вклю­че­ны 26 ох­ра­няе­мых при­род­ных тер­рито­рий об­щей пл. 33,16 тыс. км2 (Чан­бай­шань, Вэнь­чу­ань-Улун, Дин­ху); к вод­но-бо­лот­ным угодь­ям от­не­се­но 30 ох­ра­няе­мых тер­ри­то­рий, 33 за­по­вед­ни­ка вклю­че­ны в спи­сок Все­мир­но­го на­сле­дия, в т. ч. го­ра Тай­шань, го­ра Ху­ан­шань, ре­зер­ва­ты боль­шой пан­ды в пров. Сы­чу­ань, карст Юж. Ки­тая и др.

Население

В К. офи­ци­аль­но вы­де­ля­ют­ся 56 эт­нич. групп. На­ро­ды, го­во­ря­щие на си­но-ти­бет­ских язы­ках, со­став­ля­ют 94,3% нас. К., из них ки­тай­цы (хань) – 91,5%, ху­эй – 0,8%, бай – 0,2%; ти­бе­то-бир­ман­ские на­ро­ды жи­вут в осн. в Юго-Зап. К., на­счи­ты­ва­ют 1,8%, в т. ч. туц­зя – 0,6%, йи – 0,6%, ти­бет­цы – 0,4%, ха­ни – 0,1%, ли­су – 0,1%, ла­ху, на­си, цян, ка­чи­ны (цзин­по), ачан, пу­ми, ну, цзи­но, мэнь­ба, ду­лун, ло­ба. На­ро­ды, го­во­ря­щие на тай-ка­дай­ских язы­ках (гл. обр. в Юж. К.), со­став­ля­ют 2,3%, в т. ч. тай­ские на­ро­ды – св. 1,6% (чжу­ан – 1,3%, буи – 0,2%, тай – 0,1%), кам-суй­ские на­ро­ды – 0,3% (дун – 0,2%, а так­же шуй, му­лао, мао­нань и др.), ли (0,1%) и ка­дай­ские на­ро­ды (в т. ч. гэ­лао). На­ро­ды мяо-яо (св. 0,9%) так­же жи­вут в Юж. К. (в т. ч. мяо – 0,7%, яо – 0,2%, шэ). На­ро­ды, го­во­ря­щие на ал­тай­ских язы­ках (в осн. в Сев. и Сев.-Зап. К.), на­счи­ты­ва­ют 2,2%, в т. ч. тун­гу­со-мань­чжур­ские на­ро­ды – 0,9% (пре­им. мань­чжу­ры, а так­же си­бо, эвен­ки и оро­че­ны, на­най­цы, или хэч­жэ, и др.), тюрк. на­ро­ды – 0,8% (уй­гу­ры – 0,7%, ка­за­хи – 0,1%, кир­ги­зы, са­ла­ры, юйгу, уз­бе­ки, та­та­ры), монг. на­ро­ды – 0,5% (в осн. хал­ха-мон­го­лы и ой­ра­ты, а так­же дун­сян, мон­го­ры, или ту, дау­ры, бао­ань, бу­ря­ты и др.). Ко­рей­цы жи­вут на се­ве­ро-во­сто­ке К. и со­став­ля­ют 0,2%. На край­нем се­ве­ро-за­па­де про­жи­ва­ют па­мир­ские на­ро­ды (в К. на­зы­ва­ют­ся тад­жи­ка­ми) – са­ры­коль­цы и ва­хан­цы; на юге Юж. К. – на­ро­ды, го­во­ря­щие на ав­ст­роа­зи­ат­ских язы­ках, – мон-кхмер­ские на­ро­ды (ва, па­ла­унг, бу­лан и др.) и вье­ты (цзин); на о. Тай­вань – ав­стро­не­зий­цы-гао­шань. Сре­ди эт­нич. групп К. – так­же не­мно­го­числ. рус­ские.

На­се­ле­ние К. со­став­ля­ет св. 1/5 всех жи­те­лей Зем­ли. До сер. 20 в., не­смот­ря на вы­со­кий уро­вень ро­ж­дае­мо­сти (35–40 на 1000 жит.), чис­лен­ность на­се­ле­ния из-за вы­со­кой смерт­но­сти (25–30 на 1000 жит.) рос­ла мед­лен­но; ср. про­дол­жи­тель­ность жиз­ни со­став­ля­ла ме­нее 30 лет. В отд. пе­рио­ды не­уро­жа­ев, сти­хий­ных бед­ст­вий, эпи­де­мий и войн на­се­ле­ние со­кра­ща­лось. К нач. 20 в. чис­лен­ность на­се­ле­ния стра­ны ос­та­ва­лась на уров­не сер. 19 в. (ок. 430 млн. чел.). В 1950–70-х гг. при со­хра­не­нии тра­ди­ци­он­но вы­со­кой ро­ж­дае­мо­сти в ре­зуль­та­те об­ще­го улуч­ше­ния мед. об­слу­жи­ва­ния, по­вы­ше­ния уров­ня са­ни­тар­ной куль­ту­ры на­се­ле­ния и др. про­ис­хо­ди­ло зна­чит. сни­же­ние смерт­но­сти. Ус­ко­ре­ние тем­пов рос­та чис­лен­но­сти на­се­ле­ния (594,4 млн. чел. в 1953; 694,6 млн. чел. в 1964; 1008,2 млн. чел. в 1982; 1133,7 млн. чел. в 1990; 1265,8 млн. чел. в 2000) по­тре­бо­ва­ло про­ве­де­ния по­сле­до­ва­тель­ной де­мо­гра­фич. по­ли­ти­ки, на­прав­лен­ной на сни­же­ние ро­ж­дае­мо­сти. С нач. 1980-х гг. осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют­ся ком­плекс­ные ме­ры под­держ­ки се­мей, имею­щих од­но­го ре­бён­ка (вы­пла­та еже­ме­сяч­ных де­неж­ных по­со­бий, пра­во се­мьи на пер­во­оче­ред­ное по­лу­че­ние жи­лья, бес­плат­ное со­дер­жа­ние ре­бён­ка в дет­ском са­ду, пре­иму­ще­ст­ва при по­сту­п­ле­нии в ву­зы, в тру­до­уст­рой­ст­ве и др.). При ро­ж­де­нии 2-го ре­бён­ка се­мья ли­ша­лась льгот и, как пра­ви­ло, при­ну­ж­да­лась к уп­ла­те штра­фа, раз­ме­ры ко­то­ро­го в за­ви­си­мо­сти от до­хо­дов и рай­она про­жи­ва­ния мог­ли дос­ти­гать зна­чит. сумм, за­час­тую в 10–20 раз пре­вы­шав­ших раз­ме­ры сред­не­ме­сяч­ной оп­ла­ты тру­да (в наи­мень­шей сте­пе­ни ме­ры по ог­ра­ни­че­нию рож­дае­мо­сти за­тро­ну­ли ра­йо­ны ком­пакт­но­го про­жи­ва­ния нац. мень­шинств). С 2007 из-за обо­стре­ния про­бле­мы ста­ре­ния на­се­ле­ния в боль­шин­ст­ве рай­онов К. семь­ям раз­ре­ше­но иметь 2 де­тей при ус­ло­вии, что мать и отец – един­ст­вен­ные де­ти у сво­их ро­ди­те­лей, а пер­вый ре­бё­нок – де­воч­ка.

В ре­зуль­та­те про­ве­де­ния гос. по­ли­ти­ки со­кра­ще­ния ро­ж­дае­мо­сти уро­вень по­след­ней, дос­тиг­нув мак­си­му­ма в 1987 (23,3 ро­див­ших­ся на 1000 жит.), на­чал сни­жать­ся (12,1 в 2007); уро­вень смерт­но­сти прак­ти­че­ски ста­би­лен с 1980 (в сред­нем ок. 6,4–6,9 умер­ших на 1000 жит. в год; 6,9 в 2007). Тем­пы ес­теств. при­рос­та на­се­ле­ния зна­чи­тель­но за­мед­ли­лись (16,6 на 1000 жит. в 1987; 5,3 в 2007 – в 2 раза ни­же сред­не­ми­ро­во­го уров­ня). По­ка­затель фер­тиль­но­сти 1,75 ре­бён­ка на 1 жен­щи­ну (2007); мла­ден­че­ская смерт­ность 22,1 на 1000 жи­во­ро­ж­дён­ных. Стра­те­гич. цель де­мо­гра­фич. по­ли­ти­ки – до­бить­ся к 2040 ну­ле­во­го при­рос­та чис­лен­но­сти на­се­ле­ния (по оцен­кам кит. де­мо­гра­фов, к сер. 21 в. на­се­ле­ние стра­ны со­ста­вит 1,5–1,6 млрд. чел.). По­ка­за­те­ли вос­про­из­вод­ст­ва на­се­ле­ния су­ще­ст­вен­но раз­ли­ча­ют­ся по ре­гио­нам К. Наи­бо­лее вы­со­кая ро­ж­дае­мость на тер­ри­то­ри­ях ком­пакт­но­го про­жи­ва­ния нац. мень­шинств: в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском (16,8 ро­див­ших­ся на 1000 жит. в 2007), Ти­бет­ском (16,4), Нин­ся-Ху­эй­ском (14,8) ав­то­ном­ных рай­онах; наи­бо­лее низ­кая – в го­ро­дах центр. под­чи­не­ния (ГЦП) и про­вин­ци­ях Сев.-Вост. Ки­тая: в пров. Ляо­нин (6,9 ро­див­ших­ся на 1000 жит.), ГЦП Пе­кин (8,3), ГЦП Шан­хай (9,1). Тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ные раз­ли­чия уров­ня смерт­но­сти раз­нят­ся в мень­шей сте­пе­ни (от 4,7 умер­ших на 1000 жит. в пров. Гу­ан­дун до 7,1 в пров. Цзян­су, 2007). Наи­бо­лее вы­со­кий ес­теств. при­рост на­се­ле­ния в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском (11,8 на 1000 жит.), Ти­бет­ском (11,3) и Нин­ся-Ху­эй­ском (9,8) ав­то­ном­ных рай­онах; са­мые низ­кие тем­пы ес­теств. при­рос­та – в пров. Ляо­нин (1,5 на 1000 жит.), ГЦП Тянь­цзинь (2,1) и пров. Цзян­су (2,3).

По офиц. дан­ным, саль­до внеш­них ми­гра­ций от­ри­ца­тель­ное (–0,39 на 1000 жит. в 2007); за гра­ни­цей вре­мен­но про­жи­ва­ют 475 тыс. гра­ж­дан К., ра­бо­таю­щих по кон­трак­там (2006; пре­им. в стра­нах Азии – Япо­нии, Син­га­пу­ре, Юж. Ко­рее и др.), а так­же 134 тыс. кит. сту­ден­тов, обу­чаю­щих­ся в за­ру­беж­ных ву­зах. Со­хра­ня­ют­ся зна­чит. мас­шта­бы не­ле­галь­ной эмиг­ра­ции.

В К. в ср. на 100 жен­щин при­хо­дит­ся 103 муж­чины, в т. ч. на 100 новорож­дён­ных девочек – 111 мальчиков (2007). Кит. се­мьи стре­мят­ся не иметь дочерей (по тра­ди­ции сын опе­ка­ет ро­ди­те­лей в ста­рос­ти). Не­смот­ря на стро­гие за­пре­ты со­об­щать ро­ди­те­лям пол бу­ду­ще­го ре­бён­ка, час­ты слу­чаи пре­ры­ва­ния бе­ре­мен­но­сти, ес­ли ве­ли­ка ве­ро­ят­ность рож­де­ния до­че­ри. До 2007 жи­те­ли сель­ских рай­онов не все­гда ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­ли но­во­ро­ж­дён­ных де­во­чек, что­бы со­хра­нить воз­мож­ность иметь маль­чи­ка и не пла­тить штраф за ро­ж­де­ние вто­ро­го ре­бён­ка; не­ред­ки слу­чаи умер­щв­ле­ния но­во­ро­ж­дён­ных де­во­чек, хо­тя за­кон су­ро­во на­ка­зы­ва­ет за это. Вслед­ст­вие не­вы­со­кой ро­ж­дае­мо­сти воз­рас­тная струк­ту­ра на­се­ле­ния ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся от­но­си­тель­но низ­кой до­лей де­тей до 15 лет – 17,9%, ве­ли­ка, но име­ет тен­ден­цию к сни­же­нию до­ля лиц тру­до­спо­соб­но­го воз­рас­та (15–59 лет) – 67,8%; срав­ни­тель­но вы­со­ка и про­дол­жа­ет уве­ли­чи­вать­ся до­ля лиц 60 лет и стар­ше – 14,3% (2007). Ср. ожи­дае­мая про­дол­жи­тель­ность жиз­ни 72,9 го­да в 2007 (71,4 в 2000; 68,6 в 1990), в т. ч. муж­чи­ны – 71,1, жен­щи­ны – 74,8 го­да. Наи­бо­лее вы­со­ка ср. ожи­дае­мая про­дол­жи­тель­ность жиз­ни в эко­но­ми­че­ски раз­ви­тых при­мор­ских про­вин­ци­ях и ГЦП, су­ще­ст­вен­но ни­же – во внутр. рай­онах стра­ны (наи­бо­лее низ­кая – в Ти­бет­ском ав­то­ном­ном рай­оне).

Ср. плот­ность на­се­ле­ния ок. 137 чел./км2 (2006). Бо­лее плот­но за­се­ле­ны вост. рай­оны стра­ны, осо­бен­но до­ли­ны и дель­ты рек Ху­ан­хэ и Янц­зы. На тер­ри­то­рии ГЦП Шан­хай плот­ность на­се­ле­ния до­сти­га­ет 2880 чел./км2, в пров. Цзян­су – 740 чел./км2. От­но­си­тель­но ред­ко на­се­ле­ны гор­ные и пус­тын­ные ре­гио­ны зап. час­ти стра­ны (са­мая низ­кая плот­ность на­се­ле­ния в Ти­бет­ском ав­то­ном­ном рай­оне – 2,3 чел./км2).

До­ля гор. нас. (44,9% в 2007; 17,9% в 1978; 10,6% в 1949) по­сто­ян­но рас­тёт за счёт ми­гра­ций сель­ских жи­те­лей в го­ро­да, а так­же рас­ши­ре­ния гра­ниц го­ро­дов и т. н. сель­ской ур­ба­ни­за­ции (при­да­ния быв. сель­ским на­се­лён­ным пунк­там ста­ту­са го­род­ских). Ожи­да­ет­ся, что в 2020 до­ля гор. на­се­ле­ния со­ста­вит ок. 57%. Все­го на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся 656 го­ро­дов и ок. 20 тыс. по­сёл­ков гор. ти­па (2007). Св. 1/2 гор. на­се­ле­ния про­жи­ва­ет в ГЦП, го­ро­дах про­вин­ций Сев.-Вост. К. [Ляо­нин, Хэй­лунц­зян, Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)], а так­же ря­да при­мор­ских про­вин­ций (Гу­ан­дун, Чжэц­зян, Цзян­су).


Шанхай. Деловой район Пудан.


Фото В. А. Снатенкова


Гуанчжоу (провинция Гуандун). Вид части города.

Круп­ней­шие го­ро­да К. (2009; с при­го­ро­да­ми, тыс. чел.): Шан­хай (17783), Пе­кин (12230), Сян­ган (Гон­конг; 9102, вклю­чая при­го­ро­ды и го­ро­да-спут­ни­ки, рас­по­ло­жен­ные за пре­де­ла­ми осо­бо­го адм. ра­йо­на), Чун­цин (7707), Шэнь­ян (Мук­ден; 6580), Тянь­цзинь (6389), Гу­ан­чжоу (Кан­тон; 5711), Си­ань (5132), Хан­чжоу (4917), Хар­бин (4885), Шань­тоу (4747), Ухань (4696), Чэн­ду (4636), Нан­кин (4313), Цзи­нань (3405), Чан­чунь (3052), Шиц­зяч­жу­ан (3022), Тай­юань (2787), Таншань (2756), Цзы­бо (2736), Да­лянь (2709), Кунь­мин (2459), Цин­дао (2452), Гуй­ян (2420), Ань­шань (2295), Чан­ша (2267), Уси (2226), Чжэн­чжоу (2216), Нань­чан (2188), Ги­рин (Цзи­линь; 1956), Синь­ян (1904), Лань­чжоу (1865), Дань­дун (1711), Чжань­цзян (1635), Сюй­чжоу (1611), Урум­чи (1601), Нань­нин (1588), Ло­ян (1587), Суч­жоу (1547), Фуч­жоу (1537), Бао­тоу (1489), Жун­чэн (пров. Гу­ан­дун; 1446), Ху­ай­нань (1444), Хэ­фэй (1433), Ци­ци­кар (1410), Хань­дань (1377), Да­тун (1353), Нин­бо (1290), Чжан­ц­зя­коу (1267), Вэнь­чжоу (1238), Бэн­бу (1214), Ао­мынь (Ма­као; 1198, вклю­чая при­го­ро­ды и го­ро­да-спут­ни­ки, рас­по­ло­жен­ные за пре­де­ла­ми осо­бо­го адм. ра­йо­на), Пин­сян (пров. Цзян­си; 1198), Хух-Хо­то (1146), Да­цин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; 1132), Бэнь­си (1125), Бао­дин (1109), Сянь­ян (1099), Чжэнь­цзян (1040), Ху­ай­бэй (1006). Фор­ми­ру­ют­ся 3 круп­ных ме­га­ло­по­ли­са: в дель­тах рек – Янц­зы (центр – Шан­хай) и Чжуц­зян (цен­тры – Гу­ан­чжоу и Шэнь­чжэнь), а так­же Пе­кин – Тянь­цзинь в пров. Хэ­бэй.

Эко­но­ми­че­ски ак­тив­ное на­се­ле­ние 786,5 млн. чел. (2007). В струк­ту­ре за­ня­то­сти на до­лю с. х-ва и ры­бо­лов­ст­ва при­хо­дит­ся 41% ра­бо­таю­щих, сфе­ры ус­луг – 32%, пром-сти и строи­тель­ст­ва – 27%. Осо­бен­ность рын­ка тру­да – на­ли­чие в го­ро­дах, осо­бен­но в наи­бо­лее раз­ви­тых при­мор­ских рай­онах стра­ны, зна­чит. слоя вы­ход­цев из се­ла (нун­минь­гун; ок. 140 млн. чел. в сер. 2000-х гг.), за­ня­тых в разл. от­рас­лях хо­зяй­ст­ва. Уро­вень без­ра­бо­ти­цы 4,0% (2007).

Рост чис­лен­но­сти на­се­ле­ния Тай­ва­ня (млн. чел.: 8,1 в 1952; 17,8 в 1980; 20,4 в 1990; 22,3 в 2000; 23,1 в 2008) не­ук­лон­но за­мед­ля­ет­ся. В нач. 21 в. тем­пы при­рос­та на­се­ле­ния сни­зи­лись до 0,24% (2008). Гл. осо­бен­ность де­мо­гра­фич. по­ве­де­ния на­се­ле­ния – низ­кая рож­дае­мость (9,0 на 1000 жит. в 2008). Низ­кая сме­рт­ность (6,7 на 1000 жит.) от­ра­жа­ет зна­чит. тем­пы ес­теств. при­рос­та на­се­ле­ния в пре­ды­ду­щие го­ды, а так­же до­стиг­ну­тый ре­гио­ном вы­со­кий уро­вень ка­че­ст­ва жиз­ни; мла­ден­че­ская сме­рт­ность – 5,45 на 1000 жи­во­рож­дён­ных. По­ка­за­тель фер­тиль­но­сти 1,13 ре­бён­ка на 1 жен­щи­ну. До­ля де­тей до 15 лет 17,3%, лиц тру­до­спо­соб­но­го воз­рас­та (15–64 года) 72,2%, лю­дей 65 лет и стар­ше 10,5% (2008). В ср. на 100 жен­щин при­хо­дит­ся 102 муж­чи­ны. Ср. ожи­дае­мая про­дол­жи­тель­ность жиз­ни 77,8 го­да (муж­чи­ны – 74,9, жен­щи­ны – 80,9 года). Внеш­ние ми­гра­ции не­зна­чи­тель­ны; по­ло­жи­тель­ное саль­до миг­ра­ций 0,04 на 1000 жит. (2008). Уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся чис­ло лиц, при­ез­жаю­щих на Тай­вань на за­ра­бот­ки (из кон­ти­нен­таль­ной час­ти стра­ны, го­су­дарств Юго-Вост. Азии и др.); в круп­ных го­ро­дах – вы­со­ко­ква­ли­фи­цир. спе­циа­лис­ты из ря­да стран ми­ра.

Тай­вань – гус­то­на­се­лён­ная про­вин­ция, ср. плот­ность на­се­ле­ния – 637,9 чел./км2. Ин­тен­сив­но раз­ви­ва­ют­ся про­цес­сы ур­ба­ни­за­ции и суб­ур­ба­ни­за­ции. До­ля гор. на­се­ле­ния ок. 90%. Гл. го­род­ские аг­ло­ме­ра­ции (2008, тыс. чел.): Тай­бэй (8325,2 – св. 36% на­се­ле­ния Тайваня; в со­ста­ве аг­ло­ме­ра­ции го­ро­да Бань­цяо, Чжун­хэ, Синь­чжу­ан, Сань­чун и др.), Гао­сюн (2686,5), Тай­чжун (2224,5), Тай­нань (831,4).

Все­го в эко­но­ми­ке за­ня­то 10,7 млн. чел. (2007), в т. ч. в сфе­ре ус­луг – 57,9%, пром-сти и строи­тель­ст­ве – 36,8, с. х-ве и ры­бо­лов­ст­ве – 5,3%. Уро­вень без­ра­бо­ти­цы 3,9% эко­но­ми­че­ски ак­тив­но­го на­се­ле­ния (2007).

Религия

Для боль­шин­ст­ва на­се­ле­ния К. ха­рак­те­рен ре­лиг. син­кре­тизм: со­че­та­ние эле­мен­тов тра­диц. ве­ро­ва­ний, кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва, дао­сиз­ма и буд­диз­ма ма­хая­ны (см. в ст. Буд­дизм, раз­дел Буд­дизм в Ки­тае). По офиц. дан­ным (2008), в К. св. 100 млн. ве­рую­щих (по экс­перт­ным оцен­кам, до 300 млн. чел.).

Про­ник­но­ве­ние буд­диз­ма в К. на­ча­лось на ру­бе­же н. э. На нач. 21 в., со­глас­но экс­перт­ным оцен­кам, буд­дизм ис­по­ве­до­ва­ли ок. 100 млн. чел. В К. дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 13 тыс. буд­дий­ских мо­на­сты­рей и хра­мов. В Ти­бе­те рас­про­стра­не­на осо­бая фор­ма буд­диз­ма – ти­бет­ский буд­дизм, или ла­ма­изм (см. в ст. Буд­дизм, раз­дел Буд­дизм в Ти­бе­те). Есть так­же при­вер­жен­цы буд­диз­ма шко­лы тхе­ра­ва­да (ок. 1,6 тыс. мо­на­сты­рей). В К. име­ет­ся ок. 1,5 тыс. да­ос­ских хра­мов.

Со­глас­но пре­да­нию Церк­ви, про­по­ведь хри­сти­ан­ст­ва в К. на­ча­лась уже в 1 в. (мис­сия ап. Фо­мы). Пер­вые упо­ми­на­ния хри­сти­ан­ст­ва (в фор­ме не­сто­ри­ан­ст­ва) в ис­точ­ни­ках да­ти­ру­ют­ся 6–7 вв. Ка­то­лич. мис­сио­не­ры впер­вые поя­ви­лись в К. в 13 в., ак­тив­но дей­ст­во­ва­ли с 16 в. Наи­боль­шее рас­про­стра­не­ние ка­то­ли­цизм по­лу­чил в К. в сер. 19 в.; на нач. 21 в., по офиц. дан­ным, на­счи­ты­ва­лось св. 5 млн. ка­то­ли­ков (по экс­перт­ным оцен­кам, 13 млн. чел.), бо­лее 4,6 тыс. хра­мов и мо­лель­ных до­мов. В 17 в. в К. поя­ви­лась рус. пра­во­слав­ная мис­сия. В сер. 20 в. Рус. пра­во­слав­ная цер­ковь да­ро­ва­ла Церк­ви на тер­ри­то­рии К. ав­то­но­мию, бы­ла об­ра­зо­ва­на Ки­тай­ская ав­то­ном­ная пра­во­слав­ная цер­ковь. Про­тес­тан­тизм на­чал рас­про­стра­нять­ся в 19 в.; на нач. 21 в., по офиц. дан­ным, в стра­не про­жи­ва­ло св. 15 млн. про­тес­тан­тов (по экс­перт­ным оцен­кам, 40 млн. чел.), за­ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­но ок. 37 тыс. церк­вей и мо­лель­ных до­мов.

Ис­лам, поя­вив­ший­ся в К. ок. 7–8 вв., яв­ля­ет­ся ре­ли­ги­ей ря­да на­ро­дов К. (ху­эй, уй­гу­ры и др.). Чис­ло при­вер­жен­цев ок. 20 млн. чел. Дей­ст­ву­ют бо­лее 30 тыс. ме­че­тей.

Име­ют­ся так­же при­вер­жен­цы но­вых ре­лиг. дви­же­ний. Круп­ней­шим из них яв­ля­ет­ся сек­та Фа­лунь­гун (на нач. 21 в. на­счи­ты­ва­ет, по не­офиц. оцен­кам, до 100 млн. при­вер­жен­цев), за­пре­щён­ная вла­стя­ми в 1999 как пред­став­ляю­щая об­ществ. опас­ность.

Гос. по­ли­ти­ка КНР в от­но­ше­нии ре­ли­гии пре­тер­пе­ва­ла из­ме­не­ния. В 1949–66 пре­об­ла­да­ла ли­ния на от­де­ле­ние ре­ли­гии от гос-ва. В парт. и гос. ор­га­нах су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли струк­ту­ры, за­да­ча­ми ко­то­рых бы­ло ус­та­нов­ле­ние кон­тро­ля за дея­тель­но­стью ре­лиг. ор­га­ни­за­ций, на­блю­де­ние за их не­вме­ша­тель­ст­вом в по­ли­тич. дея­тель­ность, за ло­яль­но­стью к вла­сти. Во вре­мя «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» 1966–76 все ви­ды ре­лиг. дея­тель­но­сти бы­ли за­пре­ще­ны: хра­мы за­кры­ва­лись, их иму­ще­ст­во кон­фи­ско­вы­ва­лось. Во 2-й пол. 1970-х гг. Ком­пар­тия Ки­тая при­зна­ла не­до­пус­ти­мость ис­ко­ре­не­ния ре­ли­гии си­ло­вы­ми ме­то­да­ми. В 1980-х гг. во­зоб­но­ви­ли ра­бо­ту офи­ци­аль­но при­знан­ные ре­лиг. ор­га­ни­за­ции: Кит. буд­дий­ское об-во (соз­да­но в 1953), Кит. да­ос­ское об-во (1957), Кит. ис­лам­ское об-во (1953), Кит. ка­то­лич. об-во (1957) и Кит. про­тес­тант­ское дви­же­ние за «трой­ст­вен­ную не­за­ви­си­мость» (1954).

Со­глас­но Кон­сти­ту­ции КНР, ре­лиг. ор­га­ни­за­ции не мо­гут быть под­кон­троль­ны за­ру­беж­ным ре­лиг. цен­трам, по­это­му Кит. ка­то­лич. об-во фор­маль­но не при­зна­ёт вла­сти па­пы Рим­ско­го и са­мо­стоя­тель­но из­би­ра­ет епи­ско­пов. Вме­сте с тем в К. су­ще­ст­ву­ют «под­поль­ные» ка­то­лич. цер­ков­ные струк­ту­ры, при­знаю­щие юрис­дик­цию Свя­то­го Пре­сто­ла. Эти ог­ра­ни­че­ния не рас­про­стра­ня­ют­ся на осо­бые адм. рай­оны Ао­мынь и Сян­ган, где име­ют­ся 2 дио­це­за Рим­ско-ка­то­лич. церк­ви. В Сян­га­не дей­ст­ву­ет Гон­конг­ская ми­тро­по­лия Кон­стан­ти­но­поль­ской пра­во­слав­ной церк­ви.

На Тай­ва­не на нач. 21 в. за­ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­но бо­лее 8 тыс. да­ос­ских хра­мов, бо­лее 4 тыс. буд­дий­ских мо­на­сты­рей и хра­мов. Хри­сти­ан­ст­во ис­по­ве­ду­ют ок. 900 тыс. чел., в т. ч. ок. 300 тыс. чел. – ка­толи­цизм (дей­ст­ву­ет 1 ми­тро­по­лия и 6 дио­це­зов Рим­ско-ка­то­лич. церк­ви) и бо­лее 600 тыс. чел. – про­тес­тан­тизм разл. на­прав­ле­ний (пре­сви­те­риа­не, бап­ти­сты, лю­те­ра­не, анг­ли­ка­не, ад­вен­ти­сты седь­мо­го дня и др.; за­ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­но ок. 3,5 тыс. церк­вей и мо­лель­ных до­мов). Су­ще­ст­ву­ет 1 пра­во­слав­ный при­ход в со­ста­ве Гон­конг­ской ми­тро­по­лии Кон­стан­ти­но­поль­ской пра­во­слав­ной церк­ви. Бо­лее 1,5 млн. чел. – при­вер­жен­цы тай­вань­ских син­кре­ти­че­ских куль­тов.

Древнейшие археологические культуры на территории Китая

Территория Китая в древнем каменном веке

К древ­ней­шим па­мят­ни­кам че­ло­ве­че­ской дея­тель­но­сти на тер­ри­то­рии К. мн. кит. учё­ные от­но­сят на­ход­ки со стоя­нок Ни­хэ­вань, Шан­шац­зюй, Сяо­чан­лян, Дун­гу­то, Сяо­ду­коу (в сев.-зап. час­ти пров. Хэ­бэй), од­на­ко воз­раст этих на­хо­док вы­зы­ва­ет у ря­да спе­циа­ли­стов со­мне­ния, что в не­ко­то­рых слу­ча­ях под­твер­ди­ли но­вей­шие ис­сле­до­ва­ния (напр., Сяо­ду­коу ра­нее да­ти­ро­ва­лась ок. 2,5–2,0 млн. лет на­зад, сей­час 1,36 млн. лет на­зад). Од­ни­ми из са­мых ран­них, и не столь спор­ны­ми, яв­ля­ют­ся на­ход­ки из ниж­не­го слоя Си­хо­уду (ок. 1,8 млн. лет) и из Юань­моу (ок. 1,7 млн. лет на­зад; от­ту­да про­ис­хо­дят ос­тан­ки, воз­мож­но, са­мо­го древ­не­го homo erectus или ав­ст­ра­ло­пи­те­ка на тер­ри­то­рии Ки­тая).

Од­на из слож­но­стей в па­лео­ан­тро­по­ло­гии и па­лео­ли­то­ве­де­нии К. со­сто­ит в том, что ко­ст­ные ос­тан­ки, осо­бен­но ран­них пе­рио­дов, фраг­мен­тар­ны, тем не ме­нее по­яв­ле­ние древ­ней­ше­го че­ло­ве­ка на тер­ри­то­рии К., су­дя по все­му, свя­за­но с ми­гра­ци­ей, но даль­ней­шее раз­ви­тие, оче­вид­но, про­ис­хо­ди­ло на ме­ст­ной ос­но­ве. Тех­ни­ка дву­сто­рон­ней обив­ки, по ре­зуль­та­там но­вей­ших ис­сле­до­ва­ний, раз­ви­ва­лась на за­па­де и во­сто­ке Ев­ра­зии кон­вер­ге­нт­но, тех­ни­ка Ле­вал­луа не вы­яв­ле­на. Упо­треб­лять тер­ми­ны «Ашель» или «Му­стье» по от­но­ше­нию к куль­ту­рам на тер­ри­то­рии К. мож­но лишь ус­лов­но, для вы­де­ле­ния хро­но­ло­гич. пе­рио­да, со­от­вет­ст­вую­ще­го реа­ли­ям бо­лее зап. и сев. тер­ри­то­рий.


Ланьтяньский синантроп. Реконструкция (по Ян Веньмину и Ван Юпину).

Па­мят­ни­ки, да­ти­ро­ван­ные в пре­де­лах 1,5–0,4 млн. лет на­зад и со­от­но­си­мые с ран­ним Аше­лем на за­па­де Ев­ра­зии, есть в бас­сей­не р. Ху­ан­хэ, в пров. Шэнь­си, в т. ч. в до­ли­не р. Вэй­хэ: в у. Лань­тянь – Гун­ван­лин и Чэнь­цзя­во (ок. 650 тыс. лет на­зад; нук­ле­усы из галь­ки без под­го­тов­лен­ной удар­ной пло­щад­ки, от­ще­пы, скрёб­ла), свя­зы­вае­мые с синантропом («лань­т­янь­ским че­ло­ве­ком»); в у. Кэ­хэ (600 тыс. лет на­зад; нук­ле­усы и от­ще­пы, чоп­пе­ры, чоп­пин­ги, скреб­ло­вид­ные ору­дия). Ма­те­риа­лы это­го же вре­ме­ни из­вест­ны в пров. Хэ­бэй (Цзиц­зяч­жу­ан и др. в у. Вэй­сянь); на р. Янц­зы в пров. Ху­бэй (Ши­лун­тоу); в пров. Гуй­чжоу (Гу­ань­инь­дун); в пров. Ху­нань (бас­сейн р. Ли­шуй) – к ним близ­ки па­мят­ни­ки кот­ло­ви­ны Бай­сэ (Бай­гу, Гао­лин­по, Фэн­шу­дао и т. д.) в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не (бо­лее 700 тыс. лет на­зад; чоп­пе­ры, пи­ки, скрёб­ла, дву­сто­рон­не об­ра­бо­тан­ные ору­дия) и др.


Пекинский синантроп из Чжоукоудяня. Реконструкция (по Ян Веньмину и Ван Юпину).

Со сред­ним и позд­ним Аше­лем (400–130 тыс. лет на­зад) со­от­но­сят­ся гл. на­ход­ки в Чжо­уко­удянь, близ Пе­ки­на, в т. ч. останки пекинского си­нан­тро­па. Па­мят­ни­ки это­го вре­ме­ни есть в у. Шань­сянь (пров. Хэ­нань), у г. Юнь­ян­чжэнь (пров. Хэ­нань), Цзянц­зя­вань и Сы­го­укоу (пров. Гань­су), в пе­ще­ре Цзинь­ню­шань (пров. Ляо­нин на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К.) и др. На юго-вос­то­ке совр. К., к се­ве­ру от рус­ла Янц­зы, из­вест­на сто­ян­ка Тао­дянь (пров. Ань­хой; ок. 400 тыс. лет на­зад), где най­де­ны хо­ро­шо со­хра­нив­шая­ся че­реп­ная крыш­ка, аль­ве­о­ляр­ная часть ле­вой сто­ро­ны ниж­ней че­лю­сти, неск. зу­бов (по не­ко­то­рым оцен­кам, от­ли­ча­ют­ся от пе­кин­ско­го си­нан­тро­па, что по­зво­ля­ет го­во­рить о на­ли­чии в Вост. Азии не­сколь­ких раз­но­вид­нос­тей homo erectus), ору­дия из кос­ти.

Для ср. па­лео­ли­та (130–45 тыс. лет на­зад), со­от­но­си­мо­го с Му­стье зап. и сев. рай­онов Ев­ра­зии, важ­ней­ши­ми яв­ля­ют­ся сто­ян­ки Дин­цунь, в пе­ще­ре Лун­дун (го­ра Мяо­лао­шань, у. Чанъ­ян, пров. Ху­бэй), с ко­то­рой свя­зан «чанъ­ян­ский че­ло­век» (100 тыс. лет на­зад) – позд­ний ар­ха­ич­ный са­пи­енс, и др. На се­ве­ре совр. тер­ри­тории К. эта эпо­ха пред­став­ле­на сто­ян­ка­ми Сюй­цзя­яо (се­вер пров. Шань­си; ос­тан­ки 10 осо­бей), Цинъ­ян (пров. Гань­су), Да­ли и у г. Ушэнь­ци (Внутр. Мон­го­лия; зуб и час­ти ске­ле­та, род­ст­вен­ные «дин­цунь­ско­му че­ло­ве­ку», ору­дия из гру­бой квар­це­вой галь­ки, нук­ле­усы) и др. На се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К. из­вест­на сто­ян­ка Гэц­зы­дун (пров. Ляо­нин) и др.; на юге – ма­те­риа­лы из пе­ще­ры го­ры Шиц­зы­шань (Ма­ба, у. Цюй­цзян, пров. Гу­ан­дун), в т. ч. че­реп ран­не­го ар­ха­ич­но­го са­пи­ен­са (гей­дель­берг­ский че­ло­век; 100 тыс. лет на­зад), из пе­щер Яньху­эй­дун (у. Тунц­зы) и Сяоху­эй­дун (у. Шуй­чэн) в пров. Гуй­чжоу, мас­тер­ская Вон­тэй­тун (ору­дия на от­ще­пах с дву­сто­рон­ней ре­ту­шью; есть су­мат­ро­ли­ты) в Гон­кон­ге и др. В Ти­бе­те па­лео­лит из­вес­тен толь­ко по ма­те­риа­лам сбо­ров в уез­дах Шэнь­чжа, Тин­гри, Бу­ранг, Ру­тог.

Па­мят­ни­ки верх­не­го па­лео­ли­та (45–10/7-е тыс. до н. э.) в сев. час­ти совр. К. в осн. близ­ки си­бир­ским. К на­чаль­но­му эта­пу верх­не­го па­лео­ли­та от­но­сят­ся Шуй­дун­гоу, Ша­ра­ос­со­гол, Дая­о­цунь во Внутр. Мон­го­лии, Чжи­юй на се­ве­ре пров. Шань­си и др. (нук­ле­усы из мел­ких га­лек; пре­об­ла­да­ют ору­дия, из­го­тов­лен­ные из пла­сти­нок не­пра­виль­ных очер­та­ний с ре­ту­шью; сре­ди фау­ни­стич. ос­тан­ков боль­ше все­го кос­тей ло­ша­ди Прже­валь­ско­го и ку­ла­на). Вы­де­ля­ют па­мят­ни­ки «дин­цунь­ско­го кру­га» (на р. Фынь­хэ, р. Вэй­хэ, в уще­лье Сань­мынь­ся) с га­леч­ной тех­ни­кой, в т. ч. нук­ле­усы из мас­сив­ных га­лек без под­го­тов­лен­ной удар­ной пло­щад­ки, чоп­пе­ра­ми. Др. тра­ди­ция свя­за­на с па­мят­ника­ми на тер­ри­то­рии Ор­до­са (се­вер пров. Шэнь­си, Внутр. Мон­го­лия в из­лу­чи­не Ху­ан­хэ), для них ха­рак­тер­но то, что б. ч. из­де­лий из­го­тов­ле­на из от­ще­пов, в т. ч. ост­ро­ко­неч­ни­ки, ре­ту­ши­ро­ван­ные скрёб­ла; к этой тра­ди­ции так­же от­но­сит­ся сто­ян­ка Цзяо­хэ в Тур­фан­ской кот­ло­ви­не и неск. стоя­нок в рай­оне г. Ка­ба (Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н). Из па­мят­ни­ков на се­ве­ре пров. Хэ­бэй ва­жен Шань­дин­дун; на Ср. Ху­ан­хэ – Ся­чу­ань, Сю­эгу­ань (пров. Шань­си), Сяо­нань­хай (близ г. Ань­ян, пров. Хэ­нань); в сев.-вост. час­ти совр. К. – Сяо­гу­шань (пров. Ляо­нин), Чжо­уц­зяо­фан [близ г. Юй­шу, пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)]; на за­па­де, в Сы­чу­ань­ской кот­ло­ви­не, – Тун­лян и Фу­линь, в ин­ду­ст­рии ко­то­рых до­ми­ни­ру­ют мик­ро­ли­ты; на вос­то­ке – «пе­ще­ра № 1 Шань­дин­дун» Чжо­уко­удя­ня, близ Пе­ки­на.

Па­мят­ни­ки верх­не­го па­лео­ли­та на тер­ри­то­рии Юж. К. в осн. близ­ки из­вест­ным в Юго-Вост. Азии. В пе­ще­ре Тун­тянь­янь (Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н; ок. 40 тыс. лет на­зад) най­де­ны хо­ро­шо со­хра­нив­ший­ся че­реп и кос­ти взрос­ло­го муж­чи­ны (по мне­нию кит. учё­ных, об­ла­да­ет при­зна­ка­ми мон­го­ло­ид­ной и ав­ст­ра­ло­ид­ной рас); ан­тро­по­ло­гич. и ар­хео­ло­гич. на­ход­ки из­вест­ны так­же: в пе­ще­ре го­ры Ци­линь­шань (Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н); в ком­плек­се пе­щер Ду­лэ­янь (близ г. Лю­ч­жоу; в т. ч. то­по­ры, тёс­ла, близ­кие на­ход­кам на се­ве­ре Вьет­на­ма, напр. в пе­ще­ре Ке­о­фай в го­рах Бак­шон); в пе­ще­рах Ху­анъ­янь­дун (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Мао­мао­дун, в пе­ще­ре № 1 на го­ре Лун­тань­ю­лань (ок. 15 км к югу от г. Кунь­мин; ору­дия из квар­ца, крем­ня, пес­ча­ни­ка, хру­ста­ля, ага­та, хал­це­до­на). На о. Тай­вань, вбли­зи г. Тай­нань (р. Цай­ляо­си), об­на­ру­же­на те­мен­ная кость муж­чи­ны (ок. 20 лет) – древ­ней­ший (30 тыс. лет на­зад) Homo sapiens на Тай­ва­не; в пе­ще­ре Чан­бинь (15 тыс. лет на­зад) у дер. Чжанъ­юань, в цен­тре вост. по­бе­ре­жья, най­де­ны ору­дия на от­ще­пах, сня­тых с га­лек с под­го­тов­лен­ной удар­ной пло­щад­кой (скреб­ки, ост­ро­ко­неч­ни­ки, од­но­сто­рон­не об­би­тые ру­бя­щие ору­дия); свёр­ла, иг­лы, про­кол­ки и др. из кос­ти и ро­га. По-ви­ди­мо­му, за­се­ле­ние Тай­ва­ня шло с тер­ри­то­рии вост. Гу­ан­дун – юж. Фуц­зянь по су­ще­ст­во­вав­ше­му су­хо­пут­но­му мо­сту.

Изу­че­ние фи­на­ла па­лео­ли­та (ме­зо­лит как осо­бый пе­ри­од для Вост. и Юго-Вост. Азии, как пра­ви­ло, не вы­де­ля­ют) на тер­ри­то­рии К. свя­за­но с дис­кус­си­ей о со­от­но­ше­нии этих тра­ди­ций и зем­ле­дельч. не­оли­тич. куль­тур. По­ка эту связь до­ка­зать не уда­ёт­ся. К это­му пе­рио­ду в центр. об­лас­тях К. от­но­сят­ся: Линц­зин (пров. Хэ­нань; до­ми­ни­ру­ют мик­ро­ли­ты из от­ще­пов, есть то­по­ры, га­леч­ные ру­бя­щие ору­дия); Шаю­ань; верх­ний слой Ся­чу­ань и др. На тер­ри­то­рии Шань­дун­ско­го п-ова об­на­ру­же­но не ме­нее 150 стоя­нок с пре­об­ла­да­ни­ем мик­ро­ли­тич. тех­ни­ки. На бо­лее се­вер­ных зем­лях к ран­не­не­о­ли­тич. па­мят­ни­кам от­но­сят Эмао­ши (пров. Шань­си; сре­ди на­хо­док – то­по­ры и тёс­ла, из­го­тов­лен­ные об­бив­кой), хо­тя дан­ных о на­ли­чии ке­ра­ми­ки здесь нет. К бес­ке­ра­ми­че­ско­му не­оли­ту от­но­сят так­же лоб­нор­скую груп­пу па­мят­ни­ков с мик­ро­ли­та­ми (скреб­ки, пла­стин­ки, ост­ро­ко­неч­ни­ки) в Синь­цзя­не. Мик­ро­ли­тич. ору­дия, на­ко­неч­ни­ки стрел, ве­ро­ят­но, тес­ло и др. об­на­ру­же­ны так­же в Сун­шань и Га­ча на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке Внутр. Мон­го­лии. В Ши­бач­жань (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; ок. 9-го тыс. до н. э.) от­ме­че­но на­ли­чие мик­ро­ли­тич. ок­руг­лых скрё­бел и рез­цов, что по­зво­ля­ет пред­по­ло­жить связь со сто­ян­ка­ми в бас­сей­не рек Ар­гунь, Шил­ка, Амур. Неск. стоя­нок с мик­ро­ли­тич. ин­ду­ст­ри­ей об­на­ру­же­но в рай­оне На­гчу на се­ве­ре Ти­бе­та: До­гэц­зэ и Чжа­бу с тор­цо­вы­ми и ко­нич. нук­ле­уса­ми. Древ­ней­шим не­оли­тич. па­мят­ни­ком на тер­ри­то­рии К. на­зы­ва­ют верх­ний слой пе­ще­ры Ду­шиц­зы (ок. 13-го тыс. до н. э.; пров. Гу­ан­дун), но, не­смот­ря на на­ли­чие шли­фо­ван­ных ору­дий, это спор­но, по­сколь­ку не об­на­ру­же­но ке­ра­ми­ки и сле­дов до­ме­сти­ка­ции зла­ков.

Дан­ные о ке­ра­ми­ке, да­ти­руе­мой до 19-го тыс. до н. э. (Лиюй­цзуй и Мия­о­янь в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не), нуж­да­ют­ся в уточ­не­нии; и по­ка эти па­мят­ни­ки пра­виль­нее рас­смат­ри­вать не в кон­текс­те нео­ли­тич. со­об­ществ ран­них зем­ле­дель­цев, а ог­ра­ни­чить­ся кон­ста­та­ци­ей фе­но­ме­на бо­лее ран­не­го по­яв­ле­ния ке­ра­ми­ки, чем это пред­став­ля­лось ра­нее.

Эпоха древнейших аграрных очагов и государств

Раз­ви­тие не­оли­тич. куль­тур, с ко­то­ры­ми свя­за­ны осн. зем­ле­дельч. оча­ги, фор­ми­ро­ва­ние древ­них го­су­дарств и на­ро­дов, на ос­но­ве ко­то­рых сло­жи­лась др.-кит. ци­ви­ли­за­ция, про­ис­хо­ди­ло в рам­ках не­сколь­ких зон (см. кар­ту): 1) бас­сейн Ср. Ху­ан­хэ (до­ли­на рек Вэй­хэ, Фынь­хэ и др.); 2) т. н. Древ­нее При­мо­рье – зо­на, ог­ра­ни­чен­ная на за­па­де гор­ны­ми хреб­та­ми Тай­хан­шань, на юге – вост. от­ро­га­ми хреб­та Цинь­лин, на вос­то­ке т. н. Древ­ним Про­ли­вом, мед­лен­но со­кра­щав­шим­ся в 5000–2000 до н. э. за счёт на­но­сов Ху­ан­хэ; 3) п-ов (до ок. 2300 – ар­хи­пе­лаг) Шань­дун; 4) бас­сейн Ниж­ней Янц­зы; 5) бас­сейн Ср. Янц­зы. С позд­не­го не­оли­та к вос­то­ку от Древ­не­го При­мо­рья за счёт ин­тен­сив­ных на­но­сов Ху­ан­хэ и рек Шань­дун­ско­го ар­хипе­ла­га на мес­те Древ­не­го Про­ли­ва фор­ми­ро­ва­лась Ве­ли­кая Кит. рав­ни­на, где сло­жи­лась но­вая (6-я) зо­на, ока­зав­шая­ся наи­бо­лее пер­спек­тив­ной с точ­ки зре­ния даль­ней­шей ис­то­рии К.

На­ча­ло воз­де­лы­ва­ния ри­са на тер­ри­то­рии К. за­фик­си­ро­ва­но к югу от хреб­та Нань­лин (пров. Гу­ан­дун, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н, Тай­вань) и свя­за­но с па­мят­ни­ка­ми Юго-Вост. Азии кру­га Хоа­бинь. К древ­ней­шим па­мят­ни­кам не­оли­та (13–11-е тыс. до н. э.) от­но­сят Юй­чань­янь, где най­де­на ше­лу­ха ри­са (как ди­ко­рас­ту­ще­го, так и на­чаль­ной ста­дии до­ме­сти­ка­ции) и фраг­мен­ты ке­ра­ми­ки. На севе­ре совр. К., во Внутр. Мон­го­лии, пе­ре­ход к не­оли­ту пред­став­лен в Чжа­лай­но­ре, там по­лу­че­ны ра­дио­уг­ле­род­ные да­ты (9855±230) и най­де­ны фраг­мен­ты ке­ра­ми­ки, но, что­бы от­не­сти па­мят­ник к не­оли­ту, нуж­ны бо­лее де­таль­ные дан­ные о слое.

Ран­ний не­олит (ок. 9000–5500 до н. э.) ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся до­ме­сти­ка­ци­ей ри­са и в не­ко­то­рых мес­тах – про­са, се­ли­ща­ми (есть и жи­лые пе­ще­ры), ке­ра­ми­кой про­стых форм, рас­про­стра­не­ни­ем шли­фо­ван­ных ору­дий и др.

Пер­вые зем­ле­дельч. па­мят­ни­ки на сты­ке Ниж­ней и Ср. Янц­зы от­но­сят­ся к кон. 10-го тыс. (Сянь­жэнь­дун; Дяо­тунху­ань, ок. 9000–7000, ино­гда при­во­дят бо­лее ран­ние да­ты); ок. 7500–6100 на юго-за­па­де бас­сей­на Ср. Янц­зы рас­про­стра­ня­ет­ся куль­ту­ра Пэн­то­ушань. В Древ­нем При­мо­рье 8-м тыс. да­ти­ру­ет­ся ниж­ний слой по­се­ле­ния Пэй­ли­ган; ме­ж­ду Ср. Янц­зы и Древ­ним При­морь­ем на­хо­ди­лась куль­ту­ра Цзя­ху (7000–5800); к се­ве­ру от Ср. Ху­ан­хэ – по­се­ле­ние Нань­чжу­ан­тоу (пров. Хэ­бэй; 8500–7700); на Шань­ду­не к это­му вре­ме­ни от­но­сят на­ход­ки из Бянь­бянь­ду­на (тё­роч­ник, ку­рант, фраг­мен­ты ке­ра­ми­ки). Все зо­ны, кро­ме Ниж­ней Янц­зы, объ­е­ди­ня­ет на­ли­чие не­глу­бо­ких по­лу­сфе­рич. со­су­дов на трёх ко­рот­ких нож­ках (три­по­дов), Ср. Ху­ан­хэ и Древ­нее При­мо­рье – на­ли­чие кор­чаг с руч­ка­ми-уш­ка­ми, пре­об­ла­да­ние плос­ко­дон­ных со­су­дов, на Янц­зы наи­бо­лее мно­го­чис­лен­ны круг­ло­дон­ные, по­яв­ля­ют­ся рюм­ко­об­раз­ные, по-ви­ди­мо­му, ри­ту­аль­ные со­су­ды. Древ­нее При­мо­рье и Ср. Янц­зы сбли­жа­ет на­ли­чие спе­ци­фич. кор­ча­ги с руч­ка­ми-уш­ка­ми на пле­чи­ках. Эти свя­зи со­хра­ня­ют­ся и в сле­дую­щий пе­ри­од.

В ле­со­сте­пи из­вест­на куль­ту­ра Син­лун­ва. Юж­нее хреб­та Нань­лин, в бас­сей­не р. Сиц­зян, на тер­ри­то­рии совр. Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ско­го ав­то­ном­но­го р-на, к это­му пе­рио­ду от­но­сят­ся куль­ту­ры Цзэн­пи­янь 1, Ба­оц­зы­тоу, Бай­лянь­дун 2; для них ха­рак­тер­ны круг­ло­дон­ные горш­ки, пле­чи­ко­вые то­по­ры, мо­ты­ги; шли­фован­ных ору­дий уже дос­та­точ­но мно­го. Это­му кру­гу при­над­ле­жит и Хай­лэй­дун на Тай­ва­не. В гор­но-лес­ных и степ­ных об­лас­тях в это вре­мя, а в не­ко­то­рых райо­нах и позд­нее, су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли верх­не­па­лео­ли­тиче­ские по об­ли­ку куль­ту­ры охот­ни­ков и со­би­ра­те­лей.

С т. н. сред­неран­не­го не­оли­та (5500–4500 до н. э.) мож­но го­во­рить об ус­той­чи­вых куль­ту­рах, пред­став­лен­ных груп­па­ми па­мят­ни­ков; зем­ле­дель­цы ос­вои­ли аг­рар­ные оча­ги 5 осн. зон и ок­раи­ны фор­ми­рую­щей­ся Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­ны; ке­ра­ми­ка ста­но­вит­ся раз­но­об­раз­нее и ка­че­ст­вен­нее (на се­ве­ре со­хра­ня­ет­ся в осн. плос­ко­дон­ная, на юге – круг­ло­дон­ная), рас­про­стра­ня­ют­ся свои для ка­ж­дой зо­ны фор­мы три­по­дов и ор­на­мен­та­ции (в осн. штамп); вы­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют­ся стан­дар­ты до­мо­строи­тель­ст­ва (ок­руг­лые по­лу­зем­лян­ки для ря­да куль­тур в бас­сей­не Ср. Ху­ан­хэ и Древ­не­го При­мо­рья, пря­мо­уголь­ные со скруг­лён­ны­ми уг­ла­ми в зо­не Шань­дун, свай­но-стол­бовые на Ниж­ней Янц­зы и т. д.); от­ме­че­ны ус­той­чи­вые по­гре­баль­ные об­ря­ды (в осн. раз­но­вид­но­сти тру­по­по­ло­же­ний, вы­тя­ну­тые на спи­не и скор­чен­ные на бо­ку). За­фик­си­ро­ва­но тка­че­ст­во, из­го­тов­ле­ние ци­но­вок. В зо­нах Янц­зы и юж­нее ос­но­вой эко­но­ми­ки бы­ло вы­ра­щи­ва­ние ри­са, се­вер­нее – про­са. Фор­ми­ру­ют­ся но­вые свя­зи, наи­бо­лее ин­тен­сив­ные ме­ж­ду куль­ту­ра­ми Ср. Ху­ан­хэ и Древ­не­го При­мо­рья, а так­же по сто­ро­нам Древ­не­го Про­ли­ва (зо­ны Шань­дун с При­морь­ем и Ниж­ней Янц­зы).

Среднеранний неолит: 1 – культура Пэйлиган. Каменный серп. Институт археологии провинции Хэнань (Чжэнчжоу); 2 – культура Лаогуаньтай. Расписная керамическая чаша на трёх ножках. Историческ…

В Древ­нем При­мо­рье, к югу от вы­хо­да в Древ­ний Про­лив, рас­про­стра­ни­лась куль­ту­ра Пэй­ли­ган, к се­ве­ру – Цы­шань; в пре­де­лах зо­ны Ср. Ху­ан­хэ важ­ней­шим был очаг в вост. и центр. час­ти до­ли­ны р. Вэй­хэ (Лао­гу­ань­тай и Бэй­шо­улин). На Верх­ней Ху­ан­хэ, гео­гра­фи­че­ски чёт­ко от­де­лён­ной от бас­сей­на Вэй­хэ, вы­деля­ют куль­ту­ру Да­ди­вань (5200–4500; в ос­но­ве хо­зяй­ст­ва – вы­ра­щи­ва­ние про­са и сви­но­вод­ст­во; по­лу­круг­лые по­лу­зем­лян­ки; круг­ло­дон­ные мис­ки, ча­ши на под­до­не, три­под на ос­но­ве круг­ло­дон­ной ча­ши или со­су­да ба­ноч­но­го ти­па, не­ко­то­рые име­ют чер­ты сход­ст­ва с ке­ра­ми­кой Лао­гу­ань­тай). С Лао­гу­ань­тай есть сход­ст­во и у па­мят­ни­ков в зап. час­ти вер­хо­вий р. Хань­шуй. На тер­ри­то­рии Шань­дун­ско­го п-ова вы­де­ле­на куль­ту­ра Хо­ули. На Ниж­ней Янц­зы из­вест­ны куль­ту­ры Хэ­му­ду (4-й слой), Хо­уц­зя­чжай (к се­ве­ро-вос­то­ку от совр. г. Нан­кин; 5300–4500). Па­мят­ни­ки Ср. Янц­зы не все­гда ещё мож­но све­сти в куль­ту­ры; на за­па­де этой зо­ны вы­де­ле­на куль­ту­ра Чэн­бэй­си (5600–5400); на юго-за­па­де – ниж­ний слой Цао­ши (5500–5000) и др. (ино­гда их объ­е­ди­ня­ют как тра­ди­цию «до куль­ту­ры Да­си»).

Се­вер­нее осн. зон, в ле­со­степ­ной час­ти Внутр. Мон­го­лии, зап. ча­сти пров. Ляо­нин, куль­ту­ру Син­лун­ва сме­ня­ет Чжао­бао­гоу; на тер­ри­то­рии Мань­чжу­рии вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ру Синь­лэ; к се­ве­ро-вос­то­ку от совр. Пе­ки­на – Шан­чжай (5200–4500), близ­кую как куль­ту­рам се­ве­ро-вос­то­ка совр. тер­ри­то­рии К., так и Цы­шань в Древ­нем При­мо­рье.

Сред­ний не­олит (ок. 4500–2500 до н. э.) ино­гда ус­лов­но де­лят на ран­ний и позд­ний. Од­ной из важ­ней­ших от­ли­чит. черт это­го пе­рио­да яв­ля­ет­ся на­ли­чие в куль­ту­рах всех осн. зон рас­пис­ной ке­ра­ми­ки (см. в статьях Кра­ше­ной ке­ра­ми­ки куль­ту­ры, Яншао), ис­че­заю­щей в позд­нем не­оли­те.

Средний неолит. Культура Давэнькоу: 1 – керамическая урна, 2 – гребень из слоновой кости. Музей провинции Шаньдун (Цзинань); 3 – культура Мяодигоу. Расписной керамический сосуд. Музе…

На Ср. Ху­ан­хэ, в бас­сей­не Вэй­хэ, рас­про­стра­не­ны куль­ту­ры Бань­по 1, Шиц­зя­цунь (3200–3000), за­пад­нее – Сань­ли­цяо (4000–3000), Мяо­ди­гоу 1, Си­ван­цунь (2900–2400). На юге Древ­не­го При­мо­рья, уже рас­ши­ряю­ще­го­ся на фор­ми­рую­щую­ся Ве­ли­кую Ки­тай­скую рав­ни­ну, вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ры Чжун­шань­чжай 2, Да­хэ­цунь 1–2 (3300–2700), Цинь­ван­чжай; на се­ве­ре Древ­не­го При­мо­рья – Хо­уган 1, Да­сы­кун 1 (2700–2500).

В юж. час­ти бас­сей­на Ниж­ней Янц­зы про­дол­жа­ли раз­ви­вать­ся тра­ди­ции Хэ­му­ду (2–4-й слои); в рай­оне оз. Тай­ху и на при­мы­каю­щих зем­лях рас­про­стра­ни­лись Мац­зя­бан, Сунц­зэ, Лян­чжу (ран­ний и ср. пе­рио­ды), сме­няю­щие друг дру­га. Имен­но в этом рай­оне фор­ми­ру­ют­ся древ­ней­шие про­то- и ран­не­го­су­дар­ст­вен­ные ин­сти­ту­ты; мно­гие свя­зан­ные с этим ат­ри­бу­ты свет­ской и ду­хов­ной вла­сти рас­про­стра­ня­ют­ся от­сю­да по всем др. зо­нам. Влия­ние этих куль­тур про­сле­же­но на бо­лее зап. па­мят­ни­ках Ниж­ней Янц­зы: в рай­оне совр. г. Нан­кин и се­вер­нее вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ру Бэй­инь­янъ­ин (4000–3000; ха­рак­тер­ны ка­мен­ные но­жи с не­сколь­ки­ми от­вер­стия­ми, три­по­ды на ба­зе круг­ло­дон­но­го горш­ка, ча­ши на под­до­нах, рос­пись го­ри­зон­таль­ным ря­дом ром­бов на па­рад­ных со­су­дах, уни­каль­но по­яв­ле­ние ке­ра­мич. чай­ни­ка с руч­кой); юго-за­пад­нее вы­де­ля­ют близ­кую куль­ту­ру Сю­эц­зя­ган (4 пе­рио­да в рам­ках 4000–3300), юж­нее, у оз. По­ян­ху, – Шань­бэй. На Ср. Янц­зы скла­ды­ва­ют­ся куль­ту­ры Да­си, Цюй­цзя­лин, Цин­лун­цю­ань.

В сев. и зап. час­ти Шань­ду­на из­вест­на куль­ту­ра Бэй­синь (4700–3600), юж­нее – Да­дунь­цзы (4200–3700; ра­нее рас­смат­ри­ва­ли в рам­ках Да­вэнь­коу), её сме­ни­ла Да­вэнь­коу. Наи­бо­лее ин­тен­сив­ны­ми бы­ли свя­зи этих куль­тур с куль­ту­ра­ми Ниж­ней Янц­зы; с Да­дунь­цзы свя­зы­ва­ют фор­ми­ро­ва­ние ещё од­но­го цен­тра ран­не­го­род­ской куль­ту­ры.

На се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке тер­ри­то­рии совр. К. вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ру Хун­шань (па­мят­ни­ки вос­то­ка Внутр. Мон­го­лии, ра­нее от­но­си­мые к ней, вы­де­ля­ют в куль­ту­ру Фу­хэ, 3600–2600; пре­им. охот­ни­ки); на юге Ляо­дун­ско­го п-ова – куль­ту­ру Хоу­ва и её остров­ной ва­ри­ант Ся­оч­жу­шань с ра­ко­вин­ны­ми ку­ча­ми (2 пе­рио­да: 4500–4000 и 4000–3500). На юго-вос­то­ке тер­ри­то­рии совр. К., к югу от хреб­та Нань­лин, из­вест­ны куль­ту­ра Си­цяо­шань (3500–3000), где пред­став­ле­ны тор­цо­вые и ко­нич. нук­леу­сы, с ко­то­рых сни­ма­лись мик­ро­пла­сти­ны; куль­ту­ра Да­вань на тер­ри­то­рии совр. Гон­кон­га, где дол­го­вре­мен­ные по­се­ле­ния (в т. ч. свай­ные до­ма) со­че­та­лись с вре­мен­ны­ми дюн­ны­ми сто­ян­ка­ми для про­мыс­ла ры­бы и мол­лю­сков; най­ден­ная рас­пис­ная ке­ра­ми­ка име­ет ана­ло­гии с Да­си (3000–1000) и др.

На Тай­ва­не и зап. бе­ре­гу Тай­вань­ско­го прол. рас­про­ст­ра­не­на куль­ту­ра Да­бэнь­кэн и её ва­риант Фу­го­дунь (4800–3500), ос­но­ван­ные на вы­ра­щи­ва­нии та­ро, ры­бо­лов­ст­ве, мор. со­би­ра­тель­ст­ве; ти­пич­ны ка­мен­ные мо­ты­ги с ус­ту­пом на спин­ке для креп­ле­ния Г-об­раз­ной ру­коя­ти, ка­мен­ные и ке­ра­мич. ко­ло­туш­ки-та­пы, ке­ра­ми­ка с от­тис­ка­ми ве­рёв­ки и зуб­ча­то­го края ра­ко­вин; ве­ро­ят­но, она соз­да­на пред­ка­ми ав­стро­не­зий­цев.

Поздний неолит – энеолит: 1 – культура Кэшэнчжуан. Трипод с полыми ножками. Музей провинции Шэньси (Сиань), 2 – круг культур Лянчжу. Фигурка из нефрита. Музей провинции Аньхой (Хэфэй…

Для позд­не­го не­оли­та – энео­ли­та (ок. 3500–1700) мож­но ут­верж­дать, что в это вре­мя сфор­ми­ро­вал­ся ряд гор. цен­тров и ран­них гос. об­ра­зо­ва­ний, скла­ды­ва­лись мо­ну­мен­таль­ная ар­хи­тек­ту­ра, слож­ная со­ци­аль­ная ие­рар­хия, от­ра­жён­ная и в ре­ли­гии, рас­про­стра­не­нии ве­ры в ан­тро­по­морф­ных бо­гов, на­чат­ках пись­мен­но­сти. В со­ци­аль­ном раз­ви­тии ве­ду­щи­ми ос­та­ва­лись куль­ту­ры Ниж­ней Янц­зы и Шань­ду­на. В раз­ных зо­нах рас­про­стра­ня­ют­ся ва­риа­ции три­по­да ти­па «с по­лы­ми нож­ка­ми на ос­но­ве горш­ка», свя­зан­ные с ним цен­тры не­ред­ко со­от­но­сят с эт­но­сом хуа­ся, хо­тя этот тип со­су­да воз­ник, по-ви­ди­мо­му, на Шань­ду­не и был из­вес­тен у др. на­ро­дов.

На Ниж­ней Янц­зы, про­дол­жая тра­ди­ции Лян­чжу (позд­ний пе­ри­од), сло­жи­лось од­но из са­мых ран­них го­су­дарств в Вост. Азии (с ним свя­зы­ва­ют го­ро­ди­ще Моц­зяо­шань); по­ка­за­тель­но на­ли­чие го­ро­дов, хра­мов, ал­та­рей, по­гре­бе­ний «ца­рей» и «жре­цов»; фор­ми­ру­ет­ся слож­ная ре­лиг. сис­те­ма, вклю­чаю­щая ан­тро­по­морф­ных бо­гов; здесь сло­жил­ся пер­вый в Вост. Азии ком­плекс ат­ри­бу­тов выс­шей вла­сти из неф­ри­та (коль­ца-би, жез­лы-цу­ны, то­по­ры-юэ и др.); есть ли­ней­ная пись­мен­ность в ви­де отд. зна­ков.

В вер­ховь­ях Ху­ан­хэ фор­ми­ру­ет­ся аг­рар­ный и куль­тур­ный очаг, пред­став­лен­ный куль­ту­ра­ми Ши­лин­ся, Мац­зя­яо.

Па­мят­ни­ки энео­ли­та Шань­дун­ско­го п-ова ра­нее от­но­си­ли к по­зд­не­му нео­ли­ту (т. н. куль­ту­ра Лун­шань); в совр. ис­сле­до­ва­ни­ях вы­де­ля­ют не ме­нее 4 групп па­мят­ни­ков: Чэнц­зыя на се­ве­ре, Инь­цзя­чэн на за­па­де, Лян­чэн­чжэнь на вос­то­ке и др. Здесь срав­ни­тель­но мно­го го­ро­дов, круп­ней­ший – Цзяо­чан­пу (на се­ве­ро-за­па­де Шань­ду­на; сте­ной об­не­се­на пл. ок. 400000 м2), об­на­ру­же­ны об­раз­цы пись­мен­но­сти (Дин­гун­цунь).

В Древ­нем При­мо­рье, к югу от Ху­ан­хэ, из­вест­ны го­ро­ди­ща мень­ших раз­ме­ров, сре­ди них – Гу­чэн­чжай, Ван­чэн­ган (ха­рак­тер­ны пря­мо­уголь­ная фор­ма, сте­ны из ут­рам­бо­ван­ной зем­ли) и др., се­вер­нее Ху­ан­хэ вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ры Хо­уган 2 и др., за­пад­нее – Мяо­ди­гоу 2 (2500–2000); в бас­сей­не Вэй­хэ – Кэ­шэн­чжу­ан 2; в до­ли­не р. Фынь­хэ – Тао­сы; в до­ли­не, со­еди­няю­щий ле­вые при­то­ки Ср. Янц­зы и юг Древ­не­го При­мо­рья, – Ха­оц­зя­тай (рай­он г. Янь­чэн; ок. 2500 или 2300). В зо­не, где об­ра­зо­ва­лась Ве­ли­кая Ки­тай­ская рав­ни­на, за­се­ляе­мая зем­ле­дель­ца­ми из Древ­не­го При­мо­рья и Шань­ду­на, од­ним из опор­ных па­мят­ни­ков яв­ля­ет­ся го­ро­ди­ще Пин­лян­тай (ок. 2350–2130). На Ср. Янц­зы из­вест­ны куль­ту­ры Шиц­зя­хэ, Цин­лун­цю­ань 3 и др.

За пре­де­ла­ми этих зон, в бас­сей­не Верх­ней Ху­ан­хэ, на од­ном из па­мят­ни­ков Мац­зя­яо (Линь­цзи) об­на­ру­жен брон­зо­вый нож; ес­ли это не им­порт, мож­но говорить о на­ча­ле на этой тер­ри­то­рии эне­о­ли­та. По­зд­нее здесь сло­жи­лись куль­ту­ры Бань­шань, Ма­чан. На се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке совр. тер­ри­то­рии К. про­дол­жа­лось раз­ви­тие куль­ту­ры Ся­оч­жу­шань (пе­ри­од 3; 2500–2100); на юго-вос­то­ке из­вест­на куль­ту­ра Тань­ши­шань (ок. 3200–2000; пров. Фуц­зянь), для ко­то­рой ха­рак­тер­на штам­по­ван­ная ке­ра­ми­ка, к югу от хреб­та Нань­лин – Ши­ся и др., на юж­ном и юго-зап. по­бе­режье о. Тай­вань – Ню­чоу­цзы (2500–1500), где пре­об­ла­да­ет ке­ра­ми­ка с ве­рёвоч­ным от­тис­ком и об­на­ру­же­ны наи­бо­лее ран­ние на остро­ве от­пе­чат­ки ри­со­вых зё­рен; культура Фэн­би­тоу (2500–500), по мно­гим приз­на­кам (напр., ри­ту­аль­ное уда­ле­ние зу­бов) свя­зан­ная про­ис­хож­де­ни­ем с Тань­ши­шань; на сев.-зап. побережье – Юань­шань (2000–700), для ко­то­рой по­ка­затель­ны шли­фо­ван­ные мо­ты­ги с ус­ту­пом и пле­чи­ко­вые то­по­ры, брон­зо­вый на­ко­неч­ник стре­лы, ука­зы­ваю­щий на кон­так­ты с куль­ту­рой Инь (Шан).


Бронзовый век. Бронзовые сосуды из Эрлитоу. Институт археологии Академии общественных наук Китая (Пекин).

На­ча­ло брон­зо­во­го ве­ка в Вост. Азии во мно­гом не­яс­но. Един­ст­вен­ная куль­ту­ра это­го пе­рио­да на тер­ри­то­рии К., где из­де­лия из брон­зы не еди­нич­ны (Циц­зя), рас­по­ло­же­на к за­па­ду от осн. аг­рар­ных зон, на Верх­ней Янц­зы, и по­сте­пен­но про­ни­ка­ет на Ср. Ху­ан­хэ. Древ­ней­шие ме­тал­лич. из­де­лия (кро­ме мел­ких) пред­став­ле­ны в осн. аг­рар­ных зо­нах К. фор­ма­ми, ве­ро­ят­нее все­го, прив­не­сён­ны­ми 2 пу­тя­ми: из зо­ны кон­так­тов со сте­пя­ми и из зо­ны, свя­зан­ной с п-овом Ин­до­ки­тай (см. так­же в ст. Во­сточ­но-Ази­ат­ская ме­тал­лур­ги­че­ская про­вин­ция). Цен­тры со­ци­аль­но-эко­но­мич. и тех­но­ло­гич. раз­ви­тия на­хо­дят­ся в круп­ных древ­них аг­рар­ных оча­гах, но в них яв­но учи­ты­ва­ет­ся со­ци­аль­ный и тех­ни­че­ский опыт жи­те­лей др. зон и оча­гов. В кит. ар­хео­ло­гич. лит-ре куль­ту­ры, в ко­то­рых есть еди­нич­ные на­ход­ки брон­зо­вых из­де­лий, обыч­но на­зы­ва­ют­ся нео­ли­ти­че­ски­ми; эти куль­ту­ры рас­по­ло­же­ны вне пре­де­лов пра­ро­ди­ны хуа­ся.

В зо­не Ниж­ней Янц­зы на­ча­ло брон­зо­во­го ве­ка свя­зы­ва­ют с эне­о­ли­тич. па­мят­ни­ка­ми Лян­чжу (по внеш­ним при­зна­кам ря­да из­де­лий из неф­ри­та и др.), но дос­то­вер­но – с куль­ту­рой Ма­цяо (ок. 2000–1600). Их ос­та­ви­ли но­си­те­ли ав­ст­роа­зи­ат­ских язы­ков или, воз­мож­но, авс­тро­не­зий­цы. Не­мно­го вы­ше по те­че­нию Ян­цзы брон­за рас­про­стра­ни­лась при­бли­зи­тель­но то­гда же, в куль­ту­рах Юй­дунь, Ху­шу, на пра­вом бе­ре­гу – не­мно­го позд­нее (Учэн), там об­на­ру­же­но круп­ное гор. по­се­ле­ние, са­мо­сто­ят. ли­ней­ное ие­рог­ли­фич. пись­мо, вос­хо­дя­щее, ви­ди­мо, к Лян­чжу. Юж­нее Ниж­ней Ян­ц­зы к брон­зо­во­му ве­ку от­но­сит­ся куль­ту­ра Ху­ан­ту­лунь (ок. 1500–1000).

На вост. по­бе­ре­жье Тай­ва­ня вы­де­ля­ют куль­ту­ры Ци­линь и Бэй­нань (1500–1000), для ко­то­рых ха­рак­тер­ны за­хо­ро­не­ния в ка­мен­ных ящи­ках, а так­же воз­ве­де­ние ме­га­ли­тов; в по­след­ней куль­туре вы­яв­ле­ны по­во­рот­ные гар­пу­ны из неф­ри­та, что сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ет об охо­те на ки­тов или круп­ную ры­бу. На тер­ри­то­рии Шань­дун­ско­го п-ова брон­зо­вый век на­чал­ся поч­ти од­но­вре­мен­но с Ниж­ней Янц­зы (Юэши). На вос­то­ке Ср. Ян­ц­зы эта эпо­ха пред­став­ле­на куль­ту­рой Пань­лун­чэн, за­пад­нее – куль­ту­рой Сань­син­дуй. Об­ще­ст­ва в до­ли­не Вэй­хэ доль­ше за­дер­жи­ва­ют­ся на не­оли­тич. эта­пе (Кэ­син­чжу­ан 2), но позд­нее рез­ко об­го­ня­ют др. зо­ны в тех­но­ло­гич. и со­ци­аль­ном раз­ви­тии.

В Древ­нем При­мо­рье брон­за рас­про­стра­ни­лась чуть позд­нее, но куль­ту­ра Эр­ли­тоу 3 ста­но­вит­ся в бас­сей­не Ху­ан­хэ с 17 в. од­ной из наи­бо­лее раз­ви­тых в со­ци­аль­но-по­ли­тич. и куль­тур­ном от­но­ше­нии (го­ро­да, двор­цо­вый ком­плекс, раз­ви­тая ме­тал­лур­гия, слож­ная ри­ту­аль­ная прак­ти­ка – еди­нич­ные брон­зо­вые со­су­ды, кос­ти без над­пи­сей, но со сле­да­ми га­да­ний, ко­то­рые со­от­вет­ст­ву­ют из­вест­ным в гос-ве Шан и др.). Её влия­ние ши­ро­ко рас­про­стра­ни­лось в пре­де­лах Ср. Ху­ан­хэ и се­вер­нее (Дун­ся­фэн). В кит. ис­то­рио­гра­фии с ней свя­зы­ва­ют ле­ген­дар­ную «ди­на­стию Ся». Ко 2-й пол. 17 в. вос­хо­дит пре­да­ние о пред­ках пра­ви­те­лей гос-ва Инь (Шан) от Чэн-та­на до Ян-цзя [2-я пол. 17 (в кит. науч. тра­ди­ции датируется с 18 в.) – кон. 14 вв.] – в это вре­мя, ви­ди­мо, шёл про­цесс фор­ми­ро­ва­ния по­тес­тар­ных ин­сти­ту­тов, со­про­во­ж­дав­ший пе­ре­се­ле­ние на­ро­да шан.

К древ­ней­шим куль­ту­рам брон­зо­во­го ве­ка к за­па­ду от Ср. Ху­ан­хэ от­но­сит­ся свя­зан­ная с ев­ра­зий­ски­ми сте­пя­ми куль­ту­ра Циц­зя (2200–1600), ко­то­рую сме­ня­ют куль­ту­ры Сы­ба и Синь­дянь; их свя­зы­ва­ют с пред­ка­ми древ­них цянов. Для ру­бе­жа 2-го и 1-го тыс. и нач. 1-го тыс. на тер­ри­то­рии пров. Гань­су вы­де­ле­ны куль­ту­ры Тан­ван, Сы­ва и Шац­зин. За­пад­нее в Цин­хае су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли куль­ту­ра Каяо и, воз­мож­но, свя­зан­ная с ней куль­ту­ра Но­му­хун (1400–700), в ко­то­рой ка­мен­ный ин­вен­тарь (то­по­ры, мо­ты­ги, но­жи, на­ко­неч­ни­ки стрел) най­ден вме­сте с брон­зо­вым (про­уш­ные то­по­ры, во­гну­то­обуш­ко­вые но­жи, се­ки­ры и др.), воз­де­лы­ва­ние пше­ни­цы со­че­та­лось с раз­ве­де­ни­ем овец, ко­ров, ло­ша­дей, верб­лю­дов и, воз­мож­но, яков (су­дя по ке­ра­мич. фи­гур­ке). На Ляо­дун­ском п-ове вы­де­ле­на куль­ту­ра Ян­то­ува, её сме­ня­ет куль­ту­ра ниж­не­го слоя Сяц­зя­дянь, се­вер­нее из­вест­на куль­ту­ра Си­ту­ань­шань, на тер­ри­то­рии пров. Хэй­лунц­зян – Бай­цзинь­бао (ок. 1000–500).

С 14 в. центр раз­ви­тия пе­ре­ме­ща­ет­ся не­сколь­ко вос­точ­нее, в рай­он совр. г. Чжэн­чжоу, т. е. на гра­ни­цу всё бо­лее рас­ши­ряю­щих­ся аг­рар­ных зе­мель фор­ми­рую­щей­ся Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­ны (куль­ту­ра Чжэн­чжоу – Эр­ли­ган). Ок. 1300 в аг­рар­ном оча­ге к се­ве­ру от вы­хо­да Ху­ан­хэ на Ве­ли­кую Ки­тай­скую рав­ни­ну воз­ни­ка­ет куль­ту­ра Инь­сюй, свя­зан­ная с це­нт­ра­ми гос-ва Шан. На се­ве­ро-за­па­де тер­ри­то­рии К. раз­ви­ва­лись куль­ту­ры, свя­зан­ные с ми­ром ко­чев­ни­ков Ев­ра­зии, мно­гие их но­си­те­ли по­зд­нее бы­ли опи­са­ны кит. ис­то­ри­ка­ми под име­нем ху.

Исторический очерк

Древний Китай

Со­глас­но ар­хео­ло­гич. дан­ным, че­ло­век на­чал за­се­лять Вост. Азию ок. 2 млн. лет на­зад. На тер­ри­то­рии К. не бы­ло за­мет­но­го раз­ры­ва в сме­не че­ло­ве­че­ских по­пу­ля­ций. Об­на­ру­же­ние в 1920-х гг. в К. па­мят­ни­ков древ­не­ка­мен­но­го ве­ка по­зво­ли­ло оп­ро­верг­нуть тра­диц. тео­рию, со­глас­но ко­то­рой ис­то­рия кит. на­ро­да на­чи­на­ет­ся лишь в 3–1-м тыс. до н. э., с пе­рио­да «Трёх ди­на­стий» (Ся, Инь, Чжоу).

В по­зд­нем па­лео­ли­те шёл про­цесс ра­со­об­ра­зо­ва­ния, не­оан­тро­пы уже об­ла­да­ли за­мет­ны­ми мон­го­ло­ид­ны­ми чер­та­ми. По­сте­пен­но на­ча­лось фор­ми­ро­ва­ние не­ко­то­рых куль­то­вых пред­став­ле­ний, что про­яви­лось в воз­ник­но­ве­нии по­гре­баль­но­го об­ря­да и по­сы­па­нии умер­ших крас­ным ге­ма­ти­то­вым по­рош­ком. За­ро­ди­лось иск-во, од­на­ко да­ти­ров­ка на­скаль­ных ри­сун­ков, об­на­ру­жен­ных в разл. час­тях К., дис­кус­си­он­на. На сто­ян­ке Ши­юй най­де­ны кос­ти с на­ре­за­ми, нёс­ши­ми, по-ви­ди­мо­му, ин­фор­ма­ци­он­ную на­груз­ку.

От­кры­тая Ю. Г. Ан­дер­со­ном в 1921 куль­ту­ра Ян­шао име­ла важ­ное зна­че­ние для изу­че­ния кит. ци­ви­ли­за­ции. В 1928 кит. учё­ный У Цзинь­дин ис­сле­до­вал в пров. Шань­дун па­мят­ни­ки куль­ту­ры Лун­шань, унас­ле­до­вав­шей дос­ти­же­ния Ян­шао. То­гда же Ли Цзи, Лян Сы­юн и др. кит. учё­ные на­ча­ли рас­коп­ки Инь­сюя. Но­вей­шие ар­хео­ло­гич. ма­те­риа­лы по­зво­ля­ют сде­лать вы­вод, что в не­о­ли­те на тер­ри­то­рии К. су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло неск. куль­тур­ных про­вин­ций: для куль­тур в бас­сей­не р. Чанц­зян (Янц­зы) и к югу от не­го ос­но­вой хо­зяй­ст­ва бы­ло ри­со­вод­ст­во; в ра­йо­не, тя­го­тев­шем к Юго-Вост. Азии, пе­ре­ход к про­из­во­дя­ще­му хо­зяй­ст­ву был свя­зан с раз­ви­ти­ем жи­вот­но­вод­ст­ва, в мень­шей сте­пе­ни – зем­ле­де­лия, а так­же, ве­ро­ят­но, ак­ва­куль­ту­ры. Се­вер­нее на­хо­ди­лись аре­а­лы вы­со­ко­раз­ви­тых куль­тур. Их но­си­те­ли бы­ли зем­ле­дель­ца­ми, вы­ра­щи­ва­ли за­лив­ной рис и раз­во­ди­ли сви­ней, со­бак и буй­во­лов, они бы­ли зна­ко­мы с пря­де­ни­ем и тка­че­ст­вом; уме­ли ис­кус­но об­ра­ба­ты­вать не­фрит; об­ла­да­ли на­вы­ка­ми строи­тель­ст­ва и де­ре­во­об­ра­бот­ки, о чём сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют проч­ные де­рев. сош­ни­ки и мно­го­числ. ис­кус­но из­го­тов­лен­ные ук­ра­ше­ния и пред­ме­ты не­из­вест­но­го, воз­мож­но, куль­то­во­го на­зна­че­ния. На тер­ри­то­рии пос. Хэ­му­ду об­на­ру­же­ны неск. ря­дов па­рал­лель­но стоя­щих мно­го­ка­мер­ных длин­ных до­мов на сва­ях (дли­на од­но­го из них 23 м). Та­кая фор­ма по­стро­ек по­лу­чи­ла за­тем рас­про­стра­не­ние в рай­онах к югу от Чанц­зя­на. Не­о­ли­тич. куль­ту­рам бас­сей­на Ху­ан­хэ от Шань­ду­на до Гань­су при­су­щи не­ко­то­рые об­щие чер­ты. На­ли­чие круп­ных по­се­ле­ний (пл. 1–2 га) мо­жет сви­де­тель­ст­во­вать об об­ра­зо­ва­нии зна­чит. ро­до-пле­мен­ных групп. Осн. про­дук­ты пи­та­ния да­ва­ло зер­но­вое зем­ле­де­лие – вы­ра­щи­ва­ние про­са и чу­ми­зы, а так­же жи­вот­но­вод­ство – раз­ве­де­ние сви­ней, со­бак, кур, ба­ра­нов. Но­си­те­ли этих куль­тур уме­ли из­го­тов­лять ке­ра­ми­ку и шли­фо­ван­ные ка­мен­ные ору­дия.

Ар­хео­ло­гич. на­ход­ки по­ка­зы­ва­ют, что соз­да­те­ли древ­них куль­тур, ве­ро­ят­но, вне­сли вклад в фор­ми­ро­ва­ние кит. пись­мен­но­сти и раз­ви­тие ме­тал­лур­гии: зна­ки на ке­ра­ми­ке Да­вэнь­коу, Лун­ша­ня и Мац­зя­яо об­ла­да­ют оп­ре­де­лён­ным сход­ст­вом с пись­мен­но­стью пе­рио­да ди­на­стии Инь (Шан) (см. Ки­тай­ское пись­мо). На вос­то­ке в пре­де­лах Лун­ша­ня, а воз­мож­но Да­вэнь­коу, на за­па­де в позд­нем Мац­зя­яо и его про­дол­же­нии – куль­ту­ре Ци­цзя об­на­ру­же­ны сле­ды про­из-ва ме­тал­ла.

Не­пре­рыв­ность и по­сле­до­ва­тель­ность ис­то­рич. раз­ви­тия на­блю­да­ет­ся и в бас­сей­не ниж­не­го те­че­ния Чанц­зя­на. На ба­зе дос­ти­же­ний ме­ст­ных куль­тур воз­ник­ли куль­ту­ры, соз­да­те­ли ко­то­рых бы­ли зна­ко­мы с про­из-вом кра­ше­ной ке­ра­ми­ки, а так­же вы­ра­щи­ва­ли за­лив­ной рис, раз­во­ди­ли шел­ко­пря­да, из­го­тав­ли­ва­ли раз­но­об­раз­ные неф­ри­то­вые из­де­лия (не­ко­то­рые из­де­лия в этом сти­ле впо­след­ст­вии пре­вра­ти­лись в зна­ки вла­сти, вы­со­ко­го со­ци­аль­но­го по­ло­же­ния и ха­рак­тер­ные ук­ра­ше­ния кит. ари­сто­кра­тии).

В 3-м тыс. на тер­ри­то­рии К. фор­ми­ро­ва­лась ци­ви­ли­за­ция, при­зна­ка­ми ко­то­рой бы­ли строи­тель­ст­во го­ро­дов и двор­цов, раз­ви­тая ме­тал­лур­гия, культ пред­ков, на­ли­чие пись­мен­но­сти и др.

Со­глас­но ар­хео­ло­гич. дан­ным, во 2-й пол. 3-го тыс. в цен­тре Сев. К. строи­лись до­воль­но круп­ные, пло­ща­дью от 0,75 га до 3,2 км2 го­ро­да, ок­ру­жён­ные кре­по­ст­ной сте­ной, имев­шей у ос­но­ва­ния ши­ри­ну до 10 м. Она со­ору­жа­лась ме­то­дом на­слаи­ва­ния ут­рам­бо­ван­ных пла­стов зем­ли. Это стро­и­тель­ст­во свя­зы­ва­ет­ся с име­на­ми Гу­на и его сы­на Юя (2205–2198).

По­ми­мо лун­шань­ско­го и циц­зя­ско­го ме­тал­лур­гич. цен­тров, в 21–16 или 24–15 вв. в центр. и зап. об­лас­тях Хэ­нань и юж. Шань­си су­ще­ст­во­вал центр из­го­тов­ле­ния брон­зы Эр­ли­тоу.

О раз­ви­тии куль­то­вых пред­став­ле­ний сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют най­ден­ные в рай­оне дер. Сяо­тунь (се­ве­ро-вос­ток пров. Хэ­нань) кос­ти жи­вот­ных и пан­ци­ри че­ре­пах, ко­то­рые яв­ля­ют­ся, по мне­нию учёных, га­даль­ны­ми кос­тя­ми (да­ти­ру­ют­ся 14–11 вв.), а вы­ре­зан­ные на них зна­ки – древ­ней­шей фор­мой кит. пись­мен­но­сти. Най­де­но св. 150 тыс. та­ко­го ро­да га­даль­ных кос­тей, вы­де­ле­но бо­лее 5 тыс. разл. гра­фем, из ко­то­рых поч­ти 2 тыс. де­шиф­ро­ва­ны.

С раз­ви­ти­ем пись­мен­но­сти был тес­но свя­зан об­ряд га­да­ния, пре­вра­тив­ший­ся в важ­ный эле­мент куль­то­вой и по­ли­тич. жиз­ни Древ­не­го К. В пе­ри­од не­оли­та в К. су­ще­ст­во­вал культ пред­ков. В 18/17–12/11 вв. он при­об­рёл ус­той­чи­вый ха­рак­тер и был ин­сти­ту­цио­на­ли­зи­ро­ван; су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли спец. по­ме­ще­ния для от­прав­ле­ния куль­та. Он по­лу­чил от­ра­же­ние так­же в за­пад­ночжоу­ских над­пи­сях на брон­зо­вых со­су­дах (12/11–8 вв.; эти над­пи­си пред­став­ля­ют со­бой сле­дую­щий этап раз­ви­тия кит. язы­ка, пись­мен­но­сти и куль­ту­ры). Об­ряд по­чи­та­ния пред­ков на­шёл от­ра­же­ние в древ­ней­шем со­б­ра­нии кит. по­эзии «Ши цзин». За­вер­шаю­щие эле­мен­ты бы­ли прив­не­се­ны в не­го Кон­фу­ци­ем, ко­то­рый ото­жде­ст­вил гос-во с семь­ёй, а пра­ви­те­ля – с от­цом, чем при­дал куль­ту пред­ков осо­бую зна­чи­мость.

Древнекитайские царства и империи (3-е тыс. до н. э. – 1-я пол. 3-го в. н. э.)

С 3-го тыс. на­чи­на­ет­ся письм. ис­то­рия К. Сы­ма Цянь, ав­тор «Ши цзи» («Ис­то­ри­че­ские за­пис­ки»), пер­во­го свод­но­го тру­да о про­шлом К., на­чи­на­ет кит. ис­то­рию с прав­ле­ния ле­ген­дар­ных У Ди – пя­ти им­пе­ра­то­ров (2697–2206): Ху­ан-ди, Чжу­ань-сюй, Ди-ку, Яо и Шунь. Со­глас­но Сы­ма Ця­ню, по­след­ний из ми­фич. им­пе­ра­то­ров – Шунь не­за­дол­го до сво­ей смер­ти при­бли­зил к се­бе вы­ше упо­ми­нав­ше­го­ся Юя, сы­на Гу­на, ко­то­рый впо­след­ст­вии стал пра­вить Под­не­бес­ной, ос­но­вав пер­вую в ис­то­рии К. ди­на­стию – Ся (2205–1767). По­сле смер­ти Юя на пре­стол всту­пил его сын Ци (2197–89). По­след­ним пра­ви­те­лем ди­на­стии был ти­ран Цзе (1818–1767), борь­бу с ко­то­рым воз­гла­вил «при­зван­ный Не­бом» ге­рой Тан [Чэн-тан, Тянь-и; с 1783 вождь инь (шан), в 1766–54 гла­ва гос-ва], раз­бив­ший ар­мию Ся и ос­но­вав­ший но­вую ди­на­стию Инь (Шан) (1766–1122 или 1600–1027).

Инь не­од­но­крат­но ме­ня­ли об­ласть про­жи­ва­ния (тер­ри­то­рия совр. про­вин­ций Хэ­нань, Хэ­бэй и Шань­дун). По­сле па­де­ния их ди­на­стии они бы­ли пе­ре­се­ле­ны в др. рай­оны стра­ны. Инь за­ни­ма­лись зем­ле­де­ли­ем, шёл­ко­тка­че­ст­вом, ви­но­де­ли­ем, ско­то­вод­ст­вом. Даль­ней­шее раз­ви­тие по­лу­чи­ли ре­мес­ло (из­го­тов­ле­ние при­ми­тив­но­го фар­фо­ра и бе­лой ке­ра­ми­ки из као­ли­на, разл. ла­ко­вых из­де­лий) и стро­и­тель­ст­во (гра­до­строи­тель­ст­во, воз­ве­де­ние круп­ных до­мов и хра­мов). Пе­ре­ход на бо­лее вы­со­кий уро­вень с.-х. и ре­мес­лен­но­го про­из-ва при­вёл к по­яв­ле­нию тор­гов­ли и про­то­де­нег (ими яв­ля­лись пред­ме­ты оби­хо­да или кус­ки дра­го­цен­ных ме­тал­лов и ми­не­ра­лов, позд­нее – ра­ко­ви­ны кау­ри и их брон­зо­вые ре­п­ли­ки). Со­циу­му инь бы­ла при­су­ща чёт­ко вы­ра­жен­ная стра­ти­фи­ка­ция. На вер­ши­не пи­ра­ми­ды на­хо­дил­ся ван, ко­то­рый при ре­ше­нии важ­ных гос. дел со­ве­то­вал­ся с ора­ку­лом, при­бли­жён­ны­ми, а ино­гда со всем на­ро­дом. В эпо­ху Инь (Шан) поя­ви­лись до­воль­но слож­ные куль­то­вые пред­став­ле­ния и об­ря­ды. Пан­те­он бо­гов вклю­чал вер­хов­ное бо­же­ст­во Шан­ди (счи­та­лось, что оно управ­ля­ет жиз­нью лю­дей), мно­го­числ. ду­хов при­ро­ды и ду­ши пред­ков, у ко­то­рых спра­ши­ва­ли со­ве­та, про­си­ли о по­мо­щи, ко­то­рым при­но­си­ли жерт­вы. Инь жи­ли в ок­ру­же­нии бо­лее ста пле­мён (цян, ту, ма, син, гуй, лун, юй и др.), све­де­ния о ко­то­рых со­хра­ни­лись в разл. письм. ис­точ­ни­ках. Часть этих пле­мён под­чи­ня­лись инь, дру­гие под­дер­жи­ва­ли с ни­ми дру­же­ст­вен­ные или тор­го­вые от­но­ше­ния, тре­тьи по­сто­ян­но с ни­ми вое­ва­ли.

К за­па­ду от инь (юг совр. пров. Шэнь­си) про­жи­ва­ли чжоу, во­ж­дём ко­то­рых был Фа, по­сле смер­ти по­лу­чив­ший хра­мо­вое имя У-ван. Его вой­ско в сою­зе с др. пле­ме­на­ми раз­би­ло ар­мию инь, их по­след­ний пра­ви­тель Чжоу-синь по­гиб. По­сле по­бе­ды У-ван по­жа­ло­вал круп­ные уде­лы сво­им род­ст­вен­ни­кам и со­юз­ни­кам. По­ко­рив инь, чжоу за­им­ст­во­ва­ли у них дос­ти­же­ния ма­те­ри­аль­ной и ду­хов­ной куль­ту­ры, пись­мен­ность и, воз­мож­но, язык.

Эпо­ха Чжоу де­лит­ся на два пе­рио­да: зап. ди­на­стии Чжоу (1122/1027–771; её сто­ли­ца­ми бы­ли Фэн и Хао, близ совр. г. Си­ань) и вост. ди­на­стии Чжоу (770–256/249; со сто­ли­цей в Лои – совр. Ло­ян). Зап. ди­на­стия Чжоу па­ла под на­тис­ком центр.-ази­ат. цю­ань­жун, по­сле че­го сто­ли­ца бы­ла пе­ре­не­се­на в Лои. Вре­мя цар­ст­во­ва­ния вост. ди­на­стии Чжоу в свою оче­редь рас­па­да­ет­ся на два пе­рио­да: Чунь­цю (772–481 или 770–476) и Чжань­го (Воюю­щие цар­ст­ва; 403 или 475–221).

В пе­ри­од Чунь­цю, не­смот­ря на со­хране­ние мо­раль­но­го ав­то­ри­те­та ва­на, ре­аль­ная власть на­хо­ди­лась в ру­ках по­томств. удель­ных кня­зей – чжу­хоу. Об­ще­ст­во име­ло до­воль­но слож­ную струк­ту­ру. На вер­ши­не ие­рар­хич. ле­ст­ни­цы на­хо­дил­ся ван, сту­пе­нью ни­же рас­по­ла­га­лась выс­шая пра­вя­щая эли­та, со­сто­яв­шая из чжу­хоу и по­томств. са­нов­ни­ков – ци­нов. Бо­лее низ­кую сту­пень за­ни­ма­ли гла­вы круп­ных ро­до­вых об­ра­зо­ва­ний – да­фу и ши, яв­ляв­шие­ся од­но­вре­мен­но вы­со­ки­ми чи­нов­ни­ка­ми, а на ещё бо­лее низ­кой сту­пе­ни на­хо­ди­лись гла­вы се­мей и ме­ст­ное чи­нов­ни­че­ст­во. Сле­дую­щий со­ци­аль­ный слой со­став­лял про­стой на­род: кре­сть­я­не, ре­мес­лен­ни­ки и тор­гов­цы, а так­же мел­кие слу­жа­щие и обыч­ные го­ро­жа­не. В са­мом ни­зу со­ци­аль­ной ле­ст­ни­цы на­хо­ди­лись не­мно­го­чис­лен­ные и не иг­рав­шие ре­шаю­щей ро­ли в хо­зяйств. жиз­ни стра­ны ра­бы, в ко­то­рых об­ра­ща­ли во­ен­но­плен­ных и пре­ступ­ни­ков. Стра­ти­фи­ка­ция об­ще­ст­ва име­ла чёт­кое и стро­го рег­ла­мен­ти­ро­ван­ное внеш­нее вы­ра­же­ние – в оде­ж­де, пи­ще, по­воз­ках, ору­жии, жи­лье, об­ря­дах и т. п.

В са­мом на­ча­ле эпо­хи Чжоу пра­ва на зем­лю при­над­ле­жа­ли ва­ну, од­на­ко в пе­ри­од Чунь­цю они по­сте­пен­но пе­ре­шли к чжу­хоу. В ка­ж­дом вла­де­нии его гла­ва вы­сту­пал в ка­че­ст­ве вла­дель­ца всей зем­ли. Фак­ти­че­ски­ми, а со вре­ме­нем и юри­ди­че­ски на­следств. вла­дель­ца­ми зем­ли ста­но­ви­лись так­же да­фу и ши. Вла­дель­цы зем­ли пе­ре­да­ва­ли её в поль­зо­ва­ние кре­сть­я­нам за от­ра­бо­точ­ную рен­ту, а са­ми пла­ти­ли вы­ше­стоя­щим дань шёл­ком, неф­ри­том, шку­ра­ми жи­вот­ных, зер­ном и т. д. Зем­лю мож­но бы­ло на­сле­до­вать, но нель­зя бы­ло про­дать и ку­пить. На ру­бе­же 9–8 вв. от­ра­бо­точ­ная рен­та бы­ла за­ме­не­на на­ту­раль­ной, пер­во­на­чаль­но рав­няв­шей­ся 1/10 час­ти уро­жая. В пе­ри­од Чунь­цю зем­ля ста­ла объ­ек­том ку­п­ли-про­да­жи, сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись слои по­ме­щи­ков, бо­га­тых куп­цов – вла­дель­цев зем­ли и вла­дев­ших зем­лёй сво­бод­ных кре­сть­ян, зна­че­ние на­следств. ари­сто­кра­тии и за­ви­си­мых кре­сть­ян сни­зилось. В 6 в. поя­ви­лись зе­мель­ный, а не­сколь­ко позд­нее по­душ­ный и по­двор­ный на­ло­ги, уп­ла­чи­вае­мые на­ту­рой (про­сом, ри­сом, шёл­ком), а так­же от­ра­бот­ки и по­вин­но­сти.

На ру­бе­же пе­рио­дов Чунь­цю и Чжань­го раз­ви­тие К. сти­му­ли­ро­ва­лось не­сколь­ки­ми нов­ше­ст­ва­ми. Ок. 6 в. в упот­реб­ле­ние во­шло же­ле­зо, ко­то­рое к 4 в. ста­ло гл. ма­те­риа­лом для из­го­тов­ле­ния ору­дий тру­да, а за­тем ору­жия и пред­ме­тов оби­хо­да. Зна­чит. подъ­ём с. х-ва был до­стиг­нут за счёт та­ких но­во­вве­де­ний, как удоб­ре­ние по­лей, ис­поль­зо­ва­ние бычь­ей уп­ряж­ки и ко­ле­са для по­да­чи во­ды на по­ля, строи­тель­ст­во круп­ных ир­ри­гац. сис­тем. Раз­ви­тие с. х-ва и ре­мес­ла сти­му­ли­ро­ва­ло тор­гов­лю, ко­то­рой за­ни­ма­лись не толь­ко куп­цы, но и кре­сть­я­не, ре­мес­лен­ни­ки и чи­нов­ни­ки. Важ­ную роль в раз­ви­тии тор­гов­ли иг­рал Ве­ли­кий ка­нал, часть ко­то­ро­го бы­ла со­ору­же­на в 6 в. К кон­цу пе­рио­да Чунь­цю на сме­ну про­то­день­гам при­шли мед­ные и брон­зо­вые мо­не­ты. Ка­ж­дое цар­ст­во вы­пус­ка­ло собств. мо­не­ту, од­на­ко раз­ные ви­ды мо­не­ты име­ли хо­ж­де­ние на тер­ри­то­рии все­го Ки­тая.

Эпо­ха Чжоу обо­га­ти­ла кит. куль­ту­ру мно­же­ст­вом но­во­вве­де­ний в са­мых раз­ных об­лас­тях, в т. ч. в лит-ре и фи­ло­со­фии, ко­то­рые сыг­ра­ли ис­клю­чи­тель­но важ­ную роль в ис­то­рии стра­ны.

К пе­рио­ду Чжань­го на тер­ри­то­рии К. об­ра­зо­ва­лось 7 круп­ных царств: Ци, Янь, Цинь, Чу, Хань, Вэй и Чжао. Осо­бое ме­сто сре­ди них за­ни­ма­ла Цинь, воз­вы­ше­ние ко­то­рой во мно­гом свя­за­но с дея­тель­но­стью Шан Яна, внёс­ше­го зна­чит. вклад в раз­ви­тие идео­ло­гии ле­гиз­ма (впо­след­ст­вии мн. ле­ги­ст­ские идеи бы­ли вос­при­ня­ты кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­вом, что по­зво­ли­ло ему стать идео­ло­гич. опо­рой кит. им­пе­рии) и по­пы­тав­ше­го­ся во­пло­тить её в жизнь.

Шан Ян был при­зван на долж­ность со­вет­ни­ка по­сле при­хо­да к вла­сти в Цинь Сяо-гу­на (361–338). Ему бы­ло при­ка­за­но про­вес­ти ре­фор­мы, на­прав­лен­ные на ук­ре­п­ле­ние гос-ва. В 356 и 350 в Цинь бы­ли осу­ще­ст­в­ле­ны пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния в ду­хе ле­ги­ст­ских идей: зем­ле­де­лие по­ощ­ря­лось по­сред­ст­вом ос­во­бо­ж­де­ния от по­вин­но­стей тех, кто ус­пеш­но тру­дил­ся в по­ле, от­ме­не­ны на­следств. при­ви­ле­гии ари­сто­кра­тии, вве­де­на сис­те­ма при­свое­ния зва­ний за во­ен. за­слу­ги, раз­ре­ше­на ку­п­ля-про­да­жа зем­ли, ус­та­нов­ле­на еди­ная сис­те­ма мер; вве­де­но обя­за­тель­ное раз­де­ле­ние се­мьи в слу­чае, ес­ли в ней бы­ло двое или бо­лее взрос­лых муж­чин (ина­че на се­мью на­ла­гал­ся двой­ной на­лог). По адм. ре­фор­ме, про­ве­дён­ной Шан Яном, цар­ст­во Цинь бы­ло раз­де­ле­но на 31 уезд, ко­то­ры­ми управ­ля­ли чи­нов­ни­ки, пред­став­ляв­шие центр. власть. Но­во­вве­де­ния Шан Яна вы­зва­ли не­до­воль­ст­во ари­сто­кра­тии. По­сле кон­чи­ны Сяо-гу­на и всту­п­ле­ния на пре­стол Ху­эй-вэнь-ва­на (337–311) Шан Ян был каз­нён, а весь его род ис­треб­лён. Па­де­ние Шан Яна не оз­на­ча­ло, од­на­ко, пре­кра­ще­ния на­ча­тых им ре­форм. Соз­на­вая их по­лез­ность для стра­ны, на­след­ни­ки Сяо-гу­на и их пер­вые ми­ни­ст­ры, в осо­бен­но­сти Люй Бу­вэй (?–235) и Ли Сы, про­дол­жи­ли пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния, что в ито­ге по­зво­ли­ло Цинь, ис­поль­зуя во­ен. и ди­пло­ма­тич. сред­ст­ва, объ­е­ди­нить весь К. (в 230 оно под­чи­ни­ло Хань, в 229 – Чжао, в 225 – Вэй, в 224 – Чу, в 222 – Янь и в 221 – Ци).

Погребальный эскорт из керамических фигур. Гробница императора Цинь Шихуанди (провинция Шэньси). 3 в. до н. э.


Фото В. А. Снатенкова

С име­нем Ли Сы свя­за­на раз­ра­бот­ка мер, на­прав­лен­ных на пол­ную уни­фи­ка­цию Под­не­бес­ной и обес­пе­че­ние в ней еди­но­лич­ной вла­сти цинь­ско­го по­ве­ли­те­ля Цинь Шиху­ан­ди. В ре­зуль­та­те про­ве­дён­ных Ли Сы ре­форм бы­ли уп­разд­не­ны преж­ние гра­ни­цы ме­ж­ду цар­ст­ва­ми и из­ме­не­на сис­те­ма управ­ле­ния: вся стра­на раз­де­ле­на на 36 об­лас­тей, соз­дан аппа­рат управ­ле­ния ими, пол­но­стью за­ви­сев­ший от им­пе­ра­то­ра, вве­де­ны еди­ные за­ко­ны, ме­ры, день­ги и пись­мен­ность, в ве­де­ние гос-ва пе­ре­да­на сис­те­ма обу­че­ния. На­следств. ари­сто­кра­тия, выс­шее чи­нов­ни­че­ст­во и круп­ные куп­цы по­ко­рён­ных царств бы­ли пе­ре­се­ле­ны в сто­ли­цу Цинь – Сянь­ян – и по­став­ле­ны под стро­гий кон­троль центр. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва. Сто­ли­цу и пе­ри­фе­рию со­еди­ни­ли курь­ер­ски­ми до­ро­га­ми. В це­лях ук­ре­п­ле­ния вла­сти цинь­ско­го пра­ви­те­ля в 213 бы­ли пре­да­ны ог­ню древ­ние трак­та­ты и ис­то­рич. хро­ни­ки др. царств пе­рио­да Чжань­го.


Великая Китайская стена к северу от Пекина. Общий вид. Фото 2006.


Фото А. И. Нагаева

Объ­е­ди­нив под сво­ей вла­стью шесть царств, Цинь пе­ре­шла в на­сту­п­ле­ние на со­сед­ние го­су­дар­ст­ва и на­ро­ды. В 215–214 на се­ве­ре 300-ты­сяч­ная ар­мия под ко­манд. Мэн Тя­ня (?–210) раз­би­ла хун­ну, за­ня­ла зем­ли в боль­шой из­лу­чи­не Ху­ан­хэ и при­сту­пи­ла к со­ору­же­нию Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской сте­ны (до­ст­раи­ва­лись и со­еди­ня­лись во­еди­но за­щит­ные сте­ны преж­них царств; в совр. ви­де Ве­ли­кая Кит. сте­на – па­мят­ник 15–16 вв.), не­ся при этом по­те­ри не мень­шие, чем в сра­же­ни­ях с ко­чев­ни­ка­ми. На юге к 211 др. цинь­ская ар­мия по­ко­ри­ла вьетн. гос-во На­мвьет и за­хва­ти­ла сев.-вост. часть вьетн. гос-ва Ау­лак (тер­ри­то­рия совр. юж.-кит. про­вин­ций Гу­ан­си, Гу­ан­дун, а так­же часть Сев. Вьет­на­ма). Ещё рань­ше, в 223 и 221, в про­дол­же­ние борь­бы про­тив Чу 500-ты­сяч­ная цинь­ская ар­мия под ко­манд. Ван Цзя­ня (гг. ро­ж­де­ния и смер­ти не­изв.) за­вое­ва­ла зем­ли на юго-вос­то­ке (ны­не про­вин­ции Цзян­си, Фуц­зянь) и юге (ны­не пров. Ху­нань).

По­сле кон­чи­ны Цинь Шиху­ан­ди ди­на­стия Цинь на­ча­ла бы­ст­ро те­рять власть. В ре­зуль­та­те двор­цо­во­го за­го­во­ра, во гла­ве ко­то­ро­го стоя­ли Ли Сы и гл. ев­нух Чжао Гао (?–207), на пре­стол был воз­ве­дён млад­ший сын Цинь Шиху­ан­ди – Ху-хай (210–207; ко­ро­но­вал­ся под име­нем Эр­ши-ху­ан­ди). В хо­де борь­бы, раз­вер­нув­шей­ся по­сле это­го при цинь­ском дво­ре, Чжао Гао кле­ве­той до­бил­ся каз­ни Ли Сы и унич­то­же­ния его ро­да, за­тем вы­ну­дил Эр­ши-ху­ан­ди со­вер­шить са­мо­убий­ст­во, а че­рез ме­сяц был убит сам. В ус­ло­ви­ях ос­лаб­ле­ния по­зи­ций центр. вла­сти в 209 вспых­ну­ло кре­сть­ян­ское вос­ста­ние под рук. Чэнь Шэ­на, за­тем на­ча­лись вы­сту­п­ле­ния ари­сто­кра­тии по­ко­рён­ных царств. С пре­тен­зи­ей на цинь­ский пре­стол вы­сту­пи­ли вы­хо­дец из кре­сть­ян Лю Бан и чус­кий ари­сто­крат Сян Юй, сфор­ми­ро­вав­шие собств. ар­мии. Их ус­пеш­ные дей­ст­вия по­ло­жи­ли ко­нец прав­ле­нию Цинь. В 207 Лю Бан за­нял Сянь­ян и в 206 про­воз­гла­сил се­бя ва­ном, а в 202, раз­гро­мив Сян Юя, – им­пе­ра­то­ром под име­нем Гао-цзу. Им бы­ла ос­но­ва­на но­вая пра­вя­щая ди­на­стия – За­пад­ная Хань.

Взой­дя на пре­стол, Гао-цзу столк­нул­ся с серь­ёз­ны­ми про­бле­ма­ми. Стра­на бы­ла ра­зо­ре­на, раз­ру­ше­ны тра­диц. ук­лад жиз­ни и сис­те­ма управ­ле­ния, по­дор­ван ав­то­ри­тет гос. вла­сти. На се­ве­ре вновь уси­ли­лись хун­ну. Стре­мясь до­бить­ся ста­би­ли­за­ции об­ста­нов­ки, Гао-цзу от­ме­нил жес­то­кие на­ка­за­ния пе­рио­да Цинь, объ­явил ши­ро­кую ам­ни­стию, ос­во­бо­дил всех, кто, стре­мясь из­бе­жать го­лод­ной смер­ти, про­дал се­бя в раб­ст­во, вер­нул ран­ги, зем­лю и жи­ли­ща их преж­ним об­ла­да­те­лям, вос­ста­но­вил ме­ст­ную ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­цию. За­слу­жен­ные вое­на­чаль­ни­ки по­лу­чи­ли ти­ту­лы хоу и на­следств. вла­де­ния, ар­мии бы­ли рас­пу­ще­ны, сол­да­там пре­дос­тав­ле­на воз­мож­ность вер­нуть­ся к за­ня­тию с. х-вом. Все эти ме­ры спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли ус­та­нов­ле­нию в К. от­но­сит. спо­кой­ст­вия и по­ряд­ка. Од­на­ко бо­лее ре­ши­тель­но­му про­грес­су пре­пят­ст­во­ва­ли про­дол­жав­шие­ся внутр. рас­при и се­па­ра­ти­ст­ские уст­рем­ле­ния ме­ст­ных пра­ви­те­лей, яр­ким про­яв­ле­ни­ем ко­то­рых стал т. н. мя­теж се­ми ва­нов, ко­то­рый воз­гла­вил пле­мян­ник Гао-цзу – Лю Пи (215–154). Окон­ча­тель­но этот мя­теж был по­дав­лен лишь У-ди, са­мым вы­даю­щим­ся зап.-хань­ским им­пе­ра­то­ром.

У-ди до­бил­ся зна­чит. ук­ре­п­ле­ния по­зи­ций центр. вла­сти в им­пе­рии Зап. Хань. В 127 он из­дал указ, из­ме­нив­ший прин­цип на­сле­до­ва­ния: от­ны­не на­след­ни­ка­ми ста­но­ви­лись все сы­но­вья (в рав­ных до­лях), а не один лишь стар­ший сын. В ре­зуль­та­те все круп­ные вла­де­ния бы­ли раз­де­ле­ны и за­ло­же­на ос­но­ва для их даль­ней­ше­го дроб­ле­ния. В 112 У-ди ли­шил 106 чел. ти­ту­ла хоу, что окон­ча­тель­но ре­ши­ло про­бле­му круп­но­го зем­ле­вла­де­ния. У-ди фак­ти­че­ски вос­ста­но­вил цинь­скую цен­тра­ли­зов. сис­те­му управ­ле­ния с опо­рой на ог­ром­ный бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­рат, к служ­бе в ко­то­ром до­пус­ка­лись так­же куп­цы, раз­ре­шил про­да­жу ти­ту­лов и зва­ний, но не долж­но­стей.

В те­че­ние не­сколь­ких от­но­си­тель­но спо­кой­ных де­ся­ти­ле­тий, про­шед­ших с на­ча­ла во­ца­ре­ния Зап. Хань, эко­но­ми­ка К. бы­ла вос­ста­нов­ле­на. Вве­дён­ная в этот пе­ри­од сис­те­ма трёх­по­лья, изо­бре­те­ние пар­ной со­хи, вос­ста­нов­ле­ние ста­рых и со­ору­же­ние но­вых ир­ри­гац. сис­тем по­зво­ли­ли зна­чи­тель­но по­вы­сить про­из­во­ди­тель­ность с. х-ва. Бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ва­лось ре­мес­ло. Стре­мясь со­дей­ст­во­вать даль­ней­ше­му раз­ви­тию хо­зяй­ст­ва и по­пол­нить каз­ну, У-ди в 119 ус­та­но­вил гос. мо­но­по­лию на вы­плав­ку же­ле­за и вар­ку со­ли, а в 115 – на че­кан­ку мо­не­ты. Бы­ли ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ны ка­зён­ные мас­тер­ские, в ко­то­рых тру­ди­лись ра­бы (их ко­ли­че­ст­во в этот пе­ри­од бы­ло са­мым боль­шим за всю древ­нюю ис­то­рию К.). Раз­ви­тие ре­мес­ла сти­му­ли­ро­ва­ло рост тор­гов­ли и рос­тов­щи­че­ст­ва; поя­ви­лось зна­чит. ко­ли­че­ст­во лю­дей, ско­пив­ших со­стоя­ние не за счёт зем­ле­де­лия. Мно­гие кит. го­ро­да пре­вра­ти­лись в важ­ные тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­ные цен­тры и яв­ля­лись круп­ней­ши­ми го­ро­да­ми ми­ра: Чанъ­ань (ны­не Си­ань), Ло­ян, Хань­дань (на юге Хэ­бэя), Линь­цзы (ны­не Цзы­бао), Чэн­ду и др.

«Пахота». Каменный барельеф из ханьских погребений. Ок. 100 н. э. Провинция Шэньси.

При У-ди им­пе­рия Зап. Хань до­би­лась зна­чит. рас­ши­ре­ния сво­их гра­ниц. В 123–119 в ре­зуль­та­те не­сколь­ких по­хо­дов бы­ло на­не­се­но серь­ёз­ное по­ра­же­ние хун­ну, ко­то­рые на дли­тель­ное вре­мя пе­ре­ста­ли пред­став­лять уг­ро­зу для К. В ре­зуль­та­те по­соль­ст­ва пол­ко­вод­ца и са­нов­ни­ка Чжан Ця­ня Зап. Хань ус­та­но­ви­ла не­по­средств. кон­такт со стра­на­ми и на­ро­да­ми Центр. Азии (Фер­га­ной, Со­гдом, Бак­три­ей, Пар­фи­ей), что соз­да­ло пред­по­сыл­ки для от­кры­тия Ве­ли­ко­го шёл­ко­во­го пу­ти. По за­вер­ше­нии по­соль­ст­ва Чжан Ця­ня У-ди на­пра­вил в Центр. Азию вой­ска, ко­то­рые в 111 по­ко­ри­ли цян, а в 102 Фер­га­ну и весь т. н. Зап. край. Совр. Синь­цзян и со­сед­ние рай­оны Ср. Азии бы­ли вклю­че­ны в со­став им­пе­рии Зап. Хань ли­бо при­зна­ли за­ви­си­мость от неё. Од­но­вре­мен­но ук­ре­пи­лось и рас­ши­ри­лось при­сут­ст­вие Зап. Хань на юге (в совр. про­вин­ци­ях Гу­андун, Гу­ан­си, Чжэц­зян, Фуц­зянь, Сы­чу­ань, Гуй­чжоу, Юнь­нань и на се­ве­ре Вьет­на­ма). В 108 до н. э. У-ди под­чи­ни­лась Чжао­сянь (Ляо­дун и Ко­рея), бла­го­да­ря че­му бы­ли ус­та­нов­ле­ны от­но­ше­ния с Япо­ни­ей. К. дос­тиг пи­ка сво­его мо­гу­ще­ст­ва, став са­мой об­шир­ной и мно­го­люд­ной им­пе­ри­ей Древ­не­го ми­ра. Кит. шёлк, же­лез­ные из­де­лия, ме­талл, мед. по­зна­ния, пе­ре­до­вые тех­но­ло­гии про­ник­ли в др. стра­ны Азии и да­же в Ев­ро­пу. При У-ди кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во ста­ло гос. идео­ло­ги­ей К.

Со смер­тью У-ди по­зи­ции ди­на­стии Зап. Хань на­ча­ли бы­ст­ро ос­ла­бе­вать. Это­му во мно­гом спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло и то об­стоя­тель­ст­во, что в зап.-хань­ский пе­ри­од сфор­ми­ро­ва­лась и об­ре­ла зна­чит. си­лу бю­ро­кра­тич. про­слой­ка. Её пред­ста­ви­те­ли, как пра­ви­ло, не толь­ко об­ла­да­ли вла­ст­ны­ми ры­ча­га­ми, но и вла­де­ли зем­лёй, а так­же (бла­го­да­ря за­ня­тию тор­гов­лей и рос­тов­щи­че­ст­вом) зна­чит. фи­нан­со­вы­ми сред­ст­ва­ми. В 5 н. э. круп­ный са­нов­ник Ван Ман, род­ст­вен­ник пра­вя­ще­го до­ма по жен­ской ли­нии, уже ра­нее со­сре­до­то­чив­ший в сво­их ру­ках зна­чит. власть, убил имп. Пин-ди (1–5), а в 8 низ­ло­жил его ма­ло­лет­не­го на­след­ни­ка, при­нял ти­тул им­пе­ра­то­ра и объ­я­вил о во­ца­ре­нии но­вой ди­на­стии Синь (9–25).

Взой­дя на пре­стол, Ван Ман в 9 из­дал указ об от­ме­не ча­ст­ной соб­ст­вен­но­сти на зем­лю и её пе­ре­хо­де в соб­ст­вен­ность пра­ви­те­ля, пре­дос­та­вил ог­ра­ни­чен­ную сво­бо­ду ра­бам ча­ст­ных лиц, за­пре­тил ку­п­лю-про­да­жу зем­ли и ра­бов; в 10 ввёл гос. кон­троль над рын­ка­ми и це­на­ми, ус­та­но­вил мо­но­по­лию на про­из-во ви­на, со­ли, же­ле­за, от­лив­ку мо­не­ты, а так­же (впер­вые в ис­то­рии К.) на кре­дит­но-рос­тов­щи­че­ские опе­ра­ции. Со­про­тив­ле­ние ре­фор­мам Ван Ма­на в кит. об­ще­ст­ве бы­ло на­столь­ко силь­ным, что уже в 12 но­во­му им­пе­ра­то­ру при­шлось вновь раз­ре­шить ку­п­лю-про­да­жу зем­ли и ра­бов. Са­мым не­удач­ным на­чи­на­ни­ем Ван Ма­на ока­за­лась ре­фор­ма де­неж­ной сис­те­мы – за 15 лет прав­ле­ния он 5 раз ме­нял день­ги, что вы­зва­ло ха­ос в эко­но­ми­ке и уда­ри­ло по бед­ным сло­ям на­се­ле­ния. На­рас­та­ние эко­но­мич. труд­но­стей ста­ло при­чи­ной на­чав­ших­ся в 14 нар. вол­не­ний, ко­то­рые пе­ре­рос­ли на юге стра­ны в вос­ста­ние «жи­те­лей зе­лё­ных ле­сов» (17–23), а на се­ве­ре в крас­но­бро­вых вос­ста­ние. В ре­зуль­та­те Ван Ман был убит, в стра­не во­ца­ри­лась ди­на­стия Вос­точ­ная Хань (25–220), из­брав­шая сво­ей сто­ли­цей Ло­ян.

Пер­вым им­пе­ра­то­рам но­вой ди­на­стии – от Гу­ан У-ди (Гу­анъу-ди) до Хэ-ди (89–105) – при­шлось ре­шать во­про­сы, сход­ные с те­ми, что стоя­ли пе­ред пра­ви­те­ля­ми на­чаль­но­го пе­рио­да Зап. Хань. Осн. вни­ма­ние они бы­ли вы­ну­ж­де­ны уде­лить вос­ста­нов­ле­нию эко­но­ми­ки. С этой це­лью при Гу­ан У-ди на­ча­ли соз­да­вать­ся во­ен. по­се­ле­ния, жи­те­ли ко­то­рых со­вме­ща­ли труд на зем­ле с во­ин­ской служ­бой. При Мин-ди (58–75) и Хэ-ди ка­зён­ные зем­ли ста­ли пе­ре­да­вать­ся или сда­вать­ся в арен­ду зем­ле­паш­цам-бед­ня­кам, при этом им вы­да­ва­лись ин­вен­тарь и зер­но для по­се­вов. Не­од­но­крат­но про­из­во­ди­лось сни­же­ние на­ло­га на зем­лю или пол­ное ос­во­бо­ж­де­ние от не­го. Гос-во ак­тив­но со­дей­ст­во­ва­ло строи­тель­ст­ву но­вых ир­ри­гац. сис­тем. Эти ме­ры спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли вос­ста­нов­ле­нию и даль­ней­ше­му раз­ви­тию с. х-ва, а вме­сте с ним ре­мес­ла и тор­гов­ли. Важ­ным со­бы­ти­ем ста­ло изо­бре­те­ние в 105 де­шё­во­го спо­со­ба про­из-ва бу­ма­ги из ко­но­п­ли, дре­вес­ной ко­ры, ве­то­ши и пр. Из К. че­рез Зап. край бу­ма­га по­сте­пен­но рас­про­стра­ни­лась по все­му ми­ру.

В сфе­ре внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ки Вост. Хань при­шлось ре­шать те же за­да­чи, что и зап.-хань­ским им­пе­ра­то­рам. В 73–94 кит. ар­мия пред­при­ня­ла неск. ус­пеш­ных по­хо­дов про­тив вновь уси­лив­ших­ся хун­ну. Часть хун­ну бы­ла ис­треб­ле­на или пле­не­на, а ос­таль­ные на­ча­ли по­сте­пен­ный от­ход на за­пад, что, как счи­та­ет­ся, да­ло позд­нее тол­чок Ве­ли­ко­му пе­ре­се­ле­нию на­ро­дов. В 73–100 бла­го­да­ря уме­лой ди­пло­ма­тии и во­ен. по­бе­дам та­лант­ли­во­го пол­ко­вод­ца Бань Чао К. вновь под­чи­нил се­бе Зап. край. В 97 Бань Чао по­пы­тал­ся ус­та­но­вить свя­зи с Ри­мом, но его по­сол Гань Ин смог до­б­рать­ся толь­ко до Пер­сид­ско­го зал. и вер­нул­ся на­зад. В пе­ри­од сво­его рас­цве­та Вост. Хань под­дер­жи­ва­ла так­же от­но­ше­ния с Япо­ни­ей и Ко­ре­ей, а её гра­ни­цы на юге и юго-за­па­де поч­ти сов­па­да­ли с ру­бе­жа­ми Зап. Хань.

Со 107 на­чал­ся про­цесс ос­лаб­ле­ния по­зи­ций К. в Зап. крае, что бы­ло вы­зва­но за­тяж­ной и не­удач­ной для им­пе­рии вой­ной с цян. Кро­ме то­го, на се­ве­ре и се­ве­ро-за­па­де уси­ли­лись сянь­би и уху­ань, ко­то­рые во 2-й пол. 2 в. за­клю­чи­ли со­юз и ста­ли со­вер­шать опус­то­шит. на­бе­ги на вост.-хань­ские зем­ли.

Во 2 в. внутр. си­туа­ция в им­пе­рии ос­лож­ни­лась. На пре­сто­ле час­то ока­зы­ва­лись ма­ло­лет­ние им­пе­ра­то­ры, в ре­зуль­та­те че­го по­зи­ции центр. вла­сти ос­ла­бели, обо­ст­ри­лась борь­ба за влия­ние ме­ж­ду разл. груп­пи­ров­ка­ми. Рос­ло так­же не­до­воль­ст­во ни­зов, ко­то­рое в 184 вы­ли­лось в «жёл­тых по­вя­зок» вос­ста­ние под рук. Чжан Цзяо. Для его по­дав­ле­ния центр. вла­сти при­шлось об­ра­тить­ся за по­мо­щью к круп­ным вое­на­чаль­ни­кам-зем­ле­вла­дель­цам, рас­по­ла­гав­шим «лич­ны­ми ар­мия­ми». В хо­де борь­бы с вос­став­ши­ми воз­ник­ли три мощ­ные груп­пи­ров­ки, ру­ко­во­ди­мые Цао Цао, Лю Бэ­ем (161–223) и Сунь Цюа­нем (182–252). Дос­тиг­нув ме­ж­ду со­бой со­гла­ше­ния, они низ­ло­жи­ли ди­на­стию Вост. Хань и раз­де­ли­ли её вла­де­ния на три гос-ва: Вэй (со сто­ли­цей в Лоя­не), Шу (Шу­хань; со сто­ли­цей в Чэн­ду) и У [со сто­ли­цей в г. Цзя­нье (Цзинь­кан), ны­не Нан­кин]. Но­вый пе­ри­од кит. ис­то­рии, зна­ме­но­вав­ший, по при­ня­той в кит. ис­то­рио­гра­фии клас­си­фи­ка­ции, на­ча­ло эпо­хи фео­да­лиз­ма, по­лу­чил назв. Трое­цар­ст­вие.

«Смутное время» (сер. 3 – кон. 6 вв.)

Пра­ви­те­ли но­вых го­су­дарств пы­та­лись ор­га­ни­зо­вать управ­ле­ние под­вла­ст­ны­ми тер­ри­то­рия­ми по преж­ним, им­пер­ским об­раз­цам: при­дер­жи­ва­лись тра­диц. прин­ци­пов фор­ми­ро­ва­ния и ор­га­ни­за­ции ра­бо­ты бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­ра­та, со­блю­да­ли древ­ние обы­чаи. Од­на­ко по сво­ей су­ти их власть силь­но от­ли­ча­лась от «клас­си­че­ской» им­пер­ской сис­те­мы, стро­ив­шей­ся на без­ус­лов­ном при­ори­те­те гражд. ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции. По­сле сво­его во­ца­ре­ния Цао Цао (в Вэй), Лю Бэй (в Шу) и Сунь Цю­ань (в У) ос­та­ва­лись, как и пре­ж­де, в пер­вую оче­редь во­ен. ли­де­ра­ми. Они опи­ра­лись на ар­мию, но не на вой­ска, под­чи­нён­ные гос. уч­ре­ж­де­ни­ям, а на свои собств. во­ин­ские фор­ми­ро­ва­ния, со­сто­яв­шие из лич­но пре­дан­ных ко­ман­ди­ров и сол­дат. «Во­е­ни­за­ция» вла­сти на­блю­да­лась и на ме­ст­ном уров­не: гла­вен­ст­во здесь пе­ре­шло от чи­нов­ничь­ей ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции к ли­де­рам ре­гио­наль­ных элит, то­же об­за­вед­шим­ся «лич­ны­ми вой­ска­ми».

«Вое­ни­за­ция» не спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ла уп­ро­че­нию по­зи­ций пра­вя­щих до­мов трёх царств. В Вэй в 249 ре­аль­ная власть пе­ре­шла в ру­ки пол­ко­вод­цев из ро­да Сы­ма, ко­то­рые в 265 сверг­ли дом Цао и про­воз­гла­си­ли соз­да­ние гос-ва Цзинь. В Шу по­сле смер­ти Лю Бэя власть за­хва­тил вое­на­чаль­ник Чжу­гэ Лян. В У по­сле дли­тель­ной меж­до­усо­би­цы к 252 пра­вя­щий дом фак­ти­че­ски ли­шил­ся вла­ст­ных пол­но­мо­чий. Во­ен. про­ти­во­стоя­ние трёх царств за­кон­чи­лось по­бе­дой Цзинь, под эги­дой ко­то­ро­го весь К. к 280 был вновь объ­е­ди­нён.

Им­пе­рия Цзинь ока­за­лась край­не не­проч­ным об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем. По­сле смер­ти цзинь­ско­го вла­сти­те­ля Сы­ма Яня (265–290) в стра­не на­ча­лась меж­до­усоб­ная вой­на, про­дол­жав­шая­ся до 306. Внутр. рас­пря­ми в им­пе­рии вос­поль­зо­ва­лись ко­че­вые и по­лу­ко­че­вые на­ро­ды, оби­тав­шие на её сев. и сев.-зап. ру­бе­жах. В 316 они раз­гро­ми­ли цзинь­скую ар­мию, за­хва­ти­ли сто­ли­цу и пле­ни­ли им­пе­ра­то­ра. Цзинь ут­ра­ти­ла свои сев. тер­ри­то­рии. Под её кон­тро­лем ос­та­лись лишь центр. и юго-вост. рай­оны К. (шесть с по­ло­ви­ной об­лас­тей из 21, со­став­ляв­ших цзинь­скую им­пе­рию).


«Властелины разных династий». Художник Янь Либэнь. Фрагмент свитка на шёлке с изображением императора Вэнь Ди, сопровождаемого служанками. 7 в. Музей изящных искусств (Бостон).

Пе­ри­од кит. ис­то­рии с 317 по 419 при­ня­то име­но­вать Вос­точ­ная Цзинь. Сто­ли­цей гос-ва в это вре­мя был Цзинь­кан. С рас­па­дом им­пе­рии Цзинь сев. зем­ли К. в те­че­ние двух с по­ло­ви­ной ве­ков раз­ви­ва­лись фак­ти­че­ски обо­соб­лен­но от юж­ных, ис­пы­ты­вая силь­ное влия­ние ино­зем­ных за­вое­ва­те­лей. Это на­ло­жи­ло от­пе­ча­ток на даль­ней­шее раз­ви­тие стра­ны (см. Юж­ных и Се­вер­ных ди­на­стий эпо­ха).

Со 2-й четв. 4 в. сев.-кит. тер­ри­то­рии пре­вра­ти­лись в аре­ну борь­бы ме­ж­ду бы­ст­ро сме­няв­ши­ми друг дру­га и по­сто­ян­но вра­ж­до­вав­ши­ми ме­ж­ду со­бой цар­ст­ва­ми и ми­ни-им­пе­рия­ми, ко­то­рые ча­ще все­го соз­да­ва­лись во­ж­дя­ми хлы­нув­ших сю­да не­ки­тай­ских на­ро­дов. К сер. 4 в. в Сев. К. су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло 7 го­су­дарств, в 384–409 – 12. Гл. опо­рой их вла­сти­те­лей ос­та­ва­лась во­ен. си­ла. В то же вре­мя для удер­жа­ния вла­сти над пре­об­ла­дав­шим кит. на­се­ле­ни­ем за­вое­ва­те­ли при­вле­ка­ли кит. со­вет­ни­ков и соз­да­ва­ли адм. ап­па­рат по ти­пу тра­диц. ки­тай­ско­го. Ино­гда прак­ти­ко­ва­лось раз­дель­ное управ­ле­ние ме­ст­ным на­се­ле­ни­ем и за­вое­ва­те­ля­ми по при­ня­тым у тех и дру­гих за­ко­нам.

Им­пе­рия Вост. Цзинь, как и её пред­ше­ст­вен­ни­ца, бы­ла до­воль­но не­проч­ной. В сре­де вост.-цзинь­ской зна­ти бы­ли силь­ны се­па­ра­ти­ст­ские на­строе­ния и шла по­сто­ян­ная меж­до­усоб­ная борь­ба. С ос­но­ва­ни­ем в 420 пол­ко­вод­цем Лю Юем на ба­зе Вост. Цзинь им­пе­рии Юж­ная Сун в центр. и юго-вост. рай­онах К. на ко­рот­кое вре­мя во­зоб­ла­да­ла тен­ден­ция к цен­тра­ли­за­ции. Од­на­ко Юж. Сун про­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ла не­дол­го. В 479 пол­ко­во­дец Сяо Дао­чэн за­хва­тил власть и ос­новал но­вую ди­на­стию – Юж­ная Ци. Её, в свою оче­редь, в ре­зуль­та­те вер­ху­шеч­но­го пе­ре­во­ро­та в 501 сме­ни­ла ди­на­стия Лян, а ту в 551 – Чэнь. По­ли­тич. не­ста­биль­ность обу­сло­ви­ла даль­ней­шее сни­же­ние ав­то­ри­те­та вер­хов­ной вла­сти в юж.-кит. зем­лях и уси­ле­ние усо­биц. Си­туа­цию ос­лож­ня­ли час­тые нар. вос­ста­ния и не­удач­ные вой­ны с Се­ве­ром, в ре­зуль­та­те ко­то­рых юж. ди­на­стии ли­ши­лись час­ти по­ру­беж­ных тер­ри­то­рий.

Схо­жие про­цес­сы про­те­ка­ли и в сев.-кит. зем­лях, где уси­ли­лась ос­но­ван­ная в 386 таб­га­ча­ми (од­на из вет­вей сянь­би) им­пе­рия Се­вер­ная Вэй. В ней про­ис­хо­ди­ло по­сте­пен­ное сбли­же­ние таб­гач­ских и кит. пра­вя­щих вер­хов, бы­ла вве­де­на кит. сис­те­ма де­ле­ния стра­ны на об­лас­ти и уез­ды, кит. шка­ла чи­нов­ничь­их долж­но­стей, упо­ря­до­че­на на­ло­го­вая сис­те­ма. К кон. 5 в. знат­ным таб­гач­ским ро­дам сев.-вэй­ский двор пред­пи­сал сме­нить фа­ми­лии на ки­тай­ские и за­пре­тил но­ше­ние не­ки­тай­ской оде­ж­ды. Сто­ли­ца им­пе­рии бы­ла пе­ре­не­се­на из г. Пин­чэн в од­ну из ста­рых кит. сто­лиц – Ло­ян. При­ну­дит. ки­таи­за­ция вы­зы­ва­ла ост­рое не­до­воль­ст­во таб­гач­ской зна­ти и ар­мии. В 523 вос­ста­ли вой­ска в сев. рай­онах им­пе­рии. На­чав­шие­ся по­сле это­го меж­до­усо­би­цы при­ве­ли в 534–535 к рас­ко­лу Сев. Вэй на Вост. Вэй и Зап. Вэй. В ре­зуль­та­те по­сле­дую­щих двор­цо­вых пе­ре­во­ро­тов в Вост. Вэй в 550 ут­вер­дилась но­вая ди­на­стия и об­ра­зо­ва­лось гос-во Се­вер­ная Ци. То же са­мое про­изо­ш­ло в За­пад­ной Вэй, ко­то­рая в 557 пре­вра­ти­лась в Се­вер­ную Чжоу. Про­ти­во­бор­ст­во ме­ж­ду эти­ми дву­мя го­су­дар­ст­ва­ми за­кон­чи­лось в 577 раз­гро­мом Сев. Ци и объ­е­ди­не­ни­ем сев.-кит. зе­мель под эги­дой Сев. Чжоу. В 581 в Сев. Чжоу про­изо­шёл пе­ре­во­рот и власть пе­ре­шла к пол­ко­вод­цу Ян Цзя­ню (пра­вил под име­нем Вэнь Ди до 604), ко­то­рый про­воз­гла­сил се­бя ос­но­ва­те­лем ди­на­стии Суй. В 589 ему уда­лось раз­гро­мить и при­со­еди­нить к сво­им вла­де­ни­ям Чэнь. По­сле дли­тель­но­го пе­рио­да по­ли­тич. рас­па­да К. был вновь объ­е­ди­нён.

Пе­ри­од раз­дроб­лен­но­сти тя­же­ло от­ра­зил­ся на эко­но­ми­ке К. По­сто­ян­ные вой­ны и ино­зем­ные на­ше­ст­вия на­ру­ши­ли ра­бо­ту от­ла­жен­но­го ве­ка­ми эко­но­мич. ме­ха­низ­ма, мн. го­ро­да бы­ли со­жже­ны или раз­граб­ле­ны, часть на­се­ле­ния ис­треб­ле­на, тор­гов­ля за­чахла. Од­на­ко и в эти «смут­ные» вре­ме­на пра­ви­те­ли, стре­мясь по­пол­нить каз­ну, в той или иной сте­пе­ни всё же за­ни­ма­лись ор­га­ни­за­ци­ей хо­зяйств. жиз­ни на под­кон­троль­ных тер­ри­то­ри­ях. В пе­ри­од Трое­цар­ст­вия в Вэй и У, а в по­сле­дую­щие го­ды и в др. кит. го­су­дар­ст­вах ши­ро­ко прак­ти­ко­ва­лось соз­да­ние во­ен. по­се­ле­ний (тунь тянь). Но ве­ду­щей фор­мой ор­га­ни­за­ции с. х-ва в 3–6 вв. ста­ла т. н. на­дель­ная сис­те­ма зем­ле­вла­де­ния. Пред­став­ле­ние о ней да­ёт со­хра­нив­ший­ся дек­рет о её вве­де­нии в им­пе­рии Цзинь в 280, со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му ка­ж­дый взрос­лый муж­чи­на имел пра­во по­лу­чить в поль­зо­ва­ние 70 му зем­ли (му – ме­ра пло­ща­ди в К., ве­ли­чи­на ко­то­рой не­од­но­крат­но ме­ня­лась) и ещё 30 му на свою суп­ру­гу. Кро­ме то­го, ему вме­ня­лось в обя­зан­ность об­ра­ба­ты­вать до­пол­ни­тель­но 50 му за се­бя и 20 му за суп­ру­гу, уро­жай с ко­то­рых це­ли­ком по­сту­пал в каз­ну. Сверх это­го ка­ж­дое до­мо­хо­зяй­ст­во бы­ло обя­за­но пла­тить под­вор­ную по­дать тка­ня­ми. Чи­нов­ни­кам так­же по­ла­га­лись зе­мель­ные вла­де­ния (пре­дос­тав­ля­лись вме­сто жа­ло­ва­нья), но бо­лее круп­ные. В за­ви­си­мо­сти от ран­га чи­нов­ни­ка они со­став­ля­ли от 10 до 50 цин (1 цин – 100 му). Зем­ли чи­нов­ни­ков долж­ны бы­ли об­ра­ба­ты­вать при­пи­сан­ные к ним про­сто­лю­ди­ны.

На­дель­ная сис­те­ма зем­ле­вла­де­ния, по­сто­ян­но кор­рек­ти­ро­вав­шая­ся, про­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ла в К. в те­че­ние не­сколь­ких ве­ков. На­ря­ду с ней со­хра­ня­лось ча­ст­ное зем­ле­вла­де­ние. Об­ла­да­те­ли круп­ных и ср. зе­мель­ных вла­де­ний, как пра­ви­ло, сда­ва­ли зем­лю за со­от­вет­ст­вую­щую пла­ту в арен­ду. До­хо­ды от ча­ст­но­го зем­ле­вла­де­ния бы­ли зна­чи­тель­ны­ми, они обес­пе­чи­ва­ли их по­лу­ча­те­лю вес в об­ще­ст­ве, да­ва­ли воз­мож­ность за­нять оп­ре­де­лён­ную адм.-управ­ленч. долж­ность. Слой круп­ных и ср. ча­ст­ных зем­ле­вла­дель­цев в кит. ис­точ­ни­ках име­ну­ет­ся «силь­ны­ми до­ма­ми» или «боль­ши­ми до­ма­ми». Та­кие «до­ма» су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли ещё в эпо­ху Хань, но в 3–6 вв. их чис­ло зна­чи­тель­но уве­ли­чи­лось, а по­ли­тич. влия­ние воз­рос­ло.

В жиз­ни кит. го­ро­да в 3–6 вв. не про­изош­ло су­ще­ст­вен­ных пе­ре­мен. Го­ро­да по-преж­не­му бы­ли гл. обр. адм. и во­ен. цен­тра­ми. На се­ве­ре К. во мно­гих из них за­кре­пи­лась при­шлая знать ко­че­вых на­ро­дов.

3–6 вв. – пе­ри­од оп­ре­де­лён­ной ар­хаи­за­ции кит. об­ще­ст­ва и его рас­па­да на обо­соб­лен­ные ме­ст­ные со­об­ще­ст­ва. Этот про­цесс был обу­слов­лен ос­лаб­ле­ни­ем центр. вла­сти, на­ту­ра­ли­за­ци­ей хо­зяй­ст­вен­ной и «вое­ни­за­ци­ей» по­ли­тич. жиз­ни. Ак­тив­но шло ук­ре­п­ле­ние кров­но­род­ст­вен­ных и кла­но­вых струк­тур, скла­ды­ва­лись груп­пи­ров­ки «силь­ных до­мов», ру­ко­во­ди­мые ме­ст­ны­ми во­ж­дя­ми, боль­шое зна­че­ние ста­ло при­да­вать­ся во­про­сам древ­но­сти и знат­но­сти ро­да. Од­но­вре­мен­но бы­ст­ро уг­луб­ля­лось со­ци­аль­ное не­ра­вен­ст­во, воз­ни­ка­ли но­вые фор­мы за­ви­си­мо­сти, рос­ло чис­ло лич­но за­ви­си­мых, пре­ж­де все­го т. н. гос­тей – лиц, на­хо­див­ших­ся в ус­лу­же­нии.

В 3–6 вв. в К. не пре­кра­ща­лось на­ко­п­ле­ние на­уч. зна­ний. Со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­лось пра­во, по­яв­ля­лись ис­то­рич. и ис­то­ри­ко-гео­гра­фич. со­чи­не­ния, пер­вые тру­ды по тео­рии лит. твор­че­ст­ва и жи­во­пи­си, по ма­те­ма­ти­ке, бы­ли со­став­ле­ны фи­ло­ло­гич., а так­же фо­не­тич. сло­ва­ри, раз­ви­ва­лись зод­че­ст­во, по­эзия, поя­ви­лись сбор­ни­ки рас­ска­зов и пре­да­ний.

Империи Суй (589–617) и Тан (618–907)

С ру­бе­жа 6–7 вв. на­блю­да­лась тен­ден­ция к ста­би­ли­за­ции по­ли­тич. и эко­но­мич. по­ло­же­ния в К. Имп. Вэнь-ди (Ян Цзянь) ста­рал­ся опи­рать­ся не столь­ко на во­ен. си­лу, сколь­ко на чи­нов­ни­чье-бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­рат, про­вёл ре­фор­мы, на­прав­лен­ные на ук­ре­п­ле­ние по­зи­ций центр. вла­сти. При его пре­ем­ни­ке Ян Гуа­не (Ян-ди, 605–617) бы­ла со­ору­же­на осн. часть Ве­ли­ко­го ка­на­ла. Суй­ский К. вёл за­вое­ват. вой­ны про­тив сев.-кор. гос-ва Ко­гу­рё, вьетн. гос-ва Ван­су­ан, тюр­ков и ту­гу­хунь. Прав­ле­ние Ян Гуа­на от­ли­ча­лось край­ним дес­по­тиз­мом и уси­ле­ни­ем на­ло­го­во­го гнё­та, что вы­зы­ва­ло не­до­воль­ст­во суй­ской зна­ти и про­сто­го на­се­ле­ния. В 611 в раз­ных кон­цах стра­ны на­ча­лись вол­не­ния. В 617 ди­на­стия Суй па­ла, власть за­хва­тил один из суй­ских на­ме­ст­ни­ков Ли Юань, про­воз­гла­сив­ший на­ча­ло прав­ле­ния ди­на­стии Тан и из­брав­ший её сто­ли­цей Чанъ­ань. Имен­но при этой ди­на­стии, на­чи­ная со 2-й четв. 7 в., сло­жил­ся тип гос. сис­те­мы, ко­то­рый оп­ре­де­лял по­ли­тич. ор­га­ни­за­цию К. вплоть до на­ча­ла Но­во­го вре­ме­ни.

Гос. уст­рой­ст­во им­пе­рии Тан бы­ло за­кре­п­ле­но в де­таль­но раз­ра­бо­тан­ных за­ко­нах, под­раз­де­ляв­ших­ся на 4 ка­те­го­рии: гэ – нор­ма­ти­вы (пре­ж­де все­го для адм. ап­па­ра­та), люй – уго­лов­ные ус­та­нов­ле­ния, лин – об­ще­обя­за­тель­ные пред­пи­са­ния и ши – внут­ри­ве­дом­ст­вен­ные нор­мы. Бы­ло со­став­ле­но неск. за­ко­но­дат. сво­дов.

В адм. от­но­ше­нии им­пе­рия Тан де­лилась на круп­ные рай­оны (дао). Они в свою оче­редь под­раз­де­ля­лись на ок­ру­га (чжоу), а по­след­ние – на уез­ды (сянь). Спец. ор­га­нов вла­сти в рай­онах при ди­на­стии Тан не су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло. Власть в ок­ру­гах и уез­дах на­хо­ди­лась в ру­ках ок­руж­ных и уезд­ных управ­ле­ний, воз­глав­ляв­ших­ся на­чаль­ни­ка­ми. В сер. 7 в. в им­пе­рии на­счи­ты­ва­лось 358 ок­ру­гов и 1551 уезд, в сер. 8 в. – 328 ок­ру­гов и 1573 уез­да.

Адм.-терр. де­ле­ние им­пе­рии до­пол­ня­лось раз­де­ле­ни­ем на во­ен. ок­ру­га (фу). В раз­ное вре­мя их бы­ло от 600 до 800. Фу бы­ли трёх раз­ря­дов: выс­шие (вы­став­ля­ли 1200 сол­дат), сред­ние (1000 сол­дат) и низ­шие (800 сол­дат). В ар­мию бра­ли лю­дей в воз­рас­те от 20 до 60 лет. Их се­мьи ос­во­бо­ж­да­лись от на­ло­гов, но долж­ны бы­ли снаб­жать про­дук­та­ми, обу­вать и оде­вать «сво­его» сол­да­та. Вся ар­мия де­ли­лась на 16 боль­ших со­еди­не­ний (вэй).

Функ­ции центр. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва вы­пол­ня­ли Па­ла­та выс­ше­го сек­ре­та­риа­та, Па­ла­та центр. сек­ре­та­риа­та и Па­ла­та при­бли­жён­ных к Выс­шим вра­там. Док­ла­ды и за­про­сы с мест по­сту­па­ли в Па­ла­ту выс­ше­го сек­ре­та­риа­та, в ко­то­рой име­лось Шесть Ве­домств – об­ря­дов, чи­нов, на­ло­гов, об­ществ. ра­бот, су­деб­ное и во­ен­ное. Ве­дом­ст­ва под­го­тав­ли­ва­ли ре­ко­мен­да­ции по об­су­ж­дав­шим­ся в них де­лам, а ре­шения по ним при­ни­ма­лись по­сле рас­смот­ре­ния в Па­ла­те центр. сек­ре­та­риа­та. Про­вер­ку це­ле­со­об­раз­но­сти этих ре­ше­ний про­во­ди­ла Па­ла­та при­бли­жён­ных к Выс­шим вра­там. Им­пе­ра­тор вме­ши­вал­ся в ра­бо­ту пра­ви­тель­ст­ва лишь в слу­чае воз­ник­но­ве­ния раз­но­гла­сий ме­ж­ду па­ла­та­ми, а так­же ес­ли тре­бо­ва­лось офор­мить то или иное ре­ше­ние в ви­де вы­со­чай­ше­го рас­по­ря­же­ния. Прин­ци­пы ор­га­ни­за­ции и дея­тель­но­сти Шес­ти Ве­домств бы­ли за­фик­си­ро­ва­ны в со­став­лен­ных в 1-й пол. 8 в. «За­ко­но­уста­нов­ле­ни­ях Шес­ти Ве­домств ди­на­стии Тан». В Чанъ­а­ни дей­ст­во­ва­ла так­же Па­ла­та цен­зо­ров, упол­но­мо­чен­ная про­ве­рять ра­бо­ту чи­нов­ни­ков всех центр. и ме­ст­ных уч­ре­ж­де­ний, кро­ме Па­ла­ты центр. сек­ре­та­риа­та и Па­ла­ты при­бли­жён­ных к Выс­шим вра­там.

На­зна­че­ние на адм. по­сты про­из­во­ди­лось по ито­гам эк­за­ме­нац. ис­пы­та­ний. В на­ча­ле эпо­хи Тан по ре­зуль­та­там эк­за­ме­нов и в за­ви­си­мо­сти от то­го, где они сда­ва­лись (в уез­де, ок­ру­ге или сто­ли­це), при­сваи­ва­лись 8 раз­лич­ных по зна­чи­мо­сти сте­пе­ней, ка­ж­дая из ко­то­рых да­ва­ла воз­мож­ность сдав­ше­му эк­за­мен (та­кой че­ло­век име­но­вал­ся шэнь­ши) за­нять адм. долж­ность то­го или ино­го уров­ня. Тео­ре­ти­че­ски к эк­за­ме­нам до­пус­ка­лось лю­бое ли­цо, зна­чив­шее­ся в спи­сках на­се­ле­ния и не при­над­ле­жав­шее к ка­те­го­рии «под­ло­го лю­да». В ре­аль­но­сти круг шэнь­ши ог­ра­ни­чи­вал­ся вы­ход­ца­ми из со­стоя­тель­ных и влия­тель­ных кла­нов. Тем не ме­нее вве­де­ние та­кой сис­те­мы за­ня­тия долж­но­стей име­ло по­ло­жи­тель­ное зна­че­ние, по­сколь­ку ли­к­ви­ди­ро­ва­ло су­ще­ст­во­вав­шую до это­го мо­но­по­лию уз­ко­го кру­га ари­сто­кра­тич. се­мейств на гос.-адм. служ­бу.

«Воин, вынимающий стрелу из груди раненого коня». Из погребения императора Тай-цзуна (10 в.) в Сиане. Музей Пенсильванского ун-та (Филадельфия).

Им­пе­рия Тан про­во­ди­ла ак­тив­ную внеш­нюю по­ли­ти­ку. Она не­од­но­крат­но пред­при­ни­ма­ла по­хо­ды про­тив Ко­гу­рё и за­хва­ти­ла его в 668. На тер­ри­то­рии Ко­гу­рё, а за­тем и в юж.-кор. гос-ве Пэк­че бы­ло уч­ре­ж­де­но кит. во­ен. на­ме­ст­ни­че­ст­во Ань­дун (Уми­ро­тво­рён­ный Вос­ток). В 629–630 кит. вой­ска пе­ре­шли в на­ступ­ле­ние на сев.-зап. гра­ни­цах им­пе­рии и к сер. 7 в. раз­гро­ми­ли Вос­точ­ный и За­пад­ный тюрк­ские ка­га­на­ты. Их про­дви­же­ние даль­ше на за­пад бы­ло ос­та­нов­ле­но ара­ба­ми. В ре­шаю­щей бит­ве с ни­ми в 751 на р. Та­лас (близ совр. Биш­ке­ка) ки­тай­цы по­тер­пе­ли по­ра­же­ние.

Со 2-й пол. 8 в. во­ен. мощь Тан­ской им­пе­рии на­ча­ла ос­ла­бе­вать. На за­па­де Тан ли­ши­лась сво­их по­зи­ций в борь­бе с ти­бет­ца­ми, уй­гу­ра­ми, а позд­нее – тан­гу­та­ми и др. Ещё рань­ше она ут­ра­ти­ла кон­троль над кор. го­су­дар­ст­ва­ми. На юго-за­па­де Тан тес­ни­ло гос-во Нань­чжао, а с се­ве­ра в неё втор­га­лись ки­да­ни.

В са­мой им­пе­рии на­рас­та­ли кри­зис­ные яв­ле­ния. Во мно­гом они бы­ли вы­зва­ны де­гра­да­ци­ей на­дель­ной сис­те­мы зем­ле­поль­зо­ва­ния и раз­ло­же­ни­ем бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­ра­та. Ут­ра­ти­ла эф­фек­тив­ность и сис­те­ма фор­ми­ро­ва­ния ар­мии, сви­де­тель­ст­вом че­го ста­ло ши­ро­кое рас­про­стра­не­ние на­ём­ни­че­ст­ва. Стре­мясь про­ти­во­дей­ст­во­вать уси­ле­нию влия­ния ари­сто­кра­тич. груп­пи­ро­вок и по­да­вить се­па­ра­ти­ст­ские уст­рем­ле­ния ме­ст­ной зна­ти, им­пе­ра­то­ры Тан ста­ли на­зна­чать в не­спо­кой­ные рай­оны во­ен. гу­бер­на­то­ров (цзе­ду­ши). Од­на­ко это не улуч­ши­ло по­ло­же­ния – се­па­ра­тизм про­дол­жал уси­ли­вать­ся, а са­ми во­ен. гу­бер­на­то­ры не­ред­ко воз­глав­ля­ли вы­сту­п­ле­ния ме­ст­ной зна­ти. Ис­пы­та­ни­ем для им­пе­рии стал мя­теж, под­ня­тый в 755 цзе­ду­ши Ань Лу­ша­нем, ко­то­рый с боль­шим тру­дом уда­лось по­да­вить лишь в 763.

Дорога к погребениям танских императоров под Сианем. 8 в. Фото 1980-х гг.

В им­пе­ри­ях Суй и Тан, в ус­ло­ви­ях ос­лаб­ле­ния внеш­них уг­роз и ста­биль­но­го раз­ви­тия хо­зяй­ст­ва, на­чал­ся бур­ный рост го­ро­дов. Ос­та­ва­ясь по-преж­не­му во­ен. опор­ны­ми пунк­та­ми и ре­зи­ден­ция­ми, они ста­ли при­об­ре­тать так­же зна­че­ние тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­ных цен­тров (осо­бен­но со 2-й пол. эпо­хи Тан). Ши­ро­кое строи­тель­ст­во ве­лось в сто­лич­ных го­ро­дах Чанъ­ань и Ло­ян. К нач. 8 в. в Чанъ­а­ни про­жи­ва­ло ок. 1 млн. чел. Наи­бо­лее ин­тен­сив­но раз­ви­ва­лись го­ро­да в центр. и юго-вост. час­ти стра­ны. Тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­ная дея­тель­ность в го­ро­дах жё­ст­ко рег­ла­мен­ти­ро­ва­лась вла­стя­ми. В эпо­ху Тан поя­ви­лись сво­его ро­да проф. объ­еди­не­ния гор. тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­но­го на­се­ле­ния – «ря­ды» (хан), объ­е­ди­няв­шие лав­ки-мас­тер­ские ре­мес­лен­ни­ков той или иной спе­ци­аль­но­сти. «Ря­ды» воз­глав­ля­лись стар­ши­на­ми, ко­то­рые пред­став­ля­ли их ин­те­ре­сы пе­ред вла­стя­ми. Оп­ре­де­лён­ны­ми ус­пе­ха­ми бы­ло от­ме­че­но раз­ви­тие с. х-ва. Ши­ро­кое рас­про­стра­не­ние по­лу­чи­ло ово­ще­вод­ст­во, на­ча­лось куль­ти­ви­ро­ва­ние ран­них и позд­них сор­тов ри­са, а так­же чая.

Зна­чит. раз­ви­тие в 7–9 вв. по­лу­чи­ла меж­ре­гио­наль­ная тор­гов­ля. Это­му во мно­гом спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ла за­вер­шив­шая­ся к 621 уни­фи­ка­ция мед­ной мо­не­ты. По­яви­лись круп­ные тор­го­вые до­ма, за­ни­мав­шие­ся оп­то­вы­ми за­куп­ка­ми и транс­пор­ти­ров­кой од­но­го или не­сколь­ких ви­дов то­ва­ров. Бла­го­ус­т­раи­ва­лись и бра­лись под ох­ра­ну тор­го­вые пу­ти, на ко­то­рых со­ору­жа­лись скла­ды и по­стоя­лые дво­ры. В Гу­ан­чжоу, а позд­нее и в др. при­мор­ские кит. го­ро­да пра­ви­тель­ст­во ста­ло на­зна­чать «упол­но­мо­чен­ных по тор­го­вым ко­раб­лям», ко­то­рые бы­ли обя­за­ны кон­тро­ли­ро­вать мор. тор­гов­лю.

Струк­ту­ра кит. об­ще­ст­ва в пе­ри­од им­пе­рий Суй и Тан (по офиц. ста­ти­сти­ке, в 7–9 вв. по­дат­ное на­се­ле­ние К. со­став­ля­ло от 46 до 54 млн. чел.) не пре­тер­пе­ла су­ще­ст­вен­ных из­ме­не­ний по срав­не­нию с пред­ше­ст­вую­щим пе­рио­дом. На вер­ши­не со­ци­аль­ной ле­ст­ни­цы на­хо­ди­лась ари­сто­кра­тия, всё ос­таль­ное на­се­ле­ние де­ли­лось на «чи­нов­ни­ков» и «на­род». К «на­ро­ду» от­но­си­ли 4 ка­те­го­рии жи­те­лей: учё­ных (или бла­го­род­ных), зем­ле­дель­цев, ре­мес­лен­ни­ков и тор­гов­цев. Наи­бо­лее ощу­ти­мые со­ци­аль­ные барь­е­ры су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли ме­ж­ду ари­сто­кра­ти­ей и ос­таль­ной мас­сой на­се­ле­ния, ме­ж­ду слу­жи­лым со­сло­ви­ем и про­сто­лю­ди­на­ми, ме­ж­ду пол­но­прав­ны­ми и за­ви­си­мы­ми. В не­зна­чит. объ­ё­мах со­хра­ня­лись ра­бо­вла­де­ние, до­маш­нее раб­ст­во. С 7 в. на­чал­ся про­цесс эт­нич. кон­со­ли­да­ции ки­тай­цев, од­на­ко раз­ли­чия в язы­ке, обы­ча­ях, ра­цио­не пи­та­ния и пр. ме­ж­ду жи­те­ля­ми сев. и юж. об­лас­тей стра­ны, воз­ник­шие в 3–6 вв., со­хра­ня­лись.

Эпо­ха Тан бы­ла от­ме­че­на зна­чит. куль­тур­ны­ми дос­ти­же­ния­ми. Во 2-й пол. 9 в. в К. на­ча­лось кни­го­пе­ча­та­ние с рез­ных до­сок (кси­ло­гра­фия), изо­бре­тён­ное Фэн Лао. Бы­ли со­став­ле­ны 8 офиц. ди­на­стий­ных ис­то­рий пред­ше­ст­вую­ще­го пе­рио­да. Лю Чжиц­зи соз­дал пер­вый тео­ре­тич. труд по ис­то­рио­пи­са­нию «Про­ник­но­ве­ние в ис­то­рию» («Ши тун»). Поя­ви­лась но­вая ре­дак­ция клас­сич. кон­фу­ци­ан­ско­го «Пя­ти­кни­жия». В этот пе­ри­од тво­ри­ли из­вест­ные мыс­ли­те­ли Ду Ю (735–812), Хань Юй, Лю Цзу­ню­ань (773–819) и др., а так­же вы­даю­щие­ся по­эты Мэн Хао­жань, Ван Вэй, Ли Бо, Ду Фу, Бо Цзюйи. В 7–9 вв. в К. про­ник­ли «три уче­ния за­ру­беж­ных вар­ва­ров» – ма­ни­хей­ст­во, зо­роа­ст­ризм и не­сто­ри­ан­ст­во, од­на­ко ши­ро­ко­го рас­про­стра­не­ния не по­лу­чи­ли.

Империя Сун (960–1279)

Обо­ст­ре­ние внут­ри­по­ли­тич. борь­бы и не­пре­рыв­ные вой­ны на внеш­них ру­бе­жах им­пе­рии ло­жи­лись тя­жё­лым бре­ме­нем на на­се­ле­ние К. С сер. 9 в. в стра­не уча­сти­лись нар. вол­не­ния, ко­то­рые пе­ре­рос­ли в Кре­сть­ян­скую вой­ну 874–901, од­ну из са­мых гран­ди­оз­ных в кит. ис­то­рии. Ли­де­ра­ми пов­станч. дви­же­ния, ох­ва­тив­ше­го весь центр.-юж. К., бы­ли Ху­ан Чао и Ван Сянь­чжи. В 881 вос­став­шие ов­ла­де­ли сто­ли­цей и сверг­ли им­пе­ра­то­ра. При­звав на по­мощь ино­зем­ные вой­ска, знать су­ме­ла раз­гро­мить пов­стан­цев. В 883 ди­на­стия Тан бы­ла вос­ста­нов­ле­на, но её по­зи­ции по­шат­ну­лись. По­след­ний тан­ский имп. Ли Чжу (904–907) был сверг­нут вое­на­чаль­ни­ком Чжу Вэ­нем, од­ним из быв. спод­виж­ни­ков Ху­ан Чао, пе­ре­шед­шим на служ­бу пра­ви­тель­ст­ву.

С кру­ше­ни­ем им­пе­рии Тан К. вновь рас­пал­ся (см. Пя­ти ди­на­стий эпо­ха). В его сев. час­ти об­ра­зо­ва­лись гос-ва Сев. Тан и Сев. Хань. На юге воз­ник­ли гос-ва Шу (Ран­няя и Позд­няя), Пин, Чу, У (Юж. Тан), У Юэ, Минь и Юж. Хань. Рас­пад со­про­во­ж­дал­ся но­вым вит­ком «вое­ни­за­ции» об­ще­ст­ва и бес­пре­рыв­ны­ми вой­на­ми. Лишь к сер. 10 в. тен­ден­ция к объ­е­ди­не­нию кит. зе­мель вновь взя­ла верх. В 960 Чжао Ку­анъ­инь, пол­ко­во­дец воз­ник­ше­го в 951 гос-ва Позд­няя Чжоу, объ­е­ди­нил под сво­ей вла­стью б. ч. зе­мель быв. им­пе­рии Тан и ос­но­вал но­вую ди­на­стию – Сун. Сто­ли­цей сун­ско­го К. стал г. Вянь (ны­не Кай­фын).

Им­пе­ра­то­ры Сун це­ле­на­прав­лен­но про­во­ди­ли по­ли­ти­ку уси­ле­ния цен­тра­ли­за­ции стра­ны и рас­ши­ре­ния сво­их вла­ст­ных пол­но­мо­чий. Они ог­ра­ни­чи­ли пол­но­мо­чия пер­во­го ми­ни­ст­ра (цзай­ся­на), ли­шив его пра­ва на­зна­чать чи­нов­ни­ков и уча­ст­во­вать в ре­ше­нии во­ен. во­про­сов [они пе­ре­шли в ве­де­ние Со­ве­та по во­ен. де­лам (Шу­шию­ань) и лич­но им­пе­ра­то­ра]. Адм.-терр. де­ле­ние стра­ны ос­та­лось прак­ти­че­ски преж­ним, но ор­га­ни­за­ция ме­ст­ной вла­сти из­ме­ни­лась. Ап­па­рат ме­ст­но­го управ­ле­ния ста­ли воз­глав­лять 4 упол­но­мо­чен­ных (ши), ка­ж­дый из ко­то­рых от­ве­чал за свой круг во­про­сов. Они не­по­сред­ст­вен­но под­чи­ня­лись центр. пра­ви­тель­ст­ву. Кон­троль над ме­ст­ной вла­стью осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ли спец. упол­но­мо­чен­ные.

Кос­тяк сун­ской ар­мии со­став­ля­ли «двор­цо­вые вой­ска», рас­квар­ти­ро­ван­ные в сто­ли­це и во­круг неё. По­ря­док на мес­тах обес­пе­чи­ва­ли «сель­ские вой­ска». Об­щая чис­лен­ность ар­мии в нач. 11 в. со­став­ля­ла 1260 тыс. чел. (позд­нее до­хо­ди­ла до 4,5 млн. чел.).

Не­смот­ря на на­ли­чие ог­ром­но­го вой­ска, Сун в 1005 по­тер­пе­ла по­ра­же­ние в вой­не с ки­дань­ской дер­жа­вой Ляо, ко­то­рая от­торг­ла от им­пе­рии 16 сев. ок­ру­гов и об­ло­жи­ла её да­нью. Не при­нес­ла ей ус­пе­ха и дли­тель­ная вой­на про­тив воз­ник­ше­го на сев.-зап. ру­бе­жах им­пе­рии тан­гут­ско­го гос-ва Си Ся. В 1006 сун­ский двор был вы­ну­ж­ден при­знать его не­за­ви­си­мость.

Не­уда­чи в борь­бе с со­се­дя­ми и всё бо­лее от­чёт­ли­во про­яв­ляв­шая­ся не­эф­фек­тив­ность су­ще­ст­вую­щей сис­те­мы управ­ле­ния под­тал­ки­ва­ли не­ко­то­рых пред­ста­ви­те­лей пра­вя­щих вер­хов к про­ве­де­нию ре­форм. В 1030–40-х гг. про­ек­ты ре­форм пред­ла­га­ли Фань Чжунъ­янь, Фу Би, Оу­ян Сю, Ли Гоу и др. Они ре­ко­мен­дова­ли про­вес­ти «чи­ст­ку» бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­ра­та, за­ме­нить «пло­хих» чи­нов­ни­ков «хо­ро­ши­ми», по­кон­чить с фа­во­ри­тиз­мом, на­чать ком­плек­то­ва­ние ар­мии пу­тём рек­рут­ско­го на­бо­ра и пр. В 1070 по­пыт­ку про­ве­де­ния ре­форм пред­при­нял пер­вый ми­нистр Ван Ань­ши. Од­на­ко его дея­тель­ность на­толк­ну­лась на со­про­тив­ле­ние влия­тель­ных са­нов­ни­ков; в 1076 Ван Ань­ши был от­стра­нён от долж­но­сти, ре­фор­мы пре­кра­ти­лись.

В 1115 в центр. рай­онах Мань­чжу­рии воз­ник­ла дер­жа­ва чжур­чжэ­ней – Цзинь. Сун­ский К. всту­пил с ней в со­юз. Со­вме­ст­ны­ми уси­лия­ми в 1125 они раз­гро­ми­ли Ляо, что по­зво­ли­ло воз­вра­тить в со­став К. 16 сев. ок­ру­гов. В 1126 Цзинь на­ча­ла вой­ну про­тив сун­ско­го К. В 1127 чжур­чжэ­ни за­хва­ти­ли г. Вянь. Имп. дом пе­ре­ехал в г. Линь­ань (ны­не Хан­чжоу), про­воз­гла­шён­ный но­вой сто­ли­цей. Под его кон­тро­лем ос­та­ва­лись лишь юж. рай­оны им­пе­рии (пе­ри­од ис­то­рии К. с 1127 име­ну­ет­ся Юж­ная Сун). По­сле ря­да неудач­ных по­пы­ток на­нес­ти по­ра­же­ние Цзинь юж.-сун­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во в 1141 за­клю­чи­ло с чжур­чжэ­ня­ми до­го­вор, по ко­то­ро­му ус­ту­пи­ло им се­вер стра­ны до р. Ху­ай­хэ и обя­за­лось вы­пла­чи­вать еже­год­ную дань.

К кон. 10 в. на­дель­ная сис­те­ма зем­ле­поль­зо­ва­ния в К. окон­ча­тель­но от­мер­ла. Сун­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во от­ка­за­лось от по­пы­ток «ус­та­нав­ли­вать зе­мель­ные по­ряд­ки» и тре­бо­ва­ло лишь не­укос­ни­тель­ной уп­ла­ты на­ло­гов с об­ра­ба­ты­вае­мых зе­мель. Это спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло пе­ре­рас­пре­де­ле­нию зе­мель­ных уго­дий и бы­ст­ро­му рос­ту круп­но­го зем­ле­вла­де­ния за счёт по­гло­ще­ния (пу­тём скуп­ки, за­хва­та си­лой, со­став­ле­ния под­лож­ных до­ку­мен­тов и пр.) мел­ко­кре­сть­ян­ских дер­жа­ний. Зе­мель­ные вла­де­ния отд. ари­сто­кра­тич. ро­дов и чи­нов­ни­ков в эпо­ху Сун до­стига­ли 6 и бо­лее тыс. цин па­хот­ной зем­ли (об­ра­ба­ты­ва­лись на ус­ло­ви­ях арен­ды). На­ря­ду с круп­ны­ми зе­мель­ны­ми вла­де­ния­ми про­дол­жа­ли су­ще­ст­во­вать мел­кие кре­сть­ян­ские хо­зяй­ст­ва, часть зе­мель на­хо­ди­лась в соб­ст­вен­но­сти го­су­дар­ст­ва.

Аренд­ные от­но­ше­ния, став­шие в К. в 10–13 вв. по­все­ме­ст­ны­ми (к сер. 11 в. в них бы­ла во­вле­че­на поч­ти по­ло­ви­на сель­ско­го на­се­ле­ния), не впи­сы­ва­лись в об­щин­ные ин­сти­ту­ты де­рев­ни, и по­то­му зна­че­ние по­след­них в сун­ском К. не­ук­лон­но сни­жа­лось.

Про­цесс обез­зе­ме­ли­ва­ния кре­сть­ян­ст­ва сти­му­ли­ро­вал даль­ней­ший рост го­ро­дов и по­вы­ше­ние их ро­ли как тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­ных цен­тров. До­ля го­ро­жан в на­се­ле­нии стра­ны дос­тиг­ла поч­ти 10%. За пре­де­ла­ми обо­ро­нит. стен круп­ных го­ро­дов фор­ми­ро­ва­лись по­са­ды. Ре­мес­лен­ни­ки на­ча­ли объ­е­ди­нять­ся в кор­по­ра­ции (ту­ань, ши, цзо и др.), схо­жие с ев­роп. це­ха­ми, воз­ник­ли объ­е­ди­не­ния куп­цов. Гор. тор­гов­ля, ло­мая ог­ра­ни­чения, ус­та­нав­ли­вае­мые вла­стя­ми, «вы­плес­ну­лась» на ули­цы, поя­ви­лись т. н. ноч­ные рын­ки, на­ча­ли про­во­дить­ся яр­мар­ки. Вла­сти ми­ри­лись с эти­ми но­вы­ми яв­ле­ния­ми, по­сколь­ку на­ло­го­вые от­чис­ле­ния с тор­гов­ли ста­ли важ­ной стать­ёй до­хо­дов каз­ны. Раз­ви­тие тор­гов­ли по­влек­ло за со­бой из­ме­не­ние фи­нан­со­вой сис­те­мы. В эпо­ху Сун бы­ло от­че­ка­не­но са­мое боль­шое, по срав­не­нию с др. пе­рио­да­ми кит. ис­то­рии, ко­ли­че­ст­во брон­зо­вых мо­нет стан­дарт­но­го об­раз­ца. И всё же пла­тёж­ных средств не хва­та­ло. Что­бы по­крыть их не­дос­та­ток, при рас­чё­тах ста­ли ис­поль­зо­вать­ся че­ки разл. ку­пе­че­ских кор­по­ра­ций, а за­тем ас­сиг­на­ции.

В струк­ту­ре кит. об­ще­ст­ва в кон. 10–13 вв. про­изош­ли не­ко­то­рые из­ме­не­ния. Влия­ние ари­сто­кра­тич. кла­нов и во­ен. вер­хов сни­зи­лось, воз­рос ав­то­ри­тет чи­нов­ничь­е­го со­сло­вия. Пе­ри­од Сун час­то на­зы­ва­ют «зо­ло­тым ве­ком» кит. чи­нов­ни­че­ст­ва: ук­ре­п­ля­лись и рас­ши­ря­лись его при­ви­ле­гии, уве­ли­чи­ва­лось ма­те­ри­аль­ное со­дер­жа­ние. Ря­ды шэнь­ши ста­ли по­пол­нять­ся за счёт чле­нов се­мей зем­ле­вла­дель­цев, вер­хов де­ре­вен­ских об­щин и гор. со­стоя­тель­ных кру­гов, в ре­зуль­та­те че­го эта со­ци­аль­ная ка­те­го­рия пе­ре­ста­ла быть замк­ну­той кас­той.

В сун­скую эпо­ху в К. не бы­ло круп­ных нар. вос­ста­ний. Ан­ти­пра­ви­тельств. вы­сту­п­ле­ния име­ли ме­сто в 993–997 под рук. Ван Сяо­бо, Ли Шу­ня и Чжан Юя, в 1047–48 под рук. Ван Цзе и в 1120–22 под пред­во­ди­тель­ст­вом Фан Ла. Все они бы­ли без осо­бо­го тру­да по­дав­ле­ны вла­стя­ми. В 11 в. от­ме­че­ны не­од­но­крат­ные сол­дат­ские бун­ты.

В эпо­ху Сун в К. бы­ли изо­бре­те­ны ком­пас, по­рох, пуш­ка. Би Шэн соз­дал под­виж­ный шрифт для кни­го­пе­ча­та­ния, поя­ви­лись книж­ная ми­ниа­тю­ра и ас­сиг­на­ции. Бы­ли усо­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­ны про­из-во и тех­ни­ка рос­пи­си фар­фо­ра. Быт гор. на­се­ле­ния К. к 13 в. стал зна­чи­тель­но от­ли­чать­ся от де­ре­вен­ско­го. В сто­ли­цах бы­ли соз­да­ны при­двор­ные ака­де­мии жи­во­пи­си, а в г. Вэнь – так­же му­зей жи­во­пи­си. В 10–13 вв. сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись нор­мы письм. кит. язы­ка (вэнь­янь), от­ли­чав­ше­го­ся от раз­го­вор­но­го. В по­эзии воз­ник осо­бый жанр – «цы».

Китай под властью монгольских завоевателей

Им­пе­рия Юань (1279–1368). В нач. 13 в. в монг. сте­пях сло­жи­лось мощ­ное объ­е­ди­не­ние пле­мён во гла­ве с Тэ­муд­жи­ном (Тэ­муч­жи­ном), при­няв­шим ти­тул Чин­гис­ха­на. С 1211 его вой­ска на­ча­ли со­вер­шать опус­то­ши­тель­ные на­бе­ги на вхо­див­шие в со­став чжур­чжэнь­ской им­пе­рии Цзинь зем­ли Сев. К. Толь­ко в 1213–14 здесь бы­ло раз­ру­ше­но и раз­граб­ле­но ок. 90 го­ро­дов. Их жи­те­ли, как пра­ви­ло, уво­ди­лись в раб­ст­во, а ес­ли ока­зы­ва­ли со­про­тив­ле­ние, – по­го­лов­но ис­треб­ля­лись. Мно­гие монг. вое­на­чаль­ни­ки, по­лу­чив в удел за­воё­ван­ные кит. зем­ли, на­ме­ре­ва­лись пре­вра­тить их в ог­ром­ное па­ст­би­ще, вы­ре­зав всё ме­ст­ное на­се­ле­ние.

В 1215 мон­го­лы взя­ли сто­ли­цу Цзинь г. Чжун­ду (ны­не Пе­кин), по­сле че­го цзинь­ский двор бе­жал в Вэнь. В 1234 Цзинь па­ла, с 1235 монг. вой­ска на­ча­ли втор­гать­ся на тер­ри­то­рию Юж. Сун, в 1254 по­ко­ри­ли Ти­бет, в 1259 – Ко­рё.

При пре­ем­ни­ке Чин­гис­ха­на Угэ­дэе монг. за­вое­ва­те­ли с 1230 ста­ли пы­тать­ся упо­ря­до­чить управ­ле­ние за­воё­ван­ны­ми сев.-кит. зем­ля­ми. По ре­ко­мен­да­ции сво­его со­вет­ни­ка Елюй Чу­цая Угэ­дэй на­чал вво­дить на них кит. сис­те­му управ­ле­ния и при­вле­кать к ра­бо­те кит. чи­нов­ни­ков. В 1233 бы­ла про­ве­де­на пе­ре­пись на­се­ле­ния, по­сле че­го оп­ре­де­ле­ны раз­ме­ры на­ло­го­вых ста­вок. Мон­го­лы по­сте­пен­но вос­при­ни­ма­ли тра­диц. кит. сис­те­му вла­ст­ных ин­сти­ту­тов и хо­зяй­ст­во­ва­ния.

По­сле рас­па­да Монг. им­пе­рии на тер­ри­то­рии Мон­го­лии и Сев. К. воз­ник­ло гос-во Ху­би­лая (всту­пил на хан­ский пре­стол в 1260). В 1264 Ху­би­лай объ­явил сво­ей сто­ли­цей Пе­кин, в 1271 про­воз­гла­сил се­бя ве­ли­ким ха­ном (им­пе­ра­то­ром) монг.-кит. им­пе­рии Юань. В 1276 его вой­ска взя­ли Линь­ань, в 1279 за­верши­ли за­вое­ва­ние им­пе­рии Юж. Сун. За­кре­пив­шись в К., мон­го­лы по­пы­та­лись про­дол­жить за­вое­ва­ния и вторг­лись в Бир­му (на­хо­ди­лась под вла­стью Юань в 1282–1283). Од­на­ко по­пыт­ки вы­са­дить­ся в Япо­нии (1274, 1281) и за­хва­тить о. Ява (1292–93) за­кон­чи­лись пол­ным про­ва­лом.

Ху­би­лай пред­при­нял даль­ней­шие ша­ги по ор­га­ни­за­ции сис­те­мы управ­ле­ния на зем­лях К. Бы­ло раз­ра­бо­та­но за­ко­но­да­тель­ст­во, ос­но­ван­ное в зна­чит. ме­ре на преж­них кит. за­ко­нах. Выс­шим пра­ви­тельств. ор­га­ном им­пе­рии Юань ста­ла Па­ла­та центр. сек­ре­та­риа­та с под­чи­няв­ши­ми­ся ей Ше­стью Ве­дом­ст­ва­ми; бы­ли вос­ста­нов­ле­ны так­же Со­вет по во­ен. де­лам и ряд др. кит. пра­ви­тельств. ор­га­нов. На­зна­че­ние чи­нов­ни­ков в центр. и ме­ст­ные ор­га­ны вла­сти вновь ста­ло про­из­во­дить­ся на ос­но­ве сис­те­мы эк­за­ме­нац. от­бо­ра. Од­на­ко клю­че­вые по­сты в адм. ап­па­ра­те ос­та­ва­лись в ру­ках мон­го­лов или со­сто­яв­ших у них на служ­бе вы­ход­цев из Центр. Азии. Тер­ри­то­рия им­пе­рии бы­ла раз­де­ле­на на 11 про­вин­ций, ко­то­рые, в свою оче­редь, де­ли­лись на об­лас­ти двух разл. ка­те­го­рий, ок­ру­га и уез­ды. Ряд рай­онов в центр. час­ти стра­ны ос­та­вал­ся под не­по­средств. управ­ле­ни­ем ве­ли­ко­го ха­на, а по­гра­нич­ные зем­ли – под управ­ле­ни­ем монг. вое­на­чаль­ни­ков. Монг. гар­ни­зо­ны раз­ме­ща­лись во всех круп­ных го­ро­дах стра­ны.

В юань­ском К. наи­боль­ши­ми пра­ва­ми и при­ви­ле­гия­ми поль­зо­ва­лись мон­го­лы, при­ви­ле­гии пре­дос­тав­ля­лись так­же ино­зем­цам, слу­жив­шим юань­ско­му дво­ру (сэ­му­жень). По­кро­ви­тель­ст­вом вла­стей поль­зо­ва­лось буд­дий­ское и да­ос­ское мо­на­ше­ст­во. Ни­же на со­ци­аль­ной ле­ст­ни­це стоя­ли ки­тай­цы из сев. час­ти стра­ны, ки­да­ни и чжур­чжэ­ни, а ещё ни­же – жи­те­ли тер­ри­то­рий, ра­нее вхо­див­ших в Юж. Сун. Ши­ро­кую про­слой­ку со­став­ля­ли по­лу­за­ви­си­мые (цюй­коу) и ра­бы. Ки­тай­цам, ис­пы­ты­вав­шим всю тя­жесть нац. гнё­та за­вое­ва­те­лей, за­пре­ща­лось иметь ору­жие, обу­чать­ся во­ен. де­лу (кро­ме тех, кто слу­жил в вой­сках), изу­чать иностр. язы­ки, уст­раи­вать мас­со­вые сбо­ри­ща, дер­жать ло­ша­дей и по­яв­лять­ся на ули­це в тём­ное вре­мя су­ток.

Монг. за­вое­ва­ние на­нес­ло тя­же­лей­ший удар по хо­зяй­ст­ву К. Стра­на бы­ла ра­зо­ре­на. Лишь к кон. 13 в., по сви­де­тель­ст­ву М. По­ло, по­се­тив­ше­го в это вре­мя К. и ос­та­вив­ше­го его до­воль­но про­стран­ное опи­са­ние, на­ча­лось ожив­ле­ние ре­мес­лен­но­го про­из-ва, ак­ти­ви­зи­ро­ва­лась внутр. и внеш­няя тор­гов­ля.

Империя Мин (1368–1644)

К сер. 14 в. в К. на­ча­ла на­рас­тать вол­на ан­типра­вительств. вы­сту­п­ле­ний. В центр. час­ти стра­ны вспых­ну­ло «крас­ных войск» вос­ста­ние 1351–68, под­го­тов­лен­ное сек­той Бай­лянь­цзяо. Сре­ди дей­ст­во­вав­ших в ни­зовь­ях р. Янц­зы пов­станч. войск ве­ду­щую роль иг­ра­ли от­ря­ды под рук. вы­ход­ца из кре­сть­ян, буд­дий­ско­го мо­на­ха Чжу Юань­чжа­на. В 1356 он за­хва­тил Нан­кин, где сфор­ми­ро­вал но­вое пра­ви­тель­ст­во, а в 1368 был про­воз­гла­шён им­пе­ра­то­ром но­вой ди­на­стии Мин. Гл. за­да­чей мин­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва бы­ло пол­ное ос­во­бо­ж­де­ние К. от монг. гос­под­ства. Лишь к 1410 Мин уда­лось раз­гро­мить осн. си­лы про­тив­ни­ка и взять под свой кон­троль все кит. зем­ли.

Чжу Юань­чжан ре­фор­ми­ро­вал сис­те­му гос. управ­ле­ния. Функ­ции центр. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва стал вы­пол­нять Внут­ри­двор­цо­вый сек­ре­та­ри­ат (Нэй­гэ), со­став­лен­ный из учё­ных. Ре­фор­мы со­про­во­ж­да­лись ре­прес­сия­ми и каз­ня­ми, в т. ч. пред­ста­ви­те­лей пра­вя­щих вер­хов; бы­ли унич­то­же­ны де­сят­ки ты­сяч лю­дей.

За­ко­но­да­тель­ст­во им­пе­рии Мин – ко­декс «За­ко­ны Ве­ли­кой ди­на­стии Мин» («Да Мин люй») – бы­ло раз­ра­бо­та­но на ос­но­ве тра­диц. норм. За­не­сён­ные в ка­дастр об­ра­ба­ты­вае­мые зем­ли под­раз­де­ля­лись на ка­зён­ные и ча­ст­ные (со­от­но­си­лись в про­пор­ции 1: 7). На ка­зён­ных зем­лях ча­ще все­го ор­га­ни­зо­вы­ва­лись во­ен. по­се­ле­ния. Ча­ст­ные зем­ли мог­ли пе­ре­да­вать­ся по на­след­ст­ву, про­да­вать­ся и по­ку­пать­ся, раз­мер ча­ст­но­го зем­ле­вла­де­ния не ог­ра­ни­чи­вал­ся. Сбор на­ло­гов про­из­во­дил­ся два раза в год – ле­том и осе­нью; с 1371 его кон­тро­ли­ро­ва­ли на­ло­го­вые ста­рос­ты. Кре­сть­я­не, как об­ла­да­те­ли собств. на­де­лов, так и арен­да­то­ры, по­ми­мо вы­пла­ты на­ло­гов, не­сли тру­до­вые по­вин­но­сти в поль­зу каз­ны. В 1577–81 бы­ла про­ве­де­на но­вая пе­ре­пись об­ла­гае­мых зе­мель и ус­та­нов­лен «еди­ный на­лог» на иму­ще­ст­во.

Для за­кре­п­ле­ния в стра­не вла­сти но­вой ди­на­стии Чжу Юань­чжан пе­ре­дал об­шир­ные тер­ри­то­рии в управ­ле­ние сво­им сы­новь­ям, соз­дав сво­его ро­да на­следств. уде­лы. Это име­ло да­ле­ко иду­щие по­след­ст­вия, соз­да­ло поч­ву для спо­ров и во­оруж. кон­флик­тов ме­ж­ду пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми раз­рас­тав­ше­го­ся кла­на имп. род­ни, ко­то­рые пре­тен­до­ва­ли на на­сле­до­ва­ние уде­лов (в на­ча­ле эпо­хи Мин бы­ло лишь 58 ти­ту­ло­ван­ных ро­ди­чей дво­ра, к кон. 15 в. – 2 тыс., к нач. 16 в. – 80 тыс., к кон­цу прав­ле­ния ди­на­стии – ок. 150–160 тыс.). Удов­ле­тво­рять их пре­тен­зии на зе­мель­ные вла­де­ния пра­ви­тель­ст­ву Мин в даль­ней­шем за­час­тую при­хо­ди­лось за счёт гос. зе­мель­но­го фон­да, в ре­зуль­та­те че­го он су­ще­ст­вен­но со­кра­тил­ся.

На­ли­чие мощ­но­го при­ви­ле­ги­ров. кла­на имп. род­ни, а так­же ка­те­го­рии т. н. за­слу­жен­ных са­нов­ни­ков (гун чэнь) – спе­ци­фич. чер­та со­ци­аль­ной струк­ту­ры Мин, от­ли­чаю­щая эту им­пе­рию от пред­ше­ст­вую­щих кит. дер­жав.

В пе­ри­од Мин про­дол­жал­ся рост го­ро­дов, ук­ре­п­ля­лась их роль как тор­го­во-ре­мес­лен­ных цен­тров. Бы­ст­ро раз­ви­вал­ся Пе­кин, ку­да в 1421 бы­ла пе­ре­не­се­на сто­ли­ца им­пе­рии. Не­ко­то­рые го­ро­да на­ча­ли спе­циа­ли­зи­ро­вать­ся на про­из-ве отд. ви­дов то­ва­ров: Цзин­дэч­жэнь – фар­фо­ра, Суч­жоу и Хан­чжоу – шёл­ка, Нан­кин и Хуч­жоу – ме­тал­лич. из­де­лий. Всё чёт­че обо­зна­ча­лась и хо­зяйств. спе­циа­ли­за­ция разл. рай­онов стра­ны: Шань­дун сла­вил­ся ла­ка­ми, Цзян­си – юве­лир­ны­ми из­де­лия­ми, Юнь­нань – ме­дью и свин­цом. В эпо­ху Мин в К. на­чал ак­тив­но воз­де­лы­вать­ся хло­пок.

Им­пе­рия Мин про­во­ди­ла ак­тив­ную внеш­нюю экс­пан­сию. В 1407 она вме­ша­лась во внутр. борь­бу во Вьет­на­ме, ок­ку­пи­ро­ва­ла его и до 1427 удер­жи­ва­ла под сво­им кон­тро­лем. В 1405–33 в стра­ны Юго-Вост. и Юж. Азии не­од­но­крат­но на­прав­ля­лись гран­ди­оз­ные экс­пе­ди­ции кит. фло­та под рук. Чжэн Хэ с це­лью про­де­мон­ст­ри­ро­вать «бо­гат­ст­во и мощь» К. В 15 в. Мин ве­ла борь­бу на сво­их сев. и сев.-зап. ру­бе­жах про­тив ко­чев­ни­ков. В 1449 ой­рат­ский хан Эсэн раз­бил кит. ар­мию и оса­дил Пе­кин, но не смог взять его и ото­шёл в сте­пи (вой­на с ой­ра­та­ми про­дол­жа­лась до 1488). В 1592–93, 1597–98 Мин по прось­бе кор. вла­сти­те­лей ока­зы­ва­ла им по­мощь в борь­бе про­тив япон. втор­же­ний.

В 1514 к бе­ре­гам К. впер­вые по­до­шли ко­раб­ли из Ев­ро­пы, в 1517 при­бы­ла пор­туг. эс­кад­ра под ко­манд. Ф. д’Анд­раде. Пор­ту­галь­цы по­пы­та­лись до­бить­ся от мин­ско­го дво­ра со­гла­сия на соз­да­ние фак­то­рии на по­бе­ре­жье К., но пе­ре­го­во­ры за­кон­чи­лись без­ре­зуль­тат­но. В свя­зи с по­пыт­ка­ми пор­ту­галь­цев обос­но­вать­ся в К. имп. У-цзун III (1505–21) за­пре­тил ев­ро­пей­цам въезд в К. и за­крыл для них все пор­ты, за ис­клю­че­ни­ем Ао­мы­ня (Ма­као; в 1557 был сдан в арен­ду пор­ту­галь­цам). В кон. 16 – нач. 17 вв. к бе­ре­гам К. не­од­но­крат­но под­хо­ди­ли англ., исп. и ни­дерл. ко­раб­ли, но их ка­пи­та­нам не уда­ва­лось до­го­во­рить­ся об ус­та­нов­ле­нии ре­гу­ляр­ных тор­го­вых и ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ний ме­ж­ду Мин и стра­на­ми, ко­то­рые они пред­став­ля­ли. В 1618 в Пе­кин при­бы­ла пер­вая рос. ди­пло­ма­тич. мис­сия во гла­ве с то­боль­ским вое­во­дой И. Пет­ли­ным. В дос­тав­лен­ной им в Мо­ск­ву гра­мо­те кит. дво­ра со­дер­жа­лось пред­ло­же­ние на­ла­дить по­соль­ские свя­зи и тор­гов­лю ме­ж­ду дву­мя стра­на­ми в при­ня­той в К. фор­ме.

По­сле от­но­си­тель­но­го за­стоя во вре­ме­на монг. вла­ды­че­ст­ва с кон. 14 в. куль­ту­ра К. бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ва­лась. В 1420-х гг. воз­ро­ди­лась Ака­де­мия жи­во­пи­си. При дво­ре ста­ло вы­хо­дить пе­рио­дич. из­да­ние «Ди бао» («Им­пе­ра­тор­ский вест­ник») – про­об­раз га­зе­ты. Бы­ст­ро рас­ши­ря­лось кни­го­из­да­тель­ское де­ло. Бы­ли со­став­ле­ны мно­го­том­ные эн­цик­ло­пе­дии «Юн-лэ да дянь», «Ту шу бянь», «Сюй вэнь сянь тун као», уви­де­ли свет пер­вые сбор­ни­ки на­уч. тру­дов, ат­лас «Гу­ан юй ту» и опи­са­ния ино­зем­ных кра­ёв, со­став­лен­ные уча­ст­ни­ка­ми экс­пе­ди­ций Чжэн Хэ. Кит. лит-ра обо­га­ти­лась ро­ма­на­ми «Трое­цар­ст­вие» Ло Гу­ань­чжу­на, «Реч­ные за­во­ди» Ши Най­а­ня, «Пу­те­ше­ст­вие на За­пад» У Чэнъ­э­ня, «Цве­ты сли­вы в зо­ло­той ва­зе» ав­то­ра под псевд. Лань­линь­ский на­смеш­ник. Ста­ли из­го­тав­ли­вать­ся из­де­лия из пе­ре­го­род­ча­той эма­ли.

Китай под властью династии Цин (1644–1912)

На­рас­тав­шее с ру­бе­жа 16–17 вв. в свя­зи с пе­ре­рас­пре­де­ле­ни­ем зем­ли ухуд­ше­ние по­ло­же­ния ши­ро­ких сло­ёв на­се­ле­ния и всё бо­лее оче­вид­ное раз­ло­же­ние пра­вя­щих вер­хов вы­зы­ва­ли серь­ёз­ную оза­бо­чен­ность у не­ко­то­рых пред­ста­ви­те­лей мин­ской эли­ты, на­стаи­вав­ших на про­ве­де­нии ре­форм. С та­ки­ми ини­циа­ти­ва­ми вы­сту­па­ли Ян Тин­хэ в 1522–24, Чжан Цзюй­чжэн в 1572–82, учё­ные Ли Сань­цай и Ян Лянь из ака­де­мии Дун­линь в 1610–20-х гг. Од­на­ко все ре­фор­ма­тор­ские на­чи­на­ния про­ва­ли­лись. С нач. 1620-х гг. в К. уча­сти­лись нар. вос­ста­ния, пе­ре­рос­шие в Кре­сть­ян­скую вой­ну 1628–45. В 1644 вождь пов­стан­цев Ли Цзы­чэн про­воз­гла­сил соз­да­ние гос-ва Да Шунь, а се­бя им­пе­ра­то­ром. В том же го­ду вой­ска Ли Цзы­чэ­на взя­ли Пе­кин, ди­на­стия Мин па­ла.

Часть кит. зна­ти не сми­ри­лась с по­бе­дой пов­стан­цев. Ко­манд. сев.-кит. ар­ми­ей У Сань­гуй за­клю­чил со­юз с мань­чжу­ра­ми и в бит­ве у Шань­хай­гуа­ня в 1644 раз­гро­мил пов­стан­цев. В том же го­ду маньч.-кит. вой­ска за­ня­ли Пе­кин, ко­то­рый был объ­яв­лен сто­ли­цей маньч. ди­на­стии Цин. В 1645–47 цин­ские вой­ска взя­ли под свой кон­троль бóльшую часть К. к югу от р. Янц­зы, а к 1660, пре­одо­лев упор­ное со­про­тив­ле­ние ар­мии кит. пат­рио­тов во гла­ве с Ли Дин­го, – все юж. и юго-зап. кит. про­вин­ции. Ос­лаб­лен­ные дли­тель­ной вой­ной, мань­чжу­ры пе­ре­да­ли управ­ле­ние ря­дом юж.-кит. тер­ри­то­рий, ко­то­рые бы­ли пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ны в кня­же­ст­ва, У Сань­гую и двум др. сво­им кит. сто­рон­ни­кам. По­пыт­ка ли­к­ви­ди­ро­вать эти кня­же­ст­ва при­ве­ла к «вой­не трёх кня­зей» про­тив Цин­ской им­перии (1673–1681), ко­то­рая за­кон­чи­лась по­бе­дой мань­чжу­ров. В 1683 цин­ские вой­ска за­хва­ти­ли о. Тай­вань – по­след­ний оп­лот со­про­тив­ле­ния кит. пат­рио­тов.

В ре­зуль­та­те кре­сть­ян­ской вой­ны и по­сле­дую­ще­го маньч. за­вое­ва­ния К. пе­ре­жил де­мо­гра­фич. и эко­но­мич. ка­та­ст­ро­фу, был от­бро­шен в сво­ём раз­ви­тии на мно­го де­ся­ти­ле­тий на­зад. Его на­се­ле­ние в 1628–83 со­кра­ти­лось со 120–130 до 100 млн. чел. Бы­ли раз­ру­ше­ны и опус­то­ше­ны сот­ни го­ро­дов, ты­ся­чи де­ре­вень, за­бро­ше­ны ог­ром­ные пло­ща­ди па­хот­ных зе­мель, за­мер­ло ре­мес­лен­ное про­из-во. Лишь в кон. 18 в. К. смог пре­взой­ти уро­вень эко­но­мич. раз­ви­тия, дос­тиг­ну­тый на­ка­ну­не маньч. за­вое­ва­ния, чис­лен­ность его на­се­ле­ния воз­рос­ла до 300 млн. чел.

По­ко­рив К., Цин­ская ди­на­стия пе­ре­рас­пре­де­ли­ла зе­мель­ный фонд: зем­ли мин­ской зна­ти и час­ти не­ти­ту­ло­ван­ных кит. зем­ле­вла­дель­цев пе­ре­шли в соб­ст­вен­ность бо­гдо­ха­на и маньч. ари­сто­кра­тии (т. н. зна­мён­но­го со­сло­вия). В им­пе­рии был ус­та­нов­лен дес­по­тич. ре­жим, опи­рав­ший­ся на силь­ную ар­мию и раз­ветв­лён­ный бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­рат. Выс­шие ор­га­ны вла­сти и ру­ко­во­дство ар­мии, кос­тяк ко­то­рой со­став­ля­ли т. н. вось­ми­зна­мён­ные вой­ска, на­хо­ди­лись в ру­ках мань­чжур.


«Приношение даров Китаю иноземными народами». Фрагмент панно. 18 в. Музей искусства народов Востока (Москва).

Ус­та­но­вив свою власть в Сев. К., Цин пе­ре­шла к за­вое­ва­нию со­пре­дель­ных зе­мель и го­су­дарств. В 1650-х гг. её вой­ска на­ча­ли втор­гать­ся в При­аму­рье, ра­нее ни­ко­му не под­вла­ст­ное, ко­то­рое к это­му вре­ме­ни уже ус­пеш­но ос­ваи­ва­ли рус. пе­ре­се­лен­цы и ка­за­ки. Рос­сия пы­та­лась уре­гу­ли­ро­вать от­но­ше­ния с Цин­ской им­пе­ри­ей. С этой це­лью Пе­кин по­се­ти­ли по­соль­ст­ва Ф. И. Бай­ко­ва (1654–57), И. С. Пер­филь­е­ва и С. Аб­ли­на (1657–1662), Н. Г. Спа­фа­рия (1675–78), но они не при­нес­ли ре­зуль­та­та. Стре­мясь из­бе­жать вой­ны, моск. пра­ви­тель­ст­во со­гла­си­лось под­пи­сать Нер­чин­ский до­го­вор 1689, по ко­то­ро­му ус­ту­пи­ло Цин свои вла­де­ния по пра­во­му бе­ре­гу р. Ар­гунь и на час­ти ле­во­го и пра­во­го бе­ре­гов Аму­ра. Кях­тин­ским до­го­во­ром 1727 бы­ла ус­та­нов­ле­на гра­ни­ца ме­ж­ду Цин и Рос­си­ей в рай­оне за­хва­чен­ной мань­чжу­ра­ми в 1691 Сев. Мон­го­лии [Юж. (Внутр.) Мон­го­лия бы­ла за­воё­ва­на ими в 1636] и под­твер­жде­на не­раз­гра­ни­чен­ность тер­ри­то­рий в ни­зовь­ях Аму­ра и рай­оне Охот­ско­го по­бе­ре­жья.

Важ­ным объ­ек­том цин­ской экс­пан­сии был Ти­бет. В 1720 цин­ские вой­ска ок­ку­пи­ро­ва­ли его юго-вост. часть – Кхам, а в 1724 за­ня­ли сев.-вост. часть – Ам­до. Вос­поль­зо­вав­шись внутр. усо­би­ца­ми в Зап. Ти­бе­те, Цин­ская им­пе­рия в 1728 по­ста­ви­ла этот край под кон­троль сво­их на­ме­ст­ни­ков (при со­хра­не­нии фор­маль­но­го вер­хо­вен­ст­ва да­лай-ла­мы). В 1791–1792 Цин на­нес­ла по­ра­же­ние Не­паль­ско­му ко­ро­лев­ст­ву, сде­лав его сво­им дан­ни­ком. Тем са­мым весь Ти­бет ока­зал­ся под вла­стью бо­гдо­ха­нов.

В 1755–57 Цин по­ко­ри­ла Джун­гар­ское хан­ст­во, а в 1757–59 – Каш­га­рию. Джун­га­рия и Каш­га­рия бы­ли объ­е­ди­не­ны в осо­бый адм. рай­он – Синь­цзян.

С 1760-х гг. экс­пан­сия Цин ак­тив­но раз­ви­ва­лась так­же в юж. на­прав­ле­нии. В 1768–69 им­пе­рия по­пы­та­лась по­ко­рить Бир­му, но до­би­лась лишь то­го, что та при­зна­ла се­бя дан­ни­ком Пе­ки­на. В 1788 во вьетн. Дай­вьет под пред­ло­гом по­дав­ле­ния тэй­шо­нов вос­ста­ния бы­ла на­прав­ле­на 200-ты­сяч­ная цин­ская ар­мия. В нач. 1789 под Тханг­ла­ун­гом (ны­не Ха­ной) она бы­ла на­го­ло­ву раз­би­та вьет­нам­ца­ми, од­на­ко по­сле па­де­ния гос-ва тэй­шо­нов в 1802 Вьет­нам так­же стал вы­пла­чи­вать дань Цин.

По­доб­но ди­на­стии Мин, но­вые пра­ви­те­ли К. про­во­ди­ли ли­нию на его изо­ляцию от внеш­не­го ми­ра. Пор­ту­га­лия, Ни­дер­лан­ды, Фран­ция и Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния, пы­тав­шие­ся в 17–18 вв. ус­та­но­вить офиц. от­но­ше­ния с им­пе­ри­ей, не до­би­лись ус­пе­ха. Им бы­ло раз­ре­ше­но лишь тор­го­вать в Гу­ан­чжоу че­рез кит. ком­па­нию «Гун­хан» («Ко­хонг»). С кон. 18 в. зап.-ев­роп. гос-ва, в пер­вую оче­редь Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния, уси­ли­ли дав­ле­ние на К., стре­мясь «от­крыть» его лю­бой це­ной. Брит. куп­цы на­ча­ли вво­зить в К. опи­ум, по­лу­чая от его про­да­жи ог­ром­ные до­хо­ды.

С кон. 18 в. внутр. си­туа­ция в Цин­ской им­пе­рии обо­ст­ри­лась. Бю­ро­кра­тич. ап­па­рат, по­гряз­ший в кор­руп­ции и взя­точ­ни­че­ст­ве, де­мон­ст­ри­ро­вал не­спо­соб­ность обес­пе­чить эф­фек­тив­ное управ­ле­ние стра­ной, а ар­мия, ос­на­щён­ная ус­та­рев­шим ору­жи­ем, – обо­ро­ну об­шир­ной им­пе­рии и про­ти­во­дей­ст­вие уг­ро­зам со сто­ро­ны ев­роп. дер­жав. Рос на­ло­го­вый гнёт, шло бы­строе раз­ло­же­ние «зна­мён­но­го со­сло­вия». В раз­ных кон­цах стра­ны про­ис­хо­ди­ли ан­ти­пра­ви­тельств. и ан­ти­мань­чжур­ские вос­ста­ния. Ши­ро­ким раз­ма­хом от­ли­ча­лись Бай­лянь­цзяо вос­ста­ние 1796–1805, ох­ва­тив­шее про­вин­ции Сы­чу­ань, Ху­бэй, Шэнь­си, Хэ­нань и Гань­су, а так­же вос­ста­ние 1813–14 под рук. Ли Вэнь­чэ­на, под­го­тов­лен­ное тай­ной сек­той Тянь­ли («Не­бес­ный ра­зум»), рас­про­стра­нив­шее­ся на про­вин­ции Чжи­ли, Шань­дун и Хэ­нань. В 1830–32 в Гу­ан­ду­не, в 1836–44 в Ху­на­ни, в 1839 в Гуй­чжоу вспы­хи­ва­ли кре­сть­ян­ские вос­ста­ния. В 1826–27 и 1830 име­ли ме­сто ан­ти­мань­чжур­ские вы­сту­п­ле­ния не­ки­тай­ских на­род­но­стей в Синь­цзя­не.

В 1839 ме­ж­ду Цин и Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ни­ей воз­ник кон­фликт, по­во­дом к ко­то­ро­му по­слу­жи­ли дей­ст­вия упол­но­мо­чен­но­го цин­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва по борь­бе с тор­гов­лей опиу­мом Линь Цзэ­сюя, за­ста­вив­ше­го брит. куп­цов сдать имев­ший­ся у них опи­ум. В 1840 Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния на­ча­ла про­тив Цин т. н. пер­вую «опи­ум­ную вой­ну» (см. Анг­ло-ки­тай­ская вой­на 1840–42) и на­нес­ла ей по­ра­же­ние. По ус­ло­ви­ям Нан­кин­ско­го до­го­во­ра 1842 К. обя­зал­ся от­крыть для брит. тор­гов­ли 5 пор­тов, пе­ре­дать Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии в «веч­ное вла­де­ние» о. Сян­ган (Гон­конг), уп­ла­тить кон­три­бу­цию и т. д. По Ху­мэнь­ско­му про­то­ко­лу, под­пи­сан­но­му в 1843, брит. сто­ро­на по­лу­чи­ла в К. пра­во экс­тер­ри­то­ри­аль­но­сти, пра­во на соз­да­ние сеттль­мен­тов, на неё был рас­про­стра­нён прин­цип наи­боль­ше­го бла­го­при­ят­ст­во­ва­ния. В 1844 К. был вы­ну­ж­ден пре­дос­та­вить ана­ло­гич­ные при­ви­ле­гии США (см. Ван­ся­ский до­го­вор 1844) и Фран­ции. За­клю­че­ние этих до­го­во­ров по­ло­жи­ло на­ча­ло пре­вра­ще­нию К. в по­лу­ко­ло­ни­аль­ную стра­ну. В 1851 Пор­ту­га­лия за­хва­ти­ла п-ов Ао­мынь и о. Данц­зы­дао (Тай­па) [в 1864 так­же о. Цзюа­о­дао (Ко­лоа­не)] и объ­я­ви­ла Ао­мынь (Ма­као) не­за­ви­си­мым от К. (в 1887 пра­ви­тель­ст­во К. по до­го­во­ру при­зна­ло за Пор­ту­га­ли­ей пра­во на «веч­ное управ­ле­ние» Ао­мы­нем; в 1928 этот до­го­вор был в од­но­сто­рон­нем по­ряд­ке де­нон­си­ро­ван кит. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом).

По­ра­же­ние в вой­не при­ве­ло к даль­ней­ше­му ухуд­ше­нию внутр. си­туа­ции в им­пе­рии. Рез­ко уве­ли­чи­лись на­ло­ги, пра­ви­тель­ст­во вве­ло но­вые по­бо­ры, стра­ну на­вод­ни­ли иностр. то­ва­ры, что на­нес­ло ущерб ин­те­ре­сам кит. ре­мес­лен­ни­ков. С нач. 1840-х гг. по К. про­ка­ти­лась но­вая вол­на нар. вы­сту­п­ле­ний. В 1850 ре­лиг. сек­та тай­пи­нов во гла­ве с Хун Сю­цюа­нем под­ня­ла в пров. Гу­ан­си вос­ста­ние про­тив маньч. ре­жи­ма (оно ста­ло про­ло­гом к Тай­пин­ско­му вос­ста­нию 1851–1864). В 1853 тай­пи­ны ов­ла­де­ли Нан­ки­ном и про­воз­гла­си­ли соз­да­ние собств. гос-ва Тай­пин тянь­го во гла­ве с «не­бес­ным кня­зем» (тянь­ван) Хун Сю­цюа­нем и тре­мя др. князь­я­ми – Ян Сю­ци­ном, Вэй Чанхуэ­ем и Ши Да­ка­ем. Прак­ти­че­ски од­но­вре­мен­но с вос­ста­ни­ем тай­пи­нов вспых­ну­ло ан­ти­мань­чжур­ское Нянь­дан вос­ста­ние 1859–68 (име­ну­ет­ся так­же Нянь­цзюн­ским вос­ста­ни­ем) под рук. Чжан Ло­си­на, ох­ва­тив­шее об­шир­ные рай­оны Сев. К. В Шан­хае в 1853–55 и Фуц­зя­ни в 1853–58 про­изош­ли вос­ста­ния, под­го­тов­лен­ные тай­ным об-вом Сяо­дао («Ма­лые ме­чи»), а в Гу­ан­ду­не в 1854–55 – вы­сту­п­ле­ние, ор­га­ни­зо­ван­ное Тянь­ди («Об-во Не­ба и Зем­ли»). В 1854 на­ча­лось вос­ста­ние на­ро­да мяо под рук. Чжан Сю­эмэя (к 1872 по­дав­лено вла­стя­ми, по­гиб­ло ок. 1 млн. чел.), в 1855 – вос­ста­ние му­суль­ман па­тай в Юнь­на­ни под пред­во­ди­тель­ст­вом Ду Вэнь­сю (Су­лей­ма­на) (см. Юнь­нань­ские вос­ста­ния в Ки­тае 1855–73 и 1915–16). В зап. рай­онах импе­рии (в про­вин­ци­ях Шэнь­си, Гань­су, Синь­цзян) под­ня­лись дун­га­не (хай) и уй­гу­ры (см. Уй­гу­ро-дун­ган­ское вос­ста­ние 1864–77 в Синь­цзя­не).


Императорский дворец в Пекине.

Вос­поль­зо­вав­шись слож­ной об­ста­нов­кой в К., Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния, а за­тем Фран­ция раз­вя­за­ли про­тив не­го вто­рую «опи­ум­ную вой­ну», до­би­ва­ясь ещё боль­ше­го рас­ши­ре­ния при­ви­ле­гий и от­кры­тия но­вых пор­тов (см. Анг­ло-фран­ко-ки­тай­ская вой­на 1856–60). В 1858 пе­ред уг­ро­зой за­хва­та анг­ли­ча­на­ми и фран­цу­за­ми Пе­ки­на цин­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во ка­пи­ту­ли­ро­ва­ло и под­пи­са­ло Тянь­цзинь­ские до­го­во­ры 1858, по ко­то­рым для иностр. тор­гов­ли от­кры­ва­лись но­вые пор­ты, иностр. су­дам раз­ре­ша­лось пла­ва­ние по р. Ян­цзы, в Пе­ки­не уч­ре­ж­да­лись ди­пло­ма­тич. мис­сии и др. Эти торго­вые льго­ты и пра­ва бы­ли рас­про­стра­не­ны и на Рос­сию (см. Тянь­цзинь­ский трак­тат 1858). По­пыт­ка Цин не до­пус­тить в сто­ли­цу иностр. ди­пло­ма­тов да­ла по­вод Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии и Фран­ции во­зоб­но­вить в 1859 во­ен. дей­ст­вия (ино­гда име­ну­ют­ся треть­ей «опи­ум­ной вой­ной»). В 1860 их экс­пе­диц. си­лы за­хва­ти­ли Пе­кин, по­сле че­го цин­ское пра­витель­ст­во бы­ло вы­ну­ж­де­но под­пи­сать Пе­кин­ские анг­ло-ки­тай­ские и фран­ко-ки­тай­ские до­го­во­ры 1860, в со­от­вет­ст­вии с ко­то­ры­ми обя­за­лось уп­ла­тить кон­три­бу­цию Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии и Фран­ции, ус­ту­пить Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии часть п-ова Цзю­лун (Ко­улун), от­крыть для иностр. тор­гов­ли г. Тянь­цзинь. Рос.-кит. Пе­кин­ским трак­та­том 1860 был ре­шён во­прос о гра­ни­це ме­ж­ду дву­мя гос-ва­ми на Даль­нем Вос­то­ке (она про­шла по ре­кам Амур и Ус­су­ри че­рез оз. Хан­ко и гор­ные хреб­ты до р. Ту­мынь­цзян).

С нач. 1860-х гг. Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния, Фран­ция и США ока­за­ли ак­тив­ную по­мощь цин­ско­му пра­ви­тель­ст­ву в по­дав­ле­нии вос­ста­ния тай­пи­нов и др. нар. вы­сту­п­ле­ний, что по­зво­ли­ло им ещё боль­ше ук­ре­пить и рас­ши­рить свои по­зи­ции в Ки­тае.

Во­ен. по­ра­же­ния, внутр. сму­ты и воз­ник­шая за­ви­си­мость от зап. дер­жав за­ста­ви­ли пра­вя­щие кру­ги Цин вне­сти су­ще­ст­вен­ные из­ме­не­ния в свою по­ли­ти­ку. По­сле смер­ти в 1861 бо­гдо­ха­на Ич­жу (Сянь­фэ­на) в Пе­ки­не про­изо­шёл двор­цо­вый пе­ре­во­рот. Ре­аль­ная власть со­сре­до­то­чи­лась в ру­ках Цы­си, вдов­ст­вую­щей им­пе­рат­ри­цы, ма­те­ри бо­гдо­ха­на Цзай­чу­ня (Тун­чжи) (1861–75). Под по­кро­ви­тель­ст­вом Цы­си сто­рон­ни­ки т. н. по­ли­ти­ки са­мо­уси­ле­ния (см. Цзы­цян), та­кие как Цзэн Го­фань, Ли Хун­чжан, Цзо Цзун­тан и др., по­лу­чи­ли воз­мож­ность осу­ще­ст­вить мо­дер­ни­за­цию хо­зяй­ст­ва и гос. ин­сти­ту­тов К. Цин­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во взя­ло курс на бо­лее тес­ное со­труд­ни­че­ст­во с зап. гос-ва­ми, на за­им­ст­во­ва­ние их во­ен. опы­та и тех­нич. дос­ти­же­ний (по­ли­ти­ка яньу, иу) и соз­да­ние отеч. пром-сти, пре­ж­де все­го во­ен­ной. За счёт средств каз­ны и на­сильств. при­вле­че­ния ка­пи­та­лов кит. тор­гов­цев и зем­ле­вла­дель­цев раз­вер­ну­лось строи­тель­ст­во пред­при­ятий по иностр. об­раз­цу. На­ря­ду с ка­зён­ны­ми за­во­да­ми, осо­бен­но на­чи­ная с 1880-х гг., ста­ли воз­ни­кать ча­ст­ные пред­при­ятия. В ре­зуль­та­те «по­ли­ти­ки са­мо­уси­ле­ния» к кон. 19 в. в К. воз­ник­ло ка­пи­та­ли­стич. пром. про­из-во (оно со­че­та­лось с без­раз­дель­ным гос­под­ством феод. от­но­ше­ний в с. х-ве), раз­вер­нул­ся ак­тив­ный про­цесс фор­ми­ро­ва­ния нац. бур­жуа­зии и ра­бо­че­го клас­са. Од­на­ко гл. це­ли, ко­то­рой был обу­слов­лен курс на «са­мо­уси­ле­ние», – по­вы­ше­ния сво­ей во­ен. мо­щи – К. не дос­тиг.

В 1870–80-х гг. зап. дер­жа­вы про­дол­жа­ли ока­зы­вать дав­ле­ние на Цин­скую им­пе­рию. Со­пер­ни­че­ст­во за влия­ние во Вьет­на­ме при­ве­ло к ки­тай­ско-фран­цуз­ской вой­не 1884–85, ко­то­рая за­кон­чи­лась по­ра­же­ни­ем К. Ещё бо­лее тя­жё­лые по­след­ст­вия для Цин име­ла ки­тай­ско-япон­ская вой­на 1894–95. Про­иг­рав её, кит. пра­ви­тель­ст­во под­пи­са­ло Си­моно­сек­ский до­го­вор 1895, по ус­ло­ви­ям ко­то­ро­го при­зна­ло не­за­ви­си­мость Ко­реи (до это­го но­ми­наль­но она на­хо­ди­лась под су­ве­ре­ни­те­том Цин), пе­ре­да­ло Япо­нии о. Тай­вань, о-ва Пэн­ху­ле­дао (Пес­ка­дор­ские), обя­за­лось вы­пла­тить ог­ром­ную кон­три­бу­цию, от­крыть свою тер­ри­то­рию для бес­пре­пятств. вво­за иностр. то­ва­ров и соз­да­ния иностр. пред­при­ятий.

В 1897–98 ве­ду­щие дер­жа­вы при­сту­пи­ли к раз­де­лу Цин­ской им­пе­рии на сфе­ры влия­ния. Льви­ную до­лю кит. тер­ри­то­рии «за­кре­пи­ла» за со­бой Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния. В её сфе­ру, по­ми­мо зап. час­ти Юнь­на­ни, во­шёл поч­ти весь бас­сейн р. Янц­зы и её при­то­ков (про­вин­ции Цзян­су, Ань­хой, Цзян­си, Ху­бэй, Сы­чу­ань), а так­же Чжэц­зян и Ху­нань. Наи­бо­лее проч­ны­ми по­зи­ция­ми анг­ли­ча­не рас­по­ла­га­ли в вост. час­ти Гу­ан­ду­на. Сфе­рой влия­ния Фран­ции ста­ли вост. рай­оны Юнь­на­ни, Гу­ан­си, за­пад Гу­ан­ду­на и о. Хай­нань. Рос­сия за­кре­пи­ла за со­бой Мань­чжу­рию, Гер­ма­ния – Шань­дун, Япо­ния – Фуц­зянь. США в 1899 про­воз­гла­си­ли «От­кры­тых две­рей» док­три­ну, за­ре­зер­ви­ро­вав за со­бой пра­во на не­ог­ра­нич. экс­пан­сию в К. и вы­тес­не­ние кон­ку­рен­тов. Пу­тём пре­дос­тав­ле­ния зай­мов, под­ку­па и шан­та­жа дер­жавы за­хва­ти­ли под ви­дом дли­тель­ной арен­ды Цин­дао, Вэй­хай­вэй, Люй­шунь, Да­лянь, зал. Гу­ан­чжо­увань, зна­чит. тер­ри­то­рии на по­лу­ост­ро­вах Ляо­дун (Ляо­дун­ский) и Цзю­лун (Ко­улун).

Крах по­ли­ти­ки «са­мо­уси­ле­ния», по­ра­же­ние в вой­не с Япо­ни­ей и на­ча­ло тер­ри­то­ри­аль­но­го раз­де­ла К. по­ро­ди­ли в кит. об­ще­ст­ве соз­на­ние нац. ка­та­ст­ро­фы. В 1895–98 ши­ро­кий раз­мах по­лу­чи­ло ли­бе­раль­но-ре­фор­ма­тор­ское дви­же­ние, ру­ко­во­ди­те­ля­ми и идео­ло­га­ми ко­то­ро­го бы­ли Кан Ювэй, Лян Ци­чао, Тань Сы­тун и др. В ию­ле 1898 ре­фор­ма­то­ры бы­ли при­вле­че­ны имп. Цзай Тя­нем (Гу­ан­сю­ем) к гос. управ­ле­нию (см. «Сто дней ре­форм»). Од­на­ко по­пыт­ка про­ве­де­ния ре­форм про­ва­ли­лась. Имп. Цы­си и её сто­рон­ни­ки ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ли гос. пе­ре­во­рот и от­стра­ни­ли ре­фор­ма­то­ров от вла­сти. По­тер­пев по­ра­же­ние, по­след­ние ос­но­ва­ли орг-цию Баоху­ан­хой, объ­я­вив сво­ей це­лью вос­ста­нов­ле­ние на пре­сто­ле Цзай Тя­ня и во­зоб­нов­ле­ние с его по­мо­щью уме­рен­ных ре­форм. Бо­лее ра­ди­каль­ные пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния для спа­се­ния стра­ны пред­ла­га­ли пред­ста­ви­те­ли за­ро­див­ше­го­ся в 1894 кит. ре­во­люц.-де­мо­кра­тич. дви­же­ния во гла­ве с Сунь Ят­се­ном, соз­дав­шим орг-цию Син­чжун­хой.

В 1898 в про­вин­ци­ях Шань­дун, Чжи­ли и ря­де др. раз­вер­ну­лось дви­же­ние Ихэ­ту­ань (име­ну­ет­ся так­же «Бок­сёр­ским вос­ста­ни­ем»; с 1899 при­об­ре­ло мас­со­вый ха­рак­тер), на­прав­лен­ное про­тив иностр. за­си­лья в К. и в под­держ­ку ди­на­стии Цин. Ихэ­туа­ни под рук. Чжу Хун­дэ­на, Чжан Дэ­чэ­на, Цао Фу­тя­ня и Ли Лай­чжу­на, всту­пив в со­юз с маньч. ре­жи­мом, раз­ру­ша­ли же­лез­ные до­ро­ги, за­во­ды, хри­сти­ан­ские церк­ви, унич­то­жа­ли ев­роп. то­ва­ры и кни­ги, уби­ва­ли ино­стран­цев. Вме­сте с цин­ски­ми вой­ска­ми они оса­ди­ли ди­пло­ма­тич. квар­тал в Пе­ки­не. Дей­ст­вия ихэ­туа­ней да­ли по­вод дер­жа­вам ор­га­ни­зо­вать со­вме­ст­ную ка­ра­тель­ную опе­ра­цию в К. В ре­зуль­та­те ин­тер­вен­ции Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии, Фран­ции, Гер­ма­нии, США, Рос­сии, Япо­нии, Ита­лии и Ав­ст­ро-Венг­рии в 1901 дви­же­ние Ихэ­ту­ань бы­ло по­то­п­ле­но в кро­ви. Дер­жа­вы вы­ну­ди­ли Цин­скую им­пе­рию под­пи­сать «За­клю­чи­тель­ный про­то­кол» 1901, ко­то­рый пре­ду­смат­ри­вал вы­пла­ту ею ги­гант­ской кон­три­бу­ции и воз­мож­ность раз­ме­ще­ния на её тер­ри­то­рии иностр. войск. С под­пи­са­ни­ем «За­клю­чи­тель­но­го про­то­ко­ла» К. окон­ча­тель­но пре­вра­тил­ся в по­лу­ко­ло­нию.

Оче­ред­ное по­ра­же­ние им­пе­рии Цин за­ста­ви­ло её пра­вя­щие кру­ги в 1902 вер­нуть­ся к по­ли­ти­ке уме­рен­ных ре­форм, но они но­си­ли в осн. по­верх­но­ст­ный и по­каз­ной ха­рак­тер, что вы­зы­ва­ло не­до­воль­ст­во как пред­ста­ви­те­лей сфор­миро­вав­ше­го­ся в это вре­мя в К. кон­ституц.-мо­нар­хич. дви­же­ния во гла­ве с Чжан Цзя­нем, так и на­би­рав­ше­го всё боль­ший по­ли­тич. вес ре­во­люц.-де­мо­кра­тич. дви­же­ния. В 1905 под рук. Сунь Ят­се­на и Ху­ан Си­на про­изош­ло слия­ние ре­во­люц. орг-ций в «Объ­е­ди­нён­ный со­юз» (см. Тун­мэнху­эй). Его про­грам­ма пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­ла свер­же­ние маньч. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва, уч­ре­ж­де­ние рес­пуб­ли­ки и по­сте­пен­ную на­цио­на­ли­за­цию зем­ли пу­тём пе­ре­да­чи диф­фе­рен­ци­аль­ной рен­ты гос-ву.

В 1906–08 в К. имел ме­сто ряд ре­во­люц. вы­сту­п­ле­ний, ко­то­рые бы­ли ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ны или про­хо­ди­ли при уча­стии Тун­мэнху­эйя и др. орг-ций. В 1910 по стра­не про­ка­ти­лась се­рия «ри­со­вых бун­тов». В 1911 в Сы­чуа­ни раз­вер­ну­лось дви­же­ние про­тес­та про­тив сдел­ки цин­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва с кон­сор­циу­мом за­ру­беж­ных бан­ков, по ус­ло­ви­ям ко­то­рой ж.-д. строи­тель­ст­во в К. пе­ре­да­ва­лось в ру­ки иностр. ка­пи­та­ла. В сент. 1911 «дви­же­ние в за­щи­ту же­лез­ных до­рог» пе­ре­рос­ло в ан­ти­пра­ви­тельств. вы­сту­п­ле­ния. Со­бы­тия в Сы­чуа­ни да­ли тол­чок вос­ста­нию в адм. цен­тре пров. Ху­бэй г. Учан (см. Учан­ское вос­ста­ние 1911), уча­ст­ни­ки ко­то­ро­го объ­я­ви­ли о свер­же­нии ди­на­стии Цин, вве­де­нии рес­пуб­ли­кан­ской фор­мы прав­ле­ния и про­воз­гла­си­ли не­за­ви­си­мость пров. Ху­бэй от Пе­ки­на. Вслед за Ху­бэ­ем на­ча­лись вос­ста­ния в др. рай­онах стра­ны. К кон­цу но­яб. 1911 в 14 из 17 про­вин­ций К. ди­на­стия Цин бы­ла объ­яв­ле­на низ­ло­жен­ной. В дек. 1911 пред­ста­ви­те­ли юж. про­вин­ций К. съе­ха­лись в Нан­кин на со­б­ра­ние по вы­бо­рам врем. пре­зи­ден­та. Эту долж­ность за­нял вер­нув­ший­ся из эмиг­ра­ции Сунь Ят­сен. 1.1.1912 бы­ла про­воз­гла­ше­на Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ка со сто­ли­цей в Нан­ки­не, со­б­ра­ние пред­ста­ви­те­лей про­вин­ций кон­сти­туи­ро­ва­лось как Нац. со­б­ра­ние.

Цин­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во с окт. 1911 пред­при­ни­ма­ло по­пыт­ки по­да­вить ре­во­люц. вы­сту­п­ле­ния с по­мо­щью во­ен. си­лы. 2.11.1911 на пост пре­мьер-мин. был на­зна­чен ли­дер во­ен. кру­гов Сев. К. Юань Ши­кай, не­ко­гда при­мы­кав­ший к ре­фор­ма­тор­ско­му дви­же­нию Кан Ювэя. Это на­зна­че­ние вне­сло рас­кол в ла­герь ре­во­лю­цио­не­ров. Ли­бе­ра­лы юж. про­вин­ций со­об­щи­ли Юань Ши­каю о го­тов­но­сти из­брать его гла­вой гос-ва, ес­ли ди­на­стия Цин бу­дет низ­ло­же­на. Опа­са­ясь но­вой во­ен. ин­тер­вен­ции дер­жав, Сунь Ят­сен под дав­ле­ни­ем ли­бе­раль­но­го кры­ла Тун­мэнху­эйя по­шёл на со­гла­ше­ние с Юань Ши­ка­ем. По­сле то­го как 12.2.1912 от име­ни ма­ло­лет­не­го имп. Пу И бы­ло объ­яв­ле­но об от­ре­че­нии ди­на­стии Цин и уп­разд­не­нии мо­нар­хии в К., Сунь Ят­сен по­дал про­ше­ние об от­став­ке с по­ста врем. пре­зи­ден­та. 15.2.1912 нан­кин­ское Нац. со­б­ра­ние из­бра­ло на эту долж­ность Юань Ши­кая. В мар­те 1912 бы­ла при­ня­та врем. кон­сти­ту­ция Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки. Со­бы­тия в К. в окт. 1911 – мар­те 1912 по­лу­чи­ли назв. Синь­хай­ской ре­во­лю­ции.

Китай в 1912–49

Фак­тич. ка­пи­ту­ля­ция Юга при­ве­ла к бы­ст­ро­му со­сре­до­то­че­нию всей ре­аль­ной вла­сти в стра­не в ру­ках Юань Ши­кая и сев.-кит. во­ен. кру­гов (см. Бэй­ян­ские ми­ли­та­ри­сты). Юань Ши­кай на­чал го­то­вить­ся к ус­та­нов­ле­нию ре­жи­ма во­ен. дик­та­ту­ры и вы­ну­дил рес­пуб­ли­кан­цев рас­пус­тить б. ч. их ар­мии, со­сто­яв­шей из доб­ро­воль­цев. В этих ус­ло­ви­ях Тун­мэн­ху­эй пе­ре­шёл на ещё бо­лее уме­рен­ные по­зи­ции, в авг. 1912 слив­шись с не­ко­то­ры­ми ли­бе­раль­но-бур­жу­аз­ны­ми ор­га­ни­за­ция­ми в Нац. пар­тию (Го­минь­дан).

В апр. 1913 во­пре­ки во­ле пар­ла­мен­та Юань Ши­кай под­пи­сал с бан­ков­ским кон­сор­циу­мом иностр. дер­жав со­гла­ше­ние о ка­баль­ном «ре­ор­га­ни­зац. зай­ме» в раз­ме­ре 25 млн. ф. ст. и на­чал стя­ги­вать вой­ска в бас­сейн р. Янц­зы для по­дав­ле­ния воз­мож­ных вы­сту­п­ле­ний оп­по­зи­ции. Опа­са­ясь на­зре­вав­ше­го гос. пе­ре­во­ро­та, Сунь Ят­сен при­звал на­се­ле­ние К. ко «вто­рой ре­во­лю­ции». Его под­дер­жал ге­не­ра­ли­тет Юж. К. во гла­ве с Ли Лец­зю­нем и Ху­ан Си­ном. В ию­ле 1913 на­ча­лись столк­но­ве­ния ме­ж­ду вой­ска­ми Юж. и Сев. К. Упор­ные бои раз­вер­ну­лись в Ху­коу, Нан­ки­не и Шан­хае. Став­ка Го­минь­да­на ис­клю­чи­тель­но на ар­мию, внутр. борь­ба в нём, от­сут­ст­вие у южан еди­но­го ко­ман­до­ва­ния и опе­ра­тив­но­го пла­ни­ро­ва­ния обу­сло­ви­ли по­ра­же­ние «вто­рой ре­во­лю­ции».

В но­яб. 1913 дея­тель­ность Го­минь­да­на бы­ла за­пре­ще­на. В нач. 1914 в об­ста­нов­ке тер­ро­ра Юань Ши­кай был из­бран по­сто­ян­ным пре­зи­ден­том Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки. Вско­ре по­сле это­го он рас­пус­тил пар­ла­мент и пе­ре­шёл к дик­та­тор­ским ме­то­дам управ­ле­ния.

С на­ча­лом 1-й ми­ро­вой вой­ны К. объ­я­вил о ней­тра­ли­те­те, но не смог вос­пре­пят­ст­во­вать рас­про­стра­не­нию во­ен. дей­ст­вий на свою тер­ри­то­рию. Япо­ния, вы­сту­пав­шая на сто­ро­не Ан­тан­ты, в авг. 1914 вы­са­ди­ла вой­ска в Шань­ду­не и в но­яб­ре за­хва­ти­ла все герм. вла­де­ния в К. В янв. 1915 она предъ­я­ви­ла кит. пра­витель­ст­ву уль­ти­ма­тум и «два­дцать од­но тре­бо­ва­ние», что должно было по­ста­вить К. в за­ви­си­мость от Япо­нии. Юань Ши­кай при­нял уль­ти­ма­тум, а за­тем (9.5.1915) и б. ч. тре­бо­ва­ний. В знак про­тес­та про­тив дей­ст­вий Япо­нии и по­ли­ти­ки пра­ви­тель­ст­ва в стра­не раз­вер­ну­лось мас­со­вое пат­рио­тич. дви­же­ние. Стре­мясь ук­ре­пить свои по­зи­ции, Юань Ши­кай в дек. 1915 про­воз­гла­сил се­бя им­пе­ра­то­ром. В от­вет на это в Центр. и Юж. К. в дек. 1915 – нач. 1916 вспых­ну­ло воо­руж. вос­ста­ние, ко­то­рое час­то име­ну­ет­ся «треть­ей ре­во­лю­ци­ей». На­ча­ло ей по­ло­жи­ли дей­ст­вия в Юнь­на­ни «са­мо­стоя­тель­ных» (не при­над­ле­жав­ших к бэй­ян­ской груп­пи­ров­ке) ге­не­ра­лов Цай Э и Тан Цзи­яо, объ­я­вив­ших о не­за­ви­си­мо­сти этой про­вин­ции от Пе­ки­на. Они дви­ну­ли вой­ска на се­вер и за­вя­за­ли бои в Сы­чуа­ни и Гуй­чжоу. К маю 1916 «тре­тья ре­во­лю­ция» ох­ва­ти­ла уже 6 про­вин­ций юга стра­ны.

Со смер­тью Юань Ши­кая в ию­не 1916 бое­вые дей­ст­вия пре­кра­ти­лись. Власть в Пе­ки­не ос­та­лась в ру­ках бэй­ян­ской ми­ли­та­ри­ст­ской груп­пи­ров­ки, ли­де­ром ко­то­рой стал за­ни­мав­ший про­япон­ские по­зи­ции Ду­ань Ци­жуй. Од­на­ко са­ма бэй­ян­ская груп­пи­ров­ка рас­па­лась на ряд клик (см. Ки­тай­ские ми­ли­та­ри­ст­ские груп­пи­ров­ки, Ань­хой­ская кли­ка, Фын­тянь­ская кли­ка, Чжи­лий­ская кли­ка), кон­тро­ли­ро­вав­ших об­шир­ные рай­оны и бо­ров­ших­ся ме­ж­ду со­бой за власть. В ию­не – ию­ле 1917 ген. Чжан Сюнь пред­при­нял по­пыт­ку мо­нар­хич. пе­ре­во­ро­та, од­на­ко она про­ва­ли­лась. В авг. 1917 бэй­ян­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во, рас­счи­ты­вая до­бить­ся воз­вра­ще­ния К. его быв. вла­де­ний в Шань­ду­не, объ­яви­ло вой­ну Гер­ма­нии. Всту­п­ле­ние в вой­ну бы­ло край­не не­по­пу­ляр­но в К. и вы­зва­ло вол­ну про­тес­тов, осо­бен­но в юж. части стра­ны. В Гу­ан­чжоу об­ра­зо­ва­лось вто­рое пра­ви­тель­ст­во К. В сент. 1917 его воз­гла­вил Сунь Ят­сен (ос­та­вал­ся на этом по­сту до мая 1918).

Важ­ной ве­хой в ис­то­рии К. ста­ло «Чет­вёр­то­го мая» дви­же­ние (май – июнь 1919). Оно бы­ло вы­зва­но по­зи­ци­ей дер­жав – уча­ст­ниц Па­риж­ской мир­ной кон­фе­рен­ции 1919–20, от­ка­зав­ших­ся рас­смат­ри­вать тре­бо­ва­ния К. о воз­вра­ще­нии ему кит. тер­ри­то­рии в пров. Шань­дун, кон­тро­ли­ро­вав­шей­ся Гер­ма­ни­ей, и об ан­ну­ли­ро­ва­нии всех прав и при­ви­ле­гий др. гос-в на кит. зем­ле. В со­от­вет­ст­вии со стать­я­ми 156–158 Вер­саль­ско­го мир­но­го до­го­во­ра 1919 пра­ва и при­ви­ле­гии, ра­нее по­лу­чен­ные Гер­ма­ни­ей по со­гла­ше­нию с К., бы­ли пе­ре­да­ны Япо­нии. Под влия­ни­ем мас­со­вых де­мон­ст­ра­ций и по­ли­тич. за­бас­то­вок в Пе­ки­не, Шан­хае и др. го­ро­дах пе­кин­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во бы­ло вы­ну­ж­де­но зая­вить о не­при­зна­нии Вер­саль­ско­го мир­но­го до­го­во­ра и от­пра­вить в от­став­ку наи­бо­лее оди­оз­ных са­нов­ни­ков, за­ни­мав­ших про­япон­ские по­зи­ции. В от­ли­чие от зап. дер­жав и США пра­ви­тель­ст­во Сов. Рос­сии в об­ра­ще­нии к кит. на­ро­ду и пра­ви­тель­ст­вам Юж. и Сев. К. от 25.7.1919 пред­ло­жи­ло на­чать пе­ре­го­во­ры об ан­ну­ли­ро­ва­нии не­рав­но­прав­ных рос.-кит. до­го­во­ра 1896 и Пе­кин­ско­го про­то­ко­ла 1901, а так­же всех со­гла­ше­ний Рос­сии с Япо­ни­ей в от­но­ше­нии К. с 1907 по 1916.

По­сле по­бе­ды Ок­тябрь­ской ре­во­лю­ции 1917 в Рос­сии зна­чит. раз­ви­тие в К. по­лу­чи­ло ра­бо­чее дви­же­ние, уси­ли­лась про­па­ган­да мар­ксиз­ма, ве­ду­щую роль в ко­то­рой иг­ра­ли Ли Дач­жао, Чэнь Ду­сю, Цюй Цю­бо, Дэн Чжун­ся, Цай Хэ­сэнь, Чжан Тай­лэй и др. На съез­де пред­ста­ви­те­лей мар­кси­ст­ских групп, со­сто­яв­шем­ся 23–31.7.1921 в Шан­хае и Цзян­си­не, бы­ла об­ра­зо­ва­на Ком­му­ни­сти­че­ская партия Ки­тая (КПК), а её сек­ре­та­рём из­бран Чэнь Ду­сю.

В нач. 1920-х гг. по­ли­тич. де­зин­те­грация К. уси­ли­лась. Сев. (пе­кин­ское) пра­ви­тель­ст­во, но­ми­наль­но на­де­лён­ное функ­ция­ми центр. вла­сти, в за­ви­си­мо­сти от со­от­но­ше­ния в нём по­ли­тич. сил кон­тро­ли­ро­ва­лось то про­япон­ской кли­кой Чжан Цзо­ли­ня, то груп­пи­ров­кой У Пэй­фу, ори­ен­ти­ро­вав­шей­ся на Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нию и США. Усо­би­цы ме­ст­ных ми­ли­та­ри­стов ещё боль­ше ос­лож­ня­ли об­ста­нов­ку. Юж. (гу­ан­чжоу­ское) пра­ви­тель­ст­во объ­е­ди­ня­ло раз­но­род­ные по­ли­тич. си­лы, в т. ч. в не­го вхо­ди­ли чле­ны об­ще­на­цио­наль­но­го пар­ла­мен­та, ра­зо­гнан­но­го в 1914 Юань Ши­ка­ем. В апр. 1921 гу­ан­чжоу­ский пар­ла­мент из­брал Сунь Ят­се­на врем. пре­зи­ден­том Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки.


Сунь Ятсен на траурном митинге в Гуанчжоу, посвящённом памяти В. И. Ленина. Февраль 1924.

В янв. 1924 в Гу­ан­чжоу со­сто­ял­ся 1-й съезд Го­минь­да­на, в ко­то­ром при­ня­ли уча­стие пред­ста­ви­те­ли КПК. Съезд офи­ци­аль­но офор­мил соз­да­ние еди­но­го нац. фрон­та на ос­но­ве по­ли­тич. бло­ка этих двух пар­тий. Это ре­ше­ние зна­чи­тель­но ук­ре­пи­ло по­зи­ции юж. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва, ко­то­рое от­ны­не ста­ло вы­сту­пать в ро­ли ли­де­ра в борь­бе за един­ст­во и не­за­ви­си­мость К. Это­му спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло и ус­та­нов­ле­ние пра­ви­тель­ст­вом Юж. К. дру­жеств. от­но­ше­ний с пра­ви­тель­ст­вом СССР. По прось­бе Сунь Ят­се­на Сов. Со­юз на­пра­вил в Гу­ан­чжоу по­ли­тич. и во­ен. со­вет­ни­ков (М. М. Бо­ро­дин, В. К. Блюхер и др.), ору­жие, а так­же ока­зал ак­тив­ную по­мощь в соз­да­нии Нац.-ре­во­люц. ар­мии (НРА). Осе­нью 1924 был по­дав­лен мя­теж, це­лью ко­то­ро­го яв­ля­лось свер­же­ние гу­ан­чжоу­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва.

В ус­ло­ви­ях рос­та по­ли­тич. ав­то­ри­те­та гу­ан­чжоу­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва пе­кин­ские пра­вя­щие кру­ги бы­ли вы­ну­ж­де­ны вне­сти оп­ре­де­лён­ные кор­рек­ти­вы в свою по­ли­ти­ку. Они со­гла­си­лись под­пи­сать с сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом Со­гла­ше­ние об об­щих прин­ци­пах для уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния во­про­сов ме­ж­ду СССР и К. (в нём СССР под­твер­дил свой от­каз от всех рос. при­ви­ле­гий в К.; под­пи­са­но 31.5.1924) и ус­та­но­вить с ним ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ния. Вслед за этим они при­гла­си­ли Сунь Ят­се­на на пе­ре­го­во­ры по объ­е­ди­не­нию К. Он при­нял пред­ло­же­ние, но в до­ро­ге за­бо­лел и 12.3.1925 скон­чал­ся в Пе­ки­не.

В Шан­хае 30.5.1925 брит. по­ли­ция от­кры­ла огонь по уча­ст­ни­кам кит. пат­рио­тич. де­мон­ст­ра­ции. Это вы­зва­ло взрыв не­го­до­ва­ния в К. Во мно­гих го­ро­дах стра­ны про­шли по­ли­тич. ма­ни­фе­ста­ции и стач­ки (см. «Три­дца­то­го мая» дви­же­ние). Эти со­бы­тия по­ло­жи­ли на­ча­ло ан­ти­им­пе­риа­ли­стич. бур­жу­аз­но-де­мо­кра­тич. Ре­во­лю­ции 1925–27 в Ки­тае. 1.7.1925 гу­ан­чжоу­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во объ­я­ви­ло се­бя Нац. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом К. К нач. 1926 НРА ус­та­но­ви­ла ре­во­люц. власть в про­вин­ци­ях Гу­ан­си, Гуй­чжоу и юж. час­ти пров. Ху­нань. В ию­ле 1926 она на­ча­ла Се­вер­ный по­ход 1926–27 в це­лях обес­пе­че­ния по­бе­ды ре­во­лю­ции во всём К. К кон. 1926 НРА ос­во­бо­ди­ла про­вин­ции Ху­нань, Ху­бэй, Цзян­си, Фу­ц­зянь, что по­зво­ли­ло Нац. пра­ви­тель­ст­ву К. и ЦИК Го­минь­да­на пе­ре­ехать из Гу­ан­чжоу в г. Учан (ны­не Ухань). В мар­те 1927 вос­став­шие шан­хай­ские ра­бо­чие ос­во­бо­ди­ли Шан­хай. Вско­ре был ос­во­бо­ж­дён Нан­кин (по­сле че­го 24.3.1927 под­верг­ся мас­си­ров. об­стре­лу брит. и амер. эс­кадр). Ак­тив­ную роль в Сев. по­хо­де иг­ра­ли кит. ком­му­ни­сты, а так­же сов. во­ен. со­вет­ни­ки.

Ши­ро­кий раз­мах ре­во­люц. дви­же­ния и опас­ность ин­тер­вен­ции зап. дер­жав вы­зва­ли от­ход от ре­во­лю­ции кит. нац. бур­жуа­зии. 12.4.1927 пра­вое кры­ло Го­минь­да­на, воз­глав­ляе­мое глав­но­ко­манд. НРА Чан Кай­ши, ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ло в Шан­хае и Нан­ки­не пе­ре­во­ро­ты и за­хва­ти­ло там власть. Вско­ре пра­вые го­минь­данов­цы со­вер­ши­ли пе­ре­во­рот в Гу­ан­чжоу. 18.4.1927 Чан Кай­ши сфор­ми­ро­вал в Нан­ки­не из сво­их сто­рон­ни­ков но­вое Нац. пра­ви­тель­ст­во как про­ти­во­вес ле­во­го­минь­да­нов­ско­му пра­ви­тель­ст­ву в Уха­ни. В из­ме­нив­шей­ся об­ста­нов­ке ухань­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во так­же ста­ло кло­нить­ся впра­во. 15.7.1927 ухань­ский ЦИК Го­минь­да­на во гла­ве с Ван Цзин­вэ­ем от­ка­зал­ся от по­ли­тич. бло­ка с КПК и че­рез не­ко­то­рое вре­мя пе­ре­шёл на сто­ро­ну Чан Кай­ши. КПК бы­ла объ­яв­ле­на вне за­ко­на, проф­сою­зы и кре­сть­ян­ские сою­зы рас­пу­ще­ны, в стра­не раз­вер­нул­ся «бе­лый тер­рор» (в хо­де го­минь­да­нов­ских ре­прес­сий с апр. 1927 по июль 1928 в К. бы­ло уби­то 337 тыс. ре­во­лю­цио­не­ров).

По­сле за­хва­та вла­сти Чан Кай­ши КПК взя­ла курс на воо­руж. борь­бу с го­минь­да­нов­ским ре­жи­мом. 1.8.1927 в Нань­ча­не бы­ло под­ня­то вос­ста­ние и сфор­ми­ро­ва­на Крас­ная ар­мия (см. Нань­чан­ское вос­ста­ние 1927). Её кос­тяк со­ста­ви­ли вой­ска, при­ни­мав­шие уча­стие в Сев. по­хо­де и на­хо­див­шие­ся под ко­манд. ком­му­ни­стов Е Ти­на, Чжу Дэ, Хэ Лу­на и др. В кон­це ав­гу­ста – сент. 1927 в про­вин­ци­ях Ху­нань, Цзян­си, Гу­ан­дун, Ху­бэй под рук. КПК про­изош­ли «осен­не­го уро­жая» вос­ста­ния. В окт. 1927 Крас­ная ар­мия ов­ла­де­ла уезд­ны­ми го­ро­да­ми Хай­фын и Лу­фын в пров. Гу­ан­дун, где в на­ча­ле но­яб. 1927 бы­ла об­ра­зо­ва­на Хай­лу­фын­ская сов. рес­пуб­ли­ка – пер­вый очаг вла­сти со­ве­тов в К. (см. Хай­лу­фын­ская ре­во­лю­ци­он­ная ба­за). В ночь с 10 на 11 дек. 1927 в Гу­ан­чжоу гу­ан­дун­ский к-т КПК во гла­ве с Чжан Тай­лэ­ем под­нял вос­ста­ние [см. Гу­ан­чжоу­ское (Кан­тон­ское) вос­ста­ние 1927] и ор­га­ни­зо­вал ком­му­ну. Не­смот­ря на по­ра­же­ние боль­шин­ст­ва вос­ста­ний, ру­ко­во­дство КПК ут­вер­ди­лось во мне­нии, что не­об­хо­ди­мо про­дол­жать ли­нию на ук­ре­п­ле­ние воо­руж. сил пар­тии и фор­ми­ро­ва­ние со­ве­тов в разл. рай­онах стра­ны. Опи­ра­ясь на час­ти Крас­ной ар­мии, в 1928–30 КПК соз­да­ла на тер­ри­то­рии 11 про­вин­ций, гл. обр. Юж. и Центр. К., 15 сов. рай­онов.

В апр. 1928 Чан Кай­ши объ­я­вил о про­дол­же­нии Сев. по­хо­да. 5.6.1928 его вой­ска за­ня­ли Пе­кин, власть в К. пе­ре­шла к нан­кин­ско­му пра­ви­тель­ст­ву (в ию­ле 1928 при­зна­но США, а за­тем пра­ви­тель­ст­ва­ми др. зап. го­су­дарств). Ут­вер­див­шись в Пе­ки­не, Го­минь­дан объ­я­вил о вве­де­нии с 1.1.1929 «пе­рио­да опе­ки», во вре­мя ко­то­ро­го ему пре­дос­тав­ля­лось ис­клю­чит. пра­во фор­ми­ро­вать пра­ви­тель­ст­во, центр. и ме­ст­ные ор­га­ны вла­сти, ог­ра­ни­чи­ва­лись по­ли­тич. пра­ва и сво­бо­ды на­се­ле­ния К. Эко­но­мич. и внеш­няя по­ли­ти­ка го­минь­да­нов­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ла даль­ней­ше­му уси­ле­нию в К. по­зи­ций и влия­ния ве­ду­щих ка­пи­та­ли­стич. дер­жав, пре­ж­де все­го США.

Под­стре­кае­мое Япо­ни­ей, Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ни­ей и США, нан­кин­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во по­ве­ло от­кры­то вра­ж­деб­ную по­ли­ти­ку по от­но­ше­нию к СССР. Го­минь­да­нов­ские вой­ска под ко­манд. маньч. ген. Чжан Сю­эля­на совм. с от­ря­да­ми рус. бе­ло­эмиг­ран­тов на­ча­ли на­па­дать на сов. тер­ри­то­рию. 10–11.7.1929 кит. вла­сти за­хва­ти­ли Ки­тай­ско-Вос­точ­ную же­лез­ную до­ро­гу (КВЖД; см. Со­вет­ско-ки­тай­ский во­ору­жён­ный кон­фликт 1929), ко­то­рая по сов.-кит. со­гла­ше­нию 1924 совм. управ­ля­лась СССР и К., аре­сто­ва­ли ты­ся­чи сов. гра­ж­дан. 17.7.1929 СССР объ­я­вил о раз­ры­ве ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ний с К. Сов. Осо­бая Даль­не­во­сточ­ная ар­мия да­ла от­пор вы­лаз­кам го­минь­да­нов­цев. От­бро­сив вой­ска Го­минь­да­на, вторг­шие­ся на сов. тер­ри­то­рию 17.11.1929, она раз­гро­ми­ла их на кит. тер­ри­то­рии. 22.12.1929 в Ха­ба­ров­ске под­пи­сан сов.-кит. про­то­кол о вос­ста­нов­ле­нии на КВЖД и на сов.-кит. гра­ни­це по­ло­же­ния, пре­ду­смот­рен­но­го сов.-кит. со­гла­ше­ни­ем 1924. Ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ния ме­ж­ду СССР и К. бы­ли вос­ста­нов­ле­ны лишь в дек. 1932.

С но­яб. 1930 по осень 1932 го­минь­да­нов­ские вла­сти пред­при­ня­ли 4 по­хо­да про­тив сов. рай­онов (под­роб­нее см. в ст. Гра­ж­дан­ская вой­на в Ки­тае 1927–37), но все они за­кон­чи­лись по­ра­же­ни­ем войск Чан Кай­ши. По­бе­ды кит. Крас­ной ар­мии спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли рас­ши­ре­нию тер­ри­то­рии сов. рай­онов. К кон. 1931 круп­ней­ши­ми из них бы­ли: Цен­траль­ный (Юго-Вост. Цзян­си и Зап. Фуц­зянь), Ху­бэй – Хэ­нань – Ань­хой­ский, Ху­нань – Ху­бэй­ский, Цзян­си – Фуц­зянь – Чжэц­зян­ский, Цзян­си – Ху­нань – Ху­бэй­ский, Цзян­си – Ху­нань­ский. 7–24.11.1931 в г. Жуй­цзинь (пров. Цзян­си) со­сто­ял­ся 1-й Все­ки­тай­ский съезд пред­ста­ви­те­лей сов. рай­онов К. Съезд при­нял про­ек­ты кон­сти­ту­ции Кит. сов. рес­пуб­ли­ки (КСР), зе­мель­но­го за­ко­на, за­ко­нов о тру­де, об эко­но­мич. по­ли­ти­ке, ре­ше­ния «О Крас­ной ар­мии», по нац. во­про­су и др. Бы­ли из­бра­ны ЦИК КСР и Врем. центр. пра­ви­тель­ст­во, ко­то­рые воз­гла­вил Мао Цзэ­дун.


Пу И на военном параде в г. Тяньцзинь. Фото 1930-х гг.

Япо­ния, дав­но вы­на­ши­вав­шая пла­ны ус­та­нов­ле­ния сво­его гос­под­ства в Азии, 18.9.1931 при­сту­пи­ла к опе­ра­ции по за­хва­ту Сев.-Вост. К. и к нач. 1932 ок­купи­ро­ва­ла его. 28.1.1932 япон. вой­ска раз­вер­ну­ли во­ен. дей­ст­вия с це­лью за­хва­та Шан­хая, од­на­ко по­лу­чи­ли от­пор со сто­ро­ны пат­рио­ти­че­ски на­стро­ен­ной го­минь­да­нов­ской 19-й ар­мии, под­дер­жан­ной всем на­се­ле­ни­ем го­ро­да. В 1933 япон. вой­ска ок­ку­пи­ро­ва­ли пров. Жэ­хэ и вторг­лись в пров. Хэ­бэй. Осе­нью 1932 Япо­ния под­пи­са­ла до­го­вор с соз­дан­ным ею в Мань­чжу­рии ма­рио­не­точ­ным гос-вом Мань­чжоу-го, чем за­кре­пи­ла свой кон­троль над этим рай­оном К. В мар­те 1934 япон. вла­сти про­воз­гла­си­ли Пу И имп. Мань­чжоу-го.

С ус­та­нов­ле­ни­ем япон. гос­под­ства в Сев.-Вост. К. уча­сти­лись ан­ти­со­вет­ские про­во­ка­ции на даль­не­во­сточ­ных гра­ни­цах СССР и на КВЖД. Во из­бе­жа­ние воз­ник­но­ве­ния круп­но­го во­ен. кон­флик­та по­сле дли­тель­ных сов.-япон. пе­ре­го­во­ров сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­во 23.3.1935 бы­ло вы­ну­ж­де­но под­пи­сать со­гла­ше­ние об ус­туп­ке Мань­чжоу-го прав СССР в от­но­ше­нии КВЖД.

В ус­ло­ви­ях япон. ок­ку­па­ции час­ти стра­ны пра­ви­тель­ст­во Чан Кай­ши упор­но про­дол­жа­ло рас­смат­ри­вать КПК в ка­че­ст­ве сво­его гл. про­тив­ни­ка. Осенью 1933, мо­би­ли­зо­вав поч­ти мил­ли­он­ную ар­мию, Чан Кай­ши на­чал 5-й по­ход про­тив сов. рай­онов стра­ны. Го­минь­да­ну уда­лось до­бить­ся ус­пе­ха. Крас­ная ар­мия, по­нёс­шая зна­чит. по­те­ри, бы­ла вы­ну­ж­де­на от­вес­ти свои гл. си­лы из Юго-Вос­точ­но­го в Сев.-Зап. К. (см. Се­ве­ро-за­пад­ный по­ход 1934– 1936). В окт. 1935 под кон­тро­лем Крас­ной ар­мии здесь был об­ра­зо­ван сов. По­гра­нич­ный рай­он Шэнь­си – Гань­су – Нин­ся.

В мае – ию­не 1935 япон. пра­вя­щие кру­ги на­вя­за­ли нан­кин­ско­му пра­ви­тель­ст­ву сек­рет­ное со­гла­ше­ние, по ко­то­ро­му Го­минь­дан фак­ти­че­ски при­зна­вал тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ные за­хва­ты Япо­нии в Сев. К. (см. Хэ-Умэд­зу со­гла­ше­ние 1935). В но­яб­ре то­го же го­да япон. ок­ку­пан­ты об­ра­зо­ва­ли в г. Тун­чжоу т. н. Во­сточ­но-Хэ­бэй­ское ав­то­ном­ное ан­ти­ком­му­ни­стич. пра­ви­тель­ст­во. Ка­пи­ту­лянт­ская по­зи­ция Чан Кай­ши вы­зва­ла ши­ро­кую вол­ну про­тес­тов в К. 9.12.1935 в Пе­ки­не про­шла мощ­ная ан­ти­пра­ви­тельств. и ан­ти­япон­ская пат­рио­тич. де­мон­ст­ра­ция под ло­зун­га­ми нац. не­за­ви­си­мо­сти и пре­кра­ще­ния гражд. вой­ны. Тре­бо­ва­ния де­мон­ст­ран­тов по­лу­чи­ли под­держ­ку со сто­ро­ны час­ти ар­мей­ских кру­гов (см. «Де­вя­то­го де­каб­ря» дви­же­ние). В кон. 1936 Го­минь­дан был вы­нуж­ден пре­кра­тить во­ен. дей­ст­вия про­тив Крас­ной ар­мии К. Со сво­ей сто­роны КПК, ру­ко­во­дству­ясь ре­ше­ния­ми 7-го кон­грес­са Ко­мин­тер­на, вы­ска­за­лась за соз­да­ние еди­но­го ан­ти­япон­ско­го нац. фрон­та и об­ра­ти­лась к Го­минь­да­ну с при­зы­вом объ­е­ди­нить си­лы в борь­бе про­тив япон. аг­рес­сии.


Бойцы 8-й полевой армии в боях с японскими захватчиками у Великой Китайской стены.

Спро­во­ци­ро­вав 7.7.1937 ин­ци­дент у мо­с­та Лу­го­уцяо близ Пе­ки­на, Япо­ния при­сту­пи­ла к осу­ще­ст­в­ле­нию пла­на ок­ку­па­ции все­го К. В ию­ле – дек. 1937 япон. ар­мия за­хва­ти­ла об­шир­ные рай­оны и та­кие круп­ные го­рода, как Пе­кин, Тянь­цзинь, Шан­хай, Нан­кин; к кон. 1938 она взя­ла под свой кон­троль наи­бо­лее раз­ви­тые в пром. от­но­ше­нии рай­оны Сев., Центр. и Юж. К. В этих ус­ло­ви­ях ру­ко­во­дство Го­минь­да­на зая­ви­ло 23.9.1937 о го­тов­но­сти к со­труд­ни­че­ст­ву с КПК. По со­гла­ше­нию сто­рон ре­во­люц. ба­за Шэнь­си – Гань­су – Нин­ся бы­ла пре­об­ра­зо­ва­на в Осо­бый р-н Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки с со­хра­не­ни­ем в нём де­мо­кра­тич. сис­те­мы вла­сти, а на­хо­див­шие­ся здесь час­ти Крас­ной ар­мии К. – в 8-ю по­ле­вую ар­мию К. На­ча­лась На­цио­наль­но-ос­во­бо­ди­тель­ная вой­на в Ки­тае про­тив япон­ских за­хват­чи­ков 1937–45.

С са­мо­го на­ча­ла япон. аг­рес­сии СССР ока­зы­вал по­мощь бо­рю­ще­му­ся К. 21.8.1937 был за­клю­чён сов.-кит. до­го­вор о не­на­па­де­нии. Сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­во пре­дос­та­ви­ло К. зай­мы на об­щую сум­му 250 млн. долл. для за­куп­ки ору­жия и во­ен. ма­те­риа­лов, на­пра­ви­ло в стра­ну бо­лее 3,5 тыс. сов. во­ен. спе­циа­ли­стов, в т. ч. лёт­чи­ков. В те­че­ние всей вой­ны сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­во дер­жа­ло на Даль­нем Вос­то­ке круп­ную во­ен. груп­пи­ров­ку, что ско­вы­ва­ло япон. воо­руж. си­лы и су­ще­ст­вен­но об­лег­ча­ло борь­бу кит. на­ро­да.


Встреча частей советской Красной Армии населением города Далянь. Август 1945.


«Радость освобождения». Художник Ся Фын. Лубок (фрагмент). 1948.

В пе­ри­од Нац.-ос­во­бо­дит. вой­ны про­тив япон. за­хват­чи­ков К. не пред­став­лял со­бой еди­но­го це­ло­го. Он со­сто­ял из не­ок­ку­пи­ров. зо­ны (юго-зап. и сев.-зап. про­вин­ции), в ко­то­рой на­хо­ди­лась врем. сто­ли­ца К. – Чун­цин, ок­ку­пи­ро­ван­ной зо­ны (сев., вост., центр. и юж. про­вин­ции), ко­то­рая но­ми­наль­но под­чи­ня­лась ма­рио­не­точ­но­му пра­ви­тель­ст­ву Ван Цзин­вэя (соз­да­но япон­ца­ми 30.3.1940 в Нан­ки­не), и ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онов Ки­тая, кон­тро­ли­ро­вав­ших­ся 8-й по­ле­вой ар­ми­ей (отд. рай­оны про­вин­ций Шэнь­си, Гань­су, Нин­ся, Ча­хар, Суй­юань, Хэ­бэй, Шань­дун, Хэ­нань в Сев. К.) и Но­вой 4-й ар­ми­ей (бас­сейн р. Янц­зы в Центр. К.), ко­то­рой так­же ру­ко­во­ди­ла КПК. С вес­ны 1939 по ме­ре обо­ст­ре­ния от­но­ше­ний ме­ж­ду КПК и Го­минь­да­ном вой­ска по­след­не­го на­ча­ли бло­ки­ро­вать По­гра­нич­ный рай­он Шэнь­си – Гань­су – Нин­ся, где в г. Янь­ань на­хо­дил­ся ЦК КПК и от­ку­да осу­ще­ст­в­ля­лось во­ен.-по­ли­тич. ру­ко­во­дство ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ны­ми рай­она­ми К. С кон. 1940 япон. ко­ман­до­ва­ние ак­ти­ви­зи­ро­ва­ло на­сту­пат. опе­ра­ции про­тив ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онов, что по­ста­ви­ло 8-ю по­ле­вую и Но­вую 4-ю ар­мии в тя­жё­лое по­ло­же­ние. Лишь в авг. 1943 они смог­ли пе­рей­ти в контр­на­сту­п­ле­ние. К апр. 1945 в К. на­счи­ты­ва­лось 19 ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онов с на­се­ле­ни­ем св. 95 млн. чел. В этой об­ста­нов­ке 23.4–11.6.1945 в Янь­а­ни про­шёл 7-й съезд КПК. На нём бы­ло за­кре­п­ле­но ли­дер­ст­во Мао Цзэ­ду­на в пар­тии, а в ус­тав КПК вне­сён пункт об ут­вер­жде­нии «идей Мао Цзэ­ду­на» в ка­че­ст­ве ру­ко­во­дя­щей идео­ло­гии.

По­сле Крым­ской (Ял­тин­ской) кон­фе­рен­ции 1945, на ко­то­рой СССР взял на се­бя обя­за­тель­ст­во всту­пить в вой­ну про­тив Япо­нии, 30.6.1945 в Мо­ск­ве на­ча­лись пе­ре­го­во­ры ме­ж­ду пра­ви­тель­ства­ми Сов. Сою­за и К. Они за­вер­ши­лись под­пи­са­ни­ем 14.8.1945 До­го­во­ра о друж­бе и сою­зе, по ко­то­ро­му сто­ро­ны взя­ли на се­бя обя­за­тель­ст­ва ока­зы­вать друг дру­гу во­ен. и иную по­мощь в вой­не про­тив Япо­нии. Всту­п­ле­ние 9.8.1945 час­тей сов. Крас­ной Ар­мии и войск Монг. Нар. Рес­пуб­ли­ки на тер­ри­то­рию Сев.-Вост. К. и Внутр. Мон­го­лии и раз­гром ими Кван­тун­ской ар­мии име­ли ре­шаю­щее зна­че­ние для па­де­ния япон. ок­ку­пац. ре­жи­ма в К. 2.9.1945 Япо­ния под­пи­са­ла Акт о ка­пи­ту­ля­ции. Во­ен. раз­гром Япо­нии зна­ме­но­вал на­ча­ло но­во­го эта­па ос­во­бо­дит. борь­бы кит. на­ро­да.

С сент. 1945 го­минь­да­нов­ское ру­ко­вод­ство на­ча­ло спеш­но пе­ре­бра­сы­вать свои во­ин­ские час­ти для за­ня­тия круп­ных го­ро­дов, ра­нее ок­ку­пи­ро­ван­ных япон. вой­ска­ми. Под пред­ло­гом обес­пе­че­ния ка­пи­ту­ля­ции япон. ко­ман­до­ва­ния в важ­ней­шие пор­ты К. бы­ли вве­де­ны во­ен.-мор. си­лы США, в ря­де пунк­тов К. вы­са­же­ны возд. и мор. де­сан­ты амер. ар­мии. Кон­тин­гент ар­мии США на тер­ри­то­рии К. к дек. 1945 дос­тиг 113 тыс. чел. Ва­шинг­тон ока­зы­вал пря­мую во­ен. по­мощь Го­минь­да­ну, по­став­ляя ему тан­ки, са­мо­лё­ты, бое­вые ко­раб­ли, др. ви­ды воо­ру­же­ний. Амер. ин­ст­рук­то­ры к ию­лю 1946 ре­ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ли и обу­чи­ли 45 го­минь­да­нов­ских ди­ви­зий.

Стре­мясь мир­ным спо­со­бом ре­шить во­про­сы по­сле­во­ен­но­го уст­рой­ст­ва К., КПК вы­дви­ну­ла пред­ло­же­ния о соз­да­нии в К. де­мо­кра­тич. коа­лиц. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва и про­ве­де­нии де­мо­кра­тич. пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ний. 28.8–10.10.1945 в Чун­ци­не со­стоя­лись пе­ре­го­во­ры ме­ж­ду КПК и Го­минь­да­ном, ко­то­рые за­вер­ши­лись при­ня­ти­ем ком­про­мисс­но­го со­гла­ше­ния о со­зы­ве По­ли­тич. кон­суль­та­тив­ной кон­фе­рен­ции (ПКК) для ре­ше­ния во­про­са о де­мо­кра­тич. пе­ре­уст­рой­ст­ве К. Од­на­ко вы­пол­не­ние это­го со­гла­ше­ния бы­ло со­рва­но – уже 13.10.1945 пра­ви­тель­ст­во Чан Кай­ши раз­вер­ну­ло на­сту­п­ле­ние на ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ные рай­оны. Обо­ст­ре­ние об­ста­нов­ки в К. по­бу­ди­ло пра­ви­тель­ст­во СССР до­бить­ся при­ня­тия на со­сто­яв­шем­ся в Мо­ск­ве 16–26.12.1945 со­ве­ща­нии ми­ни­ст­ров иностр. дел СССР, США и Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии ре­ше­ния, в ко­то­ром ука­зы­ва­лось на не­об­хо­ди­мость мир­но­го объ­е­ди­не­ния К. и пре­кра­ще­ния гражд. вой­ны. При этом бы­ла дос­тиг­ну­та до­го­во­рён­ность о «же­ла­тель­но­сти вы­во­да из К. сов. и амер. воо­руж. сил в воз­мож­но крат­чай­ший срок».

Пред­ста­ви­те­ли Го­минь­да­на и КПК 10.1.1946 под­пи­са­ли со­гла­ше­ние о пре­кра­ще­нии во­ен. дей­ст­вий. В тот же день в Чун­ци­не от­кры­лась ПКК, ко­то­рая при­ня­ла ре­ше­ния о ре­ор­га­ни­за­ции го­минь­да­нов­ско­го од­но­пар­тий­но­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва в коа­лиц. пра­ви­тель­ст­во, о со­зы­ве Нац. со­б­ра­ния, о пе­ре­смот­ре кон­сти­ту­ции К. и др. Но вы­пол­не­ние со­гла­со­ван­ных ре­ше­ний бы­ло вновь со­рва­но. В мар­те 1946 пле­нум ЦИК Го­минь­да­на зая­вил об от­кло­не­нии дос­тиг­ну­тых до­го­во­рён­но­стей, а в ию­не 1946 на­хо­див­шие­ся в его под­чи­не­нии вой­ска раз­вер­ну­ли но­вое на­сту­п­ле­ние на ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ные рай­оны, что да­ло тол­чок На­род­но-ос­во­бо­ди­тель­ной вой­не в Ки­тае 1946–49.

В борь­бе про­тив КПК Чан Кай­ши поль­зо­вал­ся ак­тив­ной под­держ­кой США. 4.11.1946 в Нан­ки­не был под­пи­сан амер.-кит. до­го­вор о друж­бе, тор­гов­ле и на­вига­ции (см. Аме­ри­ка­но-ки­тай­ский до­го­вор 1946). По его ус­ло­ви­ям (а так­же в со­от­вет­ст­вии с до­пол­нив­ши­ми его впо­след­ст­вии мно­го­числ. со­гла­ше­ния­ми) Ва­шинг­тон пре­дос­та­вил Го­минь­да­ну во­ен. по­мощь в раз­ме­ре 6 млрд. долл., по­лу­чив в об­мен на это воз­мож­ность в зна­чит. ме­ре кон­тро­ли­ро­вать по­ли­тич. жизнь, эко­но­ми­ку и фи­нан­сы Ки­тая.


Вступление частей Народно-освободительной армии Китая в Гуанчжоу. Октябрь 1949.

С ию­ля 1946 На­род­но-ос­во­бо­ди­тель­ная ар­мия Ки­тая (НОАК), сфор­ми­ро­ван­ная из час­тей 8-й и Но­вой 4-й ар­мий, а так­же Объ­е­ди­нён­ной де­мо­кра­тич. ар­мии Сев.-Вост. К., ве­ла упор­ные обо­ро­нит. бои. В ию­ле 1947 она пе­ре­шла в контр­на­сту­п­ле­ние и к осе­ни 1948 пол­но­стью ос­во­бо­ди­ла Сев.-Вост. К., по­сле че­го на­ча­ла круп­ные опе­ра­ции в Сев. и Центр. К. В кон. 1948 НОАК вы­шла к р. Янц­зы, в янв. 1949 ос­во­бо­ди­ла Тянь­цзинь и Пе­кин, в ап­ре­ле – Нан­кин, а в мае – Шан­хай и Ухань. Ус­пеш­ное на­сту­п­ле­ние НОАК пол­но­стью дез­ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ло фронт и тыл го­минь­да­нов­ских войск.

Стре­мясь из­бе­жать пол­но­го во­ен. раз­гро­ма, Чан Кай­ши 1.1.1949 пред­ло­жил КПК на­чать пе­ре­го­во­ры. 1–15.3.1949 в Пе­ки­не де­ле­га­ции Го­минь­да­на и КПК вы­ра­бо­та­ли про­ект со­гла­ше­ния о внутр. ми­ре. Од­на­ко го­минь­да­нов­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во от­ка­за­лось его под­пи­сать. 21.4.1949 НОАК во­зоб­но­ви­ла на­сту­п­ле­ние и к осе­ни 1949 ос­во­бо­ди­ла всю тер­ри­то­рию Сев.-Зап. и Центр. К., а так­же зна­чит. часть Юж. и Юго-Зап. К. К кон. 1949 был ос­во­бо­ж­дён весь кон­ти­нен­таль­ный К. Чан Кай­ши и ок. 2 млн. его сто­рон­ни­ков бе­жа­ли на Тай­вань.

Китай в 1949–76

Мао Цзэдун провозглашает образование Китайской Народной Республики. Фото 1949.

В Пе­ки­не 21–30.9.1949 со­стоя­лась 1-я сес­сия Нар. по­ли­тич. кон­суль­та­тив­но­го со­ве­та К. (НПКСК) – выс­ше­го ор­га­на Еди­но­го на­род­но-де­мо­кра­тич. фрон­та, ру­ко­во­ди­мо­го КПК, ко­то­рая сфор­ми­ро­ва­ла центр. ор­га­ны вла­сти и ут­вер­ди­ла Об­щую про­грам­му НПКСК. 1.10.1949 бы­ло тор­же­ст­вен­но про­воз­гла­ше­но об­ра­зо­ва­ние Кит. Нар. Рес­пуб­ли­ки (КНР). СССР пер­вым при­знал КНР (2.10.1949), его при­ме­ру по­сле­до­ва­ли вост.-ев­роп. стра­ны нар. де­мо­кра­тии и Монг. Нар. Рес­пуб­ли­ка. В на­ча­ле янв. 1950 ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ния с КНР ус­та­но­ви­ли Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния, Сканд. стра­ны, Аф­га­ни­стан, Из­ра­иль, Швей­ца­рия и Ин­дия.


«И. В. Сталин и Мао Цзэдун». Плакат. Художник В. С. Иванов. 1951.

Вра­ж­деб­ную по­зи­цию в от­но­ше­нии КНР за­ня­ло пра­ви­тель­ст­во США. Оно про­дол­жа­ло ока­зы­вать под­держ­ку пра­ви­тель­ст­ву Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки во гла­ве с Чан Кай­ши (1.3.1950 из­бран пре­зи­ден­том Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки), под вла­стью ко­то­ро­го к сер. 1950 ос­та­ва­лись о. Тай­вань, о-ва Пэн­ху­ле­дао и ряд др. Пра­ви­тель­ст­во Чан Кай­ши вклю­ча­ло пред­ста­ви­те­лей всех кит. про­вин­ций, от­ка­зы­ва­лось от при­зна­ния КНР, вы­сту­па­ло с пре­тен­зи­ей на еди­но­лич­ное пред­ста­ви­тель­ст­во все­го К., про­воз­гла­шая важ­ней­шей це­лью воз­врат под свой кон­троль всей кит. тер­ри­то­рии. В кон. 1949 Ва­шинг­тон за­пре­тил амер. фир­мам тор­го­вые опе­ра­ции с КНР. Под дав­ле­ни­ем США в янв. 1950 боль­шин­ст­во чле­нов ООН от­кло­ни­ло вне­сён­ную СССР ре­зо­лю­цию об ан­ну­ли­ро­ва­нии пол­но­мо­чий в ООН де­ле­га­ции Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки (чл. ООН с 24.10.1945) и пре­дос­тав­ле­нии КНР её за­кон­ных прав (с но­яб. 1950 де­ле­га­ция пра­ви­тель­ст­ва КНР ста­ла при­сут­ст­во­вать в ООН в ка­че­ст­ве на­блю­да­те­ля). Со сво­ей сто­ро­ны пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР от­ка­зы­ва­лось при­знать ле­ги­тим­ность тай­вань­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва, объ­я­ви­ло под­кон­троль­ные Чан Кай­ши тер­ри­то­рии со­став­ной ча­стью еди­но­го кит. гос-ва, под­ле­жа­щей ос­во­бо­ж­де­нию от гос­под­ствую­ще­го на них «ан­ти­на­род­но­го ре­жи­ма».

По­сле про­воз­гла­ше­ния КНР её пра­ви­тель­ст­во при­сту­пи­ло к ук­ре­п­ле­нию сво­их по­зи­ций в цен­тре и на мес­тах, про­во­дя бес­по­щад­ное по­дав­ле­ние про­ти­во­сто­яв­ших ей со­ци­аль­но-по­ли­тич. сил. Важ­ной за­да­чей в ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онах ста­ла экс­про­приа­ция круп­но­го (бю­ро­кра­тич.) ка­пи­та­ла. В нач. 1950 на­цио­на­ли­зи­ро­ва­ны св. 2800 пред­при­ятий пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей и до­бы­ваю­щей пром-сти, а так­же бо­лее 2400 бан­ков­ских пред­при­ятий. Они со­ста­ви­ли важ­ную часть гос. сек­то­ра эко­но­ми­ки КНР. Но­вое пра­ви­тель­ст­во ан­ну­ли­ро­ва­ло все до­го­во­ры, за­кре­п­ляв­шие осо­бые пра­ва иностр. дер­жав на тер­ри­то­рии К., взя­ло в свои ру­ки та­мо­жен­ные ор­га­ны, управ­ле­ние внеш­ней тор­гов­лей и ва­лют­ное ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние.

В Мо­ск­ве 14.2.1950 был под­пи­сан сов.-кит. до­го­вор о друж­бе, сою­зе и вза­им­ной по­мо­щи и ряд др. со­гла­ше­ний, в т. ч. о пре­дос­тав­ле­нии Сов. Сою­зом на льгот­ных ус­ло­ви­ях (1% го­до­вых) дол­го­сроч­но­го кре­ди­та КНР в раз­ме­ре 300 млн. долл. для оп­ла­ты сов. по­ста­вок обо­ру­до­ва­ния и ма­те­риа­лов. СССР зая­вил о го­тов­но­сти ока­зать КНР по­мощь в строи­тель­ст­ве и ре­кон­ст­рук­ции 50 круп­ных пром. объ­ек­тов, по­став­лять не­об­хо­ди­мые пром. то­ва­ры, го­рю­чее и сы­рьё (к 1952 на до­лю СССР при­хо­ди­лось бо­лее по­ло­ви­ны все­го внеш­не­тор­го­во­го обо­ро­та КНР). Од­но­вре­мен­но бы­ли под­пи­са­ны со­гла­ше­ния о пе­ре­да­че Сов. Сою­зом КНР всех сво­их прав по со­вме­ст­но­му управ­ле­нию Кит. Чан­чунь­ской ж. д., о вы­во­де сов. войск с тер­ри­то­рии совм. ис­поль­зуе­мой во­ен.-мор. ба­зы Люй­шунь (Порт-Ар­тур; окон­ча­тель­но вы­ве­де­ны 26.5.1955) и др. пунк­тов.

С на­ча­лом Ко­рей­ской вой­ны 1950–53 ру­ко­во­дство КНР, учи­ты­вая не­од­но­крат­ные прось­бы о по­мо­щи Ким Ир Се­на, при­ня­ло ре­ше­ние о на­прав­ле­нии на Ко­рей­ский п-ов кит. доб­ро­воль­цев. С 25.10.1950 они при­ни­ма­ли ак­тив­ное уча­стие в бое­вых дей­ст­ви­ях (1.2.1951 Ге­не­раль­ная Ас­самб­лея ООН под дав­ле­ни­ем США ква­ли­фи­ци­ро­ва­ла дей­ст­вия КНР как аг­рес­сию; по­те­ри КНР в Кор. вой­не со­ста­ви­ли ок. 500 тыс. чел.). В хо­де вой­ны США вве­ли в Тай­вань­ский прол. свой 7-й флот в це­лях пре­дот­вра­ще­ния воз­мож­ной вы­сад­ки час­тей НОАК на о. Тай­вань. В окт. 1950 кит. вой­ска всту­пи­ли на тер­ри­то­рию Ти­бе­та, про­воз­гла­сив­ше­го 4.11.1949 свою не­за­ви­си­мость. Вслед за этим они во­шли в Каш­мир и взя­ли под свой кон­троль рай­он Ак­сай Чин (Ак­сай­чин) и ряд др. тер­ри­то­рий об­щей пл. 12 тыс. км2, что при­ве­ло к ос­лож­не­нию кит.-инд. от­но­ше­ний. 23.5.1951 меж­ду пра­ви­тель­ст­ва­ми Ти­бе­та и КНР бы­ло под­пи­са­но Со­гла­ше­ние о ме­ро­прия­ти­ях по мир­но­му ос­во­бо­ж­де­нию Ти­бе­та, ко­то­рое пре­дос­та­ви­ло по­след­не­му пра­во на нац. ав­то­но­мию в со­ста­ве КНР.

Ре­шить про­бле­му пре­одо­ле­ния по­сле­во­ен­ной эко­но­мич. раз­ру­хи и пе­ре­хо­да к по­строе­нию со­циа­лиз­ма ру­ко­во­дство КНР рас­счи­ты­ва­ло пу­тём фор­си­ро­ван­но­го про­ве­де­ния аг­рар­ной ре­фор­мы (на­ча­та в кон. 1951), упо­ря­до­че­ния пром.-тор­го­во­го сек­то­ра и со­кра­ще­ния рас­хо­дов на со­дер­жа­ние гос. ап­па­ра­та, а так­же пре­се­че­ния зло­упот­реб­ле­ний в адм. ор­га­нах и эко­но­ми­ке. В 1952 про­ве­де­ны мас­со­вые по­ли­тич. кам­па­нии про­тив «трёх зол» и «пя­ти зол», в хо­де ко­то­рых бы­ли ре­прес­си­ро­ва­ны св. 2 млн. чел.

К кон. 1952 за­кон­чил­ся вос­ста­но­вит. пе­ри­од в нар. хо­зяй­ст­ве КНР. Во мно­го­ук­лад­ной эко­но­ми­ке К. за­мет­но ук­ре­пи­лось влия­ние гос. сек­то­ра, до­ля ча­стно­ка­пи­та­ли­стич. сек­то­ра со­кра­ти­лась с 48,7% в 1949 до 30,7% в 1952; соз­да­на еди­ная мно­го­от­рас­ле­вая сис­те­ма гос. тор­гов­ли.

К вес­не 1953 в осн. за­вер­ши­лась аг­рар­ная ре­фор­ма (за ис­клю­че­ни­ем не­ко­то­рых рай­онов про­жи­ва­ния нац. мень­шинств; в Ти­бе­те на­ча­ла про­во­дить­ся с 1960). Ок. 300 млн. без­зе­мель­ных и ма­ло­зе­мель­ных кре­сть­ян без­воз­мезд­но по­лу­чи­ли поч­ти 47 млн. га об­ра­ба­ты­вае­мой зем­ли, ра­нее при­над­ле­жав­шей по­ме­щи­кам. В аг­рар­ном сек­то­ре ста­ли вво­дить­ся про­стей­шие ви­ды про­из­водств. коо­пе­ра­ции. К кон. 1952 бы­ли ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ны 8 млн. групп взаи­мо­по­мо­щи, объ­е­ди­нив­ших ок. 40% кре­сть­ян­ских хо­зяйств.

Од­но­вре­мен­но с ли­к­ви­да­ци­ей по­ме­щичь­е­го зем­ле­вла­де­ния про­во­ди­лись др. со­ци­аль­ные пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния. Но­вый за­кон о бра­ке от 1.5.1950 за­кре­пил ра­вен­ст­во жен­щин и муж­чин в се­мей­но-брач­ных от­но­ше­ни­ях. Бы­ло при­ня­то по­ста­нов­ле­ние о ре­фор­ме сис­те­мы нар. об­ра­зо­ва­ния, на­прав­лен­ное на де­мо­кра­ти­за­цию школ и ву­зов, ли­к­ви­да­цию не­гра­мот­но­сти, соз­да­ние бла­го­при­ят­ных ус­ло­вий для под­го­тов­ки спе­циа­ли­стов из чис­ла ра­бо­чих и кре­сть­ян. Всту­пи­ло в си­лу но­вое тру­до­вое за­ко­но­да­тель­ст­во, ко­то­рое оп­ре­де­ли­ло пра­во­вое по­ло­же­ние и функ­ции проф­сою­зов, пра­ви­ла тру­до­во­го стра­хо­ва­ния на круп­ных и сред­них пред­при­яти­ях, ме­ры по борь­бе с без­ра­бо­тицей.

Су­ще­ст­вен­ные пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния про­во­ди­лись и пра­ви­тель­ст­вом Чан Кай­ши на Тай­ва­не. В 1949–53 там бы­ла про­ве­де­на в три эта­па зе­мель­ная ре­фор­ма: сни­же­на аренд­ная пла­та за зем­лю, в соб­ст­вен­ность кре­сть­я­нам пе­ре­да­на за не­зна­чит. пла­ту часть гос. зе­мель и про­ве­де­на час­тич­ная на­цио­на­ли­за­ция круп­ной зе­мель­ной соб­ст­вен­но­сти (быв. зем­ле­вла­дель­цы по­лу­чи­ли в ка­че­ст­ве ком­пен­са­ции па­ке­ты ак­ций соз­да­вае­мых на ост­ро­ве но­вых пром. пред­при­ятий). Аг­рар­ная ре­фор­ма и ши­ро­кая по­мощь США обес­пе­чи­ли бы­ст­рый подъ­ём эко­но­ми­ки Тай­ва­ня (по­лу­чил назв. «тай­вань­ско­го эко­но­мич. чу­да»), что спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло ук­ре­п­ле­нию на ост­ро­ве по­ли­тич. по­зи­ций Го­минь­да­на.

В кон­це 1953 ЦК КПК при­нял про­грамм­ный до­ку­мент «Бо­роть­ся за мо­би­ли­за­цию всех сил для пре­вра­ще­ния на­шей стра­ны в ве­ли­кое со­циа­ли­сти­че­ское го­су­дар­ст­во», оп­ре­де­ляв­ший ге­не­раль­ную ли­нию пар­тии на пе­ре­ход­ный пе­ри­од и прин­ци­пы со­циа­ли­стич. строи­тель­ст­ва в КНР, ори­ен­ти­ро­ван­ные на сов. мо­дель. Пер­во­оче­ред­ной за­да­чей объ­яв­ля­лась ин­ду­ст­риа­ли­за­ция стра­ны. На её ре­ше­ние был на­прав­лен пер­вый 5-лет­ний план (1953–57), раз­ра­бо­тан­ный при уча­стии сов. спе­циа­ли­стов. Им пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­лось уве­ли­че­ние по срав­не­нию с уров­нем 1952 ва­ло­вой про­дук­ции пром-сти (не счи­тая кус­тар­ной) на 98,3%, с. х-ва – на 23,3%. При этом гос. пром. сек­тор (осо­бен­но тя­жё­лая пром-сть) дол­жен был раз­ви­вать­ся бо­лее вы­со­ки­ми тем­па­ми. На­ме­ча­лось скон­цен­три­ро­вать осн. уси­лия на раз­ви­тии та­ких важ­ней­ших от­рас­лей, как ме­тал­лур­гия, элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ка, ав­то­мо­би­ле­строе­ние, воз­вес­ти 694 круп­ных пром. объ­ек­та, глав­ны­ми из ко­то­рых бы­ли 156 пред­при­ятий, со­ору­жав­ших­ся при со­дей­ст­вии СССР. Ин­ду­ст­риа­ли­за­цию рес­пуб­ли­ки и со­циа­ли­стич. пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния, в т. ч. в аг­рар­ном сек­то­ре, пред­по­ла­га­лось за­вер­шить к 1967.

В ию­не 1954 в КНР бы­ла про­ве­де­на адм.-терр. ре­фор­ма. Воз­ник­шее в хо­де Нар.-ос­во­бо­дит. вой­ны 1946–49 де­ле­ние К. на ре­гио­ны (Сев. К., Сев.-Вост. К., Сев.-Зап. К., Вост. К., Юго-Зап. К.; вся пол­но­та вла­сти в них фак­ти­че­ски при­над­ле­жа­ла ар­мей­ско­му ко­ман­до­ва­нию, дей­ст­во­вав­ше­му под рук. Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК) за­ме­не­но раз­де­ле­ни­ем на про­вин­ции и ав­то­ном­ные об­лас­ти. В 1955 в свя­зи с де­лом «Гао Га­на – Жао Шу­ши» (см. в ст. Гао Ган) уп­разд­не­ны так­же ре­гио­наль­ные бю­ро ЦК КПК. Эти ме­ры пре­сле­до­ва­ли цель ис­клю­чить воз­мож­ность про­яв­ле­ния се­па­ра­ти­ст­ских тен­ден­ций в рес­пуб­ли­ке и оп­по­зи­ции ме­ст­ных парт. ли­де­ров кур­су центр. ру­ко­вод­ства КПК.

На 1-й сес­сии Все­ки­тай­ско­го со­б­ра­ния нар. пред­ста­ви­те­лей (ВСНП) 20.9.1954 бы­ла при­ня­та кон­сти­ту­ция КНР, про­воз­гла­сив­шая К. гос-вом нар. де­мо­кра­тии, ру­ко­во­ди­мым ра­бо­чим клас­сом и ос­но­ван­ным на сою­зе ра­бо­чих и кре­сть­ян. Бы­ли из­бра­ны Пред. КНР (этот пост за­нял Мао Цзэ­дун) и его за­мес­ти­те­ли, По­сто­ян­ный к-т ВСНП (ПК ВСНП), ут­вер­ждён со­став Гос. со­ве­та (пра­ви­тель­ст­ва) КНР, его пре­мье­ром на­зна­чен Чжоу Энь­лай. Кон­сти­ту­ция за­кре­пи­ла курс на даль­ней­шее раз­ви­тие от­но­ше­ний друж­бы и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва КНР с СССР и стра­на­ми нар. де­мо­кра­тии.

В про­цес­се вы­пол­не­ния 1-го пя­ти­лет­не­го пла­на СССР пре­дос­та­вил КНР но­вые кре­ди­ты и по­ста­вил обо­ру­до­ва­ние на сум­му 3 млрд. руб. для строи­тель­ст­ва и ре­кон­ст­рук­ции наи­бо­лее круп­ных пром. объ­ек­тов, в т. ч. Ань­шань­ско­го, Ухань­ско­го, Бао­тоу­ско­го ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­на­тов, Чан­чунь­ско­го ав­то­мо­биль­но­го и Ло­ян­ско­го трак­тор­но­го за­во­дов, Тай­юань­ско­го и Шэнь­ян­ско­го за­во­дов тя­жё­ло­го ма­ши­но­строе­ния. СССР ока­зал со­дей­ст­вие КНР в соз­да­нии обо­рон­ной пром-сти. В К. бы­ли на­прав­ле­ны ты­сячи сов. спе­циа­ли­стов, пре­дос­тав­ле­на об­шир­ная на­уч.-тех­нич. до­ку­мен­та­ция. В ву­зах и на пред­при­яти­ях СССР по­лу­чи­ли под­го­тов­ку ты­ся­чи кит. спе­циа­ли­стов и ра­бо­чих (в 1957 в 24 сов. ву­зах обу­ча­лись св. 6 тыс. гра­ж­дан КНР). Свой вклад в ин­ду­ст­риа­ли­за­цию КНР вне­сли ГДР, Поль­ша, Че­хо­сло­ва­кия, Венг­рия, Ру­мы­ния и Бол­га­рия, по­ста­вив­шие обо­ру­до­ва­ние бо­лее чем для 100 пром. объ­ек­тов.

В 1953–56 объ­ём ва­ло­вой про­дук­ции пром-сти КНР еже­год­но уве­ли­чи­вал­ся в сред­нем на 19,6%, с. х-ва – на 4,8%. В дек. 1953 ЦК КПК по­ста­вил за­да­чу объ­е­ди­нить к 1957 в с.-х. про­из­водств. коо­пе­ра­ти­вы по­лу­со­циа­ли­стич. ти­па 20% кре­сть­ян. Од­на­ко по на­стоя­тель­ной ре­ко­мен­да­ции Мао Цзэ­ду­на (июль 1955) и в со­от­вет­ст­вии с ре­ше­ни­ем 6-го рас­ши­рен­но­го пле­ну­ма ЦК КПК 7-го со­зы­ва (10.10.1955) в це­лях пре­дот­вра­ще­ния воз­мож­но­сти рес­тав­ра­ции в аг­рар­ном сек­то­ре преж­них по­ряд­ков про­цесс коо­пе­ри­ро­ва­ния кре­сть­ян (час­то с обоб­ще­ст­в­ле­ни­ем зем­ли и ору­дий про­из-ва) был фор­си­ро­ван, и к кон. 1956 в коо­пе­ра­ти­вы бы­ло во­вле­че­но 96,3% кре­сть­ян­ских хо­зяйств, в т. ч. 87,8% – в коо­пе­ра­ти­вы выс­ше­го ти­па. Коо­пе­ри­ро­ва­ние де­рев­ни, на ко­то­рое пер­во­на­чаль­но от­во­ди­лось 18 лет, бы­ло прак­ти­че­ски за­вер­ше­но. Оно но­си­ло при­ну­дит. ха­рак­тер, вы­зы­ва­ло не­до­воль­ст­во зна­чит. час­ти кит. кре­сть­ян­ст­ва, ко­то­рое ещё боль­ше уси­ли­лось под влия­ни­ем не­уро­жа­ев в ря­де рай­онов стра­ны, обу­слов­лен­ных сти­хий­ны­ми бед­ст­вия­ми. Про­ве­де­ние ус­ко­рен­ной коо­пе­ра­ции дик­то­ва­лось так­же не­об­хо­ди­мо­стью мо­би­ли­за­ции на ну­ж­ды ин­ду­ст­риа­ли­за­ции фи­нан­со­вых средств аг­рар­но­го сек­то­ра и уве­ли­че­ния по­ста­вок то­вар­но­го зер­на и сы­рья для лёг­кой пром-сти в це­лях пре­одо­ле­ния на­пря­жён­но­го по­ло­же­ния, воз­ник­ше­го к сер. 1950-х гг. в КНР в сфе­ре снаб­же­ния на­се­ле­ния го­ро­дов про­до­воль­ст­ви­ем и то­ва­ра­ми пер­вой не­об­хо­ди­мо­сти, и не­до­пу­ще­ния на­рас­та­ния ак­ций про­тес­та в разл. рай­онах рес­пуб­ли­ки.

К кон. 1956 99% ча­ст­но­ка­пи­та­ли­стич. про­мыш­лен­ных и 82,2% тор­го­вых пред­при­ятий пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ны в сме­шан­ные, на­хо­див­шие­ся под управ­ле­ни­ем гос-ва. В коо­пе­ра­ти­вы бы­ли объ­е­ди­не­ны 91,7% ре­мес­лен­ни­ков и кус­та­рей. Гос­под­ствую­щи­ми в нар. хо­зяй­ст­ве ста­ли две фор­мы соб­ст­вен­но­сти – все­на­род­ная и кол­лек­тив­ная соб­ст­вен­ность тру­дя­щих­ся.

Оп­ре­де­лён­ные ус­пе­хи в со­циа­ли­стич. строи­тель­ст­ве по­бу­ди­ли ру­ко­во­дство КНР по ини­циа­ти­ве Чжоу Энь­лая с нач. 1956 нес­коль­ко смяг­чить по­ли­ти­ку в от­но­ше­нии ин­тел­ли­ген­ции и при­гла­сить её к от­кры­той дис­кус­сии под вы­дви­ну­тым Мао Цзэ­ду­ном ло­зун­гом «Пусть цве­тут сто цве­тов, пусть со­пер­ни­ча­ют сто школ». В апр. 1956 на рас­ши­рен­ном за­се­да­нии По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК Мао Цзэ­дун вы­сту­пил с ре­чью «О де­ся­ти важ­ней­ших взаи­мо­от­но­ше­ни­ях», в ко­то­рой обоб­щил опыт строи­тель­ст­ва со­циа­лиз­ма в К. и по­пы­тал­ся оп­ре­де­лить путь даль­ней­ше­го со­циа­ли­стич. строи­тель­ст­ва, со­от­вет­ст­вую­щий спе­ци­фич. ус­ло­ви­ям стра­ны.

В сент. 1956 со­стоя­лась 1-я сес­сия 8-го съез­да КПК. К это­му вре­ме­ни пар­тия на­счи­ты­ва­ла в сво­их ря­дах 10,73 млн. чле­нов. На ней до­ми­ни­ро­ва­ли сто­рон­ни­ки ори­ен­та­ции на сов. мо­дель раз­ви­тия. Съезд под­твер­дил курс на ук­ре­п­ле­ние друж­бы и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва КНР с СССР и др. со­циали­стич. стра­на­ми, в т. ч. в борь­бе за мир­ное со­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ние гос-в с разл. со­ци­аль­ным стро­ем. В при­ня­тых съез­дом пред­ло­же­ни­ях по 2-му пя­ти­лет­не­му пла­ну раз­ви­тия нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва (1958–62) на­ме­ча­лось уве­ли­чить пром. про­из-во вдвое по срав­не­нию с за­да­ния­ми 1-й пя­ти­лет­ки, до­бить­ся рос­та нац. до­хо­да на 50%, уве­ли­че­ния сбо­ра про­до­вольств. куль­тур со 176 млн. до 240 млн. т. Пред­по­ла­га­лось по-преж­не­му кон­цен­три­ро­вать осн. уси­лия на пре­иму­ществ. раз­ви­тии тя­жё­лой пром-сти при не­ко­то­ром уве­ли­че­нии до­ли ка­пи­та­ло­вло­же­ний в лёг­кую пром-сть. Бы­ло под­чёрк­ну­то, что в КНР бу­дут со­хра­не­ны в раз­ме­рах, до­пус­кае­мых гос. пла­ном, еди­но­лич­ные хо­зяй­ст­ва в аг­рар­ном сек­то­ре и пром-сти как до­пол­не­ние к гос. и кол­лек­тив­ной фор­мам соб­ст­вен­но­сти.

Зна­чит. влия­ние на ра­бо­ту 8-го съез­да КПК ока­за­ли ре­ше­ния 20-го съез­да КПСС, со­сто­яв­ше­го­ся в февр. 1956. Съезд при­звал ук­ре­п­лять де­мо­кра­тию и за­кон­ность, зая­вил о не­до­пус­ти­мо­сти куль­та лич­но­сти, ука­зал на не­об­хо­ди­мость со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­ния пра­во­вой ба­зы КНР и стро­го­го со­блю­де­ния со­циа­ли­стич. за­кон­но­сти. В при­ня­том съез­дом ус­та­ве пар­тии го­во­ри­лось: «КПК в сво­ей дея­тель­но­сти ру­ко­во­дству­ет­ся мар­ксиз­мом-ле­ни­низ­мом. Толь­ко мар­ксизм-ле­ни­низм пра­виль­но объ­яс­ня­ет за­ко­но­мер­но­сти раз­ви­тия об­ще­ст­ва, пра­виль­но ука­зы­ва­ет пу­ти по­строе­ния со­циа­лиз­ма и ком­му­низ­ма». Тем са­мым пе­ре­сма­т­ри­ва­лось ре­ше­ние 7-го съез­да (1945) о том, что КПК в сво­ей дея­тель­но­сти долж­на ру­ко­вод­ство­вать­ся «идея­ми Mao Цзэ­ду­на». В ус­тав вклю­че­но по­ло­же­ние о воз­мож­но­сти вве­де­ния по­ста поч. пред. ЦК КПК, что бы­ло свя­за­но с за­яв­ле­ни­ем Мао Цзэ­ду­на, вновь из­бран­но­го ру­ко­во­ди­те­лем пар­тии, о его го­тов­но­сти в под­хо­дя­щий мо­мент ос­та­вить пост парт. ли­де­ра. Об­ра­зо­ван По­сто­ян­ный к-т По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК, на пост ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря из­бран Дэн Сяо­пин.

Вен­гер­ское вос­ста­ние 1956 и по­ли­тич. кри­зис в Поль­ше в окт. 1956 спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли ук­ре­п­ле­нию в ру­ко­во­дстве КПК и КНР по­зи­ций сто­рон­ни­ков от­ка­за от сов. мо­де­ли раз­ви­тия. На 2-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 8-го со­зы­ва 15.11.1956 Мао Цзэ­дун вы­сту­пил с кри­ти­кой по­ли­ти­ки «дес­та­ли­ни­за­ции», про­во­ди­мой в СССР. 27.2.1957 в сво­ей ре­чи «О пра­виль­ном раз­ре­ше­нии про­ти­во­ре­чий внут­ри на­ро­да» он вы­дви­нул те­зис о со­хра­няю­щих­ся в ус­ло­ви­ях со­циа­лиз­ма клас­со­вых про­ти­во­ре­чи­ях, пре­ж­де все­го ме­ж­ду на­ро­дом и «вра­га­ми на­ро­да», и при­звал к об­ще­на­род­но­му об­су­ж­де­нию это­го во­про­са. Од­на­ко на­чав­шая­ся дис­кус­сия не­ожи­дан­но для парт. и гос. ру­ко­во­дства КНР при­об­ре­ла ост­рый ха­рак­тер и вы­ли­лась в ию­не 1956 в ря­де уни­вер­си­те­тов в сту­денч. бес­по­ряд­ки. В сент. 1956 в КНР име­ли ме­сто за­бас­тов­ки и вол­не­ния на пред­при­яти­ях, пре­кра­ти­ли за­ня­тия уча­щие­ся школ и сту­ден­ты в 11 про­вин­ци­ях и 2 го­ро­дах центр. под­чи­не­ния, об­ра­тив­шие­ся с пе­ти­ция­ми к гос. и парт. ру­ко­во­дству. В ус­ло­ви­ях дес­та­би­ли­за­ции внут­ри­по­ли­тич. об­ста­нов­ки дис­кус­сия по во­про­су о про­ти­во­ре­чи­ях, как и ра­нее на­ча­тая дис­кус­сия с ин­тел­ли­ген­ци­ей, бы­ли свёр­ну­ты. Ру­ко­во­дство КПК на­ча­ло по­ли­тич. кам­па­нию про­тив «пра­вых», про­дол­жав­шую­ся до вес­ны 1958, в хо­де ко­то­рой по­ли­тич. оп­по­зи­ция бы­ла по­дав­ле­на. По­сле ви­зи­та в Сов. Со­юз в но­яб. 1957 на празд­но­ва­ние 40-ле­тия Окт. ре­во­лю­ции 1917 парт.-пра­ви­тельств. де­ле­га­ции КНР во гла­ве с Мао Цзэ­ду­ном раз­но­гла­сия ме­ж­ду КПК и КПСС ещё боль­ше обо­стри­лись. «Ле­вое» кры­ло КПК ста­ло от­кры­то вы­ра­жать со­мне­ния в це­ле­со­об­раз­но­сти раз­ви­тия пар­ла­мен­та­риз­ма и де­мо­кра­тии в ус­ло­ви­ях со­циа­ли­стич. го­су­дар­ст­вен­но­сти, про­ве­де­ния по­ли­ти­ки мир­но­го со­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния, борь­бы за пре­дот­вра­ще­ние ядер­ной вой­ны и др.

Ус­пеш­ное вы­пол­не­ние за­да­ний 1-й пя­ти­лет­ки ук­ре­пи­ло убе­ж­дён­ность Мао Цзэ­ду­на и ря­да гос. и парт. ру­ко­во­ди­те­лей КНР в том, что, дви­га­ясь по спе­ци­фич. «кит. пу­ти» и ис­поль­зуя ко­манд­ные ме­то­ды, мож­но в пре­дель­но сжа­тые сро­ки за­вер­шить по­строе­ние со­циа­лиз­ма в стра­не. Под ло­зун­гом «три го­да упор­но­го тру­да – де­сять ты­сяч лет сча­стья» в КНР раз­вер­ну­лось дви­же­ние за «боль­шой ска­чок» в пром-сти и за соз­да­ние «на­род­ных ком­мун» в де­рев­не. С по­мощью по­ли­ти­ки «боль­шо­го скач­ка» при опо­ре на «нар. ком­му­ну», ко­торая бы­ла объ­яв­ле­на осн. ячей­кой со­циа­ли­стич. и ком­му­ни­стич. об­ще­ст­ва, пла­ни­ро­ва­лось в те­че­ние не­сколь­ких лет по­стро­ить в КНР раз­ви­тое со­циа­ли­стич. и да­же ком­му­ни­стич. об­ще­ст­во, обо­гнать СССР и вы­вес­ти К. в раз­ряд ве­ду­щих ин­ду­ст­ри­аль­ных дер­жав ми­ра. Эта по­ли­ти­ка по­лу­чи­ла назв. «кур­са трёх крас­ных зна­мён» (под «зна­мё­на­ми» по­ни­ма­лись но­вая ге­не­раль­ная ли­ния КПК на по­строе­ние со­циа­лиз­ма, «боль­шой ска­чок» и «нар. ком­му­ны»).

В мар­те 1958 Мао Цзэ­дун под­верг кри­ти­ке Чжоу Энь­лая и Чэнь Юня, об­ви­нив их в «про­ти­во­дей­ст­вии фор­си­ро­ва­нию тем­пов раз­ви­тия эко­но­ми­ки». В мае 1958 на 2-й сес­сии 8-го съез­да КПК бы­ла ут­вер­жде­на но­вая по­ли­тич. ус­та­нов­ка, вы­ра­жав­шая­ся в пред­ло­жен­ной Мао Цзэ­ду­ном фор­му­ле «на­пря­гая все си­лы, стре­мясь впе­рёд, стро­ить со­циа­лизм по прин­ци­пу: боль­ше, бы­ст­рее, луч­ше, эко­ном­нее». Ру­ко­во­дству­ясь ре­ше­ния­ми КПК, Гос­план КНР в ию­не – ию­ле 1958 раз­ра­бо­тал но­вый ва­ри­ант 2-го пя­ти­лет­не­го пла­на, ко­то­рый пре­ду­смат­ри­вал уве­ли­че­ние про­из-ва пром. про­дук­ции в 6,5 раза, а сель­ско­хо­зяй­ст­вен­ной – в 2,5 ра­за по срав­не­нию с 1958. Под ло­зун­гом «сталь ре­ша­ет всё» бы­ло ре­ше­но уже в 1958 уд­во­ить её вы­плав­ку, до­ве­дя до 8–12 млн. т в год, а к 1962 еже­год­но про­из­во­дить 60–80 млн. т с це­лью дог­нать и пе­ре­гнать по это­му по­ка­за­те­лю Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нию. В КНР на­ча­лась «бит­ва за сталь» – по­все­ме­ст­ное со­ору­же­ние кус­тар­ных «до­мен­ных пе­чей», ва­гра­нок. Ана­ло­гич­ный ло­зунг был вы­дви­нут и в с. х-ве – «зер­но ре­ша­ет всё», в со­от­вет­ст­вии с ко­то­рым пла­ни­ро­ва­лось мак­си­мум в те­че­ние 3–5 лет вый­ти на уро­вень по­ка­за­те­лей рос­та зер­но­во­го про­из-ва, ко­то­рые ра­нее на­ме­ча­лось дос­тиг­нуть лишь к кон. 1960-х гг. В те­че­ние не­сколь­ких ме­ся­цев 1958 740 тыс. коо­пе­ра­ти­вов пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ны поч­ти в 26 тыс. «нар. ком­мун», ко­то­рые объ­е­ди­ня­ли св. 99% кре­сть­ян­ских дво­ров. Ка­ж­дая ком­му­на по пло­ща­ди об­ра­ба­ты­вае­мой зем­ли и чис­лу ра­бо­чих рук в 20–30 раз пре­вос­хо­ди­ла преж­ние коо­пе­ра­ти­вы. Зем­ля и все сред­ст­ва про­из-ва коо­пе­ра­ти­вов, а так­же при­уса­деб­ные уча­ст­ки кре­сть­ян, их до­маш­ний скот, пти­ца, фрук­то­вые де­ре­вья, по­су­да и ут­варь пе­ре­шли в соб­ст­вен­ность ком­мун. Вме­сто рас­пре­де­ле­ния по тру­до­дням вво­ди­лось «бес­плат­ное рас­пре­де­ле­ние про­до­воль­ст­вия», без учё­та ко­ли­че­ст­ва и ка­че­ст­ва тру­да. В свя­зи с ли­к­ви­да­ци­ей лич­но­го хо­зяй­ст­ва кре­сть­ян и вве­де­ни­ем бес­плат­но­го пи­та­ния в сто­ло­вых «нар. ком­мун» бы­ли за­кры­ты рын­ки в де­рев­нях и го­ро­дах. Од­но­вре­мен­но ста­ли про­во­дить­ся мас­со­вые мо­би­ли­за­ции на­се­ле­ния на ра­бо­ты по раз­ви­тию транс­порт­ной ин­фра­струк­ту­ры стра­ны и др. «об­ществ. ра­бо­ты».

Пе­ре­ход к по­ли­ти­ке «боль­шо­го скач­ка» вы­звал дез­ор­га­ни­за­цию нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва КНР. От­вле­че­ние мил­лио­нов кре­сть­ян (по кит. оцен­кам, до 90 млн. чел.) на вы­плав­ку ста­ли, до­бы­чу кус­тар­ным спо­со­бом уг­ля, на ир­ри­гац., ка­пи­таль­ное и до­рож­ное строи­тель­ст­во на­нес­ло серь­ёз­ный ущерб с. х-ву. Бо­га­тый уро­жай 1958 был уб­ран не пол­но­стью. Рез­ко уве­ли­чи­лось на­се­ле­ние го­ро­дов (со 100 млн. до 130 млн. чел.). Это, в свою оче­редь, при­ве­ло к уве­ли­че­нию спро­са на про­дук­ты пи­та­ния в го­ро­дах и к прак­тич. ис­то­ще­нию про­до­вольств. ре­зер­вов. Уже ре­зуль­та­ты 1958, пер­во­го го­да «боль­шо­го скач­ка», сви­де­тель­ст­во­ва­ли о про­ва­ле по­ли­ти­ки ус­ко­рен­ной ин­ду­ст­риа­ли­за­ции. Сре­ди на­се­ле­ния КНР на­рас­та­ло не­до­воль­ст­во, име­ли ме­сто слу­чаи от­кры­то­го не­по­ви­но­ве­ния вла­стям. Од­на­ко ру­ко­во­дство КНР про­дол­жа­ло при­дер­жи­вать­ся «кур­са трёх крас­ных зна­мён», вне­ся в не­го на ря­де пле­ну­мов ЦК КПК в окт. 1958 – апр. 1959 не­ко­то­рые кор­рек­ти­вы. В ча­ст­но­сти, бы­ли нес­коль­ко сни­же­ны пла­но­вые за­да­ния и тем­пы фор­ми­ро­ва­ния «нар. ком­мун». 27.4.1959 на 1-й сес­сии ВСНП 2-го со­зы­ва Мао Цзэ­дун сло­жил с се­бя обя­зан­но­сти Пред. КНР, зая­вив о на­ме­ре­нии це­ли­ком со­сре­до­то­чить­ся на парт. ра­бо­те. На пост гла­вы гос-ва был из­бран Лю Шао­ци.

В ус­ло­ви­ях «боль­шо­го скач­ка» бо­лее ра­ди­каль­ным стал и внеш­не­по­ли­тич. курс ру­ко­во­дства КНР. С 23.8.1958 НОАК на­ча­ла про­из­во­дить арт. об­стре­лы при­бреж­ных ост­ро­вов Цзинь­мынь­дао (Ку­эмой) и Мац­зу­дао в Тай­вань­ском прол., на ко­то­рых бы­ла скон­цен­три­ро­ва­на 100-ты­сяч­ная груп­пи­ров­ка го­минь­да­нов­ских войск (пер­вую по­пыт­ку ов­ла­деть эти­ми ост­ро­ва­ми НОАК пред­при­ня­ла в сент. 1954). Эта ак­ция рез­ко обо­ст­ри­ла по­ло­же­ние на Даль­нем Вос­то­ке. США, за­клю­чив­шие 2.12.1954 с пра­ви­тель­ст­вом Чан Кай­ши до­го­вор о со­вме­ст­ной обо­ро­не Тай­ва­ня, при­ве­ли в пол­ную бое­вую го­тов­ность 7-й флот, со­еди­не­ния ВВС в бас­сей­не Ти­хо­го ок. и на­ча­ли пе­ре­бро­ску войск в рай­он Тай­вань­ско­го прол. Дей­ст­вия КНР не по­лу­чи­ли под­держ­ки со сто­ро­ны сов. ру­ко­во­дства. Пра­ви­тель­ст­во СССР ре­ши­тель­но вы­ска­за­лось за мир­ное уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние тай­вань­ско­го кри­зи­са. По­зи­ция Мо­ск­вы и от­каз бли­жай­ших со­юз­ни­ков США в ре­гио­не, в т. ч. Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии, под­дер­жать пла­ны на­не­се­ния во­ен. уда­ра по КНР по­зво­ли­ли пре­дот­вра­тить воз­ник­но­ве­ние круп­но­го воо­руж. кон­флик­та. 5.10.1958 НОАК вре­мен­но пре­кра­ти­ла об­стре­лы ост­ро­вов Цзинь­мынь­дао (Ку­эмой) и Ма­ц­зу­дао (впо­след­ст­вии они бы­ли во­зоб­нов­ле­ны и про­из­во­ди­лись по не­чёт­ным дням вплоть до 31.12.1979).

С окт. 1958 обо­ст­ри­лись от­но­ше­ния КНР с Ин­ди­ей, что бы­ло вы­зва­но строи­тель­ст­вом кит. сто­ро­ной стра­те­ги­че­ски важ­но­го шос­се в под­кон­троль­ном ей рай­оне Каш­ми­ра. По­сле по­дав­ле­ния кит. вла­стя­ми вспых­нув­ше­го в Ти­бе­те в мар­те 1959 вос­ста­ния ме­ст­но­го на­се­ле­ния и бег­ст­ва за ру­беж да­лай-ла­мы на­пря­жён­ность на кит.-инд. гра­ни­це пе­ре­рос­ла в воо­руж. столк­но­ве­ния (про­дол­жа­лись до кон. 1962), в ре­зуль­та­те ко­то­рых тер­ри­то­рия, кон­тро­ли­руе­мая КНР в Каш­ми­ре, зна­чи­тель­но рас­ши­ри­лась.

Из­ме­не­ния во внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ке КНР по­бу­ди­ли пра­ви­тель­ст­во СССР пе­ре­смот­реть свою по­зи­цию в во­про­се о со­дей­ст­вии Пе­ки­ну в соз­да­нии но­вей­ших ви­дов воо­ру­же­ний. 20.6.1959 оно де­нон­си­ро­ва­ло до­го­вор от 15.10.1957 о со­дей­ст­вии в раз­ра­бот­ке КНР соб­ст­вен­но­го ядер­но­го ору­жия.


Мао Цзэдун (справа) и Линь Бяо. Фото 1960-х гг.

На­рас­та­ние не­до­ве­рия к по­ли­ти­ке «боль­шо­го скач­ка» и в це­лом к кур­су по­ли­тич. ру­ко­во­дства КНР яр­ко про­яви­лось на 8-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 8-го со­зы­ва в г. Лу­шань в ию­ле – авг. 1959. С кри­ти­кой «кур­са трёх крас­ных зна­мён» вы­сту­пи­ли мин. обо­ро­ны мар­шал Пэн Дэху­ай, зам. мин. ин. дел Чжан Вэнь­тянь, зам. мин. обо­ро­ны, нач. ген­шта­ба НОАК Ху­ан Кэ­чэн, сек­ре­тарь парт­ко­ма пров. Ху­нань Чжоу Ся­оч­жоу и др. Пэн Дэху­ай и его сто­рон­ни­ки по­тре­бо­ва­ли, по су­ще­ст­ву, воз­вра­та к ли­нии 8-го съез­да пар­тии. Они оха­рак­те­ри­зо­ва­ли «боль­шой ска­чок» и «ком­му­ни­за­цию» как «мел­ко­бур­жу­аз­ный фа­на­тизм». Пэн Дэху­ай по­ста­вил во­прос о не­до­пус­ти­мо­сти под­ме­ны эко­но­мич. ра­бо­ты иг­рой в по­ли­тич. ло­зун­ги и ука­зал на на­ру­ше­ние прин­ци­па кол­ле­ги­аль­но­сти при при­ня­тии ре­ше­ний, на фор­ми­ро­ва­ние в КПК куль­та лич­но­сти Мао Цзэ­ду­на. В сво­ём пись­ме Мао Цзэ­ду­ну он вы­ра­зил со­мне­ние в со­стоя­тель­но­сти ус­та­нов­ки «по­ли­ти­ка – ко­манд­ная си­ла», зая­вив, что она «не мо­жет от­ме­нить эко­но­мич. за­ко­нов и тем бо­лее не мо­жет за­ме­нить кон­крет­ные ме­ро­прия­тия в хо­зяйств. ра­бо­те». Мао Цзэ­дун рас­це­нил это пись­мо как вы­зов, бро­шен­ный лич­но ему и ру­ко­во­дству ЦК КПК. Он об­ви­нил Пэн Дэху­ая в «пра­вом ук­ло­низ­ме» и «ко­вар­ных на­ме­ре­ни­ях» за­хва­тить ру­ко­во­д­ство пар­ти­ей. По на­стоя­нию Мао Цзэ­ду­на пле­нум при­нял «Ре­ше­ние об ан­ти­пар­тий­ной груп­пи­ров­ке, воз­глав­ляе­мой тов. Пэн Дэхуа­ем» и до­ку­мент под назв. «Бо­роть­ся про­тив пра­во­го оп­пор­ту­низ­ма, в за­щи­ту ге­не­раль­ной ли­нии пар­тии». Все «оп­по­зи­цио­не­ры» бы­ли сня­ты со сво­их долж­но­стей, мин. обо­ро­ны на­зна­чен мар­шал Линь Бяо, в НОАК на­ча­лись «чи­ст­ки» ко­манд­но­го со­ста­ва от «пра­вых ук­ло­ни­стов», пре­ж­де все­го тех, кто сим­па­ти­зи­ро­вал СССР.

В ста­тье, по­свя­щён­ной 90-ле­тию со дня ро­ж­де­ния В. И. Ле­ни­на, Мао Цзэ­дун 16.4.1960 под­верг кри­ти­ке «ре­ви­зио­ни­ст­ские тен­ден­ции» в по­ли­ти­ке КПСС и ру­ко­во­дства СССР. В КНР раз­вер­ну­лась ан­ти­со­вет­ская кам­па­ния. Од­но­вре­мен­но кит. ру­ко­во­дство вы­дви­ну­ло пре­тен­зии на часть тер­ри­то­рии СССР на Даль­нем Вос­то­ке и в Центр. Азии. С 1960 на сов.-кит. гра­ни­це уча­сти­лись её на­ру­ше­ния с кит. сто­ро­ны (в 1963 за­фик­си­ро­ва­но св. 4 тыс. та­ких на­ру­ше­ний, в них при­ня­ли уча­стие бо­лее 100 тыс. чел.). В ус­ло­ви­ях обо­ст­ре­ния сов.-кит. от­но­ше­ний, со­про­во­ж­дав­ше­го­ся так­же не­со­блю­де­ни­ем кит. сто­ро­ной ус­ло­вий дву­сто­рон­них эко­но­мич. до­го­во­ров (это от­час­ти бы­ло вы­зва­но и на­рас­та­ни­ем хао­са в нар. хо­зяй­ст­ве КНР в ре­зуль­та­те по­ли­ти­ки «боль­шо­го скач­ка»), пра­ви­тель­ст­во СССР при­ня­ло ре­ше­ние об от­зы­ве на ро­ди­ну 1290 сов. спе­циа­ли­стов, ра­бо­тав­ших на 250 объ­ек­тах КНР (вы­еха­ли из К. 28.7–1.9.1960). Бы­ли рас­торг­ну­ты 341 со­гла­ше­ние о со­труд­ни­че­ст­ве двух стран и до­пол­не­ния к этим со­гла­ше­ни­ям, фак­ти­че­ски пол­но­стью свёр­ну­ты на­уч.-тех­нич., куль­тур­ные и пр. кон­так­ты. В ито­ге удель­ный вес СССР во внеш­ней тор­гов­ле КНР со­кра­тил­ся с 50% в 1959 до 7% в 1965.

В 1960 по­ли­ти­ка «боль­шо­го скач­ка» по­ста­ви­ла кит. эко­но­ми­ку на грань кра­ха. Со­кра­ти­лось пром. про­из-во, воз­ник­ли серь­ёз­ные труд­но­сти в обес­пе­че­нии на­се­ле­ния все­ми ви­да­ми то­ва­ров, пре­ж­де все­го про­до­воль­ст­вен­ных. Уро­жай­ность зер­но­вых сни­зи­лась до уров­ня 1951. В стра­не на­чал­ся го­лод, унёс­ший жиз­ни, по разл. оцен­кам, от 10–14 до 30 млн. чел. Ру­ко­во­дство КНР бы­ло вы­ну­ж­де­но пе­ре­смот­реть эко­но­мич. стра­те­гию.

В янв. 1961 ЦК КПК при­нял по­ста­нов­ле­ние о про­ве­де­нии кур­са на «уре­гули­ро­ва­ние, ук­ре­п­ле­ние, по­пол­не­ние и по­вы­ше­ние» нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва. Бы­ли со­кра­ще­ны объ­ё­мы ка­пи­таль­но­го строи­тель­ст­ва и рас­хо­ды на не­го (с 30 млрд. до 6 млрд. юа­ней), пре­кра­ще­но со­ору­же­ние мел­ких пред­при­ятий кус­тар­но­го ти­па, мн. за­во­ды за­кры­ты ли­бо пе­ре­про­фи­ли­ро­ва­ны на вы­пуск с.-х. тех­ни­ки и ин­вен­та­ря, а так­же то­ва­ров по­все­днев­но­го спро­са. Вы­сво­бо­див­ших­ся в пром-сти ра­бо­чих в адм. по­ряд­ке пе­ре­се­ли­ли в де­рев­ни (в 1961–1963 из го­ро­дов вы­се­ле­но св. 20 млн. чел.). На­ча­лась кам­па­ния за по­вы­ше­ние ка­че­ст­ва про­дук­ции и сни­же­ние её се­бе­стои­мо­сти. Был час­тич­но вос­ста­нов­лен прин­цип ма­те­ри­аль­ной за­ин­те­ре­со­ван­но­сти и оп­ла­ты по тру­ду, вновь ста­ло прак­ти­ко­вать­ся пре­ми­ро­ва­ние, воз­ро­ж­да­лась сис­те­ма нор­ми­ро­ва­ния тру­да.

Зна­чи­тель­ной ре­ор­га­ни­за­ции под­верг­лись «нар. ком­му­ны». Ос­нов­ной про­из­водств. и хоз­рас­чёт­ной еди­ни­цей в них ста­ли бри­га­ды в со­ста­ве 10–30 дво­ров. Отд. кре­сть­ян­ский двор нёс те­перь са­мо­сто­ят. от­вет­ст­вен­ность за вы­пол­не­ние за­кре­п­лён­но­го за ним про­из­водств. за­да­ния. Кре­сть­я­нам воз­вра­ще­ны при­уса­деб­ные уча­ст­ки и до­маш­нее иму­ще­ст­во, им раз­ре­ши­ли дер­жать сви­ней и пти­цу, были ли­к­ви­ди­ро­ва­ны об­ществ. сто­ло­вые, вновь от­кры­ты рын­ки. Раз­вер­ну­лась ра­бо­та по на­ла­жи­ва­нию спе­циа­ли­за­ции и коо­пе­ри­ро­ва­ния про­из-ва, ожив­ле­нию то­вар­но-де­неж­ных от­но­ше­ний.

Це­ной гро­мад­ных уси­лий ру­ко­во­дству КНР в 1962 уда­лось пре­дот­вра­тить даль­ней­ший спад про­из-ва, улуч­шить про­до­вольств. по­ло­же­ние в стра­не. В КНР на­ча­лась реа­би­ли­та­ция кад­ро­вых ра­бот­ни­ков и чле­нов КПК, под­верг­ших­ся пре­сле­до­ва­ни­ям в пред­ше­ст­вую­щие го­ды по об­ви­не­нию в «пра­вом ук­ло­не» (бы­ли пе­ре­смот­ре­ны «де­ла» 3,6 млн. чел.).

Од­на­ко обо­ст­ре­ние внутр. раз­но­гла­сий в КПК по­бу­ди­ло Мао Цзэ­ду­на на­чать но­вую по­ли­тич. кам­па­нию под ло­зун­гом борь­бы про­тив «ре­ви­зио­низ­ма внут­ри пар­тии», за пре­дот­вра­ще­ние уг­ро­зы ка­пи­та­ли­стич. рес­тав­ра­ции и «вос­пи­та­ние ре­во­лю­ци­он­ных на­след­ни­ков». Про­ве­де­ние этой кам­па­нии (во­шла в ис­то­рию под на­зва­ния­ми кам­па­нии за «со­циа­ли­стич. вос­пи­та­ние» или «че­ты­рёх чис­ток») одоб­ре­но 20.5.1963 ре­ше­ни­ем ЦК КПК. В хо­де неё Мао Цзэ­дун рас­счи­ты­вал на­нес­ти удар по «ре­ви­зио­ни­стам» в выс­шем эше­ло­не гос. и парт. ру­ко­во­дства – ли­цам, «стоя­щим у вла­сти и иду­щим по ка­пи­та­ли­стич. пу­ти». Од­на­ко Лю Шао­ци и его сто­рон­ни­кам уда­лось на­пра­вить кам­па­нию в рус­ло борь­бы за по­вы­ше­ние дис­ци­п­ли­ны и от­вет­ст­вен­но­сти парт. ап­па­ра­та в по­все­днев­ной ра­бо­те и за уси­ле­ние влия­ния КПК на се­ле.

Плакат и дацзыбао (рукописные стенгазеты), пропагандирующие указания Мао Цзэдуна в период «культурной революции» 1966–76.

На 1-й сес­сии ВСНП 3-го со­зы­ва 21.12.1964 Мао Цзэ­дун вы­ра­зил не­удо­воль­ст­вие хо­дом кам­па­нии за «со­циа­ли­стич. вос­пи­та­ние». 13.7.1965 по его ини­циа­ти­ве был об­ра­зо­ван спец. К-т по во­про­сам куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции, в ко­то­рый во­шли ли­ца, тес­но свя­зан­ные с Мао, – его быв. сек­ре­тарь Чэнь Бо­да, же­на Цзян Цин и др.; со­вет­ни­ком груп­пы на­зна­чен Кан Шэн. В нач. 1966 во вре­мя на­хо­ж­де­ния Лю Шао­ци с офиц. ви­зи­том за ру­бе­жом от долж­но­стей был от­стра­нён ряд его еди­но­мыш­лен­ни­ков. 16.5.1966 в цир­ку­ляр­ном пись­ме ЦК КПК бы­ло объ­яв­ле­но о не­об­ходи­мо­сти про­ве­де­ния в КНР «ве­ли­кой про­ле­тар­ской куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» («куль­тур­ная ре­во­лю­ция» 1966–76), на­прав­лен­ной на унич­то­же­ние «ос­тат­ков бур­жуа­зии и феод. клас­са в пар­тии, пра­ви­тель­ст­ве и ар­мии». В дей­ст­ви­тель­но­сти речь шла о том, что­бы от­стра­нить от вла­сти сто­рон­ни­ков ре­ше­ний 8-го съез­да КПК, на­вя­зать пар­тии и стра­не схе­му раз­ви­тия в ду­хе ле­вац­ких кон­цеп­ций, сде­лать не­пре­ре­кае­мым ав­то­ри­тет Мао Цзэ­ду­на в во­про­сах гос. и парт. строи­тель­ст­ва, идео­ло­гии.

Внутр. борь­ба в КНР раз­во­ра­чи­ва­лась на фо­не всё бо­лее обо­ст­ряв­ших­ся про­ти­во­ре­чий ме­ж­ду ру­ко­во­дством КПК и КПСС. 21.2.1963 ЦК КПСС об­ра­тил­ся с пись­мом к ЦК КПК, в ко­то­ром пред­ло­жил про­вес­ти пе­ре­го­во­ры ме­ж­ду пар­тия­ми в це­лях пре­одо­ле­ния рас­хо­ж­де­ний и улуч­ше­ния дву­сто­рон­них от­ноше­ний. В от­вет­ном пись­ме ЦК КПК от 14.6.1963 в 25 пунк­тах из­ла­гал­ся осо­бый взгляд кит. ком­му­ни­стов на ге­не­раль­ную ли­нию ми­ро­во­го ком­му­ни­стич. дви­же­ния. В нём под­чёр­ки­ва­лась не­об­хо­ди­мость от­ка­за ком­му­ни­стов от по­ли­ти­ки мир­но­го со­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния, ука­зы­ва­лось на не­при­ем­ле­мость пар­ла­мент­ско­го пу­ти к со­циа­лиз­му, на оши­боч­ность те­зи­са об от­ми­ра­нии клас­со­вой борь­бы при со­циа­лиз­ме и др. Пе­ре­го­во­ры в Мо­ск­ве 5–20.7.1963 парт. де­ле­га­ций КПСС и КПК в це­лях сбли­же­ния по­зи­ций не да­ли ре­зуль­та­та и бы­ли пре­рва­ны по ини­циа­ти­ве кит. сто­ро­ны, по­сле че­го ЦК КПСС в от­кры­том пись­ме ква­ли­фи­ци­ро­вал по­зи­цию КПК как чу­ж­дую мар­ксиз­му-ле­ни­низ­му. В от­вет 14.7.1964 ру­ко­во­дство КПК опуб­ли­ко­ва­ло за­яв­ле­ние «О псев­до­ком­му­низ­ме Хру­щё­ва и ис­то­ри­че­ских уро­ках для ми­ра». Об­ви­нив СССР и КПСС в ре­визио­низ­ме, ру­ко­во­дство КПК про­воз­гла­си­ло КНР «цен­тром ми­ро­вой ре­во­лю­ции», вы­сту­пив тем са­мым от­кры­то с пре­тен­зи­ей на ли­дер­ст­во в ме­ж­ду­нар. ком­му­ни­стич. и нац.-ос­во­бо­дит. дви­же­нии. Пе­кин стал уси­лен­но про­па­ган­ди­ро­вать ло­зунг ис­кусств. «ус­ко­ре­ния» ре­во­люц. про­цес­са в стра­нах Азии, Аф­ри­ки и Лат. Аме­ри­ки и «на­род­ных войн ки­тай­ско­го ти­па». По­сле ис­пы­та­ния 16.10.1964 атом­ной бом­бы соб­ст­вен­но­го про­из-ва ру­ко­во­дство КНР ещё боль­ше дис­тан­ци­ро­ва­лось от Сов. Сою­за. Без­ре­зуль­тат­но за­кон­чи­лись на­чав­шие­ся в 1964 по пред­ло­же­нию сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва дву­сто­рон­ние кон­суль­та­ции по во­про­су об уточ­не­нии ли­нии отд. уча­ст­ков сов.-кит. гра­ни­цы (бы­ли пре­рва­ны кит. сто­ро­ной). Не по­лу­чи­ла от­кли­ка кит. ру­ко­во­дства в 1965 и ини­циа­ти­ва пра­ви­тель­ст­ва СССР про­вес­ти об­су­ж­де­ние во­про­сов нор­ма­ли­за­ции дву­сто­рон­них от­но­ше­ний и до­стичь до­го­во­рён­но­сти о со­вме­ст­ном от­по­ре аг­рес­сии США во Вьет­на­ме.

В ка­че­ст­ве гл. удар­ной си­лы «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» Мао Цзэ­дун рас­счи­ты­вал ис­поль­зо­вать «ре­во­лю­ци­он­ных на­след­ни­ков» – по­ли­ти­че­ски не­зре­лую мо­ло­дёжь, пре­ж­де все­го сту­ден­тов, уча­щих­ся, мо­ло­дых ра­бо­чих и слу­жа­щих, из ко­то­рых с на­ча­ла ле­та 1966 ста­ли фор­ми­ро­вать­ся спец. от­ря­ды хун­вей­би­нов («крас­ных ох­ран­ни­ков»), а позд­нее цзао­фа­ней («бун­тов­щи­ков»). 8.8.1966 ЦК КПК, уси­лен­ный на 11-м пле­ну­ме 8-го со­зы­ва (со­сто­ял­ся 1–12.8.1966) сто­рон­ни­ка­ми Мао Цзэ­ду­на, одоб­рил курс на про­ве­де­ние «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». 18.8.1966 Мао Цзэ­дун и Линь Бяо на мас­со­вом ми­тин­ге в Пе­ки­не при­зва­ли хун­вей­би­нов пе­рей­ти к ак­тив­ным дей­ст­ви­ям.

Ру­ко­во­дству­ясь ди­рек­ти­вой Мао Цзэ­ду­на «Огонь по шта­бам», хун­вей­би­ны на­ча­ли от­стра­нять от ра­бо­ты, а за­тем ссы­лать на «тру­до­вое пе­ре­вос­пи­та­ние» в де­рев­ню или за­клю­чать под до­маш­ний арест от­ветств. парт. ра­бот­ни­ков, гос. слу­жа­щих, пред­ста­ви­те­лей ин­тел­ли­ген­ции. Сре­ди под­верг­ших­ся пре­сле­до­ва­ни­ям – Лю Шао­ци (умер в за­клю­че­нии), Дэн Сяо­пин, 60 из 73 чле­нов ЦК КПК 8-го со­зы­ва, 60 из 115 чле­нов ПК ВСНП 3-го со­зы­ва, боль­шин­ст­во ру­ково­ди­те­лей центр. ве­домств, ме­ст­ных парт. ко­ми­те­тов и ор­га­нов вла­сти. Парт. ко­ми­те­ты и вы­бор­ные ор­га­ны вла­сти в про­вин­ци­ях и уез­дах бы­ли раз­гром­ле­ны. Пре­кра­ти­ли свою дея­тель­ность проф­сою­зы, ком­со­мол, все об­ществ. ор­га­ни­за­ции, бы­ли за­кры­ты сот­ни центр. и ме­ст­ных га­зет и жур­на­лов, шко­лы и выс­шие учеб­ные за­ве­де­ния, биб­лио­те­ки, му­зеи, те­ат­ры. Толь­ко за авг. – сент. 1966 хун­вей­би­на­ми бы­ли из­гна­ны из го­ро­дов бо­лее 397 тыс. чел., в од­ном Пе­ки­не уби­ты 1722 чел. и кон­фи­ско­ва­но иму­ще­ст­во поч­ти 37 тыс. се­мей. Жерт­ва­ми пре­сле­до­ва­ний ста­ли бо­лее 2600 дея­те­лей куль­ту­ры. Уш­ли из жиз­ни из­вест­ные пи­са­те­ли Лао Шэ и Чжао Шу­ли. В 17 про­вин­ци­ях и го­ро­дах центр. под­чи­не­ния, по офиц. кит. дан­ным, пре­сле­до­ва­ни­ям под­верг­лись св. 142 тыс. ра­бот­ни­ков сфе­ры об­ра­зо­ва­ния, 53 тыс. учё­ных, ин­же­не­ров и кон­ст­рук­то­ров. В Пе­кин­ском ун-те бы­ли до­ве­де­ны до са­мо­убий­ст­ва или по­гиб­ли от из­де­ва­тельств св. 60 пре­по­да­ва­те­лей, со­труд­ни­ков и сту­ден­тов.

Не­по­пра­ви­мый ущерб был на­не­сён куль­тур­но-ис­то­рич. дос­тоя­нию К. В авг. – сент. 1966 хун­вей­би­ны раз­ру­ши­ли 4922 из 6843 ис­то­рич. и куль­тур­ных па­мят­ни­ков Пе­ки­на. Все­го за го­ды «куль­турной ре­во­лю­ции» в КНР бы­ло унич­то­же­но св. 6 тыс. ар­хит. па­мят­ни­ков, 2,357 млн. ис­то­рич. книг, 185 тыс. кар­тин и свит­ков с кал­ли­гра­фи­ей, 538 еди­ниц др. куль­тур­ных цен­но­стей, раз­би­то бо­лее 1 тыс. стел, имев­ших ис­то­рич. цен­ность.

Бес­чин­ст­ва хун­вей­би­нов на­толк­ну­лись в ря­де мест на ак­тив­ное со­про­тив­ле­ние со сто­ро­ны на­се­ле­ния и парт. ор­га­ни­за­ций КПК. В янв. 1967 в Шан­хае на­ча­лись столк­но­ве­ния ме­ж­ду хун­вей­би­на­ми и от­ря­да­ми са­мо­обо­ро­ны, сфор­ми­ро­ван­ны­ми ме­ст­ны­ми ком­му­ни­ста­ми. По пред­при­яти­ям КНР про­ка­ти­лась вол­на за­бас­то­вок про­тес­та, гро­зив­шая при­вес­ти к дез­ор­га­ни­за­ции про­из-ва. 17.1.1967 Мао Цзэ­дун от­дал рас­по­ря­же­ние ко­ман­до­ва­нию НОАК вме­шать­ся в про­ис­хо­дя­щее на сто­ро­не «ре­во­люц. сил». Од­на­ко эф­фект от во­вле­че­ния ар­мии в по­ли­тич. борь­бу ока­зал­ся пря­мо про­ти­во­по­лож­ным. Ар­мей­ское ко­ман­до­ва­ние на мес­тах взя­ло под жё­ст­кий кон­троль хун­вей­би­нов и вме­сте с пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми «уме­рен­но­го» кры­ла пар­тии за­ня­ло ру­ко­во­дя­щие по­зи­ции в соз­дан­ных на мес­тах «рев­ко­мах». Ле­том 1967 ре­гу­ляр­ные час­ти НОАК пре­сек­ли по­пыт­ки «ле­вых» за­хва­тить власть в юж. рай­онах КНР.

Под дав­ле­ни­ем во­ен­ных, в т. ч. мар­ша­лов Чжу Дэ, Е Цзянь­и­на, Хэ Лу­на, Чэнь И, Сюй Сянц­зя­ня и др., 18.8.1967 на рас­ши­рен­ном за­се­да­нии Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК Мао Цзэ­дун, Линь Бяо и Цзян Цин при­зна­ли не­об­хо­ди­мость из­бе­гать край­но­стей в про­ве­де­нии «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». В сент. 1967 на­ча­лось вос­ста­нов­ле­ние парт. ор­га­ни­за­ций и ор­га­нов управ­ле­ния (по­след­ние фор­ми­ро­ва­лись из пред­ста­ви­те­лей ар­мии, пар­тии и об­ще­ст­вен­но­сти). 14.10.1967 от­да­но рас­по­ря­же­ние о не­мед­лен­ном во­зоб­нов­ле­нии за­ня­тий в шко­лах и ву­зах и ра­бо­ты уч­ре­ж­де­ний куль­ту­ры. 22.12.1968 Мао Цзэ­дун при­звал мо­ло­дёжь от­пра­вить­ся в де­рев­ню, что­бы по­учить­ся тру­ду у кре­сть­ян. По­сле это­го в от­да­лён­ные рай­оны К. бы­ло «ко­ман­ди­ро­ва­но» на «пе­ре­вос­пи­та­ние» св. 10 млн. мо­ло­дых лю­дей, что по­зво­ли­ло пе­ре­вес­ти «куль­тур­ную ре­во­лю­цию» в бо­лее спо­кой­ное рус­ло.

Про­шед­ший в апр. 1969 9-й съезд КПК одоб­рил курс на про­ве­де­ние «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». В осн. док­ла­де, с ко­то­рым вы­сту­пил Линь Бяо, вся ис­то­рия КПК бы­ла пред­став­ле­на как борь­ба Мао Цзэ­ду­на про­тив разл. «ук­ло­ни­стов». Съезд одоб­рил курс на «не­пре­рыв­ную ре­во­лю­цию» и на под­го­тов­ку к вой­не, а так­же при­нял но­вый ус­тав КПК, от­ме­нив­ший ре­ше­ния 8-го съез­да и вновь про­воз­гла­сив­ший идео­ло­гич. ос­но­вой пар­тии «идеи Мао Цзэ­ду­на». В ус­та­ве со­дер­жа­лось так­же по­ло­же­ние о на­зна­че­нии Линь Бяо «пре­ем­ни­ком» Мао Цзэ­ду­на. В из­бран­ном на съез­де но­вом со­ста­ве ЦК КПК и в По­лит­бю­ро до­ми­ни­рую­щие по­зи­ции за­ня­ли пред­ста­ви­те­ли ар­мей­ских кру­гов.


«Защитим горы и реки Родины». Плакат. 1969.

В ус­ло­ви­ях «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» в КНР ещё боль­ше уси­ли­лась ан­ти­со­вет­ская про­па­ган­да и ста­ли пред­при­ни­мать­ся от­кро­вен­но вра­ж­деб­ные дей­ст­вия в от­но­ше­нии СССР, его ди­пло­ма­тич. пред­ста­ви­тельств в КНР, а так­же сов. па­ро­хо­дов, по­ез­дов, са­мо­лё­тов на кит. тер­ри­то­рии. Это вы­ну­ди­ло пра­ви­тель­ст­во СССР в 1966 ото­звать сво­его по­сла из Пе­ки­на (но­вый по­сол на­зна­чен толь­ко в окт. 1970). Зна­чи­тель­но рас­ши­ри­лись мас­шта­бы на­ру­ше­ний сов.-кит. гра­ни­цы. В мар­те 1969 кит. вой­ска вторг­лись в по­гра­нич­ные рай­оны СССР на Даль­нем Вос­то­ке, а в ав­гу­сте – в Центр. Азии. В обо­их слу­ча­ях они по­лу­чи­ли ре­ши­тель­ный от­пор.

По ини­циа­ти­ве сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва 11.9.1969 со­стоя­лась встре­ча глав пра­ви­тельств СССР и КНР и вслед за этим 20.10.1969 в Пе­ки­не на­ча­лись пе­ре­го­во­ры по по­гра­нич­ным во­про­сам. Од­на­ко пред­ло­же­ния сов. сто­ро­ны по по­гра­нич­но­му уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­нию и за­клю­че­нию до­го­во­ров о не­на­па­де­нии (8.7.1970, 14.6.1973) и не­при­ме­не­нии си­лы или уг­ро­зы си­лой (15.1.1971) бы­ли от­кло­не­ны кит. ру­ко­вод­ством. В ка­че­ст­ве не­пре­мен­но­го пер­во­го ша­га к за­клю­че­нию со­гла­ше­ний Пе­кин по­тре­бо­вал под­пи­са­ния до­го­во­ра о ста­тус-кво на гра­ни­це, в ос­но­ву ко­то­ро­го по­ло­жил тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ные при­тя­за­ния к СССР в ви­де кон­цеп­ции «спор­ных рай­онов», что, в свою оче­редь, бы­ло от­верг­ну­то сов. сто­ро­ной.

В пе­ри­од «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» зна­чи­тель­но уси­ли­лось вме­ша­тель­ст­во КНР во внутр. де­ла стран «третье­го ми­ра», что при­ве­ло к обо­ст­ре­нию от­но­ше­ний со мно­ги­ми из них, вплоть до раз­ры­ва ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ний (Ин­до­не­зия, Га­на, Ту­нис и др.), и к поч­ти пол­ной ме­ж­ду­нар. изо­ля­ции Ки­тая.

По­сле 9-го съез­да в ус­ло­ви­ях на­рас­та­ния эко­но­мич. труд­но­стей и уси­ли­ваю­щей­ся ме­ж­ду­нар. изо­ля­ции КНР в КПК обо­ст­ри­лась внутр. борь­ба по клю­че­вым во­про­сам внутр. и внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ки. К ле­ту 1969 в пар­тии фак­ти­че­ски сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись две но­вые груп­пи­ров­ки. «Праг­ма­ти­ки» во гла­ве с Чжоу Энь­ла­ем, под­дер­жан­ные ча­стью во­ен­ных, на­стаи­ва­ли на реа­би­ли­та­ции парт. дея­те­лей, под­верг­ших­ся пре­сле­до­ва­ни­ям в хо­де «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции», ско­рей­шем вос­ста­нов­ле­нии парт. ор­га­ни­за­ций, по­вы­ше­нии вни­ма­ния к раз­ви­тию эко­но­ми­ки и при­ме­не­нии бо­лее ра­цио­наль­ных ме­то­дов управ­ле­ния нар. хо­зяй­ст­вом. В про­ти­во­вес им «ле­вые», воз­глав­ляе­мые Линь Бяо и так­же под­дер­жан­ные во­ен­ны­ми, про­па­ган­ди­ро­ва­ли воз­врат к по­ли­ти­ке «боль­шо­го скач­ка», но на этот раз под ру­ко­вод­ст­вом ар­мии и на ба­зе ор­га­ни­за­ции на­се­ле­ния стра­ны по во­ен. об­раз­цу. Вес­ной – ле­том 1970 сто­рон­ни­ки Линь Бяо вы­сту­пи­ли про­тив пред­ло­жен­но­го Мао Цзэ­ду­ном из­ме­не­ния кон­сти­ту­ции КНР, в ча­ст­но­сти про­тив уп­разд­не­ния по­ста Пред. КНР. Не су­мев за­вое­вать проч­ных по­зи­ций в вос­ста­нав­ли­вае­мых про­винц. ко­ми­те­тах КПК, с дек. 1970 Линь Бяо и его сто­рон­ни­ки, со­глас­но офиц. кит. вер­сии, на­ча­ли го­то­вить гос. пе­ре­во­рот с це­лью за­хва­та вла­сти и фи­зич. унич­то­же­ния Мао Цзэ­ду­на. Од­на­ко в сент. 1971 за­го­вор был рас­крыт. По со­общениям кит. властей, Линь Бяо, его же­на и сын 13.9.1971 при по­пыт­ке бег­ст­ва по­гиб­ли в авиа­ка­та­ст­ро­фе на тер­ри­то­рии Монг. Нар. Рес­пуб­лики. Вслед за этим про­шла «чи­ст­ка» в НОАК, в хо­де ко­то­рой бы­ли ре­прес­си­ро­ва­ны де­сят­ки ты­сяч офи­це­ров. За ра­бо­ту Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК с окт. 1971 стал от­ве­чать мар­шал Е Цзянь­ин. В стра­не бы­ла раз­вёр­ну­та кам­па­ния по «кри­ти­ке Линь Бяо». Влия­ние во­ен­ных в гос. и парт. ор­га­нах зна­чи­тель­но сни­зи­лось.

С раз­гро­мом «груп­пы Линь Бяо» в КПК вы­кри­стал­ли­зо­ва­лась но­вая «ле­вая» груп­пи­ров­ка, объ­е­ди­няв­шая в осн. вы­дви­жен­цев «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции», ко­то­рую воз­гла­ви­ла Цзян Цин. «Ле­вые» ак­тив­но под­дер­жа­ли на­чав­шее­ся с вес­ны 1972 вос­ста­нов­ле­ние ком­со­мо­ла, проф­со­ю­зов и ря­да др. об­ществ. ор­га­ни­за­ций, рас­счи­ты­вая сде­лать их сво­ей опо­рой. Осе­нью 1972 с одоб­ре­ния Мао Цзэ­ду­на они раз­вер­ну­ли но­вую об­ще­на­цио­наль­ную по­ли­ти­ко-идео­ло­гич. кам­па­нию «кри­ти­ки Линь Бяо и Кон­фу­ция», ко­то­рая в ре­аль­но­сти бы­ла на­прав­ле­на про­тив парт. «праг­ма­ти­ков», пре­ж­де все­го Чжоу Энь­лая, а с мар­та 1973 так­же про­тив реа­би­ли­ти­ро­ван­но­го и вос­ста­нов­лен­но­го в долж­но­сти зам. пре­мье­ра Гос. сове­та КНР Дэн Сяо­пи­на. Не­удо­воль­ст­вие «ле­вых» вы­зы­ва­ли и про­ис­хо­див­шие серь­ёз­ные из­ме­не­ния во внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ке КНР, ко­то­рые они так­же от­но­си­ли на счёт «контр­ре­во­лю­ци­он­но­го кур­са» парт. «праг­ма­ти­ков».


Встреча Р. Никсона с Мао Цзэдуном в феврале 1972.

Обо­ст­ре­ние от­но­ше­ний с СССР и на­рас­таю­щая ме­ж­ду­нар. изо­ля­ция по­бу­ди­ли кит. ру­ко­во­дство с ле­та 1969 пред­при­нять ша­ги по нор­ма­ли­за­ции от­но­ше­ний с ря­дом со­циа­ли­стич. гос-в, имев­ших раз­но­гла­сия с Сов. Сою­зом, в ча­ст­но­сти с Юго­сла­ви­ей (до это­го она под­вер­га­лась ост­рой кри­ти­ке со сто­ро­ны КПК) и Ру­мы­ни­ей. Од­но­вре­мен­но на­ча­лись амер.-кит. кон­суль­та­ции по во­про­су о раз­ви­тии дву­сто­рон­них от­но­ше­ний, в хо­де ко­то­рых кит. ру­ко­во­дство зая­ви­ло о го­тов­но­сти впредь ру­ко­во­дство­вать­ся в сво­их дей­ст­ви­ях на ми­ро­вой аре­не прин­ци­пом мир­но­го со­су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния, Ус­та­вом ООН и др. об­ще­при­ня­ты­ми ме­ж­ду­нар. нор­ма­ми, а амер. сто­ро­на со­гла­си­лась при­знать за КНР пра­во на пред­ста­ви­тель­ст­во все­го К. на ме­ж­ду­нар. аре­не. 25.10.1971 го­минь­да­нов­ская Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ка бы­ла ис­клю­че­на из ООН, её ме­сто за­ня­ла КНР. В февр. 1972 КНР по­се­тил пре­зи­дент США Р. Ник­сон; по ито­гам его пе­ре­го­во­ров с Мао Цзэ­ду­ном и Чжоу Энь­ла­ем бы­ло опуб­ли­ко­ва­но со­вме­ст­ное ком­мю­ни­ке, в ко­то­ром сто­ро­ны зая­ви­ли о на­ме­ре­нии нор­ма­ли­зо­вать от­но­ше­ния (в 1973 США и КНР об­ме­ня­лись груп­па­ми свя­зи, ко­то­рые фак­ти­че­ски име­ли пра­ва по­сольств). По­сле ви­зи­та Ник­со­на ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ния с КНР в 1972–73 ус­та­но­ви­ли Япо­ния, Ка­на­да и боль­шин­ст­во стран Зап. Ев­ро­пы. КНР вос­ста­нови­ла так­же ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ния с гос-ва­ми, с ко­то­ры­ми ра­зо­рва­ла их на­ка­ну­не и в хо­де «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». Зап.- ев­роп. стра­ны, США и Япо­ния ста­ли с нач. 1970-х гг. глав­ны­ми внеш­не­эко­но­мич. парт­нё­ра­ми КНР. Со­труд­ни­че­ст­во с ни­ми кит. ру­ко­во­дство рас­смат­ри­ва­ло в ка­че­ст­ве важ­ней­ше­го фак­то­ра мо­дер­ни­за­ции нац. эко­но­ми­ки и воо­руж. сил. Идео­ло­гич. обос­но­ва­ние но­вый внеш­не­по­ли­тич. курс КНР по­лу­чил в сфор­му­ли­ро­ван­ной ру­ко­во­дством КПК т. н. кон­цеп­ции трёх ми­ров, со­глас­но ко­то­рой «им­пе­риа­ли­стич. сверх­дер­жа­вы» СССР и США об­ра­зу­ют «пер­вый мир», раз­ви­тые гос-ва Ев­ро­пы и Азии – «вто­рой», а раз­ви­ваю­щие­ся стра­ны, к ко­то­рым от­но­сит­ся и К., – «тре­тий». Кит. ру­ко­вод­ство за­яв­ля­ло, что для про­ти­водей­ст­вия ге­ге­мо­ни­ст­ским уст­рем­ле­ни­ям сверх­дер­жав, пре­ж­де все­го СССР, не­об­хо­дим «еди­ный фронт» «вто­ро­го» и «третье­го» ми­ров. Для его соз­да­ния КНР го­то­ва со­труд­ни­чать со все­ми стра­на­ми «третье­го ми­ра», не­за­ви­си­мо от их по­ли­тич. уст­рой­ст­ва, и рас­ши­рять от­но­ше­ния с гос-ва­ми «вто­ро­го ми­ра».

Со­зван­ный в авг. 1973 10-й съезд КПК еди­но­душ­но осу­дил Линь Бяо, при­звал про­дол­жать его кри­ти­ку и при­знал пра­виль­ной ли­нию «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». Де­ле­га­ты съез­да под­дер­жа­ли те­зис Мао Цзэ­ду­на о «про­дол­же­нии ре­во­лю­ции в ус­ло­ви­ях дик­та­ту­ры про­ле­та­риа­та». На съез­де «ле­вые» до­би­лись зна­чит. ус­пе­ха: зам. пред. ЦК КПК (и тем са­мым «пре­ем­ни­ком» Мао Цзэ­ду­на) был из­бран ру­ко­во­ди­тель шан­хай­ских цзао­фа­ней Ван Хун­вэнь. С это­го мо­мен­та в По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК, как при­ня­то счи­тать, окон­ча­тель­но сфор­ми­ро­ва­лась «че­ты­рёх» груп­па (Цзян Цин, Чжан Чун­цяо, Яо Вэнь­юань, Ван Хун­вэнь), взяв­шая курс на за­хват ру­ко­во­дства пар­ти­ей.

В янв. 1975 по­сле 10-лет­не­го пе­ре­ры­ва бы­ло со­зва­но ВСНП. Нар. пред­ста­ви­те­ли при­ня­ли но­вую кон­сти­ту­цию КНР, в текст ко­то­рой бы­ло вклю­че­но боль­шин­ст­во по­ли­тич. ус­та­но­вок на­чаль­но­го пе­рио­да «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции». Ре­ше­ни­ем ВСНП был уп­разд­нён пост Пред. КНР и сфор­ми­ро­ва­ны выс­шие ор­га­ны гос. вла­сти. Пред. ПК ВСНП был из­бран мар­шал Чжу Дэ, в со­став пра­ви­тель­ст­ва во­шёл ряд сто­рон­ни­ков Цзян Цин (Кан Шэн, У Дэ и др.).

По­сле съез­да Цзян Цин и др. «ле­вые» пред­при­ня­ли по­пыт­ку до­бить­ся даль­ней­ше­го уп­ро­че­ния сво­их по­зи­ций. По со­гла­со­ва­нию с Мао Цзэ­ду­ном они раз­вер­ну­ли кам­па­нию за «изу­че­ние тео­рии дик­та­ту­ры про­ле­та­риа­та», в хо­де ко­то­рой рас­пре­де­ле­ние по тру­ду, пра­во на при­уса­деб­ные уча­ст­ки, то­вар­но-де­неж­ные от­но­ше­ния бы­ли объ­яв­ле­ны «бур­жу­аз­ны­ми» и под­ле­жа­щи­ми ог­ра­ни­че­нию. От­кры­той кри­ти­ке под­верг­лись Чжоу Энь­лай, Дэн Сяо­пин, Чэнь Юнь и др., ко­то­рым ин­кри­ми­ни­ро­ва­лось стрем­ле­ние вер­нуть К. на ка­пи­та­ли­стич. путь раз­ви­тия. Уси­ле­ние влия­ния «ле­вых», про­па­ган­ди­ро­вав­ших вве­де­ние урав­ни­лов­ки и воз­врат к по­ли­тич. ме­то­дам ру­ко­вод­ства эко­но­ми­кой, вы­зва­ло не­га­тив­ную ре­ак­цию в кит. об­ще­ст­ве. В апр. 1976, во вре­мя це­ре­мо­нии, по­свя­щён­ной па­мя­ти Чжоу Энь­лая (скон­чал­ся 8.1.1976), на гл. пло­ща­ди Пе­ки­на – Тянь­ань­мынь про­изош­ли мас­со­вые вы­сту­п­ле­ния, уча­ст­ни­ки ко­то­рых осу­ди­ли дея­тель­ность Цзян Цин и её сто­рон­ни­ков и по­тре­бо­ва­ли их от­став­ки (см. Тянь­ань­мынь­ские со­бы­тия 1976 и 1989). Вы­сту­п­ле­ние «оп­по­зи­цио­не­ров» груп­па «че­ты­рёх» ис­поль­зо­ва­ла в сво­их ин­те­ре­сах. По ука­за­нию Мао Цзэ­ду­на по­сле тянь­ань­мынь­ских со­бы­тий Дэн Сяо­пин был снят со всех по­стов, пре­мье­ром Гос. со­ве­та ут­вер­ждён мин. об­ществ. безо­пас­но­сти Хуа Го­фэн.

Китай во 2-й пол. 1970-х – нач. 1990-х гг.

9.9.1976 скон­чал­ся Мао Цзэ­дун. Это со­бы­тие ста­ло важ­ным ру­бе­жом в раз­ви­тии КНР. Влия­ние «ле­вых», поль­зо­вав­ших­ся его по­кро­ви­тель­ст­вом, на­ча­ло бы­ст­ро сни­жать­ся. 7.10.1976 По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК из­бра­ло но­вым пред. ЦК КПК Хуа Го­фэ­на, в тот же день Цзян Цин и её сто­рон­ни­ки бы­ли аре­сто­ва­ны (осу­ж­де­ны в 1981). Опи­ра­ясь на ор­га­ны об­ществ. безо­пас­но­сти и ар­мию, но­вое ру­ко­во­дство бы­ст­ро сло­ми­ло со­про­тив­ле­ние «ле­вых» в цен­тре и на мес­тах. На про­шед­шем 12–18.8.1977 вне­оче­ред­ном, 11-м съез­де КПК пред­ста­ви­те­ли «ле­вых» бы­ли офи­ци­аль­но ис­клю­че­ны из всех парт. ор­га­нов. Съезд из­брал од­ним из за­мес­ти­те­лей пред. ЦК КПК реа­би­ли­ти­ро­ван­но­го не­за­дол­го до это­го Дэн Сяо­пи­на. Бы­ло объ­яв­ле­но о за­вер­ше­нии «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции», при­нят но­вый ус­тав пар­тии, вос­про­из­во­див­ший осн. по­ло­же­ния ус­та­ва 1956 и ори­ен­ти­ро­вав­ший на раз­ви­тие прин­ци­па кол­лек­тив­но­го ру­ко­во­дства, ук­ре­п­ле­ние парт. дис­ци­п­ли­ны и внут­ри­пар­тий­но­го кон­тро­ля.

Про­шед­шая в февр. – мар­те 1978 1-я сес­сия ВСНП 5-го со­зы­ва под­дер­жа­ла пер­со­наль­ные из­ме­не­ния в со­ста­ве парт. и гос. ру­ко­во­дства КНР и ут­вер­ди­ла Хуа Го­фэ­на в долж­но­сти премье­ра Гос. со­ве­та. 5.3.1978 ВСНП одоб­ри­ло «но­вую кон­сти­ту­цию на но­вую де­ка­ду раз­ви­тия», при­ня­ло ре­ше­ние о воз­ло­же­нии обя­зан­но­стей Вер­хов­но­го глав­но­ко­ман­дую­ще­го НОАК на Хуа Го­фэ­на, из­бра­ло пред. ПК ВСНП Е Цзянь­и­на (вме­сто Чжу Дэ, умер­ше­го 6.7.1976). Сес­сия ВСНП вы­ска­за­лась в под­держ­ку кур­са по на­ве­дению по­ряд­ка в эко­но­ми­ке, за пе­ре­вод все­го хо­зяй­ст­ва на рель­сы пла­но­мер­но­го, про­пор­цио­наль­но­го и ус­ко­рен­но­го раз­ви­тия. Подъ­ём эко­но­ми­ки оп­ре­де­лял­ся в ка­че­ст­ве пер­во­оче­ред­ной за­да­чи, по­сколь­ку в ре­зуль­та­те «куль­тур­ной ре­волю­ции» нар. хо­зяй­ст­во КНР при­шло в пол­ный упа­док. Рез­ко со­кра­ти­лись вы­плав­ка ста­ли, до­бы­ча уг­ля, вы­ра­бот­ка элек­тро­энер­гии. Упал и без то­го не­вы­со­кий жиз­нен­ный уро­вень гор. на­се­ле­ния. От го­ло­да в стра­не сис­те­ма­ти­че­ски стра­да­ли жи­те­ли сель­ских рай­онов, со­став­ляв­шие 3/4 нас. стра­ны, по про­из-ву пром. то­ва­ров и про­до­воль­ст­вия на ду­шу на­се­ле­ния КНР ока­за­лась на по­след­них мес­тах в ми­ре.

На про­шед­шем в дек. 1978 3-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 11-го со­зы­ва бы­ла одоб­ре­на ли­ния на ко­рен­ное пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ние эко­но­ми­ки КНР, в ос­но­ву ко­то­рой был по­ло­жен ло­зунг об осу­ще­ст­в­ле­нии к 2000 «че­ты­рёх мо­дер­ни­за­ций» (пром-сти, с. х-ва, обо­ро­ны, нау­ки и тех­ни­ки), при­зван­ных обес­пе­чить бы­строе по­сту­па­тель­ное раз­ви­тие стра­ны и ук­ре­п­ле­ние её обо­рон­но­го по­тен­циа­ла. С этой це­лью пла­ни­ро­ва­лось пре­ж­де все­го ре­фор­ми­ро­вать сис­те­му хо­зяйств. управ­ле­ния, пе­ре­смот­реть от­но­ше­ние к на­уч.-тех­нич. ин­тел­ли­ген­ции, ши­ро­ко от­крыть КНР внеш­не­му ми­ру в це­лях при­вле­че­ния иностр. ин­ве­сти­ций, соз­да­ния сов­ме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий, ос­на­ще­ния кит. за­во­дов и фаб­рик совр. обо­ру­до­ва­ни­ем и вне­дре­ния но­вей­ших тех­но­ло­гий. Зна­чит. вни­ма­ние пред­по­ла­га­лось уде­лить обес­пе­че­нию сба­лан­си­ро­ван­но­го раз­ви­тия с. х-ва и пром-сти, тя­жё­лой и лёг­кой пром-сти, подъ­ё­му про­из-ва на мес­тах. На­ря­ду с на­ве­де­ни­ем по­ряд­ка в управ­ле­нии эко­но­ми­кой пле­нум ЦК КПК при­звал по­сте­пен­но вво­дить прин­цип ма­те­ри­аль­но­го сти­му­ли­ро­ва­ния ра­бот­ни­ков, пре­дос­тав­лять гос. пред­при­яти­ям бóльшую са­мо­стоя­тель­ность в при­ня­тии ре­ше­ний, раз­ви­вать ча­ст­ную ини­циа­ти­ву в аг­рар­ном сек­то­ре в ви­де се­мей­но­го под­ря­да. При осу­ще­ст­в­ле­нии всех этих ме­ро­прия­тий, как бы­ло под­чёрк­ну­то Дэн Сяо­пи­ном на со­сто­яв­шем­ся в нач. 1979 со­ве­ща­нии по идей­но-по­ли­тич. ра­бо­те, пла­ни­ро­ва­лось при­дер­жи­вать­ся «че­ты­рёх ос­но­во­по­ла­гаю­щих прин­ци­пов» (со­хра­не­ние со­циа­ли­стич. пу­ти раз­ви­тия, осу­ще­ст­в­ле­ние дик­та­ту­ры про­ле­та­риа­та, ук­ре­п­ле­ние ру­ко­во­дя­щей ро­ли КПК и твёр­дое сле­дова­ние «мар­ксиз­му-ле­ни­низ­му и иде­ям Мао Цзэ­ду­на»).

Пер­вые ша­ги по ре­фор­ми­ро­ва­нию бы­ли сде­ла­ны в 1979. Од­на­ко воз­мож­но­сти обес­пе­че­ния эко­но­мич. рос­та пу­тём ис­поль­зо­ва­ния адм. мер и на­ве­де­ния эле­мен­тар­но­го по­ряд­ка в дея­тель­но­сти хо­зяй­ст­вую­щих субъ­ек­тов очень бы­ст­ро ис­чер­па­ли се­бя. Эко­но­ми­ка КНР столк­ну­лась с не­хват­кой то­п­ли­ва, элек­тро­энер­гии, сы­рья, транс­порт­ны­ми про­бле­ма­ми, а так­же с со­про­тив­ле­ни­ем кур­су ре­форм со сто­ро­ны час­ти парт. ру­ко­во­ди­те­лей и функ­цио­не­ров, тре­бо­вав­ших не­укос­ни­тель­но сле­до­вать «иде­ям Мао Цзэ­ду­на» и ква­ли­фи­ци­ро­вав­ших на­ме­чен­ные пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ния как «пра­вый ук­лон». В свя­зи с этим ру­ко­во­дство КНР при­ня­ло ре­ше­ние о врем. при­ос­та­нов­ке ре­форм и про­ве­де­нии в те­че­ние трёх лет (до 1982) кур­са на «уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва». Это ре­ше­ние бы­ло одоб­ре­но в мар­те 1979 2-й сес­си­ей ВСНП 5-го со­зы­ва.


Ху Яобан (справа) и Дэн Сяопин на трибуне принимают парад частей Народно-освободительной армии Китая после манёвров в Северном Китае. 1981.

В по­сле­дую­щие го­ды в ру­ко­во­дстве КПК раз­вер­ну­лась ост­рая борь­ба, ко­то­рая за­вер­ши­лась по­бе­дой сто­рон­ни­ков кур­са ре­форм. На 5-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 11-го со­зы­ва 23–29.2.1980 из со­ста­ва По­сто­ян­но­го к-та По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК бы­ли ис­клю­че­ны 4 ста­рых спод­виж­ни­ка Мао Цзэ­ду­на (Ван Дун­син, Чэнь Си­лянь, У Дэ, Цзи Дэн­куй) и вклю­че­ны сто­рон­ни­ки Дэн Сяо­пи­на, в т. ч. Чжао Цзы­ян и Ху Яо­бан. По­след­ний был из­бран ге­не­раль­ным сек­ре­та­рём вос­соз­дан­но­го сек­ре­та­риа­та ЦК КПК. На 3-й сес­сии ВСНП 5-го со­зы­ва (30.8–10.9.1980) Хуа Го­фэн, об­ви­нён­ный в по­го­не за ду­ты­ми по­ка­за­те­ля­ми и по­пыт­ке осу­ще­ствить «но­вый боль­шой ска­чок», сло­жил с се­бя обя­зан­но­сти пре­мье­ра Гос. со­ве­та (этот пост за­нял Чжао Цзы­ян), а на 6-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 11-го со­зы­ва (27–29.6.1981) он по­дал так­же в от­став­ку с по­стов пред. ЦК КПК и пред. Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК. На эти долж­но­сти бы­ли на­зна­че­ны со­от­вет­ст­вен­но Ху Яо­бан и Дэн Сяо­пин.

Ук­ре­п­ле­ние в парт. и гос. ру­ко­во­дстве по­зи­ций сто­рон­ни­ков мо­дер­ни­за­ции по­зво­ли­ло на 12-м съез­де КПК, про­шед­шем 1–11.9.1982, дать ре­аль­ный старт ре­фор­мам. Съезд одоб­рил про­ект но­во­го ус­та­ва пар­тии и уп­разд­нил пост пред. ЦК КПК; ру­ко­во­дство пар­ти­ей бы­ло воз­ло­же­но на ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК, в этой долж­но­сти де­ле­га­ты ут­вер­ди­ли Ху Яо­ба­на. В сво­ём от­чёт­ном док­ла­де он сфор­му­ли­ро­вал ге­не­раль­ную за­да­чу КПК на пе­ри­од до 2000: «По­сте­пен­но осу­ще­ст­вить мо­дер­ни­за­цию пром-сти, с. х-ва, нац. обо­ро­ны, нау­ки и тех­ни­ки и пре­вра­тить стра­ну в со­циа­ли­стич. гос-во с вы­со­ко­раз­ви­ты­ми куль­ту­рой и де­мо­кра­ти­ей». Гл. це­лью про­воз­гла­ша­лось 4-крат­ное уве­ли­че­ние до кон­ца сто­ле­тия го­до­во­го про­из-ва пром. и с.-х. про­дук­ции. Под­чёр­ки­ва­лась ве­ду­щая роль гос. сек­то­ра эко­но­ми­ки, при­ори­тет пла­но­во­го хо­зяй­ст­ва, а ры­ноч­но­му ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­нию от­во­ди­лась вспо­мо­гат. роль. Подъ­ём про­из-ва дол­жен был обес­пе­чить по­этап­ный рост бла­го­сос­тоя­ния на­се­ле­ния КНР. Дэн Сяо­пин по­ла­гал, что для по­вы­ше­ния жиз­нен­но­го уров­ня жи­те­лей К. по­тре­бу­ет­ся не ме­нее 70 лет: в 1980-х гг. бу­дет дос­тиг­нут уро­вень «вэнь бао» («обес­пе­че­ние одеж­дой и пи­щей»), к кон. 1990-х гг. – уро­вень «сяо кан» («скром­ный дос­та­ток») и лишь к 2050 – уро­вень за­жи­точ­но­сти. При этом на пу­ти к ре­ше­нию про­бле­мы подъ­ё­ма бла­го­состоя­ния на­се­ле­ния Дэн Сяо­пин, а вслед за ним и др. ру­ко­во­ди­те­ли КНР ре­ши­тель­но по­ры­ва­ли с урав­ни­лов­кой про­шлых лет и про­воз­гла­ша­ли прин­цип: «Пусть сна­ча­ла обо­га­тит­ся часть лю­дей, часть ре­гио­нов, что­бы за­тем при­вес­ти весь на­род к изо­би­лию».

На 5-й сес­сии ВСНП 5-го со­зы­ва, со­сто­яв­шей­ся по­сле 12-го съез­да КПК, бы­ла ут­вер­жде­на но­вая Кон­сти­ту­ция КНР (26.11.1982), а на 1-й сес­сии ВСНП 6-го со­зы­ва 18.6.1983 вос­ста­нов­лен пост Пред. КНР, ко­то­рый за­нял быв. зам. премье­ра Гос. со­ве­та Ли Сянь­нянь.

В це­лях вы­пол­не­ния ре­ше­ний 12-го съез­да КПК уже в 1982 бы­ли пол­но­стью от­ме­не­ны по­ли­тич. ог­ра­ни­че­ния се­мей­но­го под­ря­да в с. х-ве. В окт. 1983 ЦК КПК и Гос. со­вет об­на­ро­до­ва­ли со­вме­ст­ное «Рас­по­ря­же­ние о вы­де­ле­нии ор­га­нов вла­сти из струк­ту­ры на­род­ных ком­мун и уч­ре­ж­де­нии во­ло­ст­ных ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­тив­ных ор­га­нов». К кон. 1984 фор­ми­ро­ва­ние но­вых ор­га­нов вла­сти на се­ле бы­ло прак­ти­че­ски пол­но­стью за­вер­ше­но. Воз­ник­ло св. 91 тыс. во­ло­ст­ных (по­сел­ко­вых) пра­ви­тельств, 926 тыс. ко­ми­те­тов сель­ских жи­те­лей. Сис­те­ма «нар. ком­мун» пре­кра­ти­ла своё су­ще­ст­во­ва­ние.

Бла­го­да­ря ли­к­ви­да­ции «нар. ком­мун» и за­ме­не её сис­те­мой се­мей­но­го под­ря­да (в 1984 его срок был про­длён с 3–5 до 15 лет) и еди­ной кол­лек­тив­ной соб­ст­вен­но­стью на зем­лю кит. кре­сть­ян­ст­во (на тот мо­мент ок. 800 млн. чел.) по­лу­чи­ло воз­мож­ность сво­бод­но за­ни­мать­ся с.-х. тру­дом. В це­лях до­пол­нит. сти­му­ли­ро­ва­ния раз­ви­тия аг­рар­но­го сек­то­ра пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР в це­лом от­ме­ни­ло сис­те­му гос. за­го­то­вок, ос­во­бо­ди­ло це­ны на боль­шин­ст­во ви­дов с.-х. про­дук­ции. Все эти ме­ры да­ли бы­ст­рый ре­зуль­тат. Уже в 1984 про­из-во зер­но­вых в К. уве­ли­чилось на 5,2%, со­ста­вив 407,3 млн. т. Сред­не­ду­ше­вое про­из-во зер­но­вых дос­тиг­ло поч­ти 400 кг в год, что по­зво­ли­ло снять про­бле­му обес­пе­че­ния на­се­ле­ния осн. ви­да­ми про­до­воль­ст­вия. В КНР за всё вре­мя её су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния впер­вые воз­ник­ла си­туа­ция, ко­гда пред­ло­же­ние зер­на и хлоп­ка пре­вы­си­ло внутр. спрос, воз­ник­ли из­лиш­ки то­вар­ной про­дук­ции.

Од­на­ко в сфе­ре пром. про­из-ва су­ще­ст­вен­ных сдви­гов в 1982–85 не про­изош­ло. На­толк­ну­лась на труд­но­сти так­же ре­фор­ма сис­те­мы цен, по­сколь­ку ка­са­лась лишь уз­ко­го сег­мен­та – про­дук­ции с. х-ва и ус­луг транс­пор­та. Про­бук­сов­ка ре­фор­мы в пром-сти ста­ла при­чи­ной при­ня­тия в окт. 1984 3-м пле­ну­мом ЦК КПК 12-го со­зы­ва «По­ста­нов­ле­ния о ре­фор­ме эко­но­мич. сис­те­мы» и ре­ше­ний по эко­но­мич. во­про­сам, сфор­му­ли­ро­ван­ных в мар­те 1985 на 3-й сес­сии ВСНП 6-го со­зы­ва. Ру­ко­во­дство КНР взя­ло курс на за­ме­ну «око­сте­нев­ше­го ме­ха­низ­ма ко­манд­но-цен­тра­ли­зо­ван­ной эко­но­ми­ки» «жиз­не­спо­соб­ной сис­те­мой со­циа­ли­стич. то­вар­но­го хо­зяй­ст­ва». Этот курс пред­по­ла­гал: 1) пре­вра­ще­ние ни­зо­вых субъ­ек­тов эко­но­мич. дея­тель­но­сти (в пер­вую оче­редь кре­сть­ян­ских хо­зяйств и гос. пром. пред­при­ятий) в са­мо­сто­ят. то­ва­ро­про­из­во­ди­те­лей и пе­ре­вод их на са­мо­оку­пае­мость; 2) соз­да­ние (при со­хра­не­нии пла­но­вых на­чал) раз­ви­той ры­ноч­ной сис­те­мы, вклю­чаю­щей рын­ки то­ва­ров, ка­пи­та­лов, ра­бо­чей си­лы, а так­же пра­во от­но­си­тель­но сво­бод­но­го поль­зо­ва­ния зем­лёй; 3) фор­ми­ро­ва­ние аде­к­ват­ной ры­ноч­ным ин­сти­ту­там сис­те­мы мак­ро­эко­но­мич. кон­тро­ля и ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния, в т. ч. соз­да­ние совр. на­ло­го­вой, бюд­жет­ной и бан­ков­ской сис­тем. В со­от­вет­ст­вии с прин­ци­пом «чжуа да фан сяо» («дер­жать в ру­ках круп­ные пред­при­ятия, от­пус­тить мел­кие») бы­ло ре­ше­но пре­дос­та­вить мн. гос. пред­при­яти­ям пра­во из­ме­нить не толь­ко ме­ха­низм хо­зяй­ст­во­ва­ния, но и фор­му соб­ст­вен­но­сти, что по­зво­ля­ло гос-ву со­сре­до­то­чить си­лы на мо­дер­ни­за­ции и по­вы­ше­нии эф­фек­тив­но­сти клю­че­вых для эко­но­ми­ки КНР пред­при­ятий.

Важ­ное зна­че­ние в рам­ках эко­но­мич. ре­фор­мы от­во­ди­лось соз­да­нию «спец. эко­но­мич. зон» (на­ча­ли фор­ми­ро­вать­ся с 1979), от­кры­тых для ме­ж­ду­нар. тор­гов­ли. Пер­во­на­чаль­но ими бы­ли объ­яв­ле­ны го­ро­да Шэнь­чжэнь, Чжу­хай, Ся­мынь и Шань­тоу. В даль­ней­шем 14 при­мор­ских го­ро­дов, 4 райо­на в усть­ях рек Янц­зы и Чжуз­цян, юго-вост. часть пров. Фуц­зянь, ре­ги­он, при­ле­гаю­щий к зал. Бо­хай­вань, и о. Хай­нань по­лу­чили ста­тус «от­кры­тых эко­но­мич. зон». Всем этим го­ро­дам и ре­гио­нам пре­дос­тав­ля­лись разл. ин­ве­стиц. и на­ло­го­вые льго­ты, при­зван­ные обес­пе­чить при­вле­че­ние иностр. ка­пи­та­ла, а вме­сте с ним вне­дре­ние но­вей­ших тех­но­ло­гий и ме­то­дов управ­ле­ния про­из­вод­ст­вом.

Про­ве­де­ние эко­но­мич. ре­фор­мы по­тре­бо­ва­ло серь­ёз­ной кад­ро­вой пе­ре­строй­ки КПК, по­сколь­ку часть чле­нов пар­тии не под­дер­жи­ва­ла но­вый курс ру­ко­во­дства, за­ни­ма­ла пас­сив­ные по­зи­ции ли­бо не име­ла ква­ли­фи­ка­ции, не­об­хо­ди­мой для ра­бо­ты в но­вых ус­ло­ви­ях. В этой си­туа­ции 2-й пле­нум ЦК КПК 12-го со­зы­ва в окт. 1983 при­нял ре­ше­ние «об упо­ря­до­че­нии» пар­тии – омо­ло­же­нии её ру­ко­во­дя­ще­го зве­на, очи­ще­нии парт. ря­дов от пас­сив­ных и чу­ж­дых эле­мен­тов, идео­ло­гич. вос­пи­та­нии.

В со­от­вет­ст­вии с ус­та­нов­лен­ны­ми нор­ма­ми ро­та­ции к кон. 1984 ок. 900 тыс., к кон. 1986 – 1,37 млн. кад­ро­вых ра­бот­ни­ков с до­ре­во­люц. парт. ста­жем бы­ли ос­во­бо­ж­де­ны от ру­ко­во­дя­щих гос. и парт. долж­но­стей, что прак­ти­че­ски уст­ра­ни­ло ра­нее су­ще­ст­во­вав­шую сис­те­му по­жиз­нен­но­го на­зна­че­ния. На 4-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 12-го со­зы­ва в сент. 1985 в от­став­ку бы­ли от­прав­ле­ны ве­те­ра­ны ре­во­люц. дви­же­ния, вхо­див­шие в со­став ЦК КПК и др. ор­га­нов, – 131 чел., в т. ч. Е Цзянь­ин, Дэн Ин­чао, Не Жун­чжэнь. В ре­зуль­та­те это­го ЦК КПК об­но­вил­ся на 20%, По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК – на 40%.

Ре­ши­тель­ная борь­ба бы­ла раз­вёр­ну­та про­тив про­явив­ших­ся в ус­ло­ви­ях пе­ре­хо­да к но­вым ме­то­дам хо­зяй­ст­во­ва­ния не­га­тив­ных яв­ле­ний сре­ди чле­нов пар­тии (по­го­ня за на­жи­вой, хо­зяйств. пре­сту­п­ле­ния, кор­руп­ция, на­ру­ше­ния парт. дис­ци­п­ли­ны и за­ко­нов стра­ны). В 1982–1986 Ко­мис­сия ЦК КПК по про­вер­ке дис­ци­п­ли­ны рас­смот­ре­ла 76613 дел и ис­клю­чи­ла из пар­тии за разл. на­ру­ше­ния 15598 чел. Рост не­га­тив­ных яв­ле­ний ру­ко­во­дство КПК рас­смат­ри­ва­ло не толь­ко как ре­зуль­тат эко­но­мич. пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ний, но и как след­ст­вие рас­ши­ре­ния кон­так­тов с ка­пи­та­ли­стич. стра­на­ми. По­это­му, вы­сту­пая за эко­но­мич. ли­бе­ра­ли­за­цию, оно од­но­вре­мен­но взя­ло курс на борь­бу с бур­жу­аз­ным влия­ни­ем в идео­ло­гич. и куль­тур­ной сфе­рах, ве­ду­щим к «ду­хов­но­му за­гряз­не­нию» КНР.

Наи­бо­лее опас­ной счи­та­лась «тен­ден­ция к бур­жу­аз­ной ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ции» в по­ли­тич. сфе­ре. Ре­ши­тель­ным про­тив­ни­ком ка­ких бы то ни бы­ло ус­ту­пок «бур­жу­аз­ной де­мо­кра­тии» был Дэн Сяо­пин, счи­тав­ший не­при­ем­ле­мы­ми для КНР прин­ци­пы мно­го­пар­тий­но­сти и раз­де­ле­ния пред­ста­вит., ис­пол­нит. и су­деб­ной вла­стей в том ви­де, в ка­ком они су­ще­ст­ву­ют на За­па­де, и тре­бо­вав­ший не­укос­ни­тель­но­го со­блю­де­ния «че­ты­рёх ос­но­во­по­ла­гаю­щих прин­ци­пов», сфор­му­ли­ро­ван­ных в 1979. В то же вре­мя Ху Яобан и Чжао Цзы­ян, учи­ты­вая на­строе­ния в сре­де кит. мо­ло­дё­жи, с кон. 1970-х гг. не­од­но­крат­но об­ра­щав­шей­ся к парт. и гос. ру­ко­во­дству с при­зы­ва­ми о рас­ши­ре­нии гражд. прав, про­яв­ля­ли го­тов­ность к оп­ре­де­лён­ной де­мо­кра­ти­за­ции по­ли­тич. сис­те­мы КНР. Раз­вер­нув­шая­ся с ле­та 1986 дис­кус­сия о по­ли­тич. ре­фор­ме ста­ра­ния­ми про­тив­ни­ков «бур­жу­аз­ной ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ции» бы­ла све­де­на к во­про­су о пре­одо­ле­нии чрез­мер­ной цен­тра­ли­за­ции вла­сти, ре­ор­га­ни­за­ции управ­ленч. ап­па­ра­та и со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­нии сис­те­мы под­го­тов­ки кад­ро­вых ра­бот­ни­ков. Не был ре­шён и во­прос о вос­ста­нов­ле­нии не во­шед­ше­го в Кон­сти­ту­цию 1982 пунк­та о пра­ве кит. гра­ж­дан на за­бас­тов­ку.

Фак­ти­че­ский от­каз гос. и парт. ру­ко­вод­ства КНР от де­мо­кра­ти­за­ции по­ли­тич. жиз­ни стал при­чи­ной мас­со­вых вы­сту­п­ле­ний сту­ден­тов и мо­ло­дё­жи в Шан­хае 20–22.12.1986 и в 20 др. го­ро­дах; в ря­де мест сту­ден­тов под­дер­жа­ли ра­бо­чие. В це­лях пре­се­че­ния но­вых вы­сту­п­ле­ний мо­ло­дё­жи вла­сти КНР 25.12.1986 при­ня­ли «По­ло­же­ния об улич­ных ше­ст­ви­ях и де­мон­ст­ра­ци­ях», неск. де­сят­ков ты­сяч уча­ст­ни­ков вы­сту­п­ле­ний на­прав­ле­ны на ис­пра­вит. ра­бо­ты. На со­сто­яв­шем­ся 16.1.1987 за­се­да­нии По­лит­бю­ро ЦК КПК от­вет­ст­вен­ность за сту­денч. вол­не­ния бы­ла воз­ло­же­на на Ху Яо­ба­на, об­ви­нён­но­го в «край­не мяг­ком от­но­ше­нии к бур­жу­аз­ной ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ции», «на­ру­ше­нии прин­ци­па кол­лек­тив­но­го ру­ко­во­дства», «пре­неб­ре­же­нии парт. ре­ко­мен­да­ция­ми» и пр. Ху Яо­бан был вы­ну­ж­ден ос­та­вить пост ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК, ко­то­рый за­нял Чжао Цзы­ян. Парт. ру­ко­во­дство сфор­ми­ро­ва­ло спец. груп­пу по борь­бе с «бур­жу­аз­ной ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ци­ей».

Со­сто­яв­ший­ся 25.10–1.11.1987 13-й съезд КПК под­вёл ито­ги раз­ви­тия КНР с 1982. Съезд от­ме­тил, что про­шед­шее пя­ти­ле­тие бы­ло «пе­рио­дом наи­бо­лее бы­ст­ро­го рос­та эко­но­мич. мо­щи стра­ны со вре­ме­ни об­ра­зо­ва­ния КНР». Сред­не­го­до­вой при­рост ВНП со­ста­вил 11,1%, умень­ши­лись дис­про­пор­ции в нар. хо­зяй­ст­ве, прак­ти­че­ски всё на­се­ле­ние бы­ло обес­пе­че­но пи­та­ни­ем и оде­ж­дой. В про­ти­во­вес бы­то­вав­ше­му ра­нее в КПК пред­став­ле­нию о воз­мож­но­сти бы­ст­ро­го по­строе­ния со­циа­лиз­ма съезд за­клю­чил, что пе­ри­од со­циа­ли­стич. строи­тель­ст­ва в КНР бу­дет про­дол­жать­ся ок. 100 лет, в те­че­ние это­го вре­ме­ни пред­сто­ит ре­шить неск. взаи­мо­свя­зан­ных за­дач: все­мер­но раз­ви­вать то­вар­ное про­из-во, пе­ре­стро­ить про­из­водств. от­но­ше­ния, зна­чи­тель­но по­вы­сить про­из­во­ди­тель­ность тру­да и осу­ще­ст­вить про­грам­му «че­ты­рёх мо­дер­ни­за­ций». Вы­пол­не­ние этих за­дач не­воз­мож­но без глу­бо­кой ре­фор­мы эко­но­мич. сис­те­мы, вклю­чаю­щей в се­бя пе­ре­строй­ку сис­тем пла­ни­ро­ва­ния и мак­ро­эко­но­мич. ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния, ин­ве­стиц. и фи­нан­со­вой по­ли­ти­ки, а так­же соз­да­ние со­циа­ли­стич. рын­ка. Съезд ут­вер­дил в долж­но­сти ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК Чжао Цзыя­на.

Про­шед­шая 25.3–13.4.1988 1-я сес­сия ВСНП 7-го со­зы­ва при­ня­ла 11 за­ко­нов и по­ста­нов­ле­ний, на­прав­лен­ных на раз­ви­тие и уг­луб­ле­ние эко­но­мич. ре­фор­мы. Был одоб­рен За­кон о пром. пред­при­ятии об­ще­на­род­ной соб­ст­вен­но­сти, ко­то­рый пре­дос­та­вил пред­при­яти­ям гос. сек­то­ра пра­ва хо­зяйств. са­мо­стоя­тель­но­сти. Сес­сия при­ня­ла по­прав­ки к двум стать­ям Кон­сти­ту­ции КНР, ко­то­рые пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­ли воз­мож­ность пе­ре­да­чи гра­ж­да­нам прав на поль­зо­ва­ние зем­лёй и уза­ко­ни­ли су­ще­ст­во­ва­ние ча­ст­ных пред­при­ятий. Пред. КНР был из­бран ве­те­ран пар­тии Ян Шан­кунь, пред. ПК ВСНП – Вань Ли, премье­ром Гос. со­ве­та – Ли Пэн.

Во 2-й пол. 1980-х гг. КНР столк­ну­лась с про­бле­мой ин­фля­ции (на нач. 1988 со­став­ля­ла 18,5%), ко­то­рая бы­ла во мно­гом вы­зва­на ошиб­ка­ми в эмис­си­он­ной по­ли­ти­ке (в 1979–87 объ­ём де­нег, на­хо­див­ших­ся в об­ра­ще­нии, уве­ли­чил­ся в 7 раз). Ин­фля­ция рез­ко уси­ли­лась по­сле при­ня­тия в на­ча­ле ле­та 1988 ре­ше­ния о все­объ­ем­лю­щей ре­фор­ме цен и по­вы­ше­нии в круп­ных го­ро­дах цен на мя­со, яй­ца, са­хар, ово­щи, та­бак и спирт­ные на­пит­ки. Это, в свою оче­редь, вы­звало па­ни­ку сре­ди на­се­ле­ния, мас­со­вое изъ­я­тие бан­ков­ских вкла­дов и скуп­ку про­дук­тов и то­ва­ров пер­вой не­об­хо­ди­мо­сти. Уже к ию­лю 1988 уро­вень ин­фля­ции в КНР дос­тиг 40%. Рост до­ро­го­виз­ны и обес­це­ни­ва­ние де­нег про­ис­хо­ди­ли на фо­не не­уро­жая (сбор зер­но­вых в 1988 со­ста­вил 394 млн. т). Бы­строе сни­же­ние жиз­нен­но­го уров­ня вы­зва­ло ак­ции про­тес­та со сто­ро­ны на­се­ле­ния стра­ны. В 1988 в КНР про­шло ок. 200 за­бас­то­вок под эко­но­мич. ло­зун­га­ми с чис­лом уча­ст­ни­ков св. 200 тыс. чел.

Воз­ник­шие эко­но­мич. слож­но­сти и не­до­воль­ст­во на­се­ле­ния ста­ли при­чи­ной при­ня­тия 3-м пле­ну­мом ЦК КПК 13-го со­зы­ва в сент. 1988 ре­ше­ния о пе­ре­но­се ре­фор­мы цен на 1991 и про­воз­гла­ше­ния оче­ред­но­го пе­рио­да «уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва». В мар­те – апр. 1989 на 2-й сес­сии ВСНП 7-го со­зы­ва бы­ла одоб­ре­на гос. про­грам­ма эко­но­мии. Од­на­ко эти ме­ры не сня­ли на­пря­жён­но­сти в кит. об­ще­ст­ве.

Ско­ро­по­стиж­ная кон­чи­на быв. ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК Ху Яо­ба­на (умер 15.4.1988), счи­тав­ше­го­ся сто­рон­ни­ком де­мо­кра­ти­за­ции по­ли­тич. сис­те­мы КНР, по­слу­жи­ла по­во­дом для за­бас­то­вок и вол­не­ний во мно­гих го­ро­дах стра­ны (сре­ди на­се­ле­ния хо­ди­ли упор­ные слу­хи, что на­хо­див­ший­ся в опа­ле быв. ру­ко­во­ди­тель пар­тии стал жерт­вой по­ли­тич. ре­прес­сий). Осо­бую ак­тив­ность про­яви­ло пе­кин­ское сту­ден­че­ст­во. 16.4.1989 груп­па сту­ден­тов про­ве­ла на пло­ща­ди Тянь­ань­мынь ак­цию в па­мять о Ху Яо­ба­не. Пуб­ли­ка­ция на сле­дую­щий день в центр. ор­га­не КПК газ. «Жэнь­минь жи­бао» фо­то­ре­пор­та­жа об этой ак­ции бы­ла вос­при­ня­та мо­ло­дё­жью и на­се­ле­ни­ем Пе­ки­на как одоб­ре­ние ру­ко­во­дством пар­тии этих дей­ст­вий. В го­ро­де на­ча­лись ма­ни­фе­ста­ции, в ко­то­рых в об­щей слож­но­сти при­ня­ли уча­стие до 2 млн. чел. На пл. Тянь-ань­мынь про­хо­дил не­пре­рыв­ный ми­тинг, уча­ст­ни­ка­ми ко­то­ро­го бы­ла со­ору­же­на 10-мет­ро­вая ста­туя «Бо­ги­ни Де­мо­кра­тии», внеш­не на­по­ми­нав­шая амер. «Ста­тую Сво­бо­ды». Ещё боль­ше обод­ри­ло уча­ст­ни­ков ак­ций про­зву­чав­шее во 2-й де­ка­де мая 1989 за­яв­ле­ние ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК Чжао Цзыя­на о том, что кон­сер­ва­тив­ная тен­ден­ция про­ти­во­дей­ст­вия ре­фор­мам и рас­ши­ре­нию свя­зей КНР с внеш­ним ми­ром так же опас­на, как «бур­жу­аз­ная ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ция», и тре­бу­ет не ме­нее ре­ши­тель­но­го от­по­ра.

За­яв­ле­ние Чжао Цзыя­на сви­де­тель­ст­во­ва­ло об обо­ст­ре­нии борь­бы в парт. и гос. ру­ко­во­дстве КНР как по во­про­су о ре­фор­ме по­ли­тич. сис­те­мы стра­ны, так и по во­про­су о пу­тях ста­би­ли­за­ции об­ста­нов­ки в стра­не. В от­ли­чие от Чжао Цзыя­на и ря­да его сто­рон­ни­ков, на­стаи­вав­ших на по­ис­ках ком­про­мис­са с уча­ст­ни­ка­ми мас­со­вых ак­ций и мир­ном вы­хо­де из кри­зи­са, груп­па во гла­ве с Дэн Сяо­пи­ном, Ли Пэ­ном и Ян Шан­ку­нем на­стаи­ва­ла на ис­поль­зо­ва­нии в борь­бе с оп­по­зиц. дви­же­ни­ем си­ло­вых ме­то­дов, под­чёр­ки­вая, что без­дей­ст­вие вла­сти бу­дет иметь след­ст­ви­ем «мир­ное пе­ре­ро­ж­де­ние со­циа­лиз­ма» в КНР, как это уже име­ет ме­сто в СССР и стра­нах Вост. Ев­ро­пы. Сто­рон­ни­ки жё­ст­ких ме­то­дов взя­ли верх в ру­ко­во­дстве КНР. 20.5.1989 в ря­де рай­онов Пе­ки­на бы­ло вве­де­но во­ен. по­ло­же­ние, к го­ро­ду на­ча­ли стя­ги­вать­ся во­ин­ские час­ти, ко­то­рым 3.6.1989 дан при­каз по­да­вить «контр­ре­во­лю­ци­он­ный мя­теж». В ночь на 4.6.1989 под­раз­де­ле­ния НОАК всту­пи­ли на пл. Тянь­ань­мынь. По оцен­кам за­ру­беж­ных экс­пер­тов, в хо­де по­дав­ле­ния вы­сту­п­ле­ний оп­по­зи­ции в Пе­ки­не и др. кит. го­ро­дах в мае – ию­не 1989 по­гиб­ли ок. 5 тыс. чел., по­лу­чи­ли ра­не­ния св. 30 тыс. чел. Вла­сти аре­сто­ва­ли боль­шое чис­ло уча­ст­ни­ков дви­же­ния, наи­бо­лее ак­тив­ным из них вы­не­се­ны смерт­ные при­го­во­ры. Во­ен. по­ло­же­ние в Пе­ки­не со­хра­ня­лось до 10.1.1990.

Со­зван­ный 23–24.6.1989 4-й пле­нум ЦК КПК 13-го со­зы­ва рас­смот­рел док­лад Ли Пэ­на «Об ошиб­ках тов. Чжао Цзыя­на во вре­мя ан­ти­пар­тий­ных и ан­ти­со­циа­ли­сти­че­ских вол­не­ний и бес­по­ряд­ков». Пле­нум ос­во­бо­дил Чжао Цзыя­на от обя­зан­но­стей ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК (вплоть до сво­ей смер­ти 17.1.2005 Чжао Цзы­ян на­хо­дил­ся под до­маш­ним аре­стом) и из­брал на этот пост сек­ре­та­ря гор­ко­ма КПК Шан­хая Цзян Цзэ­ми­ня.

Но­вое парт. ру­ко­во­дство пред­при­ня­ло ша­ги по ук­ре­п­ле­нию по­шат­нув­ше­го­ся ав­то­ри­те­та КПК и ис­ко­ре­не­нию не­га­тив­ных яв­ле­ний в пар­тии, ко­то­рые мог­ли дать по­вод для кри­ти­ки в её ад­рес и по­ста­вить под сом­не­ние по­ли­тич. ли­дер­ст­во ком­му­ни­стов в кит. об­ще­ст­ве. «По­ста­нов­ле­ни­ем о ско­рей­шем ре­ше­нии ря­да про­блем, яв­ляю­щих­ся пред­ме­том все­об­щей оза­бо­чен­но­сти» ЦК КПК ка­те­го­ри­че­ски за­пре­тил род­ст­вен­ни­кам вы­со­ко­по­став­лен­ных гос. и парт. дея­те­лей за­ни­мать­ся ком­мерч. дея­тель­но­стью, от­ме­нил «спец. снаб­же­ние» не­ко­то­ры­ми ви­да­ми про­дук­тов пред­ста­ви­те­лей ру­ко­во­дя­ще­го зве­на, ус­та­но­вил стро­гий кон­троль за ис­поль­зо­ва­ни­ем ими ав­то­транс­пор­та, за­пре­тил ру­ко­во­ди­те­лям строи­тель­ст­во жи­лья, обу­ст­рой­ст­во квар­тир, ор­га­ни­за­цию бан­ке­тов и пре­под­не­се­ние по­дар­ков за ка­зён­ный счёт и мн. др. Бы­ли зна­чи­тель­но уже­сто­че­ны ме­ры по борь­бе с кор­руп­ци­ей (к кон. 1992 рас­смот­ре­но 214 тыс. дел о взят­ках и хи­ще­ни­ях, осу­ж­де­ны 95 тыс. чел.), ак­ти­ви­зи­ро­ва­на ра­бо­та по вос­пи­та­нию пат­рио­тиз­ма, кол­лек­ти­виз­ма, ук­ре­п­ле­нию парт. и тру­до­вой дис­ци­п­ли­ны и ис­пол­не­нию за­ко­нов.

На 5-м пле­ну­ме ЦК КПК 13-го со­зы­ва 6–9.9.1989 Дэн Сяо­пин по его прось­бе был ос­во­бо­ж­дён от обя­зан­но­стей пред. Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК (тем не ме­нее вплоть до сво­ей кон­чи­ны 19.2.1997 он ос­та­вал­ся са­мым влия­тель­ным ли­цом в КНР). Ру­ко­во­дство Во­ен. со­ве­том бы­ло воз­ло­же­но на Цзян Цзэ­ми­ня, ко­то­ро­го 27.3.1993 из­бра­ли так­же Пред. КНР, – тем са­мым в его ру­ках скон­цен­три­ро­ва­лись три выс­шие парт. и гос. долж­но­сти.

По­сле смер­ти Мао Цзэ­ду­на и окон­ча­ния «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» важ­ное ме­сто во внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ке КНР по-преж­не­му за­ни­мал тай­вань­ский во­прос. С ус­та­нов­ле­ни­ем 1.1.1979 пол­но­мас­штаб­ных ди­пло­ма­тич. от­но­ше­ний с КНР ад­ми­нист­ра­ция США ото­зва­ла сво­его по­сла с Тай­ва­ня, од­на­ко со­хра­ни­ла с го­минь­да­нов­ским ре­жи­мом «осо­бые» от­но­ше­ния, как в об­лас­ти эко­но­мич. и куль­тур­но­го со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва, так и в обо­рон­ных во­про­сах, что бы­ло за­кре­п­ле­но спец. за­ко­ном, при­ня­тым Кон­грес­сом США в 1979. Пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР не смог­ло до­бить­ся от Ва­шинг­то­на со­гла­сия на со­дей­ст­вие вос­со­еди­не­нию К. на ус­ло­ви­ях пре­до­став­ле­ния Тай­ва­ню ав­то­но­мии. Ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ция США вы­ра­зи­ла лишь го­тов­ность со­кра­тить по­став­ки воо­ру­же­ний на Тай­вань, что бы­ло под­чёрк­ну­то в со­вме­ст­ном амер.-кит. ком­мю­ни­ке, опуб­ли­ко­ван­ном 17.8.1982 (уже в 1983 в на­ру­ше­ние взя­тых на се­бя обя­за­тельств США про­да­ли Тай­ва­ню 66 но­вей­ших бое­вых са­мо­лё­тов). Од­на­ко оп­ре­де­лён­ная ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ция по­ряд­ков на Тай­ва­не по­сле смер­ти Чан Кай­ши (5.4.1975) да­ва­ла ру­ко­во­дст­ву КНР на­де­ж­ду на вос­ста­нов­ле­ние един­ст­ва К. 3.7.1987 на ост­ро­ве бы­ло от­ме­не­но со­хра­няв­шее­ся в те­че­ние 38 лет во­ен. по­ло­же­ние, 22.1.1989 офи­ци­аль­но раз­ре­ше­на дея­тель­ность по­ли­тич. пар­тий, оп­по­зи­ци­он­ных Го­минь­да­ну. Пе­ре­строй­ка эко­но­мич. сис­те­мы КНР, в свою оче­редь, под­тал­ки­ва­ла тай­вань­ское пра­ви­тель­ст­во к ус­та­нов­ле­нию кон­так­тов с Пе­ки­ном. 13-й съезд Го­минь­да­на (7–13.7.1988) ре­ко­мен­до­вал изу­чить воз­мож­ность раз­ви­тия от­но­ше­ний с ма­те­ри­ко­вым К. 30.4.1991 тай­вань­ский «пре­зи­дент» Ли Дэн­хуэй зая­вил о же­ла­нии свое­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва нор­ма­ли­зо­вать от­но­ше­ния с КНР, ука­зав на то, что «ком­му­ни­стич. вос­ста­ние на кон­ти­нен­те мож­но счи­тать за­вер­шив­шим­ся». 17.12.1991 тай­вань­ские вла­сти сня­ли за­прет на тор­гов­лю с КНР и по­езд­ки жи­те­лей ост­ро­ва на ма­те­рик. В 1992 ме­ж­ду Пе­ки­ном и Тай­бэ­ем на­ча­лись пе­ре­го­во­ры о мир­ном вос­со­еди­не­нии. 14.12.1993 пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР со сво­ей сто­ро­ны от­мени­ло за­прет на тор­гов­лю с Тай­ва­нем. Тай­вань­ские фир­мы и бан­ки на­ча­ли ак­тив­но вкла­ды­вать ка­пи­та­лы в разл. от­рас­ли пром-сти КНР.

Курс на эко­но­мич. пе­ре­строй­ку, при­вле­че­ние иностр. ин­ве­сти­ций и об­нов­ле­ние тех­но­ло­гич. ба­зы пром-сти сти­му­ли­ро­вал даль­ней­шее сбли­же­ние КНР с ве­ду­щи­ми ка­пи­та­ли­стич. стра­на­ми. 3.4.1978 за­клю­чён до­го­вор о тор­гов­ле ме­жду КНР и ЕЭС, а в хо­де офиц. ви­зи­та в К. пре­зи­ден­та США Р. Рей­га­на 26.4–1.5.1984 – со­гла­ше­ние о раз­ви­тии дву­сто­рон­не­го эко­но­мич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва, в т. ч. в во­про­сах ядер­ной энер­ге­ти­ки. Ана­ло­гич­ные со­гла­ше­ния бы­ли под­пи­са­ны кит. ру­ко­во­дством в 1985 с ве­ду­щи­ми зап.-ев­роп. гос-ва­ми. МВФ пре­дос­та­вил КНР зна­чит. сред­ст­ва на раз­ви­тие и мо­дер­ни­за­цию пром-сти.

Ук­ре­п­ле­ние ме­ж­ду­нар. по­зи­ций КНР и уг­луб­ле­ние её эко­но­мич. и по­ли­тич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва со стра­на­ми За­па­да спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли ус­ко­ре­нию ре­ше­ния во­про­са о судь­бе Сян­га­на (Гон­кон­га) и Ао­мы­ня (Ма­као). 26.9.1984 Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния и КНР па­ра­фи­ро­ва­ли со­гла­ше­ние, со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му Сян­ган по ис­те­че­нии в 1997 сро­ка дей­ст­вия брит.-кит. до­го­во­ра об арен­де дол­жен быть воз­вра­щён в со­став К. на пра­вах осо­бо­го адм. рай­она с со­хра­не­ни­ем в нём в те­че­ние 50 лет ра­нее су­ще­ст­во­вав­ших по­ряд­ков. 13.4.1987 на ана­ло­гич­ных ус­ло­ви­ях под­пи­са­но со­гла­ше­ние с Пор­ту­га­ли­ей о воз­вра­ще­нии КНР Ао­мы­ня в 1999.


Мавзолей Мао Цзэдуна («Дом памяти Председателя Мао») на площади Тяньаньмынь в Пекине. 1977. Архитектор Ян Тинбао и др.


Фото А. И. Нагаева

Важ­ное зна­че­ние Пе­кин при­да­вал ук­ре­п­ле­нию сво­их по­зи­ций в Ази­ат­ско-Ти­хо­оке­ан­ском ре­гио­не. 12.8.1978 под­пи­сан кит.-япон. до­го­вор о ми­ре и друж­бе, в сент. 1992 нор­ма­ли­зо­ва­ны от­но­ше­ния ме­ж­ду КНР и Республикой Корея. К. под­держал идею соз­да­ния ней­траль­ной зо­ны в Юго-Вост. Азии, в 1991 всту­пил в АТЭС.

В то же вре­мя рез­ко обо­ст­ри­лись от­но­ше­ния КНР с Вьет­на­мом, по­ли­ти­ка ко­то­ро­го и тес­ное со­труд­ни­че­ст­во с Сов. Сою­зом (в 1978 под­пи­сан сов.-вьетн. до­го­вор о друж­бе и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ве) вос­при­ни­ма­лись кит. ру­ко­во­дством как уг­ро­за его безо­пас­но­сти и влия­нию в Ин­до­ки­тае. Вы­сыл­ка в 1978 из Вьет­на­ма в К. 240 тыс. эт­нич. ки­тай­цев, ак­тив­ное уча­стие вьетн. ар­мии в свер­же­нии в Кам­бод­же в нач. 1979 ре­жи­ма Пол По­та, поль­зо­вав­ше­го­ся под­держ­кой кит. ру­ко­во­дства, а так­же кит.-вьетн. тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ные спо­ры, в т. ч. о гос. при­над­леж­но­сти ост­ро­вов Спрат­ли (вьетн. Чы­онг­ша, кит. Нань­ша­цюнь­дао, Ту­ань­ша), Па­ра­сель­ских (вьетн. Хо­анг­ша, кит. Си­ша­цюнь­дао), Пра­тас (вьетн. Донг­ша, кит. Дун­ша­цюнь­дао) и бан­ки Мак­лс­филд (вьетн. – Жонк­ша, кит. – Чжун­ша­цюнь­дао) в юго-зап. час­ти Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го м., да­ли по­вод КНР для про­веде­ния «ог­ра­ни­чен­ной вос­пи­тат. во­ен. ак­ции» про­тив Вьет­на­ма. За­ру­чив­шись обе­ща­ни­ем амер. ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции не вме­ши­вать­ся в кон­фликт (в хо­де ви­зи­та Дэн Сяо­пи­на в кон. ян­ва­ря – нач. фев­ра­ля 1979 в Ва­шинг­тон), кит. ру­ко­во­дство 17.2.1979 от­да­ло при­каз о втор­же­нии в сев. рай­оны Вьет­на­ма. В хо­де упор­ных бо­ёв НОАК за­хва­ти­ла вьетн. го­ро­да Лао­кай, Као­банг, Ланг­шон и др. По­сле объ­яв­ле­ния вьетн. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом 5.3.1979 все­об­щей мо­би­ли­за­ции кит. ко­ман­до­ва­ние на­ча­ло вы­вод сво­их войск с вьетн. тер­ри­то­рии (за­вершил­ся 16.3.1979). На­чав­шие­ся 18.4.1979 пе­ре­го­во­ры сто­рон за­кон­чи­лись без­ре­зуль­тат­но. В по­сле­дую­щие го­ды ин­ци­ден­ты на кит.-вьетн. гра­ни­це про­дол­жа­лись. Осо­бен­но обо­ст­ри­лось со­пер­ни­че­ст­во за спор­ные ост­ро­ва в Юж­но-Ки­тай­ском м., в рай­оне ко­то­рых во 2-й пол. 1980-х гг. об­на­ру­же­ны круп­ней­шие в Азии ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния уг­ле­во­до­ро­дов. 14.3.1988 име­ло ме­сто бое­вое столк­но­ве­ние кит. и вьетн. во­ен. су­дов у о-вов Спрат­ли. Лишь с сент. 1991 в от­но­ше­ни­ях ме­ж­ду КНР и Вьет­на­мом на­ме­ти­лась тен­ден­ция к нор­ма­ли­за­ции, хо­тя про­бле­ма спор­ных тер­ри­то­рий ос­та­лась не­ре­шён­ной. В 1995 сто­ро­ны на­ча­ли пе­ре­го­во­ры о со­вме­ст­ном ос­вое­нии ре­сур­сов спор­ных ар­хи­пе­ла­гов.

Слож­ны­ми ос­та­ва­лись от­но­ше­ния КНР с Ин­ди­ей. В дек. 1986 ме­ж­ду дву­мя стра­на­ми про­изо­шёл воо­руж. по­гра­нич­ный кон­фликт, вы­зван­ный при­да­ни­ем со­юз­ной тер­ри­то­рии Ару­на­чал-Пра­деш, на часть ко­то­рой КНР предъ­яв­ля­ла тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ные пре­тен­зии, ста­ту­са шта­та в со­ста­ве Ин­дии. На­пря­жён­ность в кит.-инд. от­но­ше­ни­ях на­ча­ла сни­жать­ся лишь по­сле под­пи­са­ния 7.9.1993 Пе­ки­ном и Де­ли до­го­во­ра о со­кра­ще­нии войск в при­гра­нич­ных рай­онах.

Вплоть до нач. 1980-х гг. ру­ко­вод­ство КНР про­дол­жа­ло курс на про­ти­во­дей­ст­вие «ге­ге­мо­ни­ст­ским уст­рем­ле­ни­ям» СССР. 3.4.1979 оно ре­ши­ло не про­дле­вать сов.-кит. до­го­вор о друж­бе, сою­зе и вза­им­ной по­мо­щи от 1950. В дек. 1979 в свя­зи с вве­де­ни­ем сов. войск в Аф­га­ни­стан Пе­кин пре­рвал на не­оп­ре­де­лён­ное вре­мя кон­суль­та­ции с сов. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом о нор­ма­ли­за­ции от­но­ше­ний, а в 1980 вслед за США и зап. дер­жа­ва­ми бой­ко­ти­ро­вал Олим­пий­ские иг­ры в Мо­ск­ве. На­чав­ший­ся в окт. 1982 но­вый ра­унд сов.-кит. пе­ре­го­во­ров за­кон­чил­ся без­ре­зуль­тат­но. Не при­нес­ли по­ло­жи­тель­ных ито­гов и пе­ре­го­во­ры в 1983–84. Кит. сто­ро­на тре­бо­ва­ла со­кра­ще­ния сов. при­сут­ст­вия в Ин­до­ки­тае, Аф­га­ни­ста­не, Мон­го­лии, а так­же при­ня­тия за ос­но­ву сво­ей кон­цеп­ции оп­ре­де­ле­ния ли­нии про­хо­ж­де­ния сов.-кит. гра­ни­цы на её спор­ных уча­ст­ках.

Сдвиг в раз­ви­тии диа­ло­га ме­ж­ду Пе­ки­ном и Мо­ск­вой обо­зна­чил­ся лишь по­сле из­бра­ния ге­не­раль­ным сек­ре­та­рём ЦК КПСС М. С. Гор­ба­чё­ва, ко­то­рый за­явил о го­тов­но­сти к по­ис­ку ком­про­мис­са с КНР. В мар­те 1985 СССР по­се­ти­ла де­ле­га­ция ВСНП, Ли Пэн встре­тил­ся с Гор­ба­чё­вым. 10.7.1985 под­пи­са­но дву­сто­рон­нее тор­го­вое со­гла­ше­ние сро­ком на 5 лет, 6.6.1986 за­клю­че­но со­гла­ше­ние о соз­да­нии се­ти кон­суль­ских уч­ре­ж­де­ний на тер­ри­то­рии обе­их стран. Офиц. ви­зит Гор­ба­чё­ва в КНР 15–18.5.1989 зна­ме­но­вал окон­ча­тель­ный по­во­рот к нор­ма­ли­за­ции сов.-кит. от­но­ше­ний. За­ин­те­ре­со­ван­ность кит. сто­ро­ны в раз­ви­тии диа­ло­га с Мо­ск­вой уси­ли­лась по­сле вве­де­ния в ию­не 1989 США и зап.-ев­роп. гос-ва­ми эко­но­мич. санк­ций в от­но­ше­нии КНР в свя­зи с тянь­ань­мынь­ски­ми со­бы­тия­ми (от­ме­не­ны ев­роп. стра­на­ми 22.10.1990) и упор­ной по­ста­нов­кой ими в даль­ней­шем во­про­са о пра­вах че­ло­ве­ка в К. (раз­ви­тие гражд. прав, по­ло­же­ние в Ти­бет­ском и Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ных рай­онах). Сов.-кит. сбли­же­нию спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло так­же ох­ла­ж­де­ние кит.-амер. от­но­ше­ний, вы­зван­ное всё бо­лее яв­но про­яв­ляв­шим­ся не­же­ла­ни­ем США со­дей­ст­во­вать ре­ше­нию тай­вань­ской про­бле­мы. По­сле рас­па­да СССР «во­ен. уг­ро­за с се­ве­ра», по мне­нию кит. ру­ко­водства, ис­чез­ла, Рос­сия пе­ре­ста­ла вос­при­ни­мать­ся как по­тен­ци­аль­ный во­ен. про­тив­ник. РФ и КНР дос­тиг­ли до­го­во­рён­но­стей по по­гра­нич­но­му во­про­су (16.5.1991; 3.9.1994), за­клю­чив ряд со­гла­ше­ний, по­зво­лив­ших окон­ча­тель­но ус­та­но­вить, юри­ди­че­ски офор­мить и де­мар­ки­ро­вать рос.-кит. гра­ни­цу бо­лее чем на 98% её про­тя­жён­но­сти. В хо­де со­сто­яв­ше­го­ся 2–6.9.1994 офиц. ви­зи­та в Рос­сию Цзян Цзэ­ми­ня по ре­зуль­та­там его пе­ре­го­во­ров с пре­зи­ден­том РФ Б. Н. Ель­ци­ным бы­ло под­пи­са­но со­гла­ше­ние о прин­ци­пах рос.-кит. от­но­ше­ний и кон­ст­рук­тив­ном парт­нёр­ст­ве двух стран.

ПК ВСНП 29.12.1991 одоб­рил при­со­еди­не­ние КНР к До­го­во­ру о не­рас­про­стра­не­нии ядер­но­го ору­жия. 29.7.1996 кит. пра­ви­тель­ст­во объ­я­ви­ло о пре­кра­ще­нии ис­пы­та­ний ядер­ных взрыв­ных уст­ройств.

Китай с нач. 1990-х гг.

На 14-м съез­де КПК (12–18.10.1992), по­ла­гая, что по­след­ст­вия тянь­ань­мынь­ских со­бы­тий пре­одо­ле­ны, Дэн Сяо­пин вы­ска­зал­ся за во­зоб­нов­ле­ние и ак­ти­ви­за­цию эко­но­мич. ре­форм. Ре­ше­ни­ем 1-й сес­сии ВСНП 8-го со­зы­ва (15–31.3.1993) по­ня­тие «пла­но­вое хо­зяй­ст­во» в Кон­сти­ту­ции КНР бы­ло за­ме­не­но тер­ми­ном «со­циа­ли­стич. ры­ноч­ное хо­зяй­ст­во». 3-й пле­нум ЦК КПК 14-го со­зы­ва (11–14.11.1993) ут­вер­дил про­грам­му даль­ней­ше­го раз­ви­тия ре­форм и по­строе­ния в КНР к 2000 но­вой со­циа­ли­стич. эко­но­мич. сис­те­мы. Од­но­вре­мен­но бы­ла по­став­ле­на за­да­ча про­вес­ти ре­фор­му от­но­ше­ний соб­ст­вен­но­сти, сис­те­мы на­ло­го­об­ло­же­ния, бан­ков­ской дея­тель­но­сти и др., а так­же соз­дать со­от­вет­ст­вую­щую тре­бо­ва­ни­ям рын­ка сис­те­му со­ци­аль­но­го обес­пе­че­ния. Про­шед­шая 5–17.3.1996 4-я сес­сия ВСНП 8-го со­зы­ва ут­вер­ди­ла «Де­вя­тый пя­ти­лет­ний план эко­но­ми­че­ско­го и со­ци­аль­но­го раз­ви­тия КНР [на 1996–2000] и пер­спек­тив­ную про­грам­му до 2010», ко­то­ры­ми пре­ду­смат­ри­вал­ся пе­ре­ход от экс­тен­сив­но­го спо­со­ба про­из-ва к ин­тен­сив­но­му, про­ве­де­ние глу­бо­кой на­уч.-тех­нич. ре­кон­ст­рук­ции нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва, раз­ви­тие ре­сур­сос­бе­ре­гаю­ще­го нау­ко-, тех­ни­ко- и ка­пи­та­ло­ём­ко­го про­из-ва. 15-й съезд КПК (12–18.9.1997) одоб­рил про­грам­му по­этап­ной при­ва­ти­за­ции гос. пред­при­ятий, имев­ших вы­со­кую за­дол­жен­ность. Эта про­грам­ма бы­ла под­твер­жде­на 4-й сес­си­ей ВСНП 9-го со­зы­ва (5–15.3.2001), ут­вер­див­шей так­же план раз­ви­тия нар. хо­зяй­ст­ва КНР на 10-ю пя­ти­лет­ку (2001–05).

Окон­ча­тель­ный пе­ре­ход в 1993 к ры­ноч­ным ус­ло­ви­ям ве­де­ния хо­зяй­ст­ва вы­сво­бо­дил ко­лос­саль­ный за­ряд со­зи­да­тель­ной энер­гии кит. об­ще­ст­ва. По­сле­до­ва­тель­ное про­ве­де­ние по­ли­ти­ки «мо­дер­ни­за­ции, ре­форм и от­кры­то­сти» обес­пе­чи­ло вы­дви­же­ние КНР на по­зи­ции од­но­го из ли­де­ров гло­баль­ной эко­но­ми­ки и тор­гов­ли, об­ре­те­ние ею ста­ту­са «все­мир­ной фаб­ри­ки». В 2001 КНР при­ня­та в ВТО. К 2007 она вы­шла на 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по аб­со­лют­ным по­ка­за­те­лям про­из-ва цвет­ных ме­тал­лов, уг­ля, це­мен­та, хлоп­ча­то­бу­маж­ных тка­ней, те­ле­ви­зо­ров, мо­то­цик­лов, ве­ло­си­пе­дов и др. ви­дов про­дук­ции, на 2-е ме­сто – по про­из-ву са­ха­ра, на 3-е место – по про­из-ву ав­то­мо­би­лей, на 4-е ме­сто – по вы­ра­бот­ке элек­тро­энер­гии, на 5-е ме­сто – по до­бы­че неф­ти. В 2007 объ­ём ВВП КНР пре­вы­сил уро­вень 1978 в 15 раз (в со­пос­та­ви­мых це­нах). По это­му по­ка­за­те­лю (3,44 трлн. долл., 2007) КНР за­ня­ла 4-е ме­сто [по па­ри­тету по­ку­па­тель­ной спо­соб­но­сти (6,99 трлн. долл.) – 2-е ме­сто], по раз­ме­рам внеш­не­тор­го­во­го обо­ро­та (2,125 трлн. долл.) – 3-е ме­сто, по зо­ло­то­ва­лют­ным ре­зер­вам (1,68 трлн. долл. и 19290 тыс. трой­ских ун­ций зо­ло­та; март 2008) – 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре.

В стра­не сфор­ми­ро­ва­лась сме­шан­ная эко­но­ми­ка с при­мер­но рав­ны­ми до­ля­ми гос., ча­ст­но­го [вклю­чая ок. 300 тыс. пред­при­ятий с иностр. ка­пи­та­лом (2007); сум­ма ис­поль­зо­ван­ных К. пря­мых иностр. ка­пи­та­ло­вло­же­ний за го­ды ре­форм со­ста­ви­ла св. 750 млрд. долл.; в К. был пе­ре­ве­дён ряд про­из­водств из стран Зап. Ев­ро­пы, Сев. Аме­ри­ки и Япо­нии] и т. н. ак­цио­нер­но-пае­во­го сек­то­ров. КНР уда­лось су­ще­ст­вен­но со­кра­тить от­ста­ва­ние сво­его тех­но­ло­гич. раз­ви­тия от ве­ду­щих стран по ря­ду клю­че­вых от­рас­лей, в т. ч. в атом­ной энер­ге­ти­ке, био-, ком­пь­ю­тер­ных и ин­фор­мац. тех­но­ло­ги­ях, а так­же в кос­мич. пром-сти (о по­след­нем сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют ус­пеш­ный за­пуск в 2003 пи­ло­ти­руе­мо­го кос­мич. ко­раб­ля, вы­ве­де­ние на око­ло­зем­ную ор­би­ту в 2004 10 ис­кусств. спут­ни­ков Зем­ли, в 2005 за­пуск но­во­го пи­ло­ти­руе­мо­го ко­раб­ля «Шэнь­чжоу-6» с 2 кос­мо­нав­та­ми на бор­ту, а в 2007 вы­ход кит. кос­мо­нав­та в от­кры­тый кос­мос в хо­де по­лё­та «Шэнь­чжоу-7»). Тем­пы рос­та вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ных от­рас­лей эко­но­ми­ки КНР в нач. 21 в. дос­тиг­ли 27% в год (при об­щем эко­но­мич. рос­те св. 10%).

С нач. 21 в. ру­ко­во­дство КНР взя­ло курс на соз­да­ние круп­ных ТНК с кит. ка­пи­та­лом и про­дви­же­ние на ми­ро­вой ры­нок про­дук­ции кит. ма­рок. Неф­те­хи­мич. кор­по­ра­ция «PetroChina» и Тор­го­во-пром. банк К. к 2008 во­шли в чис­ло круп­ней­ших ком­па­ний ми­ра. Кит. ка­пи­тал стал пред­при­ни­мать ак­тив­ные по­пыт­ки про­ник­но­ве­ния в эко­но­ми­ку ве­ду­щих ин­ду­ст­ри­аль­ных дер­жав.

Од­на­ко, не­смот­ря на впе­чат­ляю­щие ус­пе­хи раз­ви­тия, эко­но­мич. по­ка­за­те­ли КНР в пе­ре­счё­те на ду­шу на­се­ле­ния ос­та­ют­ся до­воль­но низ­ки­ми (по сред­не­ду­ше­вым раз­ме­рам ВВП КНР за­ни­ма­ет лишь 109–110-е ме­сто, по ин­дек­су че­ло­ве­че­ско­го раз­ви­тия – 81-е ме­сто в ми­ре), что по­зво­ля­ет от­но­сить её к раз­виваю­щим­ся стра­нам. Со­вер­шён­ный К. в по­след­ние де­ся­ти­ле­тия эко­но­мич. ры­вок при­вёл к воз­ник­но­ве­нию ря­да внутр. про­блем и про­ти­во­ре­чий. Уси­лил­ся раз­рыв ме­ж­ду пе­ре­до­вы­ми при­мор­ски­ми ре­гио­на­ми и срав­ни­тель­но от­ста­лы­ми внутр. рай­она­ми КНР. Уве­ли­чи­лась раз­ни­ца в уров­не до­хо­дов разл. ка­те­го­рий на­се­ле­ния, а так­же в уров­не и ка­че­стве жиз­ни гор. и сель­ско­го на­се­ле­ния (ср. до­хо­ды го­ро­жан в 2007 со­ста­ви­ли 1900 долл., сель­ских жи­те­лей – 570 долл. в год). Зна­чит. ост­ро­ту при­об­ре­ла про­бле­ма за­ня­то­сти на­се­ле­ния (по офиц. дан­ным, уро­вень без­ра­бо­ти­цы со­став­ля­ет не­мно­гим бо­лее 4%; по не­офиц. оцен­кам, от 100 до 150 млн. чел. не име­ют по­сто­ян­но­го мес­та ра­бо­ты ли­бо за­ня­ты час­тич­но). Бы­ст­рая ур­ба­ни­за­ция (с сер. 1990-х гг. в го­ро­да пе­ре­се­ли­лись св. 200 млн. чел.) соз­да­ла зна­чит. слож­но­сти с раз­ви­ти­ем гор. ин­фра­струк­ту­ры, обес­пе­че­ни­ем на­се­ле­ния го­ро­дов жиль­ём и пить­е­вой во­дой (на 2000, по офиц. дан­ным, де­фи­цит во­ды ис­пы­ты­ва­ли прак­ти­че­ски все кит. го­ро­да, в т. ч. Пе­кин). Сла­бый кон­троль за ох­ра­ной ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды обу­сло­вил воз­ник­но­ве­ние серь­ёз­ных эко­ло­гич. про­блем, что бы­ло кон­ста­ти­ро­ва­но в док­ла­де пра­ви­тель­ст­ва КНР от 5.6.2001. К. стал круп­ней­шим по­сле США за­гряз­ни­те­лем ми­ро­вой ат­мо­сфе­ры и гид­ро­сфе­ры, а по тем­пам эро­зии поч­вы вы­шел на 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре.

Кар­ди­наль­ная пе­ре­строй­ка эко­но­мич. сис­те­мы соз­да­ла пред­по­сыл­ки для ре­ше­ния во­про­са о вы­ве­де­нии ка­че­ст­ва жиз­ни на­се­ле­ния стра­ны на уро­вень «сяо кан». Од­на­ко к 2000, как пер­во­на­чаль­но пла­ни­ро­ва­лось, эта цель не бы­ла дос­тиг­ну­та (ре­ше­ние за­да­чи от­не­се­но на 2020). Уро­вень жиз­ни и со­ци­аль­ная за­щи­щён­ность, осо­бен­но сель­ско­го на­се­ле­ния КНР, ос­та­ют­ся край­не низ­ки­ми, часть на­се­ления внутр. рай­онов КНР про­дол­жа­ет жить в ни­ще­те, ок. 52 млн. чел. в воз­рас­те от 15 до 49 лет не­гра­мот­ны.

С нач. 1990-х гг. ост­ры­ми со­ци­аль­ны­ми про­бле­ма­ми в КНР, на­ря­ду с кор­руп­ци­ей и рос­том пре­ступ­но­сти, ста­ли нар­ко­ма­ния и уси­ле­ние влия­ния но­вых псев­до­ре­лиг. дви­же­ний (в ча­ст­но­сти, сек­ты Фа­лунь­гун), что сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ет о серь­ёз­ном ду­хов­ном кри­зи­се, ко­то­рый в но­вых ус­ло­ви­ях пе­ре­жи­ва­ет кит. об­ще­ст­во. Зна­чи­тель­но уси­ли­лись се­па­ра­ти­ст­ские тен­ден­ции в Ти­бет­ском и Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ных рай­онах. От­но­си­тель­но но­вым для КНР яв­ле­ни­ем ста­ли мас­со­вые про­тес­ты ра­бо­чих, осо­бен­но в де­прес­сив­ных сев.-вост. рай­онах стра­ны.

Решая эти про­бле­мы, ру­ко­вод­ство КНР при­дер­жи­ва­ет­ся тра­ди­ци­он­но жё­ст­ких ме­то­дов. К. ли­ди­ру­ет по чис­лу смерт­ных при­го­во­ров (св. 7 тыс. в год), вы­но­си­мых за кор­руп­цию и др. тяж­кие уго­лов­ные пре­сту­п­ле­ния. 23.7.1999 кит. вла­сти за­пре­ти­ли сек­ту Фа­лунь­гун, в апр. 2000 при­го­во­ри­ли св. 300 её ру­ко­во­ди­те­лей к разл. сро­кам тю­рем­но­го за­клю­че­ния, а ок. 5 тыс. ак­тив­ных чле­нов на­пра­ви­ли на «ис­пра­ви­тель­ные ра­бо­ты». В февр. 1997 си­ла­ми НОАК и об­ществ. безо­пас­но­сти бы­ли по­дав­ле­ны вы­сту­п­ле­ния уй­гу­ров, а вес­ной 2008 – жи­те­лей Ти­бе­та. Вла­сти не до­пус­ка­ют соз­да­ния оп­по­зиц. пар­тий, жё­ст­ко кон­тро­ли­ру­ют сред­ст­ва мас­со­вой ин­фор­ма­ции, вклю­чая Ин­тер­нет.

В то же вре­мя в ус­ло­ви­ях глу­бо­кой эко­но­мич. пе­ре­строй­ки про­изош­ли оп­ре­де­лён­ные из­ме­не­ния идео­ло­гич. и ор­га­ни­зац. ос­нов КПК. 16-й съезд пар­тии, со­сто­яв­ший­ся 8–14.11.2002, внёс в ус­тав по­ло­же­ние, со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му КПК пред­став­ля­ет не клас­сы, а разл. слои кит. об­ще­ст­ва: «пе­ре­до­вые про­из­во­дит. си­лы», «пе­ре­до­вую куль­ту­ру» и «по­дав­ляю­щее боль­шин­ст­во на­ро­да». В пар­тию бы­ло раз­ре­ше­но всту­пать пред­ста­ви­те­лям пред­при­ни­ма­тель­ских кру­гов. Съезд окон­ча­тель­но за­кре­пил про­це­ду­ру пла­но­мер­ной сме­ны по­ко­ле­ний в ру­ко­во­дя­щих ор­га­нах КНР. В со­от­вет­ст­вии с ней Цзян Цзэ­минь по­дал в от­став­ку с по­ста ге­не­раль­но­го сек­ре­та­ря ЦК КПК, на эту долж­ность был из­бран Ху Цзинь­тао (15.3.2003 он из­бран так­же Пред. КНР, а в сент. 2004 пред. Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК). 16.3.2003 ВСНП из­бра­ло на пост пре­мье­ра Гос. со­ве­та КНР ещё од­но­го пред­ста­ви­те­ля но­во­го по­ко­ле­ния ру­ко­во­ди­те­лей – Вэнь Цзя­бао, от­пра­вив в от­став­ку Чжу Жунц­зи, за­ни­мав­ше­го этот пост с мар­та 1998.

На 17-м съез­де КПК в окт. 2007 но­вое ру­ко­во­дство под­твер­ди­ло курс на про­ве­де­ние ком­плекс­ной мо­дер­ни­за­ции стра­ны, ко­рен­ное улуч­ше­ние ка­че­ст­ва жиз­ни на­се­ле­ния, соз­да­ние ме­ж­ду­нар. ус­ло­вий, бла­го­при­ят­ст­вую­щих раз­ви­тию К., и его ак­тив­ную ин­те­гра­цию в ми­ро­вое хо­зяй­ст­во. Ху Цзинь­тао вы­сту­пил с иде­ей раз­ра­бот­ки «кон­цеп­ции на­уч. раз­ви­тия» КНР, ос­но­ван­ной на реа­ли­стич. ана­ли­зе си­туа­ции в стра­не и за её пре­де­ла­ми, оп­ти­маль­ном вы­бо­ре ме­ж­ду «вы­иг­ры­ша­ми» и «по­те­ря­ми» по­ли­ти­ки мо­дер­ни­за­ции, а так­же на пра­виль­ном со­еди­не­нии кит. тра­ди­ций с но­вей­ши­ми дос­ти­же­ния­ми за­ру­беж­ной нау­ки, тех­ни­ки и куль­ту­ры. Эта кон­цеп­ция, по мне­нию кит. ру­ко­во­дства, при­зва­на соз­дать тео­ре­тич. ос­но­ву для эф­фек­тив­но­го пре­одо­ле­ния воз­ник­ших про­ти­во­ре­чий и труд­но­стей, дать чле­нам пар­тии и на­се­ле­нию стра­ны пра­виль­ные идео­ло­гич. ори­ен­ти­ры, снять опа­се­ния ме­ж­ду­нар. со­об­ще­ст­ва от­но­си­тель­но воз­мож­но­сти про­яв­ле­ния в пер­спек­ти­ве кит. ге­ге­мо­низ­ма, обес­пе­чить мир­ное объ­е­ди­не­ние К. и ус­та­нов­ле­ние им гар­мо­нич­ных от­но­ше­ний со все­ми стра­на­ми.

Центр. ме­сто во внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ке КНР с сер. 1990-х гг. по-преж­не­му за­ни­ма­ла про­бле­ма вос­со­еди­не­ния стра­ны. По­сле воз­вра­ще­ния в со­став К. Сян­га­на и Аомы­ня един­ст­вен­ной тер­ри­то­ри­ей, на ко­то­рую не рас­про­стра­ня­ет­ся дей­ст­вие за­ко­нов КНР, ос­та­ёт­ся Тай­вань. Про­во­див­шие­ся с нач. 1990-х гг. пере­го­во­ры меж­ду пра­ви­тель­ст­вом КНР и ру­ко­во­д­ством Тай­ва­ня спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ли ожив­ле­нию от­но­ше­ний ме­ж­ду ост­ро­вом и ма­те­ри­ко­вым К., од­на­ко не при­нес­ли сколь­ко-ни­будь за­мет­но­го про­грес­са в во­про­се о вос­со­еди­не­нии. Про­ве­де­ние на Тай­ва­не 23.3.1996 пер­вых пря­мых пре­зи­дент­ских вы­бо­ров бы­ло вос­при­ня­то Пе­ки­ном как по­пыт­ка уг­лу­бить рас­кол стра­ны. Стре­мясь ока­зать дав­ле­ние на Тай­бэй и не до­пус­тить про­ве­де­ния вы­бо­ров, 12–20.3.1996 КНР про­ве­ла ши­ро­ко­мас­штаб­ные во­ен. уче­ния у бе­ре­гов Тай­ва­ня. В от­вет на эти дей­ствия США вве­ли в Тай­вань­ский прол. авиа­нос­ное со­еди­не­ние 7-го фло­та, что соз­да­ло в ре­гио­не на­пря­жён­ную об­ста­нов­ку. По­сле за­яв­ле­ния пре­зи­ден­та Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки Ли Дэн­хуэя в те­ле­ви­зи­он­ном ин­тер­вью 11.7.1999 о том, что Тай­вань и КНР – «две стра­ны по обе сто­ро­ны Тай­вань­ско­го про­ли­ва», Пе­кин пре­рвал пе­ре­го­во­ры с Тай­бэ­ем. По­бе­да на пре­зи­дент­ских вы­бо­рах на Тай­ва­не 18.3.2000 кан­ди­да­та от Де­мо­кра­тич. про­грес­сив­ной пар­тии, вы­сту­паю­щей про­тив объ­еди­не­ния Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки с КНР, Чэнь Шуй­бяня ещё боль­ше обо­ст­ри­ла от­но­ше­ния ме­ж­ду сто­ро­на­ми. На про­хо­див­шей од­но­вре­мен­но с вы­бо­ра­ми на Тай­ва­не 4-й сес­сии ВСНП 9-го со­зы­ва пре­мьер Гос. со­ве­та КНР Чжу Жунц­зи, ка­са­ясь тай­вань­ско­го во­про­са, не ис­клю­чил воз­мож­но­сти при­ме­не­ния КНР во­ен. си­лы для вос­со­еди­не­ния стра­ны. 14.3.2005 4-я сес­сия ВСНП 10-го со­зы­ва одоб­ри­ла за­кон «О про­ти­во­дей­ст­вии рас­ко­лу стра­ны», ко­то­рым пре­дос­та­ви­ло ру­ко­во­д­ст­ву КНР пра­во при­ме­нить «не­мир­ные или же дру­гие не­об­хо­ди­мые ме­ры для за­щиты сво­его су­ве­ре­ни­те­та и тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ной це­ло­ст­но­сти» в слу­чае по­пыт­ки «под­рыв­ных эле­мен­тов, вы­сту­паю­щих за «не­за­ви­си­мость Тай­ва­ня»», от­де­лить ост­ров «от Ро­ди­ны», а так­же в слу­чае «важ­ных из­ме­не­ний, ко­то­рые мо­гут при­вес­ти к от­де­ле­нию Тай­ва­ня от стра­ны, или же ес­ли все воз­мож­но­сти для мир­но­го объ­е­ди­не­ния бу­дут ис­чер­па­ны». При­ня­тие это­го за­ко­на вы­зва­ло ост­рую ре­ак­цию как на Тай­ва­не, так и в США. Тай­вань­ское ру­ко­во­дство при­гро­зи­ло Пе­ки­ну свёр­ты­ва­ни­ем эко­но­мич. кон­так­тов, а амер. ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ция, ру­ко­во­дст­ву­ясь за­ко­ном об от­но­ше­ни­ях с Тай­ва­нем, до­би­лась в 2005 от Япо­нии со­гла­сия на вклю­че­ние Тай­ва­ня в сфе­ру об­щих амер.-япон. стра­те­гич. и обо­рон­ных ин­те­ре­сов. В от­вет на эти дей­ст­вия Вэнь Цзя­бао при­звал Япо­нию и США воз­дер­жать­ся от ка­ко­го бы то ни бы­ло вме­ша­тель­ст­ва в тай­вань­ский во­прос, яв­ляю­щий­ся внутр. де­лом К., а Ху Цзинь­тао под­черк­нул не­об­хо­ди­мость рас­ши­ре­ния мер по под­го­тов­ке к за­щи­те тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ной це­ло­ст­но­сти К. Обо­рон­ный бюд­жет КНР в 2005 был уве­ли­чен на 12,6% (в 2002 – на 17,6%).

Про­бле­ма Тай­ва­ня и по­ста­нов­ка ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ци­ей США во­про­са о со­блю­де­нии прав че­ло­ве­ка в КНР (в т. ч. в хо­де офиц. ви­зи­та Цзян Цзэ­ми­ня в Ва­шинг­тон 26.10 – 3.11.1997 и от­вет­но­го ви­зи­та Б. Клин­то­на в Пе­кин 25.6–3.7.1998) зна­чи­тель­но ос­лож­ни­ли фон ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­вав­ших­ся в 1990-х – нач. 2000-х гг. амер.-кит. эко­но­мич. от­но­ше­ний. Вы­сту­п­ле­ние пред­ста­ви­те­ля КНР в Со­ве­те Без­о­пас­но­сти ООН в мар­те 1999 про­тив во­ен. ре­ше­ния про­бле­мы Ко­со­во, бом­бар­ди­ров­ка са­мо­лё­та­ми нато 7.5.1999 по­соль­ст­ва КНР в Бел­гра­де (по­гиб­ли 3 со­труд­ни­ка, св. 20 по­лу­чи­ли ра­не­ния), ин­ци­дент с за­дер­жа­ни­ем КНР амер. са­мо­лё­та-раз­вед­чи­ка, осу­ж­де­ние К. во­ен. опе­ра­ции коа­лиц. сил во гла­ве с США про­тив Ира­ка в 2003 и раз­но­гла­сия по ря­ду др. во­про­сов зна­ме­но­ва­ли из­ме­не­ние ха­рак­те­ра от­но­ше­ний ме­ж­ду Пе­ки­ном и Ва­шинг­то­ном. Но­вый ме­ж­ду­нар. эко­но­мич. ста­тус КНР по­зво­лил ей бо­лее ак­тив­но вклю­чить­ся в ре­ше­ние ре­гио­наль­ных и гло­баль­ных про­блем, за­ни­мая са­мо­сто­ят. по­ли­тич. по­зи­цию.

В нач. 21 в. ру­ко­во­дство КНР пред­при­ня­ло даль­ней­шие ша­ги по нор­ма­ли­за­ции от­но­ше­ний с Ин­ди­ей. В 2005 кит. и инд. ру­ко­во­дство со­гла­со­ва­ли прин­ци­пы раз­ре­ше­ния по­гра­нич­ных и тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ных раз­но­гла­сий и про­ве­де­ния диа­ло­га по про­бле­мам безо­пас­но­сти и внеш­ней по­ли­ти­ки, вклю­чая во­про­сы гра­ниц и ядер­ные про­грам­мы.

Со 2-й пол. 1990-х гг. ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­ва­лись эко­но­мич. от­но­ше­ния КНР с Вьет­на­мом. В це­лях уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ных спо­ров сто­ро­ны за­клю­чи­ли дву­сто­рон­ние со­гла­ше­ния о су­хо­пут­ной гра­ни­це, де­ли­ми­та­ции вод­ных тер­ри­то­рий в зал. Бак­бо (Тон­кин­ском) (2000) и ряд др., ос­та­вив, од­на­ко, от­кры­тым во­прос о гос. при­над­леж­но­сти Па­ра­сель­ских о-вов и о-вов Спрат­ли. На­пря­жён­ность кит.-вьетн. от­но­ше­ний в этом во­про­се уда­лось на вре­мя сни­зить бла­го­да­ря под­пи­са­нию в 2002 Дек­ла­ра­ции о взаи­мо­дей­ст­вии сто­рон в Юж­но-Ки­тай­ском мо­ре. Од­на­ко с 2007 тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ный спор ме­ж­ду КНР и Вьет­на­мом рез­ко обо­ст­рил­ся. Под­пи­са­ние Вьет­на­мом со­гла­ше­ний о до­бы­че неф­ти и га­за с зап. стра­на­ми и Япо­ни­ей и со­об­ще­ние вьетн. пра­ви­тель­ст­ва о на­ме­ре­нии про­ло­жить по дну Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го м. га­зо­про­вод от о-вов Спрат­ли до сво­ей тер­ри­то­рии вы­зва­ло рез­кий про­тест КНР, ко­то­рая рас­це­ни­ла эти дей­ст­вия как по­ся­га­тель­ст­во на свою тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ную це­ло­ст­ность. В ию­ле 2007 кит. сто­ро­же­вое суд­но под­верг­ло об­стре­лу вьетн. ры­ба­ков в рай­оне о-вов Спрат­ли, а в но­ябре пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР объ­я­ви­ло о со­з­да­нии но­вой адм. еди­ни­цы в со­ста­ве пров. Хай­нань – окр. Сан­ша (пл. св. 2,5 млн. км2), вклю­чаю­ще­го о-ва Спрат­ли и Па­ра­сель­ские о-ва. Дей­ст­вия КНР вы­зва­ли ак­ции про­тес­та во Вьет­на­ме и соз­да­ли серь­ёз­ную на­пря­жён­ность в кит.-вьетн. от­но­ше­ни­ях, ко­то­рая ещё боль­ше уси­ли­лась по­сле сде­лан­но­го К. в ию­ле 2008 пре­дос­те­ре­же­ния в ад­рес амер. неф­те­до­бы­ваю­щей ком­па­нии «Exxon Mobil Corp.» в свя­зи с раз­ви­ти­ем ею со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва с Вьет­на­мом в об­лас­ти раз­вед­ки и раз­ра­бот­ки ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний уг­ле­во­до­ро­дов в Юж­но-Ки­тай­ском мо­ре.

Рос.-кит. от­но­ше­ния по­сле 1994 при­об­ре­ли ус­той­чи­вую ди­на­ми­ку и раз­ви­ва­ют­ся в ду­хе кон­ст­рук­тив­но­го парт­нёр­ства, взаи­мо­дей­ст­вия и все­сто­рон­ней вза­им­ной под­держ­ки в ре­ше­нии клю­че­вых ме­ж­ду­нар. про­блем. Это­му во мно­гом спо­соб­ст­ву­ет яс­ная по­зи­ция РФ по тай­вань­ско­му и ти­бет­ско­му во­про­сам. Рос. пра­ви­тель­ст­во не­од­но­крат­но за­яв­ля­ло, что ру­ко­во­дству­ет­ся в сво­ей по­ли­ти­ке по­ло­же­ни­ем, со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му су­ще­ст­ву­ет толь­ко один К., пра­ви­тель­ст­во КНР яв­ля­ет­ся един­ст­вен­ным за­кон­ным кит. пра­ви­тель­ст­вом, пред­став­ля­ет весь К., а Тай­вань – не­отъ­ем­ле­мая часть К. Та­кой же не­отъ­ем­ле­мой ча­стью К. яв­ля­ет­ся и Ти­бет.

В апр. 1996 в Шан­хае, а за­тем в апр. 1997 в Мо­ск­ве КНР под­пи­са­ла с РФ, Ка­зах­ста­ном, Кир­ги­зи­ей и Тад­жи­ки­ста­ном со­гла­ше­ния об ук­ре­п­ле­нии мер до­ве­рия в во­ен. об­лас­ти и о вза­им­ном со­кра­ще­нии воо­руж. сил в рай­оне быв. сов.-кит. гра­ни­цы в це­лях пре­вра­ще­ния её в по­ло­су ми­ра, безо­пас­но­сти и доб­росо­сед­ст­ва. В 2001 К. ак­тив­но под­дер­жал идею соз­да­ния на ба­зе «Шан­хай­ской пя­тёр­ки» Шан­хай­ской ор­га­ни­за­ции со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва (ШОС), при­зван­ной стать важ­ным фак­то­ром под­дер­жа­ния ми­ра, безо­пас­но­сти и ста­биль­но­сти в ре­гио­не, раз­ви­тия все­сто­рон­не­го ре­гио­наль­но­го со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва и од­ним из опор­ных эле­мен­тов бу­ду­щей кон­ст­рук­ции мно­го­по­ляр­но­го ми­ра, на­ме­чен­ной со­вме­ст­ной рос.-кит. дек­ла­ра­ци­ей 1997 о мно­го­по­люс­ном ми­ро­уст­рой­ст­ве и соз­да­нии но­во­го ме­ж­ду­нар. по­ряд­ка.

С под­пи­са­ни­ем 16.7.2001 В. В. Пу­ти­ным и Цзян Цзэ­ми­нем До­го­во­ра о доб­ро­со­сед­ст­ве, друж­бе и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ве на­чал­ся но­вый этап раз­ви­тия рос.-кит. от­но­ше­ний, ха­рак­те­ри­зую­щий­ся пе­ре­хо­дом от кон­ст­рук­тив­но­го к стра­те­гич. парт­нёр­ст­ву и взаи­мо­дей­ст­вию. 14.10.2004 сто­ро­ны ут­вер­ди­ли План дей­ст­вий на 2005–08 по реа­ли­за­ции по­ло­же­ний это­го до­го­во­ра, а 1.7.2005 под­пи­са­ли Со­вме­ст­ную дек­ла­ра­цию о ме­ж­ду­нар. по­ряд­ке в 21 в. С за­клю­че­ни­ем 14.10.2004 До­пол­нит. про­то­ко­ла-опи­са­ния рос.-кит. гос. гра­ни­цы на её Вост. час­ти (всту­пил в си­лу 14.10.2008) по­гра­нич­ный во­прос в от­но­ше­ни­ях ме­ж­ду дву­мя стра­на­ми был пол­но­стью за­крыт.

В рам­ках реа­ли­за­ции До­го­во­ра о доб­ро­со­сед­ст­ве, друж­бе и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ве про­во­дят­ся ре­гу­ляр­ные встре­чи глав гос-в РФ и КНР (офиц. ви­зи­ты, дву­сто­рон­ние кон­так­ты в рам­ках сам­ми­тов ШОС и АТЭС, «на по­лях» сам­ми­тов «вось­мёр­ки»). Важ­ным эле­мен­том дву­сто­рон­них от­но­ше­ний и прак­тич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва во всех сфе­рах яв­ля­ет­ся дей­ст­вую­щий с 1996 ме­ха­низм ре­гу­ляр­ных (еже­год­ных) встреч глав пра­ви­тельств двух стран, в рам­ках ко­то­ро­го дей­ст­ву­ет ок. 40 ко­мис­сий, под­ко­мис­сий и ра­бо­чих групп. Ме­ж­ду Пра­ви­тель­ст­вом РФ и Гос. со­ве­том КНР ус­та­нов­лена «го­ря­чая» ли­ния те­ле­фон­ной свя­зи. Еже­год­но со­вер­шен­ст­ву­ет­ся до­го­вор­ная ба­за дву­сто­рон­них от­но­ше­ний. Все­го на меж­го­су­дарств. и меж­пра­ви­тельств. уров­не РФ и КНР под­пи­са­но ок. 400 до­го­во­ров и со­гла­ше­ний, ко­то­рые ох­ва­ты­ва­ют прак­ти­че­ски все об­лас­ти дву­сто­рон­не­го со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва.


Встреча Президента Российской Федерации Д. А. Медведева и Председателя КНР Ху Цзиньтао. Лима (Перу). 23.11.2008.

Вы­со­кой ди­на­ми­кой в 21 в. ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся раз­ви­тие рос.-кит. эко­но­мич. от­но­ше­ний. В 2007 Рос­сия за­ня­ла 7-е ме­сто сре­ди внеш­не­тор­го­вых парт­нё­ров КНР. То­ва­ро­обо­рот ме­ж­ду дву­мя стра­на­ми со­ста­вил 48,16 млрд. долл. (до­ля РФ в об­щем то­ва­ро­обо­ро­те КНР – 2,2%). В со­от­вет­ст­вии с при­ня­той в 2005 про­грам­мой раз­ви­тия рос.-кит. тор­го­во-эко­но­мич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва на 2006–10 на­ме­ча­ет­ся, что в бли­жай­шие го­ды то­ва­ро­обо­рот ме­ж­ду РФ и КНР дос­тиг­нет 60–80 млрд. долл., а так­же зна­чи­тель­но уве­ли­чит­ся объ­ём вза­им­ных ин­ве­сти­ций. Осн. стать­я­ми рос. экс­пор­та в К. яв­ля­ют­ся: нефть и неф­те­про­дук­ты, дре­ве­си­на и из­де­лия из неё, про­дук­ция хи­мич. пром-сти и удоб­ре­ния, про­дук­ция с. х-ва, ме­тал­лы и из­де­лия из них. В кит. им­пор­те в Рос­сию пре­об­ла­да­ют из­де­лия лёг­кой, пре­ж­де все­го тек­стиль­ной, пром-сти, элек­тро­ни­ка и ма­ши­но­тех­нич. про­дук­ция, пром. то­ва­ры, в т. ч. про­дук­ция чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии. С рос. уча­сти­ем в кит. пров. Цзян­су со­ору­жает­ся АЭС «Тянь­вань». В 2008 начаты дву­сто­рон­ние кон­суль­та­ции по энер­ге­тич. воп­ро­сам. Раз­ви­ва­ет­ся рос.-кит. во­ен.-тех­нич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­во. В окт. 2008 в хо­де 13-й ре­гу­ляр­ной встре­чи глав пра­ви­тельств РФ и КНР в Мо­ск­ве бы­ли под­пи­са­ны Со­гла­ше­ния о прин­ци­пах строи­тель­ст­ва и экс­плуа­та­ции неф­те­про­во­да «Ско­во­ро­ди­но – гра­ни­ца с КНР», Ме­мо­ран­дум о взаи­мо­по­ни­ма­нии по со­труд­ни­че­ст­ву в неф­тя­ной сфе­ре, Со­гла­ше­ние о соз­да­нии сою­за стра­те­гич. со­труд­ни­че­ст­ва по на­но­тех­но­ло­ги­ям, дос­тиг­нут ряд до­го­во­рён­но­стей о со­вме­ст­ном фи­нан­си­ро­ва­нии рос.-кит. про­ек­тов и др. Сто­ро­ны вы­ра­зи­ли го­тов­ность рас­смот­реть воз­мож­ность объ­е­ди­не­ния уси­лий двух стран в це­лях борь­бы с ми­ро­вым фи­нан­со­во-эко­но­мич. кри­зи­сом. 15.11.2008 ут­верж­дён План дей­ст­вий на 2009–12 по реа­ли­за­ции по­ло­же­ний До­го­во­ра о доб­ро­со­сед­ст­ве, друж­бе и со­труд­ни­че­ст­ве.

Хозяйство

К. от­но­сит­ся к чис­лу круп­ней­ших и наи­бо­лее ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­ваю­щих­ся стран ми­ра. По объ­ё­му ВВП – 6991 млрд. долл. (по па­ри­те­ту по­ку­па­тель­ной спо­соб­но­сти, 2007) – за­ни­ма­ет 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США (10,8% ми­ро­во­го ВВП); объ­ём ВВП на ду­шу на­се­ле­ния 5292 долл. Ин­декс че­ло­ве­че­ско­го раз­ви­тия 0,777 (2005; 81-е ме­сто сре­ди 177 го­су­дарств ми­ра).

Тем­пы рос­та ВВП 11,4% в 2007 (11,1% в 2006). В нач. 21 в. К. вы­шел на по­зи­ции ми­ро­во­го ли­де­ра в про­из-ве ши­ро­ко­го ас­сор­ти­мен­та пром. и с.-х. про­дук­ции (см. так­же Ки­тай. Ис­то­ри­че­ский очерк). Ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­ва­ет­ся внеш­няя тор­гов­ля, улуч­ша­ет­ся струк­ту­ра эк­спор­та и им­пор­та. Сре­ди раз­ви­ваю­щих­ся стран ми­ра К. яв­ля­ет­ся ли­де­ром по прив­ле­че­нию иностр. ка­пи­та­ла. За 1979–2007 в эко­но­ми­ку вло­же­но 766,7 млрд. долл. пря­мых иностр. ин­ве­сти­ций. Ка­пи­та­ло­вло­же­ния ве­ду­щих меж­ду­нар. кор­по­ра­ций иг­ра­ют ве­со­мую роль в раз­ви­тии ав­то­мо­би­ле­ст­рое­ния, про­из-ва из­де­лий бы­то­вой тех­ни­ки и эле­кт­ро­ни­ки, совр. средств свя­зи и др. На пред­прия­тия с иностр. ин­ве­сти­ция­ми при­хо­ди­тся зна­чит. часть сто­и­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции и внеш­не­тор­го­во­го обо­ро­та стра­ны. Взят курс (с 2006) на по­сте­пен­ное свёр­ты­ва­ние опе­ра­ций, свя­зан­ных с да­валь­че­ской пе­ре­ра­бот­кой сы­рья, а так­же сбор­кой из­де­лий из ком­по­нен­тов и по об­раз­цам за­ру­беж­ных за­каз­чи­ков. В нач. 21 в. эко­но­ми­ка К. ис­пы­ты­ва­ет острую по­треб­ность в до­пол­нит. внеш­них ис­точ­ни­ках сы­рья и рын­ках сбы­та; по­ощ­ря­ет­ся дея­тель­ность кит. биз­не­са в др. стра­нах, на­чал­ся вы­воз ка­пи­та­ла (объ­ём пря­мых кит. ин­ве­сти­ций за ру­бе­жом – 18,7 млрд. долл., 2007). Осн. за­да­ча­ми эко­но­мич. раз­ви­тия на 2000–20 объ­яв­ле­ны: в 4 ра­за уве­ли­чить объ­ём ВВП в рас­чё­те на ду­шу на­се­ле­ния и вы­ве­сти К. на уро­вень жиз­ни, со­от­вет­ст­вую­щий сред­не­ми­ро­вым по­ка­за­те­лям; прев­ра­тить стра­ну из «ми­ро­вой фаб­ри­ки», про­из­во­дя­щей про­дук­цию на ос­но­ве за­им­ст­во­ван­ных тех­но­ло­гий, в один из ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых ин­но­ва­ци­он­ных це­нт­ров.

В струк­ту­ре ВВП до­ля пром-сти и стро­и­тель­ст­ва со­став­ля­ет 49,2% (2007; 44,8% в 1982), сфе­ры ус­луг – 39,1% (21,8%), сель­ско­го хо­зяй­ст­ва – 11,7% (33,4%).

Промышленность

Важ­ней­ший и наи­бо­лее ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­ваю­щий­ся сек­тор эко­но­ми­ки. Рост пром. про­из-ва со­ста­вил 12,9% в 2007 (22,9% в 2006). На до­лю от­рас­лей об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей пром-сти при­хо­дит­ся 86,7% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции, гор­но­до­бы­ваю­щей – 6,1%, элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ки, те­п­ло-, га­зо- и во­до­снаб­же­ния – 7,2% (2006). Важ­ней­шие от­рас­ли об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей пром-сти: ма­ши­но­строе­ние и ме­тал­ло­об­ра­бот­ка, хи­ми­че­ская (в т. ч. неф­те­хи­мич. и хи­ми­ко-фар­ма­цев­тич.), чёр­ная и цвет­ная ме­тал­лур­гия, лёг­кая и пи­ще­вая. В клю­че­вых от­рас­лях ве­ду­щее ме­сто за­ни­ма­ют круп­ные мно­го­про­филь­ные гос. кор­по­ра­ции.

В струк­ту­ре энер­го­по­треб­ле­ния на уголь (ка­мен­ный и бу­рый) при­хо­дит­ся 70,2%, нефть – 20,6%, при­род­ный газ – 3,0%, гид­ро­энер­гию – 5,5%, атом­ную энер­гию – 0,7%.

До­бы­ча неф­ти 186,7 млн. т в 2007 (162,6 млн. т в 2000); гл. обр. ма­ло­сер­ни­стая, ок. 1/5 – тя­жё­лая нефть. Св. 2/3 объ­ё­мов до­бы­чи при­хо­дит­ся на сев.-вост. и сев.-зап. рай­оны стра­ны; ок. 15% неф­ти до­бы­ва­ют на шель­фе зал. Бо­хай Жёл­то­го м., а так­же в Юж­но-Ки­тай­ском м.; к 2010 объ­ё­мы неф­те­до­бы­чи на мор. шель­фе пла­ни­ру­ет­ся до­ве­сти до 50 млн. т в год. Все­го на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся до 600 неф­те­про­мы­слов (576 в 2005). Круп­ней­шие неф­те­про­мыс­лы на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке К. – Да­цин­ские (на рав­ни­не Сун­ляо, пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; ок. 40 млн. т, или св. 1/5 об­ще­го объ­ё­ма до­бы­чи в 2007) и Ляо­хэ (пров. Ляо­нин; 12 млн. т). В ниж­нем те­че­нии р. Ху­ан­хэ (пров. Шань­дун) рас­по­ло­же­ны неф­те­про­мыс­лы Шэн­ли (28 млн. т). Рас­тут объ­ё­мы до­бы­чи неф­ти на се­ве­ро-за­па­де К. – в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не (здесь на­хо­дит­ся ста­рей­шее из раз­ра­ба­ты­вае­мых в стра­не неф­тя­ных ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний – Ка­ра­май; ок. 12 млн. т в 2007), а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Шэнь­си, Цин­хай и Гань­су. К. – 2-й в ми­ре (по­сле США) по­тре­би­тель сы­рой неф­ти (349,8 млн. т в 2006; 223,6 млн. т в 2000), а так­же её нет­то-им­портёр (с 1993). Чис­тый им­порт (им­порт ми­нус экс­порт) неф­ти 159,3 млн. т (2007), или ок. 46% все­го объ­ё­ма по­треб­ле­ния; по про­гно­зам, к 2020 сте­пень за­ви­си­мо­сти от внеш­них по­ста­вок воз­рас­тёт до 60%. Осн. по­став­щи­ки неф­ти – Иран, Сау­дов­ская Ара­вия, Ан­го­ла, Рос­сия, Оман.

Неф­те­пе­ре­ра­бот­ка – од­на из наи­бо­лее бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ваю­щих­ся от­рас­лей пром-сти К. Мощ­ность неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щих за­во­дов (НПЗ) 7029 тыс. барр./сут в 2006 (5407 в 2000); про­из-во неф­те­про­дук­тов 195 млн. т. Ве­ду­щие цен­тры неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей пром-сти сев.-вост. час­ти К. (пред­при­ятия рай­она ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­ны пре­им. на пе­ре­ра­бот­ку ме­ст­но­го сы­рья): Да­цин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; НПЗ мощ­но­стью 11 млн. т в год), Фу­шунь (пров. Ляо­нин; 3 НПЗ сум­мар­ной мощ­но­стью 10 млн. т), Цзи­линь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь); НПЗ мощ­но­стью 7 млн. т]. Как ки­тай­скую, так и им­порт­ную нефть пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют пред­при­ятия го­ро­дов, рас­по­ло­жен­ных в при­мор­ской час­ти пров. Ляо­нин: Да­лянь (2 НПЗ мощ­но­стью 20 и 10 млн. т), Цзинь­чжоу (НПЗ мощ­но­стью 7 млн. т), Ху­лу­дао (НПЗ мощ­но­стью 6,5 млн. т). На се­ве­ре К. дей­ст­ву­ют круп­ные НПЗ на им­порт­ной и ки­тай­ской неф­ти: в Пе­ки­не (Янь­шань­ский НПЗ мощ­но­стью 8,5 млн. т в год), Лоя­не (пров. Хэ­нань; 8,0 млн. т), Тянь­цзи­не (6 млн. т); ряд НПЗ в пров. Шань­дун (наи­бо­лее круп­ный – «Ци­лу» в г. Цзы­бо мощ­но­стью 10,5 млн. т). Ве­ду­щие цен­тры неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей пром-сти в дель­те р. Янц­зы: Шан­хай (2 НПЗ мощ­но­стью 14 и 11 млн. т; ис­поль­зу­ют им­порт­ную нефть), Нин­бо (пров. Чжэц­зян; НПЗ «Чжэнь­хай»; св. 20 млн. т; круп­ней­ший кит. экс­пор­тёр неф­те­про­дук­тов), Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су; 2 НПЗ мощ­но­стью 14 и 8 млн. т; на­ря­ду с ки­тай­ской, ра­бо­та­ют на им­порт­ной неф­ти). В центр. час­ти К. сфор­ми­ро­вал­ся ком­плекс пред­при­ятий, пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щих нефть из др. рай­онов стра­ны: в Ань­цине (пров. Ань­хой; НПЗ мощ­но­стью 5,5 млн. т), Чан­ли­не (пров. Ху­нань; 5,5 млн. т), Уха­не и Цзин­мы­не (пров. Ху­бэй; по 5 млн. т). Круп­ные НПЗ на юге стра­ны ра­бо­та­ют пре­им. на им­порт­ном сы­рье: в Гу­ан­чжоу (НПЗ мощ­но­стью 15,7 млн. т), Мао­ми­не (пров. Гу­ан­дун; 13,5 млн. т), на о. Хай­нань (8 млн. т). Гл. неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щее пред­при­ятие на се­ве­ро-за­па­де К. – НПЗ в Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су; дей­ст­ву­ет с 1958; мощ­ность 10,5 млн. т в 2007).

До­бы­ча при­род­но­го го­рю­че­го га­за (в т. ч. попутно из нефтяных мес­то­рож­де­ний) 69,3 млрд. м3 (2007; 27,2 млрд. м3 в 2000). Пред­при­ни­ма­ют­ся зна­чит. уси­лия для ус­ко­рен­но­го рос­та объ­ё­мов до­бы­чи с це­лью по­вы­шения до­ли при­род­но­го га­за в струк­ту­ре энер­го­по­треб­ле­ния стра­ны (до 5,3% в 2010; 10% в 2020). Осн. рай­оны до­бы­чи: Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н (28% об­ще­го объ­ё­ма в 2006; Та­рим­ский неф­те­га­зо­нос­ный бас­сейн и др.), про­вин­ции Сы­чу­ань (27%), Шэнь­си (14%) и др.; при­род­ный газ до­бы­ва­ют так­же на шель­фе Юж­но-Ки­тай­ско­го мо­ря. Гл. про­бле­ма от­рас­ли – тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ный раз­рыв ме­ж­ду осн. рай­она­ми до­бы­чи го­рю­чих га­зов (на за­па­де стра­ны) и по­треб­ле­ния (гл. обр. в вост. районах К.). Для ре­ше­ния про­бле­мы де­фи­ци­та го­рю­чих га­зов (воз­ник в 2008) на­ча­лось со­зда­ние при­пор­то­вых ком­плек­сов при­ём­ки и ре­га­зи­фи­ка­ции им­порт­но­го сжи­жен­но­го при­род­но­го га­за. По ис­поль­зо­ва­нию го­рю­чих га­зов уголь­ных шахт (ме­та­на и др.) К. ус­ту­па­ет лишь США.

Ве­ду­щая неф­те- и га­зо­до­бы­ваю­щая ком­па­ния – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China Na­tional Petroleum Corp.» (CNPC), ко­то­рой при­над­ле­жит б. ч. до­бы­ваю­щих ак­ти­вов К. (пре­им. на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке и за­па­де стра­ны, вклю­чая неф­тя­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния Да­цин и Ляо­хэ); ком­па­ния ве­дёт до­бы­чу и раз­вед­ку неф­ти и га­за в 27 стра­нах ми­ра, в т. ч. в Ира­не, Су­да­не, Ве­не­су­эле, Ка­зах­ста­не (в 2005 при­об­ре­ла ка­над. ком­па­нию «PetroKazakh­stan»). До­бы­ча неф­ти пред­при­ятия­ми CNPC в К. со­став­ля­ет 106,6 млн. т (2006; ок. 58% об­ще­го объ­ё­ма до­бы­чи), в за­ру­беж­ных стра­нах – 28,1 млн. т; до­бы­ча при­род­но­го го­рю­че­го га­за в К. – 44,2 млрд. м3 (75,5%), за ру­бе­жом – 3,8 млрд. м3. В 1999 соз­да­на ком­па­ния «PetroChina» (до­чер­няя струк­ту­ра CNPC) – 2-я в ми­ре (по­сле «ExxonMobil») по раз­ме­рам ры­ноч­ной ка­пи­та­ли­за­ции (2008). 2-е мес­то по объ­ё­мам до­бы­чи и 1-е по обо­ро­там в неф­те­га­зо­вом сек­то­ре К. при­над­ле­жит груп­пе ком­па­ний «Sinopec Group»; в 2000 её луч­шие ак­ти­вы вы­де­ле­ны в пуб­лич­ную ком­па­нию «Chi­na Pet­roleum and Che­mical Corp.» («Si­no­pec Corp.»; ве­дёт до­бы­чу неф­ти и при­род­но­го га­за гл. обр. на юге и вос­то­ке стра­ны; ли­ди­ру­ет в неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей пром-сти К. – го­до­вая мощ­ность её НПЗ 176,1 млн. т, 2006). Круп­ная гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China National Offshore Oil Corp.» (CNOOC) за­ни­ма­ет­ся раз­вед­кой и до­бы­чей неф­ти и при­род­но­го га­за в тер­ри­то­ри­аль­ных во­дах К., а так­же при­вле­че­ни­ем в от­расль иностр. ин­ве­сто­ров.

К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по объ­ё­мам до­бы­чи уг­ля (2536 млн. т в 2007; ок. 40% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи). Она еже­год­но воз­рас­та­ет (1299 млн. т в 2000; 1080 млн. т в 1990; 618 млн. т в 1978), к 2012 объ­ё­мы до­бы­чи пла­ни­ру­ет­ся до­ве­сти до 3 млрд. т. Осн. часть уг­ля добывается под­зем­ным спо­со­бом. Уголь­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния име­ют­ся в боль­шин­ст­ве про­вин­ций и ав­то­ном­ных рай­онов К. Гл. центры угледо­бы­чи рас­по­ложены на севере и северо-востоке стра­ны. Осо­бен­но вы­де­ля­ют­ся: пров. Шань­си (ок. 25% объ­ё­мов до­бы­чи ка­мен­ных уг­лей в 2006; наи­бо­лее круп­ное ме­сто­рож­де­ние – Да­тун), а так­же ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия (13% уг­ле­до­бы­чи), про­вин­ции Хэ­нань (8,4%), Шэнь­си (7,6%), Шань­дун (5,9%), Гуй­чжоу (5,1%), Хэй­лунц­зян (4,2%). Ок. 1/3 уг­ля про­дол­жают до­бы­вать на мел­ких шах­тах, где ост­ро сто­ят про­бле­мы безо­пас­но­сти тру­да (к нач. 2007 ок. 1/2 мел­ких шахт за­кры­то).

По­треб­ле­ние уг­ля св. 2,5 млрд. т (2007). В струк­ту­ре по­треб­ле­ния воз­рас­та­ет до­ля уг­лей, при­год­ных для кок­со­ва­ния (ок. 16% в 2007). Экс­порт уг­ля (53 млн. т в год) по­сте­пен­но со­кра­ща­ется из-за по­сто­ян­но­го по­вы­шаю­ще­го­ся внутр. спро­са, 2/3 объ­ё­мов экс­пор­та при­хо­дит­ся на Рес­пуб­ли­ку Ко­рея и Япо­нию. Рас­тёт им­порт уг­ля (51 млн. т), пре­им. из Вьет­на­ма и Ин­до­не­зии. В струк­ту­ре по­треб­ле­ния уг­ля вы­де­ля­ют­ся (2007): элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ка (53%), чёр­ная ме­тал­лур­гия (12,8%), про­из-во стро­ит. ма­те­риа­лов (12%), хи­мич. пром-сть (5,8%).

Круп­ней­шая уг­ле­до­бы­ваю­щая ком­па­ния К. – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China Shen­hua Energy» (вхо­дит в «Shenhua Group»; объ­ём до­бы­чи ок. 150 млн. т в 2007, 2-е мес­то в ми­ре по­сле амер. «Peabody Ener­gy»; 21 шах­та в сев. и зап. час­тях стра­ны); пла­ни­ру­ет на­чать про­из-во жид­ко­го то­п­ли­ва из уг­ля по собств. тех­но­ло­гии. Гос. ком­па­ния «China Coal Energy» (12 шахт) по мас­шта­бам до­бы­чи уг­ля за­нима­ет 2-е мес­то в К. и 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре. Сре­ди др. круп­ных уг­ле­до­бы­ваю­щих ком­па­ний – гос. кор­по­ра­ции «Da­tong Coal Mining Group», «Yan­kuang Group Company Ltd.», «Fushun Mining Group», «Huaibei Coal Mining Group», «Huai­nan Coal Mi­ning Group», «Kailuan Group». Пла­ни­ру­ет­ся: ре­фор­ми­ро­вать ор­га­ни­зац. струк­ту­ру от­рас­ли; к 2010 соз­дать 6–8 ком­па­ний с еже­год­ны­ми объ­ё­ма­ми до­бы­чи св. 100 млн. т уг­ля каждая, а так­же 8–10 ком­па­ний, до­бы­ваю­щих св. 50 млн. т каж­дая.

Ин­тен­сив­но раз­ви­ва­ет­ся атом­ная пром-сть. До­бы­ча руд ура­на (840 т в пе­ре­счё­те на ок­сид ура­на, 2006) при­мер­но на 1/2 обес­пе­чи­ва­ет по­треб­но­сти атом­ной энер­ге­ти­ки К. (им­порт кон­цен­тра­тов ура­на – из Ка­зах­ста­на, Ка­на­ды, Рос­сии, На­ми­бии и др.). До­бы­ча ве­дёт­ся от­кры­тым и под­зем­ным спо­со­ба­ми в пров. Цзян­си (Фуч­жоу и Чунъи), в шах­тах про­вин­ций Шэнь­си (Лань­тянь) и Ляо­нин (Бэнь­си), а так­же ме­то­дом под­зем­но­го вы­ще­ла­чи­ва­ния в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не. Ра­бо­та­ют 2 кон­вер­си­он­ных за­во­да – в Лань­чжоу и Ди­во­пу (пров. Гань­су). Пред­при­ятия по обо­га­ще­нию ура­на (на рос. обо­ру­до­ва­нии) дей­ст­ву­ют в Хань­чжу­не (пров. Шэнь­си) и Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су). Обо­га­ще­ние ура­на для К. (из кит. руд) час­тич­но осу­щест­в­ля­ет­ся на ев­роп. пред­при­яти­ях герм.-брит.-ни­дерл. ком­па­ни­ей «Urenco Group». Ура­но­вое то­п­ли­во про­из­во­дит­ся на за­во­дах в го­ро­дах Ибинь (пров. Сы­чу­ань) и Бао­тоу (ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия). Ис­поль­зу­ет­ся так­же ядер­ное то­п­ли­во, им­пор­ти­руе­мое из Фран­ции. До­бы­чу ура­на, все ста­дии про­из-ва ядер­но­го то­п­ли­ва (и ядер­ных бо­е­при­па­сов), а так­же строи­тель­ст­во и экс­плуа­та­цию АЭС осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют две гос. кор­по­ра­ции – «China Na­tional Nu­clear Corp.» (CNNC) и «China Nuclear Engineering & Construction (Group) Corp.» (CNECC).


ГЭС «Санься» («Три ущелья») на р. Янцзы.

На до­лю элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ки при­хо­дит­ся 6,8% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции (2006). Ус­та­нов­лен­ная мощ­ность элек­тро­стан­ций св. 700 тыс. МВт (2007; пла­ни­ру­ет­ся уве­ли­че­ние до 900 тыс. МВт к 2010). Про­из-во элек­тро­энер­гии 3256 млрд. кВт·ч (2007; 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США), из них на ТЭС при­хо­дит­ся 83%, на ГЭС – 14%, на АЭС – 2%, на вет­ро­вые энер­го­ус­та­нов­ки – 0,1%, на про­чие ви­ды ге­не­ри­рую­щих мощ­но­стей, ис­поль­зую­щих во­зоб­нов­ляе­мые ис­точ­ни­ки энер­гии, – 0,9%. Сре­ди ТЭС, ра­бо­таю­щих на уг­ле: «Кэ­мынь» (пров. Фу­цзянь; 10400 МВт; круп­ней­шая в Азии), «Бэй­лунь» (3000 МВт) и «Юйху­ань» (2000 МВт; обе – в пров. Чжэц­зян), «Ян­чэн» (пров. Шань­си; 2100 МВт), «Вай­гао­цяо» (ГЦП Шан­хай; 1000 МВт). Стро­ит­ся (2008) круп­ная ТЭС на при­род­ном га­зе в Шан­хае. Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся про­грам­ма за­кры­тия мел­ких ма­ло­рен­та­бель­ных ТЭС, за­гряз­няю­щих ок­ру­жаю­щую сре­ду.


Тяньваньская АЭС в провинции Цзянсу.


ЗАО «Атомстройэкспорт»

Боль­шое вни­ма­ние уде­ля­ет­ся раз­ви­тию гид­ро­энер­ге­ти­ки. Вве­дён в эк­сплу­а­та­цию (кон. 2008) по­след­ний энер­го­блок круп­ней­шей в ми­ре ГЭС «Сань­ся» («Три уще­лья») на р. Янц­зы (близ г. Ичан, в пров. Ху­бэй). Об­щая ус­та­нов­лен­ная мощ­ность 26 энер­го­бло­ков ГЭС 18,2 тыс. МВт. При соз­да­нии во­до­хра­ни­ли­ща ГЭС (дли­на 660 км, ср. ши­ри­на св. 1,1 км) бы­ло за­то­п­ле­но св. 27,8 тыс. га зе­мель и пе­ре­се­ле­но ок. 1,5 млн. чел. ГЭС «Сань­ся» ста­нет цен­тром фор­ми­рую­щей­ся объ­е­ди­нён­ной энер­го­сис­те­мы К. Сре­ди др. круп­ных ГЭС: «Лун­тань» на р. Хун­шуй­хэ в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не (4,9 тыс. МВт), «Эр­тань» на р. Ялун­цзян в пров. Сы­чу­ань (3,3 тыс. МВт), «Гэч­жо­уба» на р. Ян­цзы в пров. Ху­бэй (2,7 тыс. МВт) и др. Кас­кад из 18 гид­ро­уз­лов в ве­рх­нем и сред­нем те­че­нии р. Ху­ан­хэ (гид­ро­узел «Сань­шэн­гун» в ав­то­ном­ном р-не Внутр. Мон­го­лия пред­наз­на­чен для ир­ри­га­ции, ос­таль­ные – гл. обр. для про­из-ва элек­т­ро­энер­гии). Со­ору­жа­ет­ся (2009) ещё 7 пло­тин на р. Ху­ан­хэ, вклю­чая ГЭС «Ла­си­ва» в пров. Цин­хай (про­ек­т­ная мощ­ность 4,2 тыс. МВт). Стро­ят­ся (2009): ГЭС «Си­лоу­ду» (12,6 тыс. МВт) и «Сян­цзя­ба» (6,4 тыс. МВт) на р. Цзинь­ша­цзян (уча­сток вер­хо­вья р. Ян­цзы) в пров. Юнь­нань, «Цзинь­пин» на р. Ялун­цзян в пров. Сы­чуань (4,8 тыс. МВт), «Сяо­вань» на р. Лань­цан­цзян (Ме­конг) в пров. Юнь­нань (4,2 тыс. МВт), «Пу­бу­гоу» на р. Ян­цзы в пров. Сы­чуань (3,3 тыс. МВт), «Го­упи­тан» на р. Уц­зян (при­ток Ян­цзы) в пров. Гуй­чжоу (3,0 тыс. МВт) и др. К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по ко­ли­че­ст­ву ма­лых ГЭС (с гид­ро­аг­ре­га­та­ми мощ­но­стью до 50 МВт), обес­пе­чи­ваю­щих элек­тро­энер­ги­ей сель­ские рай­оны, в осн. в центр. и зап. час­тях стра­ны; все­го св. 40 тыс. ма­лых ГЭС об­щей ус­та­нов­лен­ной мощ­но­стью св. 40 тыс. МВт (2006).

Ус­ко­рен­ны­ми тем­па­ми раз­ви­ва­ет­ся атом­ная энер­ге­ти­ка. Дей­ст­ву­ют 11 атом­ных ре­ак­то­ров на че­ты­рёх АЭС (2008): Дая­вань­ская (мощ­но­стью 1890 МВт), «Ли­нао» (1870 МВт; обе – в пров. Гу­ан­дун; по­строе­ны по франц. тех­но­ло­гии), Тянь­вань­ская (пров. Цзян­су; 2 ре­ак­то­ра об­щей мощ­но­стью 2120 МВт; со­з­да­ны при уча­стии и по тех­но­ло­гии рос. гос. кор­по­ра­ции «Ро­са­том», пре­ду­смот­ре­но со­ору­же­ние ещё 2 ре­ак­то­ров), Цинь­шань­ская (пров. Чжэц­зян; 2830 МВт; по кит. тех­но­ло­гии). К 2020 пла­ни­ру­ет­ся уве­ли­чить ус­та­нов­лен­ные мощ­но­сти АЭС до 40 тыс. МВт, а их до­лю в струк­ту­ре вы­ра­бот­ки элек­тро­энер­гии до 5%. Стро­ят­ся АЭС (2009): «Ян­цзян» в пров. Гуан­дун (про­ек­т­ная мощ­ность 6000 МВт), «Хунъ­янь­хэ» на гра­ни­це с Мон­го­ли­ей (4320 МВт), «Нин­дэ» (пров. Фуц­зянь; 2160 МВт), «Сань­мынь» (пров. Чжэ­цзян; 2200 МВт). Об­щая мощ­ность энер­го­бло­ков вет­ро­вых эле­кт­ро­стан­ций ок. 10 тыс. МВт (2008). Со­ору­жа­ют­ся сол­неч­ные, при­лив­ные эле­кт­ро­стан­ции, а так­же ТЭС, ис­поль­зую­щие в ка­че­ст­ве то­п­ли­ва со­ло­му; вве­де­на в строй (2007) пер­вая ТЭС, ра­бо­таю­щая за счёт сжи­га­ния му­со­ра.

В осн. за­вер­ше­но (2007) объ­е­ди­не­ние 6 кит. энер­го­сис­тем Вос­точ­но­го, Се­вер­но­го, Се­ве­ро-Вос­точ­но­го, Цен­траль­но­го, Се­ве­ро-За­пад­но­го, Юж­но­го К. Об­щая про­тя­жён­ность ЛЭП (на­пря­же­ни­ем 220 кВ и вы­ше) св. 291,4 тыс. км (2007). В рам­ках со­гла­ше­ния об им­пор­те элек­тро­энер­гии из Рос­сии (еже­год­но 3,6–4,3 млрд. кВт·ч в 2008–10, до 60 млрд. кВт·ч с 2015) пла­ни­ру­ет­ся со­ору­же­ние ря­да ЛЭП (500–800 кВ), ко­то­рые со­еди­нят энер­го­сис­те­мы рос. Даль­не­го Вос­то­ка и Сев.-Вост. К. (в пер­вую оче­редь элек­тро­энер­гия бу­дет по­став­лять­ся в про­вин­ции Хэй­лунц­зян и Ляо­нин).

В сфе­ре про­из-ва и рас­пре­де­ле­ния элек­тро­энер­гии дей­ст­ву­ют 11 гос. кор­по­ра­ций. Пять наи­бо­лее круп­ных – «Chi­na Datang Corp.», «China Guodian Corp.», «China Power Investment Group», «Chi­na Huadian Corp.» и «China Huaneng Corp.» (в их до­чер­них ком­па­ни­ях уча­ст­ву­ет ча­ст­ный, в т. ч. ино­ст­ран­ный, ка­пи­тал) экс­плуа­ти­ру­ют ге­не­ри­рую­щие мощ­но­сти; до­ля ка­ж­дой ком­па­нии в об­щем объ­ё­ме про­из-ва элек­тро­энер­гии – ме­нее 20%. Две гос. кор­по­ра­ции («Chi­na State Grid Corp.» и «China Southern Power Grid Corp.») осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют пе­ре­да­чу элек­тро­энер­гии, ос­таль­ные за­ня­ты в со­пут­ст­вую­щих об­лас­тях элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ки.

Чёр­ная ме­тал­лур­гия – од­на из гл. ба­зо­вых от­рас­лей пром-сти (8,4% сто­и­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции, 2006), в нач. 21 в. раз­ви­ва­ет­ся стре­ми­тель­ны­ми тем­па­ми (сред­не­го­до­вой рост про­из-ва св. 20% в 2000–06). По объ­ё­мам про­из-ва осн. ви­дов про­дук­ции К. ли­ди­ру­ет в ми­ре, зна­чи­тель­но пре­вос­хо­дя Япо­нию, США, Рос­сию и Гер­ма­нию вме­сте взя­тые.

Пред­при­ятия от­рас­ли в осн. ис­поль­зу­ют отеч. ре­сур­сы сы­рья и то­п­ли­ва. До­бы­ча руд же­ле­за 292 млн. т (в пе­ре­счё­те на же­ле­зо­руд­ный кон­цен­трат, 2007; 245 млн. т в 2006). Ру­ды же­ле­за (в осн. низ­ко­го ка­че­ст­ва; ср. со­дер­жа­ние же­ле­за ок. 33%) до­бы­ва­ют в боль­шин­ст­ве про­вин­ций и ав­то­ном­ных рай­онов К. (все­го 3867 цен­тров до­бы­чи, 2006). Св. 60% объ­ё­мов до­бы­чи (ве­дёт­ся пре­им. от­кры­тым спо­со­бом) при­хо­дит­ся на про­вин­ции Хэ­бэй и Ляо­нин, вы­де­ля­ют­ся так­же ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия, про­вин­ции Сы­чу­ань и Шань­дун. Б. ч. раз­ра­ба­ты­вае­мых ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний – мел­кие; на до­лю 34 круп­ных ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний при­хо­дит­ся 45% все­го объ­ё­ма до­бычи (2006). В круп­ней­шем в стра­не Ань­шань­ском же­ле­зо­руд­ном бас­сей­не до­бы­чу ве­дёт ком­па­ния «Anshan Iron and Steel Corp.» (пров. Ляо­нин; ок. 15 млн. т ру­ды в 2005). С нач. 21 в. осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся ре­ор­га­ни­за­ция от­рас­ли, ли­к­ви­да­ция мел­ких и ма­ло­рен­та­бель­ных руд­ни­ков. Стре­ми­тель­ный рост про­из-ва чёр­ных ме­тал­лов при­во­дит к су­ще­ст­вен­но­му уве­ли­че­нию объ­ё­мов им­пор­та сы­рья (384 млн. т же­лез­ной ру­ды, или ок. 57% внутр. по­треб­ле­ния, 2007; св. 1/2 все­го объ­ё­ма ми­ро­вой тор­гов­ли), пре­им. из Ав­ст­ра­лии, Бра­зи­лии и Ин­дии. По­треб­ле­ние ме­тал­ло­ло­ма 67 млн. т (2005). К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер до­бы­чи руд мар­ган­ца (11 млн. т в 2006); сре­ди гл. цен­тров до­бы­чи – Дасинь (Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н), Чэн­коу (ГЦП Чун­цин), Вань­до­ушань (пров. Юнь­нань), Чанъ­ян (пров. Ху­бэй). Из-за низ­ко­го ка­че­ст­ва отеч. сы­рья про­из­во­ди­те­ли вы­ну­ж­де­ны ис­поль­зо­вать его в сме­си с при­воз­ны­ми ру­да­ми из Ав­ст­ра­лии, Га­бо­на и др. стран (им­порт руд мар­ган­ца св. 6,6 млн. т в 2007). До­бы­ча хро­ми­тов обес­пе­чи­ва­ет ок. 12–15% внутр. по­треб­но­стей; осн. часть не­об­хо­ди­мо­го сы­рья вво­зит­ся, пре­им. из Ин­дии. На до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 30% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи ва­на­дия (2-е ме­сто в ми­ре; в пров. Сы­чуань и др.). По­треб­но­сти в уг­ле, при­год­ном для про­из-ва кок­са, пол­но­стью обес­пе­чи­ва­ют­ся за счёт до­бы­чи внут­ри стра­ны. Про­из-во кок­са 328 млн. т в 2007 (60% об­ще­ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва), экс­порт го­то­во­го кок­са 15,3 млн. т (46% объ­ё­ма ми­ро­вой тор­гов­ли).

Металлургический комбинат государственной корпорации «Baosteel»(ГЦП Шанхай).

Про­из-во чу­гу­на 469,5 млн. т (2007), ста­ли 489,6 млн. т (св. 1/3 об­ще­ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва; 128,5 млн. т в 2000), сталь­но­го про­ка­та 468,9 млн. т (2006). Об­щий объ­ём ин­ве­сти­ций в строи­тель­ст­во и мо­дер­ни­за­цию мощ­но­стей по вы­плав­ке чу­гу­на и ста­ли, а так­же по про­из-ву про­ка­та чёр­ных ме­тал­лов 90,3 млрд. долл. (2006; в т. ч. 54,8 млрд. долл. на раз­ви­тие про­из-ва про­ка­та и др. ви­дов ме­тал­ло­про­дук­ции). Вы­пус­ка­ет­ся ши­ро­кий сор­та­мент ста­лей, опе­ре­жаю­щи­ми тем­па­ми рас­тут объ­ё­мы вы­плав­ки не­ржа­вею­щей ста­ли (7,2 млн. т в 2007; св. 1/4 об­ще­ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва). Ос­во­ен вы­пуск сталь­но­го про­ка­та св. 20 тыс. ви­дов и ти­по­раз­ме­ров – хо­лод­но- и го­ря­че­ка­та­но­го лис­та (в т. ч. сред­ней и боль­шой тол­щи­ны), труб, сред­не- и мел­ко­сорт­но­го про­ка­та, про­во­ло­ки, риф­лё­ной лен­ты и др. Экс­порт ста­ли 73,1 млн. т (2007), пре­им. в Республику Корея (21%), стра­ны ЕС (15%) и США (10%). Экс­порт сталь­но­го про­ка­та 62,7 млн. т, им­порт 16,9 млн. т (2007); вво­зят­ся фа­сон­ный про­кат, хо­лод­но­ка­та­ная сталь, сталь­ной трос и др. Для сдер­жи­ва­ния рос­та цен внутр. рын­ка с 2008 вве­де­ны или по­вы­ше­ны экс­порт­ные по­шли­ны на мн. ви­ды ме­тал­ло­про­дук­ции (пред­по­ла­га­ет­ся сни­же­ние объ­ё­мов экс­пор­та ста­ли).

На­ли­чие боль­шо­го ко­ли­че­ст­ва пред­при­ятий от­рас­ли (1499 в 2005) свя­за­но с соз­да­ни­ем зна­чит. чис­ла мел­ких ме­тал­лур­гич. про­из­водств в 1960-е гг. При­ня­то ре­ше­ние (2005) о за­кры­тии не­сколь­ких со­тен мел­ких не­рен­та­бель­ных пред­при­ятий. Гл. роль в про­из-ве чёр­ных ме­тал­лов иг­ра­ют круп­ные ком­би­на­ты пол­но­го цик­ла, в осн. при­над­ле­жа­щие гос. кор­по­ра­ци­ям (как пра­ви­ло, ка­ж­дая из них вла­де­ет од­ним ком­би­на­том). Ок. 37% вы­плав­ки ста­ли при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю 9 кор­по­ра­ций (с объ­ё­мом про­из-ва св. 10 млн. т ста­ли каж­дая, 2007), св. 55% – на 23 ком­па­нии (св. 5 млн. т каж­дая). Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся про­цесс ук­руп­не­ния (слия­ния и по­гло­ще­ния) пред­прия­тий от­рас­ли.

Наи­бо­лее круп­ный рай­он чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии сфор­ми­ро­вал­ся на вос­то­ке стра­ны. Здесь, на тер­ри­то­рии ГЦП Шан­хай, дей­ст­ву­ют неск. ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­на­тов пол­но­го цик­ла, в т. ч. круп­ней­ший и наи­бо­лее со­вре­мен­ный в К. – в г. Бао­шань, при­над­ле­жа­щий гос. кор­по­ра­ции «Ba­os­han Iron and Steel Group» («Ba­o­steel»; про­из-во ста­ли 28,6 млн. т в 2007). Круп­ные ком­би­на­ты рас­по­ло­же­ны: в пров. Ань­хой – в г. Ма­ань­шань («Maanshan Iron and Steel Group» – 14,2 млн. т); в пров. Цзян­су – в го­ро­дах Ху­ай­ань [«Ji­an­gsu Shagang Gro­up» («Sha­gang») – 22,9 млн. т] и Нан­кин («Nanjing Iron and Steel Group» – 6,0 млн. т); в пров. Шань­дун – в го­ро­дах Цзи­нань и Лайу (2 ком­би­на­та кор­по­ра­ции «Shandong Iron and Steel Group»; все­го 23,8 млн. т), а так­же в Жич­жао («Rizhao Iron and Steel Group» – 6,2 млн. т); в пров. Цзян­си – в г. Синьюй («Xinyu Iron and Steel Gro­up» – 5,6 млн. т). Мень­шие по раз­ме­рам и объ­ё­мам про­из-ва ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­на­ты дей­ст­ву­ют в го­ро­дах Суч­жоу, Нань­чан, Хан­чжоу, Цин­дао и др. Ве­ду­щие пред­при­ятия рай­она ра­бо­та­ют гл. обр. на им­порт­ной же­лез­ной ру­де и при­воз­ном кок­сую­щем­ся уг­ле (из пров. Шань­си); ис­поль­зу­ет­ся так­же ме­ст­ное сы­рьё.

На 2-м мес­те по мас­шта­бам про­из-ва – ста­рей­ший рай­он чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке стра­ны (в 1950-х гг. обес­пе­чи­вал св. 60% по­треб­но­стей К. в чёр­ных ме­тал­лах). Сре­ди осн. пред­при­ятий – ком­би­на­ты пол­но­го цик­ла: в пров. Ляо­нин – в го­ро­дах Ань­шань (кор­по­ра­ции «Anshan Iron and Steel Group»; произ-во стали 16,2 млн. т в 2007), Бэнь­си (ком­би­на­ты «Benxi Iron and Steel Group» – 7,4 млн. т и «Beitai Iron and Steel Gro­up» – 6,4 млн. т) и Фу­шунь, а так­же в пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь) – в г. Тун­хуа; за­во­ды спец. ста­лей – в го­ро­дах Да­лянь (пров. Ляо­нин) и Фу­ла­эрц­зи (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), ме­тал­лур­ги­че­ский – в г. Шэнь­ян (пров. Ляо­нин). Пред­прия­тия Сев.-Вост. К. ис­поль­зу­ют пре­им. ме­ст­ные сырь­е­вые и то­п­лив­ные ре­сур­сы.

Наи­бо­лее круп­ный центр чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии на се­ве­ре К. – ГЦП Пе­кин, где дей­ст­ву­ют пред­при­ятия ком­па­нии «Shoudu Iron and Steel Co.» («Sho­u­gang Group»): ком­би­нат пол­но­го цик­ла «Shoudu» [про­из-во ста­ли 12,9 млн. т в 2007; из-за обо­ст­ре­ния эко­ло­гич. про­блем идёт под­го­тов­ка к пе­ре­но­су пред­при­ятия, но­вые мощ­но­сти соз­да­ют­ся (2008) в г. Цао­фэй­дянь в пров. Хэ­бэй], за­вод спец. ста­лей, ста­ле­про­кат­ные про­из-ва. Сре­ди важ­ных объ­ек­тов от­рас­ли: в пров. Хэ­бэй – 3 ком­би­на­та пол­но­го цик­ла в г. Тан­шань («Tangshan Iron and Steel Group» – 22,8 млн. т; «Tangshan Jian­long Industry Co.» – 7,6 млн. т; «Tang­shan Guofeng Iron and Steel Group» – 5,2 млн. т) и ком­би­нат в г. Хань­дань («Handan Iron and Steel Group» – 8,3 млн. т). Дей­ст­ву­ют ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­на­ты в го­ро­дах Тай­юань в пров. Шань­си [«Taiyuan Iron and Steel Group» («Tisco») – 9,3 млн. т] и Бао­тоу в ав­то­ном­ном р-не Внутр. Мон­го­лия [«Baotou Iron and Steel Group» («Baogang Gro­up») – 8,8 млн. т]; пе­ре­дель­ные ста­ле­пла­виль­ные за­во­ды и ме­тал­лур­гич. це­хи ма­ши­но­стро­ит. пред­прия­тий Тянь­цзи­ня.

В центр. час­ти К. сло­жи­лась круп­ная груп­пировка ме­тал­лур­гич. пред­при­ятий: в пров. Ху­бэй – ком­би­нат пол­но­го цик­ла в г. Ухань [«Wuhan Iron and Steel Group» («Wugang Group»)], за­вод спец. ста­лей в г. Дае; в пров. Ху­нань – Ху­нань­ский ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­нат в г. Сян­тань («Hunan Valin Iron and Steel Gro­up»; про­из-во ста­ли 11,1 млн. т в 2007) и ме­тал­лур­гич. за­вод в г. Лянъ­юань; в пров. Хэ­нань – ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­нат в г. Ань­ян («Anyang Iron and Steel Group» – 9,0 млн. т), а так­же срав­ни­тель­но не­боль­шие совр. ме­тал­лур­гич. за­во­ды в го­ро­дах Ло­ян и Цзя­оц­зо. Ве­ду­щие пред­при­ятия чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии на юго-за­па­де К. – ком­би­на­ты пол­но­го цик­ла в пров. Сы­чу­ань – в г. Пань­чжи­хуа («Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group» – 6,6 млн. т; про­из­во­дят­ся так­же ва­на­дий и кон­цен­тра­ты ти­та­на), в ГЦП Чун­цин, в пров. Юнь­нань – в г. Кунь­мин; за­вод по про­из-ву бес­шов­ных и свар­ных труб в г. Чэн­ду (пров. Сы­чу­ань), ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­нат в г. Гуй­ян (пров. Гуй­чжоу). Осн. пред­прия­тия чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии на юге К.: в Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не – в г. Люч­жоу («Liuzhou Iron and Steel Group» – 5,8 млн. т); в пров. Гу­ан­дун – в го­ро­дах Гу­ан­чжоу и Шао­гуань. На се­ве­ро-за­па­де стра­ны вы­де­ля­ют­ся: в пров. Гань­су – ком­би­нат в Цзю­цюа­не («Jiuquan Iron and Steel Group» – 7,4 млн. т) и ме­тал­лур­гич. за­вод в Лань­чжоу; в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не – ком­би­нат в Ха­ми; в пров. Шэнь­си – ме­тал­лур­гич. за­во­ды в Сиа­ни и Бао­цзи.

Цвет­ная ме­тал­лур­гия (4,6% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции, 2006) – од­на из ве­ду­щих от­рас­лей пром-сти К., слу­жит гл. фак­то­ром, оп­ре­де­ляю­щим со­стоя­ние ми­ро­во­го рын­ка цвет­ных ме­тал­лов. По­треб­ляя св. 1/5 об­ще­ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва осн. ви­дов цвет­ных ме­тал­лов, К. яв­ля­ет­ся их круп­ным про­из­во­ди­те­лем, а так­же им­пор­тё­ром (за ис­клю­че­ни­ем алю­ми­ния и оло­ва). С 2004 из-за вы­со­ких цен на элек­тро­энер­гию, обо­ст­ре­ния про­блем за­гряз­не­ния ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды и низ­кой рен­та­бель­но­сти ря­да пред­при­ятий при­ни­ма­ют­ся ме­ры по сни­же­нию тем­пов рос­та про­из­вод­ст­ва.

Важ­ней­шая от­расль цвет­ной ме­тал­лур­гии – алю­ми­ние­вая пром-сть (вклю­ча­ет все ста­дии про­из-ва – от до­бы­чи сы­рья до из­го­тов­ле­ния раз­но­об­раз­ных из­де­лий из алю­ми­ния и его спла­вов). Для про­из-ва алю­ми­ния ис­поль­зу­ют­ся бок­си­ты, вы­со­ко­гли­но­зё­ми­стые слан­цы и алу­ни­ты (сы­рьё до­бы­ва­ет­ся пре­им. от­кры­тым спо­со­бом). По до­бы­че бок­си­тов (20 млн. т в 2006; ок. 12% ми­ро­вой) К. за­ни­ма­ет 3-е мес­то в ми­ре (по­сле Ав­ст­ралии и Бра­зи­лии). Осн. рай­оны до­бычи вы­со­ко­ка­че­ст­вен­ных бок­си­тов – про­вин­ции Шань­дун, Хэ­нань, Гуй­чжоу. Про­из-во гли­но­зё­ма 19,5 млн. т в 2007 (ок. 20% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва; 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле Ав­ст­ра­лии). Осн. за­во­ды по его про­из-ву рас­по­ло­же­ны вбли­зи рай­онов до­бы­чи бок­си­тов, а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Шань­си и Ху­нань. Ок. 1/2 по­треб­но­стей в гли­но­зё­ме по­кры­ва­ет­ся за счёт им­пор­та, пре­им. из Ав­ст­ра­лии, Ин­дии и Ямай­ки. По про­из-ву алю­ми­ния (12,3 млн. т в 2007; ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го) и объ­ё­мам его по­треб­ле­ния К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре. Про­из-во вто­рич­но­го алю­ми­ния, пре­им. из им­порт­но­го ло­ма, от­но­си­тель­но не­ве­ли­ко. В свя­зи с бы­ст­ро уве­ли­чи­ваю­щим­ся внутр. по­треб­ле­ни­ем экс­порт пер­вич­но­го алю­ми­ния со­кра­ща­ет­ся (838,3 тыс. т в 2007; 1,3 млн. т в 2005); экс­порт алю­ми­ние­вых из­де­лий рас­тёт (1240 тыс. т в 2006; 711 тыс. т в 2005). Раз­ме­ще­ние за­во­дов по про­из-ву пер­вич­но­го алю­ми­ния (ок. 120 в 2006, ряд из них под­ле­жит за­кры­тию из-за вы­со­ких из­дер­жек про­из-ва) при­уро­че­но гл. обр. к рай­онам с от­но­си­тель­но де­шё­вой элек­тро­энер­ги­ей, а так­же к транс­порт­ным цен­трам, в ко­то­рые по­сту­па­ет им­порт­ный гли­но­зём. Ве­ду­щая алю­ми­ние­вая ком­па­ния (в т. ч. осн. про­из­во­ди­тель гли­но­зё­ма в К.) – «Aluminium Cor­poration of China» («Chalko») по объ­ё­мам про­из-ва за­ни­ма­ет 4-е ме­сто в ми­ре (12% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва пер­вич­но­го алю­ми­ния, 2007).

Рас­ту­щее по­треб­ле­ние ме­ди (ок. 4 млн. т в 2006, ок. 20% ми­ро­во­го по­треб­ле­ния) ме­нее чем на 3/4 удов­ле­тво­ря­ет­ся за счёт собств. про­из-ва. До­бы­ча руд ме­ди 873 тыс. т (в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл, 2006). Раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ет­ся неск. со­тен ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний; наи­бо­лее круп­ные: мед­но­руд­ные – Бай­ин­чан (пров. Гань­су), Дун­чу­ань (пров. Юнь­нань), Хуа­тун (пров. Ляо­нин), Тун­гу­ань­шань (пров. Ань­хой); мед­но-зо­ло­то­руд­ное ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние Дэ­син (пров. Цзян­си; ок. 1/6 еже­год­ных объ­ё­мов до­бы­чи руд ме­ди); мед­но-же­ле­зо­руд­ное ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние Дае (пров. Ху­бэй). В ста­дии ос­вое­ния (2008) – ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ние руд ме­ди Чан­ду (Ти­бет­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н). Де­фи­цит мед­но­руд­но­го сы­рья обу­сло­вил стрем­ле­ние кит. ком­па­ний ин­ве­сти­ро­вать в до­бы­чу руд ме­ди за ру­бе­жом (в Чи­ли, Пе­ру, Ав­ст­ра­лии, Зам­бии и др.). Вы­плав­ка чер­но­вой ме­ди 1920 тыс. т (2006). Наи­бо­лее круп­ное пред­при­ятие по вы­плав­ке чер­но­вой ме­ди – в пров. Цзян­си (мощ­ность 400 тыс. т в год); за­во­ды мень­шей мощ­но­сти (100–150 тыс. т в год каж­дый) дей­ст­ву­ют в про­вин­ци­ях Ху­бэй и Ань­хой, а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Гань­су и Шань­си (от 30 до 50 тыс. т). Про­из-во ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­ной ме­ди 3,4 млн. т (2007). Наи­бо­лее круп­ные пред­при­ятия по про­из-ву ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­ной ме­ди рас­по­ло­же­ны: в Гуй­си (пров. Цзян­си; за­вод ком­па­нии «Jiangxi Cop­per Co., Ltd.»), Тун­ли­не (пров. Ань­хой; 2 круп­ных за­во­да ком­па­нии «Tongling Non­ferrous Metals Co.»), Кунь­ми­не (пров. Юнь­нань; «Yun­nan Copper Group Co., Ltd.»), Цзинь­чуа­не (пров. Гань­су; «Jin­chuan Nonferrous Metals Corp.»), Дае (пров. Ху­бэй; «Daye Nonferrous Metals Co.»), Чжанц­зя­га­не (пров. Цзян­су; «Tong­ling Nonfer­rous Metals Co.»), Ян­гу (пров. Шань­дун; «Shandong Yanggu Xiangguang Co., Ltd.»), Тянь­цзи­не («Ti­an­jin Datong Cop­per Co., Ltd.») и др. Им­порт кон­цен­тра­тов ме­ди (гл. обр. из Мон­го­лии, Чи­ли, Ав­ст­ра­лии и Пе­ру) ок. 4,5 млн. т (2007), ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­ной ме­ди (в осн. из Чи­ли, Япо­нии, Ка­зах­ста­на) – ок. 1,5 млн. т.

К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по до­бы­че по­ли­ме­тал­лич. руд. Про­из-во кон­цен­тра­тов свин­ца 1330 тыс. т (в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл, 2006; ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва), цин­ка 2840 тыс. т (св. 1/4 ми­ро­во­го произ-ва). Круп­ные ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния по­ли­ме­тал­лич. руд раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют­ся в про­вин­ци­ях Гу­ан­дун (Фань­коу), Ху­нань (Шуй­ко­ушань), Цин­хай (Си­те­шань), Юнь­нань (Лай­пин, Хой­цзэ), Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не (Хош­бу­лак). Про­из-во (2006) ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­но­го свин­ца 2720 тыс. т (в т. ч. пер­вич­но­го 2130 тыс. т), ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­но­го цин­ка 3150 тыс. т. Осн. мощ­но­сти по про­из-ву ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­но­го свин­ца рас­по­ло­же­ны в про­вин­ци­ях Хэ­нань (Ань­ян, Цзию­ань), Гу­ан­дун (Шао­гу­ань), Ху­нань (Чжуч­жоу), Юнь­нань (Кунь­мин); цин­ка – в про­вин­ци­ях Ляо­нин (Ху­лу­дао), Ху­нань (Чжуч­жоу), Гу­ан­дун (Шао­гу­ань), Гань­су (Бай­инь) и Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не (Люч­жоу). С 2005 в це­лях ог­ра­ни­че­ния дея­тель­но­сти мел­ких, ма­ло­эф­фек­тив­ных и наи­бо­лее за­гряз­няю­щих ок­ру­жаю­щую сре­ду пред­при­ятий вве­де­ны тре­бо­ва­ния к их ми­ним. мощ­но­сти – 50 тыс. т свин­ца и 100 тыс. т цин­ка в год. Сре­ди ве­дущих ми­ро­вых про­из­во­ди­те­лей свин­ца – кит. ком­па­ния «Shuikoushan Mining Authority», цин­ка – «Hunan Zhue Torch Metals Corp.» (обе – пров. Ху­нань). По до­бы­че зо­ло­та (250 т в 2007) К. за­ни­ма­ет 2-е мес­то, се­реб­ра (2,7 тыс. т; 13% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи) – 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре.

К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по до­бы­че (130 тыс. т в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл, 2007; ок. 40% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи) и про­из-ву оло­ва (149 тыс. т). Экс­порт оло­ва 23,6 тыс. т, им­порт 16,9 тыс. т (пре­им. из Ин­до­не­зии). В свя­зи с бы­ст­рым рос­том внутр. спро­са на оло­во при­ни­ма­ют­ся ме­ры по ог­ра­ни­че­нию его экс­пор­та; с янв. 2008 вве­де­на 20%-ная по­шли­на на про­да­жу руд и кон­цен­тра­тов оло­ва за ру­беж. До­бы­ча руд оло­ва ве­дёт­ся в руд­но-рос­сып­ном райо­не Гэц­зю и на ме­сто­рож­де­ни­ях Юнь­лун (пров. Юнь­нань), Да­чан (Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н), Фуч­жун (пров. Ху­нань). Осн. пред­при­ятия по про­из-ву ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­но­го оло­ва рас­по­ло­же­ны в про­вин­ци­ях Юнь­нань, Ху­нань, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не. Ве­ду­щие ком­па­нии – «Yunnan Tin Group Co., Ltd.» (круп­ней­ший ми­ро­вой про­из­во­ди­тель оло­ва, име­ет фи­лиа­лы в Ав­ст­ра­лии, за­вод по про­из-ву ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­но­го оло­ва в Син­га­пу­ре мощ­но­стью 36 тыс. т в год; 2006) и «Liuzhou China Tin Group Co., Ltd.».

К. – фак­ти­че­ский мо­но­по­лист на ми­ро­вом рын­ке вольф­ра­ма. До­бы­ча руд вольф­ра­ма 72 тыс. т (в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл, 2007; ок. 80% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи). Ве­ду­щие рай­оны до­бы­чи (осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся пре­им. под­зем­ным спо­со­бом) – про­вин­ции Цзян­си (св. 60% об­ще­го объ­ё­ма) и Ху­нань. Круп­ней­ший про­из­во­ди­тель вольф­ра­ма – кор­по­ра­ция «Jiangxi Rare Earth and Rare Me­tals Tungsten Group Corp.». По до­бы­че мо­либ­де­на (41 тыс. т в 2007; 23% ми­ро­вой до­бы­чи) К. вхо­дит в трой­ку ми­ро­вых ли­де­ров. Кит. экс­порт мо­либ­де­на ока­зы­ва­ет су­ще­ст­вен­ное влия­ние на це­ны ми­ро­во­го рын­ка. В стра­не рас­по­ло­же­ны 3 из 6 круп­ней­ших руд­ни­ков ми­ра: Лу­ань­чу­ань (пров. Хэ­нань), Да­хэй­шань [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)], Цзинь­дуй­чэн (пров. Шань­си). Ка­че­ст­во до­бы­вае­мых в К. руд ни­ке­ля (82,1 тыс. т в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл; 2006) вы­ше, чем у др. круп­ных про­из­во­ди­те­лей. Про­из-во ни­ке­ля (в т. ч. из им­порт­ных кон­цен­тра­тов) 214 тыс. т, экс­порт 16,9 тыс. т, им­порт 105,3 тыс. т (2007). Б. ч. ни­ке­ля, а так­же ко­баль­та (об­щий объ­ём до­бы­чи в пе­ре­счё­те на ме­талл 1,8 тыс. т; 2006) и пла­ти­нои­дов по­лу­ча­ют из руд мед­но-ни­ке­ле­вых ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний в пров. Сы­чу­ань. Опе­ре­жаю­щи­ми тем­па­ми рас­тёт про­из-во ти­та­но­вой губ­ки (св. 50 тыс. т в 2007; 18 тыс. т в 2006; по пла­ну 2010 – 126 тыс. т); круп­ней­шие пред­при­ятия на­хо­дят­ся в го­ро­дах Цзу­ньи (пров. Гуй­чжоу), Фу­шунь и Чао­ян (пров. Ляо­нин).

К. за­ни­ма­ет мо­но­поль­ное по­ло­же­ние на ми­ро­вом рын­ке сурь­мя­но­го сы­рья (ок. 80% мирового экспорта сурьмы). До­бы­ча руд сурьмы 153 тыс. т (в пере­счё­те на Sb) (2006). Круп­ней­ший про­из­во­ди­тель сурь­мы в стра­не и один из круп­ней­ших в ми­ре – Си­ку­ан­шань­ский сурь­мя­ной ком­би­нат в пров. Ху­нань (ком­па­ния «Xi­kuangshan Twinkling Star Co., Ltd.»). На до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 50% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва вис­му­та, ок. 75% – рту­ти.

К. – прак­ти­че­ски мо­но­по­лист на рын­ке ред­ко­зе­мель­ных эле­мен­тов (80% ми­ро­во­го рын­ка). Про­из-во 120,8 тыс. т (2007), экс­порт 49 тыс. т. Ве­ду­щий ре­ги­он по до­бы­че и про­из-ву ред­ко­зе­мель­ных эле­мен­тов – ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия (ме­сто­рож­де­ние Ба­ян-Обо, из руд ко­то­ро­го по­лу­ча­ют баст­не­зит-мо­на­ци­то­вый, а так­же нио­бие­вый и бе­рил­лие­вый кон­цен­тра­ты).

Ма­ши­но­строе­ние – ве­ду­щая от­расль пром-сти, на его до­лю (вклю­чая элек­трон­ную и ме­тал­ло­об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щую пром-сть) при­хо­дит­ся 34,1% стои­мо­сти про­дук­ции, 18,6% осн. про­из­водств. фон­дов, ок. 25% за­ня­тых в пром. про­из-ве (2006). Гл. от­рас­ли – элек­трон­ная пром-сть, тя­жё­лое и транс­порт­ное ма­ши­но­строе­ние. Бы­ст­ры­ми тем­па­ми уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся чис­ло ви­дов про­дук­ции, вы­пус­кае­мых на ос­но­ве совр. тех­но­ло­гий.

В нач. 21 в. опе­ре­жаю­щи­ми тем­па­ми рас­тёт внеш­не­тор­го­вый обо­рот про­дук­ции ма­ши­но­строе­ния: сред­не­го­до­вой при­рост 29,8% (2001–05, в стои­мо­ст­ном вы­ра­же­нии). Экс­порт из­де­лий ма­ши­но­строе­ния 456,3 млрд. долл. (2006; 47,2% об­щей стои­мо­сти кит. экс­пор­та), им­порт 357,0 млрд. долл. (45,1% об­щей стои­мо­сти им­пор­та). К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по объ­ё­мам экс­пор­та вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ной про­дук­ции ма­ши­но­строе­ния (ком­пь­ю­те­ров и пе­ри­фе­рий­ных ком­пь­ю­тер­ных уст­ройств, ря­да ви­дов ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния, при­бо­ров и др.).

Тя­жё­лое ма­ши­но­строе­ние вклю­ча­ет: энер­ге­тич. ма­ши­но­строе­ние и элек­тро­тех­нич. пром-сть, про­из-во обо­ру­до­ва­ния для гор­но­до­бы­ваю­щей, ме­тал­лур­гич., хи­мич. и неф­те­хи­мич., неф­те­до­бы­ваю­щей, неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей и др. пром. от­рас­лей, строи­тель­но-до­рож­ных ма­шин. К. про­дол­жа­ет за­ви­сеть от им­пор­та ря­да ви­дов пром. обо­ру­до­ва­ния и ма­шин. Од­на из ве­ду­щих и наи­бо­лее ди­вер­си­фи­ци­ро­ван­ных ком­па­ний тя­жё­ло­го ма­ши­но­строе­ния – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Chi­na National Machinery Industry Corp.» (SINOMACH; об­ра­зо­ва­на в 1997, го­лов­ной офис в Пе­ки­не). В сфе­ру дея­тель­но­сти кор­по­ра­ции и её до­чер­них ком­па­ний (ок. 40 в 2008) вхо­дит раз­ра­бот­ка, про­из-во и по­став­ка ком­плек­тов обо­ру­до­ва­ния и стро­ит. кон­ст­рук­ций для энер­ге­тич. объ­ек­тов, пред­при­ятий гор­но­до­бы­ваю­щей, ме­тал­лур­гич., неф­те­до­бы­ваю­щей (бу­ро­вое обо­ру­до­ва­ние, бу­ро­вые плат­фор­мы для неф­те­до­бы­чи на мор. шель­фе и др.), неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей, хи­мич. и неф­те­хи­мич. пром-сти, транс­порт­но­го (вклю­чая су­до- и ав­то­мо­би­ле­строе­ние) и с.-х. ма­ши­но­строе­ния, лёг­кой (в т. ч. тек­стиль­ной), пи­ще­вой и др. от­рас­лей, а так­же ря­да вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ных про­из­водств элек­трон­ной пром-сти, при­бо­ро­строе­ния и др. Пред­при­ятия кор­по­ра­ции про­из­во­дят так­же мор. су­да, те­ле­ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­ное обо­ру­до­ва­ние, стро­ит. ма­те­риа­лы и др.; кор­по­ра­ция и её до­чер­ние струк­ту­ры стро­ят под ключ про­из­водств. и ин­фра­струк­тур­ные (мос­ты, же­лез­ные и ав­то­мо­биль­ные до­ро­ги, ли­нии мет­ро­по­ли­те­на и др.) объ­ек­ты в К. и за ру­бе­жом.

В К. на­ла­же­но про­из-во ши­ро­кой но­менк­ла­ту­ры ма­шин и обо­ру­до­ва­ния для гор­но­до­бы­ваю­щей пром-сти: уголь­ных ком­бай­нов, вру­бо­вых ма­шин, уг­ле- и по­ро­до­погрузоч­ных, скреб­ко­вых и лен­точ­ных кон­вей­е­ров, бу­ро­вых ус­та­но­вок (в т. ч. глу­бо­ко­го бу­ре­ния), карь­ер­ных ав­то­са­мо­сва­лов, руд­нич­ных те­п­ло­во­зов, ак­ку­му­ля­тор­ных элек­тро­во­зов для шахт и др. Ве­ду­щие ком­па­нии: «Shanghai Hea­vy Mining Machinery Corp.» (Шан­хай), «Taiyuan Mining Machinery Group Co., Ltd.» (г. Тай­юань, пров. Шань­си), «Shenyang Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd.» (г. Шэнь­ян, пров. Ляо­нин). Круп­ные за­во­ды от­рас­ли дей­ст­ву­ют так­же в го­ро­дах Ло­ян (пров. Хэ­нань), Цзи­си (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян) и др.

Про­из-во обо­ру­до­ва­ния для чёр­ной ме­тал­лур­гии осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся гл. обр. под­раз­де­ле­ния­ми круп­ней­ших ме­тал­лур­гич. ком­би­на­тов (в го­ро­дах Ань­шань, Бэнь­си, Бао­шань, Ухань, Тай­юань, Маань­шань, Бао­тоу и др.). Ос­вое­но про­из-во крупных ус­та­но­вок для обо­га­ще­ния же­лез­ной ру­ды, об­жи­го­вых аг­ло­ме­ра­ци­он­ных ма­шин, ши­ро­кой но­менк­ла­ту­ры до­мен­но­го, ста­ле­пла­виль­но­го, про­кат­но­го и др. обо­ру­до­ва­ния (в т. ч. ком­плект­ное обо­ру­до­ва­ние для до­мен­ных пе­чей, ста­ле­пла­виль­ные кон­вер­те­ры, ду­го­вые элек­тро­пе­чи, обо­ру­до­ва­ние для про­кат­ных ста­нов и др.). Ве­ду­щая ком­па­ния хи­мич. ма­ши­но­строе­ния – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Chi­na National Chemical Engineering Group Corp.» (CNCEC; про­из-во обо­ру­до­ва­ния, про­ек­ти­ро­ва­ние и строи­тель­ст­во пред­при­ятий неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей и неф­те­хи­мич. пром-сти, по про­из-ву ми­нер. удоб­ре­ний, ре­зи­но­тех­нич. из­де­лий и др., а так­же др. от­рас­лей – гор­но­до­бы­ваю­щей, ме­тал­лур­гич., тек­стиль­ной пром-сти, объ­ек­тов пром. и транс­порт­ной ин­фра­струк­ту­ры и т. д.). Гл. цен­тры хи­мич. ма­ши­но­строе­ния – Пе­кин, Тянь­цзинь и Шан­хай, а так­же Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су) и Цзинь­чжоу (пров. Ляо­нин); круп­ней­шие пред­при­ятия по про­из-ву обо­ру­до­ва­ния для неф­те­до­бы­ваю­щей, неф­те­пе­ре­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щей и неф­те­хи­мич. пром-сти – в Шан­хае, Тянь­цзи­не, Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су), Ба­оц­зи (пров. Шэнь­си).

Стан­ко­ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ная пром-сть – важ­ная от­расль ма­ши­но­строе­ния. По объ­ё­мам про­из-ва ме­тал­ло­об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щих стан­ков (573 тыс. шт. в 2006, 177 тыс. шт. в 2000) К. за­ни­ма­ет 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре (по­сле Япо­нии и Гер­ма­нии), по объ­ё­му про­даж на внутр. рын­ке – 1-е ме­сто. В струк­ту­ре про­из-ва со­хра­ня­ет­ся вы­сокая до­ля уни­вер­саль­ных то­кар­ных, стро­галь­ных и свер­лиль­ных стан­ков. Воз­рас­таю­щие по­треб­но­сти внутр. рын­ка в шли­фо­валь­ных, рас­точ­ных, зу­бо­об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щих, дол­бёж­ных, про­тя­ж­ных стан­ках, то­кар­ных ав­то­ма­тах и по­лу­ав­то­ма­тах, стан­ках с чи­сло­вым про­грамм­ным управ­ле­ни­ем (ЧПУ), а так­же в совр. куз­неч­но-прес­со­вом, ли­тей­ном, сва­роч­ном и др. ви­дах (элек­тро­эро­зи­он­ное, ульт­ра­зву­ко­вое, ла­зер­ное и пр.) обо­ру­до­ва­ния не удов­ле­тво­ря­ют­ся. Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся гос. про­грам­ма пе­ре­воо­ру­же­ния от­рас­ли. В об­щем объ­ё­ме про­из-ва до­ля ме­тал­ло­ре­жу­щих стан­ков с ЧПУ со­став­ля­ет 13,2% (2005; 2,2% в 1990). Дей­ст­ву­ет зна­чит. чис­ло от­но­си­тель­но не­боль­ших пред­при­ятий стан­ко­ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ной пром-сти, рас­по­ло­жен­ных во мно­гих го­ро­дах стра­ны. Гл. цен­тры от­рас­ли: Шан­хай, Пе­кин, Да­лянь, Шэнь­ян (пров. Ляо­нин), Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су), Ци­ци­кар (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), Кунь­мин (пров. Юнь­нань), Ухань (пров. Ху­бэй), Чун­цин, Тянь­цзинь, Ло­ян (пров. Хэ­нань). Ве­ду­щие ком­па­нии: «Shenyang Ma­chine Tool (Group) Co., Ltd.» (SMTCL; Шэнь­ян), «Shanghai Ma­chine Tools Corp.» (Шан­хай), «Da­lian Machine Tool Group Corp.» (DMTG; Да­лянь), «Bei­jing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant» (Пе­кин). К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре им­пор­тёр про­дук­ции стан­ко­строе­ния (с 2002). Им­порт ста­ноч­но­го и куз­неч­но-прес­со­во­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния 11,1 млрд. долл. (2006; ок. 22% ми­ро­во­го объ­ё­ма про­из-ва), в т. ч. сис­тем управ­ле­ния и др. уз­лов для стан­ков с ЧПУ, а так­же пре­ци­зи­он­ных стан­ков, ро­бо­ти­зи­ро­ван­ных ком­плек­сов и др. ви­дов вы­со­ко­про­из­во­ди­тель­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния. Осн. по­став­щи­ки ме­тал­ло­об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щих стан­ков и обо­ру­до­ва­ния – ком­па­нии США, Япо­нии, Гер­ма­нии, Ита­лии и Республики Корея. Уве­ли­чи­ва­ют­ся объ­ё­мы экс­пор­та про­дук­ции от­рас­ли (ок. 1,2 млрд. долл. в 2006).

Энер­ге­тич. ма­ши­но­строе­ние и элек­тро­тех­нич. пром-сть (5,7% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции в 2006) от­но­сят­ся к чис­лу ве­ду­щих от­рас­лей ма­ши­но­строе­ния. Об­щая мощ­ность про­из­во­ди­мо­го элек­тро­энер­ге­тич. обо­ру­до­ва­ния 129,9 тыс. МВт в 2007 (12,5 тыс. МВт в 2000). Пред­при­ятия от­рас­ли вы­пус­ка­ют: энер­го­бло­ки для ГЭС, ТЭС и АЭС, па­ро­вые кот­лы для ТЭС, га­зо­вые тур­би­ны, вет­ро­вые энер­го­ус­та­нов­ки, дви­га­те­ли пе­ре­мен­но­го и по­сто­ян­но­го то­ка, транс­фор­ма­то­ры (в т. ч. сверх­вы­со­ко­го на­пря­же­ния по­сто­ян­но­го то­ка), вы­со­ко­вольт­ные элек­тро­при­бо­ры, рас­пре­де­ли­тель­ные уст­рой­ства, ап­па­ра­ты ре­лей­ной за­щи­ты, вы­со­ко­вольт­ные кон­ден­са­то­ры, вы­пря­ми­те­ли то­ка, разл. ви­ды обо­ру­до­ва­ния для атом­ной энер­ге­ти­ки, при­вод­ное обо­ру­до­ва­ние для су­дов и мн. др. Сре­ди ве­ду­щих ком­па­ний энер­ге­тич. ма­ши­но­строе­ния – «Shang­hai Electric Power Corp.» (ГЦП Шан­хай), «Dongfang Elec­trical Corp.» [г. Чэн­ду (пров. Сы­чу­ань)]. На элек­тро­ма­ши­но­стро­ит. за­во­де кор­по­ра­ции «Har­bin Po­wer Equipment Corp.» в г. Хар­бин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян) в 2007 соз­дан па­ро­тур­бин­ный ге­не­ра­тор мощ­но­стью 1 тыс. МВт (по япон. тех­но­ло­гии).

В нач. 21 в. К. за­нял ли­ди­рую­щие по­зи­ции в ми­ре по про­из-ву бы­то­вых элек­тро­при­бо­ров (св. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го рын­ка). Про­из-во (тыс. шт.): бы­то­вые хо­ло­диль­ни­ки 43971 в 2007 (12790 в 2000), сти­раль­ные ма­ши­ны 35605 в 2006 (14430), кон­ди­цио­не­ры 80143 в 2007 (18267), элек­тро­пы­ле­со­сы 53191 в 2006 (10103). Сре­ди ви­дов мас­со­вой про­дук­ции от­рас­ли – мик­ро­вол­но­вые пе­чи (55,7 млн. шт. в 2006), элек­трич. швей­ные ма­ши­ны (11,2 млн. шт. в 2004), фе­ны, мик­се­ры, со­ко­вы­жи­мал­ки и мн. др. Осн. про­из­во­ди­те­ли бы­то­вых элек­тро­при­бо­ров – круп­ные мно­го­про­филь­ные ком­па­нии, ве­ду­щая – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Haier Group» [го­лов­ной офис в Цин­дао (пров. Шань­дун); соз­да­на в 1984, совр. назв. с 1992; в её со­ста­ве 18 про­ект­ных ин­сти­ту­тов, 13 пром. пар­ков, 8 цен­тров ди­зай­на и др.]. На до­лю «Haier Group» при­хо­дит­ся ок. 30% объ­ё­мов нац. про­из-ва бы­то­вых хо­ло­диль­ни­ков, кон­ди­цио­не­ров и сти­раль­ных ма­шин (пред­при­ятия кор­по­ра­ции вы­пус­ка­ют так­же по­су­до­мо­еч­ные ма­ши­ны, мик­ро­вол­но­вые пе­чи, пор­та­тив­ные ком­пь­ю­те­ры, плаз­мен­ные и жид­ко­кри­стал­лич. те­ле­ви­зо­ры, DVD-плее­ры, мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны и др.). Про­из­водств. мощ­но­сти круп­ней­ше­го пром. пар­ка кор­по­ра­ции в г. Цин­дао – 2 млн. кон­ди­ционе­ров, 2,9 млн. сти­раль­ных ма­шин, 20 тыс. хо­ло­диль­ни­ков для су­пер­мар­ке­тов, 5 млн. мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов в год. Пром. пар­ки «Haier Group» рас­по­ло­же­ны так­же в го­ро­дах Цзя­оч­жоу, Чжан­цю и Цзяо­нань (пров. Шань­дун), Хэ­фэй (пров. Ань­хой), Ухань (пров. Ху­бэй). Кор­по­ра­ции при­над­ле­жат ок. 30 пред­при­ятий за пре­де­ла­ми стра­ны (в США, Ита­лии, Па­ки­ста­не, Иор­да­нии, Ни­ге­рии и др.). Про­из­водств. мощ­но­сти мно­го­про­филь­ной гос. кор­по­ра­ции «Chun­lan Group» (гл. центр про­из-ва и ба­за НИОКР – пром. парк в г. Тай­чжоу, пров. Цзян­су) – 6 млн. кон­ди­цио­не­ров, 400 тыс. сти­раль­ных ма­шин, а так­же ок. 1 млн. мо­то­цик­лов в год (2006). Осн. пред­при­ятия ком­па­нии «Galanz Group» – круп­ней­шей в К. и од­ной из ве­ду­щих в ми­ре по вы­пус­ку кон­ди­цио­не­ров и мик­ро­вол­но­вых пе­чей – со­сре­до­то­че­ны в го­ро­дах Да­лян (Шунь­дэ) и Чжун­шань (пров. Гу­ан­дун). Круп­ный про­из­во­ди­тель бы­то­вых кон­ди­цио­не­ров – гос. ком­па­ния «Sichuan Chan­ghong Electric Co., Ltd.» (го­лов­ной офис в г. Мянь­ян, пров. Сы­чу­ань; вы­пус­ка­ет так­же цвет­ные те­ле­ви­зо­ры, DVD-про­иг­ры­ва­те­ли и др.). Сре­ди ве­ду­щих ком­па­ний по про­из-ву хо­ло­диль­ни­ков, мо­ро­зиль­ных ка­мер и др. хо­ло­диль­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния – ком­па­нии «Xingxing Group» (г. Цзя­оц­зян, пров. Чжэц­зян), «Aucma Group» (г. Цин­дао, пров. Шань­дун), «Yuyao Hengyang Elec­tric Appliance Co.» (г. Нин­бо, пров. Чжэц­зян). Круп­ные цен­тры про­из-ва сти­раль­ных ма­шин – ГЦП Шан­хай, а так­же го­ро­да Нан­кин, Суч­жоу и Уси (пров. Цзян­су), Нин­бо и Цы­си (пров. Чжэц­зян).

Элек­трон­ная пром-сть – ве­ду­щая от­расль ма­ши­но­строе­ния (10,5% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции в 2006). К. – круп­ней­ший ми­ро­вой про­из­во­ди­тель элек­трон­ных при­бо­ров и ря­да ви­дов ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния. Про­из-во (2007, тыс. шт.): пер­со­наль­ные и пор­та­тив­ные (но­ут­бу­ки) ком­пь­ю­те­ры 120734; цвет­ные те­ле­ви­зо­ры 84330 (39400 в 2000) – ок. 1/2 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва, в т. ч. ок. 1/4 – плаз­мен­ные и жид­ко­кри­стал­лич. те­ле­ви­зо­ры; мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны 548579 (52500 в 2000) – ок. 40% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва. Сре­ди ви­дов мас­со­вой про­дук­ции – ин­те­граль­ные мик­ро­схе­мы (41,2 млрд. шт. в 2007), мик­ро­про­цес­со­ры (93364 тыс. шт. в 2006; 6720 тыс. шт. в 2000), циф­ро­вые фо­то- и ви­део­ка­ме­ры (74935 тыс. шт. в 2007), DVD-про­иг­ры­ва­те­ли и мн. др. Ок. 2/3 объ­ё­мов про­из-ва при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю фи­лиа­лов ве­ду­щих ме­ж­ду­нар. кор­по­ра­ций, пе­ре­нёс­ших в К. сбор­ку мас­со­вых ви­дов из­де­лий, а так­же со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с уча­сти­ем иностр. фирм. Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют­ся ме­ры гос. под­держ­ки нац. про­из­во­ди­те­лей. Все­го в от­рас­ли дей­ст­ву­ют 27569 пред­при­ятий (из них 14601 про­из­во­дит элек­трон­ные при­бо­ры и обо­ру­до­ва­ние, 12968 – про­дук­ты про­грамм­но­го обес­пе­че­ния) и 2129 ком­па­ний (2007). На до­лю 40 круп­ней­ших ком­па­ний (вклю­чая фи­лиа­лы иностр. фирм) при­хо­дит­ся 54% стои­мо­сти про­дук­ции от­рас­ли, на до­лю 366 сред­них ком­па­ний – 32% (2006). С нач. 1990-х гг. в стра­не сфор­ми­ро­ва­лось 9 ве­ду­щих цен­тров про­из-ва элек­трон­ных при­бо­ров и обо­ру­до­ва­ния: ГЦП Пе­кин, ГЦП Тянь­цзинь, г. Цин­дао (пров. Шань­дун), ГЦП Шан­хай, г. Суч­жоу (пров. Цзян­су), г. Хан­чжоу (пров. Чжэц­зян), при­мор­ский рай­он пров. Фу­ц­зянь, г. Шэнь­чжэнь (пров. Гу­ан­дун), рай­он дель­ты р. Чжуц­зян в пров. Гу­андун. Ве­ду­щий центр от­рас­ли – тех­нопарк «Чжун­гу­ань­цунь» (1988; пл. ок. 100 км2), рас­по­ло­жен­ный в од­но­им. рай­оне на се­ве­ро-за­па­де Пе­ки­на (не­офи­ци­аль­ное назв. «Си­ли­ко­но­вая до­ли­на» К.). Здесь раз­ме­ще­ны пред­при­ятия и цен­тры НИОКР ок. 6 тыс. нац. и за­ру­беж­ных ком­па­ний, дей­ст­вую­щих в сфе­ре вы­со­ких тех­но­ло­гий (ок. 70% из них за­ня­ты в ИТ-ин­ду­ст­рии), в т. ч. фи­лиа­лы всех круп­ней­ших ми­ро­вых фирм от­рас­ли (IBM, «Hewlett Packard», «Dell», «Acer», «Motorola», «Cisco» и др.). В р-не Чжун­гу­ань­цунь на­хо­дит­ся б. ч. ве­ду­щих сто­лич­ных ву­зов (все­го 56 в 2007, вклю­чая Пе­кин­ский ун-т и Ун-т «Цин­хуа») и под­раз­де­ле­ний кит. АН (в т. ч. 138 НИИ), все­го за­ня­то ок. 400 тыс. вы­со­ко­ква­ли­фи­ци­ро­ван­ных спе­циа­ли­стов (пре­по­да­ва­те­лей, учё­ных и ин­же­не­ров).

Ве­ду­щий про­из­во­ди­тель ком­пь­ю­тер­ной тех­ни­ки – кор­по­ра­ция «Lenovo Group» (ок. 1/3 ки­тай­ско­го и 8% ми­ро­во­го рын­ка в 2007). По стои­мо­сти про­даж ком­пь­ю­те­ров и их пе­ри­фе­рий­ных уст­ройств (мо­ни­то­ры, прин­те­ры и др.) «Le­novo Group» за­ни­ма­ет 4-е ме­сто в ми­ре (по­сле амер. кон­цер­нов «Hewlett Pa­ckard», «Dell» и япон. «Acer»); кор­пора­ция (соз­да­на в 1984, при­над­ле­жит кит. гос. струк­ту­рам с уча­сти­ем амер. ка­пи­та­ла) за­ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­на в Сян­га­не. Её пред­при­ятия рас­по­ло­же­ны в Пе­ки­не, Шан­хае, Шэнь­чжэ­не (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Ся­мы­не (пров. Фуц­зянь), Ху­эй­я­не (пров. Гу­ан­дун), а так­же в Пон­ди­чер­ри (Ин­дия); цен­тры НИОКР – в Пе­ки­не, Шан­хае, Ся­мы­не, Шэнь­чжэ­не, Ро­ли (США), пре­фек­ту­ре Ка­на­га­ва (Япо­ния). Вто­рое ме­сто на кит. рын­ке ком­пь­ю­тер­ной тех­ни­ки (ок. 13% стои­мо­сти про­даж в 2006) за­ни­ма­ет гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Founder Technology Group» (до­чер­няя струк­ту­ра груп­пы ком­па­ний «Founder Group»; соз­да­на в 1986 при Пе­кин­ском ун-те). Осн. ви­ды про­дук­ции – пер­со­наль­ные ком­пь­ю­те­ры, про­грамм­ные про­дук­ты, пе­ри­фе­рий­ные уст­рой­ст­ва; гл. цен­тры про­из-ва пер­со­наль­ных ком­пь­ю­те­ров – го­ро­да Суч­жоу (пров. Цзян­су) и Дун­гу­ань (пров. Гу­ан­дун), мо­ни­то­ров – г. Шэнь­чжэнь (пров. Гу­ан­дун). Сре­ди ве­ду­щих нац. про­из­во­ди­те­лей ком­пь­ю­тер­ной тех­ни­ки – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China Great Wall Computer Group Corp.» и др. Сбор­ку пор­та­тив­ных ком­пь­ю­те­ров под мар­ка­ми ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых фирм на кон­тракт­ной ос­но­ве осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют тай­вань­ские ком­па­нии (ок. 70% стои­мо­сти про­даж но­ут­бу­ков иностр. брен­дов кит. сбор­ки в 2006).

Ве­ду­щая ком­па­ния по про­из-ву те­ле­ви­зо­ров – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Hisense Group» (г. Цин­дао, пров. Шань­дун; вы­пус­ка­ет про­дук­цию под мар­ка­ми «Hisense», «Ke­lon», «Ronshen»); до­чер­ние струк­ту­ры так­же спе­циа­ли­зи­ру­ют­ся на про­из-ве мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов (Цин­дао), кон­ди­цио­не­ров (г. Пин­ду, пров. Шань­дун) и хо­ло­диль­ни­ков (ГЦП Пе­кин). Осн. те­ле­ви­зи­он­ные за­во­ды груп­пы ком­па­ний «Skyworth Group» (го­лов­ной офис в г. Шэнь­чжэнь, пров. Гу­ан­дун) дей­ст­ву­ют в Шэнь­чжэ­не и Хух-Хо­то (ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия). Сре­ди др. круп­ней­ших нац. про­из­во­ди­те­лей те­ле­ви­зо­ров – ком­па­нии «TCL Group Co., Ltd.» [за­во­ды – в го­ро­дах Хой­чжоу и Шэнь­чжэнь (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Уси (пров. Цзян­су), Нань­чан (пров. Цзян­си), Чэн­ду (пров. Сы­чу­ань) и др., а так­же в Мек­си­ке, Таи­лан­де, Вьет­на­ме и Поль­ше]; «Konka Group Co., Ltd.» [за­во­ды в го­ро­дах Шэнь­чжэнь и Дун­гу­ань (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Му­дань­цзян (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), ГЦП Чун­цин и др., а так­же в Ин­дии, Ин­до­не­зии, Мек­си­ке и Тур­ции]. Зна­чит. объ­ё­мы про­из-ва те­ле­ви­зи­он­ной тех­ни­ки при­хо­дят­ся на до­лю пред­при­ятий, при­над­ле­жа­щих иностр. ком­па­ни­ям «Phillips», «Toshiba», «Samsung Electronics», «Sony», «Sharp» и др.

Мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны вы­пус­ка­ют 65 ком­па­ний, в т. ч. 31 на­цио­наль­ная (2006). На до­лю гл. про­из­во­ди­те­лей, ве­ду­щих ме­ж­ду­нар. фирм («Motorola», «Nokia» и «Samsung Electronics»), при­хо­дит­ся 61,4% стои­мо­сти про­даж (2007). Сре­ди нац. про­из­во­ди­те­лей вы­де­ля­ют­ся: «Ning­bo Bird», «TCL Group Co., Ltd.», «Kon­ka Group Co., Ltd.» и др. Пред­при­ятия ком­па­нии «Ningbo Bird Co., Ltd.» (соз­да­на в 1992, го­лов­ной офис в г. Фынхуа, пров. Чжэц­зян) рас­по­ло­же­ны в г. Нин­бо (пров. Чжэц­зян). Круп­ные про­из­во­ди­те­ли мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов и др. те­ле­ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния (для оп­тич. се­тей и др.): ком­па­нии «Huawei Technologies Company, Ltd.» и «Zhong­xing Telecommunication Equipment Co., Ltd.» с го­лов­ны­ми офи­са­ми в г. Шэнь­чжэнь (пров. Гу­ан­дун). Ве­ду­щий центр сбор­ки мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов – ГЦП Тянь­цзинь, где со­сре­до­то­че­ны со­вме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия с уча­сти­ем иностр. фирм, а так­же ря­да кит. ком­па­ний. Круп­ные цен­тры про­из-ва мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов: го­ро­да Нин­бо и Хан­чжоу (пров. Чжэц­зян), Шэнь­чжэнь, Дун­гу­ань, при­го­ро­ды Гу­ан­чжоу (пров. Гу­ан­дун), ГЦП Пе­кин, г. Ся­мынь (пров. Фуц­зянь).

Осн. цен­тры про­из-ва циф­ро­вых фо­то- и ви­део­ка­мер: го­ро­да Шэнь­чжэнь, Дун­гу­ань, Гу­ан­чжоу, Хой­чжоу (пров. Гу­андун), а так­же ГЦП Тянь­цзинь (здесь дей­ст­ву­ют пред­при­ятия, на ко­то­рых тай­вань­ски­ми ком­па­ния­ми «Foxconn», «Abi­lity Enterprise» и др. на ос­но­ве кон­трак­тов с ве­ду­щи­ми за­ру­беж­ны­ми те­ле­ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­ны­ми фир­ма­ми осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся сбор­ка про­дук­ции).

Внеш­не­тор­го­вый то­ва­ро­обо­рот про­дук­ции элек­трон­ной пром-сти 804,7 млрд. долл. (2007; ок. 37% объ­ё­ма внеш­ней тор­гов­ли К.); объ­ём экс­пор­та 459,5 млрд. долл. (вы­рос на 26,2% по срав­не­нию с 2006; гл. обр. вы­во­зят­ся го­то­вые из­де­лия, в т. ч. ок. 50% со­би­рае­мых те­ле­ви­зо­ров, 80% мо­биль­ных те­ле­фо­нов); им­порт 345,2 млрд. долл. (в осн. ком­плек­тую­щие де­та­ли для сбор­ки элек­трон­ных при­бо­ров и обо­ру­до­ва­ния, вклю­чая св. 90% ис­поль­зуе­мых мик­ро­чи­пов).


Сборка автомобилей на заводе компании «Great Wall Motor» в городе Баодин (провинция Хэбэй).


Компания «Ирито»

На до­лю транс­порт­но­го ма­ши­но­строе­ния при­хо­дит­ся 6,5% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции К. (2006). Клю­че­вая от­расль транс­порт­но­го ма­ши­но­строе­ния – ав­то­мо­биль­ная пром-сть. В ав­то­мо­би­ле­строе­нии, а так­же в смеж­ных от­рас­лях пром-сти и сфе­ры ус­луг тру­дят­ся ок. 1/6 всех за­ня­тых в эко­но­ми­ке стра­ны. Вы­пус­ка­ют­ся поч­ти все ви­ды ав­томо­биль­ной тех­ни­ки, а так­же ком­плек­тую­щих де­та­лей, уз­лов и аг­ре­га­тов. Про­из-во ав­то­мо­би­лей 8887 тыс. шт. (2007, 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США и Япо­нии), в т. ч. 4798 тыс. лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей. Осн. часть про­из­во­ди­мой ав­то- и мо­то­тех­ни­ки реа­ли­зу­ет­ся внут­ри стра­ны; по объ­ё­му про­даж ав­то­мо­би­лей на внутр. рын­ке (8,8 млн. шт. в 2007) К. за­ни­ма­ет 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США. В нач. 21 в. бы­ст­ро уве­ли­чи­ва­ют­ся объ­ё­мы экс­пор­та про­дук­ции ав­то­мо­би­ле­строе­ния, ок. 70% его стои­мо­сти при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю ком­плек­тую­щих де­та­лей, уз­лов и аг­ре­га­тов. Бы­ст­ро рас­тут объ­ё­мы экс­пор­та ав­то­мо­би­лей (ок. 600 тыс. шт. в 2007). Им­порт ав­то­мо­би­лей от­но­си­тель­но не­ве­лик (229 тыс. шт. в 2006), но так­же име­ет тен­ден­цию к рос­ту по­сле сни­же­ния ввоз­ных по­шлин в 2006; осн. по­став­щи­ки ав­то­мо­би­лей – ком­па­нии Япо­нии, Гер­ма­нии, Республики Корея и США (все­го 83,8% объ­ё­ма им­пор­та в 2007).

Раз­ви­тие ав­то­мо­биль­ной пром-сти свя­за­но с об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с уча­сти­ем иностр. ком­па­ний [пер­вое из них – «Beijing Jeep Corp.» – соз­да­но в 1983 в Пе­ки­не кит. «Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Company, Ltd.» и под­раз­де­ле­ни­ем «Jeep» ком­па­нии «American Motors» (ны­не в соcтаве «Chrysler Corp.»)]. Гл. фак­то­ры стре­ми­тель­но­го раз­ви­тия от­рас­ли, на­чав­ше­го­ся в сер. 1990-х гг.: рост внутр. спро­са; вы­со­кие (на на­чаль­ном эта­пе – за­пре­ти­тель­ные) им­порт­ные по­шли­ны на ввоз но­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей (по­сте­пен­но сни­жа­лись; с ию­ля 2006 составляют 25% стои­мо­сти автомобиля); за­прет на им­порт по­дер­жан­ных ав­то­мо­би­лей и ком­плек­тую­щих (дей­ст­во­вал в 1980–90-х гг.); ме­ры, на­прав­лен­ные на мак­си­маль­ную ло­ка­ли­за­цию про­из-ва со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий; за­прет на соз­да­ние ав­то­сбо­роч­ных пред­при­ятий со 100%-ным иностр. уча­сти­ем.

В от­рас­ли дей­ст­ву­ют 6322 пред­при­ятия (2006). Ок. 2/3 го­то­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей (гл. обр. иностр. мо­де­лей) со­би­ра­ют на со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­яти­ях с уча­сти­ем ве­ду­щих за­ру­беж­ных ав­то­мо­биль­ных кор­по­ра­ций. Наи­бо­лее бы­ст­ры­ми тем­па­ми на­ра­щи­ва­ют объ­ё­мы про­из-ва т. н. не­зави­си­мые, или на­цио­наль­ные, ав­то­мо­биль­ные ком­па­нии (не имею­щие со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с иностр. фир­ма­ми), на до­лю ко­то­рых при­хо­дит­ся по­дав­ляю­щая часть экс­пор­та ав­то­мо­би­лей. Кит. ком­па­нии по­сте­пен­но от­хо­дят от прак­ти­ки ко­пи­ро­ва­ния (час­то не очень удач­но­го) сня­тых с про­из-ва мо­де­лей из­вест­ных за­ру­беж­ных ав­то­про­из­во­ди­те­лей. Раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют­ся (в т. ч. с при­вле­че­ни­ем иностр. ин­же­не­ров и ди­зай­нер­ских фирм) и ста­вят­ся на кон­вей­ер собств. мо­де­ли ав­то­мо­би­лей.

На до­лю 10 круп­ней­ших ком­па­ний при­хо­дит­ся 84% стои­мо­сти про­даж от­рас­ли (2007). В «большую пятёрку» ве­ду­щих ав­то­про­из­во­ди­те­лей входит гос. кор­по­ра­ция «SAIC Motor Corp., Ltd.» (SAIC, от «Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp.»), го­лов­ной офис – в Шан­хае. Объ­ём реа­ли­за­ции 1690 тыс. шт. в 2007 (1220 тыс. в 2006), в т. ч. 1137 тыс. лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей. В со­ста­ве кор­по­ра­ции ряд до­чер­них ком­па­ний и со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий, все­го св. 50 за­во­дов (гл. обр. в ГЦП Шан­хай), вы­пус­каю­щих лег­ко­вые и гру­зо­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли, ав­то­бу­сы, трак­то­ры, мо­то­цик­лы и ску­те­ры, а так­же ком­плек­тую­щие де­та­ли, уз­лы и аг­ре­га­ты. Круп­ней­шие со­в­ме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия SAIC: с амер. кор­по­ра­ци­ей «General Mo­tors» («Shan­ghai General Motors Corp.», вы­пус­ка­ет ав­то­мо­би­ли «Chevro­let», «Bu­ick», «Cadillac»; объ­ём про­даж св. 500 тыс. шт. в 2007); с герм. кон­цер­ном «Volkswa­gen» («Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Co.»; разл. мо­де­ли ав­то­мо­би­лей «Vol­ks­wa­gen»; про­да­жи – 456 тыс. шт.). По тех­но­ло­гии брит. ком­па­нии «MG Rover» на ба­зе мо­де­ли «Rover-75» SAIC вы­пус­ка­ет ав­то­мо­би­ли собств. мар­ки «Roewe» (16 тыс. шт. в 2007).

«FAW Group» (FAW; «China First Auto­mobile Works Group Corp.») – ста­рей­шая гос. ав­то­мо­биль­ная кор­по­ра­ция К., ос­но­ван­ная в 1953 как пер­вый ав­то­мо­биль­ный за­вод (по­стро­ен в 1956 с по­мо­щью СССР); го­лов­ной офис – в г. Чан­чунь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)]. Пред­при­ятия FAW про­из­во­дят гру­зо­вые и лег­ко­вые (в т. ч. по­вы­шен­ной про­хо­ди­мо­сти) ав­то­мо­би­ли, ав­то­бу­сы, а так­же ком­плек­тую­щие де­та­ли, уз­лы и аг­ре­га­ты. Об­щий объ­ём про­даж 1170 тыс. ав­то­моби­лей и ав­то­бу­сов (2006). В со­став FAW вхо­дят 27 до­чер­них ком­па­ний, в 20 др. ком­па­ни­ях кор­по­ра­ция вла­де­ет кон­троль­ны­ми па­ке­та­ми ак­ций. За­во­ды FAW со­сре­до­то­че­ны в пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь) (22 пред­при­ятия в 2006, круп­ней­ший центр – г. Чан­чунь), а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Хэй­лунц­зян, Шань­дун, Хай­нань, Сы­чу­ань, Юнь­нань и ГЦП Тянь­цзинь. Кор­по­ра­ция име­ет со­вме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия: с герм. кон­цер­ном «Volkswagen» и вхо­дя­щей в его со­став ком­па­ни­ей «Audi» («FAW-Volks­wagen Automobile Co., Ltd.», г. Чан­чунь; вы­пус­ка­ет разл. мо­де­ли лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей «Volks­wagen» и «Audi»); япон. кор­по­ра­ция­ми «Toyota Motor» («Tian­jin FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd.», ГЦП Тянь­цзинь) и «Mazda Motor» («FAW Haima Motor Co.», о. Хай­нань; про­из­во­дит ав­то­мо­би­ли ма­рок «Mazda» и «Haima»). Сре­ди собств. ма­рок ав­то­мо­би­лей FAW – «Hongqi» («Крас­ный Флаг»), «Jiaxing».

«Dongfeng Motor Corporation» (DFMC) ос­но­ва­на в 1968, го­лов­ной офис, н.-и. центр и кон­ст­рук­тор­ское бю­ро (од­но из круп­ней­ших в Азии) – в г. Ухань (пров. Ху­бэй; c 2003); 70% ак­ций кор­по­ра­ции при­над­ле­жит пра­ви­тель­ст­ву К. В Уха­не дей­ст­ву­ют соз­дан­ные DFMC Ав­то­мо­би­ле­строи­тель­ный ун-т и Ин-т ди­зай­на. Пред­при­ятия DFMC про­из­во­дят гру­зо­вые (гру­зо­подъ­ём­но­стью от 0,5 до 22 т) и лег­ко­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли, ав­то­бу­сы, спец. ав­то­мо­биль­ную тех­ни­ку (в т. ч. ок. 90% гру­зо­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей для кит. ар­мии), а так­же ком­плек­тую­щие. Об­щий объ­ём про­даж 1140 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей и ав­то­бу­сов (2006). В со­ста­ве кор­по­ра­ции 42 пред­при­ятия (в т. ч. 10 мо­то­ро­стро­ит. за­во­дов), вы­пус­каю­щих про­дук­цию мар­ки «Dongfeng» («Ве­тер с Вос­то­ка»), а так­же ряд сов­мест­ных пред­при­ятий, в т. ч.: с франц. кон­цер­ном «PSA Group» (про­из­во­дит лег­ко­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли ма­рок «Citroёn» и «Peugeot»), япон. ком­па­ния­ми «Nissan Motor» (лег­ко­вые и боль­ше­груз­ные гру­зо­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли «Nis­san»), «Honda Motor» (ав­то­мо­би­ли по­вы­шен­ной про­хо­ди­мо­сти и др.), амер. «Cummins» (боль­ше­груз­ные гру­зо­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли и ди­зель­ные дви­га­те­ли), юж.-кор. «Kia Motors» и кит. «Yueda» (лег­ко­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли «Kia» и «Hyun­dai»). Осн. пред­при­ятия DFMC рас­по­ло­же­ны в го­ро­дах Ши­янь, Сян­фань и Ухань (пров. Ху­бэй), а так­же Гу­ан­чжоу (пров. Гу­ан­дун); ав­то­сбо­роч­ные за­во­ды кор­по­ра­ции дей­ст­ву­ют в Па­ки­ста­не, Ма­лай­зии, Ира­не и Ук­раи­не.

Гос. кор­по­ра­ция «Chang’an Automo­tive Group» (или «Chang’an Motors», «Chang’an Auto», «Chana Auto»), го­лов­ной офис и осн. пред­прия­тия – в ГЦП Чун­цин. Объ­ём про­даж 857,7 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007. Со­вме­ст­ные пред­прия­тия с япон. кор­по­ра­ция­ми «Suzuki Motor» и «Mazda Motor» (за­вод по про­из-ву дви­га­те­лей в г. Нан­кин, пров. Цзян­су), амер. «Ford Motor» и др.; вы­пус­ка­ют­ся ав­то­мо­би­ли собств. мар­ки «Chang’an» (с 2005).

«Chery Automobile» – круп­ней­шая т. н. не­за­ви­си­мая ав­то­мо­биль­ная ком­па­ния, го­лов­ной офис – в г. Уху, пров. Ань­хой (при­над­ле­жит ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции го­ро­да). За­ни­ма­ет 5-е ме­сто по объ­ё­му про­даж ав­то­мо­би­лей – 381 тыс. в 2007 (в т. ч. ок. 120 тыс. – на экс­порт). Вы­пус­ка­ет ряд мо­де­лей лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей, в т. ч. по­вы­шен­ной про­хо­ди­мо­сти. Име­ет ав­то­сбо­роч­ные за­во­ды в Ира­не, Ма­лай­зии и Егип­те.

Сре­ди крупных ав­то­мо­биль­ных ком­па­ний: кор­по­ра­ция «Guangzhou Auto­mobile Industry Group» [GAIG; г. Гу­ан­чжоу, пров. Гу­ан­дун (при­над­ле­жит ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ци­ям го­ро­да и про­вин­ции); гл. обр. вы­пус­ка­ет ав­то­мо­би­ли и мо­то­цик­лы япон. ма­рок для экс­пор­та в тре­тьи стра­ны; объ­ём про­даж 510 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей и 890 тыс. мо­то­цик­лов в 2007]; «Brilliance China Auto» (г. Шэнь­ян, пров. Ляо­нин; объ­ём про­даж ок. 300 тыс. лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007); «Geely Auto­mobile» в со­ста­ве «Geely Holding Group» (пред­прия­тия в ГЦП Шан­хай и со­сед­ней пров. Чжэц­зян; объ­ём про­даж 219 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007); «Hafei Motor» (до­чер­няя струк­ту­ра авиа­строи­тель­ной кор­по­ра­ции «Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corp.», го­лов­ной офис в г. Хар­бин, пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; про­из-во дви­га­те­лей, ма­ло- и мик­ро­лит­раж­ных ав­то­мо­би­лей, вклю­чая ми­ни-вэ­ны, пи­ка­пы, ма­ло­тон­наж­ные гру­зо­вые, трёх­ко­лёс­ные ав­то­мо­би­ли и др.; объ­ём про­даж 216 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007); «Great Wall Motor» (г. Бао­дин, пров. Хэ­бэй; про­из-во лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей, в т. ч. по­вы­шен­ной про­хо­ди­мо­сти; объ­ём про­даж ок. 125 тыс. ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007); BYD («Build Your Dre­ams»; го­лов­ной офис в г. Шэнь­чжэнь, пров. Гу­ан­дун; пред­при­ятия в г. Си­ань в пров. Шэнь­си, при­го­ро­дах Пе­ки­на и Шан­хая, а так­же г. Шэнь­чжэнь; объ­ём про­даж ок. 100 тыс. лег­ко­вых ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007).

Про­из-во мо­то­цик­лов и ску­те­ров 25,5 млн. шт. (ок. 1/2 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва), экс­порт 8,2 млн. шт. (2007). В струк­ту­ре про­из-ва пре­об­ла­да­ют от­но­си­тель­но про­стые и не­до­ро­гие мо­де­ли, поль­зую­щие­ся мас­со­вым спро­сом. Осн. цен­тры про­из-ва – ГЦП Чун­цин (на­зы­ва­ет­ся «го­ро­дом мо­то­цик­лов»; 38,4% стои­мо­сти про­даж мо­то­цик­лет­ной тех­ни­ки в 2007), а так­же го­ро­да Гу­ан­чжоу и Цзян­мынь (пров. Гу­ан­дун). Ве­ду­щие про­из­во­ди­те­ли – до­чер­ние струк­ту­ры гос. кор­по­ра­ции ОПК «China South Industries Group Corp.», рас­по­ло­жен­ные в ГЦП Чун­цин, го­ро­дах Ло­ян (пров. Хэ­нань) и Цзи­нань (пров. Шань­дун). По объ­ё­мам вы­пус­ка (св. 6 млн. мо­то­цик­лов и ску­те­ров в 2007) кор­по­ра­ция за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре.

Про­из-вом ком­плек­тую­щих де­та­лей, уз­лов и аг­ре­га­тов для ав­то­мо­би­лей, мо­то­цик­лов и др. за­ни­ма­ет­ся ок. 2/3 пред­при­ятий от­рас­ли, гл. обр. мел­ких и сред­них. Осн. часть объ­ё­ма про­из-ва при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с уча­сти­ем иностр. фирм (17% от об­щего чис­ла пред­при­ятий по про­из-ву ком­плек­тую­щих) или пол­но­стью при­над­ле­жа­щих за­ру­беж­ным ком­па­ни­ям (ок. 3%). Ве­ду­щие иностр. про­из­во­ди­те­ли – ме­ж­ду­нар. кор­по­ра­ции «Bosch», «Del­phi», «Viste­on» и др. Сре­ди круп­ных нац. ком­па­ний – «Wanxiang Group» (Шан­хай), «Wei­chai Power» («Weifang Diesel»; г. Вэй­фан, пров. Шань­дун), «Yuchai Ma­chinery Guanxi» (г. Юй­линь, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н), «Dong­feng Honda Automobile Co., Ltd.» (г. Ухань, пров. Ху­бэй), «Torch Auto­ma­tive Group» (г. Чжуч­жоу, пров. Ху­нань).

Авиа­ра­кет­но-кос­мич. пром-сть – ин­тен­сив­но раз­ви­ваю­щая­ся вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ная от­расль. Авиац. пром-сть вы­пус­ка­ет во­ен. и гражд. про­дук­цию, ор­га­ни­за­ци­он­но со­сто­ит из двух круп­ных гос. хол­дин­го­вых кор­по­ра­ций со штаб-квар­ти­ра­ми в Пе­ки­не: «Пер­вая кор­по­ра­ция авиац. пром-сти Ки­тая» («China Aviation Industry Corporation I»; AVIC-I), «Вто­рая кор­по­ра­ция авиац. пром-сти Ки­тая» («China Aviation Industry Corporation II»; AVIC-II). Кро­ме авиац. тех­ни­ки, пред­при­ятия кор­по­ра­ций про­из­во­дят ши­ро­кую но­менк­ла­ту­ру из­де­лий (ав­то­мо­би­ли, мо­то­цик­лы, разл. ви­ды про­из­водств. обо­ру­до­ва­ния, бы­то­вой тех­ни­ки и др.), от реа­ли­за­ции ко­то­рых по­лу­ча­ют б. ч. при­бы­ли. AVIC-I вклю­ча­ет св. 90 до­чер­них ком­па­ний, пром. пред­при­ятий, НИИ, цен­тров НИОКР и др. круп­ных струк­тур­ных под­раз­де­ле­ний, в т. ч.: «She­nyang Aircraft Industry (Group) Corp., Ltd.» в г. Шэнь­ян (пров. Ляо­нин; по рос. ли­цен­зии вы­пус­ка­ет ис­тре­би­те­ли СУ-27 под назв. «Цзянь-11»); «Chengdu Aircraft Industry (Group) Corp., Ltd.» в г. Чэн­ду (пров. Сы­чу­ань; ис­тре­би­те­ли «Цзянь 10»); «Xian Air­craft Industry (Group) Corp., Ltd.» в г. Си­ань (пров. Шэнь­си; ис­тре­би­те­ли-бом­бар­ди­ров­щи­ки и сред­ние транс­порт­ные са­мо­лё­ты); «Guizhou Aviation In­dustry Corp.» (GAIC) в г. Гуй­ян (пров. Гуй­чжоу; учеб­но-тре­ни­ро­воч­ные са­мо­лёты). В со­ста­ве AVIC-II св. 80 круп­ных струк­тур­ных под­раз­де­ле­ний, в т. ч.: «Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corp.» в г. Хар­бин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян; во­ен. и гражд. вер­то­лё­ты, лёг­кие транс­порт­ные са­мо­лё­ты); «Hongdu Aviation Industry Group, Ltd.» в г. Нань­чан (пров. Цзян­си; штур­мо­ви­ки, учеб­но-тре­ни­ро­воч­ные са­мо­лё­ты, а так­же са­мо­лё­ты с.-х. и лес­ной авиа­ции); «Sha­anxi Aircraft Indus­try (Group) Co., Ltd.» в г. Хань­чжун (пров. Шэнь­си; сред­ние транс­порт­ные са­мо­лё­ты); «Changhe Aircraft Industries Corp.» в г. Цзин­дэч­жэнь (пров. Цзян­си; вер­то­лё­ты); «Shijiazhuang Aircraft Manufacturing Co.» в г. Шиц­зяч­жу­ан (пров. Хэ­бэй; са­мо­лё­ты Y-5 – кит. вер­сия сов. Ан-2). Гос. авиац. кор­по­ра­ция «China Commercial Aircraft» соз­да­на (2008) для раз­ра­бот­ки и про­из-ва кит. авиа­лай­не­ра, рас­счи­тан­но­го на пе­ре­воз­ку св. 150 пас­са­жи­ров.

Ра­кет­но-кос­мич. пром-сть ор­га­ни­за­ци­он­но со­сто­ит из 2 гос. во­ен.-пром. кор­по­ра­ций со штаб-квар­ти­ра­ми в Пе­ки­не, объ­е­ди­няю­щих ок. 300 пред­при­ятий, НИИ, цен­тров НИОКР и др. струк­тур­ных под­раз­де­ле­ний. Кор­по­ра­ция «China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp.» (CASIC; ок. 150 тыс. за­ня­тых в 2007) вы­пус­ка­ет ра­кет­ное ору­жие и кос­мич. про­дук­цию для во­ен. це­лей, а так­же разл. ви­ды обо­ру­до­ва­ния, сис­тем свя­зи и др. Ве­ду­щие пред­при­ятия ра­ке­то­строе­ния – в г. Нань­юань, близ Пе­ки­на (меж­кон­ти­нен­таль­ные бал­ли­стич. ра­ке­ты), в г. Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су; бал­ли­стич. ра­ке­ты ср. даль­но­сти), в г. Лан­фан, близ Пе­ки­на (кры­ла­тые ра­ке­ты). Кор­по­ра­ция «China Aerospace Science and Technolo­gy Corp.» (CASC; ок. 110 тыс. за­ня­тых в 2007) раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ет и про­из­во­дит ра­кет­ное ору­жие (стра­те­гич. и так­тич. на­зна­че­ния), ра­ке­ты-но­си­те­ли для вы­во­да кос­мич. ап­па­ра­тов на око­ло­зем­ную ор­би­ту [се­рии «Ве­ли­кий по­ход» («CZ»)], а так­же разл. ви­ды обо­ру­до­ва­ния (пром., транс­порт­ное, мед., эко­ло­гич. и др.), при­бо­ров, сис­тем свя­зи, ком­пь­ю­тер­ной тех­ни­ки и обес­пе­че­ния, спец. кон­ст­рук­ци­он­ных ма­те­риа­лов.

Во­ен. про­дук­ция от­рас­ли: меж­кон­ти­нен­таль­ные бал­ли­стич. ра­ке­ты «Дун­фэн-5А», «Дун­фэн-31»; бал­ли­стич. ра­ке­ты про­ме­жу­точ­ной даль­но­сти «Дун­фэн-3А», «Дун­фэн-4», «Дун­фэн-21»; бал­ли­стич. ра­ке­ты мор. ба­зи­ро­ва­ния «Цзю­лан-1», ра­ке­ты ближ­не­го ра­диу­са дей­ст­вия «Дун­фэн-11», «Дун­фэн-15»; кры­ла­тые ра­ке­ты «Хун­няо»; зе­нит­ные ра­кет­ные сис­те­мы LY-60, ко­ра­бель­ные зе­нит­ные ра­кет­ные сис­те­мы LY-60; ПЗРК FN-6; бес­пи­лот­ные са­мо­лё­ты-раз­вед­чи­ки CH-3, PW-1; РСЗО A-100, WS-1, WS-1B, WS-2; управ­ляе­мые авиац. бом­бы FT-1.

По об­ще­му ко­ли­че­ст­ву осу­ще­ст­в­лён­ных за­пус­ков кос­мич. ра­кет К. за­ни­ма­ет 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре (по­сле Рос­сии и США). Пер­вый кит. ис­кусств. спут­ник Зем­ли «Дун­фан­хун-1» вы­ве­ден на ор­би­ту в 1970, кос­мич. ко­рабль «Шэнь­чжоу-5» с че­ло­ве­ком на бор­ту – в 2003, ко­рабль «Шэнь­чжоу-6» с дву­мя кос­мо­нав­та­ми (тай­ку­нав­та­ми) – в 2005, ко­рабль «Шэньч­жоу-7» с тре­мя кос­мо­нав­та­ми – в 2008. Для за­пус­ка кос­мич. объ­ек­тов ис­поль­зу­ют­ся кос­мо­дро­мы близ го­ро­дов Цзю­цю­ань (пров. Гань­су; с 1958), Тай­юань (пров. Шань­си) и Си­чан (пров. Сы­чу­ань). На­ча­то строи­тель­ст­во (2007; за­вер­ше­ние ра­бот на­ме­че­но на 2012) кос­мо­дро­ма близ г. Вэнь­чан (пров. Хай­нань) для эко­ло­ги­че­ски безо­пас­ных за­пус­ков но­во­го по­ко­ле­ния ра­кет-но­си­те­лей (об­лом­ки от­ра­бо­тан­ных сту­пе­ней бу­дут па­дать в оке­ан). Соз­да­ют­ся (с 2007) цен­тры раз­ра­бо­ток и про­из-ва кос­мич. ра­кет и ап­па­ра­тов гражд. на­зна­че­ния в ГЦП Шан­хай и г. Си­ань (пров. Шэнь­си).

Стре­ми­тель­ный рост внутр. пе­ре­во­зок пас­са­жи­ров и гру­зов ве­дёт к бы­ст­ро­му уве­ли­че­нию спро­са на про­дук­цию ж.-д. ма­ши­но­строе­ния. Мощ­ность ло­ко­мо­ти­во­строи­тель­ных пред­при­ятий (1300 шт. те­п­ло­во­зов и элек­тро­во­зов в год, 2008) в осн. по­зво­ля­ет удов­ле­тво­рять по­треб­но­сти ж.-д. транс­пор­та стра­ны, не­боль­шая часть про­дук­ции по­став­ля­ет­ся на экс­порт. На­ла­жен вы­пуск элек­тро­во­зов для ско­ро­ст­ных ж.-д. ма­ги­ст­ра­лей – EMU AC drive «Pioneer» (макс. ско­рость 292 км/ч), «China Star» (321,5 км/ч). Про­из-во пас­са­жир­ских ва­го­нов 2143 шт., гру­зо­вых – 39,3 тыс. шт. (2006).

Все пред­при­ятия ж.-д. ма­ши­но­строе­ния объ­е­ди­не­ны (2000) в 2 круп­ные гос. кор­по­ра­ции: «China Nothern Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corp.» (CNR) и «China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corp.» (CSR). Кор­по­ра­ция CNR име­ет про­из­водств. мощ­но­сти по вы­пус­ку 460 те­п­ло­во­зов, 370 элек­тро­во­зов, 2,3 тыс. пас­са­жир­ских ва­го­нов, 1,1 тыс. еди­ниц гор. рель­со­во­го транс­пор­та и 26 тыс. гру­зо­вых ж.-д. ва­го­нов в год. Осн. пред­при­ятия CNR рас­по­ло­же­ны в го­ро­дах: Чан­чунь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)], Тан­шань (пров. Хэ­бэй), Шэнь­ян и Да­лянь (пров. Ляо­нин), Да­тун, Тай­юань и Си­ань (пров. Шэнь­си), Ци­ци­кар и Му­дань­цзян (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян) и др. Соз­да­ны со­вме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия: «Beijing Nan­kou SKF Railway Bearings Co., Ltd.» (c уча­сти­ем швед. ком­па­нии SKF) в ГЦП Пе­кин, «Datong ABC Castings Co., Ltd.» (c амер. «America ABC Railway Pro­ducts Co.») в г. Да­тун (пров. Шань­си), «Changchun – Bombardier Railway Vehicles Co., Ltd.» (c ка­над. «Bombardier») в г. Чан­чунь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)]. Со­вме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия от­рас­ли с уча­сти­ем иностр. ком­па­ний долж­ны вы­пол­нять тре­бо­ва­ния о ло­ка­ли­за­ции про­из-ва (не ме­нее 70% стои­мо­сти ком­плек­тую­щих де­та­лей уз­лов и аг­ре­га­тов).

Пред­при­ятия кор­по­ра­ции CSR про­из­во­дят: элек­тро­во­зы, те­п­ло­во­зы, пас­са­жир­ские и гру­зо­вые ва­го­ны, ва­го­ны мет­ро­по­ли­те­на, ком­плек­тую­щие уз­лы, де­та­ли и аг­ре­га­ты; кор­по­ра­ция име­ет ряд со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с уча­сти­ем ве­ду­щих за­ру­беж­ных фирм. Сре­ди осн. цен­тров про­из-ва – го­ро­да Цин­дао (пров. Шань­дун), Цзы­ян и Мэй­шань (пров. Сы­чу­ань), Чжуч­жоу (пров. Ху­нань), Чан­чжоу (пров. Цзян­су), Ло­ян (пров. Хэ­нань). Круп­ней­шие до­чер­ние ком­па­нии CSR – про­из­во­ди­те­ли ком­плек­тую­щих для ло­ко­мо­ти­вов «Jinxi Axle Co., Ltd.» в г. Тай­юань (пров. Шань­си) и «Baotou Beifang Chuangye Co., Ltd.» в г. Бао­тоу (ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия).


Судоверфь в городе Далянь (провинция Ляонин).

Су­до­строе­ние – од­на из наи­бо­лее важ­ных и бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ваю­щих­ся от­рас­лей транс­порт­но­го ма­ши­но­строе­ния. Важ­ным фак­то­ром раз­ви­тия от­рас­ли слу­жит мас­со­вое вне­дре­ние но­вей­ших тех­но­ло­гий, вклю­чая ре­зуль­та­ты на­уч. и тех­нич. ис­сле­до­ва­ний и раз­ра­бо­ток кит. учё­ных и ин­же­не­ров. По объ­ё­мам тон­на­жа по­стро­ен­ных мор. су­дов (18,93 млн. т дед­вей­та в 2007) К. за­ни­ма­ет 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле Рес­пуб­ли­ки Ко­рея и Япо­нии (ок. 23% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва; 19% в 2006; 4,7% в 2000; 2,3% в 1990). По объ­ё­му за­ка­зов (169,5 млн. т дед­вей­та – ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го объ­ё­ма) кит. су­до­строе­ние вы­шло на 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле Рес­пуб­ли­ки Ко­рея, по чис­лу за­ка­зан­ных су­дов (2975 шт.) – на 1-е ме­сто (март 2008). Осн. часть за­ка­зов при­хо­дит­ся на бал­ке­ры, тан­ке­ры (в т. ч. су­пер­тан­ке­ры) и кон­тей­не­ро­во­зы. К. экс­пор­ти­ру­ет мор. су­да в 151 стра­ну ми­ра; об­щий объ­ём экс­пор­та 14,9 млн. т дед­вей­та на сум­му 12,24 млрд. долл. (2007).

Все­го в от­рас­ли дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 3 тыс. су­до­строи­тель­ных и су­до­ре­монт­ных пред­при­ятий (гл. обр. мел­кие и сред­ние), вклю­чая ча­ст­ные (в т. ч. с уча­сти­ем иностр. фирм). Б. ч. осн. пред­при­ятий су­до­строе­ния вхо­дит в со­став 2 ве­ду­щих гос. кор­по­ра­ций. «China State Ship­buil­ding Corp.» (CSSC) – круп­ный пром. кон­г­ло­ме­рат; вклю­ча­ет ок. 60 до­чер­них ком­па­ний, ор­га­ни­за­ций и цен­тров НИОКР разл. от­рас­лей ма­ши­но­строе­ния (в т. ч. про­из-во обо­ру­до­ва­ния для элек­тро­энер­ге­ти­ки, авиа­кос­мич., неф­те­хи­мич., ме­тал­лур­ги­чес­кой пром-сти, ж.-д. транс­пор­та и др.), а так­же в сфе­ре фи­нан­сов, тор­гов­ли, ло­ги­сти­ки и др.; вхо­дит в пя­тёр­ку круп­ней­ших су­до­строит. ком­па­ний ми­ра (тон­наж по­стро­ен­ных су­дов 6,55 млн. т дед­вей­та в 2007), про­из­во­дит мор. су­да и во­ен. ко­раб­ли разл. ти­пов, а так­же поч­ти все ви­ды су­до­во­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния и ос­на­ст­ки. CSSC соз­да­на в 1982, с 1999 в со­ста­ве кор­по­ра­ции – осн. су­до­вер­фи и су­до­ре­монт­ные пред­при­ятия дель­ты р. Янц­зы и юга стра­ны; ве­ду­щие пред­при­ятия в го­ро­дах Шан­хай («Цзян­нань», «Вай­гао­цяо», «Ху­дун-Чжунхуа» и др.), Гу­ан­чжоу (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Тянь­цзинь, Уху (пров. Ань­хой) и др. В дель­те р. Янц­зы (ГЦП Шан­хай) всту­пи­ла в строй (2008) 1-я оче­редь су­до­вер­фи «Цзян­нань-Чан­син», мощ­ность трёх её сбо­роч­ных ли­ний, пред­на­зна­чен­ных для по­строй­ки бал­ке­ров и су­хо­гру­зов, со­став­ля­ет 4,5 млн. т дед­вей­та в год (2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле су­до­вер­фи в г. Уль­сан, Республика Ко­рея). В 2009–12 пла­ни­ру­ет­ся по­стро­ить 2-ю оче­редь пред­при­ятия со спе­циа­ли­за­ци­ей на соз­да­нии су­дов для пе­ре­воз­ки сжи­жен­но­го га­за и сверх­круп­ных кон­тей­не­ро­во­зов. «China Shipbuilding Industry Corp.» (CSIC) об­ра­зо­ва­на в 1999, спе­циа­ли­зи­ру­ет­ся на кон­ст­руи­ро­ва­нии, по­строй­ке и про­да­жах во­ен. ко­раб­лей и мор. су­дов разл. ти­пов, а так­же су­до­во­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния и ос­на­ст­ки, вклю­чая су­до­вые дви­га­те­ли (тон­наж по­стро­ен­ных су­дов 4,24 млн. т дед­вей­та в 2007). В со­ста­ве кор­по­ра­ции свы­ше по­лу­то­ра де­сят­ков до­чер­них ком­па­ний, 28 НИИ (ок. 30 тыс. учё­ных и ин­же­не­ров), ряд круп­ных цен­тров НИОКР и ис­сле­до­ва­тель­ских ла­бо­ра­то­рий, рас­по­ло­жен­ных бо­лее чем в 20 про­вин­ци­ях сев. час­ти стра­ны. Ве­ду­щие су­до­вер­фи: в про­вин­ци­ях Ляо­нин (г. Да­лянь, «Dalian Ship­yard», «Dalian New Shipyard»; г. Ху­лу­дао, «Bohai Shipyard»; про­из-во стра­те­гич. АПЛ, су­пер­тан­ке­ров и др.), Хэ­бэй (г. Циньху­ан­дао, «Shanhaiguan Ship­buil­ding Industry Co., Ltd.»), Шань­дун (г. Цин­дао), Ху­бэй (г. Ухань), а так­же в ГЦП Тянь­цзинь и Чун­цин.

Пред­при­ятия с.-х. ма­ши­но­строе­ния вы­пус­ка­ют ши­ро­кий ас­сор­ти­мент ма­шин, обо­ру­до­ва­ния и ин­вен­та­ря (ок. 3 тыс. на­име­но­ва­ний). Вы­со­ка до­ля тех­ни­че­ски про­стых и не­до­ро­гих из­де­лий, в т. ч. средств ма­лой ме­ха­ни­за­ции – оп­ры­ски­ва­те­лей, во­дя­ных на­со­сов, га­зо­но­ко­си­лок, мо­то­бло­ков и др. Рост объ­ё­мов про­из-ва (21,0 млрд. долл. в 2007; 10,9 млрд. долл. в 2004) зна­чи­тель­но ус­ко­рил­ся за счёт гос. под­держ­ки нац. про­из­во­ди­те­лей. Бы­ст­ро рас­ту­щий экс­порт про­дук­ции от­рас­ли (11 млрд. долл., или св. 1/2 объ­ё­ма про­из-ва; 2007) пре­вы­ша­ет им­порт с.-х. тех­ни­ки и обо­ру­до­ва­ния (ок. 9 млрд. долл.). В струк­ту­ре экс­пор­та пре­об­ла­да­ют от­но­си­тель­но не­до­ро­гие из­де­лия: дре­наж­ные на­со­сы, ди­зель­ные дви­га­те­ли ма­лой мощ­но­сти, мо­то­бло­ки, ми­ни-трак­то­ры (мощ­но­стью до 14 кВт, или 19 л. с.) и др.

В с.-х. ма­ши­но­строе­нии дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 8 тыс. ком­па­ний, в осн. не­боль­шие ча­ст­ные пред­при­ятия (на до­лю 1/5 про­из­во­ди­те­лей при­хо­дит­ся ок. 90% стои­мо­сти про­даж). Тех­ни­че­ски слож­ные с.-х. тех­ни­ку и обо­ру­до­ва­ние вы­пус­ка­ют за­во­ды, при­над­ле­жа­щие круп­ным гос. кор­по­ра­ци­ям, а так­же со­вме­ст­ным пред­при­яти­ям с уча­сти­ем ве­ду­щих за­ру­беж­ных фирм (все­го ок. 150 ком­па­ний с иностр. уча­сти­ем, 2007).

Про­из-во че­ты­рёхко­лёс­ных ми­ни-трак­то­ров (св. 2 млн. шт. в 2007) со­сре­до­то­че­но на 137 пред­при­яти­ях в разл. рай­онах стра­ны, ко­лёс­ных и гу­се­нич­ных трак­то­ров (ок. 200 тыс. шт.) – на 24 за­во­дах. Ок. 40% с.-х. и пром. трак­то­ров (мощ­но­стью св. 14 кВт) вы­пус­ка­ют пред­при­ятия 2 круп­ней­ших гос. кор­по­ра­ций от­рас­ли: «YTO Group Corporation» и «Fo­ton Lovol Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.». Груп­па ком­па­ний YTO (го­лов­ной офис и гл. центр про­из-ва в г. Ло­ян, пров. Хэ­нань) ос­но­ва­на в 1955 как 1-й трак­тор­ный за­вод (с его кон­вей­е­ра в 1958 со­шёл пер­вый кит. трак­тор); за­во­ды YTO вы­пус­ка­ют: ок. 40 мо­де­лей ко­лёс­ных и гу­се­нич­ных с.-х. и пром. трак­то­ров, зер­но­убо­роч­ные ком­бай­ны, ши­ро­кий спектр на­вес­но­го и при­цеп­но­го с.-х. обо­ру­до­ва­ния, ди­зель­ные дви­га­те­ли, а так­же до­рож­но-стро­ит. ма­ши­ны (до­рож­ные кат­ки, экс­ка­ва­то­ры, буль­до­зе­ры, по­груз­чи­ки и др.), гру­зо­вые ав­то­мо­би­ли. За­во­ды ком­па­нии «Foton» (го­лов­ной офис и ве­ду­щее пред­при­ятие в г. Вэй­фан, пров. Шань­дун), по­ми­мо с.-х. ма­шин, вы­пуска­ют боль­шое чис­ло ви­дов до­рож­но-стро­ит. и ав­то­мо­биль­ной тех­ни­ки. Сре­ди круп­ных про­из­во­ди­те­лей трак­то­ров – ком­па­нии «Jiangsu Yueda Yan­cheng Tractor Manufacturing Co., Ltd.» (г. Янь­чэн, пров. Цзян­су) и амер. «John Deere» (за­во­ды «John Deere Tianjin Trac­tor Co., Ltd.» в рай­оне Тянь­цзи­ня, а так­же в г. Нин­бо, пров. Чжэц­зян).

Ок. 70% объ­ё­ма про­из-ва са­мо­ход­ных зер­но­убо­роч­ных ком­бай­нов при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю 5 ве­ду­щих ком­па­ний: «Foton», «Zhongzhou Agricultural Machinery Co., Ltd.» (г. Чжэн­чжоу, пров. Хэ­нань), амер. «John Deere» (за­вод «John Deere Jialian Harvester Co.» в г. Цзя­му­сы, пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), «YTO Group», «Gao­mi Chunyu Machinery Co.» (г. Вэй­фан, пров. Шань­дун).

Хи­ми­че­ская про­мыш­лен­ность – од­на из важ­ней­ших от­рас­лей, по до­ле в ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции (12% в 2006, вклю­чая неф­те­хи­мию и про­из-во фар­ма­цев­тич. пре­па­ра­тов) ус­ту­па­ет толь­ко ма­ши­но­строе­нию и ме­тал­лур­гич. пром-сти. В хи­мич. пром-сти дей­ст­ву­ют 44,3 тыс. пред­при­ятий всех форм соб­ст­вен­но­сти (14,7% всех пром. пред­при­ятий, вне­сён­ных в ценз Гос. ста­ти­стич. управ­ле­ния К.), на ко­то­рых за­ня­то ок. 8,2 млн. ра­бо­чих и слу­жа­щих. Раз­но­об­раз­ная сырь­е­вая ба­за от­рас­ли по­зво­ля­ет удов­ле­тво­рять по­треб­но­сти про­из-ва боль­шин­ст­ва ви­дов хи­мич. про­дук­ции. Ве­ли­ки мас­шта­бы до­бы­чи аг­ро­но­мич., хи­мич. и ин­ду­ст­ри­аль­но­го сы­рья: К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по до­бы­че ба­ри­та (4,2 млн. т в 2005), флюо­ри­та (2,7 млн. т), ка­мен­ной со­ли (45 млн. т в 2006), фос­фо­ри­тов (32 млн. т в 2006); ог­ра­ни­чен­ные за­па­сы не обес­пе­чи­ва­ют по­треб­но­сти в ка­лий­ных со­лях (до­бы­ча ок. 600 тыс. т в 2005). К. за­ни­ма­ет од­но из ве­ду­щих мест в ми­ре по про­из-ву и по­треб­ле­нию хи­ми­ка­тов (на­ря­ду с США и Япо­ни­ей). Экс­порт про­дук­ции хи­мич. пром-сти 44,5 млрд. долл. в 2006 (12,1 млрд. долл. в 2000). Сре­ди осн. про­блем от­рас­ли – не­дос­та­точ­ное раз­ви­тие тон­ких хи­мич. тех­но­ло­гий, не­вы­со­кое ка­че­ст­во не­ко­то­рых ви­дов про­дук­ции, не­об­хо­ди­мость уве­ли­чения про­из­водств. за­трат, свя­зан­ных с ре­ше­ни­ем обо­ст­ряю­щих­ся про­блем за­гряз­не­ния ок­ру­жаю­щей сре­ды. Пред­при­ятия хи­мич. (осо­бен­но неф­те­хи­мич.) пром-сти в 21 в. всё бо­лее кон­цен­три­руют­ся в вост. при­мор­ских ре­гио­нах стра­ны (ГЦП Шан­хай, про­вин­ции Цзян­су, Шань­дун, Гу­ан­дун, Чжэц­зян), что свя­за­но с воз­рас­таю­щим ис­поль­зо­ва­ни­ем им­порт­но­го уг­ле­во­до­род­но­го и др. сы­рья, бли­зо­стью к отеч. и за­ру­беж­ным рын­кам сбы­та.

К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по про­из-ву мн. ви­дов мас­со­вой хи­мич. про­дук­ции, в т. ч. (млн. т, 2007): сер­ная ки­сло­та 55 (24,3 в 2000), каль­ци­ни­ро­ван­ная со­да 17,7 (8,3), кау­стич. со­да 17,6 (6,7), а так­же син­те­тич. ам­ми­ак 49,4 млн. т в 2006 (33,6 млн. т в 2000). На до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го объ­ё­ма про­из-ва ми­нер. удоб­ре­ний (57,9 млн. т в 2007, в пе­ре­счё­те на дей­ст­вую­щее ве­ще­ст­во; 31,9 млн. т в 2000) и ок. 35% их ми­рового по­треб­ле­ния. Про­из-вом ми­нер. удоб­ре­ний за­ни­ма­ют­ся св. 1000 ком­па­ний, в т. ч. азот­ных – ок. 600, фос­фор­ных – ок. 400, ка­лий­ных – 47 (2006). Про­из-во азот­ных удоб­ре­ний 39,1 млн. т в 2006 (в пе­ре­счё­те на N; 24 млн. т в 2000), в т. ч. мо­че­ви­ны 22,3 млн. т (14,1 млн. т в 2000), часть про­дук­ции экс­порти­ру­ет­ся. Сре­ди ве­ду­щих цен­тров про­из-ва азот­ных удоб­ре­ний – Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су), Шиц­зяч­жу­ан (пров. Хэ­бэй), Да­лянь (пров. Ляо­нин), Цзи­линь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)], Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су), Цюй­чжоу (пров. Чжэ­цзян) и др. Дос­тиг­ну­тые объ­ё­мы про­из-ва фос­фор­ных удоб­ре­ний (12,3 млн. т в 2006, в пе­ре­счё­те на P2O5; 6,6 млн. т в 2000) по­зво­ля­ют удов­ле­творять по­треб­но­сти внутр. рын­ка. Не­хват­ка ка­лий­ных удоб­ре­ний (про­из-во 2,1 млн. т в 2006, в пе­ре­счё­те на K2O; 0,7 млн. т в 2000) по­кры­ва­ет­ся за счёт им­пор­та. По объ­ё­мам про­из-ва средств за­щи­ты рас­те­ний для с.-х. нужд К. за­ни­ма­ет 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре (по­сле США). Про­из-во (тыс. т, 2006): ин­сек­ти­ци­ды 510, фун­ги­ци­ды 110, гер­би­ци­ды 390.

Неф­те­хи­мич. пром-сть раз­ви­ва­ет­ся опе­ре­жаю­щи­ми тем­па­ми, ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся хо­ро­ши­ми ка­че­ст­вен­ны­ми по­ка­за­те­ля­ми вы­пус­кае­мой про­дук­ции. Про­из-во (млн. т): эти­лен 10,5 (2007; 4,7 в 2000); по­ли­ви­нил­хло­рид 8,3 (2006; 2,6 в 2000); ме­та­нол 7,6 (1,8); бен­зол 3,4 (1,9). Наи­бо­лее круп­ные и совр. пред­при­ятия от­рас­ли (все­го ок. 300) соз­да­ны на ру­беже 20–21 вв. круп­ней­ши­ми кит. гос. неф­те­га­зо­вы­ми кор­по­ра­ция­ми с уча­сти­ем ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых ком­па­ний («Bay­er», «BASF», «Degussa», «Shell» и др.) в т. н. хи­мич. тех­но­пар­ках – в ГЦП Шан­хай, г. Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су), а так­же в ря­де цен­тров пров. Гу­ан­дун. К. – один из ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых про­из­во­ди­те­лей пла­ст­масс и син­те­тич. смол. Про­из-во пер­вич­ных пла­ст­масс 33 млн. т в 2007 (ок. 11 млн. т в 2000), ок. 20% пла­ст­масс и из­де­лий из них (по стои­мо­сти) экс­пор­ти­ру­ют­ся. Вы­пус­ком пла­ст­масс (в т. ч. из вто­рич­но­го сы­рья) и из­де­лий из них за­ни­ма­ют­ся ок. 15 тыс. ком­па­ний (с объ­ё­мом про­из-ва св. 725 тыс. долл. в год ка­ж­дая). Ве­ду­щие ре­гио­ны (2007): про­вин­ции Чжэц­зян (23,2% стои­мо­сти пласт­масс и из­де­лий из них, в т. ч. разл. ви­ды син­те­тич. плё­нок и ко­жи; ве­ду­щие цен­тры – Тай­чжоу, Ху­анъ­янь и др.), Гу­ан­дун (22,8%; пла­сти­ко­вые тру­бы, упа­ков­ки, бы­то­вые то­ва­ры; гл. цен­тры – Гу­ан­чжоу, Фо­шань, Дун­гу­ань, Шэнь­чжэнь и др.), Цзян­су (9,9%; пла­сти­ко­вые фор­мы и др.), Шань­дун (9,6%; плён­ки для те­п­лиц и др.).

К. – од­на из не­мно­гих стран, где про­из­во­дит­ся син­те­ти­че­ский (1813 тыс. т в 2006 – 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США; 840 тыс. т в 2000) и на­ту­раль­ный (533 тыс. т) кау­чук. На до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/4 ми­ро­во­го по­треб­ле­ния кау­чу­ка; ок. 40% по­треб­но­стей по­кры­ва­ет­ся за счёт им­пор­та (гл. им­пор­тё­ры на­ту­раль­но­го кау­чу­ка – Таи­ланд, Ма­лай­зия и Ин­до­не­зия, син­те­ти­че­ско­го – Япо­ния, Респуб­лика Ко­рея, США; 2005). Осн. цен­тры про­из-ва син­те­тич. кау­чу­ка – Цзы­бо и Цин­дао (пров. Шань­дун), Хой­чжоу (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Нань­тун (пров. Цзян­су), Да­цин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), Цзи­линь [пров. Ги­рин (Цзи­линь)], Цзинь­чжоу (пров. Ляо­нин), Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су), Ду­шань­цзы (Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н). Про­из-во шин для ав­то­мо­би­лей и трак­то­ров 318 млн. шт. в 2006 (ок. 15% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва), из них ок. 1/3 – на экс­порт. В шин­ной пром-сти дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 300 ком­па­ний, на до­лю 50 круп­ней­ших из них при­ходит­ся св. 70% все­го объ­ё­ма про­из-ва. Б. ч. про­дук­ции ве­ду­щих ком­па­ний от­рас­ли [«Shandong Wanda BOTO Tyre Co., Ltd.» (ок. 70 млн. шин в 2007), «Guan­g­zhou South China Rubber Tire Co., Ltd.» и др.] вы­пус­ка­ет­ся на пред­при­яти­ях, соз­дан­ных с уча­сти­ем круп­ных иностр. фирм (франц. «Michelin», амер. «Good­year», япон. «Bridgestone», юж.-кор. «Han­kook» и др.). Гл. ре­гио­ны кон­цен­тра­ции пред­при­ятий шин­ной пром-сти – про­вин­ции Шань­дун и Гу­ан­дун.

На до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва хи­мич. во­ло­кон (23,9 млн. т в 2007; 0,7 млн. т в 2000) – важ­но­го вида сы­рья для тек­стиль­ной пром-сти стра­ны. В струк­ту­ре про­из-ва пре­об­ла­да­ют син­те­тич. во­лок­на (св. 95% в 2007) – по­ли­эфир­ные, по­ли­амид­ные, по­ли­ак­ри­ло­вые и др. Ве­ду­щие цен­тры: Ич­жэн (пров. Цзян­су), ГЦП Шан­хай, Ляо­ян (пров. Ляо­нин), Чан­шоу (пров. Сы­чу­ань), Синьху­эй (пров. Гу­ан­дун) и др.

Ус­ко­рен­ны­ми тем­па­ми раз­ви­ва­ет­ся фар­ма­цев­тич. пром-сть – про­из-во ле­карств тра­диц. кит. ме­ди­ци­ны и хи­мич. ле­кар­ст­вен­ных средств, пре­им. дже­не­ри­ков (вы­пус­кае­мых без ли­цен­зии ком­па­нии-раз­ра­бот­чи­ка и раз­ме­щае­мых на рын­ке по­сле окон­ча­ния сро­ка дей­ст­вия па­тен­та). К. ли­ди­ру­ет в ми­ре по про­из-ву ан­ти­био­ти­ков, мн. ви­дов ви­та­ми­нов, обез­бо­ли­ваю­щих средств, яв­ля­ет­ся круп­ней­шим про­из­во­ди­те­лем и экс­пор­тё­ром разл. ви­дов ле­кар­ст­вен­но­го сы­рья. Раз­ви­ва­ет­ся про­из-во био­фар­ма­цев­тич. пре­па­ра­тов (пров. Сы­чу­ань и др.). Экс­порт про­дук­ции фар­ма­цев­тич. пром-сти 3,8 млрд. долл. в 2005 (1,8 млрд. долл. в 2000). В стра­не дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 3,5 тыс. фар­ма­цев­тич. ком­па­ний (пре­об­ла­да­ют мел­кие и сред­ние), из них ок. 1,8 тыс. – с уча­сти­ем иностр. ка­пи­та­ла. Ве­ду­щие ком­па­нии от­рас­ли – «China National Phar­maceutical Group Corporation» («Sino­farm») со штаб-квар­ти­рой в Пе­ки­не [пред­при­ятия в г. Шэнь­чжэнь (пров. Гу­ан­дун), и др.], «China Shineway Phar­maceutical Group Limited Company» со штаб-квар­ти­рой в г. Шиц­зяч­жу­ан (пров. Хэ­бэй). На кит. рын­ке при­сут­ст­ву­ет боль­шин­ство круп­ных фар­ма­цев­тич. ком­па­ний ми­ра, в т. ч. амер. «Pfizer», швейц. «No­var­tis» и «Roche», герм. «Bayer» и др.

Пред­при­ятия лёг­кой про­мыш­лен­но­сти (вклю­чая про­из-во тка­ней, го­то­вой оде­ж­ды, обу­ви, из­де­лий из ко­жи, ме­ха и пу­ха) про­из­во­дят 8% ва­ло­вой пром. про­дук­ции К. (в стои­мо­ст­ном вы­ра­же­нии, 2006). На до­лю тек­стиль­ных и швей­ных из­де­лий при­хо­дит­ся ок. 13% стои­мо­сти экс­пор­та. Тра­ди­ци­он­ная и наи­бо­лее раз­ви­тая от­расль – тек­стиль­ная, вклю­ча­ет про­из-во пря­жи и тка­ней из хлоп­ка, шёл­ка, шер­сти, льна, джу­та, пень­ки, ке­на­фа, ра­ми, хи­мич. во­ло­кон и их сме­сей (на на­ту­раль­ное сы­рьё прихо­дит­ся ок. 30% объ­ё­ма по­треб­ляе­мых тек­стиль­ных во­ло­кон), а так­же кра­силь­ное, пе­чат­но-на­бив­ное, три­ко­таж­ное про­из-ва. На­ли­чие об­шир­ной сырь­е­вой ба­зы и ём­ко­го внутр. рын­ка оп­ре­де­ля­ет кон­ку­рен­то­спо­соб­ность из­де­лий от­рас­ли. К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер про­из-ва тек­сти­ля (66 млрд. м тка­ней всех ви­дов в 2007; 27,7 млрд. м в 2000), на его до­лю при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/4 ми­ро­во­го экс­пор­та тек­стиль­ной про­дук­ции. На­ме­тив­шая­ся с 2007 тен­ден­ция к сни­же­нию экс­порт­ной ори­ен­та­ции от­рас­ли вы­зва­на уве­ли­че­ни­ем про­из­водств. за­трат. В тек­стиль­ной пром-сти пре­об­ла­да­ют круп­ные и сред­ние пред­при­ятия (все­го 25,3 тыс., или 8,4% пром. пред­при­ятий всех форм соб­ст­вен­но­сти, вне­сён­ных в ценз Гос. ста­ти­стич. управ­ле­ния К.), на ко­то­рых за­ня­то ок. 6,2 млн. чел. (2006). Тра­ди­ци­он­но (со 2-й пол. 19 в.) ве­ду­щие цен­тры от­рас­ли со­сре­до­то­че­ны гл. обр. в вост. при­мор­ских рай­онах стра­ны. Про­из-во хлоп­ча­то­бу­маж­ной пря­жи (ок. 20 млн. т в 2007) и тка­ней (23,6 млрд. м в 2006) ба­зи­ру­ет­ся на ки­тай­ском и им­порт­ном хлоп­ке (вво­зит­ся из Ин­дии, США, Уз­бе­ки­ста­на и др.), с 2005 объ­ё­мы им­пор­та сы­рья со­кра­ща­ют­ся (на 55% в 2006–2007). Св. 1/2 про­из-ва при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю 2 про­вин­ций Вост. К. – Шань­дун (33%) и Цзян­су (18%). Гл. цен­тры хлоп­ча­то­бу­маж­ной пром-сти: ГЦП Шан­хай и Тянь­цзинь, а так­же го­ро­да Цин­дао и Цзи­нань (пров. Шань­дун), Уси и Нань­тун (пров. Цзян­су), Шиц­зяч­жу­ан (пров. Хэ­бэй), Ухань (пров. Ху­бэй), Чжэн­чжоу (пров. Хэ­нань), ГЦП Чун­цин и др. Круп­ней­шие ком­па­нии от­рас­ли – «Weiqiao Textile Co., Ltd.» (го­лов­ной офис в у. Цзу­пин в пров. Шань­дун) и «Huafang Group of China» (г. Чжан­цзя­ган в пров. Цзян­су). Про­из-во шер­стя­ных тка­ней ба­зи­ру­ет­ся пре­им. на отеч. сы­рье. Св. 2/3 объ­ё­ма про­из-ва при­ходит­ся на до­лю при­мор­ских рай­онов Вост. К.: ГЦП Шан­хай, Пе­кин и Тянь­цзинь, а так­же про­вин­ции Цзян­су (го­ро­да Уси, Нан­кин, Чан­чжоу) и Чжэц­зян [го­ро­да Хан­чжоу, Утун (Тун­сян) и др.]. Во внутр. рай­онах стра­ны шер­стя­ная пром-сть раз­ви­та в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не [круп­ные цен­тры – Урум­чи, Ши­хэц­зы, Куль­джа (Инин)], ав­то­ном­ном р-не Внутр. Мон­го­лия (Хух-Хо­то), а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Гань­су (Лань­чжоу) и Цин­хай (Си­нин). На до­лю К. тра­ди­ци­он­но при­хо­дит­ся б. ч. ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва и экс­пор­та тка­ней из на­ту­раль­но­го шёл­ка. Гл. рай­он шёл­ко­вой пром-сти рас­по­ло­жен в ниж­нем те­че­нии р. Янц­зы; цен­тры – ГЦП Шан­хай, а так­же го­ро­да про­вин­ций Чжэ­цзян (Хан­чжоу, Хуч­жоу, Хай­нин и др.) и Цзян­су (Суч­жоу, Уси, Чан­чжоу и др.); сре­ди круп­ных цен­тров от­рас­ли – Гу­ан­чжоу (пров. Гу­ан­дун), Нань­чун и Чэн­ду (пров. Сы­чу­ань), ГЦП Чун­цин и др. Льня­ные тка­ни про­из­во­дят на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке стра­ны, гл. центр – Хар­бин (пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), тка­ни из джу­та и ке­на­фа – в про­вин­ци­ях Шань­дун, Хубэй, Хэ­нань, Чжэц­зян (круп­ней­ший центр – Хан­чжоу).

Швей­ная пром-сть К. обес­пе­чи­ва­ет пред­ме­та­ми оде­ж­ды на­се­ле­ние мн. стран ми­ра (св. 17 млрд. швей­ных из­де­лий в 2006). Пре­об­ла­да­ет не­до­ро­гая про­дук­ция мас­со­во­го спро­са. Зна­чит. часть из­де­лий из­вест­ных ми­ро­вых брен­дов так­же вы­пус­ка­ет­ся в К. (для сни­же­ния из­дер­жек ве­ду­щие ком­па­нии ми­ра раз­ме­ща­ют про­из-во пред­ме­тов оде­ж­ды на ки­тай­ских или соз­дан­ных с их уча­сти­ем со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­яти­ях). Швей­ные фаб­ри­ки и мас­тер­ские (б. ч. из них мел­кие) име­ют­ся во всех го­ро­дах и круп­ных сель­ских по­се­ле­ни­ях стра­ны; осн. кла­сте­ры от­рас­ли сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись в про­вин­ци­ях Гу­ан­дун, Чжэц­зян, Цзян­су, а так­же в ГЦП Шан­хай.

Пред­при­ятия ко­же­вен­но-обув­ной про­мышленности вы­пус­ка­ют вы­де­лан­ную ко­жу, ко­жа­ную оде­ж­ду (66 млн. из­де­лий в 2006), обувь, сум­ки (ок. 550 млн. шт.), пер­чат­ки и др. Зна­чит. часть про­дук­ции про­из­во­дит­ся из им­порт­но­го сы­рья (вы­де­лан­ные ко­жи и ко­же­вен­ные по­лу­фаб­ри­ка­ты; гл. им­пор­тё­ры – Ита­лия, Бра­зи­лия, Республика Корея и США). Стои­мость экс­пор­та шкур жи­вот­ных, ко­же­вен­ных по­лу­фаб­ри­ка­тов, вы­де­лан­ных кож и ко­жа­ных из­де­лий 23,8 млрд. долл. (2006), в т. ч. ко­жа­ной обу­ви ок. 8,8 млрд. долл. К. – ве­ду­щий ми­ро­вой про­из­во­ди­тель и экс­пор­тёр обу­ви. В струк­ту­ре про­из-ва боль­шая до­ля при­хо­дит­ся на не­до­ро­гую обувь сред­не­го и низ­ше­го це­но­вых сег­мен­тов (пла­сти­ко­вая, ре­зи­но­вая, с тек­стиль­ным вер­хом и др.). Про­из-во обу­ви ок. 10 млрд. пар в 2006 (св. 1/2 ми­ро­во­го), в т. ч. ко­жа­ной обу­ви ок. 3 млрд. пар. Экс­порт обу­ви ок. 7,7 млрд. пар (на сум­му ок. 21 млрд. долл.), в т. ч. ко­жа­ной обу­ви 1,4 млрд. пар. В то­вар­ной струк­ту­ре экс­пор­та пре­об­ла­да­ет пла­сти­ко­вая и ре­зи­но­вая обувь (ок. 4,4 млрд. пар), а так­же обувь с тек­стиль­ным вер­хом и др. (1,9 млрд. пар). Дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 40 тыс. обув­ных пред­при­ятий (в осн. мел­кие и сред­ние). Гл. ре­гио­ны: пров. Гу­ан­дун (ок. 1/2 объ­ё­ма про­из-ва обу­ви в стра­не; круп­ней­ший центр – Дун­гу­ань, на до­лю ко­то­ро­го при­хо­дит­ся ок. 10% ми­ро­во­го то­вар­но­го экс­пор­та обу­ви), а так­же пров. Фуц­зянь (круп­ный центр про­из-ва – г. Цинъ­ян), ГЦП Тянь­цзинь, пров. Цзян­су. Сре­ди ве­ду­щих ком­па­ний от­рас­ли – «Fareeast Leather Industry Co., Ltd.» (го­лов­ной офис и осн. пред­при­ятия в Гу­ан­чжоу, пров. Гу­ан­дун) и «Zhejiang Kasen In­dustrial Group Co., Ltd.» (Чанъ­ань, пров. Чжэц­зян).

К. – один из ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых про­из­во­ди­те­лей и экс­пор­тё­ров из­де­лий из ме­ха, на его до­лю при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/4 стои­мо­сти ми­ро­во­го экс­пор­та про­дук­ции из шку­рок нор­ки (шу­бы и др.); про­из-во вы­де­лан­ных шку­рок нор­ки ок. 10 млн. шт. (2006; 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле Да­нии). К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по экс­пор­ту из­де­лий из шку­рок ли­сы и ено­то­вид­ной со­ба­ки.

К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре про­из­во­ди­тель и экс­пор­тёр иг­ру­шек (св. 70% стои­мо­сти ми­ро­во­го экс­пор­та в 2006); вы­пус­ка­ет­ся ок. 30 тыс. ви­дов из­де­лий. Дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 8 тыс. пред­при­ятий от­рас­ли, на ко­то­рых за­ня­то 3,5 млн. ра­бо­чих и слу­жа­щих (2006). Пре­об­ла­да­ет про­из-во на ос­но­ве кон­трак­тов, под брен­да­ми ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых про­из­во­ди­те­лей (ком­па­ний «Mattel», «Hasbro» и др.). Ре­ша­ет­ся про­бле­ма по­вы­ше­ния ка­че­ст­ва из­де­лий, в т. ч. их эко­ло­гич. бе­зо­пас­но­сти (до 15% иг­ру­шек из­го­тав­ли­ва­ет­ся из ток­сич­ных ма­те­риа­лов). Св. 60% объ­ё­ма про­из-ва и 80% стои­мо­сти экс­пор­та иг­ру­шек при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю пров. Гу­ан­дун (2006). К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер про­из-ва и экс­пор­та пи­ро­тех­нич. из­де­лий для празд­нич­ных са­лю­тов и фей­ер­вер­ков, а так­же по­ро­хо­вых ра­кет, пе­тард и др.

К. – ве­ду­щий ми­ро­вой про­из­во­ди­тель и экс­пор­тёр ке­ра­мич. из­де­лий (св. 70% стои­мо­сти ми­ро­во­го экс­пор­та в 2006), в т. ч. тон­кой ке­ра­ми­ки – фар­фо­ра и фа­ян­са. Са­мые из­вест­ные цен­тры про­из-ва (т. н. пять кит. фар­фо­ро­вых го­ро­дов): Цзин­дэч­жэнь (пров. Цзян­си), Цзы­бо (пров. Шань­дун), Ли­лин (пров. Ху­нань), Фо­шань (пров. Гу­ан­дун) и Тан­шань (пров. Хэ­бэй). Боль­шое экс­порт­ное зна­че­ние име­ют раз­ви­тые в К. про­из-ва разл. де­кора­тив­но-ху­дож. из­де­лий – ла­ко­вых ми­ниа­тюр, ков­ров, ци­но­вок, кру­жев, а так­же вы­шив­ка, резь­ба по кос­ти, де­ре­ву, кам­ню и др.

Пи­ще­вая про­мыш­лен­ность (вклю­чая про­из-во го­то­вых про­до­вольств. то­ва­ров, на­пит­ков и та­бач­ных из­де­лий) ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­на пре­им. на удов­ле­тво­ре­ние по­треб­но­стей внутр. рын­ка, на её до­лю при­хо­дит­ся 7,8% ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции (2006). Дей­ст­ву­ют 26,5 тыс. пред­при­ятий (в осн. мел­кие и сред­ние), на ко­то­рых за­ня­то 4,8 млн. чел. Сре­ди гл. от­рас­лей – му­ко­моль­ная (пред­став­ле­на мно­же­ст­вом пре­им. мел­ких пред­при­ятий; круп­ные цен­тры – Шан­хай, Тянь­цзинь, Ухань, Хар­бин) и ри­со­очи­сти­тель­ная (ве­ду­щие цен­тры – Шан­хай, Хан­чжоу). Мас­ло­бой­ная пром-сть за­ни­ма­ет од­но из ве­ду­щих мест в ми­ре по объ­ё­мам про­из-ва рас­тит. ма­сел [ара­хи­со­вое, рап­со­вое, со­евое, тун­го­вое, хлоп­ко­вое, льня­ное, кун­жу­то­вое, ка­ме­лие­вое, из кам­фор­но­го де­ре­ва (кам­фор­но­го лав­ра); все­го 14,1 млн. т в 2005]. Про­из-во са­ха­ра (12,7 млн. т в 2007) из са­хар­но­го тро­ст­ни­ка (в пров. Гу­ан­дун, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не, про­вин­ци­ях Юнь­нань, Сы­чу­ань и Фуц­зянь), а так­же са­хар­ной свёк­лы (в Сев.-Вост. и Сев. К.). Раз­ви­ва­ют­ся мяс­ная и мо­лоч­ная от­рас­ли (до нач. 21 в. в боль­шин­ст­ве рай­онов стра­ны прак­ти­че­ски не су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло пред­при­ятий по пе­ре­ра­бот­ке мо­ло­ка, т. к. от­сут­ст­во­ва­ла тра­ди­ция его по­треб­ле­ния). Экс­порт­ное зна­че­ние име­ет про­из-во кон­сер­вов (рыб­ных, мо­ре­про­дук­тов, мяс­ных, фрук­то­вых, овощ­ных). К. – один из ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых про­из­во­ди­те­лей и экс­пор­тё­ров чая (осо­бен­но вы­со­ки­ми тем­па­ми рас­тёт экс­порт зе­лё­но­го чая). В про­из-ве ал­ко­голь­ных на­пит­ков пре­об­ла­да­ет пи­во­варе­ние (31,7 млн. т в 2005 – 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре). Круп­ней­шая ком­па­ния пи­ще­вой пром-сти – гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corp.» (COFCO) с го­лов­ным офи­сом в Пе­ки­не (пе­ре­ра­бот­ка зер­на, про­из-во рас­тит. ма­сел, на­пит­ков и др.; внеш­няя тор­гов­ля про­до­вольств. то­ва­ра­ми).

К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер про­из-ва (св. 2,1 млрд. па­чек си­га­рет в 2007) и по­треб­ле­ния та­бач­ной про­дук­ции; кит. си­га­ре­ты, как пра­ви­ло, от­ли­ча­ют­ся не­вы­со­ким ка­че­ст­вом. Ве­ду­щая в ми­ре ком­па­ния по объ­ё­мам про­из-ва та­бач­ных из­де­лий – гос. «China National Tobacco Co.» (за­ни­ма­ет мо­но­поль­ное по­ло­же­ние на рын­ке стра­ны).

Сельское хозяйство


Крестьянские поля в провинции Аньхой.


Фото В. А. Снатенкова

К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре про­из­во­ди­тель аг­рар­ной про­дук­ции, од­на из не­мно­гих стран ми­ра, бы­ст­ро уве­ли­чи­ваю­щих экс­порт про­дук­тов пи­та­ния и с.-х. сы­рья. Про­до­вольств. про­бле­ма в осн. ре­ше­на к сер. 1980-х гг., од­на­ко рав­но­ве­сие спро­са и пред­ло­же­ния на внутр. рын­ке про­дук­тов пи­та­ния про­дол­жа­ет ос­та­вать­ся не­ус­той­чи­вым. Од­на из наи­бо­лее зна­чи­мых про­блем, сдер­жи­ваю­щих раз­ви­тие от­рас­ли, – не­хват­ка па­хот­ных зе­мель. К., где скон­цент­ри­ро­ва­но ок. 22% на­се­ле­ния Зем­ли, рас­по­ла­гает ок. 10% ми­ро­вой пло­ща­ди паш­ни. Пло­щадь па­хот­ных уго­дий 121,8 млн. га (на кон. 2007; без осо­бых адм. рай­онов Сян­ган и Ао­мынь, а так­же о. Тай­вань). Св. 55% пл. паш­ни – су­хо­доль­ные по­ля, 26% – за­лив­ные, ок. 19% – оро­шае­мые зем­ли. Раз­ме­ры по­сев­ных пло­ща­дей (153,6 млн. га в 2007) пре­вы­ша­ют об­щую пло­щадь па­хот­ных зе­мель, т. к. в ря­де рай­онов стра­ны со­би­ра­ют неск. уро­жа­ев в год.

В с.-х. про­из-ве тру­дят­ся 348,7 млн. чел. (кон. 2006), или 39,5% об­ще­го чис­ла за­ня­тых в стра­не (в т. ч. 65,6% са­мо­дея­тель­но­го сель­ско­го на­се­ле­ния). Все­го в от­рас­ли на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся 200,2 млн. се­мей­ных (кре­сть­ян­ских) хо­зяйств и 395 тыс. бо­лее круп­ных хо­зяйств. еди­ниц (коо­пе­ра­тив­ных объ­е­ди­не­ний, ком­па­ний и др.).

Пред­при­ни­ма­ет­ся ком­плекс гос. мер по мо­дер­ни­за­ции с. х-ва, вклю­чая ши­ро­кую фи­нан­со­вую под­держ­ку. С 1.1.2006 от­ме­нён с.-х. на­лог. Кре­сть­я­не, за­ня­тые про­из-вом зер­но­вых, по­лу­ча­ют пря­мые до­та­ции на при­об­ре­те­ние вы­со­ко­ка­че­ствен­ных се­мян, тех­ни­ки и удоб­ре­ний (4 млрд. юа­ней, или ок. 570 млн. долл. в 2008; ок. 2 млрд. юа­ней в 2007). Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся ряд гос. про­грамм раз­ви­тия с. х-ва (в т. ч. «Про­грам­ма раз­ви­тия с.-х. нау­ки и тех­ни­ки на 2006–20»), а так­же шесть т. н. ма­лых про­ек­тов мо­дер­ни­за­ции сель­ской эко­но­ми­ки (с 2001): эко­ном­ное оро­ше­ние с.-х. уго­дий; обес­пе­че­ние лю­дей и ско­та во­дой, при­год­ной для пи­тья; строи­тель­ст­во сель­ских до­рог; ис­поль­зо­ва­ние бо­лот­но­го га­за (ме­та­на) в бы­то­вых це­лях; строи­тель­ст­во ма­лых сель­ских ГЭС; обу­ст­рой­ст­во па­ст­бищ для ско­та.

По­вы­ша­ет­ся уро­вень ком­плекс­ной ме­ха­ни­за­ции по­ле­вых ра­бот (ме­ха­ни­зи­ро­ва­но ок. 40% все­го их объ­ё­ма, в т. ч. па­хот­ных ра­бот – на 59,9% пл. паш­ни, по­сев­ных ра­бот – на 32,6%, убо­роч­ных ра­бот – на 24,9% пл. по­се­вов, кон. 2006). В с. х-ве ис­поль­зу­ет­ся 1400 тыс. трак­то­ров (мощ­но­стью св. 14 кВт, или ок. 19 л. с.) и 25,1 млн. ми­ни-трак­то­ров и мо­то­бло­ков (мощ­но­стью ме­нее 14 кВт), 550 тыс. убо­роч­ных ком­бай­нов (кон. 2006). По­сто­ян­но уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся ис­поль­зо­ва­ние ми­нер. удоб­ре­ний – 57,9 млн. т в рас­чё­те на 100% со­дер­жа­ния дей­ст­вую­щих ве­ществ в 2007 (26–30 млн. т в нач. 1990-х гг.). Зна­чит. уси­лия на­прав­ля­ют­ся на рас­ши­ре­ние пло­ща­ди оро­шае­мых зе­мель (57,8 млн. га в 2007), ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние сто­ка рек, борь­бу с эро­зи­ей почв. Еже­год­но пло­щадь эф­фек­тив­но­го оро­ше­ния в ср. уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся на 1 млн. га. Пло­щадь элек­три­фи­ци­ро­ван­но­го оро­ше­ния 26,6% об­щей пло­ща­ди паш­ни (кон. 2006); рас­ши­ря­ют­ся пло­ща­ди, оро­шае­мые по совр. тех­но­ло­ги­ям эко­ном­но­го рас­хо­до­ва­ния во­ды. Про­дол­жа­ют­ся ра­бо­ты (2008) по осу­ще­ст­в­ле­нию про­ек­та пе­ре­бро­ски час­ти сто­ка юж. рек в сев. рай­оны стра­ны. Про­во­дит­ся ре­куль­ти­ва­ция низ­ко- и сред­не­уро­жай­ных зе­мель (в 2003–07 ре­куль­ти­ви­ро­ва­но 8,5 млн. га па­хот­ных зе­мель, что по­зво­ли­ло до­пол­ни­тель­но со­брать 16,8 млн. т зер­на).


Рисовые поля в провинции Юньнань.

До­ля рас­те­ние­вод­ст­ва в струк­ту­ре с.-х. про­из-ва не­ук­лон­но сни­жа­ет­ся (50,4% ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти аг­рар­ной про­дук­ции в 2007; 79,9% в 1978). В струк­ту­ре по­сев­ных пло­ща­дей умень­ша­ет­ся до­ля зер­но­вых куль­тур – 68,7%, или 105,6 млн. га, в 2007 (75,8% в 1985; 80,3% в 1978). К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре (с 2002) по ва­ло­во­му сбо­ру зер­на – 501,5 млн. т в 2007 (381 кг в рас­чё­те на 1 жит. стра­ны); ср. уро­жай­ность зер­но­вых куль­тур св. 53 ц/га. Сель­ское хо­зяй­ст­во в осн. удов­ле­тво­ря­ет внутр. по­треб­но­сти стра­ны в про­до­вольств. и фу­раж­ном зер­не, в т. ч. по ри­су на 99,6%, пше­ни­це – 99,3%, ку­ку­ру­зе – 100%.

Гл. про­до­вольств. куль­ту­ра – рис. В нач. 21 в. на до­лю К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 1/5 об­ще­ми­ро­вой пло­ща­ди по­се­вов ри­са (29,3–30,7 млн. га); уве­ли­чи­ва­ют­ся по­сев­ные пло­ща­ди вы­со­ко­ка­че­ст­вен­ных (элит­ных) сор­тов за­лив­но­го ри­са (69,1% пло­ща­ди ри­со­вых по­лей в 2006). К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по сбо­рам ри­са – 185,5 млн. т в 2007 (ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва). Ок. 65% сбо­ров при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю гл. поя­са воз­де­лы­ва­ния за­лив­но­го ри­са в бас­сей­не р. Янц­зы (про­вин­ции Ху­нань, Ху­бэй, Цзян­си, Чжэц­зян, юж. часть пров. Хэ­нань, а так­же пров. Сы­чу­ань и др.), 17% – на юж. часть Ки­тая (пров. Гу­ан­дун, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н, пров. Хай­нань, вост. часть пров. Фуц­зянь; здесь со­би­ра­ют 2 уро­жая в год), 12% – на рай­оны ри­со­сея­ния на се­ве­ре и се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке стра­ны (в бас­сей­нах рек Ху­ан­хэ и Ляо­хэ), ок. 6% – на Юго-Зап. К. (про­вин­ции Юнь­нань, Гуй­чжоу, сев.-зап. часть Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ско­го ав­то­ном­но­го р-на). Вто­рая по важ­но­сти про­до­вольств. куль­ту­ра – пше­ница. Пло­щадь её по­се­вов 23 млн. га (2006), из них 55,2% – вы­со­ко­уро­жай­ные сор­та. К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по сбо­рам пше­ни­цы – 104,5 млн. т (2006). Осн. рай­оны воз­де­лы­ва­ния – про­вин­ции Хэ­нань, Шань­дун, Хэ­бэй, Ань­хой, Цзян­су. Важ­ная про­до­вольств. и кор­мо­вая куль­ту­ра – ку­ку­ру­за. Пло­щадь по­се­вов 27 млн. га (2006), из них св. 60% – вы­со­ко­уро­жай­ные гиб­рид­ные сор­та. Сбор ку­ку­руз­но­го зер­на 145,5 млн. т (2006; 2-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США). Осн. рай­оны воз­де­лы­ва­ния – про­вин­ции Ги­рин (Цзи­линь), Хэй­лунц­зян, Ляо­нин (Сев.-Вост. К.), а так­же про­вин­ции Шань­дун (Вост. К.), Хэ­нань (Центр.-Юж. К.), Хэ­бэй (Сев. К.). В свя­зи с рос­том внутр. по­треб­ле­ния объ­ё­мы тра­диц. экс­пор­та ку­ку­руз­но­го зер­на сни­жа­ют­ся (3,0 млн. т в 2006; 8,6 млн. т в 2005). Воз­де­лы­ва­ют гао­лян, про­со и чу­ми­зу – гл. обр. на се­ве­ро-вос­то­ке (в бас­сей­не р. Ляо­хэ) и на Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской рав­ни­не, а так­же яч­мень (пре­им. в гор­ных рай­онах) и гре­чи­ху. Сбо­ры бо­бо­вых куль­тур (соя, фа­соль, го­рох и др.) 17,5 млн. т в 2007 (в ср. 20–21 млн. т в 2000–06); обес­пе­чи­ва­ют ок. 40% по­треб­но­стей стра­ны. К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре им­пор­тёр бо­бо­вых (вво­зят­ся в осн. из США, Бра­зи­лии и Ар­ген­ти­ны), на до­лю ко­то­рых при­хо­дит­ся 23,4% об­щей стои­мо­сти им­пор­та с.-х. про­дук­ции (2006). Раз­ме­ры по­сев­ных пло­ща­дей под кар­то­фе­лем (ок. 10 млн. га) с кон. 1970-х гг. поч­ти не ме­ня­ют­ся. Сбор кар­то­фе­ля (вклю­чая ба­тат) 28 млн. т (2007; в пе­ре­счё­те на зер­но в со­от­но­ше­нии 4:1); по ва­ло­во­му про­из-ву кар­то­фе­ля К. вы­шел на 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре. Ок. 45% сбо­ров да­ют ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия, а так­же про­вин­ции Гань­су, Юнь­нань и Гуй­чжоу.

По­сев­ные пло­ща­ди мас­лич­ных куль­тур (ара­хис, рапс, кун­жут, под­сол­неч­ник и др.) 15,7 млн. га в 2006 (8 млн. га в 1980). Сбор се­мян мас­лич­ных 25,5 млн. т в 2007 (в ср. ок. 30 млн. т в 2004–2005; 5,2 млн. т в 1978). Важ­ней­шая куль­ту­ра – ара­хис (13,0 млн. т се­мян в 2007, ок. 1/2 сбо­ра се­мян мас­лич­ных); по объ­ё­мам про­из-ва и экс­пор­та ара­хи­са (ок. 40% ми­ро­во­го) К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре. Осн. рай­оны воз­де­лы­ва­ния ара­хи­са – про­вин­ции Хэ­нань, Хэ­бэй, Ань­хой, Цзян­су, Сы­чу­ань (гл. обр. хол­ми­стые ме­ст­но­сти с пес­ча­ны­ми поч­ва­ми). Важ­ная мас­лич­ная и кор­мо­вая куль­ту­ра – рапс (в юж. рай­онах стра­ны вы­ра­щи­ва­ет­ся как зим­няя куль­ту­ра). Сбор се­мян рап­са 10,4 млн. т в 2007 (ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва). В верх­нем, сред­нем и ниж­нем те­че­нии р. Янц­зы соз­да­ют­ся (2008) три круп­ных рай­она пре­иму­ще­ст­вен­но­го воз­де­лы­ва­ния рап­са. Вы­ра­щи­ва­ние кун­жу­та (сбор 557 тыс. т в 2007) в осн. со­сре­до­то­че­но в про­вин­ци­ях Хэ­нань, Ху­бэй и Ань­хой. Под­сол­неч­ник воз­де­лы­ва­ют в ре­гио­нах с от­но­си­тель­но низ­кой плот­но­стью на­се­ле­ния – в ав­то­ном­ных рай­онах Внутр. Мон­го­лия и Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском, а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях Хэй­лунц­зян и Шань­си. Про­из-во рас­тит. мас­ла не удов­ле­тво­ря­ет внутр. по­треб­но­сти, на его до­лю при­хо­дит­ся ок. 10% об­щей стои­мо­сти кит. им­пор­та с.-х. про­дук­ции.

По­сев­ные пло­ща­ди са­ха­ро­нос­ных рас­те­ний (са­хар­ный тро­ст­ник и са­хар­ная свёк­ла) ок. 1,8 млн. га (2006), в т. ч. 54% под са­хар­ным тро­ст­ни­ком. Сбор са­хар­но­го тро­ст­ни­ка 105,7 млн. т (2007). Осн. ре­гио­ны его воз­де­лы­ва­ния – юж. и юго-зап. рай­оны Центр. К. (про­вин­ции Юнь­нань, Гу­ан­дун, Хай­нань, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н). Ок. 40% вы­ра­ба­ты­вае­мо­го в стра­не са­ха­ра по­лу­ча­ют из са­хар­ной свёк­лы (сбор ок. 90 млн. т в 2007). Ве­ду­щие ре­гио­ны её вы­ра­щи­ва­ния – ав­то­ном­ные рай­оны Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский и Внутр. Мон­го­лия, а так­же пров. Хэй­лунц­зян.

К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре про­из­во­ди­тель ово­щей и фрук­тов. По­сев­ные пло­ща­ди под ово­ща­ми 17,8 млн. га (2007). Сбор ово­щей 563,4 млн. т в 2007 (582,3 млн. т в 2006), экс­порт – 7,3 млн. т; до­ля К. в ми­ро­вом экс­пор­те све­жих ово­щей 47%. При­род­ные ус­ло­вия по­зво­ляют вы­ра­щи­вать раз­но­об­раз­ные ви­ды фрук­тов: яб­ло­ки, цит­ру­со­вые, ви­но­град, пер­си­ки, ба­на­ны, ман­го, ана­на­сы и др. Сбор фрук­тов 181,4 млн. т в 2007 (1-е ме­сто в ми­ре); до­ля К. в ми­ро­вом экс­пор­те фрук­тов (в осн. све­жие яб­ло­ки) 45%. Раз­ви­то те­п­лич­ное хо­зяй­ст­во. Пло­щадь те­п­лиц 777 тыс. га (кон. 2006), в т. ч. имею­щих по­сто­ян­ное по­кры­тие 81 тыс. га. Пло­щадь те­п­лич­ных по­са­док ран­них ово­щей 723 тыс. га, пло­до­вых куль­тур – 137 тыс. га, цве­точ­ной рас­сады – 47 тыс. га. Важ­ная от­расль рас­те­ние­вод­ст­ва – цве­то­вод­ст­во. На вы­ра­щи­ва­нии цве­тов спе­циа­ли­зи­ру­ют­ся св. 53 тыс. с.-х. пред­при­ятий.

Про­из-во чай­но­го лис­та 1170 тыс. т в 2007 (1-е ме­сто в ми­ре), в т. ч. 73% – зе­лё­ный чай (ок. 80% ми­ро­во­го сбо­ра). Наи­бо­лее из­вест­ные сор­та зе­лё­но­го чая – «Ма­лун­мао», «Хун­мао­ча», «Ясу­ань­ча». Чёр­ный (в К. на­зы­ва­ет­ся «крас­ный») чай вы­ра­щи­ва­ет­ся в осн. для по­ста­вок на экс­порт. Ок. 70% пл. всех чай­ных план­та­ций об­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют­ся кре­сть­ян­ски­ми семь­я­ми. План­та­ции чая воз­де­лы­вают гл. обр. в хол­ми­стых при­мор­ских рай­онах на вос­то­ке и юго-вос­то­ке стра­ны, а так­же в бас­сей­не р. Янц­зы. Ве­ду­щие ре­гио­ны про­из-ва чай­но­го лис­та – про­вин­ции Фуц­зянь, Чжэц­зян, Юнь­нань, Ху­бэй, Ху­нань, Сы­чу­ань. Сбор ли­сть­ев та­ба­ка 2,4–2,5 млн. т в 2006–07 (в ср. 3,0–3,5 млн. т в 1990-х гг.). Та­бак вы­ра­щи­ва­ют поч­ти по­все­ме­ст­но, осн. рай­оны воз­де­лы­ва­ния – про­вин­ции Юнь­нань, Гуй­чжоу, Хэ­нань и Ху­нань. Осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся гос. курс на со­кра­ще­ние про­из-ва та­ба­ка, гл. обр. за счёт умень­ше­ния пло­ща­ди его по­се­вов.

По про­из-ву хлоп­ка-сыр­ца (7,6 млн. т в 2007) К. за­ни­ма­ет 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре по­сле США и Ин­дии (1-е ме­сто в нач. 1990-х гг.). Осн. ре­гио­ны воз­де­лы­ва­ния хлоп­чат­ни­ка – Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н, а так­же про­вин­ции Хэ­нань, Шань­дун, Хэ­бэй, Цзян­су, Ань­хой, Ху­бэй и Ху­нань. Про­из-во хлоп­ка не удов­ле­тво­ря­ет рас­ту­щие внутр. по­треб­но­сти. На до­лю хлоп­ка при­хо­дит­ся 15,2% об­щей стои­мо­сти им­пор­та с.-х. про­дук­ции (2006). Про­из-во лу­бя­ных куль­тур (джу­та, ке­на­фа и др.) 728 тыс. т в 2007 (в ср. св. 4 млн. т в 1980-х гг., ок. 1,1 млн. т в 2004–05).

Жи­вот­но­вод­ст­во – наи­бо­лее бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ваю­щая­ся от­расль с.-х. про­из-ва (49,6% ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти аг­рар­ной про­дук­ции в 2007; 20,1% в 1978). К. – круп­ней­ший в ми­ре про­из­во­ди­тель осн. ви­дов жи­вот­но­водч. про­дук­ции – мя­са, мо­ло­ка, яиц, про­дук­тов пче­ло­вод­ст­ва, шел­ко­вич­ных ко­ко­нов и др., гл. обр. для удов­ле­тво­ре­ния по­треб­но­стей внутр. рын­ка. Осн. про­бле­мы раз­ви­тия жи­вот­но­вод­ст­ва – не­об­хо­ди­мость даль­ней­ше­го улуч­ше­ния ка­че­ст­ва кор­мо­вой ба­зы, обес­пе­че­ния жи­вот­ных дос­та­точ­ным ко­ли­че­ст­вом во­ды для пи­тья (осо­бен­но в рай­онах Сев.-Зап. К.). По­го­ло­вье (2007): круп­ный ро­га­тый скот 139,6 млн. (в т. ч. ко­ро­вы 116,9 млн., буй­во­лы 22,7 млн.), сви­ньи 501,6 млн., ко­зы 197,3 млн., ов­цы 172,0 млн., ло­ша­ди и му­лы 7,2 млн., верб­лю­ды ок. 270 тыс. Осн. ре­гио­ны раз­ве­де­ния круп­но­го ро­га­то­го ско­та, а так­же ло­ша­дей и му­лов: про­вин­ции Хэ­нань, Шань­дун, Сы­чу­ань, Юнь­нань, Хэ­бэй, Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н. Мо­лоч­ное ско­то­вод­ст­во раз­ви­ва­ет­ся пре­им. в при­го­ро­дах круп­ных го­ро­дов Центр. и Сев. К., а так­же в про­вин­ци­ях сев.-вост. час­ти стра­ны и в ав­то­ном­ном р-не Внутр. Мон­го­лия. Ок. 1/4 по­го­ло­вья круп­но­го ро­га­то­го ско­та со­сре­до­то­че­но в пров. Хэй­лунц­зян – ве­ду­щем ре­гио­не мо­лоч­но­го ско­то­вод­ст­ва К. По­все­ме­ст­но, осо­бен­но в вост. рай­онах стра­ны, раз­ви­то пти­це­вод­ст­во (ку­ры, до­маш­ние ут­ки, гу­си, це­сар­ки, ин­дей­ки и др.); до­маш­нюю пти­цу в осн. вы­ра­щи­ва­ют в лич­ных хо­зяй­ст­вах кре­сть­ян. По по­го­ло­вью сви­ней вы­де­ля­ют­ся про­вин­ции Сы­чу­ань, Ху­нань, Хэ­нань, Шань­дун; ре­гио­ны наи­бо­лее раз­ви­то­го ов­це­вод­ст­ва – ав­то­ном­ные райо­ны Внутр. Мон­го­лия и Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский, а так­же про­вин­ции Хэ­нань и Цзян­су. В струк­ту­ре про­из-ва и по­треб­ле­ния мяс­ной про­дук­ции до­ля сви­ни­ны по­сте­пен­но сни­жа­ет­ся. Об­щий объ­ём про­из-ва мя­са до­маш­них жи­вот­ных и пти­цы 90,6 млн. т (2007), в т. ч. (млн. т): сви­ни­на 61,2; го­вя­ди­на 7,3; ба­ра­ни­на 2,6; коз­ля­ти­на 2,3, а так­же кроль­ча­ти­на, ко­ни­на, мя­со буй­во­лов, верб­лю­дов и др.; про­из-во мя­са пти­цы ок. 16 (в т. ч. ку­ри­ное мя­со 10,9; ути­ное мя­со 2,7; мя­со гу­сей и це­сарок 2,4). Про­из-во цель­но­го мо­ло­ка ок. 37,1 млн. т в 2007 (в т. ч. ко­ро­вье мо­ло­ко 32,8 млн. т), яиц до­маш­ней пти­цы ок. 594 млн. шт. (в т. ч. ку­ри­ные яй­ца ок. 517 млн. шт.). На­стриг не­мы­той шер­сти ок. 400 тыс. т (2007). Раз­ви­то пче­ло­вод­ст­во; все­го на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся ок. 7,4 млн. до­маш­них пче­ли­ных уль­ев; про­из-во на­ту­раль­но­го пче­ли­но­го мё­да ок. 6 тыс. т (2007). По про­из-ву шел­ко­вич­ных ко­ко­нов (882 тыс. т в 2006), гл. обр. ту­то­во­го шел­ко­пря­да, К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре.

Зна­чит. ме­сто в ра­цио­не пи­та­ния жи­те­лей К. за­ни­ма­ют ры­ба и ры­бо­про­дук­ты. В струк­ту­ре про­дук­ции вод­ных про­мыс­лов (47,5 млн. т в 2007) ве­ли­ка до­ля мо­ре­про­дук­тов – мол­лю­сков и ра­ко­об­раз­ных (ка­ра­ка­ти­цы, кре­вет­ки, кра­бы, тре­пан­ги и др.). Вслед­ствие за­гряз­не­ния вод, гид­ро­энер­ге­тич. строи­тель­ст­ва, а так­же со­кра­ще­ния пло­ща­ди во­до­ёмов уло­вы ры­бы во внутр. во­дах (без ис­кусств. ры­бо­раз­ве­де­ния) со­кра­ща­ют­ся. К. – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по раз­ви­тию ак­ва­куль­ту­ры – ис­кусств. раз­веде­нию и вы­ра­щи­ва­нию рыб, бес­по­зво­ноч­ных, во­до­рос­лей и др.; про­из-во то­вар­ной про­дук­ции ок. 46 млн. т (2006). Из­дав­на прак­ти­ку­ет­ся ры­бо­раз­ве­де­ние на ри­со­вых по­лях (гл. обр. кар­по­вых), дей­ст­ву­ет ши­ро­кая сеть ферм и спе­циа­ли­зир. пред­при­ятий по вы­ра­щи­ва­нию разл. ви­дов рыб и мо­ре­про­дук­тов.

Сфера услуг

Один из ве­ду­щих сек­то­ров хо­зяй­ст­ва; в 21 в. бы­ст­рый рост эко­но­ми­ки стра­ны ве­дёт к уве­ли­че­нию внутр. спро­са на ус­лу­ги. В сфе­ре ус­луг за­ня­то св. 246,1 млн. чел. (32,2% всех за­ня­тых). Вы­де­ля­ют­ся оп­то­вая и роз­нич­ная тор­гов­ля (18,3% стои­мо­сти ус­луг в 2006), ус­лу­ги транс­пор­та, свя­зи и склад­ско­го хо­зяй­ст­ва (14,5%), опе­ра­ции с не­дви­жи­мо­стью (11,4%), фи­нан­со­вые и по­сред­нич. ус­лу­ги (9,1%), гос­ти­нич­ное хо­зяй­ст­во и об­ществ. пи­та­ние (5,8%), пр. ус­лу­ги (40,9%; вклю­чая об­ра­зо­ва­ние, здра­во­охра­не­ние, адм. ус­лу­ги, об­слу­жи­ва­ние ту­ри­стов).

В бан­ков­ско-фи­нан­со­вом сек­то­ре клю­че­вые по­зи­ции при­над­ле­жат го­су­дар­ству. Гл. роль в раз­ви­тии фи­нан­со­вой сис­те­мы иг­ра­ет Нар. банк Ки­тая (The People’s Bank of China, соз­дан в 1948, с 1983 вы­пол­ня­ет функ­ции центр. бан­ка) – гос. эмис­си­он­ный, кре­дит­ный и рас­чёт­ный центр стра­ны. К. за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по раз­ме­рам зо­ло­то­ва­лют­ных ре­зер­вов центр. бан­ка (1682,2 млрд. долл. и 19290 тыс. трой­ских ун­ций зо­ло­та, март 2008). В по­пыт­ке сдер­жи­ва­ния ано­маль­но вы­со­ких тем­пов при­рос­та ВВП (11,4% в 2007, 11,1% в 2006) объ­яв­ле­но о пе­ре­хо­де в 2008 к «жё­ст­кой» де­неж­ной по­ли­ти­ке, пред­по­ла­гаю­щей сдер­жи­ва­ние кре­дит­ной эмис­сии. Важ­ное ме­сто в бан­ков­ской сис­те­ме К. за­ни­ма­ют т. н. по­ли­тич. бан­ки (бан­ки раз­ви­тия; соз­да­ны в 1994, на­хо­дят­ся под не­по­сред­ст­вен­ным ру­ко­во­дством Гос­со­ве­та КНР), на до­лю ко­то­рых при­хо­дит­ся ок. 7% бан­ков­ских ак­ти­вов стра­ны: Гос. банк раз­ви­тия (China Development Bank; сум­ма ак­ти­вов 2314,3 млрд. юа­ней, или ок. 297 млрд. долл., в нач. 2007) кре­ди­ту­ет гос. про­грам­мы в сфе­ре про­из-ва, ка­пи­таль­но­го строи­тель­ст­ва и ре­кон­струк­ции про­из­водств. и ин­фра­струк­тур­ных объ­ек­тов; Банк Ки­тая по раз­ви­тию сель­ско­го хо­зяй­ст­ва (Agricultural Develop­ment Bank of China; сум­ма ак­ти­вов 933,5 млрд. юа­ней, или ок. 120 млрд. долл.) рас­пре­де­ля­ет бюд­жет­ные сред­ст­ва, на­прав­ляе­мые на под­держ­ку аг­рар­но­го сек­то­ра эко­но­ми­ки; Экс­порт­но-им­порт­ный банк Ки­тая [The Export-Im­port Bank of China (China Exim Bank); сум­ма ак­ти­вов 402,9 млрд. юа­ней, или ок. 52 млрд. долл.] пре­дос­тав­ля­ет кре­ди­ты на за­куп­ку ком­плект­но­го обо­ру­до­ва­ния для пред­при­ятий клю­че­вых от­рас­лей хо­зяй­ст­ва. Св. 1/2 (53,2%, кон. 2007) бан­ков­ских ак­ти­вов К. кон­цен­три­ру­ет «боль­шая чет­вёр­ка» спе­циа­ли­зир. от­рас­ле­вых бан­ков, из них три – ак­цио­нер­ные (с 2006 их ак­ции про­да­ют­ся на бир­жах Шан­хая и Сян­га­на; не ме­нее 51% ак­ций при­над­ле­жит го­су­дар­ст­ву): Тор­го­во-пром. банк [Industrial and Com­mer­cial Bank of Chi­na (ICBC); по стои­мо­сти ак­ти­вов вхо­дит в де­сят­ку круп­ней­ших ком­мерч. бан­ков ми­ра, за­ни­ма­ет 1-е мес­то по раз­ме­рам ры­ноч­ной ка­пи­та­ли­за­ции (232 млрд. долл., авг. 2008)], Стро­ит. банк (Chi­na Construction Bank, CCB), Банк Ки­тая (Bank of China, BOC); чет­вёр­тый – гос. С.-х. банк (Agricultural Bank of China, ABC). Из об­щей сум­мы ак­ти­вов бан­ков­ских уч­ре­ж­де­ний К. 13,8% (кон. 2007) при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю ак­цио­нер­ных ком­мерч. бан­ков; сре­ди круп­ней­ших из них: Bank of Communications (BoCom), China CITIC Bank [до 2005 – CITIC Industrial Bank, при­над­ле­жит гос. ин­ве­сти­ци­он­ной кор­по­ра­ции «China In­ternational Trust and Investment Corp.» («CITIC Group»)], China Everbright Bank и др. Дей­ст­ву­ют го­род­ские и сель­ские ком­мерч. бан­ки, кре­дит­ные коо­пе­ра­ти­вы, сбер­кас­сы при поч­то­вых от­де­ле­ни­ях, а так­же иностр. бан­ки и др. фи­нан­со­вые уч­ре­ж­де­ния. Иностр. бан­ки и их фи­лиа­лы осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют весь спектр бан­ков­ских ус­луг в юа­нях на всей тер­ри­то­рии стра­ны (с 2006), их до­ля в об­щей сум­ме бан­ков­ских ак­ти­вов 2,4%, или 193 млрд. долл. (март 2008); 33 иностр. бан­ка име­ют до­лю в бан­ков­ских уч­ре­ж­де­ни­ях К. (2008).

На рын­ке стра­хо­вых ус­луг дей­ст­ву­ют 93 ком­па­нии (нач. 2006), круп­ней­шие из них: го­су­дар­ст­вен­ные – «На­род­ная стра­хо­вая ком­па­ния Ки­тая» [«People’s Insu­rance Company of China» (PICC), соз­да­на в 1949, пре­об­ра­зо­ва­на в спе­циа­ли­зир. ком­па­нию в 1981, име­ет струк­тур­ные под­раз­де­ле­ния по всей стра­не] и «China Life Insurance Company» (2003), а так­же ча­ст­ные – «China Pacific Insurance Group» (CPIC Group; Шанхай, 1991) и «Ping An Insu­rance (Group) Company of China» (Шэнь­чжэнь, пров. Гу­ан­дун, 1988). По­сту­п­ле­ния от стра­хо­вых взно­сов (лич­ное стра­хо­ва­ние жиз­ни, мед. стра­хо­ва­ние и стра­хо­ва­ние на слу­чай не­пред­ви­ден­ных травм, стра­хо­ва­ние иму­ще­ст­ва) 564,1 млрд. юа­ней, стра­хо­вые ком­пен­са­ции 143,9 млрд. юа­ней (2006).

С соз­да­ни­ем фон­до­вых бирж в Шан­хае (1990) и Шэнь­чжэ­не, пров. Гу­ан­дун (1991) в К. по­ло­же­но на­ча­ло ин­сти­ту­ци­о­на­ли­за­ции рын­ка цен­ных бу­маг. В тор­гов­ле ак­ция­ми и об­ли­га­ция­ми весь­ма ак­тив­но уча­ст­ву­ют ря­до­вые гра­ж­да­не стра­ны. Кит. ры­нок ак­ций дос­тиг зна­чи­мых по ми­ро­вым мер­кам мас­шта­бов, в 2007 объ­ём сде­лок со­ста­вил 46 трлн. юа­ней (ок. 6 трлн. долл.) по срав­не­нию с 9 трлн. юа­ней в 2006. Шан­хай­ская фон­до­вая бир­жа по уров­ню ка­пи­та­ли­за­ции пред­став­лен­ных на ней ком­па­ний вплот­ную при­бли­зи­лась к Лон­дон­ской и То­кий­ской. Все­го за­ре­ги­ст­ри­ро­ва­ны 1434 ком­па­нии-эми­тен­та ак­ций (ими вы­пу­ще­ны цен­ные бу­ма­ги об­щей стои­мо­стью 8940,4 млрд. юа­ней) и 78540 тыс. дер­жа­те­лей ак­ций (2006). Сфор­ми­ро­вав­ший­ся в К. раз­ви­тый то­вар­ный ры­нок ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся пер­ма­нент­ным пре­вы­ше­ни­ем пред­ло­же­ния над спро­сом по боль­шин­ст­ву ви­дов то­ва­ров. Прак­ти­ку­ет­ся фью­черс­ная оп­то­вая тор­гов­ля со­евы­ми бо­ба­ми (Да­лянь, пров. Ляо­нин), ме­дью, алю­ми­ни­ем и кау­чу­ком (Шан­хай), пше­ни­цей (Чжэн­чжоу, пров. Хэ­нань) и др.

В сфе­ре оп­то­вой и роз­нич­ной тор­гов­ли на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся 51,8 тыс. кор­по­ра­тив­ных и 142,7 тыс. ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ных ча­стных пред­при­ятий, за­ня­то св. 5,4 млн. чел. (2006). В сфере об­ществ. пи­та­ния – 11,8 тыс. кор­по­ра­тив­ных и 19,5 тыс. ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ных ча­ст­ных пред­при­ятий с об­щим до­хо­дом 157,4 млрд. юа­ней, за­ня­то 1489,4 тыс. чел.

В 21 в. К. пре­вра­тил­ся в круп­ней­ший в ми­ре ры­нок ту­ри­стич. ус­луг с са­мы­ми вы­со­ки­ми тем­па­ми рос­та. По чис­лу по­се­щаю­щих стра­ну иностр. ту­ри­стов (22,2 млн. чел. в 2006; 10,2 млн. чел. в 2000) стра­на вы­шла на 4-е ме­сто в ми­ре (по­сле Фран­ции, Ис­па­нии и США). Наи­боль­шее ко­ли­че­ст­во ту­ри­стов (млн. чел.) при­бы­ва­ет из Республики Ко­рея (3,9), Япо­нии (3,8), Рос­сии (2,4), США (1,7), Ма­лай­зии (0,9), Син­га­пу­ра (0,8). Ок. 60% всех по­ез­док в К. – ту­ризм с де­ло­вы­ми це­ля­ми. Кит. ста­ти­сти­ка от­но­сит к иностр. ту­ри­стам со­оте­че­ст­вен­ни­ков из осо­бых адм. рай­онов Сян­ган и Ао­мынь, по­се­щаю­щих кон­ти­нен­таль­ную часть стра­ны (98,3 млн. чел. в 2006), а так­же из пров. Тай­вань (4,4 млн. чел.). По­сту­п­ле­ния от иностр. ту­риз­ма (вклю­чая по­езд­ки жи­те­лей Сян­га­на, Ао­мы­ня и Тай­ва­ня) ок. 34 млрд. долл. в 2006 (16,2 млрд. долл. в 2000; 2,2 млрд. долл. в 1990). Чис­ло гра­ж­дан К., вы­ез­жаю­щих за гра­ни­цу (вклю­чая по­езд­ки в Сян­ган, Ао­мынь и на Тай­вань), не­уклон­но рас­тёт – 34,5 млн. чел. в 2006, из них ок. 73% по­се­ща­ли Сян­ган и Аомынь.

Чис­ло внутр. ту­ри­стов дос­тиг­ло 1394 млн. чел. в 2006 (744 млн. чел. в 2000). Для К. ха­рак­тер­но пре­об­ла­да­ние ту­ри­стов из чис­ла жи­те­лей сель­ской ме­ст­ности – 818 млн. чел. в 2006 (415 млн. чел. в 2000). До­хо­ды от внутр. ту­риз­ма 623,0 млрд. юа­ней, или ок. 83 млрд. долл., в 2006 (317,5 млрд. юа­ней в 2000). Осн. ви­ды ту­риз­ма: куль­тур­но-по­зна­ва­тель­ный [гл. цен­тры – Пе­кин, Си­ань (быв. сто­ли­ца К.), Шан­хай, Гу­ан­чжоу, Сян­ган, Хан­чжоу]; т. н. крас­ный (по­се­ще­ние мест, свя­зан­ных с со­бы­тия­ми нар. вос­ста­ний, ре­во­лю­ций, жиз­нью и дея­тель­но­стью ру­ко­во­ди­те­лей КПК и др.); ре­ли­ги­оз­ный и па­лом­ни­че­ский; эко­ло­ги­че­ский; ле­чеб­но-оз­до­ро­ви­тель­ный; эт­но­гра­фи­че­ский; раз­вле­ка­тель­ный; уча­стие в шо­пинг-ту­рах.

Дей­ст­ву­ют ок. 18,5 тыс. ту­ри­стич. агентств (293,3 тыс. за­ня­тых в 2006); 16,8 тыс. агентств за­ни­ма­ют­ся внут­рен­ним, ок. 1,7 тыс. – ме­ж­ду­нар. и внутр. ту­риз­мом. Все­го на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся св. 22,5 тыс. гос­ти­ниц и гос­тинич­ных ком­плек­сов, в т. ч. 10,2 тыс. в кор­по­ра­тив­ной и 12,3 тыс. в ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ной соб­ст­вен­но­сти (2006). В сфе­ре гос­ти­нич­но­го обслу­жи­ва­ния за­ня­то св. 1,6 млн. чел. (2006). Гл. роль в раз­ви­тии ту­риз­ма (в т. ч. ту­ри­стич. ин­фра­струк­ту­ры) в К. при­над­ле­жит го­су­дар­ст­ву. Раз­ви­тие ме­ж­ду­нар. и внутр. ту­риз­ма кон­тро­ли­ру­ет Гос. управ­ле­ние по де­лам ту­риз­ма (State Bureau of Tourism) при Гос­со­ве­те КНР; фи­лиа­лы управ­ле­ния дей­ст­ву­ют во всех ре­гио­нах стра­ны, пред­ста­ви­тель­ст­ва – в То­кио (Япо­ния), Нью-Йор­ке (США), Па­ри­же (Фран­ция), Лон­до­не (Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния), Франк­фур­те-на-Май­не (Гер­ма­ния), а так­же в Сян­га­не. Приё­мом иностр. ту­ри­стов за­ни­ма­ет­ся Кит. ме­ж­ду­нар. бю­ро ту­риз­ма (China International Travel Service, CITS) с го­лов­ным офи­сом в Пе­ки­не и фи­лиа­ла­ми во всех цен­трах про­вин­ций, ав­то­ном­ных рай­онов и ГЦП, а так­же в не­ко­то­рых от­кры­тых для по­се­ще­ния при­мор­ских рай­онах. Об­слу­жи­ва­ни­ем при­ез­жаю­щих в К. со­оте­че­ст­вен­ни­ков из за­ру­беж­ных стран, а так­же Тай­ва­ня, Сян­га­на и Ао­мы­ня за­ни­ма­ет­ся Кит. бю­ро пу­те­ше­ст­вий (China National Tourism Administration, CNTA), имею­щее св. 300 от­де­ле­ний по всей стра­не. При­ём иностр. гра­ж­дан так­же осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ют Кит. бю­ро мо­ло­дёж­но­го ту­риз­ма, Кит. ме­ж­ду­нар. ком­па­ния спор­тив­но­го ту­риз­ма, Кит. об-во куль­тур­но­го ту­риз­ма и др. го­су­дар­ст­вен­ные и не­пра­ви­тель­ст­вен­ные ор­га­ни­за­ции.

Транспорт


Развязка автомагистралей в провинции Гуандун.

Транс­порт­ная сеть раз­ме­ще­на не­рав­но­мер­но: кар­кас гл. транс­порт­ных ко­ри­до­ров (ре­шёт­ка ме­ри­дио­наль­ных и ши­рот­ных ма­ги­ст­ра­лей) по­кры­ва­ет б. ч. эко­но­ми­че­ски ос­во­ен­ной тер­ри­то­рии на вос­то­ке и юго-вос­то­ке стра­ны; к не­му при­вя­за­на сеть гл. транс­порт­ных уз­лов и осн. транс­порт­ных по­то­ков. В ос­таль­ных рай­онах К. су­хо­пут­ная транс­порт­ная сеть очень раз­ре­же­на или от­сут­ст­ву­ет. Го­ри­стость тер­ри­то­рии на за­па­де, юго-за­па­де и в центр. ча­сти стра­ны, из­ре­зан­ная бе­ре­го­вая ли­ния на вос­то­ке и юго-вос­то­ке вы­ну­ж­да­ют стро­ить тон­не­ли и мос­ты.

Стре­ми­тель­ное эко­но­мич. раз­ви­тие К. ин­тен­си­фи­ци­ро­ва­ло транс­порт­ные по­то­ки как внут­ри стра­ны, так и транс­гра­нич­ные, при­ве­ло к рас­ши­ре­нию и мо­дер­ни­за­ции се­ти мор. пор­тов и аэро­пор­тов, рас­ши­ре­нию кон­тей­не­ри­за­ции пе­ре­во­зок на вод­ном, ав­то­мо­биль­ном и ж.-д. транс­пор­те. Гру­зо­обо­рот всех ви­дов транс­пор­та со­став­ля­ет 10141,9 млрд. т·км (2007), в т. ч. вод­но­го (вклю­чая реч­ной и мор­ской) – 63,4%, ж.-д. – 23,5%, ав­то­мо­биль­но­го – 11,2%, тру­бо­про­вод­но­го – 1,8%, воз­душ­но­го – 0,1%. Пас­са­жи­ро­обо­рот всех ви­дов транс­пор­та – 2159,3 млрд. пас­са­жи­ро-ки­ло­мет­ров (2007), в т. ч. ав­то­мо­биль­но­го – 53,3%, ж.-д. – 33,4%, воз­душ­но­го – 12,9%, вод­но­го – 0,4%. Наи­бо­лее ди­на­мич­но раз­ви­ва­ет­ся ав­то­мо­биль­ный, авиа­ци­он­ный и тру­бо­про­вод­ный транс­порт.

Ж.-д. транс­порт, не­смот­ря на сни­же­ние в нач. 21 в. его до­ли в об­щем объё­ме внутр. пе­ре­во­зок, оста­ёт­ся важ­ней­шим ви­дом транс­пор­та (гру­зо­обо­рот 2379,7 млрд. т·км в 2007; пас­са­жи­ро­обо­рот 721,6 млрд. пас­са­жи­ро-ки­ло­мет­ров; объ­ём пе­ре­во­зок – 3142,4 млн. т гру­зов и 1356,7 млн. пас­са­жи­ров). Об­щая про­тя­жён­ность же­лез­ных до­рог 77,1 тыс. км в 2006 (из них элек­три­фи­ци­ро­ва­но ок. 24,4 тыс. км), в т. ч. гос. же­лез­ных до­рог – 63,4 тыс. км (ок. 40% име­ют вто­рые пу­ти), до­рог ре­гио­наль­ных и ве­домств. ж.-д. ком­па­ний – 8,5 тыс. км, ос­таль­ные – до­ро­ги мест­но­го зна­че­ния. Б. ч. се­ти име­ет стан­дарт­ную ши­ри­ну ко­леи (1435 мм).

Кар­кас ж.-д. се­ти со­сто­ит из 6 ме­ри­дио­наль­ных и 5 ши­рот­ных ма­ги­стра­лей. Осн. ме­ри­дио­наль­ные ма­ги­стра­ли: Хар­бин – Шэнь­ян – Пе­кин (вет­ка Шэнь­ян – Да­лянь); Пе­кин – Тяньц­зинь – Цзи­нань – Шан­хай – Ханч­жоу – Нин­бо (вет­ка на Цзи­нань – Цин­дао); Пе­кин – Хэц­зэ – Фу­ян – Цзюц­зян – Нань­чан – Гу­анч­жоу – Цю­ань­вань/Сян­ган; Пе­кин – Чжэн­чжоу – Ухань – Чан­ша – Гу­ан­чжоу; Бао­тоу – Си­ань – Ань­кан – Чун­цин – Гуй­ян – Люч­жоу – Юй­линь – Чжань­цзян – Хай­ань – да­лее по ж.-д. па­ром­ной пе­ре­пра­ве на о. Хай­нань (Хай­коу – Са­нья); Чжун­вэй – Бао­цзи – Чэн­ду – Кунь­мин – Хэ­коу (да­лее на Ха­ной, Вьет­нам). Осн. ши­рот­ные ма­ги­стра­ли: Ланьч­жоу – Инь­чу­ань – Бао­тоу – Цзи­нин – Тун­ляо – Сы­пин – Чан­чунь – Ги­рин (Цзи­линь) – Ту­мынь; Лун­хай­ская (Лянь­юнь­ган – Чжэнч­жоу – Си­ань – Ланьч­жоу) и Синьц­зян­ская (Ланьч­жоу – Увэй – Ха­ми – Урум­чи – Ала­шань­коу) же­лез­ные до­ро­ги; Нан­кин – Хэ­фэй – Нань­ян – Си­ань; Шан­хай – Ханч­жоу – Ин­тань – Чжуч­жоу – Ху­ай­хуа – Гуй­ян – Кунь­мин; Фуч­жоу – Нань­пин – Чжан­пин – Мэй­чжоу – Гу­анч­жоу – Мао­мин – Бэй­хай – Нань­нин – Кунь­мин – Да­ли. От этих ма­ги­стра­лей от­хо­дят от­вет­вле­ния к пе­ри­фе­рий­ным райо­нам стра­ны. Же­лез­ные до­ро­ги не справ­ля­ют­ся с по­сто­ян­но ра­сту­щи­ми гру­зо­по­то­ка­ми; гл. ма­ги­стра­ли пе­ре­гру­же­ны.

С сер. 1990-х гг. бла­го­да­ря ре­кон­струк­ции до­рог воз­ро­сла ско­рость дви­же­ния по­ез­дов на обыч­ных ж.-д. ли­ни­ях; дли­на ли­ний, на ко­то­рых по­ез­да спо­соб­ны раз­ви­вать ско­рость 200 км/ч и бо­лее (при сред­ней ско­ро­сти ок. 70 км/ч), в нач. 2008 до­стиг­ла 6227 км. Ак­тив­но ве­дут­ся ра­бо­ты по соз­да­нию се­ти вы­со­ко­ско­рост­ных ж.-д. ма­ги­стра­лей: Пе­кин – Шан­хай («Цзинь­ху», дли­на 1318 км; име­ет прио­ри­тет­ное зна­че­ние, прой­дёт поч­ти па­рал­лель­но су­щест­вую­щей ма­ги­стра­ли; ско­рость дви­же­ния до 350 км/ч); Пе­кин – Шэнь­ян – Хар­бин; Пе­кин – Чжэнч­жоу – Ухань – Чан­ша – Гу­ан­чжоу; Хайч­жоу – Чжэнч­жоу – Си­ань – Ланьч­жоу. В 2006–08 на­ча­то строи­тель­ст­во 16 но­вых ско­рост­ных ли­ний, б. ч. ко­то­рых бу­дет вве­де­на в строй к 2010. Сре­ди мно­го­числ. ж.-д. тон­не­лей са­мы­ми про­тя­жён­ны­ми яв­ля­ют­ся: Ушао­лин (дли­на св. 21 км, две тру­бы от­кры­ты в 2006 и 2007); Цинь­лин (18,46 км, пер­вая оче­редь – 2002); Даяо­шань (14,3 км); Цзи­мянь­шань (ок. 10 км, 2007; на строя­щей­ся ли­нии Вэньч­жоу – Фуч­жоу); Ми­хуа­лин (ок. 9,4 км), Цзинь­дун (ок. 9,4 км); Цзун­ду­шань (ок. 8,5 км; на ж. д. Да­тун – Цинь­ху­ан­дао); Юнь­тай­шань (св. 8,1 км); Фэн­хуйгу­ань (св. 7,2 км); Има­лин (св. 7 км).

Ав­то­мо­биль­ный транс­порт (гру­зо­обо­рот 1135,5 млрд. т·км, пас­са­жи­ро­обо­рот 1150,7 млрд. пас­са­жи­ро-ки­ло­мет­ров; объ­ём пе­ре­во­зок – 16394,3 млн. т гру­зов и 20506,8 млн. пас­са­жи­ров, 2007) раз­ви­ва­ет­ся опе­ре­жаю­щи­ми тем­па­ми. Об­щая про­тя­жён­ность ав­то­до­рог 3573 тыс. км в 2007 (1157 тыс. км в 2000), в т. ч. ско­рост­ных ав­то­ма­ги­стра­лей – 53,6 тыс. км (16,3 тыс. км в 2000). Наи­бо­лее плот­ная сеть ав­то­до­рог в вост. ча­сти К., в про­вин­ци­ях Шань­дун, Цзян­су, Хэ­нань, Ань­хой, Чжэц­зян. Осн. ме­ри­дио­наль­ные ско­рост­ные ав­то­трас­сы: Цзя­му­сы – Хар­бин – Чан­чунь – Шэнь­ян – Да­лянь; Чжанц­зя­коу – Да­тун – Тайю­ань – Чжэн­чжоу; Си­ань – Чэн­ду – Гуй­ян – Нань­нин; Пе­кин – Шиц­зяч­жу­ан – Чжэн­чжоу – Ухань – Чан­ша – Гу­анч­жоу; Пе­кин – Тянь­цзинь – Цзи­нань – Нан­кин – Шан­хай – Нин­бо; Бэн­бу – Хэ­фэй – Цзюц­зян – Наньчан – Сян­ган (с вет­вью к Фуч­жоу). Гл. ши­рот­ные ав­то­стра­ды: Ци­ци­кар – Хар­бин – Суй­фынь­хэ; Шэнь­ян – Пе­кин – Хух-Хо­то – Бао­тоу – Ланьч­жоу; Тай­юань – Шиц­зяч­жу­ан – Синьч­жун; Чанч­жи – Хань­дань – Цзи­нань – Цин­дао – Янь­тай; Кор­гас – Урум­чи – Ха­ми – Ланьч­жоу – Си­ань – Чжэнч­жоу – Лянь­юнь­ган; Синь­ян – Ухань – Хэ­фэй – Нан­кин; Жуй­ли – Кунь­мин – Гуй­ян – Чжуч­жоу – Нань­чан – Ханч­жоу – Шан­хай; Нин­бо – Вэньч­жоу – Фуч­жоу – Ся­мынь – Шэньч­жэнь – Гу­анч­жоу – Чжань­цзян – Нань­нин. От это­го кар­ка­са рас­хо­дят­ся меж­ре­гио­наль­ные шос­се к пе­ри­фе­рий­ным райо­нам стра­ны. Са­мые про­тя­жён­ные ав­то­до­рож­ные тон­не­ли: Чжун­нань­шан (пров. Шань­си; дли­на 18040 м, са­мый про­тя­жён­ный в Азии; 2007), Бу­лун­цин (пров. Юнь­нань; 8100 м, 2004), Да­фынъ­якоу (Юнь­нань; 5300 м, 2004), Юань­цзян (Юнь­нань; 5100 м, 2004), Ху­ай­ин­шань (близ Гу­анъ­ана, пров. Сы­чу­ань; 4706 м), Чжэ­гу­шань (пров. Сы­чу­ань; 4400 м, 2003), Эр­лан­шань (пров. Сы­чу­ань; 4176 м, 1999). Стро­ят­ся (2008) под­вод­ные тон­не­ли Си­анъ­ань (в Ся­мы­ни, пров. Фуц­зянь; 9000 м), Чжи­чэн (Чан­син) в Шан­хае (8950 м; пуск на­ме­чен на 2009), под зал. Цзяо­чжоу­вань в Цин­дао, пров. Шань­дун (6170 м; пуск в 2010), Ухань­ский под р. Янц­зы (3609 м).

До 1990-х гг. б. ч. ав­то­до­рог бы­ла пло­хо­го ка­чест­ва (ка­пи­таль­но­го ре­мон­та тре­бо­ва­ло до 60% всей се­ти; к 1986 лишь 20% до­рог име­ли ас­фаль­то­вое по­кры­тие). В 1990–2006 по­строе­но ок. 44 тыс. км ско­рост­ных ав­то­ма­ги­стра­лей выс­ше­го клас­са, ряд из них ста­ли ча­стью Нац. кар­ка­са се­ти ав­то­трасс (НКСА); ре­кон­струи­ро­ва­но ок. 400 тыс. км мест­ных до­рог. С 1998 ок. 75% об­ще­го объ­ёма ка­пи­та­ло­вло­же­ний в осн. фон­ды транс­пор­та (еже­год­но со­став­ля­ют св. 5% ВВП стра­ны) на­прав­ля­ет­ся на раз­ви­тие ав­то­до­рож­ной се­ти. Осу­щест­вля­ет­ся план соз­да­ния но­вых ско­рост­ных ав­то­ма­ги­стра­лей (2004), с за­вер­ше­ни­ем строи­тель­ст­ва ко­то­рых (к 2020) сеть НКСА про­тя­жён­но­стью 85 тыс. км объе­ди­нит 7 круп­ней­ших го­ро­дов стра­ны, 9 осн. ме­ри­дио­наль­ных ав­то­ма­ги­стра­лей и 18 ши­рот­ных транс­порт­ных ко­ри­до­ров.

Бы­ст­ро уве­ли­чи­ва­ет­ся ав­то­парк: за­ре­ги­стри­ро­ва­но 56,07 млн. ав­то­мо­би­лей в 2007 (6,25 млн. в 2000), в т. ч. 35,34 млн. част­ных пас­са­жир­ских, а так­же 87,98 млн. мо­то­цик­лов и др. ав­то­транс­порт­ных сред­ств (2006). Уро­вень ав­то­мо­би­ли­за­ции ос­та­ёт­ся низ­ким (28,1 ав­то­мо­биля на 1000 чел., в т. ч. 18 част­ных ав­то­мо­би­лей на 1000 чел., 2006). Сеть ав­то­мо­биль­ных до­рог раз­ви­ва­ет­ся быст­рее об­ра­зо­ва­ния ин­тен­сив­ных транс­порт­ных по­то­ков.

Гру­зо­обо­рот вод­но­го (мор­ско­го и речно­го) транс­пор­та со­став­ля­ет 6428,5 млрд. т·км, пас­са­жи­ро­обо­рот – 7,8 млрд. пас­са­жи­ро-ки­ло­мет­ров (2007); объ­ём пе­ре­во­зок – 2812 млн. т гру­зов и 228,4 млн. пас­са­жи­ров. Роль мор. транс­пор­та наи­бо­лее ве­ли­ка во внеш­не­тор­го­вых гру­зо­пе­ре­воз­ках (до 90%). Мор­ской ком­мерч. флот К. на­счи­ты­ва­ет 1822 суд­на (св. 1000 рег. бр.-т ка­ж­дое; все­го 22,22 млн. рег. бр.-т, или 33,82 млн. т дед­вей­та), в т. ч. гру­зо­вых су­дов 693, су­хо­гру­зов 442, неф­те­тан­ке­ров 246, хи­мич. тан­ке­ров 68, га­зо­тан­ке­ров 42, кон­тей­не­ро­во­зов 157 (15 в 1984), реф­ри­же­ра­то­ров 33, ав­то­мо­би­ле­во­зов 17, пас­са­жир­ских 8, кру­из­ных лай­не­ров 3. Под фла­га­ми др. стран хо­дит 1401 кит. мор. тор­го­вое суд­но (в т. ч. Па­на­мы – 502); иностр. су­дов­ла­дель­цам при­над­ле­жат 17 су­дов.

С сер. 1980-х гг. об­щий гру­зо­обо­рот мор. пор­тов К. воз­рос бо­лее чем в 10 раз: 3421,9 млн. т (2006; 1256,0 млн. т в 2000; 311,5 млн. т в 1985). Гл. уни­вер­саль­ные (ком­плекс­ные) пор­ты (гру­зо­обо­рот, млн. т, 2007): Шан­хай (537) – круп­ней­ший мор. порт ми­ра и гл. гру­зо­вой порт К., вклю­ча­ет неск. пор­то­вых комп­лек­сов и тер­ми­на­лов (в т. ч. кон­тей­нер­ный комп­лекс Янь­шань, по­стро­ен в 2004–06 к югу от Шан­хая на ост­ро­вах в зал. Хан­чжо­увань; свя­зан с ма­те­ри­ко­вой ча­стью стра­ны мос­том Дун­хай дли­ной 32,5 км); Нин­бо (424) – неск. пор­то­вых комп­лек­сов и тер­ми­на­лов (в т. ч. комп­лекс Чжо­ушань, включающий круп­ней­ший в стра­не тер­ми­нал для тран­зи­та неф­ти и кон­тей­нер­ный тер­ми­нал; в 2008 от­крыт мост Шан­хай – Нин­бо над зал. Хан­чжо­увань, дли­на 36 км); Гу­ан­чжоу (340) – вклю­ча­ет гл. портовый комплекс Ху­ан­пу и др. тер­ми­на­лы. Сре­ди круп­ней­ших мор. пор­тов – Сян­ган, Тянь­цзинь (аван­порт Пе­ки­на), Цин­дао, Да­лянь, Цинь­ху­ан­дао (пров. Хэ­бэй) и др.

Бы­ст­ро раз­ви­ва­ет­ся кон­тей­не­ри­за­ция пе­ре­во­зок (в нач. 21 в. на К. при­хо­дит­ся ок. 90% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва кон­тей­не­ров). Пер­вый кон­тей­нер­ный тер­ми­нал со­ору­жён в пор­ту Тянь­цзинь в 1980; в 1990–2000-е гг. соз­да­ны круп­ные тер­ми­на­лы во мно­гих пор­тах стра­ны, с 2003 К., обо­гнав США, за­ни­ма­ет 1-е ме­сто в ми­ре по объ­ё­мам пе­ре­вал­ки кон­тей­не­ров. Объ­ё­мы обо­ро­та кон­тей­не­ров про­дол­жа­ют бы­ст­ро уве­ли­чи­вать­ся (75 млн. кон­тей­не­ров ДФЭ в 2005; 93 млн. в 2006; св. 100 млн. в 2007; по пла­нам на 2010 – ок. 170 млн.). Круп­ней­шие кон­тей­нер­ные пор­ты: Сян­ган, Шан­хай, Шэнь­чжэнь (к северу от Сянгана), Цин­дао, Нин­бо-Чжо­ушань, Гуан­чжоу, Тянь­цзинь, Ся­мынь, Да­лянь. Круп­ней­шая су­до­ход­ная ком­па­ния – гос. «COSCO Group»; од­на из ве­ду­щих в ми­ре; в её со­ста­ве: «Chi­na Interna­tional Marine Containers Co.» – ми­ро­вой ли­дер по про­из-ву мор. кон­тей­не­ров; «COSCO Pacific Ltd.» – круп­ней­ший в стра­не опе­ра­тор кон­тей­нер­ных тер­ми­на­лов и мор. кон­тей­нер­ных пе­ре­во­зок.

Важ­ное зна­че­ние име­ет мор. па­ром­ное со­об­ще­ние. Ж.-д. па­ро­мы экс­плуа­ти­ру­ют­ся на ли­ни­ях Да­лянь – Янь­тай (че­рез прол. Бо­хай­хай­ся), Хай­коу – Хай­ань (че­рез прол. Хай­нань). Ав­то­мо­биль­ные па­ро­мы кур­си­ру­ют из Хай­коу (в Бэй­хай, Гу­ан­чжоу), Гу­ан­чжоу (в Хай­коу, Сян­ган), Чжу­хая (в Сян­ган, Шэ­коу близ Шэнь­чжэ­ня), Шэнь­чжэ­ня (в Сян­ган, Ао­мынь, Чжу­хай), Сян­га­на (в Ао­мынь, Шэ­коу, Гу­ан­чжоу, Чжу­хай), Ао­мы­ня (в Шэ­коу, ме­ж­ду­нар. аэ­ро­порт Сян­га­на), Шан­хая (на о. Пу­то­шань, а так­же в Оса­ку и Ко­бе, Япо­ния), Цин­дао (в Ин­чхон, Юж. Ко­рея; Си­мо­но­се­ки, Япо­ния), Вэй­хай (в Инч­хон, Да­лянь), Да­ля­ня (в Инч­хон, Вэй­хай, Янь­тай, Тянь­цзинь), Тянь­цзи­ня (в Да­лянь, Инч­хон, а так­же Ко­бе, Япо­ния), Дань­ду­на (в Инч­хон).

Об­щая про­тя­жён­ность внутр. су­до­ход­ных пу­тей 123,4 тыс. км (из них 61 тыс. км с га­ран­ти­ро­ван­ны­ми га­ба­ри­та­ми пу­ти, 2006); б. ч. их при­хо­дит­ся на бас­сейн р. Янц­зы, где су­ще­ст­ву­ет об­шир­ная сеть су­до­ход­ных ка­на­лов, свя­зан­ных с Ве­ли­ким ка­на­лом и р. Ху­ан­пу. Все­го в бас­сей­не р. Янц­зы дей­ст­ву­ют св. 1400 реч­ных пор­тов (бо­лее 35 тыс. при­ча­лов про­из­водств. на­зна­чения, из них 1,2 тыс. спо­соб­ны при­нимать су­да во­до­из­ме­ще­ни­ем св. 10 тыс. т). Са­мый круп­ный реч­ной порт К. и бас­сей­на Ян­цзы – Суч­жоу (гру­зо­обо­рот 127 млн. т в 2006). По р. Янц­зы пе­ре­во­зит­ся боль­ше гру­зов, чем по Рей­ну и Мис­си­си­пи. Об­щий гру­зо­обо­рот пор­тов 1100 млн. т (2007), в т. ч. на пор­ты гл. фар­ва­те­ра при­хо­дит­ся 911 млн. т (из них 114 млн. т – внеш­не­тор­го­вые гру­зы) и 5,5 млн. кон­тей­не­ров ДФЭ. Ве­ли­кий ка­нал из-за низ­ко­го уров­ня во­ды как транс­порт­ная ма­ги­ст­раль ис­поль­зу­ет­ся ма­ло, в осн. толь­ко на юж. уча­ст­ке.

Пас­са­жи­ро­обо­рот возд. транс­пор­та 279,2 млрд. пас­са­жи­ро-ки­ло­мет­ров, гру­зо­обо­рот – 11,6 млрд. т·км (2007); объ­ём пе­ре­во­зок – 185,8 млн. пас­са­жи­ров (2-е ме­сто в ми­ре пос­ле США) и 4 млн. т гру­зов. Все­го на­счи­ты­ва­ет­ся 467 аэ­ро­пор­тов (в т. ч. 147 гра­ж­дан­ских, 2008). Круп­ней­шие ме­ж­ду­нар. аэ­ро­пор­ты (млн. пас­са­жи­ров, 2007): Пе­кин – Шо­уду 53,6; Сян­ган (Гон­конг) 47,8; Гу­ан­чжоу ок. 31; Шан­хай – Пу­дун ок. 29; Шан­хай – Хун­цяо 22,6; Шэнь­чжэнь 20,6 и др. По объ­ёму пе­ре­ве­зён­ных гру­зов (тыс. т, 2007) вы­де­ля­ют­ся аэ­ро­пор­ты Сян­га­на (3580 в 2006), Шан­хая (Пу­дун – 2559), Пе­ки­на (1416), Гу­ан­чжоу (695), Шэнь­чжэ­ня (616), Чэн­ду (326).

Гл. нац. авиа­ком­па­ния – «Air China» (34,0 млн. пас­са­жи­ров в 2006; 223 са­мо­лё­та); др. круп­ней­шие – «China Sou­thern Airlines» (со­от­вет­ст­вен­но 54,4; 309), «China Eastern Airlines» (24,3 в 2005; 213), «Cathay Pacific» (вме­сте с до­чер­ней ком­па­ни­ей «Dragonair»; 23,3; 115 са­молё­тов), «Hainan Airlines Group» (14,4 в 2006; 120), «Shanghai Airlines» (7,5; 53), «Shenzhen Airlines» (7,1; 48), «Xia­men Airlines» (6,2; 45), «Sichuan Airli­nes» (5,9; 36), «Shandong Airlines» (5,4; 32), «Air Macau» (2,4; 18). Ра­бо­та­ют так­же не­боль­шие ре­гио­наль­ные и ме­ст­ные авиа­ком­па­нии. В кон. 2007 соз­дан ави­ац. хол­динг «Grand China Air» (в не­го во­шли «Hainan Airlines», «Shanxi Air­lines», «Chang’an Airlines» и «China Xinhua Airlines»).

Гру­зо­обо­рот тру­бо­про­вод­но­го транс­пор­та 186,6 млрд. т·км (2007); все­го пе­ре­ка­ча­но 405,5 млн. т жид­ких и га­зо­образ­ных гру­зов. Об­щая про­тя­жён­ность ма­ги­ст­раль­ных неф­те­про­во­дов 15256 км (2006). Су­щест­вую­щая сис­те­ма не в пол­ной ме­ре обес­пе­чи­ва­ет воз­рас­таю­щие по­треб­но­сти в транс­пор­ти­ров­ке неф­ти. Гл. неф­те­про­во­ды: Ка­ра­май – Май­таг (Ду­шань­цзы) в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не, Да­цин (пров. Хэй­лун­цзян) – Циньху­ан­дао (пров. Хэ­бэй), Да­цин – Да­лянь (пров. Ляо­нин), Да­цин – Фу­шунь (пров. Ляо­нин), Циньху­ан­дао – Пе­кин, Да­ган – Тянь­цзинь, Шэн­ли – Цзи­нань (пров. Шань­дун), Шэн­ли – Нан­кин (пров. Цзян­су), Урум­чи (Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н) – Лань­чжоу (пров. Гань­су). Важ­ное зна­че­ние при­да­ёт­ся соз­да­нию сис­те­мы неф­те­про­во­дов для им­пор­та неф­ти из Ка­зах­ста­на (от Аты­рау на Кас­пий­ском м. че­рез Джун­гар­ские Во­ро­та и да­лее до Ду­шань­цзы в Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ском ав­то­ном­ном р-не; об­щая про­тя­жён­ность св. 3000 км). За­вер­ше­ны (май 2008) про­ект­но-изы­ска­тель­ские ра­бо­ты по строи­тель­ст­ву от­ветв­ле­ния неф­те­про­во­да Вост. Си­бирь – Ти­хий ок. (Рос­сия). Дей­ст­ву­ют ма­ги­ст­раль­ные га­зо­про­во­ды, со­еди­няю­щие: неф­те­про­мыс­лы груп­пы ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний Та­рим­ско­го бас­сей­на с Шан­ха­ем; неф­те­про­мыс­лы пров. Цин­хай с го­ро­да­ми Си­нин, Лань­чжоу и Инь­чу­ань; ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ния пров. Шэнь­си с Пе­ки­ном и др. Име­ют­ся про­ек­ты строи­тель­ст­ва га­зо­про­во­дов для им­пор­та при­род­но­го га­за из Рос­сии, Центр. Азии и др.

Мет­ро­по­ли­тен дей­ст­ву­ет в Пе­ки­не, Шан­хае, Тянь­цзи­не, Гу­ан­чжоу, Шэнь­чжэ­не, Нан­ки­не, Уха­ни, Сян­га­не; со­ору­жа­ют­ся ли­нии мет­ро в Чэн­ду, Хар­би­не, Цин­дао, Сиа­ни, Шэнь­я­не.

Внешняя торговля

Объ­ём внеш­не­тор­го­во­го то­ва­ро­обо­ро­та 2125 млрд. долл. (2007), в т. ч. экс­порт 1220 млрд., им­порт 905 млрд. долл. Осн. ста­тьи то­вар­но­го экс­пор­та: про­дук­ция ма­ши­но­строе­ния, вклю­чая из­де­лия элек­трон­ной (ком­пь­ю­те­ры, те­ле­ком­му­ни­ка­ци­он­ное обо­ру­до­ва­ние и при­бо­ры, те­ле­ви­зо­ры, мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны и др.) и элек­тро­тех­нич. (элек­тробы­то­вые при­бо­ры и др.) пром-сти, транс­порт­ные сред­ст­ва (мор. су­да, ав­то­мо­би­ли), до­рож­но-стро­ит. ма­ши­ны и др.; го­то­вая оде­ж­да, тек­стиль­ные из­де­лия, чёр­ные и цвет­ные ме­тал­лы. Гл. им­пор­тё­ры то­ва­ров из К.: США (19,1%), Япо­ния (8,4%), Рес­публика Ко­рея (4,6%), Гер­ма­ния (4%). Осн. ста­тьи то­вар­но­го им­пор­та (2007): про­дук­ция ма­ши­но­строе­ния (ма­ши­ны, обо­ру­до­ва­ние и при­бо­ры, в т. ч. их ком­плек­тую­щие де­та­ли, уз­лы и аг­ре­га­ты, а так­же сред­ст­ва вы­чис­лит. тех­ни­ки, оп­тич. при­бо­ры, мед. обо­ру­до­ва­ние и др.), нефть и го­рю­че-сма­зоч­ные ма­те­риа­лы, пла­ст­мас­сы и др. про­дук­ты ор­га­нич. хи­мии, про­кат чёр­ных ме­тал­лов, медь и мед­ные спла­вы. Гл. по­став­щи­ки то­ва­ров в К.: Япо­ния (14%), Республика Ко­рея (10,9%), США (7,3%), Гер­ма­ния (4,7%).

Во 2-й пол. 20 в. Тай­ва­ню уда­лось до­бить­ся бы­ст­рых тем­пов эко­но­мич. раз­ви­тия, про­вес­ти ре­фор­мы, на­прав­лен­ные на по­вы­ше­ние жиз­нен­но­го уров­ня на­се­ле­ния ост­ро­ва. В нач. 21 в. Тай­вань от­но­сит­ся к эко­но­ми­че­ски раз­ви­тым ре­гио­нам ми­ра. Объ­ём ва­ло­во­го ре­гио­наль­но­го про­дук­та (ВРП) 757,2 млрд. долл. (2008; по па­ри­те­ту по­ку­па­тель­ной спо­соб­но­сти), в рас­чё­те на ду­шу на­се­ле­ния 33 тыс. долл. Тем­пы рос­та ВРП 1,7% (2008). В струк­ту­ре ВРП на сфе­ру ус­луг при­хо­дит­ся 71,1%, (50,2% в 1987), на про­м-сть и строи­тель­ст­во – 27,4% (44,4%), на сель­ское, лес­ное хо­зяй­ст­во и вод­ные про­мыс­лы – 1,5% (5,4%).

Промышленность

В нач. 21 в. до­ля про­м-сти в струк­ту­ре ВРП про­дол­жа­ет со­кра­щать­ся, гл. обр. в свя­зи с пе­ре­во­дом мощ­но­стей в др. ре­гио­ны К. и стра­ны с от­но­си­тель­но мень­ши­ми из­держ­ка­ми про­из-ва. Ве­ду­щее ме­сто за­ни­ма­ет об­ра­ба­ты­ваю­щая про­м-сть (94,8% ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции в 2007); гл. от­рас­ли – ма­ши­но­строе­ние, хи­ми­че­ская, ме­тал­лур­ги­че­ская; раз­ви­то произ-во по­тре­би­тель­ских то­ва­ров. Наи­бо­лее вы­со­ки­ми тем­па­ми раз­ви­ва­ют­ся вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ные от­рас­ли, на до­лю ко­то­рых при­хо­дит­ся ок. 60% стои­мо­сти пром. про­дук­ции, в т. ч. оп­ти­ко-элек­трон­ная (рост произ-ва – 28,1% в 2007) и мик­ро­био­ло­ги­че­ская (22,4%). Зна­чит. часть пред­при­ятий вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ных от­рас­лей со­сре­до­то­че­на в трёх на­уч­ных пар­ках: «Синь­чжу» (на се­ве­ро-за­па­де о. Тай­вань), Центр. Тай­ва­ня (г. Тай­чжун), Юж. Тай­ва­ня (близ г. Гао­сюн).

Энер­ге­ти­ка. По­треб­но­сти в уг­ле­во­до­род­ных энер­ге­тич. ре­сур­сах на 98% по­кры­ва­ют­ся за счёт вво­за из­вне (2007). Обес­пе­че­ни­ем ре­гио­на неф­тью за­ни­ма­ет­ся тай­вань­ская гос. кор­по­ра­ция «China Petroleum Corp.» (CPC), ко­то­рая ве­дёт раз­вед­ку неф­тя­ных ме­сто­ро­ж­де­ний в Тай­вань­ском про­л. (со­вм. с кит. гос. кор­по­ра­ци­ей CNOOC), а так­же на тер­ри­то­рии Эк­ва­до­ра, Ин­до­не­зии, Ве­не­су­элы, Ав­ст­ра­лии и США. До­бы­ча неф­ти (на кон­ти­нен­таль­ном шель­фе) 10,6 тыс. барр./сут (2007), по­треб­ле­ние – 950,5 тыс. барр./сут (2006). Осн. часть неф­ти вво­зит­ся из стран Ближ­не­го Вос­то­ка. Пе­ре­ра­бот­кой неф­ти на­ря­ду с CPC за­ни­ма­ет­ся ча­ст­ная кор­по­ра­ция «Formosa Petro­che­mical Corp.» (FPC) – фи­ли­ал хол­дин­га «For­mosa Plastics Group» (FPG). Сум­мар­ная го­до­вая мощ­ность четырёх тай­вань­ских НПЗ ок. 60 млн. т (2006); три за­во­да (в уез­дах Да­линь, Таою­ань и Гао­сюн) при­над­ле­жат CPC (на её до­лю при­хо­дит­ся ок. 70% внутр. рын­ка бен­зи­на и ди­зель­но­го то­п­ли­ва), один (в у. Май­ляо) – FPC. По­треб­ле­ние го­рю­че-сма­зоч­ных ма­те­риа­лов из неф­ти 52,5 млн. т (2007), часть про­из­ве­дён­ных неф­те­про­дук­тов экс­пор­ти­ру­ет­ся. До­бы­ча при­род­но­го га­за (на кон­ти­нен­таль­ном шель­фе) ок. 400 млн. м3 (2007). Им­порт сжи­жен­но­го при­род­но­го га­за (СПГ) 9,1 млн. т (2008), в осн. из Ин­до­не­зии, Ма­лай­зии, Ка­та­ра, Ома­на, Ни­ге­рии. Дей­ст­ву­ет тер­ми­нал Юнь­ган по приёму СПГ (в у. Гао­сюн), в нач. 2009 пла­ни­ру­ет­ся вве­сти в строй тер­ми­нал в г. Та­тан. Тор­гов­лей и рас­пре­де­ле­ни­ем га­за за­ни­ма­ет­ся CPC. Ввоз ка­мен­но­го уг­ля 62 млн. т (2006), пре­им. из Ав­ст­ра­лии, др. ре­гио­нов К., а так­же Ин­до­не­зии (до­бы­ча ка­мен­но­го уг­ля на Тай­ва­не пре­кра­ще­на в 2001).

Ус­та­нов­лен­ная мощ­ность элек­тро­стан­ций 45,1 тыс. МВт (2006). Про­из­-­во элек­тро­энер­гии 235,3 млрд. кВт·ч, в т. ч. на ТЭС – 78,2%, на АЭС – 18,1% (ок. 50% в сер. 1980-х гг.), на ГЭС – 3,7%; дей­ст­ву­ет ряд вет­ро­вых элек­тро­стан­ций. Со­кра­ще­ние до­ли АЭС в струк­ту­ре про­из­-ва элек­тро­энер­гии вы­зва­но опе­ре­жаю­щим со­ору­же­ни­ем энер­го­бло­ков ТЭС. Дей­ст­ву­ют 3 АЭС: «Цзинь­шань» («Чин­шан»; 2 энер­го­бло­ка по 636 МВт), «Го­шэн» («Ко­шэн»; 2 по 985 МВт), «Ма­ань­шань» (2 по 951 МВт); со­ору­жа­ет­ся (2009) АЭС «Лунь­мэнь» («Кун­ляо»; 2 энер­го­бло­ка по 1350 МВт). Ве­ду­щая элек­тро­энер­ге­тич. ком­па­ния – гос. «Tai­wan Power Co.» («Taipower»). Ок. 15% ге­не­ри­рую­щих мощ­но­стей при­над­ле­жит ча­ст­ным про­из­во­ди­те­лям элек­т­ро­энер­гии.


Провинция Тайвань. Металлургический комбинат компании «China Steel Corp.» в г. Гаосюн.


China Steel Corp.

Чёр­ная ме­тал­лур­гия ба­зи­ру­ет­ся на при­воз­ных коксующихся уг­лях и же­лез­ных ру­дах. По­треб­ле­ние ло­ма чёр­ных ме­тал­лов 12,3 млн. т (2007), из них 5,4 млн. т вво­зит­ся на ост­ров из др. стран и ре­гио­нов. Про­из-во ста­ли 20,9 млн. т в 2007 (в т. ч. 10,7 млн. т – кон­вер­тер­ная, 10,2 млн. т – элек­тро­сталь). Ввоз стали 7 млн. т в 2006 (пре­им. из др. ре­гио­нов К., а так­же из Япо­нии и Рос­сии). Круп­ней­шая ме­тал­лур­ги­ч. ком­па­ния – «China Steel Corp.» [до­чер­няя струк­ту­ра «Computer Systems Co. Group» (CSC Group); мощ­но­сти – 13 млн. т ста­ли в год, штаб-квар­ти­ра и гл. пред­при­ятие – в г. Гао­сюн]. В свя­зи с пе­ре­но­сом про­из­водств. мощ­но­стей цвет­ной ме­тал­лур­гии в др. ре­гио­ны К. про­дол­жа­ют со­кра­щать­ся объ­ё­мы вы­пус­ка ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­ной ме­ди, вто­рич­ных алю­ми­ния, свин­ца и цин­ка.

Гл. от­расль ма­ши­но­строе­ния – элек­трон­ная про­м-сть. На Тай­ва­не со­сре­до­то­че­ны го­лов­ные офи­сы и цен­тры НИОКР ря­да ве­ду­щих ми­ро­вых ком­па­ний – про­из­во­ди­те­лей ИТ-обо­ру­до­ва­ния, в т. ч. мик­ро­схем всех ви­дов (вклю­чая ди­зайн мик­ро­схем, из­го­тов­ле­ние мо­ду­лей па­мя­ти, фо­то­ли­то­гра­фич. и смеж­ные с ни­ми про­из­-ва, вы­пуск фо­то­ма­сок, упа­ков­ку мик­ро­схем и др.), а так­же раз­но­об­раз­но­го ком­пь­ю­тер­но­го, оп­ти­ко-элек­т­рон­но­го и те­ле­ком­му­ни­кац. обо­ру­до­ва­ния. Ком­па­нии элек­трон­ной про­м-сти Тай­ва­ня пре­им. ра­бо­та­ют по прин­ци­пу OEM (original equipment manufac­tu­rer – про­из­во­ди­тель из­на­чаль­ной ком­плек­та­ции), т. е. раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют и про­из­во­дят ком­по­нен­ты из­де­лий, вы­пус­кае­мых под тор­го­вы­ми мар­ка­ми др. фирм; по ODM-кон­трак­там (original design manufactu­rer – из­го­то­ви­тель из­де­лия по ори­ги­наль­но­му про­ек­ту) – раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ют и про­из­во­дят ко­неч­ную про­дук­цию по за­ка­зу ме­ж­ду­нар. кор­по­ра­ций, ко­то­рые реа­ли­зу­ют её на рын­ке под свои­ми тор­го­вы­ми мар­ка­ми. На до­лю тай­вань­ских ком­па­ний при­хо­дит­ся ок. 90% ми­ро­во­го про­из-ва ма­те­рин­ских плат для ПК, 80% ви­део­адап­те­ров, 75% HDD-(внеш­ний жё­ст­кий диск) и CD-при­во­дов, 70% ин­те­граль­ных схем (5033,4 млн. шт. в 2007; 2467,4 млн. шт. в 2000), 50% жид­ко­кри­с­тал­ли­ч. па­не­лей, по­дав­ляю­щая часть но­ут­бу­ков и смарт­фо­нов. По стоимо­сти раз­ра­бо­ток ин­те­граль­ных мик­ро­схем Тай­вань ус­ту­па­ет лишь США (9,67 млрд. долл. в 2006). Объ­ём про­даж по­лу­про­вод­ни­ков, про­из­во­ди­мых тай­вань­ски­ми фир­ма­ми на кон­тракт­ной ос­но­ве, ок. 37,5 млрд. долл. (2006).

Осн. про­из­водств. мощ­но­сти элек­трон­ной про­м-сти на­хо­дят­ся за пре­де­ла­ми Тай­ва­ня (гл. обр. в др. ре­гио­нах К.). На до­лю пред­при­ятий, рас­по­ло­жен­ных на ост­ро­ве, при­хо­дит­ся ок. 4,2% стои­мо­сти из­де­лий, вы­пус­кае­мых тай­вань­ски­ми фир­ма­ми (2006). Объ­ём экс­пор­та ИТ-­обо­ру­до­ва­ния, про­из­во­ди­мо­го в раз­ных стра­нах ми­ра ком­па­ния­ми Тай­ва­ня, 88,6 млрд. долл. (2006), из них 90% при­хо­дит­ся на до­лю 8 ви­дов из­де­лий: но­ут­бу­ков, на­столь­ных ком­пь­ю­те­ров, ма­те­рин­ских плат, сер­ве­ров, циф­ро­вых фо­то­камер, на­ко­пи­те­лей на оп­тич. дис­ках, цвет­ных дис­пле­ев, жид­кок­ри­стал­лич. мо­ни­то­ров. Св. 60% экс­пор­та ИТ-обо­ру­до­ва­ния на­прав­ля­ет­ся в стра­ны Сев. Аме­ри­ки и Зап. Ев­ро­пы. Од­на из круп­ней­ших ком­па­ний элек­трон­ной пром-сти Тай­ва­ня – «Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd.» («Foxconn»; го­лов­ной офис в г. Тай­бэй, 550 тыс. за­ня­тых во мно­гих стра­нах ми­ра, обо­рот 51,8 млрд. долл., 2008) – ра­бо­та­ет пре­им. по ODM-кон­т­рак­там. Пред­при­ятия «Foxconn» вы­пус­ка­ют раз­но­об­раз­ные ви­ды из­де­лий, в т. ч. для амер. кор­по­ра­ций «Apple Inc.» (ПК «Mac mini», пор­та­тив­ные ме­диа-­про­иг­ры­ва­те­ли «iPod», мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны «iPhone»), «Intel» (ма­те­рин­ские пла­ты), «Motorola» (мо­биль­ные те­ле­фо­ны), «Dell Inc.» и «Hew­lett-Packard» (HP), япон­ской «Sony» (иг­ро­вые ком­пь­ю­тер­ные при­став­ки «Play­Station-2», «PlayStation-3») и др. Осн. про­из­водств. мощ­но­сти ком­па­нии рас­по­ло­же­ны в разл. ре­гио­нах К. (круп­ней­шее пред­при­ятие – в г. Шэнь­чжэнь, пров. Гу­ан­дун), а так­же в Че­хии, Венг­рии, Бра­зи­лии, Мек­си­ке, Ин­дии и Вьет­на­ме. Ве­ду­щий про­из­во­ди­тель но­ут­бу­ков (ок. 1/3 ми­ро­во­го рын­ка) – ком­па­ния «Quanta Computer Inc.» (го­лов­ной офис в г. Тай­бэй, ок. 30 тыс. за­ня­тых, обо­рот 24,6 млрд. долл., 2007) – ра­бо­та­ет по ODM-кон­т­рак­там, по­став­ля­ет про­дук­цию тай­вань­ской «Acer Inc.», кит. «Lenovo», амер. «Alienware», «Apple Inc.», «Com­paq», «Dell Inc.» и HP, япон. «Sharp Corp.», «Sony» и «Toshiba», герм. «Siemens AG» и др. Сре­ди ве­ду­щих про­из­во­ди­те­лей ИТ-­обо­ру­до­ва­ния – «ASUSTeK Com­pu­ter Inc.» (ASUS; го­лов­ной офис в г. Тай­бэй, 100 тыс. за­нятых, обо­рот 22,9 млрд. долл., 2008), вы­пус­ка­ет про­дук­цию под соб­ств. тор­го­вой мар­кой – сис­тем­ные пла­ты, но­ут­бу­ки, смарт­фо­ны, сер­ве­ры и ком­му­ни­ка­ц. обо­ру­до­ва­ние, а так­же муль­ти­ме­дий­ные уст­рой­ст­ва и бы­то­вые элек­трон­ные при­бо­ры. Весь ODM-биз­нес ком­па­нии пе­ре­дан её до­чер­ним струк­ту­рам – «Pegatron Corp.» (про­из-во кор­пу­сов ком­пь­ю­те­ров и др.) и «Unihan Corp.» (вы­пуск ком­пь­ю­тер­ных ком­по­нен­тов, в т. ч. ма­те­рин­ских плат и гра­фич. карт, по кон­трак­там с амер., япон. и др. фир­ма­ми). Про­из­вод­ст­в. мощ­но­сти ASUS рас­по­ло­же­ны на Тай­ва­не (в го­ро­дах Тай­бэй, Нань­ган, Луч­жу­ху и др.), в пров. Цзян­су (Суч­жоу), а так­же в Мек­си­ке (Хуа­рес) и Че­хии (Ост­ра­ва). Ком­па­ния «Acer Inc.» (го­лов­ной офис в г. Тай­бэй, обо­рот 19 млрд. долл., 2008) за­ни­ма­ет 3-е ме­сто в ми­ре по про­из-­ву на­столь­ных ПК (по­сле амер. HP и «Dell Inc.») и 2-е ме­сто по вы­пуску но­ут­бу­ков; зна­чи­тель­ны объ­ё­мы про­из­-­ва про­дук­тов про­грамм­но­го обес­пе­че­ния (св. 5,3 млрд. долл., 2006, с учётом сер­вис­ных ус­луг). Круп­ней­шие ком­па­нии Тай­ва­ня, за­ни­маю­щие­ся про­из-­вом по­лу­про­вод­ни­ков, – «Taiwan Se­micon­ductor Ma­nu­facturing Co., Ltd.» и «Uni­ted Micro­electronics Corp.».

Сре­ди от­рас­лей элек­тро­тех­ни­ческой пром-­сти наи­бо­лее раз­ви­то про­из­-во бы­то­вых элек­тро­при­бо­ров, в т. ч. хо­ло­диль­ни­ков (462,1 тыс. шт. в 2007) и сти­раль­ных ма­шин (334,0 тыс. шт.).

Про­из-во ав­то­мо­би­лей 283 тыс. шт. (2007; в т. ч. 96% – лег­ко­вых), объ­ём внут­р. про­даж (366 тыс. шт. в 2006) час­тич­но по­кры­ва­ет­ся за счёт им­пор­та. Вы­пус­ка­ют­ся ав­то­мо­би­ли ве­ду­щих за­ру­беж­ных ма­рок на со­вме­ст­ных пред­при­яти­ях с иностр. фир­ма­ми или по их ли­цен­зи­ям. Осн. ав­то­мо­биль­ные ком­па­нии: «Yulon Motors» [ли­цен­зи­он­ное про­из­-во ав­то­мо­би­лей «Nissan»; со­вме­ст­ные пред­при­ятия с япон. «Nissan», амер. «General Motors» (ав­то­мо­би­ли «Buick»)], «China Motor» («Mitsubishi» и «Chrys­ler»), «Chin Chun Motors» («Hyun­dai»), «Kuozui Motors» («Toyota»), «Ford Lio Ho», «Honda Taiwan», «Prince Motors» («Suzuki») и др. Про­из­-во мо­то­цик­лов и ску­те­ров св. 1,4 млн. шт.; ок. 1/2 про­дук­ции экс­пор­ти­ру­ет­ся. Тай­вань – круп­ный про­из­во­ди­тель ком­плек­тую­щих для ав­то­мо­би­лей и мо­то­цик­лов (зна­чит. часть де­та­лей и аг­ре­га­тов идёт на экс­порт, пре­им. в США, др. ре­гио­ны К. и Япо­нию), один из гл. экс­пор­тё­ров до­ро­гих мо­де­лей ве­ло­си­пе­дов (гл. обр. в США). Стои­мость про­дук­ции су­до­строе­ния 1,6 млрд. долл. (2007); гл. ком­па­ния от­рас­ли – «China Shipbuilding Corp.» (CSBC), про­из­во­дит кон­тей­не­ро­во­зы, бал­ке­ры, тан­ке­ры, ра­кет­ные ка­те­ра и др. на вер­фях в го­ро­дах Гао­сюн и Цзи­лун.

Ве­ду­щая от­расль хи­ми­че­ской про­мыш­лен­но­сти – неф­те­хи­мия. Ок. 2/3 неф­те­хи­ми­ч. про­дук­ции (ва­ло­вая стои­мость 39,1 млрд. долл. в 2006, без учё­та пла­сти­ков) пред­на­зна­че­но для ме­ст­но­го рын­ка. Круп­ней­шие про­из­во­ди­те­ли – груп­па ком­па­ний FPG (име­ет мощ­но­сти по про­из­-ву 1,7 млн. т эти­ле­на в год, 2006) и кор­по­ра­ция CPC (1,1 млн. т эти­ле­на в год). Про­из-во син­те­ти­ч. во­ло­кон 2,7 млн. т (2006; в т. ч. ок. 10% об­ще­ми­ро­во­го вы­пус­ка по­ли­эс­те­ра). Раз­ви­ты фар­ма­цев­ти­ч. и мик­ро­био­ло­гич. от­рас­ли. Об­щий обо­рот 368 ком­па­ний, про­из­во­дя­щих ле­кар­ст­вен­ные пре­па­ра­ты, и 268 фирм, за­ня­тых в сфе­ре био­тех­но­ло­гий, – 5,5 млрд. долл. (2006).

Сре­ди от­рас­лей лёг­кой про­мыш­лен­но­сти вы­де­ля­ет­ся про­из­-во тек­стиль­ных из­де­лий, ко­то­рое раз­ви­ва­ет­ся в ус­ло­ви­ях ост­рой кон­ку­рен­ции с др. стра­на­ми и ре­гио­на­ми Азии и спе­циа­ли­зи­ру­ет­ся на вы­пус­ке про­дук­ции в вы­со­ком стои­мо­ст­ном сег­мен­те. Тек­стиль по­став­ля­ет­ся пре­им. в др. ре­гио­ны К. (в т. ч. в Сян­ган), а так­же в США, Вьет­нам и др. Сре­ди круп­ных про­из­во­ди­те­лей от­рас­ли – «Sinkong Spinning Co.», «Tai­nan Enterprises Co.», «Carnival Ind. Corp.».

Сельское, лесное хозяйство и водные промыслы

В струк­ту­ре про­из-­ва 45,8% ва­ло­вой стои­мо­сти про­дук­ции при­хо­дит­ся на рас­те­ние­вод­ст­во, 31,3% – на жи­вот­но­вод­ст­во, 22,7% – на вод­ные про­мыс­лы, ме­нее 0,2% – на лес­ное хо­зяй­ст­во (2006). Для с.-х. ис­поль­зо­ва­ния при­год­но ок. 1/4 зе­мель. Пло­до­род­ные почвы и дос­та­точ­ное ув­лаж­не­ние спо­соб­ст­ву­ют раз­но­об­ра­зию воз­де­лы­вае­мых куль­тур. Ве­ду­щая зер­но­вая куль­ту­ра – рис. По­сев­ные пло­ща­ди под ри­сом 265 тыс. га, сбор 1,41 млн. т (2007). Экс­порт ри­са выс­ших сор­тов 284 тыс. т (в т. ч. в Япо­нию). Пло­щадь план­та­ций са­хар­но­го тро­ст­ни­ка ме­нее 10 тыс. га в 2007 (ок. 100 тыс. га в 1950–60-х гг.). Им­порт са­ха­ра (в пе­ре­счё­те на ра­фи­ни­ро­ван­ный) 472,4 тыс. т. Сбор чай­но­го лис­та 19,3 тыс. т (2007), в т. ч. ок. 1/5 ми­ро­во­го про­из­-ва чая сор­та «улун». Им­порт чай­но­го лис­та 24,3 тыс. т (гл. обр. из стран Юго-Вост. Азии). Площадь фрук­то­вых на­са­ж­де­ний 217 тыс. га. Сбор фрук­тов 2,3 млн. т (вклю­чая ма­ра­куйю, ман­го, гуа­ву, аре­ко­вые оре­хи, ды­ни, бам­бу­ко­вые по­бе­ги и др.). Под овощ­ны­ми куль­ту­ра­ми 157 тыс. га; сбор ово­щей 2,7 млн. т. Раз­ви­то вы­ра­щи­ва­ние цве­тов на про­м. ос­но­ве, в т. ч. ор­хи­дей (ве­ду­щая ком­па­ния – «Taiwan Sugar Cor­po­ration», TSC). Стои­мость про­дук­ции цве­то­вод­ст­ва 384,9 млн. долл. (2006). Экс­порт цве­тов 77,9 млн. долл., пре­им. в стра­ны Юго-Вост. Азии и США. Жи­вот­но­вод­ст­во (гл. обр. про­из­-во сви­ни­ны, мя­са пти­цы, яиц) не обес­пе­чи­ва­ет внутр. по­треб­ле­ния. Им­порт про­дук­ции жи­вот­но­вод­ст­ва (270 тыс. т в 2007, вклю­чая мя­со и суб­про­дук­ты) су­ще­ст­вен­но пре­вы­ша­ет экс­порт (ок. 10 тыс. т). Гос. про­грам­ма раз­ви­тия с. х-ва (2006) пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­ет сис­те­му мер, на­прав­лен­ных на обес­пе­че­ние ус­той­чи­во­го рос­та с.-х. про­из-ва с при­ме­не­ни­ем но­вей­ших тех­но­ло­гий, «под­держ­ку фер­ме­ров» (по­мощь по­жи­лым фер­ме­рам, при­вле­че­ние в от­расль мо­ло­дё­жи), «ожив­ле­ние сель­ской ме­ст­но­сти» (раз­ви­тие сель­ско­го ту­риз­ма).

Мор. улов ры­бы и до­бы­ча мо­ре­про­дук­тов 1,3 млн. т (2006; в т. ч. 48% – глу­бо­ко­вод­ный улов). Ок. 1/2 мор. уло­ва идёт на экс­порт (в пер­вую оче­редь каль­ма­ры, ту­нец, ти­ла­пия). Про­дук­ция ак­ва­куль­ту­ры 316 тыс. т (2006).

Сфера услуг

В струк­ту­ре стои­мо­сти ус­луг (2007) на роз­нич­ную и оп­то­вую тор­гов­лю при­хо­дит­ся 26,2%, на адм. ус­лу­ги – 14,4%, фи­нан­со­вые ус­лу­ги и стра­хо­ва­ние – 14,1%, опе­ра­ции с не­дви­жи­мо­стью – 11,4%, на транс­порт и склад­ское хо­зяй­ст­во – 8,4%, здра­во­охра­не­ние и со­ци­аль­ное обес­пе­че­ние – 4,2%, на­уч.-тех­ни­ч. ус­лу­ги – 3,8%, на гос­ти­нич­ное де­ло и об­ще­ств. пи­та­ние – 3,0%, об­ра­зо­ва­ние – 2,5%, на пр. ус­лу­ги – 12,0%.

Дей­ст­ву­ют 39 ме­ст­ных ком­мер­ч. бан­ков (Bank of Taiwan, Land Bank of Tai­wan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, First Com­mercial Bank и др.) с 3313 фи­лиа­ла­ми, 32 кит. и иностр. бан­ка с 83 от­де­ле­ния­ми; 313 с.-х. кре­дит­ных коо­пе­ра­ти­вов, поч­то­вая сбе­ре­га­тель­ная сис­те­ма с 2439 от­де­ле­ния­ми. Функ­ции центр. бан­ка вы­пол­ня­ет Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). В 2007 Тай­вань по­се­ти­ло 3,71 млн. гра­ж­дан из др. ре­гио­нов К. и за­ру­беж­ных стран.

Транспорт

Тай­вань об­ла­да­ет раз­ви­той се­тью на­зем­но­го транс­пор­та. Во внут­рен­них пе­ре­воз­ках ве­ду­щее ме­сто за­ни­ма­ет ав­то­мо­биль­ный транс­порт. Про­тя­жён­ность ав­то­мо­биль­ных до­рог 40,3 тыс. км (2007), в т. ч. с твёр­дым по­кры­ти­ем 38,2 тыс. км (вклю­чая 976 км мно­го­по­лос­ных ско­ро­ст­ных ав­то­ма­ги­ст­ра­лей). Гру­зо­обо­рот ав­то­мо­биль­но­го транс­пор­та 31 млрд. т·км (2006; все­го пе­ре­ве­зе­но ок. 600 млн. т гру­зов). Чис­ло ча­ст­ных ав­то­мо­би­лей 5,53 млн. шт. (кон. 2008), мо­то­цик­лов (вклю­чая мо­пе­ды и ску­те­ры) – 13,6 млн. шт. (на­ч. 2008). Зна­чит. часть пас­са­жи­ро­пе­ре­во­зок, в т. ч. ме­ж­ду­го­род­них, при­хо­дит­ся на ав­то­бус­ное со­об­ще­ние. Дли­на же­лез­ных до­рог об­ще­го поль­зо­ва­ния 1438 км, в т. ч. 345 км с ши­ри­ной ко­леи 1435 мм (ско­ро­ст­ная ж. д. Тай­бэй – Гао­сюн), 1093 км – уз­ко­ко­лей­ные (1067 мм). Еже­год­ные объ­ёмы гру­зо­вых ж.-д. пе­ре­во­зок (гл. обр. мас­со­вые гру­зы – из­вест­няк, це­мент, уголь) со­кра­ща­ют­ся, пас­са­жир­ских – рас­тут (еже­днев­но пе­ре­во­зит­ся 464,9 тыс. чел., 2007). Мет­ро­по­ли­те­ны в Тай­бэе (8 ли­ний) и Гао­сю­не (2008; 1 ли­ния).

Мор. транс­порт осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет осн. часть внеш­не­тор­го­вых гру­зо­пе­ре­во­зок, преим. кон­тей­нер­ных (об­щий гру­зо­обо­рот пор­тов 13,7 млн. кон­тей­не­ров ДФЭ в 2007). Дей­ст­ву­ет 7 ме­ж­ду­нар. мор. пор­тов. Гл. кон­тей­нер­ные пор­ты – Гао­сюн (гру­зо­обо­рот 10,2 млн. кон­тей­не­ров ДФЭ), Цзи­лун (мор. аван­порт Тай­бэя) и Тай­чжун; Су­ао и Тай­бэй – вспо­мо­га­т. пор­ты Цзи­лу­на, Ань­пин – Гао­сю­на; порт Хуа­лянь спе­циа­ли­зи­ру­ет­ся на об­ра­бот­ке на­ва­лоч­ных гру­зов. Мор. тор­го­вый флот на­счи­ты­ва­ет 635 су­дов (2008), из них 11 хо­дят под фла­гом Сян­га­на, 525 – под фла­га­ми за­ру­беж­ных стран (Па­на­мы, Ли­бе­рии, Син­га­пу­ра и др.). С де­к. 2008 от­кры­то пря­мое су­до­ход­ное и авиац. со­об­ще­ние ме­ж­ду о. Тай­вань и кон­ти­нен­таль­ной ча­стью К. Авиац. пе­ре­воз­ки об­слу­жи­ва­ют 18 аэ­ро­пор­тов, в т. ч. 2 ме­ж­ду­на­род­ных – в Таою­а­не и Гао­сю­не. Наи­бо­лее ин­тен­сив­ное дви­же­ние воз­д. су­дов на мар­шру­тах Тай­бэй – Сян­ган и Тай­бэй – Ао­мынь. Ве­ду­щая авиа­ком­па­ния Тай­ва­ня – «China Airlines».

Внешнеэкономические связи

Объём внеш­не­тор­го­во­го то­ва­ро­обо­ро­та 528 млрд. долл. (2008); экс­порт 273,4 млрд. долл., им­порт 254,6 млрд. долл. По­ло­жи­тель­ное внеш­не­тор­го­вое саль­до (18,8 млрд. долл., 2008) спо­соб­ст­ву­ет рос­ту зо­ло­то­ва­лют­ных ре­зер­вов (291,7 млрд. долл., кон. 2008). Осн. ста­тьи то­вар­но­го экс­пор­та – про­дук­ция элек­трон­ной про­м-сти, ком­плек­тую­щие де­та­ли и аг­ре­га­ты для ав­то­мо­би­лей, элек­тро­бы­то­вые при­бо­ры, хи­ми­ка­ты, пла­сти­ки, фар­ма­цев­тич. пре­па­ра­ты, тек­стиль­ные из­де­лия. Осн. часть то­ва­ров на­прав­ля­ет­ся (2007): в др. ре­гио­ны К., вклю­чая Сян­ган и Аомынь (все­го 40,7%), а так­же стра­ны Юго-Вост. Азии (Таи­ланд, Ма­лай­зия, Ин­до­не­зия, Фи­лип­пи­ны, Син­га­пур и Вьет­нам; все­го 14,5%), США (13%), стра­ны ЕС (10,9%), Япо­нию (6,5%), Рес­публику Ко­рея (3,2%). Осн. ста­тьи то­вар­но­го им­пор­та – де­та­ли и час­ти элек­трон­ных при­бо­ров, ма­ши­ны и обо­ру­до­ва­ние, нефть, СПГ, про­дук­ты ор­га­ни­ч. хи­мии, ме­тал­лы. Гл. по­став­щи­ки то­ва­ров на Тай­вань (2007): Япо­ния (21,0%), др. ре­гио­ны К., вклю­чая Сян­ган и Ао­мынь (13,6%), стра­ны Юго-Вост. Азии (10,8%), США (12,1%), стра­ны ЕС (9,1%), Рес­публика Ко­рея (6,9%). При­ток пря­мых иностр. ин­ве­сти­ций 15,36 млрд. долл., вы­воз ка­пи­та­ла 16,44 млрд. долл. (2007). Б. ч. тай­вань­ских ка­пи­та­ло­вло­же­ний (9,97 млрд. долл., 2007) на­прав­ля­ет­ся в др. ре­гио­ны Ки­тая.

Вооружённые силы

Воо­руж. си­лы (ВС) КНР со­сто­ят из ре­гу­ляр­но­го и ре­зерв­но­го ком­по­нен­тов, все­го ок. 5,1 млн. чел. (2006). Ре­гу­ляр­ный ком­по­нент вклю­ча­ет Нар.-ос­во­бо­дит. ар­мию Ки­тая (НОАК; ок. 2,6 млн. чел.) и вой­ска Нар. воо­руж. ми­ли­ции (1,5 млн. чел.), ре­зерв­ный – Нар. опол­че­ние (мас­со­вая вое­ни­зир. ор­га­ни­за­ция, вклю­чаю­щая кад­ро­вое и об­щее опол­че­ния). Во­ен. го­до­вой бюд­жет КНР св. 45 млрд. долл. (2007).

ВС ру­ко­во­дит Центр. во­ен. со­вет (ЦВС; во вре­мя вой­ны вы­пол­ня­ет функ­ции Вер­хов­но­го глав­но­ко­ман­до­ва­ния), по пер­со­наль­но­му со­ста­ву сов­па­даю­щий с Во­ен. со­ве­том ЦК КПК. ЦВС под­чи­не­ны Мин-во обо­ро­ны, ГШ и Гл. управ­ле­ния (по­ли­тич., воо­ру­же­ния и во­ен. тех­ни­ки, ты­ла) НОАК. Мин. обо­ро­ны яв­ля­ет­ся за­мес­ти­те­лем пред. ЦВС и Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК, а нач. ГШ НОАК, на­чаль­ни­ки Гл. управ­ле­ний НОАК и ко­ман­дую­щие ви­да­ми ВС яв­ля­ют­ся чле­на­ми ЦВС и Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК. НОАК со­сто­ит из Стра­те­гич. ра­кет­ных войск (СРВ), Су­хо­пут­ных войск (СВ), ВВС и ВМС. Функ­ции шта­ба СВ вы­пол­ня­ет ГШ НОАК. Ру­ко­во­д­ство вой­ска­ми осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет мин. обо­ро­ны. Нар. воо­руж. ми­ли­ция вклю­ча­ет вой­ска внутр., по­гра­нич­ной, по­жар­ной, лес­ной ох­ра­ны, а так­же до­рож­но-стро­ит., строи­тель­ст­ва и ох­ра­ны гид­ро­энер­ге­тич. объ­ек­тов, обес­пе­че­ния зо­ло­то­до­бы­чи. Вой­ска Нар. воо­руж. ми­ли­ции под­чи­не­ны Мин-ву об­ществ. безо­пас­но­сти, а Нар. опол­че­ние – Уп­рав­ле­нию по де­лам Нар. опол­че­ния ЦВС КНР и От­де­лу по де­лам Нар. опол­че­ния ГШ НОАК. В во­ен. вре­мя вой­ска Нар. во­оруж. ми­ли­ции вы­пол­ня­ют за­да­чи в ин­те­ре­сах и в тес­ном взаи­мо­дей­ст­вии с ча­стя­ми НОАК, а Нар. опол­че­ние пред­наз­на­че­но для до­уком­плек­то­ва­ния фор­ми­ро­ва­ний НОАК и Нар. во­оруж. ми­ли­ции.

По ха­рак­те­ру ре­шае­мых НОАК за­дач вы­де­ля­ют стра­те­гич. ядер­ные си­лы (СРВ, стра­те­гич. авиа­цию и атом­ный ра­кет­ный под­вод­ный флот) и си­лы об­ще­го на­зна­че­ния [СВ, ВВС (ис­клю­чая стра­те­гич. авиа­цию) и ВМС (ис­клю­чая атом­ный ра­кет­ный под­вод­ный флот)]. СРВ (120 тыс. чел.) име­ют ок. 200 ПУ бал­ли­стич. ра­кет стра­те­гич. на­зна­че­ния, ор­га­ни­за­ци­он­но све­дён­ных в ба­зы, бри­га­ды и ди­ви­зио­ны. СВ (ок. 1,6 млн. чел.) со­сто­ят из 7 во­ен. ок­ру­гов, 28 про­винц. во­ен. ок­ру­гов, 4 ко­ман­до­ва­ний гар­ни­зо­нов, 18 ар­мий разл. ор­га­ни­за­ции (30–65 тыс. чел., обыч­но 2–3 ме­ха­ни­зиро­ван­ные или мо­то­пе­хот­ные ди­ви­зии или бри­га­ды, тан­ко­вая ди­ви­зия или бри­га­да, арт. ди­ви­зия или бри­га­да, зе­нит­ная ра­кет­ная или зе­нит­ная арт. бри­га­да). Все­го в со­ста­ве ар­мий: ди­ви­зии (15 пе­хот­ных, 3 ме­ха­ни­зир., 2 ам­фи­бий­но-штур­мо­вые, 24 мо­то­пе­хот­ные, 9 тан­ко­вых, 7 ар­тил­ле­рий­ских), бри­га­ды (12 тан­ко­вых, 1 ме­ха­ни­зир., 22 мо­то­пе­хот­ные, 14 ар­тил­ле­рий­ских, 1 про­ти­во­тан­ко­вая, 9 ра­кет­ных зе­нит­ных, 12 зе­нит­ных ар­тил­ле­рий­ских), 4 про­ти­во­тан­ко­вых пол­ка; отд. бри­га­ды (2 гор­но-пе­хот­ные, 1 мо­то­пе­хот­ная, 1 ра­кет­ная, 1 ин­же­нер­ная); отд. пол­ки (мо­то­пе­хот­ный, ар­тил­ле­рий­ский, зе­нит­ный ар­тил­ле­рий­ский, 5 по­гра­нич­ных и др.); ме­ст­ные вой­ска: 12 пех. ди­ви­зий, 1 гор­но-пе­хот­ная и 4 пех. бри­га­ды, 87 пех. ба­таль­о­нов, 50 инж. пол­ков, 50 пол­ков свя­зи. Ре­зерв (1 млн. чел.) со­став­ля­ет 42 ди­ви­зии (пе­хот­ные, ар­тил­ле­рий­ские, зе­нит­ные ра­кет­ные) и 7 бри­гад ты­ло­во­го обес­пе­че­ния. Воо­ру­же­ние: ок. 8,6 тыс. тан­ков (в т. ч. лёг­ких – св. 1 тыс.); св. 4,5 тыс. БТР и БМП; 14 тыс. ору­дий по­ле­вой ар­тил­ле­рии; 1,2 тыс. са­мо­ход­ных гау­биц; 100 пу­шек-гау­биц; 2,4 тыс. РСЗО; 6,5 тыс. ПУ ПТУР; 7,7 тыс. ору­дий про­ти­во­тан­ко­вой ар­тил­ле­рии; 15 тыс. зе­нит­ных ору­дий и ПУ ЗРК; а так­же вер­то­лё­ты, бес­пи­лот­ные ЛА. ВВС (400 тыс. чел., в т. ч. 210 тыс. чел. – в ПВО) вклю­чают авиа­цию (стра­те­гич., бом­бар­ди­ро­воч­ную, штур­мо­вую, ис­тре­бит., раз­ве­ды­ват. и во­ен­но-транс­порт­ную), зе­нит­ные ра­кет­ные вой­ска, зе­нит­ную ар­тил­ле­рию и ра­дио­тех­нич. вой­ска. На воо­ру­же­нии св. 2,6 тыс. бое­вых са­мо­лё­тов, ок. 500 ЗРК и вер­то­лё­ты разл. ти­пов. ВМС (255 тыс. чел.) со­сто­ят из Се­вер­но­го (гл. ба­за – Цин­дао), Вос­точ­но­го (гл. ба­за – Шан­хай) и Юж­но­го (гл. ба­за – Чжань­цзян) фло­тов; кро­ме то­го, в со­став ВМС вхо­дят 2 бри­га­ды мор. пе­хо­ты и час­ти мор. авиа­ции. На воо­ру­же­нии св. 300 ко­раб­лей осн. клас­сов (в т. ч. св. 100 ПЛ), ок. 200 ра­кет­ных и 150 тор­пед­ных ка­те­ров, св. 500 бое­вых са­мо­лё­тов и 25 бое­вых вер­то­лё­тов.

Ком­плек­то­ва­ние НОАК и Нар. во­оруж. ми­ли­ции осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся по при­зы­ву и кон­трак­ту. На во­ен. служ­бу при­зы­ва­ют­ся ли­ца в воз­рас­те 18–25 лет, про­дол­жи­тель­ность служ­бы по при­зы­ву 24 мес. Под­го­тов­ка ко­манд­ных кад­ров про­из­во­дит­ся в во­ен. ака­де­ми­ях, во­ен. ин­сти­ту­тах, выс­ших и ср. во­ен. учи­ли­щах и на разл. кур­сах пе­ре­под­го­тов­ки ко­манд­но­го со­ста­ва. Мо­би­ли­зац. ре­сур­сы 361,3 млн. чел., в т. ч. год­ных к во­ен. служ­бе ок. 198 млн. чел.

ВС Тай­ва­ня со­сто­ят из СВ, ВВС, ВМС, Объ­еди­нён­но­го ко­ман­до­ва­ния ты­ла, Ко­ман­до­ва­ния ре­зер­ва ВС и во­ен. по­ли­ции (все­го ок. 290 тыс. чел.; 2008), име­ют­ся так­же вое­ни­зир. фор­ми­ро­ва­ния (св. 17 тыс. чел.). Го­до­вой во­ен. бюд­жет св. 10 млрд. долл. (2008).

Глав­но­ко­ман­дую­щим ВС яв­ля­ет­ся пре­зи­дент Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки. Нац. со­вет без­о­пас­но­сти (фор­ми­ру­ет­ся пре­зи­ден­том) осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет об­щий кон­троль за обо­ронит. по­ли­ти­кой, а не­по­сред­ст­вен­но ру­ко­во­дит её реа­ли­за­ци­ей Мин-во нац. обо­ро­ны во гла­ве с мин. нац. обо­ро­ны (гражд. ли­цо), ко­то­ро­му под­чи­нён нач. ГШ, осу­ще­ст­в­ляю­щий не­по­средств. ру­ко­во­дство ВС.

На воо­ру­же­нии СВ (ок. 200 тыс. чел.) на­хо­дит­ся св. 1,8 тыс. тан­ков, ок. 900 БТР, ок. 1,8 тыс. ору­дий (в т. ч. св. 300 САУ), ок. 1 тыс. ПУ ПТУР, св. 600 ору­дий бе­ре­го­вой ар­тил­ле­рии, ок. 400 зе­нит­ных арт. сис­тем, ок. 130 ЗРК, ок. 470 ПЗРК, св. 90 (в т. ч. 30 учеб­ных) са­мо­лё­тов и ок. 120 вер­то­лё­тов ар­мей­ской авиа­ции. ВВС (ок. 45 тыс. чел.) пред­став­ле­ны ис­тре­би­тель­ной, ис­тре­би­тель­но-бом­бар­ди­ро­воч­ной, тран­спорт­ной и по­ис­ко­во-спа­са­тель­ной авиа­ци­ей, све­дён­ной в ави­ац. кры­лья и отд. эс­кад­ри­льи; име­ет­ся ави­ац. ко­ман­до­ва­ние ПВО. На во­ору­же­нии все­го ок. 600 са­мо­лё­тов (в т. ч. св. 478 бое­вых) и ок. 40 вер­то­лё­тов. ВМС (ок. 50 тыс. чел.) со­сто­ят из ко­ман­до­ва­ний: фло­та, мор. авиа­ции, мор. пе­хо­ты (ок. 15 тыс. чел.), бе­ре­го­вых ра­кет­но-арт. войск, во­ен.-мор. рай­онов и ты­ла; име­ют на воо­ру­же­нии св. 50 бое­вых ко­раб­лей (в т. ч. 4 ПЛ), 50 ра­кет­ных и до 270 де­сант­ных ка­те­ров, ок. 30 са­мо­лё­тов и 29 вер­то­лё­тов мор. авиа­ции. Во­ору­же­ние и во­ен. тех­ни­ка тай­вань­ско­го и ино­стран­но­го (пре­им. амер.) про­из-ва.

Ком­плек­то­ва­ние ВС на ос­но­ве все­об­щей во­ин­ской по­вин­но­сти лиц муж­ско­го по­ла в воз­рас­те 20 лет, а так­же по кон­трак­ту; срок служ­бы по при­зы­ву 20 мес. Мо­би­ли­зац. ре­сур­сы ок. 6,5 млн. чел., в т. ч. год­ных к во­ен. служ­бе ок. 5 млн. чел.

Здравоохранение

В К. на 100 тыс. жит. при­хо­дит­ся: вра­чей – 155, лиц ср. мед. пер­со­на­ла – 111 (2006), сто­ма­то­ло­гов – 11, фар­ма­цев­тов – 28, аку­ше­рок – 3 (2002). Об­щие рас­хо­ды на здра­во­охра­не­ние со­став­ля­ют 4,7% ВВП (2003) (бюд­жет­ное фи­нан­си­ро­ва­ние – 38%, ча­ст­ный сек­тор – 62%; 2005). Пра­во­вое ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние сис­те­мы здра­во­охра­не­ния осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся: Кон­сти­ту­ци­ей стра­ны, ре­ше­ни­ем Гос­со­ве­та КНР о ба­зо­вом мед. стра­хо­ва­нии гор. слу­жа­щих (1998); за­ко­на­ми о мед. прак­ти­ке (1999), о на­се­ле­нии и пла­ни­ро­ва­нии се­мьи (2001), о ле­кар­ст­вах (2001), о пре­ду­пре­ж­де­нии и ле­че­нии ин­фекц. за­бо­ле­ва­ний (2004); по­ста­нов­ле­ни­ем о ме­рах по про­фи­лак­ти­ке, ле­че­нию и кон­тро­лю ту­бер­ку­лё­за (1991); По­ло­же­ни­ем о тра­ди­ци­он­ной кит. ме­ди­ци­не (2001). Сис­те­ма здра­во­охра­не­ния на­хо­дит­ся в про­цес­се кар­ди­наль­но­го ре­фор­ми­ро­ва­ния. Ор­га­ни­за­ци­он­но-фи­нан­со­вая под­держ­ка воз­ло­же­на на ме­ст­ные вла­сти, что ве­дёт к пе­ре­на­сы­ще­нию рын­ка спе­циа­ли­зир. по­мо­щью и до­ро­ги­ми ле­кар­ст­ва­ми. Для не­обес­пе­чен­но­го на­се­ле­ния со­кра­ща­ет­ся по­треб­ле­ние мед. ус­луг (в т. ч. пер­вич­ной ме­ди­ко-са­ни­тар­ной по­мо­щи) из-за не­пла­тё­же­спо­соб­но­сти. Со­кра­ща­ет­ся так­же дос­туп­ность мед. ус­луг для ма­ло­обес­пе­чен­ных, вклю­чая ус­лу­ги цен­тров здра­во­охра­не­ния и цен­тров пла­ни­ро­ва­ния се­мьи. Мед. по­мощь ока­зы­ва­ют так­же вра­чи кит. тра­ди­ци­он­ной (на­род­ной) ме­ди­ци­ны. Наи­бо­лее рас­про­стра­нён­ные ин­фек­ции – бак­те­ри­аль­ная диа­рея, ге­па­тит В (10% нас.), леп­тос­пи­роз, ма­ля­рия. Осн. при­чи­ны смер­ти взрос­ло­го на­се­ле­ния: зло­ка­че­ст­вен­ные но­во­об­ра­зо­ва­ния, це­реб­ро­ва­ску­ляр­ные за­бо­ле­ва­ния, хро­нич. бо­лез­ни лёг­ких, ише­мич. бо­лезнь серд­ца, трав­мы (2005). Хро­нич. за­бо­ле­ва­ния яв­ля­ют­ся при­чи­ной 80% всех слу­ча­ев смер­ти. В К. име­ют­ся мно­го­числ. ку­рор­ты: Хан­чжоу; баль­нео­ло­ги­че­ские (Синь­чэн, Тан­ганц­зы, Цзи­мо и др.), гор­но­кли­ма­ти­че­ские (Кунь­мин, Лу­шань, Му­ган­сань, Тай­шань, Чан­шань и др.), при­мор­ские кли­ма­ти­че­ские (Бэй­дай­хэ, Цин­дао, Янь­тай и др.).

На Тай­ва­не на 100 тыс. жит. при­хо­дит­ся: вра­чей – 220, лиц ср. мед. пер­со­на­ла и аку­ше­рок – 481, сто­ма­то­ло­гов – 26, фар­ма­цев­тов – 120; функ­цио­ни­ру­ет 131152 боль­нич­ных кой­ки (2006). Мед. по­мощь (96% – ев­роп. об­раз­ца, 4% – кит. нар. ме­ди­ци­на) ока­зы­ва­ют 547 боль­ниц (в т. ч. 24 мед. цен­тра, 55 рай­он­ных кли­ник, 344 ок­руж­ные боль­ни­цы, 52 пси­хи­ат­рич. кли­ни­ки) (2006). Об­щие рас­хо­ды на здра­во­охра­не­ние со­став­ля­ют 6,1% ВРП (бюд­жет­ное фи­нан­си­ро­ва­ние – 25,9%, ча­ст­ный сек­тор – 53,6%, ра­бо­то­да­те­ли – 15%, не­ком­мерч. ор­га­ни­за­ции – 5,5%; 2006). Пра­во­вое ре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ние сис­те­мы здра­во­охра­не­ния осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет­ся за­ко­на­ми: об ис­кусств. оп­ло­до­тво­ре­нии (2007), о ср. мед. пер­со­на­ле (2004), о фи­зио­те­ра­пев­тах (1996, 2007), о нац. сис­те­ме мед. стра­хо­ва­ния (1994), об ох­ра­не пси­хич. здо­ро­вья (1992), о млад­шем мед. пер­со­на­ле (2000), о ско­рой мед. по­мо­щи (1995, 2004), о вра­чах (1943, 2002), о ро­до­вспо­мо­же­нии (2005), о пал­лиа­тив­ной по­мо­щи в тер­ми­наль­ных со­стоя­ни­ях (2000); По­ло­же­ни­ем о стан­дар­тах дея­тель­но­сти мед. уч­ре­ж­де­ний (1987, 2005). Совр. мед. по­мощь до­пол­ня­ет­ся ме­то­да­ми нар. кит. ме­ди­ци­ны (ле­че­ние тра­ва­ми, аку­пунк­ту­ра). Сис­те­ма здра­во­охра­не­ния управ­ля­ет­ся Деп-том здра­во­охра­не­ния, по мно­гим по­зи­ци­ям по­хо­жа на си­сте­му здра­во­охра­не­ния США, во всех служ­бах ак­цент де­ла­ет­ся на вы­со­ко­тех­но­ло­гич­ной ди­аг­но­сти­ке и ква­ли­фи­цир. ле­че­нии. Наи­бо­лее рас­про­стра­нён­ные ин­фек­ции – тиф, япон­ский эн­це­фа­лит, ге­па­тит А, ли­хо­рад­ка ден­ге, жёл­тая ли­хо­рад­ка. Осн. при­чи­ны смер­ти – зло­ка­че­ст­вен­ные но­во­об­ра­зо­ва­ния, це­реб­ро­ва­ску­ляр­ные за­бо­ле­ва­ния, бо­лез­ни сер­деч­но-со­су­ди­стой сис­те­мы, не­са­хар­ный диа­бет, трав­мы и не­сча­ст­ные слу­чаи.

Спорт


Победительницы турнира «Весенние ласточки» в синхронных прыжках с вышки – Чэнь Ни и Цао Цзинчжэнь (Москва, 2008).


Фото В. А. Косарева

Пер­вые све­де­ния о рас­про­стра­не­нии фи­зич. уп­раж­не­ний в К. со­дер­жат­ся в кн. «Кун­фу» (пред­по­ло­жи­тель­но 2698 до н. э.), в ко­то­рой бы­ли сис­те­ма­ти­зи­ро­ва­ны опи­са­ния рас­про­стра­нён­ных сре­ди на­ро­да разл. ви­дов ле­чеб­ной гим­на­сти­ки, бо­ле­уто­ляю­ще­го мас­са­жа, ри­ту­аль­ных тан­цев, ис­це­ляю­щих от бо­лез­ней, бес­пло­дия, а так­же бое­вых тан­цев. Зна­чит. раз­ви­тие фи­зич. куль­ту­ра по­лу­чи­ла в пе­ри­од Чжоу (12/11–3 вв. до н. э.). В пе­ри­од Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань в К. по­лу­чи­ли раз­ви­тие и по­пу­ляр­ность бое­вые иск-ва, в ко­то­рых уда­ры на­но­си­лись ла­до­нью (шоу­бо, цзи­цяо); ста­ла из­ве­ст­ной борь­ба сян­пу (на её ос­но­ве впо­след­ст­вии со­зда­на япон. борь­ба су­мо); на­ча­ли иг­рать в иг­ру, на­по­ми­наю­щую фут­бол (цу чу). Мя­чи ши­ли из шкур жи­вот­ных, а стой­ки во­рот де­ла­ли из бам­бу­ка. Кит. фут­бол был не­пре­мен­ной ча­стью пыш­ных празд­неств и эле­мен­том во­ен. под­го­тов­ки. В сте­нах Шао­линь­ско­го мон. за­ро­ди­лись «зве­ри­ные сти­ли» (усин­си); они пред­став­ля­ли со­бой 5 уп­раж­не­ний, со­дер­жав­ших оп­ре­де­лён­ную по­сле­до­ва­тель­ность дви­же­ний и ими­ти­ро­вав­ших по­вад­ки тиг­ра, дра­ко­на, лео­пар­да, змеи и жу­рав­ля.


Яо Мин – сильнейший баскетболист Китая.

По­яв­ле­ние кит. шах­мат – сян­ци – от­но­сит­ся к эпо­хе фео­да­лиз­ма. В сян­ци фи­гу­ры пе­ре­дви­га­ют­ся по 10 го­ри­зон­таль­ным и 9 вер­ти­каль­ным ли­ни­ям, а сто­ят на точ­ках. В 1956 сян­ци бы­ли вклю­че­ны в гос. сис­те­му фи­зич. куль­ту­ры и спор­та, ста­ли ре­гу­ляр­но про­во­дить­ся все­ки­тай­ские со­рев­но­ва­ния, во мно­гих про­вин­ци­ях соз­да­ны спец. спор­тив­ные об­ще­ст­ва, в го­ро­дах – шко­лы, клу­бы, ака­де­мии по игре в сян­ци. Иг­ра куль­ти­ви­ру­ет­ся так­же в ря­де стран Юго-Вост. Азии, уч­ре­ж­де­на Ази­ат. фе­де­ра­ция сян­ци, про­во­дят­ся чем­пио­на­ты Азии (с 1980).

В пе­ри­од Мин широко рас­про­ст­ра­ни­лось мэй­хуа­цю­ань – «бое­вое ис­кус­ст­во цвет­ка сли­вы». Цве­ток сли­вы яв­ля­ет­ся сим­во­лом К. и шао­линь­ских бое­вых ис­кусств. В это же вре­мя зна­чи­тель­но усо­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­лись бое­вые ис­кус­ст­ва ку­ай­цзяо (ха­рак­тер­но уме­ни­ем бы­ст­ро по­ва­лить про­тив­ни­ка на­земь) и ди­гун­цю­ань (тех­ни­ка борь­бы в па­де­нии). В 1561 пол­ко­во­дец Ци Цзи­гу­ань (1528–88) на­пи­сал кн. «Цзи­сяо­синь­шу» («Но­вая кни­га о тех­ни­ках и их дей­ст­вен­но­сти»), в ко­то­рой опи­сы­ва­лись бое­вые ис­кус­ст­ва. Не­смот­ря на не­од­но­крат­ное за­пре­ще­ние бое­вых ис­кусств, их по­пу­ляр­ность в на­ро­де воз­рас­та­ла, и ис­чез­но­ве­ние од­них при­во­ди­ло к по­яв­ле­нию дру­гих.

Не­ко­то­рые из бое­вых ис­кусств, напр. тай­цзи­цю­ань, тан­лан­цю­ань и бай­хэ­цю­ань, по­лу­чи­ли ши­ро­кую из­вест­ность. Соз­да­те­ля­ми ря­да по­пу­ляр­ных сти­лей бы­ли мас­те­ра У Чжун (бац­зи­цю­ань), Чэнь Хэн (цай­ли­фо) и Дун Хай­чу­ань (ба­гу­ач­жан). В 1909 в Шан­хае ос­но­ван Ин-т бое­вых ис­кусств Цзинъу ти­юй ху­эй. Од­на­ко в кон­це прав­ле­ния ди­на­стии Цин (нач. 1900-х гг.) бое­вые ис­кус­ст­ва ут­ра­ти­ли свой ав­то­ри­тет. В 20 в. по­пу­ляр­ным ста­но­вит­ся но­вое бое­вое ис­кус­ст­во – ушу. В 1991 в Пе­ки­не со­сто­ял­ся пер­вый чем­пио­нат ми­ра по ушу.

С 1959 про­во­дят­ся Все­ки­тай­ские спар­та­киа­ды, в про­грам­му ко­то­рых во­шли со­рев­но­ва­ния по 42 ви­дам спор­та. К кон. 1959 ок. 30 млн. чел. сда­ли нор­мы ГТО, св. 1 тыс. чел. ста­ли раз­ряд­ни­ка­ми, что сви­де­тель­ст­во­ва­ло о мас­со­вом ув­ле­че­нии фи­зич. куль­ту­рой и спор­том.

Кит. олим­пий­ский к-т пер­во­на­чаль­но ос­но­ван в 1910; спорт­сме­ны К. уча­ст­во­ва­ли в Олим­пий­ских иг­рах (1932, 1936 и 1948), но при­зо­вых мест не за­ни­ма­ли. По­сле по­втор­но­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния Кит. олим­пий­ско­го к-та в 1949 (при­знан МОК в 1954) К. был пред­став­лен на Олим­пий­ских иг­рах (1952) од­ним спорт­сме­ном. В 1958 в знак про­тес­та про­тив при­зна­ния МОК Олим­пий­ско­го к-та Ки­тай­ско­го Тай­бэя (Тай­пэя; Тай­вань) К. от­ка­зал­ся от уча­стия в олим­пий­ском дви­же­нии. В 1979 МОК вновь при­знал Кит. олим­пий­ский к-т. С 1984 (Лос-Анд­же­лес) спорт­сме­ны К. уча­ст­ву­ют в Олим­пий­ских иг­рах; все­го на лет­них Олим­пиа­дах за­воё­ва­но 386 ме­да­лей (163 зо­ло­тые, 117 се­реб­ря­ных, 106 брон­зо­вых). В не­офиц. ко­манд­ном за­чё­те сбор­ная ко­ман­да К. по­сто­ян­но улуч­ша­ет свои по­ка­за­те­ли: в Ат­лан­те (1996) – 4-е ме­сто (16, 22, 12); в Сид­нее (2000) – 3-е (28, 16, 15); в Афи­нах (2004) – 2-е (32, 17, 14); в Пе­ки­не (2008) – 1-е (51, 21, 28). Наи­боль­ших ус­пе­хов кит. спорт­сме­ны до­би­лись в ря­де ука­зан­ных в табл. 2 дис­ци­п­лин.

Таб­ли­ца 2. Олим­пий­ские на­гра­ды ки­тай­ских спорт­сме­нов (по 6 дис­ци­п­ли­нам)

Дисциплина С какого года участвуют Золотые медали Серебряные медали Бронзовые медали Всего
Прыжки в воду 1984 27 13  8 48
Спортивная гимнастика 1984  22 15  15 52
Тяжёлая атлетика 1984 24 11 8 43
Стрельба пулевая 1984 19 11 12 42
Настольный теннис 1992 20 14 8 42
Бадминтон  1992 11 6 13 30
Итого:   123   70 64 257

Сре­ди са­мых известных кит. спорт­сме­нов: гим­наст Ли Нин, вы­иг­рав­ший в Лос-Анд­же­ле­се (1984) 3 зо­ло­тые (воль­ные уп­раж­не­ния, уп­раж­не­ния на ко­не и на коль­цах) и 2 се­реб­ря­ные (ко­манд­ное пер­вен­ст­во и опор­ный пры­жок) ме­да­ли в отд. ви­дах мно­го­бо­рья; Линь Ли, одер­жав­шая по­бе­ду в Бар­се­ло­не (1992) в со­рев­но­ва­нии по ком­плекс­но­му пла­ва­нию (на дис­тан­цию 200 м) и по­лу­чив­шая се­реб­ря­ные ме­да­ли на дис­тан­ци­ях 400 м (ком­плекс­ное пла­ва­ние) и 200 м (брасс); бе­гу­нья Ван Цзюнь­ся – в Ат­лан­те (1996) по­бе­ди­ла на дис­тан­ции 5000 м и за­ня­ла 2-е ме­сто на дис­тан­ции 10000 м; ми­ро­вой ре­корд­смен и олим­пий­ский чем­пи­он (Афи­ны, 2004) в бе­ге на 110 м с барь­е­ра­ми Лю Сян; пры­гун в во­ду Тянь Лян, на Олим­пиа­дах в Сид­нее (2000) и Афи­нах (2004) удо­сто­ен­ный двух зо­ло­тых, од­ной се­реб­ря­ной и од­ной брон­зо­вой ме­да­ли за прыж­ки с 10-мет­ро­вой выш­ки (ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ные и син­хрон­ные), и др. О по­пу­ляр­но­сти прыж­ков в во­ду сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ет обо­ру­до­ва­ние 16 круп­ных спе­циа­ли­зир. цен­тров.


Фото Ф. В. Успенского


Пекинский национальный стадион «Птичье гнездо».

Сре­ди ко­манд­ных ви­дов спор­та наи­боль­шей по­пу­ляр­но­стью поль­зу­ют­ся во­лей­бол, бас­кет­бол, фут­бол. Жен­ская во­лей­боль­ная ко­ман­да К. ста­но­ви­лась по­бе­ди­те­лем Олим­пий­ских игр (1984, 2004), а так­же се­реб­ря­ным (1996) и брон­зо­вым (1988, 2008) при­зё­ром; в 2008 се­реб­ря­ным и брон­зо­вым при­зё­ра­ми ста­ли жен­ские ду­эты по пляж­но­му во­лей­бо­лу. Жен­ская сбор­ная К. по бас­кет­бо­лу – не­од­но­крат­ный при­зёр Олим­пий­ских игр (Лос-Анд­же­лес, 1984, – 3-е ме­сто; Бар­се­ло­на, 1992, – 2-е ме­сто). С 2002 в клу­бе Нац. бас­кет­боль­ной ас­со­циа­ции (НБА) «Хью­стон Ро­кетс» ус­пеш­но вы­сту­па­ет кит. бас­кет­бо­лист Яо Мин (рост 2 м 29 см) – один из са­мых по­пу­ляр­ных спорт­сме­нов в стра­не в 2000-х гг.; на па­ра­де от­кры­тия Олим­пий­ских игр (2008) был зна­ме­нос­цем сбор­ной К. Пер­вым пред­ста­ви­те­лем К. в НБА стал Ван Чжич­жи, вы­сту­пав­ший за «Дал­лас Ма­ве­рикс» (2001) и др. клу­бы. Жен­ская сбор­ная К. по фут­бо­лу – фи­на­лист Олим­пий­ских игр (1996) и чем­пио­на­та ми­ра (1999), 8-крат­ный по­бе­ди­тель Куб­ка Азии (в 1986–2006); на­па­даю­щая сбор­ной Сунь Вэнь при­зна­на ФИФА в 2002 луч­шей фут­бо­ли­ст­кой сто­ле­тия (совм. с М. Эй­керс из США); муж­ская сбор­ная К. по фут­бо­лу – фи­на­лист Куб­ка Азии (1984, 2004), уча­ст­ник чем­пио­на­та ми­ра (2002).

При под­го­тов­ке кит. спорт­сме­нов всё боль­шее вни­ма­ние уде­ля­ет­ся та­ким ви­дам, как дзю­до, тхе­к­вон­до, борь­ба гре­ко-рим­ская и воль­ная, фех­то­ва­ние, пла­ва­ние, лёг­кая ат­ле­ти­ка, тен­нис, бокс. На Олим­пиа­де в Афи­нах (2004) в жен­ском пар­ном раз­ря­де тен­нис­но­го тур­ни­ра зо­ло­тую ме­даль вы­иг­ра­ли Ли Тин и Сунь Тянь­тянь; Чжэн Цзе – по­бе­ди­тель­ни­ца От­кры­то­го чем­пи­о­на­та Ав­ст­ра­лии (2006) и Уимб­л­дон­ско­го тур­ни­ра (2006) в пар­ном раз­ря­де, в 2008 вы­шла в по­лу­фи­нал это­го пре­стиж­но­го со­стя­за­ния в оди­ноч­ном раз­ря­де. На Олим­пий­ских иг­рах в Пе­ки­не (2008) две зо­ло­тые ме­да­ли вы­иг­ра­ли бок­сё­ры и три – дзю­дои­ст­ки.

На Олим­пий­ских зим­них иг­рах (1980–2006) спорт­сме­на­ми К. за­воё­ва­но 33 ме­да­ли (4 зо­ло­тые, 16 се­реб­ря­ных, 13 брон­зо­вых); наи­бо­лее ус­пеш­но вы­сту­па­ют в од­ном из са­мых мо­ло­дых олим­пий­ских ви­дов – шорт-тре­ке (с 1992) – 20 ме­да­лей (3, 10, 7), в т. ч. пер­вые две зо­ло­тые ме­да­ли в ис­то­рии спор­та К. на Олим­пий­ских зим­них иг­рах вы­иг­ра­ла Ян Ян, по­бе­див в 2002 (Солт-Лейк-Си­ти) на ди­стан­ци­ях 500 м и 1000 м. Из др. зим­них ви­дов спор­та наи­бо­лее по­пу­ляр­ны фи­гур­ное ка­та­ние, конь­ко­беж­ный спорт, фри­стайл и би­ат­лон. На эта­пе Куб­ка ми­ра по би­ат­ло­ну в Эс­тер­сун­де (6.12.2008) кит. би­ат­ло­ни­ст­ка впер­вые до­би­лась по­бе­ды – Ван Чун­ли вы­иг­ра­ла сприн­тер­скую гон­ку на 7,5 км. В 1995 Лу Чэнь ста­ла чем­пи­он­кой ми­ра по фи­гур­но­му ка­та­нию; в 1994 и 1998 она за­ни­ма­ла 3-е мес­то на Олим­пий­ских зим­них иг­рах. В 2002, 2003, 2006 и 2007 кит. фи­гу­ри­сты вы­иг­ры­ва­ли зо­ло­тые ме­да­ли чем­пио­на­тов ми­ра в пар­ном ка­та­нии. В янв. 2009 Ван Бэй­син по­бе­ди­ла на чем­пио­на­те ми­ра по сприн­тер­ско­му мно­го­бо­рью в Мо­ск­ве.

В кон. 1990-х – нач. 2000-х гг. в К. по­ст­рое­но ок. 300 но­вых лыж­ных це­нт­ров, в т. ч. круп­ней­ший гор­но­лыж­ный – «Sun Mountain Yabuli» (близ г. Хар­бин), спо­соб­ст­вую­щий раз­ви­тию гор­но­лыж­но­го спор­та в стра­не. В 1996 Хар­бин при­ни­мал Ази­ат. зим­ние иг­ры; в февр. 2009 стал сто­ли­цей зим­ней Уни­вер­сиа­ды (12 ви­дов спор­та). Сре­ди его спор­тив­ных объ­ек­тов – хок­кей­ный Дво­рец «Harbin Ice Center» (по­ст­ро­ен в 1981; 8,0 тыс. мест), при­ни­мав­ший вес­ной 2008 жен­ский чем­пи­о­нат ми­ра по хок­кею с шай­бой; конь­ко­беж­ный центр и Дво­рец спор­та для фи­гур­но­го ка­та­ния. Пла­ни­ру­ет­ся строи­тель­ст­во мн. др. спор­тив­ных объ­ек­тов. Ру­ко­вод­ст­во К. на­де­ет­ся на по­бе­ду Хар­би­на в кон­кур­се го­ро­дов – пре­тен­ден­тов на про­ве­де­ние Олим­пий­ских зим­них игр 2018.

Из не­олим­пий­ских ви­дов спор­та в К. осо­бой по­пу­ляр­но­стью поль­зу­ют­ся ав­то­гон­ки и шах­ма­ты. На ме­ж­ду­нар. ав­то­дро­ме в Шан­хае с 2004 про­во­дит­ся этап чем­пио­на­та ми­ра «Фор­му­ла-1» – Гран-при Ки­тая. Кит. шах­ма­ти­сты с 1978 уча­ст­ву­ют во Все­мир­ных шах­мат­ных олим­пиа­дах; наи­боль­ше­го ус­пе­ха до­би­лась жен­ская ко­ман­да, вы­иг­рав­шая зо­ло­тые ме­да­ли в 1998, 2000, 2002 и 2004; муж­ская ко­ман­да – се­реб­ря­ный при­зёр ко­манд­но­го чем­пио­на­та ми­ра в 2005 и Все­мир­ной олим­пиа­ды в 2006. В 1983 гросс­мей­стер Лю Ши­лан уча­ст­во­ва­ла в мат­чах пре­тен­ден­ток на пер­вен­ст­во ми­ра. Чем­пи­он­ка­ми ми­ра по шах­ма­там ста­но­ви­лись Се Цзюнь (1991–96, 1999–2001), Чжу Чэнь (2001) и Сюй Юйхуа (2006). В 2007 сбор­ная ко­ман­да К. вы­иг­ра­ла 1-й жен­ский ко­манд­ный чем­пи­о­нат ми­ра (Ека­те­рин­бург). В 2008 14-лет­няя Хоу Ифань вы­шла в фи­нал жен­ско­го чем­пио­на­та ми­ра (Наль­чик), где про­иг­ра­ла А. К. Кос­те­нюк (1,5:2,5). Од­ним из са­мых юных гросс­мей­сте­ров ми­ра в 1999 стал 13-лет­ний Бу Сян­чжи, ко­то­рый с 2005 воз­глав­лял сбор­ную К. на мн. круп­ней­ших со­стя­за­ни­ях. В дек. 2008 он при­нял уча­стие в меж­ду­нар. тур­ни­ре 21-й ка­те­гории ФИДЕ в г. Нань­цзин (круп­ней­ший тур­нир в ис­то­рии К.) и за­нял 3-е ме­сто. В Куб­ке ми­ра (2007) ус­пеш­но вы­сту­пил гросс­мей­стер Ван Юэ. С нач. 2000-х гг. про­во­дят­ся тра­диц. шах­мат­ные мат­чи Рос­сия – К., в ко­то­рых кит. ко­ман­да одер­жа­ла ряд по­бед.

По­сле по­бе­ды Пе­ки­на на вы­бо­рах олим­пий­ской сто­ли­цы (13.7.2001) орг­ко­ми­тет Олим­пиа­ды, Кит. олим­пий­ский к-т и Мин-во об­ра­зо­ва­ния К. ста­ли ини­циа­то­ра­ми раз­ра­бот­ки нац. про­грам­мы «Олим­пий­ское об­ра­зо­ва­ние» и в шко­лах на­ча­ли пре­по­да­вать олим­пий­ские уро­ки. В про­грам­ме уча­ст­ву­ют 400 млн. школь­ни­ков в 400 тыс. школ; её осн. раз­де­лы – тео­ре­тич. зна­ния, прак­тич. за­ня­тия спор­том, обу­че­ние англ. язы­ку. Офиц. де­виз Олим­пиа­ды в Пе­ки­не: «Один мир – од­на меч­та». Го­то­вясь к Олим­пий­ским иг­рам (2008), К. стал ме­стом про­ве­де­ния мн. круп­ней­ших со­стя­за­ний, в т. ч. здесь со­стоя­лись чем­пио­нат ми­ра по бок­су (Мянь­ян, 2005), чем­пио­нат ми­ра по пла­ва­нию на т. н. ко­рот­кой во­де (в бас­сей­не дли­ной 25 м; Шан­хай, 2006), Ку­бок ми­ра по греб­ле на бай­дар­ках и ка­ноэ (Гу­ан­чжоу, 2006).

К вес­не 2008 спе­ци­аль­но к Олим­пий­ским иг­рам в Олим­пий­ском пар­ке воз­ве­дён мно­го­функ­цио­наль­ный Пе­кин­ский нац. ста­ди­он – «Пти­чье гнез­до» (св. 90 тыс. мест); стои­мость про­ек­та ок. 325 млн. ев­ро; все­го к Олим­пиа­де (2008) по­строе­но и ре­кон­ст­руи­ро­ва­но 37 (в т. ч. 31 в Пе­ки­не) спор­тив­ных объ­ек­тов. Сре­ди них наи­бо­лее круп­ные – нац. вод­ный центр «Вод­ный куб», нац. Дво­рец спор­та, Олим­пий­ский бас­кет­боль­ный ста­ди­он, Олим­пий­ский парк, Олим­пий­ский кон­гресс-центр. Олим­пий­ские со­стя­за­ния по па­рус­но­му спор­ту со­стоя­лись в Цин­дао, по кон­но­му спор­ту – в Гон­кон­ге. Все­го в Олим­пий­ских иг­рах в Пе­ки­не (2008) при­ня­ли уча­стие 11028 спорт­сме­нов из 204 стран, в т. ч. сбор­ную К. пред­став­ля­ли 639 чел. – наи­боль­шее ко­ли­че­ст­во спорт­сме­нов.

От­дель­ной ко­ман­дой на Олим­пий­ских иг­рах вы­сту­па­ет ко­ман­да Тай­ва­ня. Все­го на Олим­пий­ских иг­рах (1960–2008) она за­вое­ва­ла 19 ме­да­лей (2 зо­ло­тые, 6 се­реб­ря­ных, 11 брон­зо­вых), в т. ч. 7 ме­да­лей (2, 1, 4) в тхе­к­вон­до (по­бе­ди­те­ля­ми Олим­пий­ских игр в Афи­нах 2004 в лег­чай­шей ве­со­вой ка­те­го­рии ста­ли сре­ди муж­чин Чу Му­ен, сре­ди жен­щин Чэнь Ши­синь). На Олим­пий­ских иг­рах в Пе­ки­не (2008) спорт­сме­ны Тай­ва­ня удо­стое­ны 4 брон­зо­вых на­град – по две в тя­жёлой ат­ле­ти­ке (жен­щи­ны) и в тхе­к­вон­до (муж­чи­ны).

Вско­ре пос­ле окон­ча­ния Олим­пий­ских игр (8.8–24.8.2008) в Пе­ки­не со­стоя­лись Па­ра­олим­пий­ские иг­ры (6.9–17.9.2008), в ко­то­рых при­ня­ли уча­стие спорт­сме­ны-ин­ва­ли­ды из 148 стран (ок. 4200 чел.). 1-е ме­сто в не­офиц. ко­манд­ном за­чё­те за­ня­ла ко­ман­да К., за­вое­вав 211 ме­да­лей (89 зо­ло­тых, 70 се­реб­ря­ных, 52 брон­зо­вые). В окт. 2008 в Пе­ки­не со­стоя­лись 1-е Все­мир­ные ин­тел­лек­ту­аль­ные иг­ры, в про­грам­му ко­то­рых во­шли со­стя­за­ния по шах­ма­там, шаш­кам, го, брид­жу и сян­ци. В об­ще­ко­манд­ном за­чё­те по­бе­ды до­би­лась сбор­ная ко­ман­да К., вы­иг­рав­шая 26 ме­да­лей (12, 8, 6).

Жо­кей-клуб Гон­кон­га (ос­но­ван в 1884; в 1959–96 но­сил назв. Ко­ро­лев­ский жо­кей-клуб Гон­кон­га) про­во­дит скач­ки на двух ип­под­ро­мах Ша Тин и Хеп­пи-Вал­ли. Еже­год­но про­хо­дит ряд тра­диц. меж­ду­нар. со­стя­за­ний, в т. ч. в де­каб­ре ра­зы­гры­ва­ют­ся Меж­ду­нар. при­зы Гон­кон­га с при­зо­вым фон­дом в неск. мил­лио­нов дол­ла­ров.

Образование. Учреждения науки и культуры


Пекинский университет. Здание астрономического факультета.

Сис­те­ма об­ра­зо­ва­ния в КНР на­хо­дит­ся в ве­де­нии гос-ва. Об­ра­зо­ва­ние бес­плат­но на сту­пе­ни обя­за­тель­но­го. Гл. нор­ма­тив­ные функ­ции за­кре­п­ле­ны за Мин-вом об­ра­зо­ва­ния, дей­ст­ву­ет «сту­пен­ча­тая» сис­те­ма управ­ле­ния и фи­нан­си­ро­ва­ния: ву­зов – на уров­не цен­тра и про­вин­ций с при­ори­те­том по­след­них, ба­зо­во­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния – на уров­не ме­ст­ной ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции, пре­им. уезд­ной. Осн. за­ко­но­да­тель­ные ак­ты: об обя­за­тель­ном об­ра­зо­ва­нии (1986, но­вая ре­дак­ция 2006), об учи­те­лях (1993), об об­ра­зо­ва­нии (1995), о про­фес­сио­наль­ном об­ра­зо­ва­нии (1996), о выс­шем об­ра­зо­ва­нии (1998), о сти­му­ли­ро­ва­нии не­го­су­дар­ствен­но­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния (2002). Соз­да­ёт­ся сис­те­ма не­пре­рыв­но­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния. Сис­те­ма об­ще­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния вклю­ча­ет (2007): до­школь­ное (дет­ские са­ды по­се­ща­ют ок. 50% де­тей, под­го­то­вит. клас­сы – св. 70%), ба­зо­вое об­ра­зо­ва­ние [9-лет­нее обя­за­тель­ное на­чаль­ное (с 6–7-лет­не­го воз­рас­та, 99,3% де­тей) и не­пол­ное сред­нее (100% вы­пу­ск­ни­ков на­чаль­ных школ)], со­от­но­ше­ние сту­пе­ней варь­и­ру­ет­ся (6 и 3 го­да ли­бо 5 и 4 го­да); пол­ное сред­нее (3 го­да, ме­нее 60% де­тей). В ре­гу­ляр­ные ву­зы (их 1867) по­сту­па­ет 75% вы­пу­ск­ни­ков школ. Проф. об­ра­зо­ва­ние трёх­сту­пен­ча­тое: на­чаль­ное (на ба­зе на­чаль­ных школ), сред­нее спе­ци­аль­ное (тех­ни­ку­мы, пед­учи­ли­ща, ли­цеи и др.) и выс­шее (22% мо­ло­дё­жи). Выс­шее об­ра­зо­ва­ние вклю­ча­ет осн. сту­пе­ни: ба­ка­лав­ри­ат (4 го­да), за ко­то­рым сле­ду­ет ас­пи­ран­ту­ра; ма­ги­ст­ра­ту­ра (2–3 го­да); док­то­ран­ту­ра (от 3 лет), а так­же спе­циа­ли­зи­ро­ван­ные – 2–3-го­дич­ные ву­зы и ф-ты (в т. ч. выс­шие проф.-тех­нич. кол­лед­жи), в ко­то­рых обу­ча­ет­ся 60% всех сту­ден­тов. Дей­ст­ву­ет и под­сис­те­ма об­ра­зо­ва­ния для взрос­лых (до­пол­нит. об­ра­зо­ва­ние, вто­рое выс­шее, разл. кур­сы) с те­ми же от­де­ле­ния­ми. До­ля не­гра­мот­ных в воз­рас­те 15–49 лет со­став­ля­ет 4%. В КНР св. 2 тыс. выс­ших учеб­ных за­ве­де­ний. Круп­ней­шие ву­зы: Пе­кин­ский ун-т (1898), Цинхуа (1911), Кит. нар. ун-т (1950), Центр. ун-т на­цио­наль­но­стей (1951), Пе­кин­ский пе­да­го­гич. ун-т (1954); центр. ака­де­мии: ис­кусств (1918, совр. назв. с 1950), те­ат­ра (1950), де­ко­ра­тив­но-при­клад­но­го иск-ва и ди­зай­на (1956) – все в Пе­ки­не; ун-ты – Тунцзы (соз­дан нем­ца­ми в 1907, совр. назв. с 1927, Шан­хай), Чжэц­зян­ский (1897, совр. ста­тус с 1998, г. Хан­чжоу), Шань­дун­ский (1901, Цзи­нань), Сы­чу­ань­ский (1905), Сян­ган­ский (ос­но­ван в 1887 как мед. кол­ледж, совр. ста­тус с 1911, Сян­ган), Фу­дань­ский (1905, совр. назв. и ста­тус с 1917), Нань­кай­ский (1919, г. Тянь­цзинь), им. Сунь Ят­сена (1924, совр. назв. с 1926, г. Гу­ан­чжоу), Центр. Юж­ный (2000, на ба­зе 3 ун-тов, г. Чан­ша), а так­же ун-ты в Уха­ни (1893, совр. назв. и ста­тус с 1923), Нан­ки­не (1902), Ся­мы­ни (1921, с 1937 го­су­дар­ст­вен­ный). На­уч.-тех­нич. ун-ты: Сев.-Во­сточ­ный (1923, г. Шэнь­ян), Центр.-китай­ский (1953, под этим назв. с кон. 1990-х гг., г. Ухань), Ки­тай­ский (1958, г. Хэ­фэй), Пе­кин­ский тех­но­ло­ги­че­ский (1960). Круп­ные ча­ст­ные ун-ты: «Дун Фан», за­оч­ный Хай­дянь­ский (Пе­кин), «Ян Энь» (г. Цю­ань­чжоу), На­уч.-тех­нич. «Ху­ан­хэ» (пров. Хэ­нань), «Хуа­лянь» (Гу­ан­чжоу) и др. В К. функ­цио­ни­ру­ют 1372 ака­де­мич. и уни­вер­си­тет­ские биб­лио­те­ки, 781 пуб­лич­ная, бо­лее 1000 спе­циа­ли­зи­ро­ван­ных. Нац. биб­лио­те­ки: На­цио­наль­ная (с 1800 как двор­цо­вая, совр. назв. и ста­тус с 1987, 18 млн. экз., 5-е ме­сто в ми­ре по объ­ёму фон­дов, на её ба­зе в 1999 соз­да­на Нац. элек­трон­ная б-ка, Пе­кин), Нан­кин­ская (1907), Шан­хай­ская (1952); на­уч. биб­лио­те­ки при ака­де­ми­ях КНР, ву­зах, НИИ. В К. св. 2300 му­зе­ев, соз­дан К-т по де­лам нац. му­зе­ев (2006). Гл. нац. му­зеи: двор­цо­вый ан­самбль Гу­гун (1420, с 1914 му­зей, Пе­кин; часть кол­лек­ции – в г. Тай­бэй) и дво­рец ди­на­стии Цин в Шэнь­я­не; двор­цы и ср.-век. са­до­во-пар­ко­вые усадь­бы в го­ро­дах Чэн­дэ, Сучжоу, Уси, Ян­чжоу; Му­зей гео­ло­гии (1916), Ху­дож. га­ле­рея при Ака­де­мии жи­во­пи­си (тра­диц. иск-во К., 1958), Во­ен. му­зей кит. нар. ре­во­лю­ции (1958, от­крыт в 1960), Му­зей изо­бра­зит. иск-ва (от­крыт в 1963, совр. иск-во К.), Му­зей пе­ча­ти (1996) и Му­зей ки­но (2005) – круп­ней­шие в ми­ре, Центр ис­кусств «Ки­тай в сто­ле­ти­ях» с Му­зе­ем ми­ро­во­го иск-ва (2000), Нац. му­зей [соз­дан в 2003 в ре­зуль­та­те слия­ния Ис­то­рич. му­зея (1912) и Му­зея Ре­во­лю­ции (1950)], а так­же му­зеи: авиа­ции, ну­миз­ма­ти­ки, спор­та, с. х-ва – все в Пе­ки­не. Сре­ди др. му­зе­ев – Шан­хай­ский му­зей (древ­не­го иск-ва, 1952; но­вое зда­ние – 1996), тер­ра­ко­то­вых вои­нов из гроб­ни­цы имп. Цинь Шиху­ан­ди (г. Си­ань), Бань­по (сто­ян­ка не­оли­та, 1958, г. Си­ань), древ­них ко­лес­ниц (1994, пров. Шань­дун), «Сань­ся» (ар­хео­ло­гич., 2005, г. Чун­цин), кал­ли­гра­фии (2007, г. Шан­чжи, пров. Хэй­лунц­зян), чая (пров. Чжэц­зян), ви­но­де­лия (2002, г. Янь­тай, пров. Шань­дун). Ме­мо­ри­а­лы: Кон­фу­ция (с 5 в. до н. э., г. Цюй­фу, пров. Шань­дун), Ли Бо (1959, г. Ма­ань­шань, пров. Ань­хой). Му­зеи гос. дея­те­лей: Сунь Ят­се­на (Дом-му­зей близ Гу­ан­чжоу, 1999), Мао Цзэ­ду­на (г. Шао­шань, пров. Юнь­нань), Дэн Сяо­пи­на (Дом-му­зей, 2001, г. Гу­анъ­ань, пров. Сы­чу­ань); до­ма-му­зеи по­этов и пи­са­те­лей: Ду Фу (1961, г. Чэн­ду), Лу Си­ня (Пе­кин, Шан­хай, Шао­син), Мао Ду­ня (2007, Пе­кин).


Новый комплекс Нанкинской библиотеки.

На­уч.-тех­нич. ис­сле­до­ва­ния­ми в К. ру­ко­во­дит Гос. к-т по нау­ке и тех­ни­ке при Гос. со­ве­те КНР. На­уч. ис­сле­до­ва­ния ор­га­ни­зу­ют­ся и ко­ор­ди­ни­ру­ют­ся тре­мя гос. ака­де­мия­ми: АН Ки­тая (1949, Пе­кин; 12 фи­лиа­лов, 6 от­де­ле­ний, 123 НИИ), Ака­де­ми­ей инж. на­ук (1994, Пе­кин), Ака­де­ми­ей об­ществ. на­ук К. (1977, Пе­кин и фи­лиа­лы; 35 НИИ). Важ­ную роль иг­ра­ет Нац. фонд К. по ес­теств. нау­кам, не­по­сред­ст­вен­но под­чи­няю­щий­ся Гос. со­ве­ту КНР. При ря­де ми­ни­стерств дей­ст­ву­ют от­рас­ле­вые ака­де­мии: с.-х., мед., гео­ло­гич. на­ук, тра­диц. кит. ме­ди­ци­ны и др. Функ­цио­ни­ру­ют св. 100 на­уч. об­ществ и ас­со­циа­ций, св. 7 тыс. НИИ.

Сис­те­ма об­ра­зо­ва­ния на Тай­ва­не рег­ла­мен­ти­ру­ет­ся за­ко­на­ми о пол­ном сред­нем и сред­нем проф. об­ра­зо­ва­нии (2004), о не­пол­ном сред­нем об­ра­зо­ва­нии (2006), о не­го­су­дар­ст­вен­ных шко­лах (2006), об уни­вер­си­те­тах (2007). Сис­те­ма об­ра­зо­ва­ния вклю­ча­ет (2008): до­шко­ль­ное вос­пи­та­ние де­тей от 3 до 6 лет, обя­за­тель­ное 9-лет­нее об­ра­зо­ва­ние (6-лет­няя на­чаль­ная шко­ла; 3-лет­няя не­пол­ная сред­няя шко­ла, по­сле окон­ча­ния ко­то­рой мож­но про­дол­жить обу­че­ние в 3-лет­ней пол­ной сред­ней шко­ле или в 3-лет­ней сред­ней проф. шко­ле, или в 5-лет­нем проф. кол­лед­же), выс­шее об­ра­зо­ва­ние. До­шко­ль­ным вос­пи­та­ни­ем ох­ва­че­но (2005/2006 учеб­ный год) св. 224 тыс. де­тей, на­чаль­ным обу­че­ни­ем – св. 1 млн. 832 тыс., не­полным сред­ним об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем – св. 951 тыс., пол­ным сред­ним об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем – св. 420,6 тыс., сред­ним проф. об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем – св. 331,6 тыс. уч-ся, выс­шим об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем – ок. 1 млн. 260 тыс. сту­ден­тов. Гра­мот­ность на­се­ле­ния в воз­рас­те стар­ше 15 лет со­став­ля­ет 96,97% (2006). Осн. на­уч. уч­ре­ж­де­ния, круп­ные ву­зы, гл. биб­лио­те­ки и му­зеи на­хо­дят­ся в Тай­бэе, Тай­на­не, Тай­чжу­не. Дей­ст­ву­ют так­же Нац. ун-т Цзяо Тун (1896) и Нац. ун-т Цзын Хуа (1956) – оба в Синь­чжу, Нац. оке­ан­ский ун-т в Цзи­лу­не (1953), Мед. ун-т в Гао­сю­не (1954) и др.

Средства массовой информации

Пекин. Комплекс Центрального телевидения. 2002–08. Архитектурное бюро ОМА.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

Из­да­вать га­зе­ты совр. ти­па в К. на­ча­ли в сер. 19 в. В КНР вы­хо­дит св. 2 тыс. на­име­но­ва­ний пе­рио­дич. из­да­ний об­щим ти­ра­жом 35 млрд. экз. (2008). При­мер­но 20% из них яв­ля­ют­ся ор­га­на­ми КПК. Сре­ди ве­ду­щих об­ще­на­цио­наль­ных га­зет (все – в Пе­ки­не): «Жэнь­минь жи­бао» («На­род­ная га­зе­та»; ор­ган ЦК КПК; с 1948, еже­днев­ная; ти­раж ок. 5 млн. экз.), «Гун­жэнь жи­бао» («Ра­бо­чая га­зе­та»; ор­ган Все­ки­тай­ской фе­де­ра­ции проф­сою­зов; с 1949, еже­днев­ная; 2,5 млн. экз.), «Цзе­фанц­зюнь бao» («Ос­во­бо­ди­тель­ная ар­мия»; ор­ган Во­ен. со­ве­та ЦК КПК; с 1956, еже­днев­ная; ок. 800 тыс. экз.), «Чжун­го цин­нянь бао» («Китай­ская мо­ло­дёжь»; ор­ган ЦК Ком­му­ни­стич. сою­за мо­ло­дё­жи К.; ос­но­ва­на в 1951, с 1978 вы­хо­дит 4 раза в не­де­лю; 3 млн. экз.). Во­про­сы нау­ки и об­ра­зо­ва­ния ос­ве­ща­ет еже­днев­ная газ. «Гу­ан­мин жи­бао» («Свет»; с 1949; ок. 6 млн. экз.). На англ. язы­ке из­да­ёт­ся газ. «China Daily» (с 1981, еже­днев­ная). Круп­ные ре­гио­наль­ные га­зе­ты: «Сиц­зан жи­бао» («Ти­бет­ская га­зе­та»; с 1956, Лха­са, еже­днев­ная, на кит. и ти­бет. язы­ках), «Нань­фан жи­бао» («Юж­ная га­зе­та»; с 1952, Гу­ан­чжоу, еже­днев­ная), «Синь­цзян жи­бао» («Синь­цзян­ская га­зе­та»; с 1956, Урум­чи, еже­днев­ная), «Гу­ан­си жи­бао» («Га­зе­та Гу­ан­си»; Нань­нин, еже­днев­ная). Ве­ду­щие жур­на­лы (все – в Пе­ки­не): «Цю­ши» («Стрем­ле­ние к ис­ти­не»; тео­ре­тич. ор­ган ЦК КПК; с 1958, до 1988 на­зы­вал­ся «Хун­ци»), «Жэнь­минь хуа­бао» («Народная ил­лю­ст­ри­ро­ван­ная га­зе­та»; с 1951, еже­ме­сяч­ный, на ки­тай­ском и 17 иностр. язы­ках, в т. ч. на рус. яз.), «Peking Review» (с 1958, еже­не­дель­ный, на англ., нем., франц., исп. и япон. язы­ках). Ра­дио­веща­ние с 1927. В 1947 в К. на­счи­ты­ва­лось 42 гос. и 90 ча­ст­ных и иностр. ра­дио­стан­ций, в 1949 все на­цио­на­ли­зи­ро­ва­ны, в г. Пе­кин соз­да­на Центр. нар. ра­дио­ве­ща­тель­ная стан­ция. Ра­бо­та­ют, по разл. дан­ным, до 1200 ра­дио­стан­ций (2008). Ме­ж­ду­нар. ра­дио К. (с 1941) ве­дёт ве­ща­ние на 38 язы­ках и 5 ме­ст­ных кит. диа­лек­тах (2008). Те­ле­ви­де­ние с 1958. Св. 450 те­ле­сту­дий (2008). Два гос. ин­фор­мац. агент­ст­ва: Синьхуа (ос­но­ва­но в 1931 в г. Жуй­цзинь, до 1937 на­зы­ва­лось «Крас­ный Ки­тай», с 1937 в Пе­ки­не), Чжун­го (с 1952, Пе­кин; ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­но на ин­фор­ми­ро­ва­ние ки­тай­цев, про­жи­ваю­щих за гра­ни­цей).

На Тай­ва­не из­да­ёт­ся св. 600 га­зет и жур­на­лов. Б. ч. пе­рио­дич. из­да­ний вы­хо­дит на англ. яз. (все – в г. Тай­бэй): газ. «Independent Evening Post» (c 1947, еже­днев­ная; ок. 300 тыс. экз.), газ. «In­dependent Morning Post» (с 1988, еже­днев­ная; ок. 300 тыс. экз.), газ. «Com­mercial Times» (с 1978, еже­днев­ная; ок. 250 тыс. экз.), газ. «China Post» (с 1952, еже­днев­ная; ок. 150 тыс. экз.), ж. «Free China Journal» (с 1964, ок. 35 тыс. экз.). Сре­ди ве­ду­щих га­зет на кит. яз. (все – в г. Тай­бэй): «Сень­шэн бао» («Но­вая жизнь»; с 1945, еже­днев­ная; 460 тыс. экз.), «Лянь­хэ­бао» («Объ­е­ди­нён­ные еже­днев­ные но­во­сти»; с 1951, еже­днев­ная; 1,2 млн. экз.). На кит. и англ. язы­ках из­да­ют­ся га­зе­ты (все – в г. Тай­бэй): «Чжунъ­ян жи­бао» («Central Dai­ly News»; ор­ган Го­минь­да­на; с 1928, еже­днев­ная; ок. 600 тыс. экз.), «Чжун­го жи­бао» («China Times»; с 1950, еже­днев­ная; 1,2 млн. экз.). Ра­дио­ве­ща­ние осу­ще­ст­в­ля­ет Ра­дио­ве­ща­тель­ная кор­по­ра­ция К. («Broadcasting Corporation of Chi­na», BCC; г. Тай­бэй). Дей­ст­ву­ет Тай­вань­ская те­ле­ви­зи­он­ная ком­па­ния («Tai­wan Tele­vision Enterprise», TTV; ос­но­ва­на в 1962; г. Тай­бэй). 76 те­ле­ка­на­лов, 229 ра­дио­стан­ций УКВ и 140 СВ. Ин­фор­мац. агент­ст­во – Центр. агент­ст­во но­во­стей («Джу­нян шэ», ос­но­ва­но в 1924; г. Тай­бэй), 30.12.1995 на­цио­на­ли­зи­ро­ва­но.

Философия

Фи­ло­со­фия в К. воз­ник­ла в сер. 1-го тыс. до н. э. Отд. фи­лос. идеи и те­мы, а так­же мн. тер­ми­ны, об­ра­зо­вав­шие по­том б. ч. лек­си­ко­на тра­диц. кит. фи­ло­со­фии, со­дер­жа­лись уже в древ­ней­ших письм. па­мят­ни­ках – «Шу цзин», «Ши цзин», «И цзин». Пер­вым ис­то­ри­че­ски дос­то­вер­ным твор­цом фи­лос. тео­рии в К. был Кон­фу­ций, вы­сту­пив­ший вы­ра­зи­те­лем ду­хов­ной тра­ди­ции жу – учё­ных, об­ра­зо­ван­ных лю­дей, чьё на­име­но­ва­ние ста­ло за­тем тер­ми­но­ло­гич. обо­зна­че­ни­ем для кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва. Тер­мин «жу» с са­мо­го воз­ник­но­ве­ния фи­ло­со­фии в К. обо­зна­чал не столь­ко од­ну из её школ, сколь­ко еди­ный идео­ло­гич. ком­плекс, со­че­тав­ший в се­бе при­зна­ки фи­ло­со­фии, нау­ки, иск-ва и ре­ли­гии; в раз­ные эпо­хи ба­ланс этих при­зна­ков был раз­лич­ным.

Со­глас­но тра­диц. да­ти­ров­ке, стар­шим со­вре­мен­ни­ком Кон­фу­ция был Лао-цзы, ос­но­во­по­лож­ник дао­сиз­ма, ко­то­ро­му при­пи­сы­ва­ет­ся ав­тор­ст­во кн. «Дао дэ цзин». Од­на­ко ны­не ус­та­нов­ле­но, что пер­вые соб­ст­вен­но да­ос­ские про­из­ве­де­ния бы­ли на­пи­са­ны по­сле кон­фу­ци­ан­ских, да­же, ве­ро­ят­но, яви­лись ре­ак­ци­ей на них. Ви­ди­мо, дис­кус­си­он­но и тра­диц. пред­став­ле­ние о до­цинь­ском (до кон. 3 в. до н. э.) пе­рио­де в ис­то­рии кит. фи­ло­со­фии как эпо­хе рав­но­прав­ной по­ле­ми­ки «ста школ», по­сколь­ку все су­ще­ст­во­вав­шие в то вре­мя фи­лос. шко­лы са­мо­оп­ре­де­ля­лись че­рез своё от­но­ше­ние к кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ву, ко­то­рое во 2 в. до н. э. до­би­лось офиц. ста­ту­са ор­то­док­саль­ной идео­ло­гии.

Общий характер китайской философии

Кон­фу­ций и пер­вые фи­ло­со­фы – жу – ви­де­ли свою осн. за­да­чу в тео­ре­тич. ос­мыс­ле­нии жиз­ни об­ще­ст­ва и лич­ной судь­бы че­ло­ве­ка. Как но­си­те­ли и рас­про­стра­ни­те­ли куль­ту­ры они бы­ли тес­но свя­за­ны с со­ци­аль­ны­ми ин­сти­ту­та­ми, от­вет­ст­вен­ны­ми за хра­не­ние и вос­про­из­вод­ст­во пись­мен­ных, пре­ж­де все­го ис­то­рич., лит. и про­то­на­уч­ных, до­ку­мен­тов (куль­ту­ра, пись­мен­ность и ли­те­ра­ту­ра в кит. язы­ке обо­зна­ча­лись од­ним тер­ми­ном – «вэнь»), и их пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми – скри­ба­ми-ши (хро­но­гра­фа­ми, ас­т­ро­ло­га­ми, ас­тро­но­ма­ми). От­сю­да та­кие осо­бен­но­сти кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва, как его по­сто­ян­ные пре­тен­зии на роль офиц. идео­ло­гии, до­ми­ни­ро­ва­ние в нём со­ци­аль­но-по­ли­тич. и этич. про­бле­ма­ти­ки и при­зна­ние тек­сто­ло­гич. ка­но­на в ка­че­ст­ве об­ще­ме­то­до­ло­гич. прин­ци­па. Уже со 2 в. до н. э. на­ча­ла скла­ды­вать­ся эк­за­ме­нац. сис­те­ма, за­кре­п­ляв­шая связь фи­лос. мыс­ли как с гос. ин­сти­ту­та­ми, так и с «клас­сич. ли­те­ра­ту­рой» – оп­ре­де­лён­ным на­бо­ром ка­но­нич. тек­стов. Бла­го­да­ря вы­со­ко­му со­ци­аль­но­му ста­ту­су фи­ло­со­фия име­ла вы­даю­щее­ся зна­че­ние в жиз­ни кит. об­ще­ст­ва, где она все­гда бы­ла «ца­ри­цей на­ук». С са­мо­го на­ча­ла про­грамм­ной ус­та­нов­кой Кон­фу­ция бы­ло «пе­ре­да­вать, а не соз­да­вать, ве­рить древ­но­сти и лю­бить её» («Лунь юй», VII, 1). При этом акт пе­ре­да­чи древ­ней муд­ро­сти гря­ду­щим по­ко­ле­ни­ям имел творч. ха­рак­тер, ибо ар­ха­ич. про­из­ве­де­ния (ка­но­ны), на ко­то­рые опи­ра­лись пер­вые кон­фу­ци­ан­цы, бы­ли уже ма­ло­по­нят­ны их со­вре­мен­ни­кам и тре­бо­ва­ли ос­мыс­ляю­щих ис­тол­ко­ва­ний, чре­ва­тых пе­ре­ос­мыс­ле­ни­ем. В ито­ге пре­об­ла­даю­щи­ми фор­ма­ми кит. фи­ло­со­фии ста­ли ком­мен­та­тор­ст­во и эк­зе­ге­за древ­них клас­сич. про­из­ве­де­ний.

То, что со­би­рал­ся «пе­ре­да­вать» Кон­фу­ций, бы­ло за­фик­си­ро­ва­но гл. обр. в ис­то­рич. и лит. па­мят­ни­ках – «Шу цзин» и «Ши цзин». В фи­лос. про­из­ве­де­ни­ях тра­ди­ци­он­но ца­ри­ла лит. фор­ма, по сте­пе­ни бел­лет­ри­за­ции фи­ло­со­фия в К. мо­жет быть со­пос­тав­ле­на с рус. фи­ло­со­фи­ей. Эти чер­ты кит. фи­ло­со­фия в це­лом со­хра­ня­ла вплоть до нач. 20 в., ко­гда под влия­ни­ем зап. фи­ло­со­фии в К. на­ча­ли воз­ни­кать не­тра­ди­ци­он­ные фи­лос. тео­рии.

Спе­ци­фи­ку кит. клас­сич. фи­ло­со­фии, не вы­ра­бо­тав­шей по­ня­тия иде­аль­но­го как та­ко­во­го, оп­ре­де­ля­ет пре­ж­де все­го гос­под­ство на­ту­ра­лиз­ма. От­сут­ст­вие раз­ви­тых идеа­ли­стич. тео­рий ти­па пла­то­низ­ма или не­оп­ла­то­низ­ма обу­сло­ви­ло и от­сут­ст­вие та­ко­го уни­вер­саль­но­го об­ще­на­уч­но­го ин­ст­ру­мен­та, как фор­маль­ная ло­ги­ка. Кит. ана­ло­ги ка­те­го­рий, ге­не­ти­че­ски вос­хо­дя к ми­фич. пред­став­ле­ни­ям, об­раз­ам га­даль­ной прак­ти­ки и хо­зяй­ст­вен­но упо­ря­до­чи­ваю­щей дея­тель­но­сти, име­ли пре­ж­де все­го на­тур­фи­ло­соф­ский смысл и ис­поль­зо­ва­лись в ка­че­ст­ве клас­си­фи­ка­ци­он­ных мат­риц: напр., дво­ич­ная – инь и ян, или лян и – «двои­ца обра­зов»; тро­ич­ная – тянь, жэнь, ди – «не­бо, че­ло­век, зем­ля», или сань цай – «три ма­те­риа­ла»; пя­те­рич­ная – у син – «пять эле­мен­тов» (см. Эле­мен­ты). Совр. кит. тер­мин «ка­те­го­рия» (фань-чоу) име­ет ну­ме­ро­ло­гич. эти­мо­ло­гию, т. к. про­ис­хо­дит от обо­зна­че­ния квад­рат­но­го 9-кле­точ­но­го (9 – чоу) по­строе­ния (по мо­дели ма­гич. квад­ра­та 3×3), на ко­то­ром ос­но­ван ми­ро­воз­зренч. ком­пен­ди­ум «Хун фань» (гла­ва «Шу цзин»). Ме­сто ло­ги­ки в Ки­тае за­ни­ма­ла ну­ме­ро­ло­гия (сян шу чжи сюэ – «уче­ние о сим­во­лах и чис­лах»), т. е. фор­ма­ли­зо­ван­ная тео­ре­тич. сис­те­ма, эле­мен­та­ми ко­то­рой яв­ля­ют­ся ма­те­ма­тич. объ­ек­ты – чи­сло­вые ком­плек­сы и гео­мет­рич. струк­ту­ры, свя­зан­ные ме­ж­ду со­бой сим­во­ли­че­ски, ас­со­циа­тив­но, эс­те­ти­че­ски, суг­ге­стив­но и т. д. Древ­ней­шие и став­шие ка­но­ни­че­ски­ми фор­мы ос­мыс­ле­ния по­зна­ват. ме­то­до­ло­гии кит. клас­сич. фи­ло­со­фии бы­ли реа­ли­зо­ва­ны, с од­ной сто­ро­ны, в ну­ме­ро­ло­гии «Чжоу и» («И цзин»), «Хун фань», «Тай сю­ань цзин» (см. Ян Сюн), а с дру­гой – в про­то­ло­ги­ке «Мо-цзы» (см. Мо-цзы), «Гун­сунь Лун-цзы» (см. Мин цзя), «Сюнь-цзы» (см. Сюнь-цзы).

Фун­да­мент кит. ну­ме­ро­ло­гии со­став­ля­ют три ти­па объ­ек­тов, ка­ж­дый из ко­то­рых пред­став­лен дву­мя раз­но­вид­но­стя­ми, – 1) «сим­во­лы»: а) три­грам­мы, б) гек­са­грам­мы (гуа); 2) «чис­ла»: а) хэ ту, б) ло шу; 3) гл. он­то­ло­гич. ипо­ста­си «сим­во­лов» и «чи­сел»: а) инь ян (тём­ное и свет­лое), б) у син (пять эле­мен­тов). Са­ма эта сис­те­ма по­строе­на на двух ис­ход­ных ну­ме­ро­ло­гич. чис­лах – 3 и 2. В ней от­ра­же­ны все три гл. ви­да гра­фич. сим­во­ли­за­ции, ис­поль­зо­вав­шие­ся в тра­диц. кит. куль­ту­ре: «сим­во­лы» – гео­мет­рич. фор­мы; «чис­ла» – циф­ры; инь ян, у син – ие­рог­ли­фы. Древ­ней­ши­ми об­раз­ца­ми кит. пись­мен­но­сти яв­ля­ют­ся пре­дель­но ну­ме­ро­ло­ги­зи­ро­ван­ные над­пи­си на га­даль­ных кос­тях, и в даль­нейшем ка­но­нич. тек­сты соз­да­ва­лись по ну­ме­ро­ло­гич. стан­дар­там, дос­тиг­шим в те­че­ние сво­ей дол­гой ис­то­рии вы­со­кой сте­пе­ни фор­ма­ли­за­ции. Имен­но это об­стоя­тель­ст­во сыг­ра­ло ре­шаю­щую роль в по­бе­де кит. ну­ме­ро­ло­гии над про­то­ло­ги­кой, по­сколь­ку по­след­няя не ста­ла ни фор­маль­ной, ни фор­ма­ли­зо­ван­ной, а по­то­му не об­ла­да­ла ка­че­ст­ва­ми удоб­но­го и ком­пакт­но­го ме­то­до­ло­гич. ин­ст­ру­мен­та.

Основные школы

В на­чаль­ный пе­ри­од сво­его су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния (6–3 вв. до н. э.) кит. фи­ло­со­фия в ус­ло­ви­ях не­диф­фе­рен­ци­ро­ван­но­сти фи­лос., на­уч. и ре­лиг. зна­ния яв­ля­ла со­бой кар­ти­ну пре­дель­но­го раз­но­об­ра­зия взгля­дов и на­прав­ле­ний, пред­став­ляв­ших­ся как «со­пер­ни­че­ст­во ста школ» (бай цзя чжэн мин). Пер­вые по­пыт­ки клас­си­фи­ка­ции это­го мно­го­об­ра­зия пред­при­ни­ма­лись пред­ста­ви­те­ля­ми кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва и дао­сиз­ма, стре­мив­ши­ми­ся под­верг­нуть кри­ти­ке всех сво­их оп­по­нен­тов. Это­му спе­ци­аль­но по­свя­ще­на 6-я гла­ва («Фэй ши-эр цзы» – «Про­тив две­на­дца­ти мыс­ли­те­лей») кон­фу­ци­ан­ско­го трак­та­та «Сюнь-цзы». В ней, по­ми­мо про­па­ган­ди­руе­мо­го уче­ния Кон­фу­ция и его уче­ни­ка Цзы Гу­на (5 в. до н. э.), ав­тор вы­де­лил «шесть уче­ний» (лю шо), по­пар­но пред­став­лен­ных 12 мыс­ли­те­ля­ми, и под­верг их рез­кой кри­ти­ке. При­мер­но син­хрон­ная (хо­тя, по не­ко­то­рым пред­по­ло­же­ни­ям, бо­лее позд­няя, вплоть до ру­бе­жа н. э.) и ти­по­ло­ги­че­ски сход­ная клас­си­фи­ка­ция со­дер­жит­ся в за­клю­чи­тель­ной 33-й гла­ве («Тянь-ся» – «Под­не­бес­ная») «Чжу­ан-цзы» (4–3 вв. до н. э.), где так­же вы­де­ле­но стерж­не­вое уче­ние кон­фу­ци­ан­цев, ко­то­ро­му про­ти­во­пос­тав­ле­ны «сто школ» (бай цзя), раз­де­лён­ные на шесть на­прав­ле­ний.

Ана­ло­гич­ные шес­те­рич­ные по­строе­ния, ис­хо­дя­щие из идеи един­ст­ва ис­ти­ны (дао) и мно­го­об­ра­зия её про­яв­ле­ний, ста­ли ос­но­вой для пер­вой клас­си­фи­ка­ции осн. фи­лос. уче­ний как та­ко­вых (а не про­сто их пред­ста­ви­те­лей), ко­то­рую осу­ще­ст­вил Сы­ма Тань (2 в. до н. э.) в сво­ём трак­та­те о «шес­ти шко­лах» (лю цзя), во­шед­шем в со­став за­клю­чи­тель­ной 130-й гла­вы со­став­лен­ной его сы­ном Сы­ма Ця­нем пер­вой ди­на­стий­ной ис­то­рии «Ши цзи» («Ис­то­ри­че­ские за­пис­ки»). В этом про­из­ве­де­нии пе­ре­чис­ле­ны и оха­рак­те­ри­зо­ва­ны: 1) «шко­ла тём­но­го и свет­ло­го [ми­ро­об­ра­зую­щих на­чал]» (инь­ян цзя), в зап. лит-ре на­зы­вае­мая так­же «на­тур­фи­ло­соф­ской»; 2) «шко­ла учё­ных» (жу цзя), т. е. кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во; 3) «шко­ла Мо [Ди]» (мо цзя, мо­изм); 4) «шко­ла имён» (мин цзя), в зап. лит-ре на­зы­вае­мая так­же «но­ми­на­ли­ст­ской» и «диа­лек­ти­ко-со­фис­ти­че­ской»; 5) «шко­ла за­ко­нов» (фа цзя), т. е. ле­гизм; 6) «шко­ла Пу­ти и бла­го­да­ти» (дао дэ цзя), т. е. дао­сизм. Наи­выс­шей оцен­ки удо­стое­на по­след­няя шко­ла, ко­то­рая, по­доб­но кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ву в «Сюнь-цзы» и «Чжу­ан-цзы», пред­став­ле­на как син­те­зи­рую­щая гл. дос­то­ин­ст­ва всех ос­таль­ных школ.

Дан­ная схе­ма по­лу­чи­ла раз­ви­тие в клас­си­фи­ка­ци­он­но-биб­лио­гра­фич. тру­де Лю Си­ня (46 до н. э. – 23 н. э.), лёг­шем в ос­но­ву древ­ней­ше­го в Ки­тае ка­та­ло­га «И вэнь чжи» («Трак­тат об ис­кус­ных и изящ­ных тек­стах»), ко­то­рый стал 30-й гла­вой со­став­лен­ной Бань Гу вто­рой ди­на­стий­ной ис­то­рии «Цань Хань шу» («Ис­то­рия Ран­ней Хань­ской ди­на­стии»). Клас­си­фи­ка­ция вы­рос­ла здесь до 10 чле­нов – к 6 имев­шим­ся при­ба­ви­лись 4 но­вых: ди­пло­ма­тич. «шко­ла вер­ти­каль­ных и го­ри­зон­таль­ных [по­ли­тич. сою­зов]» (цзун хэн цзя), эк­лек­ти­ко-энцик­ло­пе­дич. «сво­бод­ная шко­ла» (цза цзя); «аг­рар­ная шко­ла» (нун цзя) и фольк­лор­ная (от­ра­жаю­щая взгля­ды со­ци­аль­ных ни­зов) «шко­ла ма­лых изъ­яс­не­ний» (сяо шо цзя).

Лю Синь пред­ло­жил тео­рию про­ис­хож­де­ния ка­ж­дой из «де­ся­ти школ» (ши цзя), ох­ва­ты­ваю­щих «всех фи­ло­со­фов» (чжу цзы). Эта тео­рия пред­по­ла­га­ла, что в на­чаль­ный пе­ри­од фор­ми­ро­ва­ния тра­диц. кит. куль­ту­ры, т. е. в пер­вые ве­ка 1-го тыс. до н. э., но­си­те­ля­ми со­ци­аль­но зна­чи­мо­го зна­ния бы­ли офиц. ли­ца, ина­че го­во­ря, «учё­ные» яв­ля­лись «чи­нов­ни­ка­ми», а «чи­нов­ни­ки» – «учё­ны­ми». Вслед­ст­вие упад­ка «пу­ти ис­тин­но­го го­су­да­ря» (ван дао), т. е. ос­лаб­ле­ния вла­сти пра­вя­ще­го до­ма Чжоу, про­изош­ло раз­ру­ше­ние цен­тра­ли­зо­ван­ной адм. струк­ту­ры и её пред­ста­ви­те­ли, ли­шив­шись офиц. ста­ту­са, ока­за­лись вы­ну­ж­ден­ны­ми вес­ти ча­ст­ный об­раз жиз­ни и обес­пе­чи­вать соб­ст­вен­ное су­ще­ст­во­ва­ние реа­ли­за­ци­ей сво­их зна­ний и уме­ний в ка­че­ст­ве учи­те­лей, на­став­ни­ков, про­по­вед­ни­ков. В на­сту­пив­шую эпо­ху гос. раз­дроб­лен­но­сти пред­ста­ви­те­ли разл. сфер не­ко­гда еди­ной ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции об­ра­зо­ва­ли раз­ные фи­лос. шко­лы, са­мо обо­зна­че­ние ко­то­рых «цзя» (бу­к­валь­ное зна­че­ние ие­рог­ли­фа – «се­мья») сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ет об их ча­ст­ном ха­рак­те­ре. Кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из ве­дом­ст­ва про­све­ще­ния, «по­мо­гав­шие пра­ви­те­лям сле­до­вать си­лам инь ян и разъ­яс­няв­шие, как осу­ще­ст­в­лять вос­пи­тую­щее влия­ние», опи­ра­ясь на «пись­мен­ную куль­ту­ру» (вэнь) ка­но­нич. тек­стов «Лю и», «У цзин», позд­нее – «Ши сань цзин» и ста­вя во гла­ву уг­ла гу­ман­ность (жэнь) и долж­ную спра­вед­ли­вость (и). Дао­сизм (дао цзя) соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из ве­дом­ст­ва хро­но­гра­фии и ас­т­ро­ло­гии (ши гу­ань), ко­то­рые «со­став­ля­ли ле­то­пи­си о пу­ти (дао) ус­пе­хов и по­ра­же­ний, су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния и ги­бе­ли, го­ря и сча­стья, древ­но­сти и со­времен­но­сти», бла­го­да­ря че­му по­стиг­ли «цар­ское иск-во» са­мо­со­хра­не­ния по­сред­ст­вом «чис­то­ты и пус­то­ты», «уни­жен­но­сти и ос­лаб­лен­но­сти». «Шко­лу тём­но­го и свет­ло­го [ми­ро­об­ра­зую­щих на­чал]» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из ве­дом­ст­ва ас­тро­но­мии и ка­лен­дар­ных рас­чё­тов (Си-хэ гу­ань), сле­див­шие за не­бес­ны­ми зна­ме­ния­ми, Солн­цем, Лу­ной, звёз­да­ми, кос­мич. ори­ен­ти­ра­ми и че­ре­до­ва­ни­ем вре­мён. Ле­гизм соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из су­деб­но­го ве­дом­ст­ва, ко­то­рые до­пол­ня­ли управ­ле­ние на ос­но­ве «бла­го­при­стой­но­сти» (ли) на­гра­да­ми и на­ка­за­ния­ми, оп­ре­де­лён­ны­ми за­ко­на­ми (фа). «Шко­лу имён» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из ри­ту­аль­но­го ве­дом­ст­ва (ли гу­ань), чья дея­тель­ность обу­слов­ли­ва­лась тем, что в древ­но­сти в чи­нах и ри­туа­лах но­ми­наль­ное и ре­аль­ное не сов­па­да­ло и воз­ни­ка­ла про­бле­ма их при­ве­де­ния во вза­им­ное со­от­вет­ст­вие. Мо­изм соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из хра­мовых сто­ро­жей, про­по­ве­до­вав­шие бе­реж­ли­вость, «все­объ­ем­лю­щую лю­бовь» (цзянь ай), вы­дви­же­ние «дос­той­ных» (сянь) и «еди­но­об­ра­зие» (тун). Ди­пло­ма­тич. «шко­лу вер­ти­каль­ных и го­ри­зон­таль­ных [по­ли­тич. сою­зов]» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из по­соль­ско­го ве­дом­ст­ва, спо­соб­ные «вер­шить де­ла как долж­но и ру­ко­во­дство­вать­ся пред­пи­са­ния­ми, а не сло­во­пре­ния­ми». Эк­лек­ти­ко-эн­цик­ло­пе­дич. «сво­бод­ную шко­лу» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из со­вет­ни­ков, со­че­тав­шие идеи кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва и мо­из­ма, «шко­лы имён» и ле­гиз­ма во имя под­дер­жа­ния по­ряд­ка в го­су­дар­ст­ве. «Аг­рар­ную шко­лу» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из ве­дом­ст­ва зем­ле­де­лия, ве­дав­шие про­из-вом про­до­воль­ст­вия и то­ва­ров, что в «Хун фань» от­не­се­но со­от­вет­ст­вен­но к пер­во­му и вто­ро­му из вось­ми важ­ней­ших гос. дел (ба чжэн). «Шко­лу ма­лых изъ­яс­не­ний» соз­да­ли вы­ход­цы из низ­ко­раз­ряд­ных чи­нов­ни­ков, ко­то­рые долж­ны бы­ли со­би­рать све­де­ния о на­строе­ни­ях сре­ди на­ро­да на ос­но­ве «улич­ных пе­ре­су­дов и до­рож­ных слу­хов». В спец. раз­дел бы­ла вы­де­ле­на «во­ен­ная шко­ла» (бин цзя), пред­став­лен­ная об­ра­зо­ван­ны­ми вы­ход­ца­ми из во­ен. ве­дом­ст­ва.

Оце­нив «шко­лу ма­лых изъ­яс­не­ний» (но­сив­шую в боль­шей сте­пе­ни фольк­лор­ный, не­же­ли фи­ло­соф­ский ха­рак­тер и про­дуци­ро­вав­шую «бел­лет­ри­сти­ку» – сяо шо) как не за­слу­жи­ваю­щую вни­ма­ния, ав­то­ры этой тео­рии при­зна­ли де­вять ос­тав­ших­ся школ «вза­им­но про­ти­во­по­лож­ны­ми, но фор­ми­рую­щи­ми друг дру­га», т. е. иду­щи­ми к од­ной це­ли раз­ны­ми пу­тя­ми и опи­раю­щи­ми­ся на об­щий идей­ный ба­зис – «Шесть ка­но­нов» («Лю цзин»). Раз­но­об­ра­зие фи­лос. школ, рас­смат­ри­вав­шее­ся как след­ст­вие рас­па­да об­щей гос. сис­те­мы, долж­но быть пре­одо­ле­но при вос­ста­нов­ле­нии по­след­ней и воз­вра­ще­нии фи­лос. мыс­ли в объ­е­ди­няю­щее кон­фу­ци­ан­ское рус­ло.

Ис­то­ки этой де­ся­ти­член­ной клас­си­фи­ка­ции про­сле­жи­ва­ют­ся в эн­цик­ло­пе­дич. па­мят­ни­ках 3–2 вв. до н. э. «Люй-ши чунь цю» («Вёс­ны и осе­ни гос­по­ди­на Люя») и «Ху­ай­нань-цзы» («[Трак­тат] Учи­те­ля из Ху­ай­на­ни»).

Соз­дан­ная в пе­ри­од фор­ми­ро­ва­ния цен­тра­ли­зо­ван­ной им­пе­рии Хань тео­рия Лю Си­ня – Бань Гу в тра­диц. нау­ке об­ре­ла ста­тус клас­си­че­ской. Её раз­ра­бот­ка про­дол­жа­лась в те­че­ние всей ис­то­рии К., осо­бый вклад в неё вне­сли Чжан Сю­эчэн (1738–1801) и Чжан Бин­линь. В кит. фи­ло­со­фии 20 в. она бы­ла под­верг­ну­та кри­ти­ке Ху Ши, но, на­про­тив, под­дер­жа­на и раз­ви­та Фэн Юла­нем (1895–1990), ко­то­рый при­шёл к вы­во­ду, что шесть осн. школ соз­да­ли лю­ди, при­над­ле­жав­шие не толь­ко к разл. про­фес­си­ям, но и к раз­ным ти­пам лич­но­сти и об­разу жиз­ни: кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во сфор­ми­ро­ва­ли учё­ные-ин­тел­лек­туа­лы, мо­изм – ры­ца­ри, т. е. стран­ст­вую­щие вои­ны и ре­мес­лен­ни­ки, дао­сизм – от­шель­ни­ки и за­твор­ни­ки, «шко­лу имён» – ри­то­ры-по­ле­ми­сты, «шко­лу тём­но­го и свет­ло­го [ми­ро­об­ра­зую­щих на­чал]» – ок­куль­ти­сты и ну­ме­ро­ло­ги, ле­гизм – по­ли­ти­ки и со­вет­ни­ки вла­сти­те­лей.

Центр. роль в ду­хов­ной куль­ту­ре тра­диц. К. иг­ра­ло кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во, так что его ис­то­рия яв­ля­ет­ся стерж­не­вой для всей ис­то­рии кит. фи­ло­со­фии, по край­ней ме­ре на­чи­ная с эпо­хи Хань. В об­щем ви­де ис­то­рия кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва де­лит­ся на че­ты­ре пе­рио­да, на­ча­ло ка­ж­до­го из ко­то­рых свя­за­но с гло­баль­ным со­циаль­но-куль­тур­ным кри­зи­сом. Пер­вый пе­ри­од: 6–3 вв. до н. э., ко­гда про­ис­хо­ди­ло раз­ло­же­ние ран­не­чжоу­ской ре­лиг. идео­ло­гии, под­ры­вае­мой ре­лик­та­ми до­чжоу­ских ве­ро­ва­ний, не­оша­ма­ни­ст­ски­ми (про­то­да­ос­ски­ми) куль­та­ми и ино­куль­тур­ны­ми вея­ния­ми, до­но­си­мы­ми до Сре­дин­ных го­су­дарств в об­ста­нов­ке бес­ко­неч­ных войн их аг­рес­сив­ны­ми со­се­дя­ми. Ре­ак­ци­ей на этот ду­хов­ный кри­зис ста­ли ка­но­ни­за­ция Кон­фу­ци­ем идео­ло­гич. ус­то­ев ран­не­чжоу­ско­го про­шло­го, за­пе­чат­лён­ных пре­ж­де все­го в тек­сте «Пи­са­ний» («Шy») и «Сти­хов» («Ши»), и соз­да­ние прин­ци­пи­аль­но но­во­го куль­тур­но­го об­ра­зо­ва­ния – фи­ло­со­фии.

Во вто­рой пе­ри­од (3 в. до н. э. – 10 в. н. э.) осн. сти­му­лом фор­ми­ро­ва­ния т. н. хань­ско­го кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва ста­ло стрем­ле­ние к вос­ста­нов­ле­нию идей­но­го гла­вен­ст­ва, ут­ра­чен­но­го в борь­бе с но­во­об­ра­зо­вав­ши­ми­ся фи­лос. шко­ла­ми, пре­ж­де все­го дао­сиз­мом и ле­гиз­мом. С по­мо­щью древ­них тек­стов, в пер­вую оче­редь «Пе­ре­мен» («И») и «Ве­ли­че­ст­вен­но­го об­раз­ца» («Хун фань»), кон­фу­ци­ан­цы это­го пе­рио­да во гла­ве с Дун Чжун­шу су­ще­ст­вен­но ре­фор­ми­ро­ва­ли своё уче­ние, ин­тег­ри­ро­вав в не­го про­бле­ма­ти­ку сво­их тео­ре­тич. кон­ку­рен­тов: дао­сиз­ма и инь­ян цзя, мо­из­ма и ле­гиз­ма.

Тре­тий пе­ри­од (11–20 вв.) пред­став­лен не­окон­фу­ци­ан­ст­вом, ко­то­рое воз­ник­ло в свя­зи с оче­ред­ным идей­ным кри­зи­сом, обу­слов­лен­ным про­ти­во­стоя­ни­ем офиц. кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва его но­во­му кон­ку­рен­ту – буд­диз­му, а так­же пре­об­ра­зо­вав­ше­му­ся под его влия­ни­ем дао­сиз­му.

Чет­вёр­тый, не­за­вер­шён­ный, пе­ри­од, на­чав­ший­ся в 20 в., свя­зан с ре­ак­ци­ей на об­ще­ми­ро­вые ка­та­ст­ро­фы и гло­баль­ные ин­фор­мац. про­цес­сы, вы­ра­зив­шие­ся, в ча­ст­но­сти, в уко­ре­не­нии в К. зап. тео­рий. Для их но­ва­тор­ско­го пе­ре­ос­мыс­ле­ния вновь был при­вле­чён ста­рый ар­се­нал преж­них кон­фу­ци­ан­ских и не­о­кон­фу­ци­ан­ских по­строе­ний.

Литература

Ли­те­ра­ту­ра на кит. яз. – од­на из древ­ней­ших ли­те­ра­тур ми­ра. Она име­ет ре­лиг.-ри­ту­аль­ные ис­то­ки: пред­по­ло­жи­тель­но в об­ря­дах не­оли­тич. эпо­хи (при­бли­зи­тель­но в 6–5-м тыс. до н. э.) вме­сте с ис­кус­ст­вом му­зы­ки и тан­ца за­ро­ди­лось пе­сен­но-по­этич. твор­че­ст­во, а пер­вы­ми письм. тек­ста­ми на кит. яз. яв­ля­ют­ся над­пи­си на га­даль­ных кос­тях (14–11 вв. до н. э.), на сме­ну ко­то­рым при­шла брон­зо­вая эпи­гра­фи­ка (10–8 вв. до н. э.). Cреди ран­них письм. па­мят­ни­ков – кон­фу­ци­ан­ские и да­ос­ские ка­но­нич. со­чи­не­ния эпо­хи Чжоу. В этот пе­ри­од по­яв­ля­ют­ся спец. тер­ми­ны «вэнь» (пись­ме­на, пись­мен­ность) и ши (по­эзия, сти­хо­тво­ре­ние), ко­то­ры­ми вплоть до 1 в. н. э. обо­зна­чал­ся со­от­вет­ст­вен­но лю­бой письм. и по­этич. текст. Позд­нее в кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ве пись­мен­ность ото­жде­ст­в­ля­лась с про­све­щён­но­стью и куль­турой как пер­во­ос­но­ва­ми го­су­дар­ст­ва; письм. текст пред­на­зна­чал­ся для ис­пол­не­ния об­ще­ст­вен­но зна­чи­мых функ­ций: про­све­ти­тель­ской, об­ра­зо­ва­тель­ной, вос­пи­та­тель­ной, на­зи­да­тель­ной. Это обу­сло­ви­ло спе­ци­фи­ку кит. сло­вес­но­сти по­сле­дую­ще­го вре­ме­ни, б. ч. ко­то­рой со­ста­ви­ли де­ло­вые (ав­гу­стей­шие ука­зы, док­ла­ды тро­ну, рас­по­ря­же­ния на­чаль­ст­вую­щих лиц и ра­пор­ты под­чи­нён­ных), ме­мо­ри­аль­ные (эпи­та­фии) и эпи­сто­ляр­ные жан­ры. Осо­бое зна­че­ние в кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ве при­да­ва­лось по­эзии. Пер­вый в ис­то­рии К. лит.-по­этич. па­мят­ник – ан­то­ло­гия «Кни­га пе­сен» («Ши цзин», 11–7 вв. до н. э.), ко­то­рая од­но­вре­мен­но яв­ля­ет­ся од­ной из кон­фу­ци­ан­ских ка­но­нич. книг в со­ста­ве сво­да «Пять ка­но­нов» («У цзин»); её со­став­ле­ние при­пи­сы­ва­ет­ся Кон­фу­цию. «Ши цзин» сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ет о жан­ро­вом и те­ма­тич. бо­гат­ст­ве др.-кит. по­этич. твор­че­ст­ва. В ней со­б­ра­но 305 про­из­ве­де­ний объ­ё­мом от шес­ти­сти­ший до по­эм в 50 и бо­лее строк разл. жан­ро­вых раз­но­вид­но­стей: оды я, хра­мо­вые пес­но­пе­ния сунн и др. В др. па­мят­ни­ке др.-кит. лит-ры – ан­то­ло­гии «Чус­кие стро­фы» («Чу цы», 2 в. н. э.) пред­став­ле­на по­этич. тра­ди­ция юга К. (твор­че­ст­во Цюй Юа­ня, ко­то­рый по­чи­та­ет­ся пер­вым кит. по­этом, а так­же Сун Юя). Для чус­кой по­эзии ха­рак­тер­но ис­поль­зо­ва­ние сю­же­тов и об­ра­зов, вос­хо­дя­щих к ме­ст­ным ре­лиг.-ми­фо­ло­гич. пред­став­ле­ни­ям; в ней яр­ко вы­ра­же­но ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ное на­ча­ло.

Ав­тор­ская по­эзия окон­ча­тель­но ут­вер­ди­лась в эпо­ху Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань, в пе­ри­од фор­ми­ро­ва­ния в К. им­пер­ской фор­мы прав­ле­ния. Гл. ме­сто в ней за­ня­ли оды фу – про­стран­ные про­из­ве­де­ния (до не­сколь­ких со­тен строк), до­пус­каю­щие че­ре­до­ва­ние сти­хотв. и про­за­ич. фраг­мен­тов. Ве­ду­щие по­эты эпо­хи Хань: Мэй Шэн, Цзя И, Сы­ма Сян­жу, Ян Сюн, Чжан Хэн. Оды соз­да­ва­лись так­же мо­нар­ха­ми, учё­ны­ми, мыс­ли­те­ля­ми. Все­го со­хра­ни­лось 230 пол­ных тек­стов и от­рыв­ков: по­ли­ти­ко-на­зи­да­тель­но­го, ли­рич. ха­рак­те­ра, в т. ч. с ан­ти­со­ци­аль­ными мо­ти­ва­ми (при­зы­вы к бег­ст­ву от ми­ра), и др. В по­сле­дую­щие ис­то­рич. эпо­хи оды фу ос­та­ва­лись од­ним из рас­про­стра­нён­ных по­этич. жан­ров, но ни­ко­гда бо­лее не за­ни­ма­ли столь зна­чит. мес­та в лит-ре К. Ли­рич. на­сле­дие Хань со­сто­ит так­же из нар. пе­сен юэфу, за­пи­сан­ных чи­нов­ни­ка­ми спец. гос. уч­ре­ж­де­ния (Па­ла­ты Юэфу, 114 до н. э. – 6 в. н. э.), куль­то­вых пес­но­пе­ний, час­тич­но соз­дан­ных те­ми же чи­нов­ни­ка­ми, и 20 ано­ним­ных т. н. древ­них сти­хов гу ши. Древ­ней­ши­ми об­раз­ца­ми кит. по­ве­ст­во­ват. про­зы счи­та­ют­ся со­чи­не­ния об ис­то­рич. ли­цах (го­су­да­рях, им­пе­ра­тор­ских на­лож­ни­цах), ко­то­рые воз­во­дят­ся к 4–3 вв. до н. э. (час­тич­но «Жиз­не­опи­са­ние сы­на не­ба Му» и др.), а так­же непо­сред­ст­вен­но к эпо­хе Хань («Не­офи­ци­аль­ное жиз­не­опи­са­ние Чжао – Ле­тя­щей лас­точ­ки» и др.). Они яв­ля­лись ва­ри­ан­том ис­то­рио­гра­фич. жан­ра жиз­не­опи­са­ний (чжу­ань).


Китайская народная картина на сюжет романа «Речные заводи» Ши Найаня. Кон. 19 в.


Китайская народная картина по мотивам сборника новелл «Странные истории из кабинета неудачника» Пу Сунлина. 19 в.

В 3–6 вв. н. э. ве­ду­щую роль в кит. по­эзии впер­вые на­ча­ли иг­рать ли­рич. жан­ры – ши и юэфу. Ги­бель Вост. Хань, раз­дроб­лен­ность стра­ны по­влек­ли за со­бой из­ме­не­ния в ду­хов­ной жиз­ни кит. об­ще­ст­ва: на пер­вый план вы­дви­ну­лись лич­но­ст­ные цен­но­сти, пра­во че­ло­ве­ка на внутр. сво­бо­ду. Ав­то­ри­тет кон­фу­ци­ан­ских мо­раль­но-этич. идеа­лов за­мет­но упал, что обу­сло­ви­ло раз­ви­тие др. идео­ло­гич. сис­тем – дао­сиз­ма, кит. буд­диз­ма. Сло­жил­ся но­вый, эс­те­тич. под­ход к по­эзии: она при­бли­зи­лась к вы­ра­же­нию эмо­цио­наль­но­го со­стоя­ния че­ло­ве­ка. По­ис­ки и пе­ре­жи­ва­ния лю­дей в «смут­ное вре­мя» на­шли от­ра­же­ние в ли­ри­ке на да­ос­ские (по­ис­ки бес­смер­тия, при­зы­вы к от­ка­зу от со­ци­аль­ной дея­тель­но­сти во имя по­сти­же­ния дао) и буд­дий­ские те­мы, в пей­заж­ной ли­ри­ке («по­эзия гор и вод»). Осо­бо­го рас­цве­та дос­тиг­ла лю­бов­ная ли­ри­ка, воз­ник­ла «по­эзия двор­цо­во­го сти­ля» (гун ти ши, 1-я пол. 6 в.), вос­пе­вав­шая рос­кошь при­двор­ной жиз­ни, жен­скую кра­со­ту и лю­бов­ные на­сла­ж­де­ния (ан­то­ло­гия «Но­вые на­пе­вы неф­ри­то­вой баш­ни»). Круп­ней­шие по­эты это­го пе­рио­да: Цао Чжи, Цзи Кан, Жу­ань Цзи (3 в.), Тао Юань­мин, Се Линъ­юнь, Бао Чжао, Юй Синь (6 в.).

Лит.-тео­ре­тич. мысль К. во­пло­ти­лась в трак­та­тах «Рас­су­ж­де­ния о клас­си­че­ском» Цао Пи, «Ода об изящ­ной сло­вес­но­сти» Лу Цзи (оба 3 в.), «Рас­су­ж­де­ния ис­то­ри­ка» Шэнь Юэ, «Ка­те­го­рии сти­хов» Чжун Жу­на (оба кон. 5 – нач. 6 вв.), «Дра­кон, из­ва­ян­ный в серд­це пись­мён» Лю Се (нач. 6 в.), ан­то­ло­гии «Из­бран­ные про­из­ве­де­ния изящ­ной сло­вес­но­сти» Сяо Ту­на (нач. 6 в.). В них бы­ла опи­сана ис­то­рия нац. лит-ры с древ­ней­ших вре­мён, соз­да­ны жан­ро­вые клас­си­фи­ка­ции, да­ны ха­рак­те­ри­сти­ки те­ма­тич. на­прав­ле­ний, твор­че­ст­ва разл. ав­то­ров, рас­смот­ре­ны пра­ви­ла сти­хо­сло­же­ния и др.


Иллюстрация к сборнику «Стихи тысячи поэтов». Дворцовое издание эпохи Мин.

К 3–6 вв. от­но­сит­ся так­же ста­нов­ле­ние сю­жет­ной про­зы сяо­шо. Сло­во «сяо­шо» («мел­кие су­ж­де­ния») пер­во­на­чаль­но обо­зна­ча­ло тол­ки и слу­хи, хо­див­шие сре­ди про­стых лю­дей. Из­вест­но, что уже во 2–1 вв. до н. э. соз­да­ва­лись сб-ки сяо­шо, ни один из ко­то­рых не со­хра­нил­ся. Сб-ки 3–6 вв. со­сто­ят из от­ры­воч­ных фраг­мен­тов (из­вле­че­ния из раз­ных со­чи­не­ний, за­пи­си о со­бы­ти­ях) и ху­дож. рас­ска­зов. Рас­ска­зы сяо­шо от­ли­ча­ют ин­те­рес ко все­му не­обыч­но­му, ве­ра в чу­де­са (сб. «За­пис­ки о по­ис­ках ду­хов» Гань Бао, 4 в.). Вы­де­ля­ют­ся сб-ки на буд­дий­ские те­мы («Вес­ти из по­тус­то­рон­не­го ми­ра» Ван Яня, 5 в.), со­б­ра­ния ле­генд и анек­до­тов об ис­то­рич. пер­со­на­жах («Хо­дя­чие тол­ки в но­вом пе­ре­ска­зе» Лю Ици­на, 1-я пол. 5 в.).


«Ли Бо, пьяный, пишет ответ варварам». Иллюстрация к сборнику «Удивительные истории нашего времении древности». Народная картина (нянь-хуа).

От эпо­хи им­пе­рии Тан со­хра­ни­лось ок. 50 тыс. по­этич. про­из­ве­де­ний, при­над­ле­жа­щих 2300 по­этам. Гла­вен­ст­вую­щее по­ло­же­ние за­ня­ли «сти­хи но­во­го сти­ля» (синь ти ши), ко­то­рые обыч­но и на­зы­ва­ют «клас­си­че­ской ки­тай­ской по­эзи­ей». Пре­об­ла­да­ли 4 сти­хотв. фор­мы: че­ты­рёх­сти­шия и вось­ми­сти­шия, на­пи­сан­ные пя­ти­слов­ным и се­ми­слов­ным раз­ме­ром (со­от­вет­ст­вен­но 5 и 7 ие­рог­ли­фов в стро­ке). Все они под­чи­ня­лись стро­гим пра­ви­лам сти­хо­сло­же­ния и ком­по­зи­ции. По­этич. язык и об­раз­ная сис­те­ма «сти­хов но­во­го сти­ля» (ли­ри­ка Мэн Хао­жа­ня, Ван Вэя, Ли Бо, Ду Фу, Бо Цзюйи) от­ли­ча­лись изя­ще­ст­вом и глу­бо­кой экс­прес­сив­но­стью. В кон­це су­ще­ст­во­ва­ния им­пе­рии Тан по­я­вил­ся но­вый жанр по­эзии цы – сти­хи на пе­сен­ные ме­ло­дии с не­ре­гу­ляр­ным ко­ли­че­ст­вом слов в стро­ке. Воз­ник про­за­ич. жанр гу­вэнь (изящ­ная сло­вес­ность ста­ро­го сти­ля), близ­кий по фор­ме к эс­се (твор­че­ст­во Хань Юя, Лю Цзунъ­юа­ня). Сяо­шо транс­фор­ми­ро­вал­ся в жанр чу­ань­ци; лит-ра К. впер­вые об­ра­ти­лась к по­все­днев­ной жиз­ни го­ро­жан, чи­нов­ни­ков. Осо­бую по­пу­ляр­ность по­лу­чи­ли сю­же­ты о «не­доз­во­лен­ной» (до­б­рач­ной) люб­ви и об от­но­ше­ни­ях ме­ж­ду юно­ша­ми бла­го­род­но­го про­ис­хо­ж­де­ния и ге­те­ра­ми.

В пе­рио­ды Пя­ти ди­на­стий и Сев. Сун ли­ри­ка цы, из­на­чаль­но ог­ра­ни­чен­ная лю­бов­ны­ми мо­ти­ва­ми, об­ре­ла глу­би­ну со­дер­жа­ния и те­ма­тич. раз­но­об­ра­зие, в то вре­мя как по­эзия ши ста­но­ви­лась всё бо­лее умо­зри­тель­ной и вто­рич­ной. Поэ­ты «цзян­сий­ской шко­лы» счи­та­ли, что им­пуль­сом к по­этич. твор­че­ст­ву яв­ля­ют­ся не ок­ру­жаю­щая ав­то­ра дей­ст­ви­тель­ность и его пе­ре­жи­ва­ния, а книж­ные об­ра­зы и идеи (Ху­ан Тинц­зянь, 2-я пол. 11 в.). За­вое­ва­ние К. в эпо­ху Юж. Сун и тра­гич. со­бы­тия, свя­зан­ные с этим, на не­ко­то­рое вре­мя вер­ну­ли ли­ри­ке преж­нюю реа­ли­стич­ность, эмо­цио­наль­ный на­кал и гражд. па­фос. В 12 в. твор­че­ст­во по­этес­сы Ли Цин­чжао, по­этов Ян Вань­ли, Фань Чэн­да, Лу Ю, Синь Циц­зи ста­ло за­вер­ше­ни­ем зо­ло­то­го ве­ка кит. ли­ри­ки.

Всё боль­шее раз­ви­тие по­лу­ча­ет про­за. Воз­ник но­вый вид про­из­ве­де­ний – сб-ки биц­зи (за­пи­си ки­стью), в ко­то­рых сю­жет­ная и бес­сю­жет­ная про­за со­че­талась с разл. сти­хотв. вкра­п­ле­ния­ми. Сб-ки биц­зи соз­да­ва­лись ли­те­ра­то­ра­ми Сев. Сун (Оу­ян Сю, Су Ши) и об­ра­зо­ван­ны­ми чи­нов­ни­ка­ми. Но­вел­ла чу­ань­ци до­пол­ни­лась гор. по­ве­стью хуа­бэнь (ос­но­ва для ска­за), вы­рос­шей из свое­об­раз­ных кон­спек­тов, по ко­то­рым ска­зи­те­ли строи­ли свои им­про­ви­за­ции. Став лит. жан­ром, гор. по­весть про­дол­жа­ла ими­ти­ро­вать уст­ное вы­сту­п­ле­ние: в ней при­сут­ст­во­ва­ли сти­хотв. за­чин и кон­цов­ка, по­этич. встав­ки. В хуа­бэнь ши­ро­ко ис­поль­зо­ва­лись аван­тюр­ные, де­тек­тив­ные и лю­бов­ные сю­же­ты, не­ред­ко с ко­мич. от­тен­ком; пер­со­на­жа­ми ча­ще все­го бы­ли кре­сть­я­не, ре­мес­лен­ни­ки, тор­гов­цы, мел­кие чи­нов­ни­ки, мо­на­хи.

За­вое­ва­ние К. мон­го­ла­ми (эпо­ха Юань) из­ме­ни­ло об­лик лит-ры: по­эзия как со­кро­вищ­ни­ца нац. ду­хов­ных цен­но­стей по­ко­рён­но­го на­ро­да по­па­ла под не­глас­ный за­прет монг. вла­стей. В этот пе­ри­од раз­ви­тие по­лу­ча­ют дра­ма и ро­ман. Юань­ская дра­ма (из­вест­но о соз­да­нии 730 пьес, со­хра­ни­лось 170) ис­поль­зо­ва­ла 12 ти­пов сю­же­тов, вклю­чая пье­сы на ис­то­рич., ре­лиг., аван­тюр­ные и лю­бов­ные те­мы («Взвол­но­вав­шая не­бе­са и зем­лю оби­да Доу Э» Гу­ань Хань­ци­на, 13 в.; «Осень в хань­ском двор­це» Ма Чжию­а­ня, «За­пад­ный фли­гель» Ван Ши­фу, обе 2-я пол. 13 – нач. 14 вв., и др.). Арии цюй пре­вра­ти­лись в са­мо­сто­ят. сти­хотв. про­из­ве­де­ния (сань­цюй), со­ста­вив­шие ли­ри­ко-по­этич. на­сле­дие эпо­хи Юань. Ис­то­ка­ми кит. ро­ма­на по­слу­жи­ли по­ве­ст­во­ва­ния ска­зи­те­лей и вы­рос­шие на их ос­но­ве нар. кни­ги пинхуа, а так­же ис­торио­гра­фич. лит-ра. Пер­вые ро­ма­ны («Трое­цар­ст­вие» Ло Гу­ань­чжу­на, «Реч­ные за­во­ди» Ши Най­а­ня, оба 14 в.) по­свя­ще­ны ис­то­рич. со­бы­ти­ям во вре­мя ги­бе­ли им­пе­рии Хань и пред­ше­ст­во­вав­шим ги­бе­ли им­пе­рии Сев. Сун. Они за­ло­жи­ли ос­но­вы двух гл. раз­но­вид­но­стей кит. ро­ма­на: ис­то­ри­че­ской и аван­тюр­но-при­клю­чен­че­ской.

По­эзия эпо­хи ди­на­стий Мин и Цин в зна­чит. сте­пе­ни ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­лась на тра­ди­ции клас­сич. кит. по­эзии. Для эпо­хи Мин это объ­яс­ня­ет­ся тен­ден­ци­ей к вос­соз­да­нию (по­сле монг. вла­ды­че­ст­ва) нац. ху­дож. тра­ди­ций (твор­че­ст­во Гао Ци, 14 в., и др.), для эпо­хи Цин – стрем­ле­ни­ем со­хра­нить нац. ду­хов­ные цен­но­сти при маньч. вла­ды­че­ст­ве. В 16–18 вв. раз­ви­ва­лись про­за­ич. жан­ры (сб-к но­велл Пу Сун­ли­на; со­б­ра­ния хуа­бэнь, со­став­лен­ные Фэн Мэн­лу­ном, Лин Мэн­чу; про­из­ве­де­ния Юань Мэя, Цзи Юа­ня), про­дол­жив­шие тра­ди­цию биц­зи. Жанр ро­ма­на обо­га­тил­ся но­вы­ми ви­да­ми: бы­то­вым, лю­бов­но-эро­ти­че­ским («Цве­ты сли­вы в зо­ло­той ва­зе», 16 в., и др.), ди­дак­ти­ко-са­ти­ри­че­ским («Не­офи­ци­аль­ная ис­то­рия кон­фу­ци­ан­цев» У Цзинц­зы и др.). Бы­ли соз­да­ны ро­ма­ны: фан­та­сти­че­ский «Пу­те­ше­ст­вие на за­пад» У Чэнъ­эня, бы­то­вой «Сон в крас­ном те­ре­ме» Цао Сю­эци­ня, до­ны­не поль­зую­щие­ся по­пу­ляр­но­стью в К. и за его пре­де­ла­ми.

Кри­зис, ох­ва­тив­ший во 2-й пол. 19 в. кит. об­ще­ст­во, предъ­я­вил к лит-ре но­вые тре­бо­ва­ния: ак­ту­аль­ность со­дер­жа­ния и дос­туп­ность для ши­ро­ко­го кру­га чи­та­те­лей. По­лу­чил раз­ви­тие об­ли­чит. ро­ман (Лю Э, Ли Ба­оц­зя, У Во­яо, Цзэн Пу). Пред­ста­ви­те­ли кит. ин­тел­ли­ген­ции, по­бы­вав­шие за гра­ни­цей, об­ра­ти­лись к опы­ту иностр. лит-ры. В кон. 19 в. по­эт и ди­пло­мат Ху­ан Цзунь­сянь при­звал к об­нов­ле­нию язы­ка и фор­мы по­эзии.

В нач. 20 в. ли­те­ра­тор Лян Ци­чао ввёл в про­зе об­лег­чён­ный «но­вый стиль». Уве­ли­чи­лось чис­ло пе­ре­во­дов иностр. лит-ры. Од­на­ко под­лин­ное об­нов­ле­ние лит-ры про­изош­ло лишь в хо­де т. н. лит. ре­во­лю­ции, на­ча­лом ко­то­рой ста­ла пуб­ли­ка­ция в 1917 в ж. «Но­вая мо­ло­дёжь» ста­тьи Ху Ши «На­бро­ски от­но­си­тель­но ре­фор­мы ли­те­ра­ту­ры», ут­вер­ждав­шей, что язы­ком лит-ры долж­на стать разг. речь, а кри­те­ри­ем ху­до­же­ст­вен­но­сти – прав­ди­вость изо­бра­жае­мо­го. Пер­вы­ми об­раз­ца­ми но­вой лит-ры ста­ли рас­сказ «Днев­ник су­ма­сшед­ше­го» (1918) Лу Си­ня, ко­ме­дий­ная пье­са «Глав­ное де­ло жиз­ни» (1919) и сб-к сти­хов «Опы­ты» (1920) Ху Ши. Подъ­ём нац. са­мо­соз­на­ния, вы­зван­ный «Чет­вёр­то­го мая» дви­же­ни­ем (1919), при­вёл к по­яв­ле­нию ок. 400 га­зет и жур­на­лов на разг. язы­ке. Ве­ду­щее ме­сто за­ня­ла про­за, осн. жан­ром ко­то­рой стал рас­сказ (твор­че­ст­во Бин Синь, Е Ша­оц­зю­ня, Ван Тун­чжао, Ян Чжэнь­шэ­на). В по­эзии (Бин Синь, Кан Бай­цин, Шэнь Инь­мо и др.) про­изо­шёл от­каз от риф­мы, по­пу­ляр­ность при­об­рёл вер­либр. Дра­ма на­ча­ла от­хо­дить от тра­ди­ций кит. дра­ма­тур­гии и ос­ваи­вать прин­ци­пы зап. те­ат­ра (пье­сы Дин Си­ли­ня, Хун Шэ­на, Тянь Ха­ня). В 1921 в Пе­ки­не бы­ло соз­да­но Об-во изу­че­ния лит-ры, чле­ны ко­то­ро­го (Чжоу Цзо­жэнь, Шэнь Янь­бин, Е Ша­оц­зюнь, Сюй Ди­шань, Ван Тун­чжао и др.) тя­го­те­ли к кри­тич. реа­лизму. Уча­ст­ни­ки ор­га­ни­зо­ван­но­го то­гда же кит. сту­ден­та­ми в То­кио об-ва «Твор­чест­во» (Го Мо­жо, Юй Да­фу, Чэн Фанъу, Чжан Цзы­пин, Тянь Хань и др.) пи­са­ли в рус­ле ев­роп. ро­ман­тиз­ма и мо­дер­низ­ма.

В 1927–37 ве­ду­щее по­ло­же­ние за­ни­ма­ла лит-ра мар­кси­ст­ской ори­ен­та­ции, пред­став­лен­ная сна­ча­ла об-вом «Солн­це» (1927–30), а с 1930 – Ли­гой ле­вых пи­са­те­лей. Её ли­де­ром стал Лу Синь. Пи­са­те­ли Цзян Гу­ан­цы, Мао Дунь, Дин Лин, Чжан Тя­ньи, Ся Янь, Е Цзы и др. вос­при­ня­ли мар­кси­ст­ские взгля­ды на иск-во, за­им­ст­во­ва­ли опыт рус. и сов. лит-ры. Од­но­вре­мен­но раз­ви­ва­лась т. н. на­цио­на­ли­стич. лит-ра, под­дер­жи­вае­мая вла­стя­ми (по­эзия Ван Пин­ли­на, Ху­ан Чжэнь­ся, Шао Сюнь­мэя, про­за Ли Цзаньхуа, Вань Гоа­ня). За сво­бо­ду в вы­бо­ре тем и не­за­ви­си­мость от по­ли­ти­ки вы­сту­па­ли пи­са­те­ли-ли­бе­ра­лы (в кон. 1920-х гг. – чле­ны об-ва «Но­во­лу­ние»: Сюй Чжи­мо, Лян Ши­цю, Ху Ши, Вэнь Идо и др.; в 1930-е гг. – пе­кин­ская груп­па: Шэнь Цун­вэнь, Чжу Гу­ан­цянь, Ли Цзя­ньу, шан­хай­ские пи­са­те­ли-мо­дер­ни­сты Е Лин­фэн, Ши Чжэ­цунь, Лю На­оу, Му Шин). В этот пе­ри­од бы­ли соз­да­ны ро­ма­ны Ба Цзи­ня, Лао Шэ, Мао Ду­ня, эпич. по­эмы Цзан Кэц­зя и Ай Ци­на, мно­го­акт­ные пьесы Цао Юя и Ся Яня.

От­ли­чит. осо­бен­но­стя­ми лит-ры 1937–1945 бы­ли аги­та­ци­он­ная на­прав­лен­ность, дух оп­ти­миз­ма и ге­ро­из­ма; ши­ро­ко ис­поль­зо­ва­лись ска­зы, час­туш­ки, пес­ни, те­ат­раль­ные пред­став­ле­ния. По­лу­чил раз­ви­тие жанр до­ку­мен­таль­ной про­зы, поя­ви­лись но­вые жан­ры в по­эзии: дек­ла­ма­ци­он­ные, на­стен­ные сти­хи. В лит-ре рай­онов, под­кон­троль­ных Го­минь­да­ну, в нач. 1940-х гг. гл. те­ма­ми ста­ли кор­руп­ция, мо­раль­ное раз­ло­же­ние чи­нов­ни­ков, тер­рор спец­служб и пре­да­тель­ст­во нац. ин­те­ре­сов (ро­ма­ны Мао Ду­ня, Лао Шэ, Ша Ти­на, пье­сы Го Мо­жо, Дин Си­ли­ня); зна­чит. ме­сто за­нял жанр по­ли­тич. са­ти­ры. За­мет­ны­ми яв­ле­ния­ми ста­ли про­за Лу Ли­на, Ло Бинь­цзи, Яо Сюэ­и­ня, У Мин­ши, Ху­ан Гу­лю; по­эзия Юань Шуй­по, Цзоу Ди­фа­ня, Ша Оу; дра­ма­тур­гия У Цзу­гуа­на, Юань Цзю­ня, Сун Чжи­ди. Лит-ра «ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онов» сле­до­ва­ла ус­та­нов­кам, сфор­му­ли­ро­ван­ным Мао Цзэ­ду­ном в 1942: лит-ра долж­на бы­ла слу­жить ин­те­ре­сам ра­бо­чих, кре­сть­ян и сол­дат и ис­поль­зо­вать при­выч­ные им ху­дож. фор­мы. При­ме­ра­ми со­че­та­ния тра­ди­ций нар. и но­вой лит-ры бы­ло твор­че­ст­во Чжао Шу­ли и Чжоу Ли­бо, пи­сав­ших о пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ях в кит. де­рев­не. В про­зе Сунь Ли, Лю Бай­юя, Цю Дун­пи­на, Ма Фэ­на, Кун Цзюэ и Юань Цзин глав­ной бы­ла ар­мей­ская про­бле­ма­ти­ка. В по­эзии рас­кры­лись та­лан­ты Ай Ци­на, Тянь Цзя­ня, Кэ Чжун­пи­на, Хэ Ци­фа­на, Жу­ань Чжан­цзи­на, Ли Цзи. Хэ Цзин­чжи и Дин И соз­да­ли текст од­но­го из са­мых зна­чит. про­из­ве­де­ний ле­во­го иск-ва – муз. дра­мы «Се­дая де­вуш­ка» (1945). В пе­ри­од гражд. вой­ны (1946–49) в «ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онах» вы­де­ля­лось твор­че­ст­во Чжоу Ли­бо, Дин Ли­на, Цао Ми­на. Сре­ди пи­са­те­лей, про­жи­вав­ших на тер­ри­то­ри­ях, под­кон­троль­ных Го­минь­да­ну, всё бо­лее ост­ро зву­ча­ла кри­ти­ка ре­жи­ма (про­из­ве­де­ния Шэнь Цун­вэ­ня, Ван Тун­чжао, Ба Цзи­ня, Дин Си­ли­ня).

По­сле соз­да­ния КНР (1949) не­ко­то­рые ли­те­ра­то­ры (Лао Шэ, Ба Цзинь, Цао Юй) доб­ро­воль­но от­ка­за­лись от творч. не­за­ви­си­мо­сти и при­ня­ли прин­цип пар­тий­но­сти лит-ры; дру­гие (Шэнь Цун­вэнь, Цянь Чжун­шу) пе­ре­ста­ли пи­сать. Зна­чит. влия­ние на лит. жизнь К. ока­за­ла сов. лит-ра. В 1950-е гг. те­мы и сю­же­ты в осн. ог­ра­ни­чи­ва­лись тре­мя об­лас­тя­ми: вос­пе­ва­ние со­циа­ли­стич. пре­об­ра­зо­ва­ний (про­за Чжао Шу­ли, Ма Фэ­на, Ли Чжу­ня, Цао Мин, Чжоу Ли­бо, Лэй Цзя, по­эмы Ли Цзи и Жу­ань Чжанц­зи­на и др.), про­слав­ле­ние ре­во­люц. про­шло­го Ком­му­ни­стич. пар­тии Ки­тая (ро­ма­ны Лю Бай­юя, Сунь Ли, Ду Пэн­чэ­на, Чэнь Дэн­кэ, Кун Цзюэ и Юань Цзин, по­эзия Кэ Чжун­пи­на и др.), опи­са­ние под­ви­гов кит. сол­дат, ока­зы­вав­ших по­мощь кор. на­ро­ду в борь­бе с амер. аг­рес­си­ей (про­за Вэй Вэя, Лу Ли­на, Лао Шэ, сти­хи Тянь Цзя­ня и др.). Осо­бое ме­сто за­ни­ма­ла те­ма друж­бы кит. и сов. на­ро­дов (по­эзия Го Мо­жо, Ай Ци­на, Цзан Кэц­зя, Цзоу Ди­фа­ня и др.). В кон. 1950-х гг. окон­ча­тель­но ут­вер­ди­лось под­чи­не­ние лит-ры по­ли­ти­ке, на сме­ну со­циа­ли­стич. реа­лиз­му при­шёл ме­тод «со­че­та­ния ре­во­люц. реа­лиз­ма и ре­во­люц. ро­ман­тиз­ма».

В пе­ри­од «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» 1966–76 ре­прес­си­ям под­верг­лись поч­ти все проф. пи­са­те­ли, лит. жизнь бы­ла прак­ти­че­ски ос­та­нов­ле­на, един­ст­вен­ной раз­ре­шён­ной фор­мой иск-ва яв­ля­лись 10 «об­раз­цо­вых ре­во­люц. спек­так­лей», про­па­ган­ди­ро­вав­ших идеи Мао Цзэ­ду­на. В нач. 1970-х гг. часть ре­прес­си­ро­ван­ных пи­са­те­лей бы­ла реа­би­ли­ти­ро­ва­на, ста­ли вы­хо­дить не­сколь­ко лит. жур­на­лов. По­сле смер­ти Мао Цзэ­ду­на (1976) воз­ник­ли ус­ло­вия для воз­ро­ж­де­ния лит. жиз­ни. Про­из­ве­де­ния Лу Синьхуа, Лю Си­ньу, Су Шуя­на об­ли­ча­ли пре­сту­п­ле­ния вре­мён «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции»; глу­бо­кое ос­мыс­ле­ние её при­чин ха­рак­тер­но для про­из­ве­де­ний Ван Мэ­на, Цун Вэй­си, Фэн Цзи­цая, Чжан Сянь­ля­на. В лит-ру вер­ну­лись ста­рые пи­са­те­ли (Ба Цзинь, Ай Цин и др.), при­шли мо­ло­дые (Е Синь, Те Нин, Чжан Синь­синь и др.). По­ли­ти­ка ре­форм и внеш­ней от­кры­то­сти по­ро­ди­ла в нач. 1980-х гг. те­че­ние «лит-ры ре­форм» (Цзян Цзы­лун, Кэ Юнь­лу, Чжан Цзе и др.), про­изош­ла пе­ре­оцен­ка про­из­ве­де­ний кит. пи­са­те­лей 1920–40-х гг. (Шэнь Цун­вэ­ня, Лао Шэ, Чжан Ай­лин и др.), вос­ста­но­ви­лись лит. свя­зи с за­ру­бежь­ем. Поя­ви­лась «лит-ра по­ис­ка кор­ней» (Хань Шао­гун, А Чэн, Цзя Пин­ва, Та­ши Да­ва и др.), пы­тав­шая­ся по­сред­ст­вом об­ра­ще­ния к нар. куль­ту­ре уст­ра­нить раз­рыв со ста­ры­ми тра­ди­ция­ми. Под влия­ни­ем мо­дер­низ­ма и по­стмо­дер­низ­ма воз­ник­ла лит-ра аван­гар­да (в про­зе – Ван Шо, Юй Хуа, Гэ Фэй, Сунь Гань­лу, Лю Со­ла, в по­эзии – Бэй Дао, Гу Чэн, Цань Сюэ, Шу Тин, в дра­ме – Ша Есинь, Гао Син­цзянь, Лю Шу­ган).

В нач. 1990-х гг. про­дол­жал­ся про­цесс деи­део­ло­ги­за­ции лит-ры. Раз­ви­ва­ет­ся нео­реа­лизм (Чи Ли, Фан Фан, Янь Лянь­кэ), пси­хо­ло­гич. жен­ская про­за (Ван Аньи, Чэнь Жань, Сюй Кунь, Вэй Ху­эй). Пи­са­те­ли Цю Хуа­дун, Чжу Вэнь, Дяо Доу про­по­ве­ду­ют прин­ци­пы «ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­но­го пись­ма», про­ти­во­стоя­ще­го вся­кой тра­ди­ции. Рас­про­стра­ня­ют­ся эро­тич., аван­тюр­ный и де­тек­тив­ный жан­ры. В 2000 пер­вым лау­реа­том Но­бе­лев­ской пр. по лит-ре в КНР стал дра­матург и про­за­ик Гао Синц­зянь (с кон. 1980-х гг. про­жи­ваю­щий во Фран­ции).

О лит-ре на язы­ках др. на­ро­дов, на­се­ляю­щих тер­ри­то­рию К., см. раз­дел Ли­те­ра­ту­ра в стать­ях Мон­го­лия, Ти­бет­ский ав­то­ном­ный рай­он, а так­же ст. Уй­гур­ская ли­те­ра­ту­ра.

Архитектура и изобразительное искусство

С не­оли­та до на­ших дней иск-во К. раз­ви­ва­лось не­пре­рыв­но и по­сту­па­тель­но. На про­тя­же­нии 5 ты­ся­че­ле­тий ста­биль­ность эво­лю­ции ху­дож. тра­ди­ции обес­пе­чи­ва­лась её эт­ни­че­ским и струк­тур­ным един­ст­вом. В кит. эс­те­ти­ке пре­об­ла­да­ла идея о ду­хов­но-энер­ге­тич. ре­зо­нан­се (юнь) от­да­лён­ных во вре­ме­ни творч. ак­тов, став­шая гно­сео­ло­гич. ос­но­вой пре­ем­ст­вен­но­сти ху­дож. школ и на­прав­ле­ний. Кон­цен­тра­ция ху­дож. опы­та га­ран­ти­ро­ва­ла вы­со­кий уро­вень раз­ви­тия тра­ди­ции как в бла­го­при­ят­ные, так и в тра­гич. пе­рио­ды ис­то­рии К. Ши­ро­кая под­держ­ка иск-ва мно­го­числ. сло­ем ин­тел­лек­туа­лов (ши) не по­зво­ля­ла гос-ву мо­но­по­ли­зи­ро­вать раз­ви­тие ху­дож. тра­ди­ции и спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ла её по­сто­ян­но­му об­нов­ле­нию. Об­ще­при­ня­то рас­смат­ри­вать ис­то­рию иск-ва К. по ди­на­стий­ным пе­рио­дам. На ка­ж­дом эта­пе сво­его раз­ви­тия кит. иск-во дос­ти­га­ло тех­нич. со­вер­шен­ст­ва, пол­но­ты ху­дож. вы­ра­же­ния и зре­ло­сти эс­те­тич. реф­лек­сии, что ми­ни­ми­зи­ро­ва­ло по­след­ст­вия кри­зи­сов при сме­не ис­то­рич. фор­ма­ций.

Древнейший период

Ар­хео­ло­гич. ис­сле­до­ва­ния 20 в. об­на­ру­жи­ли в бас­сей­нах рек Ху­ан­хэ и Ян­цзы ряд не­оли­тич. куль­тур с кон. 10-го тыс. до н. э. (см. раз­дел Древ­ней­шие ар­хео­ло­ги­че­ские куль­ту­ры Ки­тая). Не­смот­ря на по­ли­цен­трич­ность кит. нео­ли­та и раз­ную ста­ди­аль­ность раз­ви­тия его цен­тров, из­де­лия из ке­ра­ми­ки и неф­ри­та де­мон­ст­ри­ру­ют общ­ность сис­те­мы пла­стич. мыш­ле­ния, от­ли­чаю­щую па­мят­ни­ки кит. ареа­ла от не­ки­тай­ских.


Маска. Лепная керамика. 4-е тыс. до н. э. Культура Яншао. Музей провинции Ганьсу (Ланьчжоу).

Не­оли­тич. ке­ра­ми­ка про­шла путь от ста­дии руч­ной спи­раль­но-лен­точ­ной леп­ки (6–4-е тыс. до н. э.) до из­го­тов­ле­ния на гон­чар­ном кру­ге (3-е тыс. до н. э.), бла­го­да­ря усо­вер­шен­ст­во­ван­ным кон­ст­рук­ци­ям ко­то­ро­го проч­ность и тон­кость че­реп­ка со­от­вет­ст­во­ва­ли кри­те­рию «яич­ной скор­лу­пы». Ви­ды из­де­лий очень раз­но­об­раз­ны. По­ми­мо со­су­дов, из­го­тав­ли­ва­лись леп­ные мас­ки и го­ло­вы, ста­ту­эт­ки и мо­де­ли по­стро­ек. Де­кор ке­ра­ми­ки эво­лю­цио­ни­ро­вал от мо­но­хро­мии (6–5-е тыс. до н. э.) к пре­об­ла­да­нию по­ли­хро­мии (4-е тыс. до н. э.) и вновь к гос­под­ству мо­но­хро­мии (3-е тыс. до н. э.). Ха­рак­тер­ны то­ро­об­раз­ные мо­ти­вы де­ко­ра, а так­же на­ту­ра­ли­стич­но трак­то­ван­ные изо­бра­зит. эле­мен­ты, вы­пол­нен­ные в тех­ни­ках гра­ви­ров­ки, на­ле­пов и рос­пи­си. Ком­по­зи­ция де­ко­ра стро­ит­ся на урав­но­ве­ши­ва­нии про­ти­во­по­лож­но на­прав­лен­ных век­то­ров дви­же­ния.

Из неф­ри­та соз­да­ва­лись то­по­ры, но­жи, под­вес­ки (ху­ан), оже­ре­лья, дис­ки (би), сдво­ен­ные дис­ки, брас­ле­ты, шпиль­ки, зоо- и ан­тро­по­морф­ная пла­сти­ка, ци­лин­д­ры (цун), ски­пет­ры (гуй). Име­ют­ся по­дел­ки из кос­ти и ра­ку­шек. Об­на­ру­же­ны пер­вые ар­те­фак­ты с ла­ко­вой рос­пи­сью. На па­мят­ни­ках из ке­рами­ки и неф­ри­та пред­став­ле­ны то­тем­ные изо­бра­же­ния, ко­то­рые со­хра­ня­лись в даль­ней­шем как ар­хе­ти­пич. зна­ки: сви­нья, со­ва, ры­ба, змея, яще­ри­ца, дра­кон, ля­гуш­ка, тигр, вол­на, тра­ва, об­лач­ная спи­раль, пла­ме­нею­щая сфе­ра, то­пор, ли­чи­ны ду­хов. В рам­ках пер­во­быт­ных ша­ман­ских прак­тик раз­ви­тие изо­бра­зит. приё­мов шло от на­ту­ра­лиз­ма к обоб­щению, но с со­хра­не­ни­ем кон­крет­но­сти дви­же­ния пла­стич. об­раза.

Древние царства и империи


Кувшин (цзунь) для подношения жертвенного вина. Бронза. Ок. 1200 до н. э. Институт археологии (Пекин).

Во 2-м тыс. до н. э. на тер­ри­то­рии К. воз­ник­ли пер­вые гос. объ­е­ди­не­ния и на­сту­пи­ла эпо­ха брон­зы. Ар­хео­ло­га­ми об­на­ру­же­ны де­сят­ки го­ро­дищ ди­на­стии Инь (Шан): Эр­ли­тоу, Ван­чэн­ган, Шанц­зе, Эр­ли­ган, Ши­сян­гоу, Сяо­шу­ан­цяо (все в совр. пров. Хэ­нань). Са­мый круп­ный ком­плекс – «Руи­ны Инь» близ г. Ань­ян. Все по­строй­ки бы­ли де­ре­вян­ны­ми. Де­ре­вом же от­де­лы­ва­лись под­зем­ные по­гре­баль­ные ка­ме­ры; сте­ны жи­лых строе­ний и по­гре­баль­ных ка­мер рас­пи­сы­ва­лись. Иск-во яв­ля­лось ча­стью слож­ных ма­гич. ри­туа­лов, что от­ра­зи­лось в суг­ге­стив­ном сти­ле шан­ских па­мят­ни­ков.

За­ро­ж­де­ние шан­ской кал­ли­гра­фии про­ис­хо­ди­ло в рам­ках ри­туа­лов га­да­ния по тре­щи­нам на пан­ци­рях че­ре­пах и ло­па­точ­ных кос­тях круп­но­го ско­та; об­на­ру­же­но св. 150 тыс. над­пи­сан­ных кос­тей и пан­ци­рей. Резь­ба в плот­ном ма­те­риа­ле тре­бо­ва­ла от ис­пол­ни­те­ля уме­ния со­че­тать мощ­ный на­жим рез­ца с юве­лир­ной точ­но­стью дви­же­ний. По­черк ин­ск­рип­ций от­ли­ча­ют про­сто­та форм, рав­но­мер­ная тол­щи­на и пря­миз­на ли­ний, а так­же пря­мо­уголь­ность очер­та­ний. Пла­стич. свой­ст­ва шан­ских га­даль­ных над­пи­сей ак­тив­но ин­тер­пре­ти­ро­ва­лись кал­ли­гра­фа­ми 20 в. в по­чер­ке цзя-гу («щи­ток-кость»).

Шан­ские ри­туа­лы вклю­ча­ли так­же под­но­ше­ния ду­хам жерт­вен­ной пи­щи. Ём­ко­стя­ми для неё слу­жи­ли мас­сив­ные брон­зо­вые со­су­ды, вес ко­то­рых варь­и­ро­вал­ся от 15 до 60 кг, а отд. об­раз­цы ве­си­ли до 700 кг. Со вре­ме­нем из­де­лия по­кры­ва­лись зе­ле­но­ва­ты­ми, ре­же бу­ры­ми окис­ла­ми, в свя­зи с чем кол­лек­цио­не­ры по­сле­дую­щих ди­на­стий на­зы­ва­ли их цин тун («зе­лё­ная брон­за»). Сре­ди кит. зна­то­ков уже на ру­бе­же н. э. сло­жи­лась свое­об­раз­ная эс­те­ти­ка па­ти­ни­ро­ван­но­сти, вы­ра­жав­шая идею пре­одо­ле­ния пред­на­чер­тан­но­го вре­ме­нем рас­па­да си­лой куль­тур­ной фор­мы, свя­зы­ваю­щей по­том­ков с их пред­ка­ми. Брон­зо­вые со­су­ды и ко­ло­ко­ла от­ли­ва­лись в при­двор­ных мас­тер­ских по разъ­ём­ным фор­мам.

К кон. 2-го тыс. до н. э. на ос­но­ве форм не­оли­тич. ке­ра­ми­ки сло­жи­лась раз­ветв­лён­ная ти­по­ло­гия ри­ту­аль­ной брон­зы: со­су­ды для при­го­тов­ле­ния пи­щи (кот­лы дин, ли, фу, янь), со­су­ды для под­но­ше­ния жерт­вен­ной пи­щи (ларь гуй, ковш шао), со­су­ды для по­дог­ре­ва, раз­ве­де­ния и раз­ли­ва ви­на (чай­ник хэ, кув­шин гу­ан), кув­ши­ны для под­но­ше­ния жерт­вен­но­го ви­на (цзунь, ю, фанъи, лэй, бу, ху), вин­ные куб­ки (цзюэ, цзяо, цзя, гу, гун), со­су­ды для во­ды (ча­ша пань, кув­шин и таз цзянь). Из­де­лия име­ют фо­но­вый узор в ви­де лэй­вэнь («узор гро­ма»), об­лач­ных спи­ра­лей, пе­ре­пле­те­ний гео­мет­рич. фи­гур. Эле­мен­та­ми рель­еф­но про­ра­бо­тан­но­го де­ко­ра слу­жи­ли зоо­ан­тро­по­морф­ная мас­ка тао-те, дра­кон, «гвоз­де­вид­ный» узор и ани­ма­ли­стич. изо­бра­же­ния. То­тем­ные об­ра­зы эво­лю­цио­ни­ро­ва­ли в ас­т­ро­ло­гич. сим­во­лы, в свя­зи с чем на­рас­та­ла по­ли­се­ман­тич­ность изо­бра­же­ний. Ри­ту­аль­ные со­су­ды име­ли над­пи­си, по­черк ко­то­рых по­лу­чил на­зва­ния цзинь-вэнь («пись­ме­на на брон­зе») или гу-вэнь («древ­ние пись­ме­на»). В кон­це шан­ско­го пе­рио­да по­яви­лась гла­зу­ро­ван­ная ке­ра­ми­ка и «бе­лая ке­ра­ми­ка» ка­мен­ной мас­сы. Не­ко­то­рые об­раз­цы сто­ло­вой ут­ва­ри име­ли ла­ко­вую рос­пись или бы­ли ин­кру­сти­ро­ва­ны би­рю­зой. По­ми­мо шан­ских цен­тров, во 2-м тыс. до н. э. су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло иск-во пе­ри­фе­рий­ных зон: куль­ту­ры Шу (Сань­син­дуй, пров. Сы­чу­ань), Учэн (пров. Цзян­си), Сяц­зя­дянь (Да­дянь­цзы, ав­то­ном­ный р-н Внутр. Мон­го­лия) и др.

В эпо­ху Чжоу иск-во на­ча­ло раз­ви­вать­ся в со­ста­ве он­то­ло­ги­зи­ро­ван­но­го эти­ко-ри­ту­аль­но­го ком­плек­са ли, в куль­тур­ном про­стран­ст­ве ко­то­ро­го воз­ни­ка­ли уже соб­ст­вен­но ху­дож. за­да­чи. Бла­го­да­ря это­му ста­ли воз­мож­ны ак­тив­ные творч. по­ис­ки, ва­риа­тив­но­сти ко­то­рых спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ла на­рас­тав­шая по­ли­тич. раз­дроб­лен­ность К. Эво­лю­ция иск-ва оп­ре­де­ля­лась ис­то­рич. са­мо­соз­на­ни­ем чжо­ус­цев, в све­те ко­то­ро­го творч. нор­ма­ти­вы по­ни­ма­лись как итог по­ло­жит. опы­та пред­ков, под­ле­жа­ще­го даль­ней­ше­му со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­нию. Клю­че­вым ком­по­нен­том это­го опы­та бы­ли за­ко­ны чи­сло­вой се­мио­ти­ки и сис­те­ма ас­со­циа­тив­но-кор­ре­ля­ци­он­ных свя­зей.

В чжоу­скую эпо­ху кал­ли­гра­фия офор­ми­лась как са­мо­сто­ят. вид иск-ва, имев­ший са­мый вы­со­кий со­ци­аль­ный ста­тус. Бы­ло соз­да­но неск. ре­гио­наль­ных вер­сий по­чер­ка да-чжу­ань, в рам­ках ко­то­ро­го ро­ж­да­лись ос­но­вы кал­ли­гра­фич. эс­те­ти­ки и раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­лись тех­нич. при­ёмы. Осн. кор­пус па­мят­ни­ков пред­став­лен над­пи­ся­ми на из­де­ли­ях из брон­зы и кам­ня. Письм. ис­точ­ни­ки сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют о по­все­ме­ст­ном раз­ви­тии мо­ну­мен­таль­ной жи­во­пи­си и жи­во­пи­си на шёл­ко­вых свит­ках, что под­твер­жда­ет­ся ар­хео­ло­гич. на­ход­ка­ми.

В ар­хи­тек­ту­ре гос­под­ство­ва­ли де­рев. строе­ния. Воз­во­ди­лись 2-этаж­ные па­виль­о­ны и мно­го­этаж­ные баш­ни. Ок. 9–8 вв. до н. э. на­ча­ли из­го­тав­ли­вать че­ре­пи­цу, а за­тем и кир­пич, ис­поль­зо­вав­ший­ся пре­им. для об­ли­цов­ки плат­форм и кре­по­ст­ных стен. Пла­ни­ро­воч­ным мо­ду­лем в гра­до­строи­тель­ст­ве был ло шу («ма­гич. квад­рат»).


Статуэтка. Бронза. 1300–1100 до н. э. Музей Саньсиндуй (Гуаньхань).

Со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­ние тех­но­ло­гии ра­бо­ты с брон­зой при­ве­ло к ос­вое­нию от­лив­ки по вос­ко­вой фор­ме, гра­ви­ров­ки, ин­кру­ста­ции дра­го­цен­ны­ми ме­тал­ла­ми и кам­ня­ми. Ти­по­ло­гия ри­ту­аль­ных из­де­лий рас­ши­ри­лась, вклю­чив куб­ки (чжи), чар­ки (бэй, цзунь), бас­сей­ны (си), ла­ри (фу, дуй, доу, сю); муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­ты (ко­ло­ко­ла чжун, ко­ло­коль­чи­ки нао, ба­ра­ба­ны гу, гон­ги чжэн и т. д.); зер­ка­ла, ору­жие, ме­бель, мо­не­ты. Брон­зо­вая ут­варь из­го­тав­ли­ва­лась как для жерт­во­при­но­ше­ний, так и по по­ли­тич. и ме­мо­ри­аль­ным по­во­дам.

К ас­сор­ти­мен­ту из­де­лий из неф­ри­та до­ба­ви­лись ри­ту­аль­ные под­вес­ки, ста­ту­эт­ки, по­яс­ные пряж­ки и пр. В ке­ра­ми­ке со­хра­ня­лись не­оли­тич. и шан­ские тра­ди­ции, до­пол­няе­мые приёмами под­ра­жа­ния брон­зо­вым со­су­дам. Ла­ко­вое про­из-во к кон­цу эпо­хи пре­вра­ти­лось в са­мо­сто­ят. и вы­со­ко­раз­ви­тое ре­мес­ло. Изо­бре­те­ние грун­то­во­го по­кры­тия по тка­ни су­ще­ст­вен­но рас­ши­ри­ло сфе­ру при­ме­не­ния ла­ков, в неё во­шли ар­хит. кон­ст­рук­ции, ору­жие и дос­пе­хи, обе­ден­ная ут­варь, гро­бы и пр.

В 5–3 вв. до н. э. яр­ко про­яви­лось свое­об­ра­зие иск-ва ав­то­хтон­ных куль­тур­ных зон: центр. цар­ст­ва (ком­плек­сы в Фэнь­шуй­ли­не, пров. Хэ­бэй; в Цзинь­цуни, пров. Хэ­нань; в Хо­ума, пров. Шань­си, и др.), юж. цар­ст­ва Чу (ком­плекс в Лу­тай­ша­ни, за­хо­ро­не­ние Хоу И в у. Суй­сянь, оба – в пров. Ху­бэй; за­хо­ро­не­ния в ок­ре­ст­но­стях г. Чан­ша, пров. Ху­нань, и др.), сев.-зап. цар­ст­ва Цинь (ком­плекс в Фэн­ся­не, пров. Шэнь­си, и др.), вост. царств Ци и Янь (ком­плек­сы в Линь­цзы и в Шан­ван­цу­ни, оба – в пров. Шань­дун, и др.). Не­взи­рая на сти­ли­стич. осо­бен­но­сти ка­ж­дой из суб­тра­ди­ций, дей­ст­вие об­ще­ки­тай­ских он­то­ло­гич. струк­тур обес­пе­чи­ва­ло пре­об­ла­да­ние ин­те­грац. век­то­ра над цен­тро­беж­ны­ми тен­ден­ция­ми в ис­кус­ст­ве.

По­ли­тич. ус­ло­вия для ста­ди­аль­но но­во­го куль­тур­но­го син­те­за бы­ли обес­пе­че­ны во­ен. ус­пе­ха­ми ди­на­стии Цинь. В пе­ри­од Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань ин­те­грац. про­цес­сы в иск-ве при­об­ре­ли по­сте­пен­ный и бо­лее ес­теств. ха­рак­тер. Хань­ский идео­ло­гич. син­тез (кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во – ле­гизм – дао­сизм) стал ос­но­ва­ни­ем для эс­те­тич. плю­ра­лиз­ма и для мн. но­ва­ций в ху­дож. сфе­ре.

Фигурка дракона. Красно-чёрная керамика. 475–221 до н. э. Государственные музеи (Берлин).

Стан­дар­ти­за­ция пись­мен­но­сти при Цинь зна­ме­но­ва­ла под­ве­де­ние ито­гов ты­ся­че­лет­не­го по­ис­ка оп­ти­маль­ных пла­стич. ре­ше­ний в иск-ве кал­ли­гра­фии. Но­вая вер­сия пись­ма по­лу­чи­ла назв. сяо-чжу­ань. Од­но­вре­мен­но с ней рас­про­стра­нил­ся про­то­устав­ной по­черк ли-шу. В эпо­ху Хань со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­лись сор­та кис­тей и ту­ши, поя­ви­лась пер­вая бу­ма­га. Кал­ли­гра­фы раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ли всё бо­лее ско­ро­ст­ные тех­ни­ки пись­ма, что при­ве­ло к воз­ник­но­ве­нию по­лу­кур­си­ва син-шу, ско­ро­пи­си цао-шу и ус­та­ва кай-шу.

В на­ча­ле н. э. в сре­де слу­жи­лых ин­тел­лек­туа­лов (ши) поя­ви­лись лю­ди, за­ни­мав­шие­ся кал­ли­гра­фи­ей не толь­ко в свя­зи с тре­бо­ва­ния­ми свое­го со­ци­аль­но­го ста­ту­са, но и для творч. са­мо­вы­ра­же­ния. С это­го вре­ме­ни иск-во кал­ли­гра­фии на­ча­ло раз­ви­вать­ся как вслед­ст­вие ано­ним­ных эво­люц. про­цес­сов, вы­зре­вав­ших внут­ри ре­гио­наль­ных тра­ди­ций, так и бла­го­да­ря оза­ре­ни­ям твор­че­ски ода­рён­ных лич­но­стей. Ос­но­ва­те­ля­ми ав­тор­ской кал­ли­гра­фии и пер­вы­ми её тео­ре­ти­ка­ми счи­та­ют­ся Ду Ду, Цай Юн, Чжан Чжи и Чжун Ю.

Кон­фу­ци­ан­ский ми­ро­воз­зренч. ком­плекс пре­до­пре­де­лил на­зи­дат. функ­ции при­двор­ной жи­во­пи­си и спе­ци­фи­ку её жан­ров: ис­то­ри­ко-ле­ген­дар­но­го, порт­рет­но­го, при­двор­но-бы­то­во­го и ре­ли­ги­оз­но-ми­фо­ло­ги­че­ско­го. С кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­вом бы­ло свя­за­но и по­яв­ле­ние но­во­го ти­па ху­дож­ни­ка – ху­дож­ни­ка-учё­но­го, со­вме­щав­ше­го чи­нов­ни­чью карь­е­ру с твор­че­ст­вом. Ху­дож­ни­ки-ре­мес­лен­ни­ки по-преж­не­му вы­пол­ня­ли осн. объ­ём ра­бот по рос­пи­си двор­цов и по­гре­баль­ных ка­мер, но ли­дер­ст­во в ху­дож. про­цес­сах по­сте­пен­но на­ча­ло пе­ре­хо­дить к ин­тел­лек­туа­лам. Для сти­ля хань­ской жи­во­пи­си ха­рак­тер­ны гла­вен­ст­во ли­не­ар­но­го на­ча­ла, вы­со­кая ди­на­ми­ка кон­ту­ров и по­слой­ное по­строе­ние про­стран­ст­ва.

По­гре­баль­ная скульп­ту­ра, су­ще­ст­во­вав­шая ра­нее в ка­мер­ном фор­ма­те, для за­хо­ро­не­ния им­пе­ра­то­ра Цинь Шиху­ан­ди вы­пол­ня­лась в на­ту­раль­ную ве­ли­чи­ну и в бес­пре­це­дент­ном ко­ли­че­ст­ве (рас­ко­пы № 1–4; Линь­тун, пров. Шэнь­си). Эф­фект «порт­рет­но­сти» ста­туй дос­ти­гал­ся при­ме­не­ни­ем фи­зи­ог­но­мич. схем и ас­т­ро­ло­гич. пси­хо­ти­пов. Хань­ская по­гре­баль­ная пла­сти­ка вер­ну­лась к не­боль­шим раз­ме­рам и бы­ла раз­но­об­раз­на. Она соз­да­ва­лась ли­бо в ус­лов­ной ма­не­ре, ли­бо в на­ту­ра­ли­стич. сти­ле. В пер­вом слу­чае ста­ту­эт­ки вы­пол­не­ны при­ми­тив­но, во вто­ром – вы­со­ко­про­фес­сио­наль­но. Пре­об­ла­да­ют изо­бра­же­ния лю­дей, до­маш­них жи­вот­ных, а так­же мо­де­ли до­мов, ку­хон­ных плит, «де­неж­ных де­ревь­ев» и пр. В ка­че­ст­ве ма­те­риа­лов ис­поль­зо­ва­лись ке­ра­ми­ка, де­ре­во, брон­за, неф­рит. В по­гре­баль­ной пла­сти­ке буд­нич­ные сце­ны по­ка­за­ны без идеа­ли­за­ции и очень жи­во. За­да­ча по­гре­баль­но­го иск-ва со­стоя­ла в том, что­бы на­пол­нить склеп энер­ги­ей и рит­ма­ми зем­ной жиз­ни, ко­то­рая все­гда име­ла в К. аб­со­лют­ную эс­те­тич. цен­ность. Сте­ны по­гре­баль­ных ка­мер сплошь ук­ра­ша­лись по­ли­хром­ны­ми ка­мен­ны­ми и ке­ра­мич. рель­е­фа­ми, сю­же­ты ко­то­рых со­от­вет­ст­во­ва­ли жи­во­пис­ным жан­рам. Под­хо­ды к по­гре­бе­ни­ям ук­ра­ша­ла круп­ная мо­ну­мен­таль­ная скульп­ту­ра «стра­жей мо­гил». Со­хра­ни­лись 11 имп. усы­паль­ниц и по­гре­бе­ние Хо Цюй­би­на в ок­ре­ст­но­стях г. Си­ань (пров. Шэнь­си).

Раз­ви­тие ар­хи­тек­ту­ры оп­ре­де­ля­лось нор­ма­ти­ва­ми фэн-шуй. Кар­кас­но-стол­бо­вой ме­тод строи­тель­ст­ва был ос­нов­ным. В юж. ре­гио­нах кар­кас за­пол­нял­ся бам­бу­ко­вой ре­шёт­кой, об­ма­зан­ной гли­ной; в се­вер­ных – кир­пич­ной клад­кой. Т. к. под­валь­ные по­ме­ще­ния под жи­лы­ми по­строй­ка­ми за­пре­ща­лись пра­ви­ла­ми фэн-шуй, то зда­ния воз­во­ди­лись на гли­но­бит­ных сти­ло­ба­тах, об­ли­цо­ван­ных кир­пи­чом. Для то­го что­бы ред­ко по­став­лен­ные де­рев. ко­лон­ны мог­ли вы­дер­жать вес тя­жё­лой че­ре­пич­ной кры­ши, ещё при Чжоу бы­ла раз­ра­бо­та­на сис­те­ма крон­штей­нов до­угун, ко­то­рая пе­ре­рас­пре­де­ля­ла на­груз­ку на опо­ры и по­зво­ля­ла уве­ли­чи­вать вы­нос кры­ши. Кри­виз­на кры­ши обес­пе­чи­ва­ла уда­лён­ный скат во­ды и аэ­ро­ди­на­мич. ус­той­чи­вость кон­ст­рук­ции. Тя­жё­лая кры­ша со­от­но­си­лась с по­ляр­но­стью ян (из оп­по­зи­ции инь и ян), по­это­му её фор­ма вы­ра­жа­ла не­ве­со­мое па­ре­ние. Лёг­кие сте­ны ас­со­ции­ро­ва­лись с по­ляр­но­стью инь, в свя­зи с чем их об­лик во­пло­щал ста­ти­ку и гра­ви­тац. дав­ле­ние. Из­мен­чи­вая иг­ра све­то­те­ни в крон­штей­нах до­угун со­еди­ня­ла эти 2 пла­стич. по­ляр­но­сти в це­ло­ст­ный об­раз. По­доб­ное не­сов­па­де­ние тех­нич. дан­ных и ху­дож. эф­фек­тов яв­ля­ет­ся уни­каль­ной осо­бен­но­стью кит. ар­хит. тра­ди­ции. Еди­ни­цей ар­хит. ком­плек­са был двор с гл. строе­ни­ем в цен­тре или в се­ре­ди­не про­ти­во­по­лож­ной от вхо­да сте­ны. Все­го бы­ло раз­ра­бо­та­но 5 ти­пов зда­ний: па­виль­он дянь, ба­шен­ный па­виль­он тай, бе­сед­ка тин, баш­ня лоу, га­ле­рея лан. Т. к. строе­ния бы­ли де­ре­вян­ны­ми, со­хра­ни­лись толь­ко ос­тат­ки сти­ло­ба­тов, ба­зы ко­лон и че­ре­пи­ца.

В эпо­ху Хань про­цве­та­ло из­го­тов­ле­ние брон­зо­вых зер­кал, из­де­лий из неф­ри­та и ла­ка. На­бор шел­ков вклю­чал глад­кие, кре­по­вые, га­зо­вые, кам­ча­тые и по­ли­хром­ные тка­ни.

«Смутное время» (3–6 вв.)

В этот пе­риод по­ли­тич. раз­дроб­лен­ность стра­ны усу­губ­ля­лась мас­си­ро­ван­ны­ми втор­же­ния­ми ко­чев­ни­ков, ра­зо­ряв­ших ста­рые куль­тур­ные цен­тры. Но со­ци­аль­ные ка­та­ст­ро­фы не при­ос­та­но­ви­ли об­щей по­зи­тив­ной ди­на­ми­ки раз­ви­тия иск-ва, в ко­то­ром за­вер­шал­ся пе­ре­ход от ано­ним­но­сти к ав­тор­ско­му твор­че­ст­ву. Де­цен­тра­ли­за­ция куль­тур­ных про­цес­сов вы­дви­ну­ла на пер­вый план ло­каль­ные ху­дож. шко­лы круп­ных ари­сто­кра­тич. се­мейств, ко­то­рые по сво­ей зна­чи­мо­сти и ус­той­чи­во­сти не­ред­ко пре­вос­хо­ди­ли при­двор­ные цен­тры. Ут­вер­жде­ние лич­но­ст­но­го на­ча­ла в иск-ве со­про­во­ж­да­лось ста­нов­ле­ни­ем тра­ди­ции эпа­та­жа и эс­те­ти­ки на­прав­ле­ния фэн лю («ве­тер и по­ток»).

Се­вер К., на­хо­див­ший­ся под вла­стью чу­же­зем­ных ди­на­стий, был цен­тром со­хра­не­ния ри­ту­аль­но-мо­ну­мен­таль­ных тра­ди­ций хань­ской кал­ли­гра­фии. На юге, где уце­ле­ла кит. го­су­дар­ст­вен­ность, раз­ви­ва­лись ав­тор­ские но­ва­ции, свя­зан­ные с твор­че­ст­вом мас­те­ров се­мейств Вэй, Су, Лу, Си, Юй и Се, а так­же про­слав­лен­но­го се­мей­ст­ва Ва­нов, пред­став­лен­но­го та­ки­ми име­на­ми, как Ван Си­чжи, Ван Сянь­чжи, Ван Вэй­чжи, Ван Ху­эй, Ван Сюнь, Ван Сэн­цянь, Ван Цы, Ван Чжи и Чжи­юн.

Сре­ди но­ва­ций эпо­хи бы­ло по­яв­ле­ние жи­во­пи­си на го­ри­зон­таль­ных свит­ках. Воз­ник­нув как ил­лю­ст­ра­ции к тек­стам, она по­сте­пен­но пре­вра­ти­лась в са­мо­стоят. вид жи­во­пи­си, до­пол­няв­ший тра­диц. сте­но­пись и де­ко­ра­тив­ные рос­пи­си. Как и кал­ли­гра­фич. про­из­ве­де­ния, жи­во­пис­ные ра­бо­ты вы­пол­ня­лись на эла­стич­ной ос­но­ве из шёл­ка или бу­ма­ги и мон­ти­ро­ва­лись в ви­де свит­ка. Обыч­ная вы­со­та го­ри­зон­таль­но­го свит­ка при по­сле­дую­щих ди­на­сти­ях ко­ле­ба­лась от 25 до 40–55 см, а дли­на – от 120–140 до 350 см. Ос­мотр свит­ка на­чи­на­ет­ся с близ­ко­го рас­стоя­ния, что по­зво­ля­ет зна­то­ку вгля­деть­ся в ка­че­ст­во штри­хов и ли­ний и толь­ко за­тем пе­рей­ти к со­зер­ца­нию всей ком­по­зи­ции с не­зна­чит. от­да­ле­ния. Пол­ный цикл про­смот­ра свя­зан как с раз­ма­ты­ва­ни­ем свит­ка, так и с его об­рат­ной на­мот­кой на ва­лик и за­ни­ма­ет не один час. В свя­зи с этим ком­по­зи­ции жи­во­пис­ных про­из­ве­де­ний соз­да­ют­ся с учё­том их дву­на­прав­лен­но­го про­смот­ра: сна­чала спра­ва на­ле­во, за­тем сле­ва на­пра­во при на­прав­лен­но­сти взгля­да зри­те­ля свер­ху вниз. Ес­ли жи­во­пис­ная ком­по­зи­ция не по­де­ле­на ав­то­ром на фраг­мен­ты, от­де­ляе­мые про­ме­жу­точ­ны­ми по­ля­ми, то учи­ты­ва­ет­ся ве­ро­ят­ность её про­из­воль­ной фраг­мен­та­ции зри­те­лем в про­цес­се ос­мот­ра свит­ка.

Сре­ди ху­дож­ни­ков сво­его вре­ме­ни пер­вое ме­сто за­ни­ма­ет Гу Кай­чжи. К кон­цу эпо­хи пей­заж­ные фо­ны, поя­вив­шие­ся ещё в пе­ри­од Хань, эво­лю­цио­ни­ро­ва­ли в са­мо­сто­ят. жанр шань–шуй («го­ры–во­ды»), о чём сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют как письм. ис­точ­ни­ки, так и сви­ток Чжань Цзы­ця­ня «Ве­сен­няя про­гул­ка» (Му­зей Гу­гун, Пе­кин).

В 3–6 вв. про­ис­хо­ди­ло ста­нов­ле­ние эс­те­ти­ки как са­мо­сто­ят. об­лас­ти зна­ния. Воз­ник­ла письм. тра­ди­ция, фик­си­ро­вав­шая бе­се­ды и рас­су­ж­де­ния ко­ри­фе­ев, ад­ре­со­ван­ные не толь­ко чле­нам се­мьи, но и все­му об­ще­ст­ву. Ла­ко­нич­ный стиль тек­стов вос­хо­дил к про­фес­сио­наль­ным по­го­вор­кам и был рас­счи­тан на бо­га­тую изу­ст­ную тра­ди­цию их ком­мен­ти­ро­ва­ния. Дош­ли фраг­мен­ты со­чи­не­ний Ван Сич­жи, Гу Кай­чжи, трак­тат Цзун Би­на «Вве­де­ние в пей­заж­ную жи­во­пись» (кон. 4 – нач. 5 вв.) и трак­тат Се Хэ «За­мет­ки о ка­те­го­ри­ях ста­рин­ной жи­во­пи­си» (500–535).

Кит. куль­ту­ра это­го пе­рио­да впер­вые в сво­ей ис­то­рии ши­ро­ко­мас­штаб­но вос­при­ня­ла чу­же­зем­ные изо­бра­зит. нор­ма­ти­вы, что бы­ло свя­за­но с ак­тив­ным рас­про­стра­не­ни­ем буд­диз­ма. Си­ла адап­та­ци­он­ных ме­ха­низ­мов кит. куль­ту­ры бы­ла столь ве­ли­ка, что ин­дий­ский изо­бра­зит. ка­нон срав­ни­тель­но бы­ст­ро пре­тер­пел кар­ди­наль­ную транс­фор­ма­цию. Круп­ней­ши­ми ан­самб­ля­ми ки­тай­ско-буд­дий­ско­го иск-ва яв­ля­ют­ся пе­щер­ный мон. Мо­гао (см. в ст. Дуньху­ан), скаль­ные хра­мы Бин­лин­сы (5–10 вв.), Май­цзи­шань (4–17 вв.; оба – в пров. Гань­су), Юнь­ган (5–12 вв.; пров. Шань­си), Лун­мынь (5–9 вв.; пров. Хэ­нань), гор­ный буд­дий­ский мон. Сю­ань­кун­сы (ок. 5–17 вв.; пров. Шань­си).


«Буддийские монахи». Фреска «Пещеры тысячи Будд» близ Турфана. 9 в.

Скульп­ту­ра в К. ни­ко­гда не от­но­си­лась к раз­ря­ду вы­со­ких ис­кусств, т. к. тре­бо­ва­ла гру­бо­го фи­зич. тру­да и ин­тел­лек­туа­лы ею не за­ни­ма­лись. По­это­му о скульп­ту­ре не пи­са­лись трак­та­ты, а име­на скульп­то­ров, боль­шин­ст­во из ко­то­рых бы­ли не­гра­мот­ны­ми или ма­ло­гра­мот­ны­ми ре­мес­лен­ни­ка­ми, за­бы­ва­лись. Скульп­то­ры ра­бо­та­ли пре­им. над оформ­ле­ни­ем по­гре­баль­ных ком­плек­сов. Буд­дизм при­нёс в К. тра­ди­цию со­зда­ния об­ра­зов для по­кло­не­ния, что при­да­ло до­пол­нит. им­пульс раз­ви­тию иск-ва вая­ния. Скульп­тур­ные ал­тар­ные ан­самб­ли ста­но­вят­ся гл. эле­мен­та­ми хра­мо­во­го уб­ран­ст­ва. До­на­то­ры за­ка­зы­ва­ли мно­го­мет­ро­вые рель­еф­ные ком­по­зи­ции в скаль­ных хра­мах и пе­щер­ных мо­на­сты­рях. В 4–8 вв. вы­де­ли­лись 6 школ буд­дий­ской пла­сти­ки, обо­зна­чае­мых по на­зва­ни­ям про­вин­ций их пре­иму­ще­ст­вен­но­го рас­про­стра­не­ния: шэнь­сий­ская, шань­сий­ская, хэ­бэй­ская, юго-вос­точ­ная (цзян­су-чжэц­зян­ская), шань­дун­ская и сы­чу­ань­ская. Наи­бо­лее час­то встре­чаю­щи­ми­ся фор­ма­ми по­гре­баль­ной пла­сти­ки, ко­то­рая про­дол­жа­ла раз­ви­вать тра­ди­ции хань­ско­го пе­рио­да с пре­об­ла­да­ни­ем при­ми­тив­ной сти­ли­сти­ки, яв­ля­ют­ся со­став­ные ке­ра­мич. рель­еф­ные пан­но и рель­еф­ные изо­бра­же­ния на сар­кофа­гах (нек­ро­поль из 31 за­хо­ро­не­ния в ок­ре­ст­но­стях Нан­ки­на, 5–7 вв.). В па­мят­ни­ках при­клад­но­го иск-ва за­мет­ны ин­дий­ское и ближ­не­во­сточ­ное влия­ния. Луч­шие об­раз­цы ке­ра­ми­ки ка­мен­ной мас­сы из­го­тав­ли­ва­лись мас­тер­ски­ми в Хун­чжоу (пров. Цзян­су), Уч­жоу (пров. Чжэц­зян) и Юэч­жоу (пров. Ху­бэй).

Империи Суй и Тан (кон. 6 – нач. 10 вв.)

В эпо­ху ди­на­стий Суй и Тан иск-во пе­ре­жи­ва­ет но­вый этап объ­е­ди­не­ния ре­гио­наль­ных ху­дож. тра­ди­ций, от­ли­чит. осо­бен­но­стью ко­то­ро­го бы­ло со­че­та­ние глу­бин­но­го эт­но­цен­триз­ма с кос­мо­по­ли­тич. от­кры­то­стью, утон­чён­но­го ари­сто­кра­тиз­ма с тя­гой ко все­му про­сто­на­род­но­му. При дина­стии Тан при­двор­ные кал­ли­гра­фы син­те­зи­ро­ва­ли тех­ни­ку пись­ма и ху­дож. приё­мы мас­те­ров, ра­бо­тав­ших в пре­ды­ду­щий пе­ри­од. На ос­но­ве это­го син­те­за ка­ж­дый из них соз­дал собств. ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ный стиль, в сум­ме эти сти­ли об­ра­зо­ва­ли еди­ный для всех по­сле­дую­щих по­ко­ле­ний кал­ли­гра­фов фонд, по­лу­чив­ший ста­тус ор­то­док­саль­ной нор­мы. От­тал­ки­ва­ясь от на­сле­дия Ван Сич­жи, тан­ские мас­те­ра раз­ви­ва­ли кал­ли­гра­фич. тра­ди­цию в двух про­ти­во­по­лож­ных на­прав­ле­ни­ях. Од­но, по­лу­чив­шее назв. нэй е («внутр. сжа­тие»), свя­за­но с ус­тав­ны­ми по­чер­ка­ми, в пла­стич. па­ра­мет­рах ко­то­рых кал­ли­гра­фы на­ра­щи­ва­ли энер­ге­тич. кон­цен­тра­цию форм и уси­ли­ва­ли плот­ность ком­по­зиц. струк­тур (Юй Ши­нань, Оу­ян Сюнь, Чу Суй­лян, Янь Чжэнь­цин и др.). Мас­те­ра др. на­прав­ле­ния – вай то («внеш­нее рас­ши­ре­ние»), та­кие как Чжан Сюй и Ху­ай­су, раз­ви­ва­ли ско­ро­пис­ное на­сле­дие Ван Сич­жи в сто­ро­ну всё боль­ше­го рас­ши­ре­ния ам­пли­туд дви­же­ния ки­стью, что при­да­ва­ло по­чер­кам эф­фект­ность.

Про­из­ве­де­ния тан­ских жи­во­пис­цев дош­ли до нас пре­им. в ко­пи­ях по­сле­дую­щих сто­ле­тий, т. к. вплоть до 10 в. гос­под­ство­ва­ла прак­ти­ка за­хо­ро­не­ния свит­ков вме­сте с их вла­дель­ца­ми. В тан­ское вре­мя поя­вил­ся вер­ти­каль­ный фор­мат жи­во­пис­ных свит­ков (с обыч­ной ши­ри­ной 30–40 см, дли­ной 100–130 см). Вер­ти­каль­ные свит­ки, ко­то­рые, в от­ли­чие от жи­во­пи­си на эк­ра­нах и шир­мах, не пред­на­зна­ча­лись для по­сто­ян­ной экс­по­зи­ции, рас­счи­та­ны на про­смотр в двух на­прав­ле­ни­ях: по ме­ре раз­во­ра­чи­ва­ния свит­ка зна­ток сна­ча­ла ви­дит верх­нюю часть ком­по­зи­ции, за­тем цен­траль­ную и ниж­нюю, а в про­цес­се сво­ра­чи­ва­ния рас­смат­ри­ва­ние про­ис­хо­дит в об­рат­ной по­сле­до­ва­тель­но­сти.


Хань Гань. «Конь «Звезда ночи»». Бумажный свиток. Фрагмент. Сер. 8 в. Метрополитен-музей (Нью-Йорк).

При­двор­ные ху­дож­ни­ки бы­ли при­кре­п­ле­ны к Деп-ту жи­во­пи­си и име­ли чи­нов­ни­чьи ран­ги. По за­ка­зу дво­ра они рас­пи­сы­ва­ли двор­цы, при­сут­ст­вен­ные мес­та и скле­пы зна­ти. Ше­дев­ром мо­ну­мен­таль­ной жи­во­пи­си яв­ля­ет­ся рос­пись за­хо­ро­не­ния прин­цес­сы Юн­тай (706, близ Сиа­ни, пров. Шэнь­си). Ве­ду­щий фи­гу­ра­тив­ный жанр на­зы­вал­ся жэ­ньу («лю­ди и пред­ме­ты»), он вклю­чал в се­бя порт­рет, сце­ны при­двор­ной, го­род­ской и сель­ской жиз­ни, а так­же ис­то­ри­ко-ле­ген­дар­ную те­ма­ти­ку. Назв. хуа­няо («цве­ты и пти­цы») по­лу­чил поя­вив­ший­ся ани­ма­ли­стич. жанр, под­ви­да­ми ко­то­ро­го бы­ли изо­бра­же­ния бы­ков, ло­ша­дей, тиг­ров, дра­ко­нов и рыб. Ак­тив­но раз­ви­вал­ся пей­заж­ный жанр, зна­чи­мость ко­то­ро­го не­ук­лон­но воз­рас­та­ла. Поя­вил­ся жанр ар­хит. ве­ду­ты, позд­нее име­нуе­мый цзехуа («раз­де­ли­тель­ные ли­нии»). Отд. жан­ро­вую груп­пу со­став­ля­ли про­из­ве­де­ния буд­дий­ской и да­ос­ской те­ма­ти­ки.

В тан­ский пе­ри­од обо­зна­чи­лись 2 осн. ли­нии по­сле­дую­ще­го раз­ви­тия жи­во­пис­ной тра­ди­ции. Пер­вая свя­за­на со ста­рой тех­ни­кой гун-би и эс­те­тич. прин­ци­пом се­шэн (букв. – изо­бра­жать жизнь); к ней при­над­ле­жа­ли Ли Сы­сюнь, Ли Чжао­дао, Янь Ли­бэнь, Чжан Сю­ань, Чжоу Фан, Хань Гань и др. Вто­рая ли­ния воз­ник­ла на ба­зе но­вой тех­ни­ки цзянь-би и вы­ра­жа­ла прин­цип се и (букв. – от­ра­жать идею); её ос­но­во­по­лож­ни­ки – Ван Вэй и У Да­оц­зы. Всем на­прав­ле­ни­ям тан­ской жи­во­пи­си при­су­щи мо­ну­мен­таль­ная про­сто­та сти­ля и цель­ность гар­мо­нич­ных об­ра­зов. Круп­ней­ши­ми тео­ре­ти­ка­ми ис­кусства бы­ли Чжан Ху­ай­гу­ань, Ван Вэй, Чжан Янь­юань и др.


Статуя Лэшаньского Большого Будды в горах Линъюньшань (провинция Сычуань). 8 в.

Для ки­тай­ско-буд­дий­ско­го иск-ва в эпо­ху Тан ха­рак­тер­но об­мир­ще­ние не толь­ко вто­ро­сте­пен­ных, но час­то и центр. пер­со­на­жей, в ко­то­рых от­стра­нён­ная идеа­ли­за­ция сме­ни­лась на­ту­ра­ли­стич­но­стью и бы­то­вой кон­крет­но­стью, что сви­де­тель­ст­во­ва­ло об окон­чат. ки­таи­за­ции ин­дий­ско­го изо­бра­зит. ка­но­на. Про­дол­жа­лись ра­бо­ты в ста­рых буд­дий­ских цен­трах, вы­се­ка­лись но­вые скаль­ные хра­мы (Дац­зу). На­ря­ду с ка­мер­ны­ми про­из­ве­де­ния­ми соз­да­ва­лись ко­лос­сы, са­мым круп­ным из ко­то­рых яв­ля­ет­ся 70-мет­ро­вый Лэ­шань­ский Боль­шой Буд­да (8 в.; на горе Линъ­юнь­шань, пров. Сы­чу­ань).

Сто­ли­ца тан­ских им­пе­ра­то­ров г. Чанъ­ань (ны­не Си­ань, пров. Шэнь­си) пред­став­лял со­бой ги­гант­ский гра­до­стро­ит. ан­самбль пл. 84,1 км2. От­сут­ст­вие в кит. куль­ту­ре про­ти­во­по­став­ле­ния ду­ха и ма­те­рии обу­сло­ви­ло един­ст­во нор­ма­ти­вов фэн-шуй для свет­ской и куль­то­вой ар­хи­тек­ту­ры. Храм по­ни­мал­ся как дом для ре­пре­зен­ти­руе­мо­го скульп­ту­рой «те­ла» бо­же­ст­ва, а по­то­му воз­во­дил­ся по тем же пра­ви­лам и в тех же фор­мах, что и дво­рец пра­ви­те­ля. Со­хра­ни­лись буд­дий­ские де­рев. хра­мы в мо­на­сты­рях Нань­чань­сы (782) и Фо­гу­ан­сы (857, оба – в пров. Шань­си).

От­ли­чит. осо­бен­но­стью буд­дий­ско­го хра­ма бы­ла па­го­да. По сво­им функ­ци­ям па­го­ды де­лят­ся на хра­ни­ли­ща, ку­да по­ме­ща­лись ре­ли­к­вии, во­тив­ные пред­ме­ты, свит­ки и мо­на­стыр­ская каз­на, и ме­мо­риа­лы, в ко­то­рые за­му­ро­вы­ва­лись ур­ны с пе­п­лом от кре­ма­ции. К по­след­не­му ти­пу от­но­сит­ся ком­плекс из 500 па­год Та­линь («Лес па­год») 8 в. в мон. Шао­линь на го­ре Сун­шань (пров. Хэ­нань). Раз­ли­ча­ют ма­лые и вы­сот­ные па­го­ды. Ма­лые па­го­ды обыч­но не име­ют внутр. по­ме­ще­ний [квад­рат­ная па­го­да 7 в. в мон. Сю­дин­сы в ок­ре­ст­но­стях г. Ло­ян, пров. Хэ­нань; ок­та­го­наль­ная па­го­да Чань­ши­та («Па­го­да на­став­ни­ка Чань») на го­ре Сун­шань и па­го­да Цзю­тай­та («Де­вя­ти­ба­шен­ная па­го­да»), обе – 8 в., пров. Хэ­нань]. Вы­сот­ные мно­го­сту­пен­ча­тые па­го­ды со­хра­ни­лись в Сиа­ни (пров. Шэнь­си): Да­янь­та (7 в.); Шань­дао (706) в мон. Сянц­зи­сы; Сяо­янь­та (8 в.).

Имп. по­гре­баль­ные ком­плек­сы при ди­на­стии Тан строи­лись с не­обы­чай­ным раз­ма­хом. Ан­самбль из 18 усы­паль­ниц 7–8 вв. на­хо­дит­ся в ок­ре­ст­но­стях Сиа­ни. В не­ко­то­рых ком­плек­сах со­хра­ни­лись мас­сив­ные (выс. 2–6 м) ка­мен­ные из­вая­ния, оформ­ляв­шие «До­ро­гу ду­хов» (в гроб­ни­це Цянь­лин – св. 100 по­доб­ных скульп­тур, в гроб­ни­це Шунь­линь – 30 скульп­тур). По­гре­баль­ная скульп­ту­ра из­го­тав­ли­ва­лась в эпо­ху ди­на­стии Тан в та­ких мас­шта­бах, что при­шлось за­ко­но­да­тель­но ре­гу­ли­ро­вать её раз­ме­ры и ко­ли­че­ст­во со­об­раз­но ран­гам знат­но­сти. Тер­ра­ко­то­вые ста­ту­эт­ки не толь­ко рас­пи­сы­ва­ли, но и на­ча­ли по­кры­вать цвет­ной гла­зу­рью. По­ми­мо тра­диц. об­ра­зов слуг, слу­жа­нок и ак­тё­ров бы­ли по­пу­ляр­ны изо­бра­же­ния иностр. куп­цов и верб­лю­дов.

Во 2-й пол. 1-го тыс. в свя­зи с по­хо­ло­да­ни­ем кли­ма­та в бас­сей­не р. Ху­ан­хэ в К. про­изош­ло из­ме­не­ние уров­ня жи­ло­го про­стран­ст­ва ин­терь­е­ра, рас­про­стра­ни­лись вы­со­кие фор­мы ме­бе­ли и та­кие её но­вые ви­ды, как крес­ла и сту­лья.


Корзиночка для чая. Серебро, позолота. 9 в. Музей монастыря Фамэнсы (Фуфын).

На ру­бе­же 6–7 вв. поя­вил­ся фар­фор, ко­то­рый от­ли­чал­ся от ке­ра­ми­ки ка­мен­ной мас­сы, имев­шей цвет­ной и не­про­све­чи­ваю­щий че­ре­пок, сво­ей бе­лиз­ной и «све­че­ни­ем». Пер­вый фар­фор из­го­тав­ли­ва­ли в мас­тер­ских Дин­чжоу (пров. Хэ­бэй), а в 8 в. за­ра­бо­та­ли пе­чи в ме­ст­ности Цзин­дэч­жэнь (пров. Цзян­си). Но в ко­ли­че­ст­вен­ном и ка­че­ст­вен­ном от­но­ше­нии сре­ди элит­ной про­дук­ции ли­ди­ро­ва­ла ка­мен­ная мас­са, по­кры­тая бес­цвет­ной или цвет­ной гла­зу­рью. Сорт юэтао (ме­ст­ность Юэч­жоу, пров. Чжэц­зян) был зна­ме­нит сво­им свет­ло-зе­лё­ным цве­том. Мас­тер­ские Яоч­жоу под г. Чанъ­ань из­го­тав­ли­ва­ли ке­ра­ми­ку с чёр­ным гла­зур­ным по­кры­ти­ем. При ди­на­стии Тан поя­вил­ся сорт трёх­цвет­ной по­лив­ной ке­ра­ми­ки (сань­цай­тао), центр про­из-ва ко­то­рой на­хо­дил­ся вбли­зи Лоя­на. Рас­пис­ные сор­та ке­ра­ми­ки ка­мен­ной мас­сы вы­пус­ка­лись мас­тер­ски­ми в Тун­гуа­не (пров. Ху­нань).


Сюй Даонин. «Ловля рыбы в горном потоке» («Вечерняя песнь рыбака»). Шёлковый свиток. Фрагмент. 1-я пол. 11 в. Музей искусствим. Нелсона и Аткинс (Канзас-Сити, США).

В тан­скую эпо­ху боль­шой по­пу­ляр­ностью поль­зо­ва­лись по­ли­хром­ные шел­ка. Поя­ви­лись но­вые ти­пы тка­ней: ат­лас, бар­хат, пар­ча. Про­сто­лю­ди­ны, как и пре­ж­де, оде­ва­лись в ко­но­п­ля­ные тка­ни, но воз­ник­ли и пер­вые цен­тры хлоп­ча­то­бу­маж­но­го про­из-ва. Тя­га к рос­ко­ши и кос­мо­по­ли­тизм ху­дож. вку­сов этой эпо­хи наи­бо­лее яр­ко про­яви­лись в из­де­ли­ях из ме­тал­ла. Рас­цвет зла­то- и се­реб­ро­де­ла­ния сов­пал с про­ник­но­ве­ни­ем ти­бет­ско­го и са­са­нид­ско­го влия­ний. Кит. мас­те­ра в со­вер­шен­ст­ве ос­вои­ли но­вые, при­шед­шие с За­па­да тех­ни­ки зо­ло­че­ния, тис­не­ния, че­кан­ки и фи­ли­гра­ни.

Период Пяти династий и империи Сун (нач. 10–2-я пол. 13 вв.)


Ся Гуй. «Светлые просторы гор и стремнин». Шёлковый свиток. Фрагмент. Кон. 12 – нач. 13 вв. Национальный дворец-музей (Тайбэй).

В пе­ри­од Пя­ти ди­на­стий и в эпоху ди­на­стии Сун раз­ви­тие иск-ва под­дер­жи­ва­лось ме­це­нат­ст­вом дво­ра и ча­ст­ны­ми кол­лек­цио­не­ра­ми, со­б­ра­ния ко­то­рых раз­рас­та­лись до мас­шта­бов круп­ных му­зе­ев. Для обес­пе­че­ния вы­со­ко­го куль­тур­но­го уров­ня при­двор­ных имп. Ху­эй-цзун (Чжао Цзи) в 1104 от­крыл при­двор­ную шко­лу кал­ли­гра­фии (Шу­сюэ) и Шко­лу жи­во­пи­си (Хуа­сюэ), пре­об­ра­зо­ван­ную в 1112 в Ака­де­мию жи­во­пи­си (Хуаю­ань).

Кал­ли­гра­фы тя­го­те­ли к рас­кры­тию ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ных ас­пек­тов творч. вдох­но­ве­ния. Де­виз эпо­хи гла­сил: «От­прав­ля­ясь от древ­но­сти, всё бо­лее от­да­лять­ся от неё» (цюй гу и юань). Са­мым вид­ным мас­те­ром эпо­хи Пя­ти ди­на­стий был Ян Нин­ши. Сун­скую кал­ли­гра­фию пред­став­ля­ют шко­лы ве­ли­кой «чет­вёр­ки мас­те­ров»: Цай Сян, Ху­ан Тинц­зянь, Су Ши и Ми Фу.


Му Ци. «Закат над рыбачьей деревней». Бумажный свиток. Фрагмент. 13 в. Музей Нэдзу (Токио).

Со­ци­аль­ный ста­тус жи­во­пис­цев при­бли­зил­ся к по­ло­же­нию кал­ли­гра­фов (не­ко­то­рые из них про­яви­ли се­бя и как вы­даю­щие­ся жи­во­пис­цы). Тес­ней­шая и ор­га­нич­ная связь жи­во­пи­си с фи­ло­со­фи­ей и лит-рой обу­слов­ли­ва­ла её глу­бо­ко ин­тел­лек­ту­аль­ный и меж­кон­фес­сио­наль­ный ха­рак­тер. Пей­заж вы­шел на пер­вое ме­сто в ие­рар­хии жан­ров, ка­ж­дый из ко­то­рых дос­тиг пол­но­ты раз­ви­тия.

В эпо­ху Сун окон­ча­тель­но сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись 4 сфе­ры жи­во­пис­ной тра­ди­ции. Её кон­сер­ва­тив­ный по­люс пред­став­ля­ла ака­де­ми­че­ская, или при­двор­ная, жи­во­пись (гун­тинхуа) в ли­це та­ких мас­те­ров, как Гу Хун­чжун, Чжоу Вэнь­цзюй, Цзин Хао, Гу­ань Тун, Го Си, Чжао Цзи (имп. Ху­эй-цзун), Сюй Дао­нин, Чжан Цзэ­ду­ань, Ли Тан, Ли Ди, Сяо Чжао, Янь Ци­пин, Су Хань­чэнь, Чжао Боц­зюй, Ма Юань и Ся Гуй. Со­че­та­ни­ем фа­ми­лий двух по­след­них мас­те­ров кри­ти­ки обо­зна­чи­ли ака­де­мич. стиль кон­ца пе­рио­да Сун – «шко­ла Ма – Ся». В жан­ре хуа­няо («цве­ты и пти­цы») ра­бо­та­ли Ху­ан Цю­ань, Цуй Бо, У Юань­юй, Ай Сю­ань, И Юань­цзи, Чжао Мэнц­зянь.

По­люс творч. сво­бо­ды и но­ва­ций со­ста­ви­ло на­прав­ле­ние вэнь­жэньхуа, пред­ста­ви­те­ли ко­то­ро­го (Фань Ку­ань, Вэнь Тун, Су Ши, Ми Фу и др.), при­над­ле­жа к со­ци­аль­ной эли­те, не за­ви­се­ли от за­ка­зов. Эти мас­те­ра про­дол­жа­ли ли­нию Ван Вэя и та­ких жи­во­пис­цев, как Дун Юань, Цзюй Жань и Сюй Си. Мас­те­ром бы­то­во­го жан­ра в тех­ни­ке тон­ко­го ту­ше­во­го кон­ту­ра (бай­мяо) был Ли Гун­линь. Пси­хо­тех­нич. экс­пе­ри­мен­та­ми с ху­дож. фор­мой за­ни­ма­лись мо­на­хи-ху­дож­ни­ки буд­дий­ско­го на­прав­ле­ния чань (Лян Кай, Му Ци, Янь Ху­эй, Ин Юй­цзянь и др.). Их твор­че­ст­во бы­ло по­пу­ляр­но в Ко­рее и Япо­нии, но кит. ме­це­на­ты не под­дер­жи­ва­ли чань­ское на­прав­ле­ние, на­хо­дя его из­лиш­не экс­цен­трич­ным и су­гу­бо эзо­те­ри­че­ским. Мно­го­числ. слой ре­мес­лен­ни­ков пред­став­лял чет­вёр­тую сфе­ру – т. н. про­сто­на­род­ной жи­во­пи­си (сухуа), по сво­ей кон­сер­ва­тив­но­сти смы­кав­шей­ся с ака­де­мич. жи­во­пи­сью, об­раз­чи­ки ко­то­рой ци­ти­ро­ва­лись и варь­и­ро­ва­лись нар. мас­те­ра­ми на дос­туп­ном им уров­не. По­доб­ное уст­рой­ст­во жи­во­пис­ной тра­ди­ции по­зво­ля­ло со­хра­нять и про­дук­тив­но раз­ви­вать на­ко­п­лен­ный опыт. Тес­ное взаи­мо­дей­ст­вие всех че­ты­рёх сфер обес­пе­чи­ва­лось един­ст­вом жан­ров и тех­ник пись­ма.

Сто­ли­цей Сев. Сун был г. Кай­фын (пров. Хэ­нань), имев­ший план ром­бо­вид­ных очер­та­ний и сте­ны про­тя­жён­но­стью 27 км. Ком­по­зи­ции двор­цо­вых и хра­мо­вых ан­самб­лей ста­ли слож­нее из-за боль­ше­го ко­ли­че­ст­ва час­тей. Гл. хра­мо­вые па­виль­о­ны воз­во­ди­лись в 2–3 эта­жа. Про­гиб крыш уве­ли­чил­ся, а в крон­штей­нах до­угун поя­вил­ся до­пол­нит. эле­мент – ан. Ар­хи­тек­тор Ли Цзе со­ста­вил свод ар­хит. пра­вил «Ин-цзао фа-ши» (1103). Из де­рев. хра­мов со­хра­ни­лись: па­виль­он Сань­цин­дянь да­ос­ско­го мон. Юань­мяо­гу­ань­сы (пров. Фуц­зянь; 1009); Шэн­му­дянь в мон. Цзинь­сы (пров. Шань­си; 1023–31); гл. па­виль­он свя­тили­ща Гу­ань­ди­мяо (пров. Шань­дун; 1128); храм Гу­ань­инь в мон. Ду­лэ­сы (пров. Хэ­бэй; 11 в.); биб­лио­теч­ный кор­пус в мон. Лун­син­сы (пров. Хэ­бэй; 11 в.); ан­самбль мон. Шаньхуа­сы в г. Да­тун (пров. Шань­си; 12 в.).


Статуя Лао-цзы на горе Цинъюаньшань (провинция Фуцзянь). 12 в.

Де­рев. па­го­ды име­ли ок­та­го­наль­ное се­че­ние, об­ход­ные га­ле­реи на ка­ж­дом эта­же и че­ре­пич­ные кры­ши с ши­ро­ким вы­но­сом: па­го­ды Лю­хэ­та в Хан­чжоу (пров. Чжэц­зян; 970), Шиц­зя­та в мон. Фо­гу­ан­сы (пров. Шань­си; 11 в.). Кир­пич­ные мно­го­гран­ные па­го­ды от­ли­ча­лись оби­ли­ем рель­еф­но­го де­ко­ра, ими­ти­рую­ще­го де­рев. кон­ст­рук­ции: па­го­да Те­та в г. Кай­фын (957), па­го­да мон. Кай­юань­сы в г. Дин­сянь (пров. Хэ­бэй; 11 в.) и «реб­ри­стая па­го­да» мон. Тянь­нин­сы в Пе­ки­не (12 в.). Ана­ло­гич­но де­ко­ри­ро­ва­лись и ка­мен­ные па­го­ды: Цзюч­жо­ута (пров. Сы­чу­ань; 1000) и в мон. Чун­шэн­сы (пров. Юнь­нань; 12 в.). Со­ору­жа­лись па­го­ды, це­ли­ком со­сто­яв­шие из чу­гун­ных кон­ст­рук­ций и плит, напр. в Дань­я­не (пров. Ху­бэй; 1061).

Мо­ну­мен­таль­ная ка­мен­ная скульп­ту­ра пред­став­ле­на па­мят­ни­ка­ми из за­хо­ро­не­ний им­пе­ра­то­ров Шэнь-цзу­на (1085) и Чжэ-цзу­на (11 в.) (оба – в пров. Хэ­нань). Скульп­ту­ра пе­щер­ных буд­дий­ских ком­плек­сов про­дол­жа­ла своё раз­ви­тие пре­им. на юго-за­па­де К., пре­ж­де все­го в Дац­зу. Со­хра­ни­лось боль­шое ко­ли­че­ст­во ал­тар­ной скульп­ту­ры из гли­ны: ан­сам­бли 11 в. – из мон. Хуа­янь­сы в г. Да­тун (пров. Шань­си), груп­па ар­ха­тов мон. Линъ­янь­сы (пров. Шань­дун), один­на­дца­ти­ли­кая Гу­ань­инь из мон. Ду­лэ­сы (пров. Хэ­бэй), ан­самбль в па­виль­о­не Шэн­му­дянь в мон. Цзинь­сы (пров. Шань­си), ан­самб­ли 12 в. – в да­ос­ском хра­ме Эр­сянь­мяо и хра­ме Ду­ню­эмяо, оба – в при­го­ро­де г. Цзинь­чэн (пров. Шань­си). Де­рев. хра­мо­вая скульп­ту­ра пред­став­ле­на триа­дой «Буд­да Шакь­я­му­ни с бод­хи­сат­тва­ми Манд­жуш­ри и Са­ман­таб­хад­ра» в мон. Гу­ан­шэн­сы (пров. Шань­си; 12 в.). Са­мым круп­ным па­мятни­ком брон­зо­вой хра­мо­вой скульп­ту­ры яв­ля­ет­ся 22-мет­ро­вая Гу­ань­инь в мон. Лун­син­сы (пров. Ху­бэй; 10 в.). Бы­ла рас­про­стра­не­на и мо­ну­мен­таль­ная скульп­ту­ра из же­ле­за: стра­жи в хра­ме Чжу­нюэ на го­ре Сун­шань (пров. Хэ­нань; 11 в.). Ше­девр скаль­но­го вая­ния – 5-мет­ро­вое изо­бра­же­ние Лао-цзы в пров. Фу­цзянь (12 в.).


Сосуд. Селадон. 2-я пол. 10 в. Провинция Шэньси. Музей Гиме (Париж).

Про­из-во се­ла­до­нов (до­уцин­тао) – раз­но­вид­но­сти ке­ра­ми­ки с гла­зурью неж­но-зе­лё­но­го цве­та – на­ча­лось при Пя­ти ди­на­сти­ях и ут­вер­ди­лось в эпо­ху Сун. Осо­бен­но про­сла­ви­лись мас­тер­ские в Лун­цюа­ни и пе­чи в Юй­чжоу (все – в пров. Чжэц­зян). Ши­ро­ко при­ме­ня­лись де­ко­ра­тив­ные тре­щи­ны в гла­зу­ри (цэ­ка), а так­же их со­че­та­ние с крас­кой. Фар­фо­ро­вые из­де­лия ста­ли тон­костен­ны­ми, де­кор гра­ви­ро­вал­ся или соз­да­вал­ся в разл. рель­еф­ных тех­ни­ках. Цен­тра­ми фар­фо­ро­во­го про­из-ва бы­ли Дин­чжоу (пров. Хэ­бэй), мас­тер­ские Жу­яо и Цзюнь­яо (обе – в пров. Хэ­нань), пе­чи Цзянь­яо (пров. Фуц­зянь). Но са­мым круп­ным гос. цен­тром был Цзин­дэч­жэнь (пров. Цзян­си), где про­из­во­ди­лись вы­со­ко­ка­че­ст­вен­ная ка­мен­ная мас­са и фар­фор. Сун­ские тка­чи дос­тиг­ли со­вер­шен­ст­ва в тех­ни­ке кэ-сы («рез­ной шёлк»). Мас­тер­ст­во вы­ши­валь­щиц по­зво­ля­ло соз­да­вать точ­ные ко­пии слож­ных жи­во­пис­ных про­из­ве­де­ний.

Империя Юань (2-я пол. 13 – сер. 14 вв.)

При ди­на­стии Юань весь К. ока­зал­ся под вла­стью монг. ха­нов. В этот пе­ри­од кал­ли­гра­фич. тра­ди­ция всту­па­ет в но­вую фа­зу сво­ей эво­лю­ции. До­ми­ни­рую­щая ус­та­нов­ка фор­му­ли­ро­ва­лась как «стрем­ле­ние к гла­вен­ст­ву древ­но­сти» (чжуй цю шан гу), в со­от­вет­ст­вии с ко­то­рой ав­тор­ская кон­цеп­ция бы­ла ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­на на про­ник­но­ве­ние в за­мыс­лы мас­те­ров про­шло­го. Тре­мя круп­ней­ши­ми кал­ли­гра­фа­ми эпо­хи бы­ли Чжао Мэн­фу, Ян Вэй­чжэнь и Чжан Юй.


Цянь Сюань. «Путешествие Чжун Куя». Шёлковый свиток. Фрагмент. 13 в. Государственные музеи (Берлин).

Монг. ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ция офи­ци­аль­но по­кро­ви­тель­ст­во­ва­ла толь­ко буд­дий­ской и да­ос­ской жи­во­пи­си, но бла­го­да­ря твор­че­ст­ву мас­те­ров вэнь­жэньхуа кит. тра­ди­ция не толь­ко со­хра­ни­ла свои прин­ци­пы, но и при­шла к но­вым вы­даю­щим­ся ре­зуль­та­там. Кит. кри­ти­ка вы­де­ля­ет «шес­тёр­ку ве­ли­ких» юань­ских жи­во­пис­цев, ко­то­рую воз­глав­ля­ет Чжао Мэн­фу, да­лее сле­ду­ют Гао Кэ­гун, Ху­ан Гун­ван, У Чжэнь, Ни Цзань и Ван Мэн. Вид­ны­ми мас­те­ра­ми бы­ли Цянь Сю­ань, Лю Гу­ань­дао, Ли Кань, Ли Ши­син, Ван И, Жэнь Жэнь­фа и др. Из мо­ну­мен­таль­ных ра­бот до нас дош­ли рос­пи­си да­ос­ско­го хра­ма Юн­лэ-гун (пров. Шань­си).


«Дорога духов» погребального комплекса 13 императоров династии Мин близ Пекина. 15–17 вв.

В ар­хи­тек­ту­ре шло ак­тив­ное про­ник­но­ве­ние форм ти­бет­ско­го зод­че­ст­ва, что на­шло от­ра­же­ние в па­го­де Бай­та в Пе­ки­не (1271). Рас­про­стра­ня­лась буд­дий­ская тан­трич. ико­но­гра­фия, ши­ро­ко пред­став­лен­ная скульп­ту­рой в брон­зе, де­ре­ве и су­хом ла­ке. В про­цес­се вос­ста­нов­ле­ния раз­ру­шен­ных мон­го­ла­ми ста­рых цен­тров из­го­тов­ле­ния ке­ра­ми­ки об­нов­ля­лись тех­но­ло­гии её про­из-ва, ас­сор­ти­мент и де­кор из­де­лий. Из­го­тав­ли­вал­ся фар­фор с под­гла­зур­ной ко­баль­то­вой рос­пи­сью, на­ла­жи­ва­лось про­из-во пе­ре­го­род­ча­тых эма­лей.

Империя Мин (2-я пол. 14 – сер. 17 вв.)


◀ Интерьер Зала для молитв о добром урожае в Храме Неба в Пекине. 1530 (реконструирован в 1749).
Вход ▶в погребальный комплекс 13 императоров династии Мин близ Пекина. 15–17 вв.

При ди­на­стии Мин соз­на­ние пре­вос­ход­ст­ва нац. куль­ту­ры над все­ми, то­гда из­вест­ны­ми ки­тай­цам, по­влек­ло за со­бой вос­ста­нов­ле­ние и рас­ши­ре­ние ин­сти­ту­тов тра­диц. кит. куль­ту­ры. Бы­ла про­ве­де­на оче­ред­ная сис­те­ма­ти­за­ция и ка­но­ни­за­ция куль­тур­но­го на­сле­дия, пре­ж­де все­го пе­рио­дов Сун и Юань. В разл. об­лас­тях куль­ту­ры про­ис­хо­ди­ла по­ля­ри­за­ция сто­рон­ни­ков и про­тив­ни­ков офиц. ис­кус­ст­ва.


Ваза. Фарфор. 1488–1505. Музей Гугун (Пекин).

Осо­бен­ность эпо­хи за­клю­ча­лась в том, что ве­ду­щие ху­дож. про­цес­сы и наи­бо­лее вы­со­кое ка­че­ст­во про­из­ве­де­ний бы­ли свя­за­ны не с тра­ди­цио­на­ли­ста­ми или экс­пе­ри­мен­та­то­ра­ми, а с про­ме­жу­точ­ны­ми на­прав­ле­ния­ми, ко­то­рые ло­ка­ли­зо­ва­лись не в Пе­ки­не, а в круп­ных про­винц. цен­трах. На­прав­ле­ния раз­ли­ча­лись ме­ж­ду со­бой ли­бо вы­бо­ром ко­ри­фе­ев, ли­бо сте­пе­нью до­пус­ти­мой сво­бо­ды об­ра­ще­ния с на­сле­ди­ем древ­них. Как и при ди­на­стии Сун, мн. кал­ли­гра­фы бы­ли и вид­ны­ми ху­дож­ни­ка­ми. К мас­те­рам на­прав­ле­ния умэнь пай от­но­сят­ся: У Ку­ань, Чжу Юнь­мин, Ван Чун и др. Ли­дер и тео­ре­тик на­прав­ле­ния сунц­зян пай – Дун Ци­чан. Кал­ли­гра­фы Сун Кэ, Ли Ду­нян, Син Тун не вхо­ди­ли ни в од­но из объ­е­ди­не­ний. На­прав­ле­ние кал­ли­гра­фич. экс­цен­три­ки (се) пред­став­ля­ют Чэнь Чунь, Сюй Вэй, Чжан Жуй­ту, Ван До, Фу Шань и др.

В 1420-х гг. бы­ла вос­ста­нов­ле­на Ака­де­мия жи­во­пи­си. Как и в кал­ли­гра­фии, в жи­во­пи­си про­ис­хо­ди­ло бур­ное раз­ви­тие и на­пря­жён­ное со­пер­ни­че­ст­во ре­гио­наль­ных цен­тров и школ, что спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло оби­лию ху­дож. про­дук­ции и её вы­со­ко­му ка­че­ст­ву. Поя­вил­ся ши­ро­кий слой об­ра­зо­ван­ных проф. ху­дож­ни­ков, ра­бо­тав­ших вне гос. ака­де­мич. сис­те­мы. Их не­фор­маль­ным творч. объ­е­ди­не­ни­ем ста­ла «шко­ла Чжэ», воз­ро­ж­дав­шая стиль «шко­лы Ма – Ся»: Дай Цзинь, У Вэй, Лань Ин, Чэнь Хун­шоу и др. Ху­дож­ни­ки «шко­лы У» (умэнь пай) раз­ви­ва­ли на­прав­ле­ние вэнь­жэньхуа: Шэнь Чжоу, Вэнь Чжэн­мин, Вэнь Бо­жэнь, Ван Чун, Чжан Фу­ян, Чэнь Чунь, Цянь Гу и др. Ра­бо­та­ли и ху­дож­ни­ки-оди­ноч­ки: Ван Фу, Ван Мянь, Ма Вань, Тан Инь, Чоу Ин, Сюй Вэй, Чжоу Гун­ся и др. Всем на­прав­ле­ни­ям мин­ской жи­во­пи­си при­сущ эк­лек­тизм как тео­ре­ти­че­ски ос­мыс­лен­ный ху­дож. прин­цип.


Сад Чжочжэнъюань в Сучжоу. 16–19 вв.

В эпо­ху Мин за­но­во от­страи­ва­ет­ся Пе­кин, план ко­то­ро­го со­сто­ит из встав­лен­ных друг в дру­га пря­мо­уголь­ни­ков – За­прет­но­го го­ро­да в цен­тре и Внутр. го­ро­да во­круг. Внеш­ний го­род при­мы­кал с юга. За ним рас­по­ла­гал­ся Храм Не­ба. Во всех ан­самб­лях до­ми­ни­ро­вал прин­цип осе­вой зер­каль­ной сим­мет­рии. Са­мы­ми круп­ны­ми ме­мо­ри­аль­ны­ми ком­плек­са­ми яв­ля­лись по­гре­бе­ние имп. Чжу Юань­чжа­на в ок­ре­ст­но­стях Нан­ки­на и ком­плекс за­хо­ро­не­ний 13 императоров под Пе­ки­ном. Ти­бет­ские и юж.-ази­ат. влия­ния во­пло­ти­лись в но­вом ви­де строе­ний, в ко­то­рых неск. па­год со­еди­не­ны об­щей плат­фор­мой (храм Ута­сы в мон. Дач­жэнь­цзюе­сы, Пе­кин, 1473). Му­сульм. зод­че­ст­во, про­ник­нув в К. в кон. 8–9 вв., бы­ст­ро ут­ра­ти­ло свою спе­ци­фи­ку. В ме­че­ти Цин­чжэн­да­сы в г. Си­ань му­сульм. стиль при­сут­ст­ву­ет толь­ко в де­ко­ре ин­терь­е­ра.


Блюдо. Фарфор. 18 в. Музей Гиме (Париж).

При­клад­ное иск-во эпо­хи Мин от­ли­ча­ет един­ст­во функ­цио­наль­но­го и эс­те­ти­че­ско­го, осо­бо ощу­ти­мое в ме­бе­ли и ке­ра­ми­ке. В Цзин­дэч­жэ­не (пров. Цзян­си) дей­ст­во­ва­ло до 300 ка­зён­ных пе­чей. По­ми­мо си­ней рос­пи­си фар­фо­ра, при­ме­ня­лась и крас­ная под­гла­зур­ная рос­пись. Поя­ви­лись тех­ни­ки над­гла­зур­ной рос­пи­си. Вна­ча­ле это бы­ли трёх­цвет­ные рос­пи­си (сань­цай), а с 16 в. – пя­ти­цвет­ная рос­пись (уцай). К ор­на­мен­таль­ным мо­ти­вам до­ба­ви­лись сю­жет­ные мно­го­фи­гур­ные ком­по­зи­ции и пей­заж­ные те­мы. На пе­ри­од Мин при­шёл­ся и пик рас­цве­та се­ла­до­нов, ко­то­рые ук­ра­ша­лись под­гла­зур­ным вре­зан­ным или лёг­ким рель­еф­ным ор­на­мен­том. Боль­шо­го раз­но­об­ра­зия дос­тиг­ло из­го­тов­ле­ние ла­ков, сре­ди ко­то­рых раз­ли­ча­лись рас­пис­ные, рель­еф­ные, рез­ные, ин­кру­сти­ро­ван­ные, с зо­ло­тым по­кры­ти­ем или зо­ло­тым кра­п­ле­ни­ем. В это вре­мя на­ча­лось мас­со­вое про­из-во пе­ре­го­род­ча­тых эма­лей.

Период династии Цин (сер. 17 – нач. 20 вв.)


Умывальный прибор. Эмаль, полихромная роспись. 1-я треть 18 в. Мастерская Гуанчжоу. Эрмитаж (С.-Петербург).

Втор­же­ние мань­чжу­ров в К. не со­про­во­ж­да­лось гло­баль­ной дез­ор­га­ни­за­ци­ей куль­тур­ной жиз­ни, как при мон­го­лах, од­на­ко узость при­ори­те­тов мань­чжур­ской ад­ми­ни­ст­ра­ции тор­мо­зи­ла раз­ви­тие офиц. иск-ва. Ув­ле­че­ние «ев­ро­пей­щи­ной» при дво­ре не вне­сло су­ще­ст­вен­ных кор­рек­ти­вов в чрез­мер­но кон­сер­ва­тив­ную куль­тур­ную по­ли­ти­ку ди­на­стии Цин. Маньч­жур­ская цен­зу­ра не мог­ла пол­но­стью под­чи­нить се­бе ху­дож. жизнь кит. об­ще­ст­ва, пред­ста­ви­те­ли ко­то­ро­го с дос­то­ин­ст­вом раз­ви­ва­ли нац. на­сле­дие.

В кал­ли­гра­фии со 2-й пол. 17 в. до сер. 18 в. в рам­ках ор­то­док­саль­но­го «на­прав­ле­ния изу­че­ния про­пи­сей» (те сюэ пай) до­ми­ни­ро­вал стиль Дун Ци­ча­на. Бла­го­да­ря твор­че­ст­ву та­ких мас­те­ров, как Чжан Чжао, Лю Юн, Вэн Фан­ган, был со­хра­нён вы­со­кий уро­вень про­фес­сио­на­лиз­ма. Са­мым зна­чи­мым дви­же­ни­ем 2-й пол. 18 – сер. 19 вв. ста­ло «на­прав­ле­ние изу­че­ния стел» (бэй сюэ пай), пред­став­лен­ное кал­ли­гра­фа­ми Цзинь Нун, Чжэн Се, Дэн Ши­жу, И Бин­шоу и др. Для 2-й пол. 19 – нач. 20 вв. ха­рак­тер­но мно­го­об­ра­зие ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ных сти­ли­стич. по­ис­ков в си­туа­ции сбли­же­ния двух вы­ше­на­зван­ных на­прав­ле­ний. Клю­че­вы­ми фи­гу­ра­ми бы­ли Хэ Ша­о­цзи, Чжао Чжи­цянь, У Да­чэн и др.

Кит. жи­во­пис­цам в эпо­ху Цин при­хо­ди­лось пре­одо­ле­вать опас­но­сти ака­де­мич. омерт­в­ле­ния вы­со­кой тра­ди­ции и ры­ноч­ной де­гра­да­ции ху­дож. ка­че­ст­ва. И ака­де­мич. жи­во­пись, и не­за­ви­си­мые на­прав­ле­ния 17 в. на­хо­ди­лись под силь­ным влия­ни­ем Дун Ци­ча­на, раз­ви­вая раз­ные гра­ни его на­сле­дия, за­час­тую в про­ти­во­по­лож­ных на­прав­ле­ни­ях. При­двор­ная (ор­то­док­саль­ная) жи­во­пись от­ли­ча­лась кон­сер­ва­тиз­мом, тех­нич. со­вер­шен­ст­вом и де­ко­ра­тив­но­стью. Её пред­ста­ви­те­ли – «чет­вёр­ка Ва­нов»: Ван Ши­минь, Ван Цзянь, Ван Ху­эй, Ван Юань­ци. К ним при­мы­ка­ли У Ли и Юнь Шо­упин. При­двор­ное си­но-ев­роп. на­прав­ле­ние жи­вопи­си раз­ви­ва­лось на про­тя­же­нии все­го 18 в., но в сре­де кит. ин­тел­лек­туа­лов оно иг­но­ри­ро­ва­лось.

Ор­то­док­сам про­ти­во­стоя­ли мас­те­ра-оди­ноч­ки, т. н. ин­ди­ви­дуа­ли­сты, сре­ди ко­то­рых наи­бо­лее про­сла­ви­лись Чжу Да (Ба-да шань-жэнь) и Ши Тао. Су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли и ре­гио­наль­ные дви­же­ния. Для ань­хой­ской шко­лы (пров. Ань­хой) ха­рак­тер­на тех­ни­ка пись­ма су­хой ту­шью (цянь мо), ко­гда по­лу­су­хой ки­стью на­но­сят­ся ред­кие свет­лые штри­хи, ед­ва обо­зна­чаю­щие фор­мы (Сяо Юнь­цун, Хун-жэнь, Чжа Ши­бяо, Дай Бэнь­сяо, Чэн Суй, Мэй Цин и др.). Стиль нан­кин­ской шко­лы оп­ре­де­ля­ло то­наль­ное бо­гат­ст­во ко­ло­ри­та, соз­да­вае­мое обиль­ны­ми раз­мы­ва­ми влаж­ной ту­ши (ши мо). Сре­ди пред­стави­те­лей шко­лы не бы­ло яр­ко вы­ра­жен­ной сти­ли­стич. общ­но­сти, и ка­ж­дый ра­бо­тал в собств. ма­не­ре (Гун Сянь, Кунь-цань, Чэн Чжэн­куй, Фа Жоч­жэнь, Гао Цэнь, Фань Ци, Ван Кай и др.).

В 18 в. вы­де­ли­лось объ­е­ди­не­ние «Ян­чжоу ба гу­ай» («Во­семь чу­да­ков из Ян­чжоу»), про­дол­жав­шее вы­со­кую тра­ди­цию «ин­ди­ви­дуа­ли­стов», но бо­лее экс­т­ра­ва­гант­но и уп­ро­щён­но; в не­го вхо­ди­ли Цзинь Нун, Чжэн Се, Ли Шань, Ло Пинь, Ху­ан Шэнь, Ван Ши­шэнь, Гао Сян, Ли Фанъ­инь, Хуа Янь, Ло Пинь, Гао Фэн­хань и др. Во 2-й пол. 19 в. сре­ди не­ор­то­док­саль­ных на­прав­ле­ний ли­ди­ро­ва­ла шан­хай­ская шко­ла жи­во­пи­си (Шань­хай хуа­пай), ина­че на­зы­вае­мая при­мор­ской (Хай­пай), ко­то­рую воз­глав­ля­ли Чжао Чжи­цянь и ху­дож­ни­ки се­мей­ст­ва Жэнь: Жэнь Бо­нянь, Жэнь Сюн, Жэнь Сюнь и Жэнь Юй. Сти­ли­сти­че­ски бли­зок к ним был Сюй­гу. В гор. и де­ревен­ских мас­тер­ских ты­ся­чи мас­те­ров спе­циа­ли­зи­ро­ва­лись на книж­ной гра­вюре и нар. кар­тин­ках няньхуа. Сре­ди мно­го­числ. со­чи­не­ний по жи­во­пи­си, на­пи­сан­ных при ди­на­стии Цин, вы­де­ля­ет­ся эн­цик­ло­пе­дич. труд «Сло­во о жи­во­пи­си из Са­да с гор­чич­ное зер­но» (Ван Гай и др., кон. 17 – нач. 18 вв.).

Цин­ский ар­хит. стиль ха­рак­те­ри­зу­ет­ся чрез­мер­ной де­ко­ра­тив­но­стью и сис­те­ма­тич. ис­поль­зо­ва­ни­ем не­ки­тай­ских форм и ти­пов со­ору­же­ний. Про­во­ди­лась ре­кон­ст­рук­ция ста­рых ан­самб­лей: двор­ца Гу­гун в Пе­ки­не, ком­плек­са хра­ма Кон­фу­ция в г. Цюй­фу (пров. Шань­дун) и др. В тра­диц. сти­ле со­ору­жён имп. нек­ро­поль в Цзуньхуа (пров. Хэ­бэй). В си­но-ти­бет­ском сти­ле в 18 в. вы­строе­ны: храм Юн­хэ­гун в Пе­ки­не, па­го­да Цзинъ­чан­баоц­зо­та хра­ма Би­юнь­сы под Пе­ки­ном, храм Пу­тоц­зун­чэн­мяо в у. Чэн­дэ (пров. Хэ­бэй) и др. К бир­ма­но-таи­ланд­ско­му сти­лю от­но­сит­ся храм Мань­су­мань (пров. Юнь­нань, у. Цзин­хун). Си­но-му­сульм. стиль пред­став­ля­ют ме­че­ти в Тур­фа­не (Синь­цзян-Уй­гур­ский ав­то­ном­ный рай­он). В си­но-ев­роп. сти­ле бы­ла оформ­ле­на часть имп. ре­зи­ден­ции в пар­ке Юань­минъ­юань.

При ди­на­сти­ях Мин и Цин про­дол­жа­ет­ся раз­ви­тие са­до­во­го иск-ва, ис­то­рия ко­то­ро­го вос­хо­дит к имп. са­дам пе­рио­да ди­на­стий Шан и Чжоу. В 4–6 вв. по­яви­лись «са­ды серд­ца», пред­на­зна­чав­шие­ся для до­су­га ин­тел­лек­туа­ла. Позд­нее са­ды ста­ли не­отъ­ем­ле­мой ча­стью бы­та всех со­стоя­тель­ных се­мей. На фор­ми­ро­ва­ние ланд­шафт­ных ком­по­зи­ций ре­шаю­щее зна­че­ние ока­зал фэн-шуй. Асим­мет­рия са­да до­пол­ня­ла ре­гу­ляр­ную часть жи­ло­го ком­плек­са. В эпо­хи Мин и Цин су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли имп. пар­ки раз­ме­ром в сот­ни гек­та­ров (пар­ко­вый ком­плекс За­прет­но­го го­ро­да в Пе­ки­не, при­го­род­ный парк Ихэю­ань и др.), не­боль­шие го­род­ские и за­го­род­ные ча­ст­ные са­ды (Чжо­чжэнъ­юань и Люю­ань в Суч­жоу, сад Юй­юань в Шан­хае и др.), хра­мо­вые пар­ки (Сию­ань и Шиц­зы­линь в Суч­жоу, парк Юнь­тай­юань в г. Уси и др.), пар­ки при­род­ных за­по­вед­ни­ков [у оз. Си­ху в г. Хан­чжоу; в г. Гуй­линь (Гу­ан­си-Чжу­ан­ский ав­то­ном­ный р-н) и др.]. В са­до­во-пар­ко­вой тра­ди­ции раз­ли­ча­ют се­вер­ный и юж­ный сти­ли. Для пер­во­го ха­рак­тер­ны круп­ные раз­ме­ры и по­ли­хро­мия; для вто­ро­го – ка­мер­ность и мо­но­хро­мия. Кит. са­ды от­ли­ча­ют­ся оби­ли­ем ар­хит. форм (на­руж­ные и внутр. сте­ны, па­виль­о­ны, бе­сед­ки, га­ле­реи, за­мо­щён­ные пло­щад­ки и до­рож­ки), со­че­та­ни­ем ка­мен­ных го­рок и гро­тов с пру­да­ми и про­то­ка­ми, ог­ра­ни­чен­ным ас­со­циа­ция­ми с клас­сич. тек­ста­ми на­бо­ром фло­ры и фау­ны, смен­ной экс­по­зи­ци­ей цве­тов в горш­ках.

Цен­тром фар­фо­ро­во­го про­из-ва был Цзин­дэч­жэнь (пров. Цзян­си), где по­яв­ля­лись но­вые фор­мы из­де­лий. Фар­фо­ро­вые мас­тер­ские ра­бо­та­ли так­же в Дэ­хуа (пров. Фуц­зянь) и Ланъ­яо (пров. Цзян­си). Воз­ник­ла тех­ни­ка фэнь­цин («раз­брыз­ган­ный ко­бальт») с рос­пи­сью зо­ло­том. В 18 в. ши­ро­ко рас­про­стра­ни­лась под- или над­гла­зур­ная рос­пись крас­ной крас­кой по би­ск­ви­ту. По­ми­мо тра­диц. тем, в рос­пи­сях ак­тив­но ис­поль­зо­ва­лись ср.-ази­ат. и ев­роп. сю­же­ты. Рос­пись в гам­ме «зе­лё­но­го се­мей­ст­ва» в 1730-е гг. сме­ни­лась на гам­му «ро­зо­во­го се­мей­ства». Про­из­во­ди­лись разл. сор­та мо­но­хром­но­го фар­фо­ра: «лун­ная гла­зурь», «чай­ная пыль», «пла­ме­нею­щая гла­зурь», «чёр­ное зер­ка­ло» и др. Тер­мо­стой­кая без­гла­зур­ная ке­ра­ми­ка для чай­ных ком­плек­тов из­го­тав­ли­ва­лась в у. Исин (пров. Цзян­су). В мас­тер­ских Ши­вань (при­горо­ды Гу­ан­чжоу) вы­пус­ка­лась пре­им. ар­хит. ке­ра­ми­ка. В ху­дож. ме­тал­ле 18 в. был по­пу­ля­рен си­но-ти­бет­ский стиль. Вы­со­кий уро­вень со­хра­нял­ся в про­из-ве эма­лей: пе­ре­го­род­ча­тых, вы­ем­ча­тых, рас­пис­ных (кан­тон­ских) и про­зрач­ной эма­ли по се­реб­ру. Сре­ди раз­но­об­раз­ных ла­ко­вых тех­ник осо­бен­но мод­ным был «ко­ро­ман­дель­ский лак» (гу­ань­цай), при­ме­няе­мый в ме­бель­ном де­ле.

Изобразительное искусство 20 – нач. 21 вв.

Ис­то­рия кит. изо­бра­зит. иск-ва 20 в. де­лит­ся на 3 эта­па, со­от­вет­ст­вую­щих пе­рио­дам мо­дер­ни­за­ции тра­диц. об­ще­ст­ва: 1912–49, 1949–76 и по­след­няя чет­верть 20 в. Синь­хай­ская ре­во­лю­ция по­ло­жи­ла на­ча­ло мо­дер­ни­за­ции тра­диц. куль­тур­ных ин­сти­ту­тов: от­кры­ва­лись гос. пуб­лич­ные му­зеи и вы­став­ки, де­мо­кра­ти­зиро­вал­ся ху­дож. ры­нок, ор­га­ни­зо­вы­ва­лись цен­тры сред­не­го и выс­ше­го ху­дож. об­ра­зо­ва­ния, соз­дан­ные по зап. об­раз­цам.

В 1-й пол. 20 в. мно­го­числ. шко­лы кал­ли­гра­фии то про­ти­во­стоя­ли друг дру­гу, то объ­е­ди­ня­лись в бо­лее ши­ро­кие на­прав­ле­ния. Круп­ней­ши­ми кал­ли­гра­фа­ми бы­ли У Чан­ши, Кан Ювэй, Ло Чжэнь­юй, Ли Жуй­цин, Лян Ци­чао, Тань Янь­кай, Шэнь Инь­мо, Юй Южэнь, Дэн Сань­му и др.

Рас­пад при­двор­ной ака­де­мич. сис­те­мы спо­соб­ст­во­вал подъ­ё­му ре­гио­наль­ных цен­тров жи­во­пи­си. Пе­кин­скую шко­лу пред­став­ля­ли Сяо Сунь, Лин Шухуа, Чэнь Шао­мэй, шан­хай­скую – Ван Чэнь, И Да­хань и др.; кан­тон­скую шко­лу – Лян Дин­мин, Чжао Шао­ан и др. Ли­де­ра­ми лин­нань­ской (гу­ан­дун­ской) шко­лы яв­ля­лись Гао Цзянь­фу, Гао Ци­фэн. Тра­ди­ции нац. жи­во­пи­си про­дол­жа­ло на­прав­ле­ние гохуа, воз­ник­шее во­круг та­ких мас­те­ров, как Пань Тянь­шоу, У Чан­ши, Ци Бай­ши и Ху­ан Бинь­хун. Че­рез влия­ние ев­роп. жи­во­пи­си про­шли вид­ные мас­те­ра гохуа Чэнь Хэн­кэ, Ли Шу­тун, Вэнь Идо, Чжан Дао­фан, Сюй Бэй­хун. Пер­вые скульп­то­ры, по­лу­чив­шие зап. об­ра­зо­ва­ние, – Ли Цзинь­фа, Хуа Тя­нью, Лю Кай­цю и др.

По­сле об­ра­зо­ва­ния КНР при­шед­шая к вла­сти КПК ак­тив­но ис­поль­зо­ва­ла иск-во как идео­ло­гич. ору­жие. Мас­те­ром аги­тац. кал­ли­гра­фии был сам Мао Цзэ­дун, а так­же его бли­жай­шие спод­виж­ни­ки Го Мо­жо, Чэнь И, Кан Шэн и Линь Бяо. Не­смот­ря на идео­ло­гич. дав­ле­ние, вы­со­кую тра­ди­цию про­дол­жа­ли Линь Сань­чжи, Ша Мэн­хай и др. Но­ва­тор­ские сти­ли­стич. фор­мы ус­пеш­но раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­ли Чжан Чжэ­нюй и Ли Ло­гун. В жи­во­пи­си мас­лом на­са­ж­дал­ся стиль со­циа­ли­сти­че­ско­го реа­лиз­ма, сре­ди мас­те­ров ко­то­ро­го – Фэн Фа­сы, Чэнь Ифэй, Чэнь Имин, Вэй Цзин­шань. Про­дол­жа­ли свой творч. путь вы­даю­щие­ся мас­те­ра на­прав­ле­ния гохуа: Чжу Цич­жань, Линь Фэн­мянь, Дун Шо­упин, Ли Кэ­жань, Фу Бао­ши, Лю Хай­су, Дин Янь­юн, Цзян Чжао­хэ, Лю Чжи­бай, У Гу­ань­чжун, Ху­ан Чжоу и др. В скульп­ту­ре без­раз­дель­но пре­об­ла­дал си­но-со­вет­ский стиль ре­во­люц. ме­мо­риа­лов, в ко­то­ром ра­бо­та­ли Хуа Тя­нью, Го Ци­сян, Е Юй­шань и др.


Хуан Ци. «Облако в сердце». 1986. Собрание художника.

В по­след­ней четв. 20 в. проф. кал­ли­гра­фич. со­об­ще­ст­во раз­де­ля­ет­ся на 2 ла­ге­ря: тра­диц. ори­ен­та­ции и мас­те­ров, ищу­щих но­вые ре­ше­ния. Сре­ди сто­рон­ни­ков тра­ди­ции раз­ли­ча­ются стро­го ор­то­док­саль­ная ли­ния (Ци Гун, Ху­ан Ци, Ху Вэнь­суй, Ли Пу­тун, Лу Ши, Лю Шань) и об­нов­лен­че­ское кры­ло (Ван Сю­эч­жун, Шэнь Пэн, Кан Инь, Лю Цзян, Оу­ян Чжун­ши, Ху­ан Цзинь­лин и др.). В на­прав­ле­нии экс­пе­рим. кал­ли­гра­фии вы­де­ля­лись ре­фор­ма­то­ры тра­диц. тех­ни­ки и ма­те­риа­лов (Ху­ан Мя­оц­зы, Чжан Дин, Гу Гань, Ван Дун­лин, Чэнь Чжэнь­лянь) и пред­ста­ви­те­ли кал­ли­гра­фич. аван­гар­да, ра­бо­тав­шие в фор­ма­те ин­стал­ля­ций и ви­део­про­ек­тов (Чжан Дау, Пу Лэй­пин, Чжан Ци­ан, Ван Нань­мин, Вэй Ли­ган и др.).


Ай Вэйвэй. «Арбузы». Инсталляция. Фарфор. 2007. Музей Грунинге (Брюгге).

Для совр. К. ха­рак­тер­но раз­но­об­ра­зие жи­во­пис­ных школ и сти­лей. На­блю­да­ет­ся подъ­ём на­прав­ле­ния гохуа (Чэн Ши­фа, Лу Янь­шао, Ши Лу, Лю Шо­укунь, Цзэн Юй­хэ, Я Мин, Гу­ань Шань­юэ, Ли Хуа­шэн, Ли Хун­чжи, Ли Цзюнь­ци и др.). В гра­фи­ке ра­бо­та­ют Дун Кэц­зюнь, У Фан, Чжао Чжунц­зао, Ван Вэй­синь, Ли Шао­вэнь и др. Реа­ли­стич. ли­нию в мас­ля­ной жи­во­пи­си про­дол­жа­ют Бао Цзя, Цзинь Ша­ни, Ли Чжун­лян, Ай Сюнь, Хэ До­лин, Чжу Июн и др. Ряд мас­те­ров на­чи­на­ют раз­ви­вать аван­гард­ную про­за­пад­ную сти­ли­сти­ку (Шао Фэй, Сюй Бин, Гэн Цзя­ньи, Гу Дэ­синь, Фан Ли­цзюнь, Цзэн Фань­чжи, Ай Вэйвэй и др.).

На Тай­ва­не ра­бо­та­ли ху­дож­ни­ки Чжан Да­цянь, Шэнь Яо­чу, Лю Гос­ун, Ху­ан Сянь и др., а сре­ди скульп­то­ров ми­ровую из­вест­ность сни­ска­ли Чжу Мин и Ян Ин­фэн (Юй­юй Ян). В Гон­кон­ге и в Юго-Вост. Азии из­вест­ны ху­дож­ни­ки Люй Шо­угу­ань, Лян Цзю­тин, Ирэн Чоу (Чжоу Люй­юнь). В зап. стра­ны эмиг­ри­ро­ва­ли Чжао Уц­зи, Ван Кэ­пин, Гу Вэнь­да, Ма Дэ­шэн, Гу Сян и др.

Архитектура 19 – нач. 21 вв.


Императорский парк Ихэюань в Пекине. 18–19 вв.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

В гра­до­строи­тель­ст­ве, ар­хи­тек­ту­ре, про­ек­ти­ро­ва­нии пар­ков в 1-й пол. 19 в. про­дол­жа­ли раз­ви­вать­ся древ­ние тра­ди­ции. Но с се­ре­ди­ны сто­ле­тия ар­хи­тек­ту­ра пе­ре­жи­ва­ла упа­док: су­ще­ст­вую­щие па­мят­ни­ки вет­ша­ли, но­вое строи­тель­ст­во поч­ти не ве­лось. К за­мет­ным со­ору­же­ни­ям 2-й пол. 19 в. от­но­сят­ся ком­плекс те­ат­раль­ных зда­ний Дэ­хэю­ань (1892) и пе­ре­стро­ен­ный ан­самбль имп. пар­ка Ихэю­ань (1888) в Пе­ки­не. Кон­фу­ци­ан­ский храм Чао­тянь­гун в Нан­ки­не (2-я пол. 19 в.) де­мон­стри­ру­ет сле­до­ва­ние ка­но­нам са­краль­ной ар­хи­тек­ту­ры, но ха­рак­тер де­ко­ра и про­ра­бот­ка его де­та­лей сви­де­тель­ст­ву­ют о бо­лее низ­ком по срав­не­нию с пре­ды­ду­щи­ми сто­ле­тия­ми уров­не мас­тер­ст­ва.


Собор Бэйтан в Пекине. 1887–89.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

В этот пе­ри­од в Кан­то­не (Гу­ан­чжоу), Шан­хае, Тянь­цзи­не и др. го­ро­дах по­явля­ют­ся (как в рай­онах про­жи­ва­ния иностр. ком­мер­сан­тов и ди­пло­ма­тов, так и за их пре­де­ла­ми) по­строй­ки зап. ти­па в ис­то­ри­че­ских сти­лях (церк­ви, бан­ки, шко­лы), по­сте­пен­но на­чи­на­ет­ся при­ме­не­ние но­вых стро­ит. тех­но­ло­гий и ма­те­риа­лов (чу­гун, це­мент, бе­тон). На ру­бе­же 19–20 вв. в Пе­ки­не воз­во­дят­ся зда­ния в ев­роп. сти­ле: управ­ле­ние Се­вер­но-Ки­тай­ской ж. д., нео­го­тич. ка­фед­раль­ный со­бор Бэй­тан (Си­ши­ку; 1887–1889). Стро­ят­ся нео­го­тич. со­бо­ры Бо­го­ма­те­ри Ро­за­рия в Гао­сю­не на Тай­ва­не (1860) и Св. Трои­цы в Шан­хае (1866, арх. Дж. Г. Скотт), позд­не­клас­си­ци­стич. зда­ние Шан­хай­ско­го клу­ба в Шан­хае (1864). Ус­вое­ние дос­ти­же­ний зап. ар­хи­тек­ту­ры в К. ста­но­вит­ся осо­бен­но ак­тив­ным в 1-е де­ся­ти­ле­тие 20 в. На­ря­ду с иностр. ар­хи­тек­то­ра­ми (Г. К. Мер­фи, Л. Э. Ху­дек), про­ек­ти­ро­ва­ни­ем за­ня­ты мо­ло­дые кит. мас­те­ра, по­лу­чив­шие об­ра­зо­ва­ние за ру­бе­жом (Лу Янь­чжи, Ян Тин­бао). По­сле свер­же­ния имп. вла­сти в 1912 раз­ви­тие пром-сти при­ве­ло к рос­ту го­ро­дов. Наи­бо­лее ин­тен­сив­но за­страи­вал­ся Шан­хай, где ши­ро­ко при­ме­ня­лись жел.-бе­тон. кон­ст­рук­ции, в фор­маль­ном от­но­ше­нии пре­об­ла­да­ли по­строй­ки в ду­хе чи­каг­ской шко­лы, ар де­ко и в ис­то­рич. сти­лях. Фор­ми­ру­ет­ся ком­плекс на­бе­реж­ной Вай­тань (Бунд): не­оре­нес­санс­ный Рус.-Ази­ат. банк (1901, арх. Х. Бек­кер) – од­но из пер­вых жел.-бе­тон. зда­ний в К.; не­оба­роч­ный Шан­хай­ско-Гон­конг­ский банк (1923, бю­ро «Palmer & Tur­ner»; при строи­тель­ст­ве ис­поль­зо­ван чу­гун­ный кар­кас); зда­ние та­мож­ни в сти­ле ар де­ко (выс. 90 м, 1925–27, бю­ро «Pal­mer & Turner»). Ху­дек стро­ит в Шан­хае зда­ния в сти­ле ар де­ко: гос­ти­ни­цу «Парк-Отель» (1931–34; не­бо­скрёб со сталь­ным кар­ка­сом, выс. 86 м), ки­но­театр «Да­гу­ан­мин» на 1900 мест (1933); в ин­тер­на­цио­наль­ном сти­ле – вил­лу Д. В. Ву (1938). Зап. мас­те­ра про­ек­ти­ру­ют зда­ния и в тра­диц. кит. сти­ле, но из совр. ма­те­риа­лов и с зап. прин­ци­пами пла­ни­ров­ки (мед. кол­ледж «Пе­кин – Юни­он» в Пе­ки­не, 1916–21, арх. Г. Хас­си; Ухань­ский ун-т, 1929–35, арх. Ф. Х. Кейлс; кол­ледж Гинь­лин в Нан­ки­не, 1923, Мер­фи).


Гостиница «Парк-Отель» в Шанхае. 1931–34. Архитектор Л. Э. Худек.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

Кит. ар­хи­тек­то­ры пы­та­ют­ся соз­да­вать зда­ния в но­вом нац. сти­ле, ис­поль­зуя дос­ти­же­ния за­ру­беж­ных кол­лег. В ком­плек­се мав­зо­лея Сунь Ят­се­на в Нан­ки­не (1926–29, арх. Лу Янь­чжи) ис­поль­зо­ва­ны об­щая пла­ни­ров­ка имп. гроб­ниц ди­на­стии Цин и тра­диц. де­ко­ра­тив­ные мо­ти­вы в со­че­та­нии с об­щей уп­ро­щён­но­стью форм. К этой же ли­нии от­но­сят­ся ме­мо­ри­аль­ный зал Сунь Ят­се­на в Кан­то­не (Гу­ан­чжоу) (1928–31, Лу Янь­чжи) – ин­тер­пре­та­ция тра­диц. кит. хра­мо­вых ком­плек­сов, и по­строй­ки арх. Дун Даю (зда­ние му­ни­ци­па­ли­те­та Боль­шо­го Шан­хая, 1931–33; ста­рое зда­ние Шан­хай­ско­го му­зея и Шан­хай­ская б-ка, 1934–1935). Гра­до­строи­тель­ст­во К. 1-й пол. 20 в. пред­став­ле­но ген­пла­ном Гу­ан­чжоу (с 1919), со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му бы­ли раз­де­ле­ны но­вые пром. и жи­лые рай­оны. Чан Кай­ши по­ру­чил Г. К. Мер­фи раз­ра­бот­ку ген­пла­на Нан­ки­на в 1928, ко­гда ту­да бы­ла пе­ре­не­се­на сто­ли­ца Кит. Рес­пуб­ли­ки. В кон­тро­ли­ро­вав­шем­ся с 1895 Япо­ни­ей Тай­ва­не в этот пе­ри­од стро­ят­ся зда­ния в ду­хе эк­лек­тиз­ма (Дво­рец ге­не­рал-гу­бер­на­то­ра в Тай­бэе, со­че­таю­щий мо­ти­вы не­оклас­си­ки и юж.-ази­ат. тра­диц. зод­че­ст­ва, 1919, арх. Ухе­ид­зи На­га­но).

С об­ра­зо­ва­ни­ем в 1949 КНР был при­нят курс на фор­ми­ро­ва­ние но­во­го нац. сти­ля. В поя­вив­ших­ся в пе­ри­од 1-й пя­ти­лет­ки (1953–57) зда­ни­ях учи­ты­вал­ся опыт ар­хи­тек­ту­ры СССР 1930–40-х гг.: ла­ко­нич­ные ку­бич. бло­ки оформ­ле­ны ха­рак­тер­ны­ми для тра­диц. кит. зда­ний дву­скат­ны­ми кры­ша­ми с изо­гну­тым про­фи­лем. Т. н. стиль боль­ших крыш на­шёл от­ра­же­ние в про­ек­тах гос­ти­ни­цы «Друж­ба», са­на­то­рия для сту­ден­тов стран Азии и Аф­ри­ки (оба – 1954, арх. Чжан Бо) и Мин-ва строи­тель­ст­ва (1955, арх. Гун Дэ­шунь) в Пе­ки­не. С 1955 это на­прав­ле­ние под­вер­га­лось офиц. кри­ти­ке из-за из­лиш­ней до­ро­го­виз­ны строи­тель­ст­ва и ими­та­ции па­мят­ни­ков «феод. про­шло­го». Со­труд­ни­че­ст­во с сов. спе­циа­ли­ста­ми к кон. 1950-х гг. пре­кра­ти­лось, в пе­ри­од «боль­шо­го скач­ка» воз­ник но­вый ва­ри­ант нац. сти­ля. Он яр­ко про­явил­ся в 10 зда­ни­ях «нац. празд­не­ст­ва», по­стро­ен­ных в Пе­ки­не к 10-ле­тию КНР: воз­ве­дён­ные в 1958–59 зда­ния Все­ки­тай­ско­го со­б­ра­ния нар. пред­ста­ви­те­лей (арх. Чжао Дун­жи), Му­зея кит. ре­во­лю­ции и Му­зея ис­то­рии Ки­тая (арх. Чжан Кай­цзи), Дво­рец куль­туры на­цио­наль­но­стей (арх. Чжан Бо) и др. В них тес­нее свя­за­ны кон­ст­рук­ция и де­ко­ра­ция, ис­поль­зу­ют­ся не­оклас­сич. ком­по­зиц. мо­ти­вы на­ря­ду с тра­диц. ма­те­риа­ла­ми и де­ко­ром (гла­зу­ро­ван­ная че­ре­пи­ца, из­раз­цы, резь­ба). В эту груп­пу так­же вхо­дит ком­плекс но­во­го пе­кин­ско­го во­кза­ла, по­стро­ен­но­го арх. Ян Тин­бао, в ко­то­ром мо­ти­вы нац. ар­хи­тек­ту­ры со­че­та­ют­ся с чёт­кой пла­ни­ро­воч­ной струк­ту­рой и функ­цио­наль­но­стью. Так­же к его ра­бо­там от­но­сят­ся гос­ти­ни­ца «Мир» (1951) и уни­вер­маг «Ван­фуц­зин» (1954) в Пе­ки­не, про­ек­ты ко­то­рых от­ли­ча­ют­ся чёт­ко­стью чле­не­ния фа­са­да и сдер­жан­но­стью де­ко­ра. На Тай­ва­не в пе­ри­од с 1949 по 1980-е гг. соз­да­ют­ся по­строй­ки в ду­хе «нац. воз­ро­ж­де­ния»: ме­мо­ри­ал Чан Кай­ши (1976–80), в его ос­но­ве – про­ект мав­зо­лея Сунь Ят­се­на в Нан­ки­не; Нац. те­атр и Нац. кон­церт­ный зал (оба 1987) в Тай­бэе (все – арх. Ян Чо­чэн), ин­тер­пре­ти­рую­щие древ­ние ка­но­ны строи­тель­ст­ва двор­цо­вых и хра­мо­вых ком­плек­сов. В 1990–2000-х гг. на Тай­ва­не ар­хи­тек­то­ры ра­бо­та­ют в «нац. сти­ле» (не­бо­скрёб «Taipei 101», выс. 510 м, в Тай­бэе, 1999–2004, бю­ро «C. Y. Lee & Partners») и в рус­ле не­омо­дер­низ­ма (Глав­ная б-ка ун-та Юань­цзэ в Таою­а­не, 1995–98, арх. Крис Яо).


Храм Юэяцюань близ Дуньхуана. Кон. 20 в.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

С на­ча­лом в 1966 «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» гражд. строи­тель­ст­во на тер­ри­то­рии КНР поч­ти пол­но­стью ос­та­но­ви­лось. При­ня­тие пра­ви­тель­ст­вом ре­ше­ния о ли­бе­ра­ли­за­ции эко­но­ми­ки (1978) по­ло­жи­ло на­ча­ло но­во­му эта­пу раз­ви­тия ар­хи­тек­ту­ры. В 1979–82 амер. ар­хи­тек­тор (кит. про­ис­хо­ж­де­ния) Й. М. Пей по­стро­ил в Пе­ки­не гос­ти­ни­цу «Сян­шань», при соз­да­нии ко­то­рой ис­поль­зо­ва­ние приё­мов тра­диц. кит. ланд­шафт­но­го ди­зай­на и сис­те­мы дво­ров как ос­но­вы ком­по­зи­ции ком­плек­са со­че­та­лось с ла­ко­нич­ны­ми фор­ма­ми кор­пу­сов оте­ля, сдер­жан­ным ис­поль­зо­ва­ни­ем де­ко­ра. Вновь на­чи­на­ют­ся по­ис­ки нац. сти­ля: Нац. б-ка Ки­тая в Пе­ки­не (1987, ар­хи­тек­то­ры Ян Тин­бао, Чжан Бо и др.) и Зап. пе­кин­ский во­кзал (1996, арх. Чжу Цзянь­лу) увен­ча­ны ши­ро­ки­ми кры­ша­ми с изо­гну­тым про­фи­лем. Прин­ци­пи­аль­но иной под­ход к на­сле­дию нац. ар­хи­тек­ту­ры про­де­мон­стри­ро­ван при ре­кон­ст­рук­ции пе­кин­ско­го ху­ту­на (квар­та­ла) Цзю­эж (1990, арх. У Ля­нюн), пре­вра­тив­шей его в совр. жи­лой ком­плекс с со­хра­не­ни­ем струк­ту­ры. К «нац. дви­же­нию» мож­но так­же от­не­сти на­прав­ле­ние ре­гио­на­лиз­ма.


Музей искусств Центральной академии художеств КНР в Пекине. 2008. Архитектор Арата Исодзаки.


Фото Л. Ю. Иляхиной

Кит. ар­хи­тек­то­ра­ми соз­да­ют­ся ра­бо­ты в сти­ле по­стмо­дер­низ­ма (Б-ка ун-та Цин­хуа в Пе­ки­не, 1991, арх. Гу­ань Чжа­ое; Шан­хай­ский му­зей, 1992–96, арх. Син Тун­хэ) и не­омо­дер­низ­ма (Ме­мо­ри­ал по­гиб­шим от рук япон. за­хват­чи­ков в Нан­ки­не, 1985, арх. Ци Кан; ком­плекс «Ком­му­на Ве­ли­кой Ки­тай­ской сте­ны» близ Пе­ки­на, 2002, ар­хи­тек­то­ры Ян Хо­чан, Га­ри Чан, К. Ку­ма, С. Бан и др.). В 1980–2000-е гг. в К. ак­тив­но ра­бо­та­ют за­ру­беж­ные ар­хи­тек­то­ры (не­бо­скрёб Цзинь Мао в Шан­хае, 1998, бю­ро «Skidmor, Owings & Mer­rill»; ком­плекс Центр. кит. те­ле­ви­де­ния в Пе­ки­не, бю­ро ОМА, 2002–08; тер­ми­нал 3 Пе­кин­ско­го ме­ж­ду­нар. аэ­ро­пор­та, 2003–08, арх. Н. Фостер; Му­зей куль­ту­ры Лян­чжу в Лян­чжу, 2003–07, арх. Д. Чип­пер­филд). Ак­тив­ное строи­тель­ст­во бы­ло при­уро­че­но к Олим­пиа­де 2008 в Пе­ки­не (Олим­пий­ский ста­ди­он, 2002–08, бю­ро «Her­zog & de Meuron»; ин­фор­мац. центр «Циф­ро­вой Пе­кин», 2005–08, ар­хи­тек­то­ры Чжу Пэй и У Тун).

Ар­хи­тек­ту­ра Сян­га­на (Гон­кон­га), на­хо­див­ше­го­ся до 1997 под уп­рав­ле­ни­ем Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии, бы­ла тес­но свя­за­на с бри­тан­ской. Для за­строй­ки 2-й пол. 19 – нач. 20 вв. ха­рак­тер­на не­оклас­си­ка (Ра­ту­ша, 1869, арх. Мэтр Эр­мит; зда­ние За­ко­но­дат. со­ве­та, 1912, арх. А. Уэбб), позд­нее поя­ви­лись по­строй­ки в сти­ле ар де­ко (ры­нок Вань­чай, 1937) и «совр. дви­же­ния» (Центр. ры­нок, 1938). Из-за не­хват­ки тер­ри­то­рий под за­строй­ку ак­тив­но раз­ви­ва­лось вы­сот­ное строи­тель­ст­во; на ру­бе­же 20–21 вв. в Сян­га­не на­счи­ты­ва­лось до 7 тыс. не­бо­скрё­бов (в т. ч. зда­ние HSBC, 1979–86, арх. Н. Фос­тер; баш­ня «Bank of Chi­na», 1989, арх. Й. М. Пэй; зда­ние «Ci­tigroup», 1992, арх. Р. Им). На ис­кусств. ост­ро­ве в 1998 от­крыл­ся ме­ж­ду­нар. аэ­ро­порт Чэк­лап­кок (арх. Н. Фос­тер).

Об иск-ве Ти­бе­та см. в ст. Ти­бет­ский ав­то­ном­ный рай­он.

Музыка

Му­зы­ка К. объ­е­ди­ня­ет св. 50 нац. тра­ди­ций: тай­ских (чжуа­ны, мяо-яо), тюрк­ских (уй­гу­ры, ка­за­хи, кир­ги­зы) на­ро­дов, ти­бет­цев, мон­го­лов и др. Са­мые ран­ние па­мят­ни­ки муз. куль­ту­ры К. от­но­сят­ся к 6–5-му тыс. до н. э. (кос­тя­ные про­доль­ные флей­ты, най­ден­ные в пров. Хэ­нань, и др.), наи­бо­лее ран­ние изо­бра­же­ния муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов – к эпо­хе Инь (Шан). В про­цес­се раз­ви­тия кит. му­зы­ка взаи­мо­дей­ст­во­ва­ла с куль­ту­ра­ми Юж., Центр. и Зап. Азии. Ока­за­ла силь­ное влия­ние на фор­ми­ро­ва­ние муз. куль­тур Вьет­на­ма, Ко­реи, Япо­нии. Кит. му­зы­ка рас­про­стра­не­на, по­ми­мо тер­ри­то­рии К., в Син­га­пу­ре и ря­де др. стран Юго-Вост. Азии. Древ­ней­ший пласт кит. му­зы­ки свя­зан с нар. куль­та­ми и прак­ти­кой ша­ма­низ­ма, на их ос­но­ве сло­жи­лась да­ос­ская об­ря­до­вая прак­ти­ка, вклю­чаю­щая му­зы­каль­но-тан­це­валь­ные дей­ст­ва.

В Древ­нем Ки­тае по­ня­тие «му­зы­ка» (юэ; сло­во из­вест­но с 12 в. до н. э.) обо­зна­ча­ло слож­ный син­кре­тич. ком­плекс. В 13–12 вв. до н. э. сло­жил­ся ста­тус проф. мас­те­ра-му­зы­кан­та. Позд­нее (до 6 в. до н. э.) юэ (му­зы­ка и та­нец) вхо­ди­ло в сис­те­му «ше­с­ти ис­кусств» (люи; на­ря­ду со стрель­бой из лу­ка, управ­ле­ни­ем ко­лес­ни­цей, кал­ли­гра­фи­ей, ма­те­ма­ти­кой, эти­ке­том). Впо­след­ст­вии юэ кон­кре­ти­зи­ро­ва­лось как иск-во зву­ков (инь­юэ).


Маска персонажа традиционной музыкальной драмы. Традиционные народные вырезки из бумаги чуан-хуа.

Ещё в древ­но­сти сло­жи­лись идео­ло­гич., эс­те­тич. и тео­ре­тич. ос­но­вы кит. му­зы­ки, свя­зан­ные гл. обр. с кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­вом и дао­сиз­мом. Му­зы­ка рас­смат­ри­ва­лась как по­ро­ж­де­ние дао, од­на из суб­стан­ций бы­тия, и ос­мыс­ля­лась как зву­ко­вая реа­ли­за­ция прин­ци­па инь – ян, свя­зы­ва­лась с пер­во­энер­ги­ей ци. Стро­гая сим­во­ли­ко-чи­сло­вая ор­га­ни­за­ция му­зы­ки опи­ра­лась на прин­цип пя­ти пер­во­эле­мен­тов, ко­то­рым со­от­вет­ст­во­ва­ли 5 сту­пе­ней зву­ко­ря­да (кон­цеп­ция ла­да – тяо – опи­са­на в сло­ва­ре «Эръя» и др. ис­точ­ни­ках 3 в. до н. э.), на­хо­ди­лась в со­от­вет­ст­вии с 12 зна­ка­ми зо­диа­ка. Сло­жи­лась сис­те­ма клас­си­фи­ка­ции муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов ба­инь («во­семь зву­ков»), свя­зан­ная с 8 три­грам­ма­ми (со­ста­вив­ши­ми ос­но­ву гек­са­грамм кн. «И цзин», 1-я пол. 1-го тыс. до н. э.) и ос­но­ван­ная на ко­ор­ди­на­ции ма­те­риа­лов, из ко­то­рых сде­ла­ны ин­ст­ру­мен­ты или их осн. час­ти (гли­на, ка­мень, ме­талл, ко­жа, де­ре­во, бам­бук, ты­к­ва, шёлк), со сто­ро­на­ми све­та, вре­ме­на­ми го­да и т. д. Сфор­ми­ро­валась прак­ти­ка ор­ке­ст­ро­во­го ис­пол­ни­тель­ст­ва (древ­ней­шая в ми­ре), при­чём ор­ке­ст­ры вклю­ча­ли 3 груп­пы ин­ст­ру­мен­тов: удар­ные, ду­хо­вые, струн­ные. Му­зы­ка бы­ла при­зва­на пе­ре­да­вать не­кое уни­вер­саль­ное со­дер­жа­ние; соз­да­ние «пра­виль­ной» му­зы­ки пре­сле­до­ва­ло цель дос­ти­же­ния все­лен­ско­го рав­но­ве­сия (за соз­да­ние «не­пра­виль­ной», «без­нрав­ст­вен­ной» му­зы­ки в Древ­нем К. под­вер­га­ли смерт­ной каз­ни). Бу­ду­чи ас­пек­том офиц. идео­ло­гии – кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва, му­зы­ка слу­жи­ла од­ним из средств упо­ря­до­че­ния со­ци­аль­ных и гос. от­но­ше­ний, рег­ла­мен­та­ции всех об­лас­тей жиз­ни. Муз. жизнь бы­ла ор­га­ни­зо­ва­на в со­от­вет­ст­вии с ас­т­ро­ло­гич. ка­лен­да­рём; сло­жил­ся 12-то­но­вый муз. строй люй-люй с учё­том аб­со­лют­ной вы­со­ты зву­ков (од­но из ран­них под­роб­ных из­ло­же­ний – в трак­та­те «Люй­ши чунь­цю», 239 до н. э.). С во­ца­ре­ни­ем ка­ж­дой но­вой ди­на­стии осн. тон строя люй-люй из­ме­нял­ся в со­от­вет­ст­вии с аст­ро­ло­гич. па­ра­мет­ра­ми ди­на­стии, со­от­вет­ст­вен­но пе­ре­на­страи­ва­лись ин­ст­ру­мен­ты при­двор­но­го ор­ке­ст­ра, вклю­чая ко­ло­ко­ла и ли­то­фо­ны. В эпо­ху Чжоу бы­ла тео­ре­ти­че­ски оформ­ле­на ла­до­вая сис­те­ма, ос­но­ван­ная на 6 «муж­ских» и 6 «жен­ских» 5–7-сту­пен­ных ла­дах. Ис­пол­ни­тель­ская прак­ти­ка ба­зи­рова­лась на кон­цеп­ци­ях ли (ри­ту­ал) и вэнь (ху­дож. фор­ма), сфор­му­ли­ро­ван­ных в «Ли цзи» – «Кни­ге ри­туа­лов» (4–1 вв. до н. э.). Кон­фу­ци­ан­ская идея юэ раз­ви­ва­лась в трак­та­тах на про­тя­же­нии ты­ся­че­ле­тия [от «Юэц­зи» (раз­дел «Ли цзи») до «Юэшу» Чэнь Яна (нач. 12 в. н. э.)].

В эпо­ху Чжоу ис­пол­не­ни­ем при­двор­ной ор­ке­ст­ро­вой му­зы­ки и тан­ца­ми ве­да­ла при­двор­ная па­ла­та Да­сы­юэ, вклю­чав­шая ок. 1,5 тыс. чел. (му­зы­кан­та­ми бы­ли и муж­чи­ны, как пра­ви­ло сле­пые, и жен­щи­ны). В лит. па­мят­ни­ках упо­ми­на­ют­ся св. 70 муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов, сре­ди них – ко­ло­ко­ла чжун, ли­то­фо­ны цин, ба­ра­ба­ны гу, щип­ко­вые цит­ры цинь, сэ, про­доль­ные и по­пе­реч­ные флей­ты, губ­ной ор­ган шэн, ока­ри­на сюнь, мно­го­стволь­ная флей­та пай­сяо. Муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­ты опи­са­ны в кон­фу­ци­ан­ских тек­стах («Чжоу ли», ок. 3 в. до н. э.), сло­ва­рях «Эръя», «Шо­вэнь» Сюй Шэ­ня (ок. 120 н. э.), позд­нее – в эн­цик­ло­пе­дии «Тун Дянь» (801). Ди­на­стий­ные хро­ни­ки, лит. и фи­лос. тек­сты со­дер­жат све­де­ния толь­ко о при­двор­ной ор­ке­ст­ро­вой му­зы­ке (гл. обр. ри­ту­аль­ной кон­фу­ци­ан­ской), ко­то­рая пе­ре­жи­ла пе­ри­од рас­цве­та в 10–4 вв. до н. э., по­нес­ла урон в свя­зи с го­не­ния­ми на кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­во при ди­на­стии Цинь и бы­ла воз­ро­ж­де­на при ди­на­сти­ях Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань. В пе­ри­од Хань при­двор­ная му­зы­ка бы­ла раз­де­ле­на на 2 ка­те­го­рии: ри­ту­аль­ная куль­то­вая (яюэ) и раз­вле­ка­тель­ная (во­каль­ные жан­ры, ос­но­ван­ные на нар. пес­нях; те­ат­ра­ли­зо­ван­ные пред­став­ле­ния, в т. ч. тан­це­валь­ные – «во­ен­ные» и «гра­ж­дан­ские»). При­двор­ный ор­кестр вклю­чал ок. 830 му­зы­кан­тов, тан­це­валь­ная труп­па – св. 130 чел. Муз. жизнь рег­ла­мен­ти­ро­ва­лась при­двор­ной Муз. па­ла­той Юэфу (об­ра­зо­ва­на в прав­ле­ние имп. У-ди, 140–87 до н. э.; в её со­ста­ве бы­ло 829 му­зы­кан­тов), ко­то­рая ве­да­ла так­же сбо­ром и об­ра­бот­кой нар. пе­сен для вклю­че­ния их в ре­пер­ту­ар при­двор­ной му­зы­ки. В рам­ках Мин-ва ри­туа­лов и му­зы­ки бы­ла так­же уч­ре­ж­де­на па­ла­та, ве­даю­щая во­ен. му­зы­кой, на­ря­ду с Даю­эшу (Па­ла­той Ве­ли­кой му­зы­ки), кон­тро­ли­ро­вав­шей при­двор­ную раз­вле­кат. му­зы­ку. Поя­ви­лись му­зы­каль­но-те­ат­раль­ные пред­став­ле­ния пин­лэ­гу­ань («сто игр»). Муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­та­рий по­пол­нил­ся гон­га­ми ло.

В пер­вые ве­ка н. э. рас­про­стра­ни­лась му­зы­ка буд­дий­ско­го ри­туа­ла (пес­но­пе­ния шэн­мин на сан­ск­ри­те, осн. жанр – фан­па; см. в ст. Буд­дизм, раз­дел Му­зы­каль­ная куль­ту­ра). В кит. му­зы­ку про­ник­ли эле­мен­ты инд. муз. тео­рии, инд. тех­ни­ка ме­ло­дич. ор­на­мен­та­ции и др. В 3 в. по­лу­чи­ла ши­ро­кое раз­ви­тие тра­ди­ция соль­но­го ис­пол­ни­тель­ст­ва на ци­не. В муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­та­рий до­ба­ви­лись та­рел­ки бо, за­ве­зён­ные из Центр. Азии.

Ян Гуйфэй – женский персонаж пекинской оперы в традиционных костюме и гриме.

С 5–6 вв. рас­про­стра­ня­лись пе­сен­но-тан­це­валь­ные пред­став­ле­ния инд. и перс. про­ис­хо­ж­де­ния, но­вые муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­ты: лют­ня пи­па, го­бой би­ли, уг­ло­вая перс. ар­фа чанг (кит. назв. – кун­хоу), ба­ра­ба­ны в фор­ме пе­соч­ных ча­сов. Вклю­че­ние в при­двор­ный ре­пер­ту­ар му­зы­ки не­ки­тай­ско­го про­ис­хо­ж­де­ния (из кор. го­су­дарств, Са­мар­кан­да и Бу­ха­ры, Ти­бе­та и др.) обу­сло­ви­ло ин­тер­на­цио­наль­ный ха­рак­тер при­двор­ной му­зы­ки К., ко­то­рая дос­тиг­ла рас­цве­та в эпо­ху Тан. Муз. цен­тра­ми ста­ли Чанъ­ань (ны­не Си­ань), Ло­ян, Ян­чжоу, Чэн­ду. При дво­ре функ­цио­ни­ро­ва­ли 6 спец. муз. уч­ре­ж­де­ний, в т. ч. Даю­эшу и муз. шко­лы для имп. га­ре­ма. Вне дво­ра в 7 в. су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли муз. учеб­ные за­веде­ния для «де­ву­шек чай­ных до­мов». В 714 имп. Сю­ань-цзун в Чанъ­а­ни ос­новал му­зы­каль­но-те­ат­раль­ное учеб­ное уч­ре­ж­де­ние Лию­ань («Гру­ше­вый сад»), где обу­ча­лось ок. 300 му­зы­кан­тов, на его ос­но­ве бы­ло соз­да­но учеб­ное за­ве­де­ние Сянь­шао-юань («Двор му­зы­ки не­бо­жи­те­лей»). При­двор­ные му­зы­кан­ты име­ли ста­тус гос. ра­бов и де­ли­лись на 5 ран­гов. В Чанъ­а­ни функ­цио­ни­ро­ва­ли 4 ор­ке­ст­ра: кон­фу­ци­ан­ский ри­ту­аль­ный, имп. це­ре­мо­ни­аль­ный, во­ен­ный и ор­кестр имп. га­ре­ма. В эту эпо­ху раз­ви­ва­лись ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ная и во­каль­но-ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ная тра­ди­ции, с 6 в. но­ти­ро­ва­лась му­зы­ка для цит­ры цинь, по­лу­чил рас­про­стра­не­ние но­вый ин­ст­ру­мент – ме­тал­ло­фон фан­сянь. Воз­ник­ли 12-ча­ст­ная те­ат­ра­ли­зо­ван­ная во­каль­но-ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ная фор­ма да­цюй (в эпо­хи Тан и Суй бы­ло соз­да­но св. 3 тыс. ком­по­зи­ций, по со­дер­жа­нию свя­зан­ных с ис­то­рич. и об­ществ. со­бы­тия­ми), ка­мер­ный во­каль­но-ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ный жанр цза­цюй­цзы (пе­ре­ло­же­ние на 8-доль­ную ме­ло­дию 5–7-сло­го­вых сти­хов); раз­ви­ва­лись тра­ди­ции иг­ры на ци­не, эпич. ге­ро­ич. ска­за­ний в со­про­во­ж­де­нии пи­пы (ска­зи­те­ли объ­е­ди­ня­лись в гиль­дии).

Фор­ми­ро­ва­ние но­вых об­ществ. сло­ёв (куп­цы, тор­гов­цы), ак­тив­ная ур­ба­ни­за­ция в эпо­ху Сун обу­сло­ви­ли рост по­пу­ляр­но­сти зре­лищ­ных ви­дов ис­кусств. Раз­ви­вал­ся поя­вив­ший­ся ещё в 8 в. на ос­но­ве нар. пе­сен­но­го твор­че­ст­ва во­каль­ный жанр цы; ис­пол­няе­мый проф. пе­ви­ца­ми на разг. язы­ке, он стал ве­ду­щим гор. жан­ром и ока­зал ог­ром­ное влия­ние на раз­ви­тие кит. клас­сич. те­ат­ра, ко­то­рый стал пре­об­ла­даю­щей фор­мой реа­ли­за­ции кит. му­зы­ки в 13–19 вв. На клас­сич. те­атр ока­зал влия­ние и жанр ис­то­рич. ска­за (ти­па бал­ла­ды) шо­чан. В 13 в. об­рёл клас­сич. фор­му жанр муз. дра­мы цза­ц­зюй, за­ро­див­ший­ся на се­ве­ре К. и бы­ст­ро рас­про­стра­нив­ший­ся по всей стра­не. В цзац­зюй ре­чи­та­тив­ные диа­ло­ги че­ре­до­ва­лись с «ария­ми» (цюй) гл. ге­ро­ев (су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло ок. 65 стан­дарт­ных ме­ло­дий), ор­кестр вклю­чал пи­пу, по­пе­реч­ные флей­ты, ба­ра­ба­ны, гонг, де­рев. тре­щот­ки. На юге К. сфор­ми­ро­вал­ся му­зы­каль­но-те­ат­раль­ный жанр нань­си, раз­ви­вал­ся муз. ку­коль­ный те­атр (из­вест­ный ещё в эпо­ху Тан). Во­шёл в мо­ду фрик­ци­он­ный (позд­нее смыч­ко­вый) муз. ин­ст­ру­мент си­цинь (про­то­тип ши­ро­ко рас­про­стра­нив­ших­ся позд­нее ин­ст­ру­мен­тов се­мей­ст­ва ху­цинь). В эпо­ху Сун соз­да­ны эн­цик­ло­пе­дич. труд «Юэшу» Чэнь Яна и муз.-эс­те­тич. трак­тат «Мэн­ци би­тань» Шэнь Ко.

В эпо­ху Мин осн. му­зы­каль­но-те­ат­раль­ным жан­ром ста­ла 4-акт­ная дра­ма кунь­цюй (в 16 в. поя­ви­лись но­та­ции «арий» это­го жан­ра и трак­та­ты о нём, в т. ч. «Трак­тат о пе­нии» – «Шан­лунь» Цзи Аня). В ор­кестр при­двор­ной раз­вле­кат. му­зы­ки вве­де­ны но­вые ин­ст­ру­мен­ты (эр­ху и др. смыч­ко­вые ин­ст­ру­мен­ты се­мей­ст­ва ху­цинь), в ре­пер­ту­ар – ме­ло­дии чжур­чжэ­ней. Рас­про­стра­ни­лась лют­ня сань­сянь (из­вест­на с 12 в.). В 1584 муз. тео­ре­тик Чжу Цзай­юй, ра­бо­тав­ший над сис­те­мой люй-люй, изо­брёл раз­но­вид­ность рав­но­мер­ной тем­пе­ра­ции. Раз­ви­тие жан­ра кунь­цюй при­ве­ло в кон. 18 – нач. 19 вв. к по­яв­ле­нию жан­ра цзин­цзюй (т. н. пе­кин­ская опе­ра). Воз­ник­ли но­вые тра­ди­ции: гор. ка­мер­но-ин­ст­ру­мен­таль­ная му­зы­ка, ис­пол­няе­мая на эр­ху, ху­ци­не, флей­те сяо и др.; две муз.-по­ве­ст­во­ват. фор­мы (тань­цы – в со­про­во­ж­де­нии пи­пы; да­гу­цы – в со­про­во­ж­де­нии ба­ра­ба­на да­гу и де­рев. кас­тань­ет или лют­ни сань­сянь), ко­то­рые ис­пол­ня­ли проф. пев­цы-рас­сказ­чи­ки шо­шу­ды (с собств. ак­ком­па­не­мен­том). Рас­про­стра­нил­ся но­вый ин­ст­ру­мент – цим­ба­лы ян­цинь. Мн. го­род­ские и кре­сть­ян­ские муз. тра­ди­ции со­хра­ни­лись по­ны­не.

Кит. му­зы­ка мо­но­дий­на в сво­ей ос­но­ве, при иг­ре на ин­ст­ру­мен­тах воз­ни­ка­ют ге­те­ро­фон­ные от­кло­не­ния, а так­же квар­то-квин­то­вые со­зву­чия; ха­рак­тер­на мик­ро­то­но­вая ор­на­мен­та­ция зву­ков. Рас­про­стра­не­но ан­ти­фон­ное и рес­пон­сор­ное пе­ние. В ос­но­ве ла­до­вой ор­га­ни­за­ции тра­диц. кит. му­зы­ки, имею­щей фик­си­ро­ван­ную аб­со­лют­ную вы­со­ту зву­ков по сис­те­ме люй-люй, ле­жит пен­та­то­ни­ка; на её ос­но­ве об­ра­зу­ют­ся 7-сту­пен­ные зву­ко­ря­ды (2 до­пол­нит. сту­пе­ни – 4-я и 7-я; ис­поль­зу­ют­ся в ка­че­ст­ве ор­на­мен­таль­ных). В про­шлом бы­ли из­вест­ны 9-сту­пен­ные зву­ко­ря­ды в пре­де­лах ок­та­вы. Метр в осн. дву­доль­ный. В во­каль­ной му­зы­ке ритм под­чи­нён за­ко­нам сти­хо­сло­же­ния, со­глас­но ко­то­рым об­ра­зу­ют­ся ме­ло­ди­ко-рит­мич. мо­де­ли (са­мые ран­ние об­раз­цы та­ких мо­де­лей встре­ча­ют­ся в кн. «Ши цзин», 11–6 вв. до н. э.). Древ­ней­шая сис­те­ма за­писи кит. му­зы­ки – ие­рог­ли­фи­че­ская (из­вест­на с 4 в. до н. э.), в даль­ней­шем ис­поль­зо­ва­лись и др. сис­те­мы но­та­ции (в т. ч. та­бу­ла­ту­ры) для ци­ня (с 6 в.), флейт, пи­пы, цит­ры чжэн.


Павильон для представлений Пекинской оперы. Летний дворец в Пекине.

По­сле анг­ло-кит. вой­ны 1840–42 на­ча­лось про­ник­но­ве­ние ев­роп. влия­ний: му­зы­ки хри­сти­ан­ской Церк­ви, во­ен. ду­хо­вых ор­ке­ст­ров; в шко­лах но­во­го, ев­ро­пей­ско­го ти­па бы­ли вве­де­ны уро­ки пе­ния и ев­роп. тео­рии му­зы­ки, поя­вил­ся но­вый для К. жанр школь­ной пес­ни; про­цесс ев­ро­пеи­за­ции осо­бен­но за­ме­тен на ру­бе­же 19–20 вв. Ме­ж­ду 1919 и 1949 муз. куль­ту­ра К. в це­лом свя­за­на с нац.-ос­во­бо­дит. дви­же­ни­ем. На ос­но­ве школь­ной пес­ни поя­ви­лись жан­ры мас­со­вой пат­рио­тич. пес­ни и кан­та­ты; пред­ста­ви­те­ли это­го на­прав­ле­ния Не Эр (ав­тор «Мар­ша доб­ро­воль­цев», 1935; с 1949 Гос. гимн КНР) и Сянь Син­хай (ав­тор «Кан­та­ты о Ху­ан­хэ», 1939) счи­та­ют­ся ос­но­во­по­лож­ни­ка­ми совр. му­зы­ки К. В 1919 при под­держ­ке муз. дея­те­ля Сяо Юмэя соз­да­но муз. от­де­ле­ние в Пе­кинском ун-те (обу­че­ние по про­грам­ме ев­роп. муз. учеб­ных за­ве­де­ний), в 1927 в Шан­хае от­кры­та пер­вая в стра­не кон­сер­ва­то­рия. Зна­чит. вклад в раз­ви­тие ака­де­мич. му­зы­ки ев­роп. тра­ди­ции в К. вне­сли рус. му­зы­кан­ты-эмиг­ран­ты, ко­то­рые ра­бо­та­ли в муз. учеб­ных за­ве­де­ни­ях и пер­вых сим­фо­нич. ор­ке­ст­рах: Хар­бин­ском (1903), Шан­хай­ском му­ни­ци­паль­ном (1922). В 1930–40-х гг. поя­вил­ся ряд круп­ных му­зы­кан­тов, учив­ших­ся в Ев­ро­пе и К.: Ху­ан Цзи, Лю Тянь­нуа, Ма Сы­цун, Тань Сяо­лин, Цзян Вэ­нье, Хэ Лу­тин и др. В сво­ём твор­че­ст­ве ком­по­зи­то­ры стре­ми­лись со­че­тать ин­то­на­ци­он­ный строй и об­раз­ную сфе­ру тра­диц. кит. му­зы­ки с фор­ма­ми ев­роп. му­зы­ки 19 в. В пе­ри­од вой­ны с Япо­ни­ей (1937–1945) уси­ли­лись де­мо­кра­тич. тен­ден­ции, раз­ви­ва­лось груп­по­вое муз. твор­че­ст­во (в 1945 в Ака­де­мии ис­кусств им. Лу Си­ня по­став­ле­на муз. дра­ма «Се­дая де­вуш­ка» ком­по­зи­то­ров Ма Кэ, Чжан Лу и Цюй Вэя).

Об­ра­зо­ва­ние КНР (1949) да­ло но­вый им­пульс раз­ви­тию муз. куль­ту­ры. Соз­да­ва­лись но­вые муз. учеб­ные за­ве­де­ния, к пре­по­да­ва­нию при­вле­ка­лись луч­шие кит. и за­ру­беж­ные (б. ч. из СССР) спе­ци­а­ли­сты. На гос. ос­но­ве соз­да­ва­лись муз. и те­ат­раль­ные кол­лек­ти­вы как с тра­диц. ки­тай­ским, так и с ев­роп. ре­пер­туа­ром. Соз­да­на Все­ки­тай­ская ас­со­циа­ция лит-ры и иск-ва (1949), из ко­то­рой в 1953 вы­де­ли­лась Ас­со­циа­ция кит. му­зы­кан­тов. Ру­ко­во­дство стра­ны при­зы­ва­ло дея­те­лей куль­ту­ры соз­да­вать вы­со­ко­идей­ные, об­ра­щён­ные к ши­ро­ким мас­сам про­из­ве­де­ния. Пред­при­ни­ма­лись по­пыт­ки ре­фор­мы в об­лас­ти тра­диц. му­зы­ки: мо­ди­фи­ка­ция муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов, рас­ши­ре­ние их диа­па­зо­нов и уни­фи­ка­ция строя. Бы­ли соз­да­ны боль­шие ор­ке­ст­ры кит. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов по ти­пу сим­фо­нич. ор­ке­ст­ра. Тра­диц. фор­мы муз. дра­мы ста­ли при­ме­нять­ся для во­пло­ще­ния сю­же­тов из совр. жиз­ни. Про­во­ди­лись экс­пе­ри­мен­ты по соз­да­нию опер­ных спек­так­лей на ос­но­ве нар. пе­сен. В 1959 ком­по­зи­то­ры Чень Ган и Хэ Чжань­хао соз­да­ли кон­церт для скрип­ки с ор­ке­ст­ром «Лян Шань­бо и Чжу Ин­тай», в ко­то­ром удач­но со­еди­не­ны кит. тра­ди­ции с ев­роп. фор­мой; это со­чи­не­ние со­хра­ня­ет ши­ро­кую по­пу­ляр­ность в К. Сре­ди му­зы­кан­тов дан­но­го пе­рио­да: ди­ри­жёры Ли Дэ­лунь, Цао Пэн, пиа­ни­сты Лю Ши­кунь, Инь Ченц­зун, ком­по­зи­то­ры У Цзу­цян, Ду Мин­син, Дин Шань­дэ, пе­ви­цы Чжоу Сяо­янь, Го Шуч­жень.

В кон. 1950-х гг. на­ме­ти­лась тен­ден­ция к вуль­га­ри­за­ции муз. твор­че­ст­ва. Не­по­пра­ви­мый ущерб муз. куль­ту­ре К. на­нес­ла «куль­тур­ная ре­во­лю­ция» 1966–76. В этот пе­ри­од бы­ло за­пре­ще­но ис­пол­нение лю­бой за­ру­беж­ной, а так­же кит. му­зы­ки, кро­ме 7 «об­раз­цо­вых» по­ста­но­вок, от­ве­чав­ших иде­ям Мао Цзэ­ду­на и при­зван­ных ил­лю­ст­ри­ро­вать по­ли­тич. ло­зун­ги, сре­ди них – ба­лет «Крас­ный жен­ский ба­таль­он» и муз. дра­ма «Взя­тие го­ры Вэ­ху­шань». Рас­про­стра­ня­лись пе­сен­ки на тек­сты из «ци­тат­ни­ка Мао». Учеб­ные за­ве­де­ния за­кры­лись, мн. вид­ные му­зы­кан­ты бы­ли ре­прес­си­ро­ва­ны или со­сла­ны на «тру­до­вое пе­ре­вос­пи­та­ние» в де­рев­ни.

С 1980-х гг. муз. куль­ту­ра К. раз­ви­ва­ет­ся в рус­ле гос. ре­форм, в зна­чит. ме­ре на­прав­лен­ных на рас­ши­ре­ние кон­так­тов с зап. куль­ту­рой. Вос­ста­нов­ле­на ра­бо­та муз. ву­зов стра­ны, от­кры­лись но­вые муз. учеб­ные за­ве­де­ния. Уже в 1980-х гг. кит. ву­зы под­го­то­ви­ли ряд ком­по­зи­то­ров «но­вой вол­ны», ов­ла­дев­ших зап. ком­по­зи­тор­ски­ми тех­ни­ка­ми 20 в., сре­ди них: Тан Дун (жи­вёт в США), Чэнь Ци­ган (жи­вёт во Фран­ции), Цзо Чжэнь­гу­ань (жи­вёт в Рос­сии), Го Вэнь­цзин, Хэ Сюнь­тянь, Е Сяо­ган. Соз­да­ны опе­ры – «Степь» Цзин Ся­на (1987; по пье­се Цао Юя), «За­пис­ки су­ма­сшед­ше­го» Го Вэнь­цзи­на (1994; по рассказу Лу Си­ня), ба­ле­ты – «Крас­ные фо­на­ри» Чэнь Ци­га­на (2001), про­из­ве­де­ния сим­фо­нич. и ка­мер­ной му­зы­ки (сре­ди ав­то­ров – Чэнь Пэй­сюнь, Чжу Цзянь­эр, Ван Си­лин), ак­тив­но раз­ви­ва­ет­ся жанр по­пу­ляр­ной пес­ни. Боль­шое влия­ние на но­вую кит. му­зы­ку ока­за­ли гон­конг­ские и тай­вань­ские пес­ни. Воз­ро­ж­да­ют­ся раз­но­го ро­да нац. празд­ни­ки (Вес­ны, Се­ре­ди­ны осе­ни, Во­ды в Юнь­на­не и др.), про­во­дят­ся муз. фес­ти­ва­ли – ме­ж­ду­на­род­ные (Пе­кин­ский, Шан­хай­ский) и на­цио­наль­ные (Фес­ти­валь ис­кусств). Осо­бо по­пу­ляр­ны боль­шие му­зы­каль­но-те­ат­раль­ные шоу на ис­то­рич. и эт­но­гра­фич. сю­же­ты, те­ле­ви­зи­он­ные муз. кон­кур­сы. Сре­ди из­вест­ных ис­пол­ни­те­лей: ди­ри­жё­ры – Чэнь Цзо­ху­ан, Тан Му­хай, Чень Се­ян, Ли Синь­цао, Юй Лун; пев­цы – Ху Сяо­пин, Ляо Юн­чан; пиа­ни­сты – Лан Ланг, Ли Юнь­ди; вио­лон­че­лист Ван Цзянь. Сре­ди круп­ней­ших му­зы­ко­ве­дов 20 в.: Ван Гу­ан­ци, Ян Инь­лу, Инь Фа­лу; му­зы­ко­вед и фольк­ло­рист Сюй Чанху­эй (Тай­вань).

В К. функ­цио­ни­ру­ют (2008): 10 опер­ных те­ат­ров, в т. ч. Цен­траль­ный (1952) в Пе­ки­не, Шан­хай­ский (1956); 25 сим­фо­нич. ор­ке­ст­ров, в т. ч. Шан­хай­ский сим­фо­ни­че­ский (1922), Нац. сим­фо­ни­че­ский (1956), Кит. фи­лар­мо­ни­че­ский (2000), 25 муз. ву­зов, в т. ч. Цен­траль­ная, Ки­тай­ская, Шан­хай­ская, Тянь­цзин­ская кон­сер­ва­то­рии.

Танец и балет


Танец с мечами.

Тан­це­валь­ное иск-во К. за­ро­ди­лось в глу­бо­кой древ­но­сти. Уже во 2-м тыс. до н. э. в кит. тек­стах встре­ча­ет­ся ие­ро­г­лиф у (та­нец). В пе­ри­од Чжоу в ри­ту­аль­ных тан­цах раз­ра­ба­ты­ва­лись ка­но­ны дви­же­ний, имею­щих сим­во­лич. зна­че­ние. Проф. му­зы­кан­ты и тан­цов­щи­ки уже су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли в эту эпо­ху. Их при­гла­ша­ли на им­пе­ратор­ские пи­ры, хра­мо­вые празд­ни­ки. Тан­цы ос­но­вы­ва­лись на сю­же­тах кон­крет­ных со­бы­тий, сю­же­тах об ис­то­рич. ге­ро­ях, бо­же­ст­вах. Сфор­ми­ро­ва­лись два тан­це­валь­ных жан­ра – вэнь у (гра­ж­дан­ские тан­цы) и у у (во­ен­ные тан­цы), раз­ли­чав­шие­ся сю­же­та­ми и ха­рак­те­ром дви­же­ний. Му­зы­ка и та­нец бы­ли так­же сред­ст­вом вос­пи­та­ния, по­это­му обу­че­ние этим иск-вам по­лу­чи­ло ши­ро­кое рас­про­стра­не­ние.

В пе­ри­од Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань тан­це­валь­ное иск-во, про­дол­жав­шее за­ни­мать ве­ду­щее по­ло­же­ние в ре­лиг. ри­туа­лах и нар. об­ря­дах, ис­пы­ты­ва­ло влия­ние кон­фу­ци­ан­ст­ва. Ха­рак­тер ри­ту­аль­ных тан­цев из­ме­нил­ся, они пе­ре­ста­ли со­про­во­ж­дать­ся ма­гич. за­кли­на­ния­ми, ис­сту­п­лён­ны­ми вы­кри­ка­ми, ха­рак­тер­ны­ми для тан­цев глу­бо­кой древ­но­сти, и в со­от­вет­ст­вии со стро­го раз­ра­бо­тан­ным ри­туа­лом вме­сте с му­зы­кой под­чёр­ки­ва­ли ве­ли­чие и тор­же­ст­вен­ность об­ря­да. На­ря­ду с тан­ца­ми на сю­же­ты кон­крет­ных ис­торич. со­бы­тий поя­ви­лись тан­цы на вы­мыш­лен­ные сю­же­ты. Внутр. гар­мо­ния свет­ло­го и тём­но­го на­чал вы­ра­жа­лась в прин­ци­пе дуй­би (кон­траст, про­ти­во­по­с­тав­ле­ние), ко­то­рый тре­бо­вал со­че­та­ния в тан­це оваль­ных и пря­мых ли­ний, энер­гич­ных и мяг­ких, мед­лен­ных и бы­ст­рых рит­мов, сим­мет­рии встреч­но­го дви­же­ния рук, ла­до­ней, ступ­ней. Та­нец пред­по­ла­гал со­гла­со­ван­ность (дяо­хэ) всех дви­же­ний и тан­це­валь­но­го ри­сун­ка в це­лом с эмо­цио­наль­ным со­стоя­ни­ем ис­пол­ни­те­ля, цве­то­вой гам­мой кос­тю­мов и т. д. Кос­мо­ло­гич. пред­став­ле­ния древ­но­сти, свя­зан­ные с куль­том не­ба и зем­ли, по­лу­чи­ли эс­те­тич. ин­тер­пре­та­цию: тан­це­валь­ная схе­ма впи­сы­ва­лась в квад­рат – сим­вол зем­ли и бы­ла ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­на по стра­нам све­та. Чёт­кую про­стран­ст­вен­ную ори­ен­та­цию при­об­ре­ли и отд. дви­же­ния. До­ми­нан­той хо­рео­гра­фич. ком­по­зи­ции бы­ла не по­за, как в инд. клас­сич. тан­це, и не по­сле­до­ва­тель­ное че­ре­до­ва­ние скульп­тур­ных поз, а слия­ние дви­жу­щих­ся фи­гур. В тан­це, как в кал­ли­гра­фии, при­об­ре­та­ли зна­че­ние ком­би­на­ция ли­ний, об­щий ри­су­нок ком­по­зи­ции. Од­ним из рас­про­стра­нён­ных ви­дов тан­ца хань­ской эпо­хи, во­шед­ших в тан­це­валь­ное иск-во бо­лее позд­не­го пе­рио­да, бы­ли по­строе­ния, изо­бра­жав­шие ие­рог­ли­фы тра­диц. бла­го­по­же­ла­ния, напр. ие­рог­ли­фы «Бла­го­по­лу­чия (уми­ро­тво­ре­ния) Под­не­бес­ной». В г. Чанъ­ань бы­ла уч­ре­ж­де­на Муз. па­ла­та (Юэфу), ве­дав­шая пев­ца­ми, тан­цов­щи­ка­ми и тан­цов­щи­ца­ми (их на­счи­ты­ва­лось до 800), со­б­ран­ны­ми из разл. об­лас­тей Ки­тая.

В по­сле­дую­щие сто­ле­тия обо­га­ща­лись ре­пер­ту­ар и тех­ни­ка ис­пол­не­ния. Боль­шое раз­ви­тие по­лу­чи­ло не­про­фес­сио­наль­ное тан­це­валь­ное иск-во. В пе­ри­од Суй в г. Дун­ду (ны­не Ло­ян) во вре­мя празд­неств в пе­сен­но-тан­це­валь­ных пред­став­ле­ни­ях уча­ст­во­ва­ло до нес­коль­ких де­сят­ков ты­сяч че­ло­век.


Танец павлина.

Пе­ри­од Тан – вре­мя рас­цве­та тан­ца, раз­ра­бот­ки его осн. эс­те­тич. прин­ци­пов. Тан­цы ста­ли ква­ли­фи­ци­ро­вать­ся по груп­пам: цзянь у (твёр­дые, энер­гич­ные), жу­ань у (мяг­кие, неж­ные), цзы у (тан­цы ие­рог­ли­фов), хуа у (тан­цы цве­тов), ма у (тан­цы с ко­ня­ми) и др. Пер­вые две груп­пы да­ли на­зва­ние осн. эс­те­тич. ка­те­го­ри­ям тан­ца, оп­ре­де­лив­шим даль­ней­шие пу­ти его раз­ви­тия. Эти груп­пы, вос­хо­дя­щие к гражд. и во­ен. тан­цам чжоу­ско­го пе­рио­да, ос­но­вы­ва­лись на др.-кит. дуа­ли­стич. кон­цеп­ции ми­ра, ут­вер­ждав­шей, что мир со­сто­ит из двух на­чал – инь и ян. К ра­нее из­вестным эс­те­тич. ка­те­го­ри­ям до­ба­ви­лись прин­ци­пы: цин (лёг­кий) и пяо (но­сить­ся по вет­ру, ко­лы­хать­ся), со­от­но­ся­щие та­нец со сво­бод­ной сти­хи­ей волн и об­ла­ков. Ос­но­вой тан­це­валь­ной тех­ни­ки яв­ля­лась не ста­ти­ка пря­мо­ли­ней­ной, ус­той­чи­вой по­зи­ции рук и ног, а изо­гну­тость, ко­то­рая таи­ла в се­бе по­тен­цию дви­же­ния. Изо­гну­тость за­кре­п­ле­на в эс­те­тич. прин­ци­пе юань (ок­руг­лый). Т. о., эс­те­тич. ин­тер­пре­та­ция пре­тен­до­ва­ла на рас­кры­тие в тан­це це­ло­ст­ной кар­ти­ны бы­тия. Пе­ри­од Тан – по­след­ний в раз­ви­тии тан­ца как са­мо­сто­ят. ви­да иск-ва. В даль­ней­шем про­ис­хо­ди­ло по­сте­пен­ное со­еди­не­ние тан­ца, пе­ния и сло­ва, что при­ве­ло к фор­ми­ро­ва­нию тра­диц. муз. дра­мы. Да­цюй – од­на из осн. форм со­еди­не­ния пе­ния и тан­ца по­сред­ст­вом сю­же­та (по­яв­ле­ние да­цюй от­но­сит­ся ещё к хань­ско­му вре­ме­ни). Это трёх­ча­ст­ное про­из­ве­де­ние, со­стоя­щее из муз. всту­п­ле­ния, пе­сен­ной и пе­сен­но-тан­це­валь­ной час­тей, где та­нец пре­об­ла­да­ет. Дру­гая фор­ма, ве­ду­щая к воз­ник­но­ве­нию син­те­тич. те­ат­раль­но­го спек­так­ля, – сю­жет­ная пан­то­ми­ма. Раз­ви­тие тан­це­валь­но­го, пе­сен­но-муз. и те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло соз­да­нию сис­те­мы проф. под­го­тов­ки. Бы­ло ор­га­ни­зо­ва­но неск. при­двор­ных учеб­ных за­ве­де­ний под об­щим назв. «Гру­ше­вый сад» (714). Од­но из них – «Чу­дес­ный сад не­бо­жи­те­лей», где обу­ча­ли пе­нию и тан­цам де­тей, вы­сту­пав­ших при дво­ре.

В пе­ри­од Сун раз­ви­тие тан­ца как проф. иск-ва за­мед­ли­лось. Та­нец всё бо­лее пре­вра­щал­ся во вспо­мо­гат. эле­мент зре­ли­ща и, как пра­ви­ло, за­вер­шал его. Это бы­ло вре­мя ста­нов­ле­ния син­те­тич. фор­мы спек­так­ля и ро­ж­де­ния но­во­го ти­па ак­тё­ра, вла­дев­ше­го во­каль­ным иск-вом, сло­вом и тан­цем, близ­ким по фор­ме к сце­нич. дви­же­нию. Те­ат­раль­ная пан­то­ми­ма со­хра­ни­ла свою по­пу­ляр­ность и про­дол­жа­ла раз­ви­вать­ся.

С рас­цве­том лит. дра­мы в эпо­ху Юань та­нец пол­но­стью под­чи­нил­ся те­ат­ру. О тан­це в 15–18 вв. как о са­мо­сто­ят. ви­де иск-ва ос­та­лось ма­ло све­де­ний. Тем не ме­нее в рам­ках тра­диц. те­ат­ра тан­це­валь­ное иск-во дос­тиг­ло зна­чит. раз­ви­тия (в т. н. жан­ре кунь­цюй, где име­лись боль­шие тан­це­валь­ные эпи­зо­ды; см. о нём в раз­де­ле Му­зы­ка). Позд­нее мно­гие из спек­так­лей кунь­цюй пре­вра­ти­лись в ба­ле­ты-пан­то­ми­мы («Ис­то­рия неф­ри­то­вой шпиль­ки», «Осен­няя ре­ка» и др.). В жан­ре пе­кин­ской муз. дра­мы цзин­цзюй (воз­ник­ла в кон. 18 – нач. 19 вв.) ба­ле­ты-пан­то­ми­мы по­лу­чи­ли ши­ро­кое раз­ви­тие («На пе­ре­крё­ст­ке трёх до­рог», «Пе­ре­по­лох в не­бес­ном двор­це»). В 1949 соз­да­на Пер­вая тан­це­валь­ная труп­па при Центр. те­ат­раль­ной ака­де­мии. По­доб­ные труп­пы соз­да­ва­лись по всей стра­не. В 1953 со­сто­ял­ся 1-й Все­ки­тай­ский фес­ти­валь му­зы­ки и тан­ца. К нач. 1960-х гг. в КНР ра­бо­та­ли св. 20 тан­це­валь­ных кол­лек­ти­вов.

Зна­ком­ст­во кит. зри­те­ля с ев­роп. клас­сич. ба­ле­том со­стоя­лось в 1920-х гг., ко­гда на га­ст­ро­ли в К. ста­ли при­ез­жать рус. ар­ти­сты ба­ле­та и пе­да­го­ги. Од­на­ко соз­да­ние ба­ле­та ев­роп. ти­па на­ча­лось лишь в 1950-х гг. Во 2-й пол. 1950-х гг. кит. тан­цов­щи­цей Дай Ай­лянь на ос­нове со­еди­не­ния ев­роп. ба­ле­та и кит. клас­сич. тан­ца по­став­ле­но пер­вое зна­чит. про­из­ве­де­ние – «Го­лубь ми­ра». В ре­зуль­та­те сце­нич. об­ра­бот­ки нар. тан­цев бы­ли соз­да­ны ба­ле­ты «Та­нец ло­то­са», «Друж­ба», «Сбор чая и лов­ля ба­бо­чек» и др. Для под­го­тов­ки нац. кад­ров в 1954 ор­га­ни­зо­ва­но Пе­кин­ское хо­рео­гра­фич. уч-ще (худ. рук. Дай Ай­лянь). При уч-ще бы­ли соз­да­ны кур­сы ба­лет­мей­сте­ров под рук. сов. пе­да­го­гов В. И. Ца­п­ли­на (1955), П. А. Гу­се­ва (1958), ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ны от­де­ле­ния клас­сич. и нар. тан­цев. В 1959 на ба­зе вы­пу­ск­ни­ков уч-ща соз­да­на Экс­пе­рим. труп­па. В 1953 в Пе­ки­не от­крыл­ся Центр. те­атр опе­ры и ба­ле­та; сре­ди пер­вых по­ста­но­вок – ба­лет «Бе­лая змей­ка», соз­дан­ный на ос­но­ве од­но­им. муз. дра­мы (1957, на тра­диц. му­зы­ку, ба­лет­мей­сте­ры Ван Пин, Ван Си­сянь и др.). В 1960 ос­но­ва­на Шан­хай­ская ба­лет­ная шко­ла.

В 1960-х гг. под ло­зун­гом пре­вра­ще­ния тан­ца в ре­во­люц. мас­со­вое и нац. иск-во из ре­пер­туа­ра бы­ли изъ­я­ты все ба­лет­ные спек­так­ли пред­ше­ст­вую­щих лет. Их за­ме­ни­ли ди­вер­тис­мен­ты, ча­ще все­го на во­ен. сю­же­ты. Сре­ди по­ста­но­вок – «Крас­ный жен­ский ба­таль­он» [1964, сце­на­рий и по­ста­нов­ка Ли Чэн­ся­на, Чон Цзу­ци, Ван Си­ся­на, на ос­но­ве ев­роп. хо­рео­гра­фии, Ра­бо­че-кре­сть­ян­ская сол­дат­ская ба­лет­ная труп­па (ос­но­ва­на в 1963)]. В даль­ней­шем ба­лет имел неск. ре­дак­ций и во­шёл в чис­ло «об­раз­цо­вых» спек­так­лей, раз­ре­шён­ных ру­ко­во­дством Ки­тая.

По­сле «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» 1966–1976 на­ча­лось воз­ро­ж­де­ние клас­сич. ба­ле­та, ста­ли соз­да­вать­ся но­вые ба­лет­ные кол­лек­ти­вы. В 1979 об­ра­зо­ва­на са­мая круп­ная в К. Шан­хай­ская ба­лет­ная труп­па; в её ре­пер­туа­ре по­пу­ляр­ные спек­так­ли на сю­же­ты про­из­ве­де­ний кит. ав­то­ров («Се­дая де­вуш­ка», «Гро­за», «А-Кью»), а так­же клас­сич. рус. ба­ле­ты («Ле­бе­ди­ное озе­ро» и «Щел­кун­чик» П. И. Чай­ков­ско­го, «Ро­мео и Джуль­ет­та» С. С. Про­кофь­е­ва и др.). Сре­ди ве­ду­щих ис­пол­ни­те­лей – Сунь Шэ­ньи, Фань Сяо­фэн. В 1981 об­ра­зо­ва­на Ляо­нин­ская ба­лет­ная труп­па под рук. Ван Сю­ньи, где по­став­ле­ны нац. спек­так­ли: «Мон­голь­ское имя», «Лян Шань­бо и Чжу Ин­тай», «От­ра­же­ние лу­ны в двух ис­точ­ни­ках». Сре­ди ве­ду­щих ар­ти­стов – Чэнь Мэй, Ян Сяо­гу­ан. В 1993 соз­да­на Гу­ан­чжоу­ская ба­лет­ная труп­па под рук. Чжан Дань­да­ня. На­ря­ду со все­мир­но из­вест­ны­ми клас­сич. ба­ле­та­ми так­же по­став­ле­ны нац. спек­так­ли: «Фея ре­ки Ло», «Та­ин­ст­вен­ный (тём­ный) фе­никс» и др. В спек­так­лях нач. 21 в. на­хо­дит от­ра­же­ние син­тез ба­лет­но­го и цир­ко­во­го иск-ва («Ле­бе­ди­ное озе­ро» П. И. Чай­ков­ско­го, 2005, Цир­ко­вая труп­па бой­цов Гу­ан­дун­ско­го во­ен. ок­ру­га и Шан­хай­ская ком­па­ния по ор­га­ни­за­ции пред­став­ле­ний совр. тан­ца). В об­лас­ти совр. тан­ца так­же ра­бо­та­ют те­атр тан­ца «Кла­уд гейт» (Тай­вань), Труп­па совр. тан­ца (Сян­ган).

Театр

Кит. те­атр пред­став­лен тре­мя ви­да­ми: тра­ди­ци­он­ный, ку­коль­ный и дра­ма­ти­че­ский.

Кит. тра­ди­ци­он­ный те­атр – син­те­тич. вид те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва, со­еди­няю­щий му­зы­ку, пе­ние, та­нец, сце­нич. речь, сце­нич. дви­же­ние, ос­но­ван­ное на тех­ни­ке цир­ко­вых жан­ров и бое­вых ис­кусств. Ис­то­ки кит. те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва – в древ­них ри­туа­лах ша­ма­низ­ма. Ре­лиг. дей­ст­во из­гна­ния де­мо­нов, за­кли­на­ний от бо­лез­ней, мо­ле­ний о до­ж­де, пред­ска­за­ний над­ви­гаю­щих­ся бед­ст­вий и др. но­си­ло назв. «но». Оно строи­лось на чёт­ком рит­мич. ри­сун­ке, за­дан­ном боль­шим ба­ра­ба­ном (круг­лая фор­ма ко­то­ро­го сим­во­ли­зи­ро­ва­ла не­бо), его зву­ча­ние спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло вхо­ж­де­нию в ритм не­бес­ных энер­гий. Здесь ро­ж­да­лись ка­нон сим­во­лич. ша­га, по­зы рук, дви­же­ния кор­пу­са, ко­то­рые позд­нее во­шли в ар­се­нал те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва. Со вре­ме­нем со­дер­жа­ние но рас­ши­ря­лось, вклю­чая ре­лиг. сю­же­ты («Му­лянь ищет свою мать» – сю­жет, сфор­ми­ро­вав­ший­ся в пе­ри­од Тан и пе­ре­не­сён­ный на сце­ну в пе­ри­од Сун). В пе­ри­од Чжоу проф. ак­тёр­ст­во (ю) раз­ви­ва­лось в сре­де при­двор­ных шу­тов и кар­ли­ков, пев­цов и тан­цо­ров, умею­щих под­ра­жать кон­крет­ным лю­дям и по­вад­кам жи­вот­ных. По­ющие и тан­цую­щие ак­тё­ры на­зы­ва­лись «чан-ю»; шу­ты и ли­це­деи, ко­ми­ки – «пай-ю». В пе­ри­од Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань по­лу­чи­ли раз­ви­тие про­сто­на­род­ные фор­мы те­ат­раль­но­го зре­ли­ща: «Сто игр, сто пред­став­ле­ний» (бай си) или «Бо­да­ние, со­стя­за­ние в си­ле» (цзяо­ди си). Они вклю­ча­ли ак­ро­ба­ти­ку, фех­то­ва­ние, жонг­ли­ро­ва­ние, хо­ж­де­ние по ка­на­ту, шпа­гог­ло­та­ние, из­ры­га­ние ог­ня, ла­за­ние по шес­ту и др. Уча­ст­ни­ки «Бо­да­ния, со­стя­за­ния в си­ле» на­де­ва­ли чу­че­ла го­ло­вы жи­вот­но­го. Сце­ны еди­но­борств ино­гда со­че­та­лись с сю­жет­ным по­ве­ст­во­вани­ем (напр., в ис­то­рии «Иг­ры Чию») о ле­ген­дар­ных сра­же­ни­ях Ху­ан­ди с ве­ли­ка­ном Чию – по­лу­че­ло­ве­ком-по­лу­зве­рем. Ко вре­ме­ни эпо­хи Хань ми­фо­ло­гич. ис­то­рия о кро­ва­вых сра­же­ни­ях пре­об­ра­зи­лась в за­ни­ма­тель­ное зре­ли­ще – иг­ру (си), ко­то­рую с удо­воль­ст­ви­ем смот­ре­ли и про­сто­лю­ди­ны, и ари­сто­кра­ты. О ша­ман­ских ис­то­ках на­по­ми­на­ла уст­ра­шаю­щая внеш­ность ве­ли­ка­на и его ма­гич. си­ла в борь­бе со сти­хия­ми.

Рост го­ро­дов, ре­мё­сел и куль­тур­ных кон­так­тов в пе­ри­од Тан спо­соб­ст­во­вал раз­ви­тию те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва. Зна­чи­тель­ным бы­ло влия­ние буд­диз­ма: буд­дий­ские му­зы­ка и ико­но­гра­фия (слож­ный ри­су­нок и сим­во­ли­ка жес­та) воз­дей­ст­во­ва­ли на ис­пол­ни­тель­ское иск-во кит. ак­тё­ра, на фор­ми­ро­ва­ние ка­но­на сце­нич. дви­же­ния. При Та­нах воз­рос­ла роль сю­жет­ных инс­це­ни­ро­вок. Од­на из них – «Мас­ка» («Дай мянь», букв. – за­ме­нять ли­цо) – по­ве­ст­во­ва­ла об от­важ­ном ва­не, неж­но­стью ли­ца на­по­ми­нав­шем жен­щи­ну; что­бы на­во­дить ужас на вра­гов, он на­де­вал в сра­же­нии уст­ра­шаю­щую мас­ку. По­пу­ляр­ные не­боль­шие пье­сы это­го пе­рио­да – «Бо тоу» (о еди­но­бор­ст­ве че­ло­ве­ка и зве­ря), «Су чжун­лан» (о чи­нов­ни­ке, лю­бив­шем вы­пить), «Тао­яо-нян» (о жен­щи­не, тер­пя­щей по­бои пья­но­го му­жа). По­лу­чи­ли раз­ви­тие пье­сы-диа­ло­ги ко­ме­дий­но­го и са­ти­рич. ха­рак­те­ра – т. н. иг­ры о цань­цзю­не (цань­цзюнь си). В них впер­вые поя­ви­лось ам­п­луа – на­ход­чи­во­го ост­ро­сло­ва цань­цзю­ня. Пер­вые учеб­ные за­ве­де­ния под об­щим назв. «Гру­ше­вый сад», где маль­чи­ков и де­во­чек обу­ча­ли му­зы­ке, пе­нию, тан­цам и ак­тёр­ско­му иск-ву, поя­ви­лись при дво­ре тан­ско­го имп. Сю­ань-цзу­на (714). Бы­ли соз­да­ны пер­вые те­ат­раль­ные трак­та­ты – свое­об­раз­ные эн­цик­ло­пе­дии по ис­то­рии те­ат­ра, со­дер­жа­щие све­де­ния о пев­цах и му­зы­кан­тах, оцен­ки их мас­тер­ст­ва: «За­пис­ки па­ла­ты Цзяо­фан» («Цзяо­фан цзи») Цуй Пин­ци­ня (1-я пол. 8 в.), «Раз­ные за­мет­ки о Му­зы­каль­ной па­ла­те» («Юэфу цза лу») Ду­ань Ань­цзе (2-я пол. 9 в.).

В пе­ри­од Сун со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­лись уже из­вест­ные дра­ма­тич. фор­мы. На их ос­но­ве воз­ник жанр т. н. смешан­но­го пред­став­ле­ния муз. дра­мы цзац­зюй, имев­шей два ре­гио­наль­ных ти­па – се­вер­ный (бэй цюй) и юж­ный (нань цюй). По­яви­лись но­вые ам­п­луа: муж­ские пер­со­на­жи фу­мо и фуц­зин, по сво­им функ­ци­ям близ­кие к пер­со­на­жам цань­цзюнь си; мо­ни – ак­тёр-рас­по­ря­ди­тель (глав­ный сре­ди др. ам­п­луа); чжи – ве­ду­щий пье­су; чжу­ан­дань – пе­ре­оде­тый в жен­щи­ну. С раз­ви­ти­ем го­ро­дов воз­ник­ли гор. ста­цио­нар­ные те­ат­ры, про­дол­жа­ло рас­ти чис­ло бро­дя­чих трупп, иг­рав­ших для сель­ско­го зри­те­ля. В го­ро­дах су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло два ти­па те­ат­раль­ных по­стро­ек: вац­зы (ба­ла­ган для про­сто­на­родья, где зри­те­ли си­де­ли на лав­ках, под­ни­маю­щих­ся яру­са­ми над сце­ной под че­ре­пич­ным на­ве­сом, ли­бо стоя на­блю­да­ли иг­ру ак­тё­ров) и го­улан (бо­лее слож­ные по­строй­ки, имев­шие по­ме­ще­ние за сце­ной для ак­тё­ров, мес­та для зри­те­лей; вме­ща­ли до нес­коль­ких ты­сяч че­ло­век).

Персонаж пьесы китайского традиционного театра по мотивам романа «Дело судьи Ше». Иллюстрация из «Дворцового альбома». 19 в.

Пе­ри­од Юань – зо­ло­той век кит. дра­мы. В ус­ло­ви­ях за­вое­ва­ния К. мон­го­ла­ми и при­тес­не­ний куль­тур­ных и по­чи­тае­мых сло­ёв на­се­ле­ния – кон­фу­ци­ан­ских учё­ных, по­этов, ли­те­ра­то­ров – об­щее для всех чув­ст­во нац. уни­же­ния по­мог­ло пред­ста­ви­те­лям вы­со­ко­об­ра­зо­ван­ных сло­ёв сбли­зить­ся с жиз­нью про­стых лю­дей, по­нять их бе­ды и ну­ж­ды. Это и по­ро­ди­ло фе­но­мен т. н. юань­ской дра­мы, оди­на­ко­во вос­тре­бо­ван­ной и мас­со­вым зри­те­лем, и об­ра­зо­ван­ной ча­стью об­ще­ст­ва. Её круп­ней­шие пред­ста­ви­те­ли: Гу­ань Хань­цин («Взвол­но­вав­шая не­бе­са и зем­лю оби­да Доу Э»), Ван Ши­фу («За­пад­ный фли­гель»), Бо Пу («Дождь в пла­та­нах»), Ма Чжию­ань («Осень в Хань­ском двор­це»). Во 2-й пол. прав­ле­ния ди­на­стии Юань сев. дра­ма ста­ла сбли­жать­ся с юж­ной; сня­тие ре­гио­наль­ных ог­ра­ни­че­ний под­го­тав­ли­ва­ло поч­ву для соз­да­ния об­ще­на­цио­наль­но­го те­ат­ра. По­вы­си­лись тре­бо­ва­ния к ис­пол­ни­тель­ско­му мас­тер­ст­ву, бы­ла соз­да­на раз­ви­тая сис­те­ма ак­тёр­ских ам­п­луа: чжэн­мо – гл. муж­ской пер­со­наж (един­ст­вен­ный по­ющий в ка­ж­дом ак­те); вай­мо и фуц­зин – вто­ро­сте­пен­ные муж­ские пер­со­на­жи; сяо­мо – маль­чик, под­рос­ток; чун­мо – от­кры­вав­ший спек­такль; цзин – вто­рой по зна­чи­мо­сти муж­ской пер­со­наж, обыч­но от­ри­ца­тель­ный; гу – чи­нов­ник; пэй­лао – ста­рик; бан­лао – вор; чоу – ко­мик с ти­пич­ным ри­сун­ком гри­ма на но­су (т. н. ку­сок бо­бо­во­го сы­ра). Воз­рос­ший уро­вень ак­тёр­ско­го мас­тер­ст­ва по­зво­лил тео­ре­ти­кам на­звать их иг­ру кра­си­вой, пре­крас­ной (мэй). Ак­тё­ры ис­поль­зо­ва­ли сим­во­лич. жес­ты и ус­лов­ные пред­ме­ты сце­нич. ре­к­ви­зи­та.

Сцена из спектакля традиционного театра «Переполох в небесном царстве»по роману «Путешествие на запад» У Чэнъэня (Сунь Укун – царь обезьян).

Пе­ри­од Мин в те­ат­ре был оз­на­ме­но­ван ро­ж­де­ни­ем (у. Кунь­шань, пров. Цзян­су) и рас­цве­том жан­ра кунь­цюй (так­же из­вес­тен под назв. «кунь­шан­ская опе­ра» или «кунь­шан­ский те­атр») – од­но­го из юж. ло­каль­ных жан­ров, под­няв­ше­го­ся до вы­со­ты об­ще­на­цио­наль­но­го. Сво­им по­яв­ле­ни­ем кунь­цюй обя­зан пев­цу и му­зы­кан­ту Вэй Лян­фу (да­ты жиз­ни не­из­вест­ны), со­еди­нив­ше­му осо­бен­но­сти сев. и юж. во­каль­ных школ, рас­ши­рив­ше­му со­став ор­ке­ст­ра; в соз­да­ние те­ат­раль­ной фор­мы кунь­цюй зна­чит. вклад внёс му­зы­кант и дра­ма­тург Лян Бо­лун (16 в.): его пье­са «Жен­щи­на, мою­щая шёлк», на­пи­сан­ная изящ­ным лит. сти­лем, при­влек­ла вни­ма­ние об­ра­зо­ван­ной час­ти пуб­ли­ки к но­во­му те­ат­раль­но­му жан­ру. Кунь­цюй ста­ли на­зы­вать ари­сто­кра­тич., изы­скан­ным те­ат­ром (ябу), от­ли­чая его от про­сто­на­род­ных, сме­шан­ных жан­ров (лу­ань­тань). Дра­ма­тур­гом пер­вой ве­ли­чи­ны счи­тал­ся Тан Сянь­цзу (кон. 16 – нач. 17 вв.); его пье­са «Пио­но­вая бе­сед­ка» ос­та­ёт­ся од­ной из ос­нов­ных в ре­пер­туа­ре кунь­цюй.

К 18 в. кунь­цюй стал ус­ту­пать по по­пу­ляр­но­сти иян­ско­му те­ат­ру (за­ро­дил­ся в у. Иян, пров. Цзян­си), от­ли­чит. осо­бен­но­сти ко­то­ро­го – чёт­кий ритм ме­ло­дий, на­пря­жён­ный темп сце­нич. дей­ст­вия, осо­бен­но ба­таль­ных ми­зан­сцен. В нём сло­жи­лись спек­так­ли-цик­лы, в ос­но­ве ко­то­рых бы­ли сю­же­ты по­пу­ляр­ных ро­ма­нов. Рас­цвет дра­ма­тур­гии по­вли­ял на со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­ние ак­тёр­ско­го мас­тер­ст­ва и ак­ти­ви­за­цию те­ат­раль­ной жиз­ни. В тео­ре­тич. соч. «Зер­ка­ло Про­свет­лён­но­го ду­ха» Ху­ан Фань­чо («Мин синь цзянь», сер. 18 – нач. 19 вв.), обоб­щив­шем весь опыт ак­тёр­ско­го мас­тер­ст­ва, на­ко­п­лен­но­го пред­ше­ст­вую­щим раз­ви­ти­ем те­ат­ра, из­ла­га­ет­ся тео­рия сце­нич. об­раза («во­семь об­ли­ков», свя­зан­ных с со­ци­аль­но-этич. функ­ци­ей ти­па­жа и его вне­со­ци­аль­ной ес­те­ст­вен­ной при­ро­дой, «че­ты­ре эмо­цио­наль­ных со­стоя­ния», оп­ре­де­ляю­щие внутр. связь ак­тё­ра и об­раза, а так­же 8 осн. и 4 до­пол­нит. ам­плуа). В те­ат­ре пе­рио­да Мин воз­рос­ло влия­ние зри­те­лей, осо­бо це­нив­ших вир­ту­оз­ность ис­пол­не­ния. Фи­ли­гран­ное мас­тер­ст­во ак­тё­ров (осо­бен­но кунь­шань­ско­го жан­ра) при­ве­ло к дроб­ле­нию ам­п­луа на суб­ам­п­луа, тре­бую­щие тон­кой ак­тёр­ской тех­ни­ки и пла­стич. средств вы­ра­зи­тель­но­сти. Шао­син­ская муз. дра­ма (шао­син цзюй) поя­ви­лась в кон. пе­рио­да Мин (у. Шао­син, пров. Чжэц­зян) на ос­но­ве ме­ст­ных ме­ло­дий и по­лу­чи­ла рас­про­стра­не­ние в рай­онах круп­ных го­ро­дов (в т. ч. Нин­бо, Хан­чжоу и др.). Со вре­ме­нем этот жанр за­им­ст­во­вал ме­ло­дии и ре­пер­ту­ар те­ат­ров кунь­цюй и дин­си, пре­вра­тив­шись в ре­гио­наль­ный жанр тра­диц. те­ат­ра. До нач. 20 в. он был пред­став­лен 2 ви­да­ми трупп (в за­ви­си­мо­сти от ре­пер­туа­ра и сти­ля иг­ры) – труп­па­ми «гра­ж­дан­ских» (не ми­ли­та­ри­ст­ских) пьес и изящ­но­го сти­ля ис­пол­не­ния (вэнь­си) и труп­па­ми ба­таль­ных пьес (уси) в му­жеств. сти­ле, на­сыщен­ных приё­ма­ми бое­вых ис­кусств. В 1914 оба сти­ля объ­е­ди­ни­лись в об­щих труп­пах. В сер. 1910-х гг. в Шан­хае и др. куль­тур­ных цен­трах это­го ре­гио­на сфор­ми­ро­вал­ся но­вый те­ат­раль­ный жанр юэц­зюй, во­брав­ший в се­бя ме­ло­дии и ис­пол­ни­тель­ский стиль шао­син­ской дра­мы, ко­то­рый по­сле 1949 прак­ти­че­ски ут­ра­тил своё преж­нее назв. (шао­син) и стал на­зы­вать­ся име­нем по­гло­тив­ше­го его жан­ра (юэц­зюй). Од­на из по­пу­ляр­ных драм юэц­зюй – «Лян Шань­бо и Чжу Ин­тай». С 1970-х гг. жанр ус­пеш­но раз­ви­ва­ет­ся (ве­ду­щий те­атр – Шан­хай­ский те­атр юэц­зюй, име­ют­ся труп­пы в ря­де про­вин­ций К.).

Пе­кин­ская, или сто­лич­ная, муз. дра­ма (цзинц­зюй, др. назв. цзин­си) сло­жи­лась в са­мо­сто­ят. жанр в сер. 19 в. Её ро­ж­де­ние свя­за­но с при­гла­ше­ни­ем в 1790 из пров. Ань­хой в сто­ли­цу те­ат­раль­ных трупп «Три празд­не­ст­ва» («Сань цин бань») во гла­ве с ак­тё­ром Гао Лан­ти­ном, «Че­ты­ре ра­до­сти» («Сы си»), «Ве­сен­ние под­мо­ст­ки» («Чунь тай»), «Вес­на со­гла­сия» («Хэ чунь»). В Пе­ки­не они по­лу­чи­ли назв. «Че­ты­ре боль­ших труп­пы ань­хой­ской шко­лы» («Сы да Хой­бань»). «Че­ты­ре ра­до­сти» про­сла­ви­лись ис­пол­не­ни­ем кунь­цюй, чьё влия­ние на сто­лич­ную муз. дра­му бы­ло ог­ром­но. Ре­пер­ту­ар цзин­цзюй скла­ды­вал­ся из пьес, ис­пол­няе­мых ань­хой­ски­ми ак­тё­ра­ми на сю­же­ты по­пу­ляр­ных ро­ма­нов и ис­то­рич. хро­ник, а так­же про­из­ве­де­ний юань­ской и мин­ской дра­ма­тур­гии.

В сер. 19 в. муз. дра­ма впи­та­ла в се­бя все на­прав­ле­ния нар. и ари­сто­кра­тич. иск-ва, став нац. фор­мой кит. тра­диц. те­ат­ра. В ней 4 осн. ам­п­луа: шэн (ге­рой), дань (ге­рои­ня), цзин (муж­ской пер­со­наж, т. н. рас­кра­шен­ное ли­цо – хуа­лянь), чоу (ко­мик). Все ам­п­луа раз­де­ля­лись на бо­лее мел­кие суб­ам­п­луа – сяо­шэн (мо­ло­дой ге­рой), ушэн (во­ен. ге­рой), лао­шэн (по­жи­лой ге­рой); хуа­дань (де­вуш­ка в пё­ст­ром на­ря­де) – ха­рáк­тер­ная ге­рои­ня; дао­ма­дань (жен­щи­на – фех­то­валь­щи­ца и на­езд­ни­ца), удань (во­ен. ге­рои­ня). Ам­п­луа цзин – ха­рáк­тер­ных ге­ро­ев (вклю­чая по­ло­жи­тель­ных и от­ри­ца­тель­ных пер­со­на­жей) – под­раз­де­ля­ют­ся на гражд. и во­ен. суб­ам­п­луа. 19 в. явил­ся за­вер­шаю­щим эта­пом со­вер­шен­ст­во­ва­ния те­ат­раль­ных форм, что на­шло от­ра­же­ние в тео­ре­тич. со­чи­не­ни­ях это­го пе­рио­да, пре­ж­де все­го в трак­та­тах Цзяо Сю­ня (кон. 18 – нач. 19 вв.): «Раз­го­вор о те­ат­ре» («Цзюй шо»), «Бе­се­ды зем­ле­дель­ца о про­сто­на­род­ном те­ат­ре» («Хуа­бу нун тань»), «Изу­че­ние дра­мы» («Као цюй»). Кон. 19 – нач. 20 вв. – этап фор­ми­ро­ва­ния ис­пол­ни­тель­ских школ, свя­зан­ных с дея­тель­но­стью мас­те­ров стар­ше­го по­ко­ле­ния Тань Синь­пэя, Ван Яо­ци­на (их по­сле­до­ва­те­ли сер. 20 в. – Чжоу Синь­фан и Мэй Лань­фан). С нач. 20 в. но­вая ин­тел­ли­ген­ция вы­дви­ну­ла идею ре­фор­мы ста­ро­го те­ат­ра и да­же пол­но­го от­ка­за от не­го в поль­зу ев­ро­пеи­за­ции те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва. По­явил­ся ряд «но­вых пьес в со­вре­мен­ных кос­тю­мах», ко­то­рые, од­на­ко, не смог­ли со­пер­ни­чать со ста­ры­ми спек­так­ля­ми про­слав­лен­ных трупп. В пе­ри­од япон. ок­ку­па­ции соз­да­ние «Все­ки­тай­ско­го те­ат­раль­но­го об­ще­ст­ва со­про­тив­ле­ния» спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло по­яв­ле­нию и по­ста­нов­ке пат­рио­тич. про­из­ве­де­ний. Круп­ные те­ат­раль­ные дея­те­ли (Чэн Янь­цю, Мэй Лань­фан) в знак про­тес­та ото­шли от ак­тив­ной те­ат­раль­ной дея­тель­но­сти. По­сле 1949 на­чал­ся ак­тив­ный этап ре­фор­ми­ро­ва­ния тра­диц. те­ат­ра. Во 2-й пол. 1960-х гг. кит. те­атр ис­пы­тал раз­ру­шит. по­тря­се­ние в пе­ри­од «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» (в ре­пер­туа­ре тра­диц. те­ат­ра ос­та­ва­лись лишь т. н. об­раз­цо­вые спек­так­ли на ис­то­ри­ко-ре­во­люц. те­му – «Крас­ный фо­нарь», «Шац­зя­бан», «За­хват горы Вэй­ху­шань», «На­лёт на полк Бе­ло­го ти­гра»). На­чи­ная с 1970-х гг. обо­зна­чи­лись тен­ден­ции к пе­ре­смот­ру оце­нок пе­рио­да «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции», пре­одо­ле­нию её раз­ру­шит. ре­зуль­та­тов. Бы­ла реа­би­ли­ти­ро­ва­на б. ч. дея­те­лей куль­ту­ры, снят за­прет с тра­диц. ре­пер­туа­ра, во­зоб­но­ви­лась ра­бо­та по под­го­тов­ке ак­тёр­ских кад­ров, ис­сле­до­ва­тель­ская ра­бо­та по изу­че­нию те­ат­раль­но­го на­сле­дия. На ру­бе­же 20–21 вв. пол­но­стью вос­ста­нов­ле­но функ­цио­ни­ро­ва­ние тра­диц. те­ат­ра во всём мно­го­об­ра­зии его жан­ров.

Тра­ди­ции и ре­пер­ту­ар клас­сич. жан­ров тра­диц. те­ат­ра, пре­ж­де все­го пе­кин­ской муз. дра­мы, а так­же иск-во фольк­лор­ных, муз.-тан­це­валь­ных кол­лек­ти­вов або­ри­ге­нов со­хра­ня­ют­ся на Тай­ва­не, че­му спо­соб­ст­во­ва­ло соз­да­ние филь­мов (в т. ч. «Лян Шань­бо и Чжу Ин­тай», 1963, гон­конг­ский реж. Ли Хань­сян). Осн. труп­пы кит. тра­диц. те­ат­ра на Тай­ва­не – Да­пэн­ская, Лу­гу­ан­ская, а так­же Нац. Фу­син­ская ака­де­мия дра­ма­тич. иск-ва, спек­так­ли ко­то­рых по­сто­ян­но пред­став­ле­ны на сце­нах г. Тай­бэй.


Труппа кукольного театра г. Цюаньчжоу демонстрирует исполнительскую технику кукловодов в спектакле традиционного репертуара «Мулянь ищет свою мать».

Ку­коль­ный те­атр. Уча­стие в по­гре­баль­ных це­ре­мо­ни­ях и об­ря­дах и иг­ра на те­ат­раль­ных под­мо­ст­ках – тра­дици­он­но две гл. функ­ции кит. кук­лы. Са­мое ран­нее упо­ми­на­ние о дви­жу­щих­ся кук­лах встре­ча­ет­ся в «Ле-цзы» (ок. 4–3 вв. до н. э.), где го­во­рит­ся о чжоу­ском мас­те­ре Янь-ши, вы­пол­няв­шем кук­лы, ко­то­рые мог­ли дви­гать­ся как жи­вые. По­яв­ле­ние соб­ст­вен­но ку­коль­но­го те­ат­ра свя­зы­ва­ют с эпо­хой Хань, ко­гда мас­тер Чэнь­пин вы­ре­зал де­рев. фи­гу­ры лю­дей, что­бы за­щи­тить го­род во вре­мя оса­ды: их пе­ре­дви­же­ние за­ста­ви­ло по­ве­рить в на­ли­чие у оса­ж­дён­ных боль­шо­го вой­ска, что вы­ну­ди­ло про­тив­ни­ка снять оса­ду. Те­ат­раль­ные кук­лы по­лу­чи­ли назв. «куй­лэй», в ко­то­ром про­сле­жи­ва­ет­ся их род­ст­во с по­гре­баль­ной це­ре­мо­ни­ей (ле­вая часть ие­рог­ли­фа куй – че­ло­век, пра­вая – ду­ша умер­ше­го). В эпо­ху Тан по­яв­ля­ют­ся разл. ви­ды ку­кол: ма­рио­нет­ки на тро­стях и ни­тях; ма­рио­нет­ки, при­во­ди­мые в дви­же­ние по­ро­хом; кук­лы, вы­сту­паю­щие в вод­ных фее­ри­ях; ко­жа­ные кук­лы. Са­мым ран­ним ви­дом ку­кол счи­та­ют­ся кук­лы на ни­тях. Они бы­ли рас­про­стра­не­ны на юге. Цен­тром бы­ла совр. пров. Фуц­зянь, где их на­зы­ва­ли «кук­ла­ми на зо­ло­тых ни­тях», что под­чёр­ки­ва­ло осо­бую связь ме­ж­ду кук­ло­во­дом и кук­лой. Сю­же­ты для это­го ви­да ку­кол на­зы­ва­ли «те­ат­раль­ны­ми тек­ста­ми для зо­ло­тых ни­тей» («цзинь сянь си­вэнь»). Все ку­коль­ные пред­став­ле­ния ис­поль­зо­ва­ли по­пу­ляр­ные сю­же­ты, ис­пол­няв­шие­ся и в те­ат­ре жи­во­го ак­тё­ра. Пе­ри­од Сун счи­та­ет­ся зо­ло­тым ве­ком ку­коль­но­го те­ат­ра. Ре­пер­ту­ар его был об­ши­рен, со­сто­ял из пьес цзац­зюй, пьес на сю­же­ты гор. по­вес­ти хуа­бэнь, ис­то­рич. пьес и др. Рос­ло мас­тер­ст­во кук­ло­во­дов, их име­на ста­но­ви­лись из­вест­ны и во­шли в те­ат­раль­ную ис­то­рию. Осо­бой по­пу­ляр­но­стью поль­зо­ва­лись вод­ные фее­рии с уча­сти­ем ку­кол. Пред­став­ле­ния на­чи­на­лись с на­сту­п­ле­ни­ем тем­но­ты, их ос­ве­ща­ли фей­ер­вер­ки и кит. фо­на­ри­ки. Ло­доч­ные те­ат­ры бы­ли ос­на­ще­ны слож­ной ма­ши­не­ри­ей. Ак­тё­ры-кук­ло­во­ды пря­та­лись в во­де, что­бы не­за­мет­но управ­лять дви­же­ни­ем ку­кол. В по­сле­дую­щие ве­ка ку­коль­ный те­атр про­дол­жал раз­ви­вать­ся, ох­ва­ты­вая се­тью го­род­ских, сель­ских, при­хра­мо­вых трупп всю стра­ну. Ре­пер­ту­ар пред­по­ла­гал че­ты­ре осн. ам­п­луа и неск. суб­ам­п­луа, ана­ло­гич­ных те­ат­ру жи­во­го ак­тё­ра. На ре­пер­ту­ар ку­коль­но­го те­ат­ра по­сле 1949 по­влия­ла ре­фор­ма: в не­го вклю­чи­ли совр. про­из­ве­де­ния, а так­же пе­ре­ра­бо­та­ли тра­диц. спек­так­ли со­глас­но но­вым тре­бо­ва­ни­ям. В 1970–80-х гг. го­су­дар­ст­во ока­зы­ва­ло под­держ­ку раз­ви­тию ку­коль­ных кол­лек­ти­вов стра­ны. Од­ним из из­вест­ных в К. те­ат­ров ма­рио­не­ток стал ку­коль­ный те­атр г. Цю­ань­чжоу (пров. Фу­ц­зянь), соз­дан­ный в 1952. Сре­ди вы­даю­щих­ся мас­те­ров-кук­ло­во­дов – Ху­ан Цзюе. Кит. кук­ло­во­ды – при­знан­ные во всём ми­ре мас­те­ра это­го иск-ва: ка­ж­дая из ку­кол управ­ля­ет­ся бо­лее чем 30 ни­тя­ми, что яв­ля­ет­ся ред­ко­стью за пре­де­ла­ми К. В 2007 те­атр за­вер­шил в Мо­ск­ве год Ки­тая в Рос­сии спек­так­лем по пье­се «Ре­ви­зор» Н. В. Го­го­ля (ав­тор кит. ва­ри­ан­та Ван Цзин­сян, гл. ре­жис­сёр Линь Чжаохуа, ре­жис­сёр-по­ста­нов­щик Люй Чжун­вэнь, ху­дож­ник Хун Лянь­цзин).

Раз­ви­тие дра­ма­ти­че­ско­го те­ат­ра в К. на­ча­лось в 1898–1905, ко­гда по­яви­лись пер­вые опы­ты «раз­го­вор­ной дра­мы» (ху­ац­зюй). Вре­ме­нем его ро­ж­де­ния счи­та­ет­ся вес­на 1907, ко­гда кит. сту­ден­ты (обу­чаю­щие­ся в Япо­нии) ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ли в То­кио труп­пу «Ве­сен­няя ива» («Чунь лю шэ»). Сре­ди её ор­га­ни­за­торов – из­вест­ный те­ат­раль­ный дея­тель Оу­ян Юй­цянь. В том же го­ду в К. (Шан­хай) соз­дан пер­вый проф. те­атр – труп­па «Ве­сен­нее солн­це» («Чунь ян шэ»). В 1910 Ван Чжун­шэн и Жэнь Тянь­чжи от­кры­ли в Шан­хае те­ат­раль­ную шко­лу «Гунц­зян», го­то­вив­шую дра­ма­тич. ак­тё­ров. Пер­вые по­ста­нов­ки пред­став­ля­ли со­бой пе­ре­ход­ную фор­му от тра­диц. те­ат­ра к но­во­му иск-ву дра­ма­тич. ак­тё­ра: жен­ские ро­ли ис­пол­ня­ли муж­чи­ны, ме­ж­ду ак­та­ми встав­ля­лись муз. но­ме­ра, не свя­зан­ные с сю­же­том; вме­сте с тем су­ще­ст­во­ва­ли де­ко­ра­ции, спец. ос­ве­ще­ние, ма­не­ра иг­ры ста­ла бо­лее сво­бод­ной. Не­дос­та­ток проф. ак­тё­ров и ре­жис­сё­ров, от­сут­ст­вие серь­ёз­ной дра­ма­тур­гии, сла­бое зна­ком­ст­во с опы­том зару­беж­ных дра­ма­тич. те­ат­ров ос­лож­ня­ли ста­нов­ле­ние но­во­го те­ат­ра. Кол­лек­ти­вы, соз­дан­ные в Шан­хае и др. го­ро­дах в 1911–13, бы­ли не­дол­го­веч­ны­ми. В 1920-х гг. поя­ви­лись пер­вые дра­мы ав­то­ров, позд­нее став­ших из­вест­ны­ми дра­ма­тур­га­ми и те­ат­раль­ны­ми дея­те­ля­ми (Тянь Хань, Хун Шэнь). В 1920 в Шан­хае бы­ла по­ка­за­на пер­вая ев­роп. со­ци­аль­ная дра­ма «Про­фес­сия мис­сис Уор­рен» Б. Шоу. В 1921 те­ат­раль­ный дея­тель Сунь Чунь­фан пред­ло­жил соз­дать «не­ком­мер­че­ский те­атр», ос­но­вой ко­то­ро­го долж­на бы­ла стать «раз­го­вор­ная дра­ма» ев­роп. ти­па. То­гда же идею под­хва­ти­ло об-во «Нар. те­атр», в ко­то­рое во­шли Оу­ян Юй­цянь, Сунь Чунь­фан, Сюй Бань­мэй и др. В нач. 1920-х гг. на­чал из­да­вать­ся ж. «Те­атр» («Сиц­зюй»). Об-во «Нар. те­атр» про­дол­жа­ло соз­да­вать лю­бит. труп­пы, при­зы­вая от­ка­зать­ся от ме­ха­нич. ко­пи­ро­ва­ния иностр. об­раз­цов. В сер. 1920-х гг. в Пе­ки­не бы­ло соз­да­но те­ат­раль­ное уч-ще, а так­же те­ат­раль­ное об-во «Но­вый Ки­тай» («Синь Чжун­хуа»). Впер­вые поя­ви­лись сме­шан­ные муж­ские и жен­ские труп­пы. В 1925 при Проф. ху­дож. уч-ще (Пе­кин) был от­крыт те­ат­раль­ный ф-т. В 1927 в Шан­хае Тянь Ха­нем ос­но­ва­но «Юж. об-во» («Нань­го шэ»), под­дер­жи­вав­шее но­ватор­ские тен­ден­ции в иск-ве. В 1929 соз­дан­ная в Шан­хае «Ху­дож. труп­па» («Ишу­ц­зюй шэ») впер­вые вы­дви­ну­ла ло­зунг про­ле­тар­ско­го те­ат­ра, в 1930 в Шан­хае бы­ла соз­да­на Ли­га ле­вых те­ат­раль­ных кол­лек­ти­вов (с 1931 – Ли­га ле­вых те­ат­раль­ных дея­те­лей «Нань­го шэ»). На не­сколь­ких пред­при­яти­ях бы­ли соз­да­ны труп­пы «си­ней блу­зы», соз­да­ва­лись мно­го­числ. те­ат­раль­ные круж­ки в учеб­ных за­ве­де­ни­ях (сре­ди по­ста­но­вок – «Ре­ви­зор» Н. В. Го­го­ля, «Гро­за» А. Н. Ост­ров­ско­го, «На дне» М. Горь­ко­го, «Но­ра» Г. Иб­се­на). В 1930–40-х гг. соз­да­ва­лись агит­бри­га­ды в ря­дах Крас­ной ар­мии для ра­бо­ты сре­ди сель­ско­го на­се­ле­ния в «ос­во­бо­ж­дён­ных рай­онах». В эти го­ды в К. пе­ре­во­ди­ли и пуб­ли­ко­ва­ли рус. дра­ма­тур­гию, зна­ко­ми­ли со Ста­ни­слав­ско­го сис­те­мой. В нач. 1950-х гг. поя­ви­лись по­ста­нов­ки (ис­чез­нув­шие в 1960-х гг.) пьес М. Горь­ко­го, А. П. Че­хо­ва, а так­же У. Шек­спи­ра, К. Голь­дони. По­ли­тич. тен­ден­ции это­го пе­рио­да на­ло­жи­ли от­пе­ча­ток на дра­ма­тур­гию и стиль те­ат­раль­ных по­ста­но­вок, ко­то­рым бы­ли при­су­щи схе­ма­тизм, пла­кат­ность, от­каз от ин­ди­ви­дуа­ли­за­ции об­ра­зов, при­зыв к ас­ке­тиз­му. В 1970–90-х гг. бы­ли сня­ты за­пре­ты с по­ста­но­вок пьес кит. и за­ру­беж­ных ав­то­ров, по­пу­ляр­ных в преж­ние го­ды. Ожи­ви­лась творч. жизнь дра­ма­тич. те­ат­ров, гл. обр. в круп­ных цен­трах стра­ны. Зна­чи­тель­но рас­ши­рил­ся ре­пер­ту­ар Пе­кин­ско­го те­ат­ра нар. иск-ва, Шан­хай­ско­го цен­тра дра­ма­тич. иск-ва, Те­ат­ра нар. иск-ва пров. Шэнь­си, Дра­ма­тич. те­ат­ра г. Си­ань, Пе­кин­ско­го двор­ца куль­ту­ры и др. Про­дол­жа­ет раз­ви­вать­ся сис­те­ма те­ат­раль­ных трупп при по­ли­тич. управ­ле­нии те­ат­ров Нар.-ос­во­бо­дит. ар­мии К. Сре­ди из­вест­ных дея­те­лей совр. те­ат­ра К. – ре­жис­сёр и ис­кус­ст­во­вед Цзяо Цзюй­инь (по­лу­чил об­ра­зо­ва­ние в Па­ри­же), по­ста­вив­ший в Пе­кин­ском нар. ху­дож. те­ат­ре ряд спек­так­лей (в т. ч. «Чай­ная» Лао Шэ, нач. 1970-х гг.; в 1980 спек­такль с ус­пехом был по­ка­зан в ФРГ, Фран­ции, Япо­нии, Ка­на­де). На Тай­ва­не с 1970–1980-х гг. су­ще­ст­ву­ют аван­гар­ди­ст­ские труп­пы (в т. ч. «Совр. те­атр ле­ген­ды» под рук. У Син­го; спек­такль «Мак­бет» Шек­спи­ра – син­тез эле­мен­тов зап. дра­мы и кит. нац. те­ат­раль­но­го иск-ва).

Кино

Пер­вая в К. де­мон­ст­ра­ция при­воз­ных лент со­стоя­лась в 1896 в Шан­хае. Пер­вый нац. фильм снят в 1905 в Пе­ки­не («Го­ра Динц­зюнь» – сце­на из клас­сич. ба­таль­но­го спек­так­ля). С са­мо­го на­ча­ла ки­но К. ори­ен­ти­ро­ва­лось на тра­ди­ции ка­но­нич. ср.-век. те­ат­ра: ха­рак­тер­ная для не­го ма­не­ра вос­про­из­во­дить со­бы­тия в ус­лов­ной ди­дак­тич. фор­ме дол­гие де­ся­ти­ле­тия ос­та­ва­лась ве­ду­щим эс­те­тич. прин­ци­пом кит. ки­но. Пер­вы­ми кит. ре­жис­сё­ра­ми счи­та­ют­ся Чжан Ши­чу­ань и Чжэн Чжэн­цю (сня­ли в 1913 ко­рот­ко­мет­раж­ный иг­ро­вой ф. «Брач­ные ос­лож­не­ния»). Чжан Ши­чу­ань в 1931 по­ста­вил пер­вый зву­ко­вой ф. «Пе­ви­ца Крас­ный пи­он». Ли­де­ром ки­но­про­из­вод­ст­ва стал Шан­хай, где в съё­моч­ном от­де­ле при книж­ном изд-ве «Шанъу» был по­стро­ен пер­вый в стра­не па­виль­он, в 1921 снят пер­вый пол­но­мет­раж­ный иг­ро­вой фильм – со­ци­аль­ная дра­ма «Янь Жуй­шэн», в 1920-х гг. соз­да­ны 3 ве­ду­щие сту­дии стра­ны «Мин­син» (1922), «Тя­ньи» (1925), «Ляньхуа» (1929), сни­мав­шие сен­ти­мен­таль­ные и мо­ра­ли­за­тор­ские кар­ти­ны. За­мет­ные ра­бо­ты это­го пе­рио­да: «Яро­ст­ный по­ток», «Ве­сен­ние шел­ко­пря­ды» Чэн Бу­гао, «24 ча­са Шан­хая» Шэнь Си­ли­на (все 1933 – ру­беж­ный год в ис­то­рии кит. ки­но: в ле­галь­ных рам­ках бур­жу­аз­ной рес­пуб­ли­ки за­ро­ди­лась т. н. ле­вая ки­не­ма­то­гра­фия с со­ци­оп­си­хо­ло­гич. ак­цен­та­ми), «До­ро­га» (1934, реж. Сунь Юй), «Пес­ня ры­ба­ков» (1934, реж. Цай Чу­шэн, пр. Мкф в Мо­ск­ве), «Го­род­ские сце­ны» (1935) и «Улич­ные ан­ге­лы» (1937, оба – реж. Юань Муч­жи). В филь­мах нач. 1930-х гг. сни­ма­лась ак­три­са Жу­ань Линъ­юй («Иг­руш­ка», 1933; «Свя­тая», 1934, и др.), ко­то­рая уме­ла при­дать жи­вую реа­ли­стич­ность да­же по­сред­ст­вен­ной дра­ма­тур­гии. В 1930-х гг. япон. аг­рес­сия в Мань­чжу­рии и япо­но-кит. вой­на фак­ти­че­ски ос­та­но­ви­ли вы­пуск филь­мов в стра­не. Пе­рио­дом по­ис­ков в об­лас­ти пси­хо­ло­гич. вы­ра­зи­тель­но­сти стал кон. 1940-х гг. [«До­ро­га в во­семь ты­сяч ли, лу­на и об­ла­ка» Ши Дун­ша­ня, «На ре­ке Сун­га­ри» Цзинь Ша­ня, «Ве­сен­ние во­ды те­кут на вос­ток» Цай Чу­шэ­на и Чжэн Цзюнь­ли, все 1947; «Вес­на в го­род­ке» Фэй Му, 1948, – од­на из луч­ших ра­бот это­го пе­рио­да, где на­пря­жён­ная ат­мо­сфе­ра эпо­хи вос­соз­да­на в ин­тим­но-ка­мер­ном сю­же­те (пять пер­со­на­жей в замк­ну­том про­стран­ст­ве за­го­род­ной усадь­бы); «Во­ро­ны и во­ро­бьи» Чжэн Цзюнь­ли, 1949].

Ме­то­до­ло­гич. ос­но­ву ки­но КНР сфор­му­ли­ро­вал Мао Цзэ­дун, рез­ко от­де­лив «идей­ность» от «ху­до­же­ст­вен­но­сти» и от­дав пред­поч­те­ние пер­вой. Сре­ди филь­мов, в той или иной ме­ре пре­одо­ле­вав­ших идео­ло­гич. дог­мы, – кар­ти­ны реж. Шуй Хуа «Се­дая де­вуш­ка» (1950), «Лав­ка Ли­ня» (1959) с ак­тё­ром Се Тя­нем в гл. ро­ли. В пе­ри­од «куль­тур­ной ре­во­лю­ции» 1966–76 ки­но­про­из­вод­ст­во в КНР бы­ло пол­но­стью ос­та­нов­ле­но как не от­ве­чаю­щее «ре­во­люц. кри­те­ри­ям». С 1973 на­чал­ся вы­пуск «об­раз­цо­вых про­из­ве­де­ний» с тща­тель­но вы­ве­рен­ны­ми пер­со­на­жа­ми, к ко­пи­ро­ва­нию ко­то­рых дол­жен был стре­мить­ся зри­тель. Для боль­шей эф­фек­тив­но­сти воз­дей­ст­вия бы­ла вве­де­на фор­ма обя­зат. кол­лек­тив­но­го по­се­ще­ния ки­но­се­ан­сов.

На Тай­ва­не ки­но дол­гое вре­мя су­ще­ст­во­ва­ло пре­им. как фор­ма про­ка­та. Толь­ко в 1922 снят пер­вый иг­ро­вой ф. «Глаз Буд­ды» на тра­диц.-мис­тич. сю­жет о чу­дес­ном спа­се­нии влюб­лён­ных в хра­ме. По­сле 1949 ки­но на Тай­ва­не раз­ви­ва­лось в ус­ло­ви­ях по­ли­тич. дав­ле­ния ан­ти­ком­му­ни­сти­че­ски на­стро­ен­ных вла­стей. Си­туа­цию зна­чи­тель­но смяг­ча­ли раз­ви­тие ры­ноч­ных от­но­ше­ний и ста­нов­ле­ние ча­ст­но­го про­из­вод­ст­ва, что по­зво­ли­ло ки­но Тай­ва­ня со­еди­нить эле­мен­ты 3 ки­но­эс­те­тик – ки­тай­ской (ме­ло­дра­ма­тич. сю­жет), япон­ской (сен­ти­мен­таль­ная се­мей­ная дра­ма) и аме­рикан­ской (жанр «action», спо­соб­ст­во­вав­ший раз­ви­тию ди­на­мич­но­го мон­та­жа). В 1963 из Гон­кон­га на Тай­вань пе­ре­ехал реж. Ли Хань­сян, соз­дав­ший на­прав­ле­ние, чер­пав­шее ма­те­ри­ал и спо­со­бы его ор­га­низа­ции в клас­сич. кит. куль­ту­ре. Его мас­штаб­ные кос­тюм­ные филь­мы («Лян Шань­бо и Чжу Ин­тай», 1963; «Си­ши», 1966, и др.) вер­ну­ли ин­те­рес ост­ро­ви­тян к нац. те­ма­ти­ке. На вол­не «поч­вен­ни­че­ст­ва» 1970-х гг. фор­ми­ро­ва­лась ки­но­эс­те­ти­ка Ли Си­на («Осен­няя казнь», 1972). Фильм «Ры­цар­ша» Ху Цзин­чуа­ня (пред­ше­ст­вен­ни­ка совр. жан­ра «кун­фу») в 1975 при­нёс Тай­ва­ню пер­вую для кит. ки­но пр. Мкф в Кан­не.


Кадр из фильма «Ночной банкет». Режиссёр Фэн Сяоган. 2006.

В 1980-х гг. и на кон­ти­нен­те, и на Тай­ва­не поя­ви­лось «но­вое ки­но» – совр. иск-во, сме­нив­шее по­ли­ти­ко-идео­ло­гич. ак­цен­ты на эс­те­ти­че­ские, склон­ное к пси­хо­ло­гич. ана­ли­зу да­же на эпич. ма­те­риа­ле. На Тай­ва­не ли­де­ра­ми ста­ли ре­жис­сё­ры Хоу Сяо­сянь – при­вер­же­нец ло­каль­ных пси­хо­ло­гич. сю­же­тов («Боль­шая кук­ла сы­на», 1983; «Го­род скор­би», 1989, и др.) и Ли Ань (в зап. прес­се – Ang Lее, Энг Ли), вы­сту­паю­щий в жан­ре кос­тюм­но­го бое­ви­ка («Кра­ду­щий­ся тигр, за­та­ив­ший­ся дра­кон», 2000, пр. «Ос­кар»); на кон­ти­нен­те – Чэнь Кай­гэ («Жёл­тая зем­ля», 1984; «Боль­шой во­ен­ный па­рад», 1986; «Про­щай, моя на­лож­ни­ца», 1993; «Бес­пре­дель­ность», 1995) и Чжан Имоу, пер­вая ра­бо­та ко­то­ро­го – «Крас­ный гао­лян» (1987) яр­ко про­де­мон­ст­ри­ро­ва­ла сво­бо­ду и рас­ко­ван­ность но­во­го по­ко­ле­ния ки­не­ма­то­гра­фи­стов, ут­вер­ж­даю­щих свою ча­ст­ную творч. ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­ность. Этот фильм – вто­рая (по­сле ф. «Вес­на в го­род­ке» Фэй Му, 1948) ве­ха раз­ви­тия кит. ки­но на пу­ти к гу­ма­ни­за­ции иск-ва. В по­след­них ра­бо­тах («Ге­рой», 2002; «Дом ле­таю­щих кин­жа­лов», 2004; «Про­кля­тие зо­ло­то­го цве­тка», 2006) Чжан Имоу об­ра­тил­ся к сти­ли­сти­ке кос­тюм­но­го вост. бое­ви­ка, раз­во­ра­чи­вая сю­жет не че­рез ба­таль­ные по­един­ки, а в кон­флик­тах ха­рак­те­ров. Вы­де­ля­ют­ся ра­бо­ты Цзян Вэ­ня – сна­ча­ла как ха­риз­ма­тич. ак­тё­ра (в филь­мах «По­сё­лок Ло­то­сов», «Крас­ный гао­лян» и др.), а за­тем – как ре­жис­сё­ра яр­ко ин­ди­ви­ду­аль­но­го по­чер­ка («Дни яр­ко­го солн­ца», 1994; «Дья­во­лы на по­ро­ге», 2000, пр. Мкф в Кан­не; «И всё-та­ки солн­це взой­дёт», 2007, – сти­ли­сти­че­ски слож­ная ком­пи­ля­ция раз­но­вре­мен­ных но­велл, ре­шён­ная в сим­во­лич. ма­не­ре, близ­кой сюр­реа­лиз­му). Са­мое мо­ло­дое, т. н. шес­тое, по­ко­ле­ние ки­не­ма­то­гра­фи­стов сни­ма­ет филь­мы в са­мых раз­ных творч. ма­не­рах – от доб­ро­по­ря­доч­но­го реа­лиз­ма, близ­ко­го сов. шко­ле, до жиз­не­по­доб­но­го на­ту­ра­лиз­ма или сим­во­лич. аб­ст­рак­ций. Их ра­бо­там чу­ж­ды как плав­ная по­ве­ст­во­ва­тель­ность, ти­пич­ная для клас­сич. кит. ки­но, так и мно­го­мер­ная прит­че­вость, ко­то­рой от­ме­че­но ки­но т. н. пя­то­го по­ко­ле­ния (Чжан Имоу). Ре­жис­сё­ры ру­бе­жа 20–21 вв. тя­го­те­ют к под­чёрк­ну­то до­ку­мен­таль­но­му сти­лю и не­ред­ко де­мон­ст­ра­тив­но сни­ма­ют филь­мы в чёр­но-бе­лом ва­ри­ан­те. Их ра­бо­ты от­ли­ча­ют пси­хо­ана­ли­тич. вни­ма­ние к че­ло­ве­ку, его внутр. ми­ру, под­соз­на­нию, от­кры­тые или мно­го­ва­ри­ант­ные фи­на­лы. Ху­дож. язык этих ки­не­ма­то­гра­фи­стов бли­зок про­фес­сио­на­лам и ши­ро­ко­му зри­те­лю за пре­де­ла­ми К.; об­ще­ми­ро­вое при­зна­ние по­лу­чи­ли филь­мы: «За­тме­ние лу­ны» (1999, пр. Мкф в Мо­ск­ве) и «Туя вы­хо­дит за­муж» (2007, гл. пр. Мкф в Бер­ли­не) Ван Цю­ань­а­ня, «Ре­ка Суч­жоу» Лоу Е (2000), «Та го­ра. Тот че­ло­век. Тот пёс» Хо Цзянь­ци (2000), «Ноч­ной бан­кет» Фэн Сяо­га­на (2006), «До­б­рый че­ло­век из Сань­ся» Цзя Чжан­кэ (в отеч. про­ка­те «На­тюр­морт», 2006, гл. пр. Мкф в Ве­не­ции). Ме­ж­ду­нар. ки­но­фес­ти­ва­ли: Сян­га­н­ский (с 1978), Шан­хай­ский (с 1993), Чан­чунь­ский (с 1995).

Цирк

Ро­ди­ной кит. цир­ка обыч­но счи­та­ют пров. Хэ­бэй. Цир­ко­вое иск-во (цзац­зы) из­вест­но в К. с 8–5 вв. до н. э., ко­гда ак­ро­ба­ти­ка ста­ла са­мо­сто­ят. ви­дом зре­лищ­но­го иск-ва. По­лу­чив­шие ши­ро­кое рас­про­стра­не­ние пред­став­ле­ния бай си («сто игр», «сто пред­став­ле­ний») вклю­ча­ли си­ло­вое жонг­ли­ро­ва­ние (тя­же­ло­ат­ле­ты па­ра­ми или по от­дель­но­сти жонг­ли­ро­ва­ли ко­лё­са­ми, ка­мен­ны­ми глы­бами), фех­то­ва­ние на ме­чах и копь­ях, ак­ро­бати­ку с шес­том, гло­та­ние ме­ча, борь­бу и др. под ак­ком­па­не­мент ор­ке­ст­ра, обыч­но со­сто­яв­ше­го из удар­ных, ду­хо­вых и струн­ных ин­ст­ру­мен­тов. Цир­ко­вое иск-во К. тес­но свя­за­но с во­ен., ре­лиг. и тру­до­вой дея­тель­но­стью. Жонг­лё­ры и ак­ро­ба­ты час­то при­ме­ня­ют в ка­че­ст­ве ак­сес­суа­ров ору­дия тру­да и ору­жие (об­ру­чи, ме­чи, но­жи, тре­зуб­цы и т. п.), пред­ме­ты до­маш­не­го оби­хо­да (сту­лья, сто­лы, та­рел­ки, кру­тя­щие­ся ча­ши с во­дой, кув­ши­ны и т. п.). Об­ра­зы ак­ро­ба­тов за­пе­чат­ле­ны в древ­них кни­гах, в резь­бе по кам­ню, в ви­де гли­ня­ных ста­ту­эток, на на­стен­ных ри­сун­ках древ­них гроб­ниц и т. п. При ар­хео­ло­гич. рас­коп­ках в про­вин­ци­ях Шань­дун, Хэ­нань, Ань­хой, Цзян­си, Сы­чу­ань най­де­ны рель­е­фы с сю­же­та­ми цир­ко­вых пред­став­ле­ний пе­рио­да Зап. Хань и Вост. Хань, в ча­ст­но­сти «тан­ца с та­рел­ка­ми» («тан­ца на та­рел­ках»). Фре­ски эпо­хи ди­на­стии Тан, най­ден­ные в пе­ще­рах Дуньху­ан, изо­бра­жа­ют ак­ро­ба­тов, пев­цов, тан­цо­ров и на­езд­ни­ков. В пе­ри­од ди­на­стии Сун бы­ла по­пу­ляр­на жен­ская и муж­ская спор­тив­ная борь­ба. При ди­на­сти­ях Мин и Цин ак­ро­ба­тич. иск-во ста­ло ча­стью тра­диц. муз. те­ат­ра.

Сцена из спектакля «Лебединое озеро» в постановке Цирковой труппы бойцов Гуандунского военного округа Народно-освободительной армии Китая совместно с Шанхайской компанией по организации представлений …

Пер­вым гос. кол­лек­ти­вом, вы­сту­пав­шим в ста­цио­нар­ном цир­ке, ста­ла об­ра­зо­ван­ная в 1950 в Пе­ки­не Кит. ак­ро­ба­тич. труп­па. Впо­след­ст­вии ста­цио­нар­ные труп­пы бы­ли ор­га­ни­зо­ва­ны в др. го­родах – Шан­хае, Чун­ци­не, Гу­ан­чжоу, Шэнь­я­не, Уха­не. Су­ще­ст­ву­ет так­же ряд пе­ре­движ­ных цир­ко­вых кол­лек­ти­вов. В 1981 ос­но­ва­на Ак­ро­ба­тич. ас­со­циа­ция К. В кит. цир­ке нет кло­уна­ды, дрес­сиро­ван­ных жи­вот­ных, круг­ло­го ма­не­жа (пред­став­ле­ния про­хо­дят на сце­не), по­это­му пре­об­ла­да­ют пар­тер­ные жан­ры (ак­ро­ба­ти­ка, гим­на­сти­ка, эк­ви­либ­ри­сти­ка, жонг­ли­ро­ва­ние, ил­лю­зи­он­ное иск-во). Осо­бый ин­те­рес пред­став­ля­ют спе­ци­фич. трю­ко­вые ком­би­на­ции и но­ме­ра: подъ­ём на рем­нях, эк­ви­либр на мач­те, на ка­на­те и про­во­ло­ке, прыж­ки че­рез об­ру­чи с ост­ры­ми но­жа­ми, че­рез огонь и но­жи, жонг­ли­ро­ва­ние но­га­ми, кру­тя­щие­ся та­рел­ки, иг­ра с чаш­ка­ми на го­ло­ве, «та­нец львов», иг­ры со ста­рин­ны­ми кит. зна­мё­на­ми, с лен­та­ми, зон­тами, уп­раж­не­ния на тур­ни­ке. В 21 в. про­дол­жа­ет су­ще­ст­во­вать древ­нее иск-во зву­ко­под­ра­жа­ния (впер­вые упо­ми­на­ет­ся в «Ис­то­ри­че­ских за­пис­ках» Сы­ма Ця­ня) го­ло­сам птиц, все­воз­мож­ным при­род­ным шу­мам, зву­ча­нию муз. ин­ст­ру­мен­тов и т. д. Для кит. цир­ка тра­ди­ци­он­но ха­рак­тер­на связь с нац. те­ат­ром, ак­тё­ры ко­то­ро­го вла­де­ют разл. ви­да­ми ис­кусств, вклю­чая и цир­ко­вое: ар­ти­сты У Чжэн­дан и Вэй Баохуа из Гу­ан­ду­на, со­еди­нив пар­ную ак­ро­ба­ти­ку с клас­сич. хо­рео­гра­фи­ей, соз­да­ли но­вый жанр ак­ро­ба­тич. ба­ле­та. В этом жан­ре был по­став­лен по­лу­чив­ший ме­ж­ду­нар. при­зна­ние спек­такль «Ле­бе­ди­ное озе­ро» (хо­рео­граф Чжао Мин, 2005, Шан­хай), соз­дан­ный Цир­ко­вой труп­пой бой­цов Гу­ан­дун­ско­го во­ен. ок­ру­га Нар.-ос­во­бо­дит. ар­мии К. и Шан­хай­ской ком­па­ни­ей по ор­га­ни­за­ции пред­став­ле­ний совр. тан­ца. С 1987 раз в два го­да про­во­дит­ся Кит. ме­ж­ду­нар. фес­ти­валь цир­ко­во­го иск-ва в г. Ши­цзяч­жу­ан.

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